1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10 #include <stdio.h>
11 #include <limits.h>
12 #include <errno.h>
13 #include "../ssl_local.h"
14 #include <openssl/evp.h>
15 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
16 #include <openssl/rand.h>
17 #include "record_local.h"
18 #include "internal/packet.h"
19 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
20
21 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
22 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
23 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
24 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
25 )
26 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
27 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
28 #endif
29
RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER * rl,SSL * s)30 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
31 {
32 rl->s = s;
33 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer);
34 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
35 }
36
RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER * rl)37 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
38 {
39 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
40
41 /*
42 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
43 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
44 * that right?
45 */
46
47 rl->packet = NULL;
48 rl->packet_length = 0;
49 rl->wnum = 0;
50 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
51 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
52 rl->wpend_tot = 0;
53 rl->wpend_type = 0;
54 rl->wpend_ret = 0;
55 rl->wpend_buf = NULL;
56
57 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
58 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
59 rl->numrpipes = 0;
60 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
61
62 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
63 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
64
65 if (rl->d)
66 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
67 }
68
RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER * rl)69 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
70 {
71 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
72 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
73 if (rl->numwpipes > 0)
74 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
75 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
76 }
77
78 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER * rl)79 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
80 {
81 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
82 }
83
RECORD_LAYER_data_present(const RECORD_LAYER * rl)84 int RECORD_LAYER_data_present(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
85 {
86 if (rl->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
87 return 1;
88 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(rl))
89 return 1;
90 return 0;
91 }
92
93 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER * rl)94 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
95 {
96 size_t curr_rec = 0, num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl);
97 const SSL3_RECORD *rr = rl->rrec;
98
99 while (curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]))
100 curr_rec++;
101
102 return curr_rec < num_recs;
103 }
104
RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER * rl)105 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
106 {
107 return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
108 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0;
109 }
110
RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER * rl)111 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
112 {
113 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
114 }
115
RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER * rl)116 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
117 {
118 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
119 }
120
ssl3_pending(const SSL * s)121 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
122 {
123 size_t i, num = 0;
124
125 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
126 return 0;
127
128 /* Take into account DTLS buffered app data */
129 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
130 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
131 pitem *item, *iter;
132
133 iter = pqueue_iterator(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data.q);
134 while ((item = pqueue_next(&iter)) != NULL) {
135 rdata = item->data;
136 num += rdata->rrec.length;
137 }
138 }
139
140 for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) {
141 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i])
142 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
143 return num;
144 num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]);
145 }
146
147 return num;
148 }
149
SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX * ctx,size_t len)150 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len)
151 {
152 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len;
153 }
154
SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL * s,size_t len)155 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
156 {
157 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len);
158 }
159
SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL * s)160 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
161 {
162 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
163 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
164 return "read header";
165 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
166 return "read body";
167 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
168 return "read done";
169 default:
170 return "unknown";
171 }
172 }
173
SSL_rstate_string(const SSL * s)174 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
175 {
176 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
177 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
178 return "RH";
179 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
180 return "RB";
181 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
182 return "RD";
183 default:
184 return "unknown";
185 }
186 }
187
188 /*
189 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
190 */
ssl3_read_n(SSL * s,size_t n,size_t max,int extend,int clearold,size_t * readbytes)191 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold,
192 size_t *readbytes)
193 {
194 /*
195 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
196 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
197 * s->rlayer.rbuf.buf specified by s->rlayer.packet and
198 * s->rlayer.packet_length. (If s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may
199 * be stored in rbuf [plus s->rlayer.packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
200 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
201 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
202 */
203 size_t len, left, align = 0;
204 unsigned char *pkt;
205 SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
206
207 if (n == 0)
208 return 0;
209
210 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
211 if (rb->buf == NULL)
212 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) {
213 /* SSLfatal() already called */
214 return -1;
215 }
216
217 left = rb->left;
218 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
219 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
220 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
221 #endif
222
223 if (!extend) {
224 /* start with empty packet ... */
225 if (left == 0)
226 rb->offset = align;
227
228 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
229 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
230 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
231 }
232
233 if (!ossl_assert(s->rlayer.packet != NULL)) {
234 /* does not happen */
235 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
236 return -1;
237 }
238
239 len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
240 pkt = rb->buf + align;
241 /*
242 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
243 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
244 */
245 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) {
246 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
247 s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
248 rb->offset = len + align;
249 }
250
251 /*
252 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
253 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
254 * the buffer).
