1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10 #include <stdio.h>
11 #include <stdlib.h>
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
16 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
17 #include <openssl/conf.h>
18 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
19 #include <openssl/dh.h>
20 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/provider.h>
22 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
23 #include "internal/nelem.h"
24 #include "internal/sizes.h"
25 #include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
26 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
27 #include "ssl_local.h"
28 #include <openssl/ct.h>
29
30 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
31 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu);
32
33 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
34 tls1_enc,
35 tls1_mac,
36 tls1_setup_key_block,
37 tls1_generate_master_secret,
38 tls1_change_cipher_state,
39 tls1_final_finish_mac,
40 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
41 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
42 tls1_alert_code,
43 tls1_export_keying_material,
44 0,
45 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
46 tls_close_construct_packet,
47 ssl3_handshake_write
48 };
49
50 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
51 tls1_enc,
52 tls1_mac,
53 tls1_setup_key_block,
54 tls1_generate_master_secret,
55 tls1_change_cipher_state,
56 tls1_final_finish_mac,
57 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
58 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
59 tls1_alert_code,
60 tls1_export_keying_material,
61 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
62 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
63 tls_close_construct_packet,
64 ssl3_handshake_write
65 };
66
67 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
68 tls1_enc,
69 tls1_mac,
70 tls1_setup_key_block,
71 tls1_generate_master_secret,
72 tls1_change_cipher_state,
73 tls1_final_finish_mac,
74 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
75 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
76 tls1_alert_code,
77 tls1_export_keying_material,
78 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
79 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
80 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
81 tls_close_construct_packet,
82 ssl3_handshake_write
83 };
84
85 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
86 tls13_enc,
87 tls1_mac,
88 tls13_setup_key_block,
89 tls13_generate_master_secret,
90 tls13_change_cipher_state,
91 tls13_final_finish_mac,
92 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
93 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
94 tls13_alert_code,
95 tls13_export_keying_material,
96 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
97 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
98 tls_close_construct_packet,
99 ssl3_handshake_write
100 };
101
tls1_default_timeout(void)102 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
103 {
104 /*
105 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
106 * http, the cache would over fill
107 */
108 return (60 * 60 * 2);
109 }
110
tls1_new(SSL * s)111 int tls1_new(SSL *s)
112 {
113 if (!ssl3_new(s))
114 return 0;
115 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
116 return 0;
117
118 return 1;
119 }
120
tls1_free(SSL * s)121 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
122 {
123 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
124 ssl3_free(s);
125 }
126
tls1_clear(SSL * s)127 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
128 {
129 if (!ssl3_clear(s))
130 return 0;
131
132 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
133 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
134 else
135 s->version = s->method->version;
136
137 return 1;
138 }
139
140 /* Legacy NID to group_id mapping. Only works for groups we know about */
141 static struct {
142 int nid;
143 uint16_t group_id;
144 } nid_to_group[] = {
145 {NID_sect163k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163k1},
146 {NID_sect163r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r1},
147 {NID_sect163r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r2},
148 {NID_sect193r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r1},
149 {NID_sect193r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r2},
150 {NID_sect233k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233k1},
151 {NID_sect233r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233r1},
152 {NID_sect239k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect239k1},
153 {NID_sect283k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283k1},
154 {NID_sect283r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283r1},
155 {NID_sect409k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409k1},
156 {NID_sect409r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409r1},
157 {NID_sect571k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571k1},
158 {NID_sect571r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571r1},
159 {NID_secp160k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160k1},
160 {NID_secp160r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r1},
161 {NID_secp160r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r2},
162 {NID_secp192k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192k1},
163 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192r1},
164 {NID_secp224k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224k1},
165 {NID_secp224r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224r1},
166 {NID_secp256k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256k1},
167 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1},
168 {NID_secp384r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1},
169 {NID_secp521r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1},
170 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1},
171 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1},
172 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1},
173 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519},
174 {EVP_PKEY_X448, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448},
175 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA, 0x0022},
176 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB, 0x0023},
177 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC, 0x0024},
178 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD, 0x0025},
179 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA, 0x0026},
180 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB, 0x0027},
181 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC, 0x0028},
182 {NID_ffdhe2048, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048},
183 {NID_ffdhe3072, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072},
184 {NID_ffdhe4096, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096},
185 {NID_ffdhe6144, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144},
186 {NID_ffdhe8192, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192}
187 };
188
189 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
190 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
191 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
192 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
193 };
194
195 /* The default curves */
196 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default[] = {
197 29, /* X25519 (29) */
198 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
199 30, /* X448 (30) */
200 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
201 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
202 34, /* GC256A (34) */
203 35, /* GC256B (35) */
204 36, /* GC256C (36) */
205 37, /* GC256D (37) */
206 38, /* GC512A (38) */
207 39, /* GC512B (39) */
208 40, /* GC512C (40) */
209 0x100, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
210 0x101, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
211 0x102, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
212 0x103, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
213 0x104, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
214 };
215
216 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
217 TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
218 TLSEXT_curve_P_384
219 };
220
221 struct provider_group_data_st {
222 SSL_CTX *ctx;
223 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider;
224 };
225
226 #define TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
227 static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_groups;
add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params[],void * data)228 static int add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *data)
229 {
230 struct provider_group_data_st *pgd = data;
231 SSL_CTX *ctx = pgd->ctx;
232 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider = pgd->provider;
233 const OSSL_PARAM *p;
234 TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = NULL;
235 EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt;
236 unsigned int gid;
237 unsigned int is_kem = 0;
238 int ret = 0;
239
240 if (ctx->group_list_max_len == ctx->group_list_len) {
241 TLS_GROUP_INFO *tmp = NULL;
242
243 if (ctx->group_list_max_len == 0)
244 tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO)
245 * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
246 else
247 tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(ctx->group_list,
248 (ctx->group_list_max_len
249 + TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE)
250 * sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO));
251 if (tmp == NULL) {
252 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
253 return 0;
254 }
255 ctx->group_list = tmp;
256 memset(tmp + ctx->group_list_max_len,
257 0,
258 sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO) * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
259 ctx->group_list_max_len += TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE;
260 }
261
262 ginf = &ctx->group_list[ctx->group_list_len];
263
264 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME);
265 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
266 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
267 goto err;
268 }
269 ginf->tlsname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
270 if (ginf->tlsname == NULL) {
271 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
272 goto err;
273 }
274
275 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME_INTERNAL);
276 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
277 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
278 goto err;
279 }
280 ginf->realname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
281 if (ginf->realname == NULL) {
282 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
283 goto err;
284 }
285
286 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ID);
287 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &gid) || gid > UINT16_MAX) {
288 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
289 goto err;
290 }
291 ginf->group_id = (uint16_t)gid;
292
293 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ALG);
294 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
295 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
296 goto err;
297 }
298 ginf->algorithm = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
299 if (ginf->algorithm == NULL) {
300 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
301 goto err;
302 }
303
304 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_SECURITY_BITS);
305 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &ginf->secbits)) {
306 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
307 goto err;
308 }
309
310 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_IS_KEM);
311 if (p != NULL && (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &is_kem) || is_kem > 1)) {
312 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
313 goto err;
314 }
315 ginf->is_kem = 1 & is_kem;
316
317 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_TLS);
318 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mintls)) {
319 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
320 goto err;
321 }
322
323 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_TLS);
324 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxtls)) {
325 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
326 goto err;
327 }
328
329 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_DTLS);
330 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mindtls)) {
331 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
332 goto err;
333 }
334
335 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_DTLS);
336 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxdtls)) {
337 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
338 goto err;
339 }
340 /*
341 * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
342 * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
343 * successfully processed this group, even though we may decide not to use
344 * it.
345 */
346 ret = 1;
347 ERR_set_mark();
348 keymgmt = EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx->libctx, ginf->algorithm, ctx->propq);
349 if (keymgmt != NULL) {
350 /*
351 * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
352 * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
353 *
354 * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
355 * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
356 * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
357 * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
358 * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
359 * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
360 * behaviour)?
