1 /* $OpenBSD: x509_vfy.c,v 1.103 2022/08/31 07:15:31 tb Exp $ */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58
59 #include <errno.h>
60 #include <stdio.h>
61 #include <string.h>
62 #include <time.h>
63 #include <unistd.h>
64
65 #include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
66
67 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
68 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
69 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
70 #include <openssl/err.h>
71 #include <openssl/evp.h>
72 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
73 #include <openssl/objects.h>
74 #include <openssl/x509.h>
75 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
76 #include "asn1_locl.h"
77 #include "vpm_int.h"
78 #include "x509_internal.h"
79
80 /* CRL score values */
81
82 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
83
84 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
85
86 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
87
88 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
89
90 /* CRL times valid */
91
92 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
93
94 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
95
96 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
97
98 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
99
100 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
101
102 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
103
104 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
105
106 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
107
108 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
109
110 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
111
112 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
113
114 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
115
116 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
117
118 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
119 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
120 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x,
121 int allow_expired);
122 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
123 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
124 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
125 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
126 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, int depth);
127 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
128
129 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
130 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
131 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
132 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
133 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
134 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
135 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
136 int *pcrl_score);
137 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
138 unsigned int *preasons);
139 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
140 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
141 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
142 static int X509_cmp_time_internal(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time,
143 int clamp_notafter);
144
145 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
146 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
147 static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
148 static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth, int err);
149
150 int ASN1_time_tm_clamp_notafter(struct tm *tm);
151
152 static int
null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX * e)153 null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
154 {
155 return ok;
156 }
157
158 #if 0
159 static int
160 x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
161 {
162 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a, *b);
163 }
164 #endif
165
166 /* Return 1 if a certificate is self signed */
167 static int
cert_self_signed(X509 * x)168 cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
169 {
170 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
171 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
172 return 1;
173 else
174 return 0;
175 }
176
177 static int
check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int errcode)178 check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
179 {
180 ctx->error = errcode;
181 ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
182 ctx->error_depth = 0;
183 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
184 }
185
186 static int
check_hosts(X509 * x,X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID * id)187 check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id)
188 {
189 int i, n;
190 char *name;
191
192 n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts);
193 free(id->peername);
194 id->peername = NULL;
195
196 for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
197 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i);
198 if (X509_check_host(x, name, strlen(name), id->hostflags,
199 &id->peername) > 0)
200 return 1;
201 }
202 return n == 0;
203 }
204
205 static int
check_id(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)206 check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
207 {
208 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
209 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
210 X509 *x = ctx->cert;
211
212 if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0) {
213 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
214 return 0;
215 }
216 if (id->email != NULL && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0)
217 <= 0) {
218 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
219 return 0;
220 }
221 if (id->ip != NULL && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
222 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
223 return 0;
224 }
225 return 1;
226 }
227
228 int
x509_vfy_check_id(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)229 x509_vfy_check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
230 return check_id(ctx);
231 }
232
233 /*
234 * This is the effectively broken legacy OpenSSL chain builder. It
235 * might find an unvalidated chain and leave it sitting in
236 * ctx->chain. It does not correctly handle many cases where multiple
237 * chains could exist.
238 *
239 * Oh no.. I know a dirty word...
240 * Oooooooh..
241 */
242 static int
X509_verify_cert_legacy_build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int * bad,int * out_ok)243 X509_verify_cert_legacy_build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int *bad, int *out_ok)
244 {
245 X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL;
246 int bad_chain = 0;
247 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
248 int ok = 0, ret = 0;
249 int depth, i;
250 int num, j, retry, trust;
251 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
252 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
253
254 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
255
256 /*
257 * First we make sure the chain we are going to build is
258 * present and that the first entry is in place.