255 */
256 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
257 if (left == 0 && extend)
258 return 0;
259 if (left > 0 && n > left)
260 n = left;
261 }
262
263 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
264 if (left >= n) {
265 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
266 rb->left = left - n;
267 rb->offset += n;
268 *readbytes = n;
269 return 1;
270 }
271
272 /* else we need to read more data */
273
274 if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) {
275 /* does not happen */
276 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
277 return -1;
278 }
279
280 /*
281 * Ktls always reads full records.
282 * Also, we always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS.
283 */
284 if (!BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) && !s->rlayer.read_ahead
285 && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
286 /* ignore max parameter */
287 max = n;
288 } else {
289 if (max < n)
290 max = n;
291 if (max > rb->len - rb->offset)
292 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
293 }
294
295 while (left < n) {
296 size_t bioread = 0;
297 int ret;
298
299 /*
300 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3.rbuf.buf and
301 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
302 * possible)
303 */
304
305 clear_sys_error();
306 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
307 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
308 ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
309 if (ret >= 0)
310 bioread = ret;
311 if (ret <= 0
312 && !BIO_should_retry(s->rbio)
313 && BIO_eof(s->rbio)) {
314 if (s->options & SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF) {
315 SSL_set_shutdown(s, SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
316 s->s3.warn_alert = SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY;
317 } else {
318 /*
319 * This reason code is part of the API and may be used by
320 * applications for control flow decisions.
321 */
322 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
323 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EOF_WHILE_READING);
324 }
325 }
326 } else {
327 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
328 ret = -1;
329 }
330
331 if (ret <= 0) {
332 rb->left = left;
333 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
334 if (len + left == 0)
335 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
336 return ret;
337 }
338 left += bioread;
339 /*
340 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
341 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
342 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
343 */
344 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
345 if (n > left)
346 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
347 }
348 }
349
350 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
351 rb->offset += n;
352 rb->left = left - n;
353 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
354 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
355 *readbytes = n;
356 return 1;
357 }
358
359 /*
360 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
361 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
362 */
ssl3_write_bytes(SSL * s,int type,const void * buf_,size_t len,size_t * written)363 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len,
364 size_t *written)
365 {
366 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
367 size_t tot;
368 size_t n, max_send_fragment, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
369 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
370 size_t nw;
371 #endif
372 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
373 int i;
374 size_t tmpwrit;
375
376 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
377 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
378 /*
379 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
380 * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for
381 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
382 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
383 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
384 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
385 * report the error in a way the user will notice
386 */
387 if ((len < s->rlayer.wnum)
388 || ((wb->left != 0) && (len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) {
389 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
390 return -1;
391 }
392
393 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
394 && !early_data_count_ok(s, len, 0, 1)) {
395 /* SSLfatal() already called */
396 return -1;
397 }
398
399 s->rlayer.wnum = 0;
400
401 /*
402 * If we are supposed to be sending a KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket then go
403 * into init unless we have writes pending - in which case we should finish
404 * doing that first.
405 */
406 if (wb->left == 0 && (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
407 || s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0))
408 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
409
410 /*
411 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in
412 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
413 * messages yet.
414 */
415 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)
416 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING) {
417 i = s->handshake_func(s);
418 /* SSLfatal() already called */
419 if (i < 0)
420 return i;
421 if (i == 0) {
422 return -1;
423 }
424 }
425
426 /*
427 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
428 * will happen with non blocking IO
429 */
430 if (wb->left != 0) {
431 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
432 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot,
433 &tmpwrit);
434 if (i <= 0) {
435 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
436 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
437 return i;
438 }
439 tot += tmpwrit; /* this might be last fragment */
440 }
441 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
442 /*
443 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
444 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
445 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
446 * compromise is considered worthy.