361 */
362 if (EVP_KEYMGMT_get0_provider(keymgmt) == provider) {
363 /* We have a match - so we will use this group */
364 ctx->group_list_len++;
365 ginf = NULL;
366 }
367 EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt);
368 }
369 ERR_pop_to_mark();
370 err:
371 if (ginf != NULL) {
372 OPENSSL_free(ginf->tlsname);
373 OPENSSL_free(ginf->realname);
374 OPENSSL_free(ginf->algorithm);
375 ginf->algorithm = ginf->tlsname = ginf->realname = NULL;
376 }
377 return ret;
378 }
379
discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER * provider,void * vctx)380 static int discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER *provider, void *vctx)
381 {
382 struct provider_group_data_st pgd;
383
384 pgd.ctx = vctx;
385 pgd.provider = provider;
386 return OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider, "TLS-GROUP",
387 add_provider_groups, &pgd);
388 }
389
ssl_load_groups(SSL_CTX * ctx)390 int ssl_load_groups(SSL_CTX *ctx)
391 {
392 size_t i, j, num_deflt_grps = 0;
393 uint16_t tmp_supp_groups[OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default)];
394
395 if (!OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx->libctx, discover_provider_groups, ctx))
396 return 0;
397
398 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default); i++) {
399 for (j = 0; j < ctx->group_list_len; j++) {
400 if (ctx->group_list[j].group_id == supported_groups_default[i]) {
401 tmp_supp_groups[num_deflt_grps++] = ctx->group_list[j].group_id;
402 break;
403 }
404 }
405 }
406
407 if (num_deflt_grps == 0)
408 return 1;
409
410 ctx->ext.supported_groups_default
411 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * num_deflt_grps);
412
413 if (ctx->ext.supported_groups_default == NULL) {
414 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
415 return 0;
416 }
417
418 memcpy(ctx->ext.supported_groups_default,
419 tmp_supp_groups,
420 num_deflt_grps * sizeof(tmp_supp_groups[0]));
421 ctx->ext.supported_groups_default_len = num_deflt_grps;
422
423 return 1;
424 }
425
tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX * ctx,const char * name)426 static uint16_t tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
427 {
428 size_t i;
429
430 for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
431 if (strcmp(ctx->group_list[i].tlsname, name) == 0
432 || strcmp(ctx->group_list[i].realname, name) == 0)
433 return ctx->group_list[i].group_id;
434 }
435
436 return 0;
437 }
438
tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CTX * ctx,uint16_t group_id)439 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t group_id)
440 {
441 size_t i;
442
443 for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
444 if (ctx->group_list[i].group_id == group_id)
445 return &ctx->group_list[i];
446 }
447
448 return NULL;
449 }
450
tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id,int include_unknown)451 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id, int include_unknown)
452 {
453 size_t i;
454
455 if (group_id == 0)
456 return NID_undef;
457
458 /*
459 * Return well known Group NIDs - for backwards compatibility. This won't
460 * work for groups we don't know about.
461 */
462 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
463 {
464 if (nid_to_group[i].group_id == group_id)
465 return nid_to_group[i].nid;
466 }
467 if (!include_unknown)
468 return NID_undef;
469 return TLSEXT_nid_unknown | (int)group_id;
470 }
471
tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)472 uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
473 {
474 size_t i;
475
476 /*
477 * Return well known Group ids - for backwards compatibility. This won't
478 * work for groups we don't know about.
479 */
480 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
481 {
482 if (nid_to_group[i].nid == nid)
483 return nid_to_group[i].group_id;
484 }
485
486 return 0;
487 }
488
489 /*
490 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
491 * the number of groups supported.
492 */
tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL * s,const uint16_t ** pgroups,size_t * pgroupslen)493 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
494 size_t *pgroupslen)
495 {
496 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
497 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
498 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
499 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
500 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
501 break;
502
503 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
504 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
505 *pgroupslen = 1;
506 break;
507
508 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
509 *pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
510 *pgroupslen = 1;
511 break;
512
513 default:
514 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
515 *pgroups = s->ctx->ext.supported_groups_default;
516 *pgroupslen = s->ctx->ext.supported_groups_default_len;
517 } else {
518 *pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
519 *pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
520 }
521 break;
522 }
523 }
524
tls_valid_group(SSL * s,uint16_t group_id,int minversion,int maxversion,int isec,int * okfortls13)525 int tls_valid_group(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int minversion, int maxversion,
526 int isec, int *okfortls13)
527 {
528 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(s->ctx, group_id);
529 int ret;
530
531 if (okfortls13 != NULL)
532 *okfortls13 = 0;
533
534 if (ginfo == NULL)
535 return 0;
536
537 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
538 if (ginfo->mindtls < 0 || ginfo->maxdtls < 0)
539 return 0;
540 if (ginfo->maxdtls == 0)
541 ret = 1;
542 else
543 ret = DTLS_VERSION_LE(minversion, ginfo->maxdtls);
544 if (ginfo->mindtls > 0)
545 ret &= DTLS_VERSION_GE(maxversion, ginfo->mindtls);
546 } else {
547 if (ginfo->mintls < 0 || ginfo->maxtls < 0)
548 return 0;
549 if (ginfo->maxtls == 0)
550 ret = 1;
551 else
552 ret = (minversion <= ginfo->maxtls);
553 if (ginfo->mintls > 0)
554 ret &= (maxversion >= ginfo->mintls);
555 if (ret && okfortls13 != NULL && maxversion == TLS1_3_VERSION)
556 *okfortls13 = (ginfo->maxtls == 0)
557 || (ginfo->maxtls >= TLS1_3_VERSION);
558 }
559 ret &= !isec
560 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "EC") == 0
561 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "X25519") == 0
562 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "X448") == 0;
563
564 return ret;
565 }
566
567 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
tls_group_allowed(SSL * s,uint16_t group,int op)568 int tls_group_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t group, int op)
569 {
570 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(s->ctx, group);
571 unsigned char gtmp[2];
572
573 if (ginfo == NULL)
574 return 0;
575
576 gtmp[0] = group >> 8;
577 gtmp[1] = group & 0xff;
578 return ssl_security(s, op, ginfo->secbits,
579 tls1_group_id2nid(ginfo->group_id, 0), (void *)gtmp);
580 }
581
582 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
tls1_in_list(uint16_t id,const uint16_t * list,size_t listlen)583 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
584 {
585 size_t i;
586 for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
587 if (list[i] == id)
588 return 1;
589 return 0;
590 }
591
592 /*-
593 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
594 * if there is no match.
595 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
596 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
597 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
598 */
tls1_shared_group(SSL * s,int nmatch)599 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
600 {
601 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
602 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
603 int k;
604 SSL_CTX *ctx = s->ctx;
605
606 /* Can't do anything on client side */
607 if (s->server == 0)
608 return 0;
609 if (nmatch == -2) {
610 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
611 /*
612 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
613 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
614 */
615 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
616
617 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
618 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
619 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
620 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
621 /* Should never happen */
622 return 0;
623 }
624 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
625 nmatch = 0;
626 }
627 /*
628 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
629 * otherwise peer decides.