259 */
260 ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null();
261 if (ctx->chain == NULL || !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert)) {
262 X509error(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
263 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
264 goto end;
265 }
266 X509_up_ref(ctx->cert);
267 ctx->num_untrusted = 1;
268
269 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
270 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL &&
271 (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
272 X509error(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
273 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
274 goto end;
275 }
276
277 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
278 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
279 depth = param->depth;
280
281 for (;;) {
282 /* If we have enough, we break */
283 /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
284 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
285 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
286 * later.
287 */
288 if (depth < num)
289 break;
290 /* If we are self signed, we break */
291 if (cert_self_signed(x))
292 break;
293 /*
294 * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
295 */
296 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
297 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
298 if (ok < 0) {
299 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
300 goto end;
301 }
302 /*
303 * If successful for now free up cert so it
304 * will be picked up again later.
305 */
306 if (ok > 0) {
307 X509_free(xtmp);
308 break;
309 }
310 }
311 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
312 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) {
313 /*
314 * If we do not find a non-expired untrusted cert, peek
315 * ahead and see if we can satisify this from the trusted
316 * store. If not, see if we have an expired untrusted cert.
317 */
318 xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x, 0);
319 if (xtmp == NULL &&
320 !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)) {
321 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
322 if (ok < 0) {
323 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
324 goto end;
325 }
326 if (ok > 0) {
327 X509_free(xtmp);
328 break;
329 }
330 xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x, 1);
331 }
332 if (xtmp != NULL) {
333 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
334 X509error(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
335 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
336 ok = 0;
337 goto end;
338 }
339 X509_up_ref(xtmp);
340 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
341 ctx->num_untrusted++;
342 x = xtmp;
343 num++;
344 /*
345 * reparse the full chain for the next one
346 */
347 continue;
348 }
349 }
350 break;
351 }
352 /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
353 j = num;
354
355 /*
356 * At this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
357 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
358 * if possible, otherwise we complain.
359 */
360
361 do {
362 /*
363 * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is
364 * self signed.
365 */
366 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
367 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
368 if (cert_self_signed(x)) {
369 /* we have a self signed certificate */
370 if (i == 1) {
371 /*
372 * We have a single self signed
373 * certificate: see if we can find it
374 * in the store. We must have an exact
375 * match to avoid possible
376 * impersonation.
377 */
378 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
379 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
380 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
381 ctx->current_cert = x;
382 ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
383 if (ok == 1)
384 X509_free(xtmp);
385 bad_chain = 1;
386 ok = cb(0, ctx);
387 if (!ok)
388 goto end;
389 } else {
390 /*
391 * We have a match: replace
392 * certificate with store
393 * version so we get any trust
394 * settings.
395 */
396 X509_free(x);
397 x = xtmp;
398 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
399 ctx->num_untrusted = 0;
400 }
401 } else {
402 /*
403 * extract and save self signed
404 * certificate for later use
405 */
406 chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
407 ctx->num_untrusted--;
408 num--;
409 j--;
410 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
411 }
412 }
413 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
414 for (;;) {
415 /* If we have enough, we break */
416 if (depth < num)
417 break;
418 /* If we are self signed, we break */
419 if (cert_self_signed(x))
420 break;
421 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
422
423 if (ok < 0) {
424 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
425 goto end;
426 }
427 if (ok == 0)
428 break;
429 x = xtmp;
430 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
431 X509_free(xtmp);
432 X509error(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
433 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
434 ok = 0;
435 goto end;
436 }
437 num++;
438 }
439
440 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
441 trust = check_trust(ctx);
442
443 /* If explicitly rejected error */
444 if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
445 ok = 0;
446 goto end;
447 }
448 /*
449 * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there
450 * is an alternative chain that could be used. We only
451 * do this if we haven't already checked via
452 * TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off
453 * alternate chain checking
454 */
455 retry = 0;
456 if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED &&