447 */
448 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
449 && len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s))
450 && s->compress == NULL
451 && s->msg_callback == NULL
452 && !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s)
453 && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)
454 && BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) == 0
455 && (EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
456 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) != 0) {
457 unsigned char aad[13];
458 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
459 size_t packlen;
460 int packleni;
461
462 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
463 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
464 max_send_fragment -= 512;
465
466 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
467 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
468
469 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
470 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
471 (int)max_send_fragment, NULL);
472
473 if (len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
474 packlen *= 8;
475 else
476 packlen *= 4;
477
478 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) {
479 /* SSLfatal() already called */
480 return -1;
481 }
482 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
483 /* free jumbo buffer */
484 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
485 *written = tot;
486 return 1;
487 }
488
489 n = (len - tot);
490 for (;;) {
491 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
492 /* free jumbo buffer */
493 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
494 break;
495 }
496
497 if (s->s3.alert_dispatch) {
498 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
499 if (i <= 0) {
500 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
501 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
502 return i;
503 }
504 }
505
506 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
507 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
508 else
509 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
510
511 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
512 aad[8] = type;
513 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
514 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
515 aad[11] = 0;
516 aad[12] = 0;
517 mb_param.out = NULL;
518 mb_param.inp = aad;
519 mb_param.len = nw;
520
521 packleni = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
522 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
523 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
524 packlen = (size_t)packleni;
525 if (packleni <= 0 || packlen > wb->len) { /* never happens */
526 /* free jumbo buffer */
527 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
528 break;
529 }
530
531 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
532 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
533 mb_param.len = nw;
534
535 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
536 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
537 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
538 return -1;
539
540 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
541 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
542 int j = 6;
543 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
544 }
545
546 wb->offset = 0;
547 wb->left = packlen;
548
549 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
550 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
551 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
552 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
553
554 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, &tmpwrit);
555 if (i <= 0) {
556 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
557 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
558 /* free jumbo buffer */
559 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
560 }
561 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
562 return i;
563 }
564 if (tmpwrit == n) {
565 /* free jumbo buffer */
566 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
567 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
568 return 1;
569 }
570 n -= tmpwrit;
571 tot += tmpwrit;
572 }
573 } else
574 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK */
575 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
576 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
577 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
578
579 *written = tot;
580 return 1;
581 }
582
583 n = (len - tot);
584
585 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s);
586 split_send_fragment = ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s);
587 /*
588 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
589 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
590 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
591 * explicit IVs
592 */
593 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
594 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
595 /*
596 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
597 * shouldn't get here
598 */
599 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
600 return -1;
601 }
602 if (maxpipes == 0
603 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL
604 || (EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
605 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) == 0
606 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
607 maxpipes = 1;
608 if (max_send_fragment == 0
609 || split_send_fragment == 0
610 || split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) {
611 /*
612 * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send
613 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
614 */
615 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
616 return -1;
617 }
618
619 for (;;) {
620 size_t pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain;
621 size_t numpipes, j;
622
623 if (n == 0)
624 numpipes = 1;
625 else
626 numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1;
627 if (numpipes > maxpipes)
628 numpipes = maxpipes;
629
630 if (n / numpipes >= split_send_fragment) {
631 /*
632 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
633 * pipelines
634 */
635 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
636 pipelens[j] = split_send_fragment;
637 } else {
638 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
639 tmppipelen = n / numpipes;
640 remain = n % numpipes;
641 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
642 pipelens[j] = tmppipelen;
643 if (j < remain)
644 pipelens[j]++;
645 }
646 }
647
648 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0,
649 &tmpwrit);
650 if (i <= 0) {
651 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
652 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
653 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
654 return i;
655 }
656
657 if (tmpwrit == n ||
658 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
659 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
660 /*
661 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
662 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
663 */
664 s->s3.empty_fragment_done = 0;
665
666 if (tmpwrit == n
667 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) != 0
668 && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
669 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
670
671 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
672 return 1;
673 }
674
675 n -= tmpwrit;
676 tot += tmpwrit;
677 }
678 }
679
do_ssl3_write(SSL * s,int type,const unsigned char * buf,size_t * pipelens,size_t numpipes,int create_empty_fragment,size_t * written)680 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
681 size_t *pipelens, size_t numpipes,
682 int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written)