630 */
631 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
632 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
633 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
634 } else {
635 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
636 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
637 }
638
639 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
640 uint16_t id = pref[i];
641 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *inf;
642
643 if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
644 || !tls_group_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
645 continue;
646 inf = tls1_group_id_lookup(ctx, id);
647 if (!ossl_assert(inf != NULL))
648 return 0;
649 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
650 if (inf->maxdtls == -1)
651 continue;
652 if ((inf->mindtls != 0 && DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, inf->mindtls))
653 || (inf->maxdtls != 0
654 && DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, inf->maxdtls)))
655 continue;
656 } else {
657 if (inf->maxtls == -1)
658 continue;
659 if ((inf->mintls != 0 && s->version < inf->mintls)
660 || (inf->maxtls != 0 && s->version > inf->maxtls))
661 continue;
662 }
663
664 if (nmatch == k)
665 return id;
666 k++;
667 }
668 if (nmatch == -1)
669 return k;
670 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
671 return 0;
672 }
673
tls1_set_groups(uint16_t ** pext,size_t * pextlen,int * groups,size_t ngroups)674 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
675 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
676 {
677 uint16_t *glist;
678 size_t i;
679 /*
680 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
681 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
682 */
683 unsigned long *dup_list = NULL;
684 unsigned long dup_list_egrp = 0;
685 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp = 0;
686
687 if (ngroups == 0) {
688 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
689 return 0;
690 }
691 if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL) {
692 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
693 return 0;
694 }
695 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
696 unsigned long idmask;
697 uint16_t id;
698 id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
699 if ((id & 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
700 goto err;
701 idmask = 1L << (id & 0x00FF);
702 dup_list = (id < 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp : &dup_list_dhgrp;
703 if (!id || ((*dup_list) & idmask))
704 goto err;
705 *dup_list |= idmask;
706 glist[i] = id;
707 }
708 OPENSSL_free(*pext);
709 *pext = glist;
710 *pextlen = ngroups;
711 return 1;
712 err:
713 OPENSSL_free(glist);
714 return 0;
715 }
716
717 # define GROUPLIST_INCREMENT 40
718 # define GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH 64
719 typedef struct {
720 SSL_CTX *ctx;
721 size_t gidcnt;
722 size_t gidmax;
723 uint16_t *gid_arr;
724 } gid_cb_st;
725
gid_cb(const char * elem,int len,void * arg)726 static int gid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
727 {
728 gid_cb_st *garg = arg;
729 size_t i;
730 uint16_t gid = 0;
731 char etmp[GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH];
732
733 if (elem == NULL)
734 return 0;
735 if (garg->gidcnt == garg->gidmax) {
736 uint16_t *tmp =
737 OPENSSL_realloc(garg->gid_arr, garg->gidmax + GROUPLIST_INCREMENT);
738 if (tmp == NULL)
739 return 0;
740 garg->gidmax += GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
741 garg->gid_arr = tmp;
742 }
743 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
744 return 0;
745 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
746 etmp[len] = 0;
747
748 gid = tls1_group_name2id(garg->ctx, etmp);
749 if (gid == 0) {
750 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT,
751 "group '%s' cannot be set", etmp);
752 return 0;
753 }
754 for (i = 0; i < garg->gidcnt; i++)
755 if (garg->gid_arr[i] == gid)
756 return 0;
757 garg->gid_arr[garg->gidcnt++] = gid;
758 return 1;
759 }
760
761 /* Set groups based on a colon separated list */
tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX * ctx,uint16_t ** pext,size_t * pextlen,const char * str)762 int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
763 const char *str)
764 {
765 gid_cb_st gcb;
766 uint16_t *tmparr;
767 int ret = 0;
768
769 gcb.gidcnt = 0;
770 gcb.gidmax = GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
771 gcb.gid_arr = OPENSSL_malloc(gcb.gidmax * sizeof(*gcb.gid_arr));
772 if (gcb.gid_arr == NULL)
773 return 0;
774 gcb.ctx = ctx;
775 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, gid_cb, &gcb))
776 goto end;
777 if (pext == NULL) {
778 ret = 1;
779 goto end;
780 }
781
782 /*
783 * gid_cb ensurse there are no duplicates so we can just go ahead and set
784 * the result
785 */
786 tmparr = OPENSSL_memdup(gcb.gid_arr, gcb.gidcnt * sizeof(*tmparr));
787 if (tmparr == NULL)
788 goto end;
789 OPENSSL_free(*pext);
790 *pext = tmparr;
791 *pextlen = gcb.gidcnt;
792 ret = 1;
793 end:
794 OPENSSL_free(gcb.gid_arr);
795 return ret;
796 }
797
798 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
tls1_check_group_id(SSL * s,uint16_t group_id,int check_own_groups)799 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int check_own_groups)
800 {
801 const uint16_t *groups;
802 size_t groups_len;
803
804 if (group_id == 0)
805 return 0;
806
807 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
808 if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
809 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
810
811 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
812 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
813 return 0;
814 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
815 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
816 return 0;
817 } else {
818 /* Should never happen */
819 return 0;
820 }
821 }
822
823 if (check_own_groups) {
824 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
825 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
826 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
827 return 0;
828 }
829
830 if (!tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
831 return 0;
832
833 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
834 if (!s->server)
835 return 1;
836
837 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
838 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
839
840 /*
841 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
842 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
843 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
844 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
845 */
846 if (groups_len == 0)
847 return 1;
848 return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
849 }
850
tls1_get_formatlist(SSL * s,const unsigned char ** pformats,size_t * num_formats)851 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
852 size_t *num_formats)
853 {
854 /*
855 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
856 */
857 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
858 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
859 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
860 } else {
861 *pformats = ecformats_default;
862 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
863 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
864 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
865 else
866 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
867 }
868 }
869
870 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL * s,EVP_PKEY * pkey)871 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
872 {
873 unsigned char comp_id;
874 size_t i;
875 int point_conv;
876
877 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
878 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
879 return 1;
880
881
882 /* Get required compression id */
883 point_conv = EVP_PKEY_get_ec_point_conv_form(pkey);
884 if (point_conv == 0)
885 return 0;
886 if (point_conv == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
887 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
888 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
889 /*
890 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
891 * this check.
892 */
893 return 1;
894 } else {
895 int field_type = EVP_PKEY_get_field_type(pkey);
896
897 if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
898 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
899 else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
900 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
901 else
902 return 0;
903 }
904 /*
905 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
906 * supported (see RFC4492).
907 */
908 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL)
909 return 1;
910
911 for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
912 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
913 return 1;
914 }
915 return 0;
916 }
917
918 /* Return group id of a key */
tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY * pkey)919 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
920 {
921 int curve_nid = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey);
922
923 if (curve_nid == NID_undef)
924 return 0;
925 return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid);
926 }
927
928 /*
929 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
930 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
931 */
tls1_check_cert_param(SSL * s,X509 * x,int check_ee_md)932 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
933 {
934 uint16_t group_id;
935 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
936 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
937 if (pkey == NULL)
938 return 0;
939 /* If not EC nothing to do */
940 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
941 return 1;
942 /* Check compression */
943 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
944 return 0;
945 group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
946 /*
947 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
948 * groups.
949 */
950 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id, !s->server))
951 return 0;
952 /*
953 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
954 * SHA384+P-384.
955 */
956 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
957 int check_md;
958 size_t i;
959
960 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
961 if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
962 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
963 else if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
964 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
965 else
966 return 0; /* Should never happen */
967 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
968 if (check_md == s->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
969 return 1;;
970 }
971 return 0;
972 }
973 return 1;
974 }
975
976 /*
977 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
978 * @s: SSL connection
979 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
980 *
981 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
982 * is compatible with the client extensions.
983 *
984 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
985 */
tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL * s,unsigned long cid)986 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
987 {
988 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
989 if (!tls1_suiteb(s))
990 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
991 /*
992 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
993 * curves permitted.
994 */
995 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
996 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 1);
997 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
998 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_384, 1);
999
1000 return 0;
1001 }
1002
1003 /* Default sigalg schemes */
1004 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
1005 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1006 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
1007 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
1008 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
1009 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
1010
1011 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
1012 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
1013 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
1014 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
1015 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
1016 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
1017
1018 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
1019 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
1020 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
1021
1022 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
1023 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
1024
1025 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
1026 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
1027
1028 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
1029 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
1030
1031 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
1032 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
1033 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
1034
1035 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1036 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
1037 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
1038 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
1039 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
1040 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
1041 #endif
1042 };
1043
1044
1045 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
1046 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1047 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
1048 };
1049
1050 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
1051 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1052 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1053 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1},
1054 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
1055 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1056 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1, 1},
1057 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
1058 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1059 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1, 1},
1060 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
1061 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
1062 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1063 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
1064 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
1065 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1066 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
1067 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1068 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef, 1},
1069 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
1070 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1071 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef, 1},
1072 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
1073 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1074 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1075 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
1076 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1077 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1078 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
1079 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1080 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1081 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
1082 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1083 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1084 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
1085 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1086 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1087 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
1088 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1089 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1090 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
1091 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1092 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1093 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
1094 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1095 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1096 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
1097 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1098 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1099 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
1100 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1101 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1102 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
1103 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1104 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1105 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
1106 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1107 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef, 1},
1108 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
1109 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1110 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1111 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
1112 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1113 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1114 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
1115 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1116 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1117 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
1118 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1119 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef, 1},
1120 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1121 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
1122 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1123 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
1124 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1125 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
1126 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1127 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
1128 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1129 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
1130 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1131 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
1132 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1133 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
1134 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1135 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
1136 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1137 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
1138 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
1139 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
1140 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1}
1141 #endif
1142 };
1143 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
1144 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
1145 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
1146 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
1147 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1148 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1
1149 };
1150
1151 /*
1152 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
1153 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
1154 */
1155 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
1156 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
1157 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
1158 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
1159 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
1160 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
1161 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
1162 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
1163 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
1164 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
1165 };
1166
ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX * ctx)1167 int ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
1168 {
1169 size_t i;
1170 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1171 SIGALG_LOOKUP *cache
1172 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*lu) * OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl));
1173 EVP_PKEY *tmpkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
1174 int ret = 0;
1175
1176 if (cache == NULL || tmpkey == NULL)
1177 goto err;
1178
1179 ERR_set_mark();
1180 for (i = 0, lu = sigalg_lookup_tbl;
1181 i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); lu++, i++) {
1182 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
1183
1184 cache[i] = *lu;
1185
1186 /*
1187 * Check hash is available.
1188 * This test is not perfect. A provider could have support
1189 * for a signature scheme, but not a particular hash. However the hash
1190 * could be available from some other loaded provider. In that case it
1191 * could be that the signature is available, and the hash is available
1192 * independently - but not as a combination. We ignore this for now.