457 !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) &&
458 !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
459 while (j-- > 1) {
460 xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
461 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
462 if (ok < 0)
463 goto end;
464 /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
465 if (ok > 0) {
466 /*
467 * Free up the found cert
468 * we'll add it again later
469 */
470 X509_free(xtmp);
471 /*
472 * Dump all the certs above
473 * this point - we've found an
474 * alternate chain
475 */
476 while (num > j) {
477 xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
478 X509_free(xtmp);
479 num--;
480 }
481 ctx->num_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
482 retry = 1;
483 break;
484 }
485 }
486 }
487 } while (retry);
488
489 /*
490 * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
491 * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
492 * and set bad_chain == 1
493 */
494 if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) {
495 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
496 if (ctx->num_untrusted >= num)
497 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
498 else
499 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
500 ctx->current_cert = x;
501 } else {
502 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss)) {
503 X509error(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
504 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
505 ok = 0;
506 goto end;
507 }
508 num++;
509 ctx->num_untrusted = num;
510 ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
511 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
512 chain_ss = NULL;
513 }
514
515 ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
516 bad_chain = 1;
517 ok = cb(0, ctx);
518 if (!ok)
519 goto end;
520 }
521
522 ret = 1;
523 end:
524 sk_X509_free(sktmp);
525 X509_free(chain_ss);
526 *bad = bad_chain;
527 *out_ok = ok;
528
529 return ret;
530 }
531
532 static int
X509_verify_cert_legacy(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)533 X509_verify_cert_legacy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
534 {
535 int ok = 0, bad_chain;
536
537 ctx->error = X509_V_OK; /* Initialize to OK */
538
539 if (!X509_verify_cert_legacy_build_chain(ctx, &bad_chain, &ok))
540 goto end;
541
542 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
543 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
544 if (!ok)
545 goto end;
546
547 /* Check that the chain satisfies the security level. */
548 ok = x509_vfy_check_security_level(ctx);
549 if (!ok)
550 goto end;
551
552 /* Check name constraints */
553 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
554 if (!ok)
555 goto end;
556
557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
558 ok = X509v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
559 if (!ok)
560 goto end;
561
562 ok = X509v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
563 if (!ok)
564 goto end;
565 #endif
566
567 ok = check_id(ctx);
568 if (!ok)
569 goto end;
570
571 /*
572 * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
573 * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
574 */
575 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
576 if (!ok)
577 goto end;
578
579 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
580 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
581 ok = ctx->verify(ctx);
582 else
583 ok = internal_verify(ctx);
584 if (!ok)
585 goto end;
586
587 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
588 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
589 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
590
591 end:
592 /* Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error */
593 if (ok <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK)
594 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
595
596 return ok;
597 }
598
599 int
X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)600 X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
601 {
602 STACK_OF(X509) *roots = NULL;
603 struct x509_verify_ctx *vctx = NULL;
604 int chain_count = 0;
605
606 if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
607 X509error(X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
608 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
609 return -1;
610 }
611 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
612 /*
613 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify
614 * a cert. We cannot do another one.
615 */
616 X509error(ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
617 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
618 return -1;
619 }
620 if (ctx->param->id->poisoned) {
621 /*
622 * This X509_STORE_CTX had failures setting
623 * up verify parameters. We can not use it.
624 */
625 X509error(ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
626 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
627 return -1;
628 }
629 if (ctx->error != X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL) {
630 /*
631 * This X509_STORE_CTX has not been properly initialized.
632 */
633 X509error(ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
634 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
635 return -1;
636 }
637
638 /*
639 * If the certificate's public key is too weak, don't bother
640 * continuing.
641 */
642 if (!check_key_level(ctx, ctx->cert) &&
643 !verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL))
644 return 0;
645
646 /*
647 * If flags request legacy, use the legacy verifier. If we
648 * requested "no alt chains" from the age of hammer pants, use
649 * the legacy verifier because the multi chain verifier really
650 * does find all the "alt chains".
651 *
652 * XXX deprecate the NO_ALT_CHAINS flag?