683 {
684 WPACKET pkt[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
685 SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
686 WPACKET *thispkt;
687 SSL3_RECORD *thiswr;
688 unsigned char *recordstart;
689 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
690 size_t prefix_len = 0;
691 int eivlen = 0;
692 size_t align = 0;
693 SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
694 SSL_SESSION *sess;
695 size_t totlen = 0, len, wpinited = 0;
696 size_t j;
697
698 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
699 totlen += pipelens[j];
700 /*
701 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
702 * will happen with non blocking IO
703 */
704 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
705 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
706 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
707 }
708
709 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
710 if (s->s3.alert_dispatch) {
711 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
712 if (i <= 0) {
713 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
714 return i;
715 }
716 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
717 }
718
719 if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes) {
720 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0)) {
721 /* SSLfatal() already called */
722 return -1;
723 }
724 }
725
726 if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
727 return 0;
728
729 sess = s->session;
730
731 if ((sess == NULL)
732 || (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
733 || (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
734 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
735 mac_size = 0;
736 } else {
737 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(s->write_hash);
738 if (mac_size < 0) {
739 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
740 goto err;
741 }
742 }
743
744 /*
745 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
746 */
747 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3.empty_fragment_done) {
748 /*
749 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
750 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
751 */
752
753 if (s->s3.need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
754 /*
755 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
756 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
757 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
758 * payload)
759 */
760 size_t tmppipelen = 0;
761 int ret;
762
763 ret = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1, &prefix_len);
764 if (ret <= 0) {
765 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
766 goto err;
767 }
768
769 if (prefix_len >
770 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
771 /* insufficient space */
772 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
773 goto err;
774 }
775 }
776
777 s->s3.empty_fragment_done = 1;
778 }
779
780 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) {
781 /*
782 * ktls doesn't modify the buffer, but to avoid a warning we need to
783 * discard the const qualifier.
784 * This doesn't leak memory because the buffers have been released when
785 * switching to ktls.
786 */
787 SSL3_BUFFER_set_buf(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], (unsigned char *)buf);
788 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], 0);
789 SSL3_BUFFER_set_app_buffer(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], 1);
790 goto wpacket_init_complete;
791 }
792
793 if (create_empty_fragment) {
794 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
795 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
796 /*
797 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
798 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
799 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
800 */
801 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
802 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
803 #endif
804 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
805 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
806 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
807 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) {
808 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
809 goto err;
810 }
811 wpinited = 1;
812 } else if (prefix_len) {
813 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
814 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0],
815 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
816 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
817 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
818 + prefix_len, NULL)) {
819 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
820 goto err;
821 }
822 wpinited = 1;
823 } else {
824 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
825 thispkt = &pkt[j];
826
827 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
828 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
829 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
830 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
831 #endif
832 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
833 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
834 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
835 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, align, NULL)) {
836 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
837 goto err;
838 }
839 wpinited++;
840 }
841 }
842
843 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
844 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && !SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)) {
845 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
846 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
847 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
848 if (eivlen < 0) {
849 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
850 goto err;
851 }
852 if (eivlen <= 1)
853 eivlen = 0;
854 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
855 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
856 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
857 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
858 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
859 }
860 }
861
862 wpacket_init_complete:
863
864 totlen = 0;
865 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
866 memset(wr, 0, sizeof(wr));
867 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
868 unsigned int version = (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) ? TLS1_2_VERSION
869 : s->version;
870 unsigned char *compressdata = NULL;
871 size_t maxcomplen;
872 unsigned int rectype;
873
874 thispkt = &pkt[j];
875 thiswr = &wr[j];
876
877 /*
878 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
879 * record type
880 */
881 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)
882 && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL
883 && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
884 || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT))
885 rectype = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
886 else
887 rectype = type;
888 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, rectype);
889
890 /*
891 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
892 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
893 */
894 if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
895 && !s->renegotiate
896 && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION
897 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
898 version = TLS1_VERSION;
899 SSL3_RECORD_set_rec_version(thiswr, version);
900
901 maxcomplen = pipelens[j];
902 if (s->compress != NULL)
903 maxcomplen += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
904
905 /*
906 * When using offload kernel will write the header.