1193 */
1194 if (lu->hash != NID_undef
1195 && ctx->ssl_digest_methods[lu->hash_idx] == NULL) {
1196 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1197 continue;
1198 }
1199
1200 if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey, lu->sig)) {
1201 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1202 continue;
1203 }
1204 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ctx->libctx, tmpkey, ctx->propq);
1205 /* If unable to create pctx we assume the sig algorithm is unavailable */
1206 if (pctx == NULL)
1207 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1208 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1209 }
1210 ERR_pop_to_mark();
1211 ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache = cache;
1212 cache = NULL;
1213
1214 ret = 1;
1215 err:
1216 OPENSSL_free(cache);
1217 EVP_PKEY_free(tmpkey);
1218 return ret;
1219 }
1220
1221 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL * s,uint16_t sigalg)1222 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL *s, uint16_t sigalg)
1223 {
1224 size_t i;
1225 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1226
1227 for (i = 0, lu = s->ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache;
1228 /* cache should have the same number of elements as sigalg_lookup_tbl */
1229 i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1230 lu++, i++) {
1231 if (lu->sigalg == sigalg) {
1232 if (!lu->enabled)
1233 return NULL;
1234 return lu;
1235 }
1236 }
1237 return NULL;
1238 }
1239 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX * ctx,const SIGALG_LOOKUP * lu,const EVP_MD ** pmd)1240 int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
1241 {
1242 const EVP_MD *md;
1243 if (lu == NULL)
1244 return 0;
1245 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
1246 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
1247 md = NULL;
1248 } else {
1249 md = ssl_md(ctx, lu->hash_idx);
1250 if (md == NULL)
1251 return 0;
1252 }
1253 if (pmd)
1254 *pmd = md;
1255 return 1;
1256 }
1257
1258 /*
1259 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
1260 *
1261 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
1262 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
1263 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
1264 */
1265 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_get_size(md) + 2)
rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX * ctx,const EVP_PKEY * pkey,const SIGALG_LOOKUP * lu)1266 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
1267 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1268 {
1269 const EVP_MD *md;
1270
1271 if (pkey == NULL)
1272 return 0;
1273 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md) || md == NULL)
1274 return 0;
1275 if (EVP_PKEY_get_size(pkey) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
1276 return 0;
1277 return 1;
1278 }
1279
1280 /*
1281 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
1282 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
1283 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
1284 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
1285 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
1286 */
tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL * s,int idx)1287 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
1288 {
1289 if (idx == -1) {
1290 if (s->server) {
1291 size_t i;
1292
1293 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
1294 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1295 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
1296
1297 if (clu == NULL)
1298 continue;
1299 if (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
1300 idx = i;
1301 break;
1302 }
1303 }
1304
1305 /*
1306 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
1307 * */
1308 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
1309 int real_idx;
1310
1311 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
1312 real_idx--) {
1313 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1314 idx = real_idx;
1315 break;
1316 }
1317 }
1318 }
1319 /*
1320 * As both SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 and SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 indices can be used
1321 * with new (aGOST12-only) ciphersuites, we should find out which one is available really.
1322 */
1323 else if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256) {
1324 int real_idx;
1325
1326 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
1327 real_idx--) {
1328 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1329 idx = real_idx;
1330 break;
1331 }
1332 }
1333 }
1334 } else {
1335 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
1336 }
1337 }
1338 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
1339 return NULL;
1340 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
1341 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
1342
1343 if (lu == NULL)
1344 return NULL;
1345 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
1346 return NULL;
1347 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1348 return NULL;
1349 return lu;
1350 }
1351 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, &legacy_rsa_sigalg))
1352 return NULL;
1353 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
1354 }
1355 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL * s,const EVP_PKEY * pkey)1356 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1357 {
1358 size_t idx;
1359 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1360
1361 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
1362 return 0;
1363 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
1364 if (lu == NULL)
1365 return 0;
1366 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1367 return 1;
1368 }
1369
tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL * s,int sent,const uint16_t ** psigs)1370 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
1371 {
1372 /*
1373 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1374 * preferences.
1375 */
1376 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1377 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1378 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1379 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
1380
1381 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1382 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1383 return 1;
1384
1385 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1386 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
1387 return 1;
1388 }
1389 /*
1390 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1391 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1392 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1393 */
1394 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
1395 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1396 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1397 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1398 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1399 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1400 } else {
1401 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1402 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1403 }
1404 }
1405
1406 /*
1407 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1408 * specified EC curve.
1409 */
tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL * s,int curve)1410 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve)
1411 {
1412 const uint16_t *sigs;
1413 size_t siglen, i;
1414
1415 if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1416 sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1417 siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1418 } else {
1419 sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1420 siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1421 }
1422
1423 for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
1424 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sigs[i]);
1425
1426 if (lu == NULL)
1427 continue;
1428 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC
1429 && lu->curve != NID_undef
1430 && curve == lu->curve)
1431 return 1;
1432 }
1433
1434 return 0;
1435 }
1436
1437 /*
1438 * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
1439 * error.
1440 */
sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX * ctx,const SIGALG_LOOKUP * lu)1441 static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1442 {
1443 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1444 int secbits = 0;
1445
1446 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md))
1447 return 0;
1448 if (md != NULL)
1449 {
1450 int md_type = EVP_MD_get_type(md);
1451
1452 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1453 secbits = EVP_MD_get_size(md) * 4;
1454 /*
1455 * SHA1 and MD5 are known to be broken. Reduce security bits so that
1456 * they're no longer accepted at security level 1. The real values don't
1457 * really matter as long as they're lower than 80, which is our
1458 * security level 1.
1459 * https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014 puts a chosen-prefix attack for
1460 * SHA1 at 2^63.4 and MD5+SHA1 at 2^67.2
1461 * https://documents.epfl.ch/users/l/le/lenstra/public/papers/lat.pdf
1462 * puts a chosen-prefix attack for MD5 at 2^39.
1463 */
1464 if (md_type == NID_sha1)
1465 secbits = 64;
1466 else if (md_type == NID_md5_sha1)
1467 secbits = 67;
1468 else if (md_type == NID_md5)
1469 secbits = 39;
1470 } else {
1471 /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
1472 if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519)
1473 secbits = 128;
1474 else if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448)
1475 secbits = 224;
1476 }
1477 return secbits;
1478 }
1479
1480 /*
1481 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1482 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1483 * s.
1484 */
tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL * s,uint16_t sig,EVP_PKEY * pkey)1485 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1486 {
1487 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1488 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1489 char sigalgstr[2];
1490 size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
1491 int pkeyid = -1;
1492 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1493 int secbits = 0;
1494
1495 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey);
1496 /* Should never happen */
1497 if (pkeyid == -1)
1498 return -1;
1499 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1500 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1501 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
1502 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1503 return 0;
1504 }
1505 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1506 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1507 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1508 }
1509 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sig);
1510 /*
1511 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1512 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1513 */
1514 if (lu == NULL
1515 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
1516 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
1517 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
1518 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1519 return 0;
1520 }
1521 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1522 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey), &cidx)
1523 || lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) {
1524 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1525 return 0;
1526 }
1527
1528 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1529
1530 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1531 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
1532 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1533 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
1534 return 0;
1535 }
1536
1537 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1538 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1539 int curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey);
1540
1541 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
1542 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1543 return 0;
1544 }
1545 }
1546 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1547 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1548 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) {
1549 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1550 return 0;
1551 }
1552 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1553 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1554 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1555 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
1556 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1557 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1558 return 0;
1559 }
1560 }
1561 }
1562 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1563 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1564 return 0;
1565 }
1566
1567 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1568 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1569 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1570 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1571 break;
1572 }
1573 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1574 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1575 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1576 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1577 return 0;
1578 }
1579 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) {
1580 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1581 return 0;
1582 }
1583 /*
1584 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1585 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1586 */
1587 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1588 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1589 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
1590 if (secbits == 0 ||
1591 !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
1592 md != NULL ? EVP_MD_get_type(md) : NID_undef,
1593 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1594 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1595 return 0;
1596 }
1597 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1598 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1599 return 1;
1600 }
1601
SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL * s,int * pnid)1602 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1603 {
1604 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1605 return 0;
1606 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1607 return 1;
1608 }
1609
SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL * s,int * pnid)1610 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1611 {
1612 if (s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
1613 return 0;
1614 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.sigalg->sig;
1615 return 1;
1616 }
1617
1618 /*
1619 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1620 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1621 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1622 *
1623 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1624 * by the client.