653 */
654 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_LEGACY_VERIFY) ||
655 (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS))
656 return X509_verify_cert_legacy(ctx);
657
658 /* Use the modern multi-chain verifier from x509_verify_cert */
659
660 if ((vctx = x509_verify_ctx_new_from_xsc(ctx)) != NULL) {
661 ctx->error = X509_V_OK; /* Initialize to OK */
662 chain_count = x509_verify(vctx, NULL, NULL);
663 }
664 x509_verify_ctx_free(vctx);
665
666 sk_X509_pop_free(roots, X509_free);
667
668 /* if we succeed we have a chain in ctx->chain */
669 return (chain_count > 0 && ctx->chain != NULL);
670 }
671
672 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
673 */
674
675 static X509 *
find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* sk,X509 * x,int allow_expired)676 find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x,
677 int allow_expired)
678 {
679 int i;
680 X509 *issuer, *rv = NULL;
681
682 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
683 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
684 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) {
685 if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, issuer, -1))
686 return issuer;
687 if (allow_expired)
688 rv = issuer;
689 }
690 }
691 return rv;
692 }
693
694 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
695
696 static int
check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x,X509 * issuer)697 check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
698 {
699 int ret;
700
701 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
702 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
703 return 1;
704 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
705 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
706 return 0;
707
708 ctx->error = ret;
709 ctx->current_cert = x;
710 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
711 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
712 }
713
714 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
715
716 static int
get_issuer_sk(X509 ** issuer,X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)717 get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
718 {
719 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x, 1);
720 if (*issuer) {
721 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
722 return 1;
723 } else
724 return 0;
725 }
726
727 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
728 * with the supplied purpose
729 */
730
731 int
x509_vfy_check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)732 x509_vfy_check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
733 {
734 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
735 return 1;
736 #else
737 int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
738 X509 *x;
739 int (*cb)(int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
740 int proxy_path_length = 0;
741 int purpose;
742 int allow_proxy_certs;
743
744 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
745
746 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
747 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
748 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
749 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
750 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
751 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
752 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
753 */
754 must_be_ca = -1;
755
756 /* CRL path validation */
757 if (ctx->parent) {
758 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
759 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
760 } else {
761 allow_proxy_certs =
762 !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
763 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
764 }
765
766 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
767 for (i = 0; i < ctx->num_untrusted; i++) {
768 int ret;
769 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
770 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) &&
771 (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
772 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
773 ctx->error_depth = i;
774 ctx->current_cert = x;
775 ok = cb(0, ctx);
776 if (!ok)
777 goto end;
778 }
779 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
780 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
781 ctx->error_depth = i;
782 ctx->current_cert = x;
783 ok = cb(0, ctx);
784 if (!ok)
785 goto end;
786 }
787 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
788 switch (must_be_ca) {
789 case -1:
790 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) &&
791 (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
792 ret = 0;
793 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
794 } else
795 ret = 1;
796 break;
797 case 0:
798 if (ret != 0) {
799 ret = 0;
800 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
801 } else
802 ret = 1;
803 break;
804 default:
805 if ((ret == 0) ||
806 ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) &&
807 (ret != 1))) {
808 ret = 0;
809 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
810 } else
811 ret = 1;
812 break;
813 }
814 if (ret == 0) {
815 ctx->error_depth = i;
816 ctx->current_cert = x;
817 ok = cb(0, ctx);
818 if (!ok)
819 goto end;
820 }
821 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
822 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
823 if ((ret == 0) ||
824 ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) &&
825 (ret != 1))) {
826 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
827 ctx->error_depth = i;
828 ctx->current_cert = x;
829 ok = cb(0, ctx);
830 if (!ok)
831 goto end;
832 }
833 }
834 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
835 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) &&
836 (x->ex_pathlen != -1) &&
837 (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
838 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
839 ctx->error_depth = i;
840 ctx->current_cert = x;
841 ok = cb(0, ctx);
842 if (!ok)
843 goto end;
844 }
845 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
846 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
847 plen++;
848 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
849 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
850 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a
851 CA certificate. */
852 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
853 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
854 ctx->error =
855 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
856 ctx->error_depth = i;
857 ctx->current_cert = x;
858 ok = cb(0, ctx);
859 if (!ok)
860 goto end;
861 }
862 proxy_path_length++;
863 must_be_ca = 0;