907 * Otherwise write the header now
908 */
909 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)
910 && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, rectype)
911 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt, version)
912 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt)
913 || (eivlen > 0
914 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, eivlen, NULL))
915 || (maxcomplen > 0
916 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, maxcomplen,
917 &compressdata)))) {
918 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
919 goto err;
920 }
921
922 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
923 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, compressdata);
924 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, pipelens[j]);
925 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr, (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
926 totlen += pipelens[j];
927
928 /*
929 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
930 * thiswr->data
931 */
932
933 /* first we compress */
934 if (s->compress != NULL) {
935 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, thiswr)
936 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, thiswr->length, NULL)) {
937 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
938 goto err;
939 }
940 } else {
941 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) {
942 SSL3_RECORD_reset_data(&wr[j]);
943 } else {
944 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt, thiswr->input, thiswr->length)) {
945 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
946 goto err;
947 }
948 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
949 }
950 }
951
952 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)
953 && !BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)
954 && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL
955 && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
956 || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
957 size_t rlen, max_send_fragment;
958
959 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, type)) {
960 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
961 goto err;
962 }
963 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, 1);
964
965 /* Add TLS1.3 padding */
966 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s);
967 rlen = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
968 if (rlen < max_send_fragment) {
969 size_t padding = 0;
970 size_t max_padding = max_send_fragment - rlen;
971 if (s->record_padding_cb != NULL) {
972 padding = s->record_padding_cb(s, type, rlen, s->record_padding_arg);
973 } else if (s->block_padding > 0) {
974 size_t mask = s->block_padding - 1;
975 size_t remainder;
976
977 /* optimize for power of 2 */
978 if ((s->block_padding & mask) == 0)
979 remainder = rlen & mask;
980 else
981 remainder = rlen % s->block_padding;
982 /* don't want to add a block of padding if we don't have to */
983 if (remainder == 0)
984 padding = 0;
985 else
986 padding = s->block_padding - remainder;
987 }
988 if (padding > 0) {
989 /* do not allow the record to exceed max plaintext length */
990 if (padding > max_padding)
991 padding = max_padding;
992 if (!WPACKET_memset(thispkt, 0, padding)) {
993 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
994 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
995 goto err;
996 }
997 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, padding);
998 }
999 }
1000 }
1001
1002 /*
1003 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
1004 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
1005 * in the wb->buf
1006 */
1007
1008 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) && !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
1009 unsigned char *mac;
1010
1011 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
1012 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
1013 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1014 goto err;
1015 }
1016 }
1017
1018 /*
1019 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption. If
1020 * we are adding the MAC independently of the cipher algorithm, then the
1021 * max encrypted overhead does not need to include an allocation for that
1022 * MAC
1023 */
1024 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) {
1025 if (!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt,
1026 SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
1027 - mac_size, NULL)
1028 /*
1029 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
1030 * sub-packet
1031 */
1032 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)) {
1033 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1034 goto err;
1035 }
1036
1037 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
1038 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len;
1039 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, recordstart);
1040 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr);
1041 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, len);
1042 }
1043 }
1044
1045 if (s->statem.enc_write_state == ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS) {
1046 /*
1047 * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to
1048 * send early data - so we need to use the tls13enc function.
1049 */
1050 if (tls13_enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1, NULL, mac_size) < 1) {
1051 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
1052 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1053 }
1054 goto err;
1055 }
1056 } else {
1057 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) {
1058 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1, NULL,
1059 mac_size) < 1) {
1060 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
1061 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1062 }
1063 goto err;
1064 }
1065 }
1066 }
1067
1068 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
1069 size_t origlen;
1070
1071 thispkt = &pkt[j];
1072 thiswr = &wr[j];
1073
1074 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio))
1075 goto mac_done;
1076
1077 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
1078 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &origlen)
1079 /* Check we allowed enough room for the encryption growth */
1080 || !ossl_assert(origlen + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
1081 - mac_size >= thiswr->length)
1082 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
1083 || origlen > thiswr->length
1084 || (thiswr->length > origlen
1085 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt,