1625 *
1626 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1627 */
ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL * s)1628 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1629 {
1630 s->s3.tmp.mask_a = 0;
1631 s->s3.tmp.mask_k = 0;
1632 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3.tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1633 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3.tmp.min_ver,
1634 &s->s3.tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0)
1635 return 0;
1636 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1637 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1638 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1639 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1640 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1641 }
1642 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1643 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1644 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1645 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1646 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1647 }
1648 #endif
1649 return 1;
1650 }
1651
1652 /*
1653 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1654 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1655 * @c: cipher to check
1656 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1657 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1658 *
1659 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1660 */
ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL * s,const SSL_CIPHER * c,int op,int ecdhe)1661 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
1662 {
1663 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3.tmp.mask_k
1664 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3.tmp.mask_a)
1665 return 1;
1666 if (s->s3.tmp.max_ver == 0)
1667 return 1;
1668 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1669 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1670
1671 /*
1672 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1673 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1674 */
1675 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1676 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1677 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1678
1679 if ((min_tls > s->s3.tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3.tmp.min_ver))
1680 return 1;
1681 }
1682 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
1683 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.min_ver)))
1684 return 1;
1685
1686 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1687 }
1688
tls_use_ticket(SSL * s)1689 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1690 {
1691 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1692 return 0;
1693 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1694 }
1695
tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL * s)1696 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1697 {
1698 size_t i;
1699
1700 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1701 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1702 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1703 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1704 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1705 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1706 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1707 /*
1708 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1709 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1710 */
1711 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
1712 && s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1713 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1714 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1715
1716 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1717 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1718 size_t j;
1719
1720 if (lu == NULL)
1721 continue;
1722 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1723 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1724 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1725 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1726 break;
1727 }
1728 }
1729 }
1730 return 1;
1731 }
1732
1733 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1734 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1735 return 0;
1736 }
1737 if (s->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1738 return 1;
1739
1740 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1741 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1742 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1743 return 0;
1744 }
1745
1746 /*-
1747 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1748 *
1749 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1750 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1751 * point to the resulting session.
1752 */
tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL * s,CLIENTHELLO_MSG * hello,SSL_SESSION ** ret)1753 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1754 SSL_SESSION **ret)
1755 {
1756 size_t size;
1757 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1758
1759 *ret = NULL;
1760 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1761
1762 /*
1763 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1764 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1765 * resumption.
1766 */
1767 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1768 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1769
1770 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1771 if (!ticketext->present)
1772 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1773
1774 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1775
1776 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1777 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1778 }
1779
1780 /*-
1781 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1782 *
1783 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1784 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1785 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1786 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1787 *
1788 * Side effects:
1789 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1790 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1791 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1792 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1793 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1794 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1795 *
1796 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1797 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1798 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1799 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1800 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1801 * point to the resulting session.
1802 */
tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL * s,const unsigned char * etick,size_t eticklen,const unsigned char * sess_id,size_t sesslen,SSL_SESSION ** psess)1803 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1804 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1805 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1806 {
1807 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1808 unsigned char *sdec;
1809 const unsigned char *p;
1810 int slen, ivlen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1811 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1812 size_t mlen;
1813 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1814 SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
1815 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
1816 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1817
1818 if (eticklen == 0) {
1819 /*
1820 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1821 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1822 */
1823 ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1824 goto end;
1825 }
1826 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1827 /*
1828 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1829 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1830 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1831 * calculate the master secret later.
1832 */
1833 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1834 goto end;
1835 }
1836
1837 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1838 if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
1839 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1840 goto end;
1841 }
1842
1843 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1844 hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
1845 if (hctx == NULL) {
1846 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1847 goto end;
1848 }
1849 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1850 if (ctx == NULL) {
1851 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1852 goto end;
1853 }
1854 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1855 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1856 #else
1857 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1858 #endif
1859 {
1860 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1861 int rv = 0;
1862
1863 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1864 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(s, nctick,
1865 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1866 ctx,
1867 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
1868 0);
1869 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1870 else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1871 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
1872 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
1873 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1874 ctx, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 0);
1875 #endif
1876 if (rv < 0) {
1877 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1878 goto end;
1879 }
1880 if (rv == 0) {
1881 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1882 goto end;
1883 }
1884 if (rv == 2)
1885 renew_ticket = 1;
1886 } else {
1887 EVP_CIPHER *aes256cbc = NULL;
1888
1889 /* Check key name matches */
1890 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1891 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
1892 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1893 goto end;
1894 }
1895
1896 aes256cbc = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
1897 s->ctx->propq);
1898 if (aes256cbc == NULL
1899 || ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
1900 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
1901 "SHA256") <= 0
1902 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, aes256cbc, NULL,
1903 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
1904 etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
1905 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1906 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1907 goto end;
1908 }
1909 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1910 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1911 renew_ticket = 1;
1912 }
1913 /*
1914 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1915 * checks on ticket.
1916 */
1917 mlen = ssl_hmac_size(hctx);
1918 if (mlen == 0) {
1919 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1920 goto end;
1921 }
1922
1923 ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
1924 if (ivlen < 0) {
1925 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1926 goto end;
1927 }
1928
1929 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1930 if (eticklen <= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + ivlen + mlen) {
1931 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1932 goto end;
1933 }
1934 eticklen -= mlen;
1935 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1936 if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1937 || ssl_hmac_final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL, sizeof(tick_hmac)) <= 0) {
1938 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1939 goto end;
1940 }
1941
1942 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1943 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1944 goto end;
1945 }
1946 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1947 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1948 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + ivlen;
1949 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + ivlen;
1950 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1951 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1952 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1953 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
1954 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1955 goto end;
1956 }
1957 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1958 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
1959 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1960 goto end;
1961 }
1962 slen += declen;
1963 p = sdec;
1964
1965 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1966 slen -= p - sdec;
1967 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
1968 if (sess) {
1969 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1970 if (slen != 0) {
1971 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1972 sess = NULL;
1973 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1974 goto end;
1975 }
1976 /*
1977 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1978 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1979 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1980 * standard.
1981 */
1982 if (sesslen) {
1983 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1984 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1985 }
1986 if (renew_ticket)
1987 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1988 else
1989 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1990 goto end;
1991 }
1992 ERR_clear_error();
1993 /*
1994 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1995 */
1996 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1997
1998 end:
1999 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
2000 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
2001
2002 /*
2003 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
2004 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
2005 * performs any action
2006 */
2007 if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL
2008 && (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
2009 || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
2010 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2011 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)) {
2012 size_t keyname_len = eticklen;
2013 int retcb;
2014
2015 if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
2016 keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
2017 retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(s, sess, etick, keyname_len,
2018 ret,
2019 s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
2020 switch (retcb) {
2021 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT:
2022 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2023 break;
2024
2025 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE:
2026 ret = SSL_TICKET_NONE;
2027 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2028 sess = NULL;
2029 break;
2030
2031 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW:
2032 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_EMPTY && ret != SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
2033 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2034 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
2035 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2036 sess = NULL;
2037 break;
2038
2039 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE:
2040 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW:
2041 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2042 && ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)
2043 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2044 else if (retcb == SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE)
2045 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
2046 else
2047 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
2048 break;
2049
2050 default:
2051 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2052 }
2053 }
2054
2055 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2056 switch (ret) {
2057 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
2058 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
2059 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
2060 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
2061 }
2062 }
2063
2064 *psess = sess;
2065
2066 return ret;
2067 }
2068
2069 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL * s,int op,const SIGALG_LOOKUP * lu)2070 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2071 {
2072 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
2073 int secbits;
2074
2075 if (lu == NULL || !lu->enabled)
2076 return 0;
2077 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
2078 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2079 return 0;
2080 /*
2081 * At some point we should fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello as per TLS 1.3
2082 * spec
2083 */
2084 if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
2085 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
2086 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
2087 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
2088 return 0;
2089
2090 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
2091 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(s->ctx, lu->sig_idx))
2092 return 0;
2093
2094 if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2095 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
2096 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2097 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
2098 if (s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
2099 return 0;
2100 if (!s->server
2101 && s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
2102 && s->s3.tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
2103 int i, num;
2104 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
2105
2106 /*
2107 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
2108 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
2109 * ciphersuites enabled.
2110 */
2111
2112 if (s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
2113 return 0;
2114
2115 sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
2116 num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0;
2117 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
2118 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
2119
2120 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
2121 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2122 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
2123 continue;
2124
2125 if ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kGOST | SSL_kGOST18)) != 0)
2126 break;
2127 }
2128 if (i == num)
2129 return 0;
2130 }
2131 }
2132
2133 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
2134 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
2135 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
2136 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
2137 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
2138 }
2139
2140 /*
2141 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
2142 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
2143 * disabled.
2144 */
2145
ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t * pmask_a,SSL * s,int op)2146 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
2147 {
2148 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
2149 size_t i, sigalgslen;
2150 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
2151 /*
2152 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
2153 * in disabled_mask.
