History log of /openbsd/usr.bin/ssh/monitor.c (Results 126 – 150 of 240)
Revision Date Author Comments
# 46a56068 23-Jun-2011 djm <djm@openbsd.org>

ignore EINTR errors from poll()


# f5d037f6 17-Jun-2011 djm <djm@openbsd.org>

make the pre-auth privsep slave log via a socketpair shared with the
monitor rather than /var/empty/dev/log; ok dtucker@ deraadt@ markus@


# 3d892b28 23-May-2011 djm <djm@openbsd.org>

allow AuthorizedKeysFile to specify multiple files, separated by spaces.
Bring back authorized_keys2 as a default search path (to avoid breaking
existing users of this file), but override this in ssh

allow AuthorizedKeysFile to specify multiple files, separated by spaces.
Bring back authorized_keys2 as a default search path (to avoid breaking
existing users of this file), but override this in sshd_config so it will
be no longer used on fresh installs. Maybe in 2015 we can remove it
entierly :)

feedback and ok markus@ dtucker@

show more ...


# ff3b17dc 20-May-2011 djm <djm@openbsd.org>

use a macro to define which string options to copy between configs
for Match. This avoids problems caused by forgetting to keep three
code locations in perfect sync and ordering

"this is at once bea

use a macro to define which string options to copy between configs
for Match. This avoids problems caused by forgetting to keep three
code locations in perfect sync and ordering

"this is at once beautiful and horrible" + ok dtucker@

show more ...


# 5d60427e 15-May-2011 djm <djm@openbsd.org>

use FD_CLOEXEC consistently; patch from zion AT x96.org


# 2c7d4950 09-Sep-2010 djm <djm@openbsd.org>

ECDH/ECDSA compliance fix: these methods vary the hash function they use
(SHA256/384/512) depending on the length of the curve in use. The previous
code incorrectly used SHA256 in all cases.

This fi

ECDH/ECDSA compliance fix: these methods vary the hash function they use
(SHA256/384/512) depending on the length of the curve in use. The previous
code incorrectly used SHA256 in all cases.

This fix will cause authentication failure when using 384 or 521-bit curve
keys if one peer hasn't been upgraded and the other has. (256-bit curve
keys work ok). In particular you may need to specify HostkeyAlgorithms
when connecting to a server that has not been upgraded from an upgraded
client.

ok naddy@

show more ...


# f6c05033 31-Aug-2010 djm <djm@openbsd.org>

Implement Elliptic Curve Cryptography modes for key exchange (ECDH) and
host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656. ECDH and ECDSA offer
better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equiv

Implement Elliptic Curve Cryptography modes for key exchange (ECDH) and
host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656. ECDH and ECDSA offer
better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equivalent symmetric
key length, as well as much shorter keys.

Only the mandatory sections of RFC5656 are implemented, specifically the
three REQUIRED curves nistp256, nistp384 and nistp521 and only ECDH and
ECDSA. Point compression (optional in RFC5656 is NOT implemented).

Certificate host and user keys using the new ECDSA key types are supported.

Note that this code has not been tested for interoperability and may be
subject to change.

feedback and ok markus@

show more ...


# 5bde9fcc 13-Jul-2010 djm <djm@openbsd.org>

s/timing_safe_cmp/timingsafe_bcmp/g


# 8488487f 13-Jul-2010 djm <djm@openbsd.org>

implement a timing_safe_cmp() function to compare memory without leaking
timing information by short-circuiting like memcmp() and use it for
some of the more sensitive comparisons (though nothing hig

implement a timing_safe_cmp() function to compare memory without leaking
timing information by short-circuiting like memcmp() and use it for
some of the more sensitive comparisons (though nothing high-value was
readily attackable anyway); "looks ok" markus@

show more ...


# ed29c4c0 07-Mar-2010 dtucker <dtucker@openbsd.org>

Hold authentication debug messages until after successful authentication.
Fixes an info leak of environment variables specified in authorized_keys,
reported by Jacob Appelbaum. ok djm@


# b94e498e 26-Feb-2010 djm <djm@openbsd.org>

Add support for certificate key types for users and hosts.

OpenSSH certificate key types are not X.509 certificates, but a much
simpler format that encodes a public key, identity information and
som

Add support for certificate key types for users and hosts.

OpenSSH certificate key types are not X.509 certificates, but a much
simpler format that encodes a public key, identity information and
some validity constraints and signs it with a CA key. CA keys are
regular SSH keys. This certificate style avoids the attack surface
of X.509 certificates and is very easy to deploy.

Certified host keys allow automatic acceptance of new host keys
when a CA certificate is marked as trusted in ~/.ssh/known_hosts.
see VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1) for details.

Certified user keys allow authentication of users when the signing
CA key is marked as trusted in authorized_keys. See "AUTHORIZED_KEYS
FILE FORMAT" in sshd(8) for details.

Certificates are minted using ssh-keygen(1), documentation is in
the "CERTIFICATES" section of that manpage.

Documentation on the format of certificates is in the file
PROTOCOL.certkeys

feedback and ok markus@

show more ...