1086 thiswr->length - origlen,
1087 NULL))) {
1088 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1089 goto err;
1090 }
1091 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
1092 unsigned char *mac;
1093
1094 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
1095 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
1096 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1097 goto err;
1098 }
1099 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, mac_size);
1100 }
1101
1102 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)
1103 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt)) {
1104 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1105 goto err;
1106 }
1107
1108 if (s->msg_callback) {
1109 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len
1110 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1111 s->msg_callback(1, thiswr->rec_version, SSL3_RT_HEADER, recordstart,
1112 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1113 s->msg_callback_arg);
1114
1115 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
1116 unsigned char ctype = type;
1117
1118 s->msg_callback(1, thiswr->rec_version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE,
1119 &ctype, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1120 }
1121 }
1122
1123 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt)) {
1124 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1125 goto err;
1126 }
1127
1128 /* header is added by the kernel when using offload */
1129 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
1130
1131 if (create_empty_fragment) {
1132 /*
1133 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1134 * out anything here
1135 */
1136 if (j > 0) {
1137 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
1138 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1139 goto err;
1140 }
1141 *written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
1142 return 1;
1143 }
1144
1145 mac_done:
1146 /*
1147 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
1148 * is thiswr->length long
1149 */
1150 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type); /* not needed but helps for
1151 * debugging */
1152
1153 /* now let's set up wb */
1154 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
1155 prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr));
1156 }
1157
1158 /*
1159 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1160 * retries later
1161 */
1162 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen;
1163 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
1164 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
1165 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen;
1166
1167 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1168 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
1169 err:
1170 for (j = 0; j < wpinited; j++)
1171 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt[j]);
1172 return -1;
1173 }
1174
1175 /* if s->s3.wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
1176 *
1177 * Return values are as per SSL_write()
1178 */
ssl3_write_pending(SSL * s,int type,const unsigned char * buf,size_t len,size_t * written)1179 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
1180 size_t *written)
1181 {
1182 int i;
1183 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf;
1184 size_t currbuf = 0;
1185 size_t tmpwrit = 0;
1186
1187 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len)
1188 || (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)
1189 && (s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf))
1190 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
1191 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1192 return -1;
1193 }
1194
1195 for (;;) {
1196 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1197 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0
1198 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) {
1199 currbuf++;
1200 continue;
1201 }
1202 clear_sys_error();
1203 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
1204 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
1205
1206 /*
1207 * To prevent coalescing of control and data messages,
1208 * such as in buffer_write, we flush the BIO
1209 */
1210 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
1211 i = BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1212 if (i <= 0)
1213 return i;
1214 BIO_set_ktls_ctrl_msg(s->wbio, type);
1215 }
1216 i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)
1217 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])
1218 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]),
1219 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]));
1220 if (i >= 0)
1221 tmpwrit = i;
1222 } else {
1223 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1224 i = -1;
1225 }
1226
1227 /*
1228 * When an empty fragment is sent on a connection using KTLS,
1229 * it is sent as a write of zero bytes. If this zero byte
1230 * write succeeds, i will be 0 rather than a non-zero value.
1231 * Treat i == 0 as success rather than an error for zero byte
1232 * writes to permit this case.
1233 */
1234 if (i >= 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) {
1235 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1236 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1237 if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes)
1238 continue;
1239 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1240 *written = s->rlayer.wpend_ret;
1241 return 1;
1242 } else if (i <= 0) {
1243 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1244 /*
1245 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1246 * using a datagram service
1247 */
1248 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1249 }
1250 return i;
1251 }
1252 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1253 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1254 }
1255 }
1256
1257 /*-
1258 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1259 * 'type' is one of the following:
1260 *
1261 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1262 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1263 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1264 *
1265 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1266 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1267 *
1268 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1269 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1270 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recvd_type|
1271 * argument is non NULL.