2154 */
2155 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
2156 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
2157 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *sigalgs);
2158 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
2159
2160 if (lu == NULL)
2161 continue;
2162
2163 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
2164 if (clu == NULL)
2165 continue;
2166
2167 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
2168 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
2169 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
2170 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
2171 }
2172 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
2173 }
2174
tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt,const uint16_t * psig,size_t psiglen)2175 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
2176 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
2177 {
2178 size_t i;
2179 int rv = 0;
2180
2181 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
2182 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *psig);
2183
2184 if (lu == NULL
2185 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
2186 continue;
2187 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
2188 return 0;
2189 /*
2190 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
2191 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
2192 */
2193 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2194 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
2195 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
2196 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
2197 rv = 1;
2198 }
2199 if (rv == 0)
2200 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2201 return rv;
2202 }
2203
2204 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL * s,const SIGALG_LOOKUP ** shsig,const uint16_t * pref,size_t preflen,const uint16_t * allow,size_t allowlen)2205 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
2206 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
2207 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
2208 {
2209 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
2210 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
2211 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
2212 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *ptmp);
2213
2214 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
2215 if (lu == NULL
2216 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
2217 continue;
2218 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
2219 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
2220 nmatch++;
2221 if (shsig)
2222 *shsig++ = lu;
2223 break;
2224 }
2225 }
2226 }
2227 return nmatch;
2228 }
2229
2230 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL * s)2231 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2232 {
2233 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
2234 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
2235 size_t nmatch;
2236 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
2237 CERT *c = s->cert;
2238 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
2239
2240 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
2241 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2242 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2243 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2244 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2245 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
2246 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
2247 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2248 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
2249 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
2250 } else
2251 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
2252 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
2253 pref = conf;
2254 preflen = conflen;
2255 allow = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2256 allowlen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2257 } else {
2258 allow = conf;
2259 allowlen = conflen;
2260 pref = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2261 preflen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2262 }
2263 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2264 if (nmatch) {
2265 if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL) {
2266 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2267 return 0;
2268 }
2269 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2270 } else {
2271 salgs = NULL;
2272 }
2273 s->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
2274 s->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
2275 return 1;
2276 }
2277
tls1_save_u16(PACKET * pkt,uint16_t ** pdest,size_t * pdestlen)2278 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
2279 {
2280 unsigned int stmp;
2281 size_t size, i;
2282 uint16_t *buf;
2283
2284 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2285
2286 /* Invalid data length */
2287 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
2288 return 0;
2289
2290 size >>= 1;
2291
2292 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL) {
2293 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2294 return 0;
2295 }
2296 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
2297 buf[i] = stmp;
2298
2299 if (i != size) {
2300 OPENSSL_free(buf);
2301 return 0;
2302 }
2303
2304 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
2305 *pdest = buf;
2306 *pdestlen = size;
2307
2308 return 1;
2309 }
2310
tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt,int cert)2311 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
2312 {
2313 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
2314 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2315 return 1;
2316 /* Should never happen */
2317 if (s->cert == NULL)
2318 return 0;
2319
2320 if (cert)
2321 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
2322 &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
2323 else
2324 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs,
2325 &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
2326
2327 }
2328
2329 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2330
tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL * s)2331 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2332 {
2333 size_t i;
2334 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags;
2335
2336 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
2337 return 0;
2338
2339 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2340 pvalid[i] = 0;
2341
2342 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2343 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2344 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
2345
2346 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
2347 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2348 continue;
2349 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
2350 if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(s->ctx, idx))
2351 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2352 }
2353 return 1;
2354 }
2355
SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL * s,int idx,int * psign,int * phash,int * psignhash,unsigned char * rsig,unsigned char * rhash)2356 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2357 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2358 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2359 {
2360 uint16_t *psig = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2361 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2362 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
2363 return 0;
2364 if (idx >= 0) {
2365 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2366
2367 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
2368 return 0;
2369 psig += idx;
2370 if (rhash != NULL)
2371 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
2372 if (rsig != NULL)
2373 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
2374 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *psig);
2375 if (psign != NULL)
2376 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
2377 if (phash != NULL)
2378 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
2379 if (psignhash != NULL)
2380 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
2381 }
2382 return (int)numsigalgs;
2383 }
2384
SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL * s,int idx,int * psign,int * phash,int * psignhash,unsigned char * rsig,unsigned char * rhash)2385 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2386 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2387 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2388 {
2389 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
2390 if (s->shared_sigalgs == NULL
2391 || idx < 0
2392 || idx >= (int)s->shared_sigalgslen
2393 || s->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
2394 return 0;
2395 shsigalgs = s->shared_sigalgs[idx];
2396 if (phash != NULL)
2397 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
2398 if (psign != NULL)
2399 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
2400 if (psignhash != NULL)
2401 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
2402 if (rsig != NULL)
2403 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
2404 if (rhash != NULL)
2405 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
2406 return (int)s->shared_sigalgslen;
2407 }
2408
2409 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
2410 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
2411
2412 typedef struct {
2413 size_t sigalgcnt;
2414 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
2415 uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
2416 } sig_cb_st;
2417
get_sigorhash(int * psig,int * phash,const char * str)2418 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
2419 {
2420 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
2421 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2422 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
2423 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
2424 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
2425 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2426 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2427 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2428 } else {
2429 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
2430 if (*phash == NID_undef)
2431 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
2432 }
2433 }
2434 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2435 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2436
sig_cb(const char * elem,int len,void * arg)2437 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
2438 {
2439 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
2440 size_t i;
2441 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
2442 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
2443 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
2444 if (elem == NULL)
2445 return 0;
2446 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
2447 return 0;
2448 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
2449 return 0;
2450 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
2451 etmp[len] = 0;
2452 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
2453 /*
2454 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2455 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2456 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2457 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2458 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2459 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2460 * in the table.
2461 */
2462 if (p == NULL) {
2463 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2464 i++, s++) {
2465 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
2466 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2467 break;
2468 }
2469 }
2470 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2471 return 0;
2472 } else {
2473 *p = 0;
2474 p++;
2475 if (*p == 0)
2476 return 0;
2477 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
2478 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
2479 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
2480 return 0;
2481 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2482 i++, s++) {
2483 if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
2484 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2485 break;
2486 }
2487 }
2488 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2489 return 0;
2490 }
2491
2492 /* Reject duplicates */
2493 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
2494 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
2495 sarg->sigalgcnt--;
2496 return 0;
2497 }
2498 }
2499 return 1;
2500 }
2501
2502 /*
2503 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2504 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2505 */
tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT * c,const char * str,int client)2506 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
2507 {
2508 sig_cb_st sig;
2509 sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
2510 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
2511 return 0;
2512 if (c == NULL)
2513 return 1;
2514 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
2515 }
2516
tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT * c,const uint16_t * psigs,size_t salglen,int client)2517 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen,
2518 int client)
2519 {
2520 uint16_t *sigalgs;
2521
2522 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2523 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2524 return 0;
2525 }
2526 memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
2527
2528 if (client) {
2529 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2530 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2531 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
2532 } else {
2533 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2534 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2535 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
2536 }
2537
2538 return 1;
2539 }
2540
tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT * c,const int * psig_nids,size_t salglen,int client)2541 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
2542 {
2543 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
2544 size_t i;
2545
2546 if (salglen & 1)
2547 return 0;
2548 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2549 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2550 return 0;
2551 }
2552 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
2553 size_t j;
2554 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
2555 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
2556 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
2557
2558 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2559 j++, curr++) {
2560 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
2561 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
2562 break;
2563 }
2564 }
2565
2566 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2567 goto err;
2568 }
2569
2570 if (client) {
2571 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2572 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2573 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2574 } else {
2575 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2576 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2577 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2578 }
2579
2580 return 1;
2581
2582 err:
2583 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
2584 return 0;
2585 }
2586
tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL * s,X509 * x,int default_nid)2587 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
2588 {
2589 int sig_nid, use_pc_sigalgs = 0;
2590 size_t i;
2591 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigalg;
2592 size_t sigalgslen;
2593 if (default_nid == -1)
2594 return 1;
2595 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2596 if (default_nid)
2597 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
2598
2599 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2600 /*
2601 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2602 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2603 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2604 */
2605 sigalgslen = s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen;
2606 use_pc_sigalgs = 1;
2607 } else {
2608 sigalgslen = s->shared_sigalgslen;
2609 }
2610 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++) {
2611 sigalg = use_pc_sigalgs
2612 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i])
2613 : s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2614 if (sigalg != NULL && sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash)
2615 return 1;
2616 }
2617 return 0;
2618 }
2619
2620 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF (X509_NAME)* names,X509 * x)2621 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
2622 {
2623 const X509_NAME *nm;
2624 int i;
2625 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
2626 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
2627 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
2628 return 1;
2629 }
2630 return 0;
2631 }
2632
2633 /*
2634 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2635 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2636 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2637 * attempting to use them.