# d07c367c 12-Jun-2009 andreas <andreas@openbsd.org>

Fix warnings found by chl@ and djm@ and change roaming_atomicio's
return type to match atomicio's
Diff from djm@, ok markus@


# 46b8043e 28-May-2009 andreas <andreas@openbsd.org>

Keep track of number of bytes read and written. Needed for upcoming
changes. Most code from Martin Forssen, maf at appgate dot com.
ok markus@


# bd3c5045 25-May-2009 andreas <andreas@openbsd.org>

Put the globals in packet.c into a struct and don't access it directly
from other files. No functional changes.
ok markus@ djm@


# b404b02a 12-Feb-2009 djm <djm@openbsd.org>

some paranoia: check that the serialised key is really KEY_RSA before
diddling its internals


# 5e1e7a52 04-Nov-2008 djm <djm@openbsd.org>

Add support for an experimental zero-knowledge password authentication
method using the J-PAKE protocol described in F. Hao, P. Ryan,
"Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling", 16th Workshop

Add support for an experimental zero-knowledge password authentication
method using the J-PAKE protocol described in F. Hao, P. Ryan,
"Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling", 16th Workshop on
Security Protocols, Cambridge, April 2008.

This method allows password-based authentication without exposing
the password to the server. Instead, the client and server exchange
cryptographic proofs to demonstrate of knowledge of the password while
revealing nothing useful to an attacker or compromised endpoint.

This is experimental, work-in-progress code and is presently
compiled-time disabled (turn on -DJPAKE in Makefile.inc).

"just commit it. It isn't too intrusive." deraadt@

show more ...


# c51fe1e9 10-Jul-2008 markus <markus@openbsd.org>

sync v1 and v2 traffic accounting; add it to sshd, too; ok djm@, dtucker@


# fd3b13c5 04-Jul-2008 dtucker <dtucker@openbsd.org>

Make debug a little clearer. ok djm@


# 296c1c50 13-Jun-2008 dtucker <dtucker@openbsd.org>

Clear key options in the monitor on failed authentication, prevents
applying additional restrictions to non-pubkey authentications in
the case where pubkey fails but another method subsequently succe

Clear key options in the monitor on failed authentication, prevents
applying additional restrictions to non-pubkey authentications in
the case where pubkey fails but another method subsequently succeeds.
bz #1472, found by Colin Watson, ok markus@ djm@

show more ...


# 6d13e39a 08-May-2008 djm <djm@openbsd.org>

Make the maximum number of sessions run-time controllable via
a sshd_config MaxSessions knob. This is useful for disabling
login/shell/subsystem access while leaving port-forwarding working
(MaxSessi

Make the maximum number of sessions run-time controllable via
a sshd_config MaxSessions knob. This is useful for disabling
login/shell/subsystem access while leaving port-forwarding working
(MaxSessions 0), disabling connection multiplexing (MaxSessions 1) or
simply increasing the number of allows multiplexed sessions.

Because some bozos are sure to configure MaxSessions in excess of the
number of available file descriptors in sshd (which, at peak, might be
as many as 9*MaxSessions), audit sshd to ensure that it doesn't leak fds
on error paths, and make it fail gracefully on out-of-fd conditions -
sending channel errors instead of than exiting with fatal().

bz#1090; MaxSessions config bits and manpage from junyer AT gmail.com

ok markus@

show more ...


# 2a54096d 08-May-2008 djm <djm@openbsd.org>

Implement a channel success/failure status confirmation callback
mechanism. Each channel maintains a queue of callbacks, which will
be drained in order (RFC4253 guarantees confirm messages are not
re

Implement a channel success/failure status confirmation callback
mechanism. Each channel maintains a queue of callbacks, which will
be drained in order (RFC4253 guarantees confirm messages are not
reordered within an channel).

Also includes a abandonment callback to clean up if a channel is
closed without sending confirmation messages. This probably
shouldn't happen in compliant implementations, but it could be
abused to leak memory.

ok markus@ (as part of a larger diff)

show more ...


# 59c448d9 29-Oct-2007 dtucker <dtucker@openbsd.org>

Send config block back to slave for invalid users too so options
set by a Match block (eg Banner) behave the same for non-existent
users. Found by and ok djm@


# 6841e186 21-Sep-2007 djm <djm@openbsd.org>

unifdef -DBSD_AUTH
unifdef -USKEY

These options have been in use for some years;
ok markus@ "no objection" millert@


# b8533c9b 04-Sep-2007 djm <djm@openbsd.org>

make file descriptor passing code return an error rather than call fatal()
when it encounters problems, and use this to make session multiplexing
masters survive slaves failing to pass all stdio FDs;

make file descriptor passing code return an error rather than call fatal()
when it encounters problems, and use this to make session multiplexing
masters survive slaves failing to pass all stdio FDs; ok markus@

show more ...


# 1aaa3514 17-May-2007 djm <djm@openbsd.org>

pass received SIGINT from monitor to postauth child so it can clean
up properly. bz#1196, patch from senthilkumar_sen AT hotpop.com;
ok markus@


12345678910