1272 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1273 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1274 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1275 * Change cipher spec protocol
1276 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1277 * Alert protocol
1278 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1279 * Handshake protocol
1280 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1281 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1282 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1283 * Application data protocol
1284 * none of our business
1285 */
ssl3_read_bytes(SSL * s,int type,int * recvd_type,unsigned char * buf,size_t len,int peek,size_t * readbytes)1286 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
1287 size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes)
1288 {
1289 int i, j, ret;
1290 size_t n, curr_rec, num_recs, totalbytes;
1291 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
1292 SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf;
1293 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
1294 int is_tls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s);
1295
1296 rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
1297
1298 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) {
1299 /* Not initialized yet */
1300 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) {
1301 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1302 return -1;
1303 }
1304 }
1305
1306 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1307 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
1308 && (type !=
1309 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
1310 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1311 return -1;
1312 }
1313
1314 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1315 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1316 {
1317 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1318 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1319 unsigned int k;
1320
1321 /* peek == 0 */
1322 n = 0;
1323 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1324 *dst++ = *src++;
1325 len--;
1326 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
1327 n++;
1328 }
1329 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1330 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1331 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1332
1333 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1334 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1335
1336 *readbytes = n;
1337 return 1;
1338 }
1339
1340 /*
1341 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1342 */
1343
1344 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1345 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1346 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1347 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1348 if (i < 0)
1349 return i;
1350 if (i == 0)
1351 return -1;
1352 }
1353 start:
1354 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1355
1356 /*-
1357 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1358 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1359 * rr[i].data, - data
1360 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1361 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1362 */
1363 rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
1364 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1365
1366 do {
1367 /* get new records if necessary */
1368 if (num_recs == 0) {
1369 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1370 if (ret <= 0) {
1371 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
1372 return ret;
1373 }
1374 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1375 if (num_recs == 0) {
1376 /* Shouldn't happen */
1377 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1378 return -1;
1379 }
1380 }
1381 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1382 for (curr_rec = 0;
1383 curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]);
1384 curr_rec++) ;
1385 if (curr_rec == num_recs) {
1386 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0);
1387 num_recs = 0;
1388 curr_rec = 0;
1389 }
1390 } while (num_recs == 0);
1391 rr = &rr[curr_rec];
1392
1393 if (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0
1394 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1395 && SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1396 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1397 SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA);
1398 return -1;
1399 }
1400
1401 /*
1402 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1403 * record that isn't an alert.
1404 */
1405 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1406 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0)
1407 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
1408
1409 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1410
1411 if (s->s3.change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1412 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1413 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1414 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1415 SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1416 return -1;
1417 }
1418
1419 /*
1420 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1421 * 'peek' mode)
1422 */
1423 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1424 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1425 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1426 return 0;
1427 }
1428
1429 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
1430 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1431 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL
1432 && !is_tls13)) {
1433 /*
1434 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1435 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1436 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1437 */
1438 /*
1439 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1440 * doing a handshake for the first time
1441 */
1442 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1443 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1444 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1445 return -1;
1446 }
1447
1448 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1449 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1450 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
1451 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1452 return -1;
1453 }
1454
1455 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1456 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
1457
1458 if (len == 0) {
1459 /*
1460 * Mark a zero length record as read. This ensures multiple calls to
1461 * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
1462 * SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
1463 */
1464 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1465 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1466 return 0;
1467 }
1468
1469 totalbytes = 0;
1470 do {
1471 if (len - totalbytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1472 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
1473 else
1474 n = len - totalbytes;
1475
1476 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1477 buf += n;
1478 if (peek) {
1479 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1480 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1481 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1482 } else {
1483 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CLEANSE_PLAINTEXT)
1484 OPENSSL_cleanse(&(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1485 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
1486 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1487 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
1488 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1489 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
1490 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1491 }
1492 }
1493 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0
1494 || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) {
1495 curr_rec++;
1496 rr++;
1497 }
1498 totalbytes += n;
1499 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs
1500 && totalbytes < len);
1501 if (totalbytes == 0) {
1502 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1503 goto start;
1504 }
1505 if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs
1506 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1507 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0)
1508 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1509 *readbytes = totalbytes;
1510 return 1;
1511 }
1512
1513 /*
1514 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1515 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1516 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1517 */
1518
1519 /*
1520 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1521 */
1522 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
1523 /*
1524 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1525 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1526 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1527 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1528 */
1529 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1530 return -1;
1531 }
1532
1533 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1534 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1535 /*
1536 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1537 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing
1538 * with. We shouldn't be receiving anything other than a ClientHello
1539 * if we are a server.
1540 */
1541 s->version = rr->rec_version;
1542 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1543 return -1;
1544 }
1545
1546 /*-
1547 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1548 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1549 */
1550
1551 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1552 unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr;
1553 unsigned char *alert_bytes = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)
1554 + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr);
1555 PACKET alert;
1556
1557 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1558 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level)
1559 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr)
1560 || PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) {
1561 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT);
1562 return -1;
1563 }
1564
1565 if (s->msg_callback)
1566 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, s,
1567 s->msg_callback_arg);
1568
1569 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1570 cb = s->info_callback;
1571 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1572 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1573
1574 if (cb != NULL) {
1575 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1576 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1577 }
1578
1579 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING
1580 || (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED)) {
1581 s->s3.warn_alert = alert_descr;
1582 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1583
1584 s->rlayer.alert_count++;
1585 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
1586 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1587 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
1588 return -1;
1589 }
1590 }
1591
1592 /*
1593 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3
1594 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore.