2638 */
2639
2640 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2641
2642 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2643 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2644 /* Strict mode flags */
2645 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2646 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2647 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2648
tls1_check_chain(SSL * s,X509 * x,EVP_PKEY * pk,STACK_OF (X509)* chain,int idx)2649 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
2650 int idx)
2651 {
2652 int i;
2653 int rv = 0;
2654 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
2655 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
2656 CERT *c = s->cert;
2657 uint32_t *pvalid;
2658 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
2659 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2660 if (idx != -1) {
2661 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2662 if (idx == -2) {
2663 cpk = c->key;
2664 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
2665 } else
2666 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2667 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2668 x = cpk->x509;
2669 pk = cpk->privatekey;
2670 chain = cpk->chain;
2671 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
2672 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2673 if (!x || !pk)
2674 goto end;
2675 } else {
2676 size_t certidx;
2677
2678 if (!x || !pk)
2679 return 0;
2680
2681 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
2682 return 0;
2683 idx = certidx;
2684 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2685
2686 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
2687 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
2688 else
2689 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
2690 strict_mode = 1;
2691 }
2692
2693 if (suiteb_flags) {
2694 int ok;
2695 if (check_flags)
2696 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2697 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
2698 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
2699 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2700 else if (!check_flags)
2701 goto end;
2702 }
2703
2704 /*
2705 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2706 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2707 */
2708 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
2709 int default_nid;
2710 int rsign = 0;
2711 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
2712 || s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2713 default_nid = 0;
2714 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2715 } else {
2716 switch (idx) {
2717 case SSL_PKEY_RSA:
2718 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2719 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
2720 break;
2721
2722 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
2723 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2724 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
2725 break;
2726
2727 case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
2728 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2729 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
2730 break;
2731
2732 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
2733 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
2734 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
2735 break;
2736
2737 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
2738 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
2739 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
2740 break;
2741
2742 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
2743 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
2744 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
2745 break;
2746
2747 default:
2748 default_nid = -1;
2749 break;
2750 }
2751 }
2752 /*
2753 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2754 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2755 */
2756 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2757 size_t j;
2758 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2759 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2760 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *p);
2761
2762 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
2763 break;
2764 }
2765 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2766 if (check_flags)
2767 goto skip_sigs;
2768 else
2769 goto end;
2770 }
2771 }
2772 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2773 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2774 /*
2775 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2776 * so check_flags is always set.
2777 */
2778 if (find_sig_alg(s, x, pk) != NULL)
2779 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2780 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, x, default_nid)) {
2781 if (!check_flags)
2782 goto end;
2783 } else
2784 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2785 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2786 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2787 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2788 if (check_flags) {
2789 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2790 break;
2791 } else
2792 goto end;
2793 }
2794 }
2795 }
2796 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2797 else if (check_flags)
2798 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2799 skip_sigs:
2800 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2801 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2802 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2803 else if (!check_flags)
2804 goto end;
2805 if (!s->server)
2806 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2807 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2808 else if (strict_mode) {
2809 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2810 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2811 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2812 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2813 if (check_flags) {
2814 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2815 break;
2816 } else
2817 goto end;
2818 }
2819 }
2820 }
2821 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2822 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2823 int check_type = 0;
2824
2825 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "RSA"))
2826 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2827 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "DSA"))
2828 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2829 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "EC"))
2830 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2831
2832 if (check_type) {
2833 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3.tmp.ctype;
2834 size_t j;
2835
2836 for (j = 0; j < s->s3.tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2837 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2838 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2839 break;
2840 }
2841 }
2842 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2843 goto end;
2844 } else {
2845 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2846 }
2847
2848 ca_dn = s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names;
2849
2850 if (ca_dn == NULL
2851 || sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn) == 0
2852 || ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2853 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2854 else
2855 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2856 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2857
2858 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2859 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2860 break;
2861 }
2862 }
2863
2864 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2865 goto end;
2866 } else
2867 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2868
2869 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2870 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2871
2872 end:
2873
2874 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2875 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2876 else
2877 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2878
2879 /*
2880 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2881 * chain is invalid.
2882 */
2883 if (!check_flags) {
2884 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2885 *pvalid = rv;
2886 } else {
2887 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2888 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2889 return 0;
2890 }
2891 }
2892 return rv;
2893 }
2894
2895 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL * s)2896 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2897 {
2898 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2899 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2900 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2901 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2902 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2903 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2904 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2905 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2906 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448);
2907 }
2908
2909 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
SSL_check_chain(SSL * s,X509 * x,EVP_PKEY * pk,STACK_OF (X509)* chain)2910 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2911 {
2912 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2913 }
2914
ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL * s)2915 EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2916 {
2917 EVP_PKEY *dhp = NULL;
2918 BIGNUM *p;
2919 int dh_secbits = 80, sec_level_bits;
2920 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2921 OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = NULL;
2922 OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
2923
2924 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 2) {
2925 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2926 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2927 dh_secbits = 128;
2928 else
2929 dh_secbits = 80;
2930 } else {
2931 if (s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
2932 return NULL;
2933 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey);
2934 }
2935 }
2936
2937 /* Do not pick a prime that is too weak for the current security level */
2938 sec_level_bits = ssl_get_security_level_bits(s, NULL, NULL);
2939 if (dh_secbits < sec_level_bits)
2940 dh_secbits = sec_level_bits;
2941
2942 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2943 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2944 else if (dh_secbits >= 152)
2945 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL);
2946 else if (dh_secbits >= 128)
2947 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2948 else if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2949 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL);
2950 else
2951 p = BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL);
2952 if (p == NULL)
2953 goto err;
2954
2955 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(s->ctx->libctx, "DH", s->ctx->propq);
2956 if (pctx == NULL
2957 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx) != 1)
2958 goto err;
2959
2960 tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
2961 if (tmpl == NULL
2962 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p)
2963 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_uint(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, 2))
2964 goto err;
2965
2966 params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl);
2967 if (params == NULL
2968 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &dhp, EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, params) != 1)
2969 goto err;
2970
2971 err:
2972 OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
2973 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
2974 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2975 BN_free(p);
2976 return dhp;
2977 }
2978
ssl_security_cert_key(SSL * s,SSL_CTX * ctx,X509 * x,int op)2979 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2980 {
2981 int secbits = -1;
2982 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2983 if (pkey) {
2984 /*
2985 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2986 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2987 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2988 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2989 */
2990 secbits = EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkey);
2991 }
2992 if (s)
2993 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2994 else
2995 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2996 }
2997
ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL * s,SSL_CTX * ctx,X509 * x,int op)2998 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2999 {
3000 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
3001 int secbits, nid, pknid;
3002 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
3003 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
3004 return 1;
3005 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
3006 secbits = -1;
3007 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
3008 if (nid == NID_undef)
3009 nid = pknid;
3010 if (s)
3011 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
3012 else
3013 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
3014 }
3015
ssl_security_cert(SSL * s,SSL_CTX * ctx,X509 * x,int vfy,int is_ee)3016 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
3017 {
3018 if (vfy)
3019 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
3020 if (is_ee) {
3021 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
3022 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
3023 } else {
3024 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
3025 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
3026 }
3027 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
3028 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
3029 return 1;
3030 }
3031
3032 /*
3033 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
3034 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
3035 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
3036 */
3037
ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL * s,STACK_OF (X509)* sk,X509 * x,int vfy)3038 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
3039 {
3040 int rv, start_idx, i;
3041 if (x == NULL) {
3042 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
3043 if (x == NULL)
3044 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3045 start_idx = 1;
3046 } else
3047 start_idx = 0;
3048
3049 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
3050 if (rv != 1)
3051 return rv;
3052
3053 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
3054 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
3055 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
3056 if (rv != 1)
3057 return rv;
3058 }
3059 return 1;
3060 }
3061
3062 /*
3063 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
3064 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
3065 */
3066
tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL * s,const SIGALG_LOOKUP * lu)3067 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
3068 {
3069 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3070 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
3071
3072 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
3073 if (clu == NULL
3074 || (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0
3075 || (clu->nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
3076 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
3077 return -1;
3078
3079 return s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
3080 }
3081
3082 /*
3083 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
3084 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
3085 * the key.
3086 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
3087 */
check_cert_usable(SSL * s,const SIGALG_LOOKUP * sig,X509 * x,EVP_PKEY * pkey)3088 static int check_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
3089 EVP_PKEY *pkey)
3090 {
3091 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
3092 int mdnid, pknid, supported;
3093 size_t i;
3094 const char *mdname = NULL;
3095
3096 /*
3097 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot support signing with this digest,
3098 * the answer is simply 'no'.
3099 */
3100 if (sig->hash != NID_undef)
3101 mdname = OBJ_nid2sn(sig->hash);
3102 supported = EVP_PKEY_digestsign_supports_digest(pkey, s->ctx->libctx,
3103 mdname,
3104 s->ctx->propq);
3105 if (supported <= 0)
3106 return 0;
3107
3108 /*
3109 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
3110 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
3111 */
3112 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
3113 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &mdnid, &pknid, NULL, NULL))
3114 return 0;
3115 for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
3116 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
3117 if (lu == NULL)
3118 continue;
3119
3120 /*
3121 * This does not differentiate between the
3122 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
3123 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
3124 * signing certificate.
3125 */
3126 if (mdnid == lu->hash && pknid == lu->sig)
3127 return 1;
3128 }
3129 return 0;
3130 }
3131
3132 /*
3133 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
3134 * a viable public key is permitted.
3135 */
3136 return 1;
3137 }
3138
3139 /*
3140 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
3141 * with signature scheme |sig|.
3142 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
3143 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
3144 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
3145 */
has_usable_cert(SSL * s,const SIGALG_LOOKUP * sig,int idx)3146 static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
3147 {
3148 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
3149 if (idx == -1)
3150 idx = sig->sig_idx;
3151 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
3152 return 0;
3153
3154 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509,
3155 s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
3156 }
3157
3158 /*
3159 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
3160 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
3161 */
is_cert_usable(SSL * s,const SIGALG_LOOKUP * sig,X509 * x,EVP_PKEY * pkey)3162 static int is_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
3163 EVP_PKEY *pkey)
3164 {
3165 size_t idx;
3166
3167 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
3168 return 0;
3169
3170 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
3171 if ((int)idx != sig->sig_idx)
3172 return 0;
3173
3174 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, x, pkey);
3175 }
3176
3177 /*
3178 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
3179 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
3180 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
3181 */
find_sig_alg(SSL * s,X509 * x,EVP_PKEY * pkey)3182 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
3183 {
3184 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
3185 size_t i;
3186 int curve = -1;
3187 EVP_PKEY *tmppkey;
3188
3189 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
3190 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3191 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3192
3193 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
3194 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
3195 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
3196 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
3197 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3198 continue;
3199 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
3200 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
3201 continue;
3202 if ((pkey == NULL && !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
3203 || (pkey != NULL && !is_cert_usable(s, lu, x, pkey)))
3204 continue;
3205
3206 tmppkey = (pkey != NULL) ? pkey
3207 : s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
3208
3209 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3210 if (curve == -1)
3211 curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(tmppkey);
3212 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
3213 continue;
3214 } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
3215 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3216 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, tmppkey, lu))
3217 continue;
3218 }
3219 break;
3220 }
3221
3222 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen)
3223 return NULL;
3224
3225 return lu;
3226 }
3227
3228 /*
3229 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
3230 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
3231 *
3232 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
3233 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
3234 *
3235 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
3236 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
3237 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
3238 */
tls_choose_sigalg(SSL * s,int fatalerrs)3239 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
3240 {
3241 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
3242 int sig_idx = -1;
3243
3244 s->s3.tmp.cert = NULL;
3245 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = NULL;
3246
3247 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3248 lu = find_sig_alg(s, NULL, NULL);
3249 if (lu == NULL) {
3250 if (!fatalerrs)
3251 return 1;
3252 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3253 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3254 return 0;
3255 }
3256 } else {
3257 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
3258 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
3259 return 1;
3260 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
3261 return 1;
3262
3263 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3264 size_t i;
3265 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
3266 int curve = -1;
3267
3268 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
3269 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
3270 curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]
3271 .privatekey);
3272
3273 /*
3274 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
3275 * cert type
3276 */
3277 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3278 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3279
3280 if (s->server) {
3281 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
3282 continue;
3283 } else {
3284 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
3285
3286 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3287 if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
3288 continue;
3289 }
3290 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
3291 if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
3292 continue;
3293 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
3294 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3295 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
3296
3297 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, pkey, lu))
3298 continue;
3299 }
3300 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
3301 break;
3302 }
3303 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3304 /*
3305 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
3306 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
3307 * we have to assume GOST support.
3308 */
3309 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) {
3310 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3311 if (!fatalerrs)
3312 return 1;
3313 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3314 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3315 return 0;
3316 } else {
3317 i = 0;
3318 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3319 }
3320 }
3321 #endif
3322 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
3323 if (!fatalerrs)
3324 return 1;
3325 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3326 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3327 return 0;
3328 }
3329 } else {
3330 /*
3331 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
3332 */
3333 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
3334 size_t sent_sigslen;
3335
3336 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3337 if (!fatalerrs)
3338 return 1;
3339 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3340 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3341 return 0;
3342 }
3343
3344 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
3345 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
3346 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
3347 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
3348 && has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
3349 break;
3350 }
3351 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
3352 if (!fatalerrs)
3353 return 1;
3354 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3355 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3356 return 0;
3357 }
3358 }
3359 } else {
3360 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3361 if (!fatalerrs)
3362 return 1;
3363 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3364 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3365 return 0;
3366 }
3367 }
3368 }
3369 if (sig_idx == -1)
3370 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3371 s->s3.tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
3372 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3373 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = lu;
3374 return 1;
3375 }
3376
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX * ctx,uint8_t mode)3377 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode)
3378 {
3379 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3380 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3381 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3382 return 0;
3383 }
3384
3385 ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3386 return 1;
3387 }
3388
SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL * ssl,uint8_t mode)3389 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
3390 {
3391 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3392 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3393 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3394 return 0;
3395 }
3396
3397 ssl->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3398 return 1;
3399 }
3400
SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION * session)3401 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session)
3402 {
3403 return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;
3404 }
3405
3406 /*
3407 * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
3408 */
ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX * ctx)3409 SSL_HMAC *ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
3410 {
3411 SSL_HMAC *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
3412 EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
3413
3414 if (ret == NULL)
3415 return NULL;
3416 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3417 if (ctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb == NULL
3418 && ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
3419 if (!ssl_hmac_old_new(ret))
3420 goto err;
3421 return ret;
3422 }
3423 #endif
3424 mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx->libctx, "HMAC", ctx->propq);
3425 if (mac == NULL || (ret->ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac)) == NULL)
3426 goto err;
3427 EVP_MAC_free(mac);
3428 return ret;
3429 err:
3430 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ret->ctx);
3431 EVP_MAC_free(mac);
3432 OPENSSL_free(ret);
3433 return NULL;
3434 }
3435
ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC * ctx)3436 void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3437 {
3438 if (ctx != NULL) {
3439 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
3440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3441 ssl_hmac_old_free(ctx);
3442 #endif
3443 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
3444 }
3445 }
3446
ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC * ctx)3447 EVP_MAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3448 {
3449 return ctx->ctx;
3450 }
3451
ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC * ctx,void * key,size_t len,char * md)3452 int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC *ctx, void *key, size_t len, char *md)
3453 {
3454 OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
3455
3456 if (ctx->ctx != NULL) {
3457 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST, md, 0);
3458 *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3459 if (EVP_MAC_init(ctx->ctx, key, len, params))
3460 return 1;
3461 }
3462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3463 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3464 return ssl_hmac_old_init(ctx, key, len, md);
3465 #endif
3466 return 0;
3467 }
3468
ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC * ctx,const unsigned char * data,size_t len)3469 int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
3470 {
3471 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3472 return EVP_MAC_update(ctx->ctx, data, len);
3473 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3474 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3475 return ssl_hmac_old_update(ctx, data, len);
3476 #endif
3477 return 0;
3478 }
3479
ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC * ctx,unsigned char * md,size_t * len,size_t max_size)3480 int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC *ctx, unsigned char *md, size_t *len,
3481 size_t max_size)
3482 {
3483 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3484 return EVP_MAC_final(ctx->ctx, md, len, max_size);
3485 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3486 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3487 return ssl_hmac_old_final(ctx, md, len);
3488 #endif
3489 return 0;
3490 }
3491
ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC * ctx)3492 size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3493 {
3494 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3495 return EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(ctx->ctx);
3496 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3497 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3498 return ssl_hmac_old_size(ctx);
3499 #endif
3500 return 0;
3501 }
3502
ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(const EVP_PKEY * pkey)3503 int ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
3504 {
3505 char gname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
3506
3507 if (EVP_PKEY_get_group_name(pkey, gname, sizeof(gname), NULL) > 0)
3508 return OBJ_txt2nid(gname);
3509
3510 return NID_undef;
3511 }
3512
tls13_set_encoded_pub_key(EVP_PKEY * pkey,const unsigned char * enckey,size_t enckeylen)3513 __owur int tls13_set_encoded_pub_key(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
3514 const unsigned char *enckey,
3515 size_t enckeylen)
3516 {
3517 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "DH")) {
3518 int bits = EVP_PKEY_get_bits(pkey);
3519
3520 if (bits <= 0 || enckeylen != (size_t)bits / 8)
3521 /* the encoded key must be padded to the length of the p */
3522 return 0;
3523 } else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC")) {
3524 if (enckeylen < 3 /* point format and at least 1 byte for x and y */
3525 || enckey[0] != 0x04)
3526 return 0;
3527 }
3528
3529 return EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(pkey, enckey, enckeylen);
3530 }
3531