1595 */
1596 if (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED) {
1597 goto start;
1598 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
1599 && (is_tls13 || alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING)) {
1600 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1601 return 0;
1602 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL || is_tls13) {
1603 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1604 s->s3.fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1605 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT,
1606 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr,
1607 "SSL alert number %d", alert_descr);
1608 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1609 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1610 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1611 return 0;
1612 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1613 /*
1614 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1615 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1616 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1617 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1618 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1619 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1620 */
1621 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1622 return -1;
1623 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1624 /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */
1625 goto start;
1626 }
1627
1628 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1629 return -1;
1630 }
1631
1632 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
1633 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1634 BIO *rbio;
1635
1636 /*
1637 * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are
1638 * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other
1639 * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them
1640 * because we are unable to write any response due to having already
1641 * sent close_notify.
1642 */
1643 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1644 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1645 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1646
1647 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY) != 0)
1648 goto start;
1649
1650 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1651 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1652 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
1653 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
1654 return -1;
1655 }
1656 } else {
1657 /*
1658 * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have
1659 * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have
1660 * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled
1661 * above.
1662 * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify
1663 */
1664 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1665 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1666 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT,
1667 SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
1668 return -1;
1669 }
1670 }
1671
1672 /*
1673 * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we
1674 * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the
1675 * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data
1676 * that we're just going to discard.
1677 */
1678 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1679 size_t dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment);
1680 unsigned char *dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1681 size_t *dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
1682
1683 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1684 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
1685 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
1686
1687 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1688 memcpy(dest + *dest_len,
1689 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr) + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr), n);
1690 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1691 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
1692 *dest_len += n;
1693 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1694 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1695
1696 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1697 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1698 }
1699
1700 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1701 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1702 return -1;
1703 }
1704
1705 /*
1706 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
1707 * protocol violation)
1708 */
1709 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
1710 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
1711 int ined = (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING);
1712
1713 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
1714 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1715
1716 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1717 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
1718 if (i < 0)
1719 return i;
1720 if (i == 0) {
1721 return -1;
1722 }
1723
1724 /*
1725 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a
1726 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read
1727 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now.
1728 */
1729 if (ined)
1730 return -1;
1731
1732 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1733 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1734 /* no read-ahead left? */
1735 BIO *bio;
1736 /*
1737 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1738 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1739 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1740 * problems in the blocking world
1741 */
1742 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1743 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1744 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1745 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1746 return -1;
1747 }
1748 }
1749 goto start;
1750 }
1751
1752 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
1753 default:
1754 /*
1755 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1756 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1757 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1758 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1759 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1760 */
1761 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1762 return -1;
1763 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1764 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1765 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1766 /*
1767 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1768 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1769 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1770 */
1771 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1772 return -1;
1773 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1774 /*
1775 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1776 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1777 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1778 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1779 * started), we will indulge it.
1780 */
1781 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
1782 s->s3.in_read_app_data = 2;
1783 return -1;
1784 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) {
1785 /*
1786 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
1787 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
1788 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
1789 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
1790 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
1791 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
1792 * record.
1793 */
1794 if (!early_data_count_ok(s, rr->length,
1795 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) {
1796 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1797 return -1;
1798 }
1799 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1800 goto start;
1801 } else {
1802 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1803 return -1;
1804 }
1805 }
1806 }
1807
ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char * seq)1808 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
1809 {
1810 int i;
1811
1812 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
1813 ++seq[i];
1814 if (seq[i] != 0)
1815 break;
1816 }
1817 }
1818
1819 /*
1820 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1821 * format and false otherwise.
1822 */
RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER * rl)1823 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1824 {
1825 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]);
1826 }
1827
1828 /*
1829 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1830 */
RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER * rl)1831 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1832 {
1833 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]);
1834 }
1835