864 } else
865 must_be_ca = 1;
866 }
867 ok = 1;
868
869 end:
870 return ok;
871 #endif
872 }
873
874 static int
check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)875 check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
876 return x509_vfy_check_chain_extensions(ctx);
877 }
878
879 static int
check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)880 check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
881 {
882 if (!x509_constraints_chain(ctx->chain, &ctx->error,
883 &ctx->error_depth)) {
884 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
885 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
886 return 0;
887 }
888 return 1;
889 }
890
891 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
892
893 static X509 *
lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)894 lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
895 {
896 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
897 X509 *xtmp = NULL;
898 size_t i;
899
900 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
901 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
902 if (certs == NULL)
903 return NULL;
904
905 /* Look for exact match */
906 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
907 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
908 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
909 break;
910 }
911
912 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
913 X509_up_ref(xtmp);
914 else
915 xtmp = NULL;
916
917 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
918 return xtmp;
919 }
920
921 X509 *
x509_vfy_lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)922 x509_vfy_lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
923 {
924 if (ctx->lookup_certs == NULL || ctx->store == NULL ||
925 ctx->store->objs == NULL)
926 return NULL;
927 return lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
928 }
929
930 static int
check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)931 check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
932 {
933 size_t i;
934 int ok;
935 X509 *x = NULL;
936 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
937
938 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
939 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
940 for (i = ctx->num_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
941 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
942 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
943
944 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
945 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
946 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
947 /*
948 * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
949 * overridden.
950 */
951 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
952 ctx->error_depth = i;
953 ctx->current_cert = x;
954 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
955 ok = cb(0, ctx);
956 if (!ok)
957 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
958 }
959 }
960 /*
961 * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
962 * return success.
963 */
964 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
965 X509 *mx;
966 if (ctx->num_untrusted < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
967 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
968 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
969 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
970 if (mx) {
971 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
972 X509_free(x);
973 ctx->num_untrusted = 0;
974 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
975 }
976 }
977
978 /*
979 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
980 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
981 */
982 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
983 }
984
985 int
x509_vfy_check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)986 x509_vfy_check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
987 {
988 return check_trust(ctx);
989 }
990
991 static int
check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)992 check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
993 {
994 int i, last, ok;
995
996 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
997 return 1;
998 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
999 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1000 else {
1001 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
1002 if (ctx->parent)
1003 return 1;
1004 last = 0;
1005 }
1006 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
1007 ok = check_cert(ctx, ctx->chain, i);
1008 if (!ok)
1009 return ok;
1010 }
1011 return 1;
1012 }
1013
1014 int
x509_vfy_check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1015 x509_vfy_check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1016 {
1017 return check_revocation(ctx);
1018 }
1019
1020 static int
check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* chain,int depth)1021 check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, int depth)
1022 {
1023 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1024 X509 *x;
1025 int ok = 0, cnum;
1026 unsigned int last_reasons;
1027
1028 cnum = ctx->error_depth = depth;
1029 x = sk_X509_value(chain, cnum);
1030 ctx->current_cert = x;
1031 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
1032 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
1033 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
1034 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
1035 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1036 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
1037 if (ctx->get_crl)
1038 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
1039 else
1040 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
1041 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
1042 * notify callback
1043 */
1044 if (!ok) {
1045 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
1046 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1047 goto err;
1048 }
1049 ctx->current_crl = crl;
1050 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
1051 if (!ok)
1052 goto err;
1053
1054 if (dcrl) {
1055 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
1056 if (!ok)
1057 goto err;
1058 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
1059 if (!ok)
1060 goto err;
1061 } else
1062 ok = 1;
1063
1064 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
1065 if (ok != 2) {
1066 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
1067 if (!ok)
1068 goto err;
1069 }
1070
1071 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
1072 X509_CRL_free(crl);
1073 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
1074 crl = NULL;
1075 dcrl = NULL;
1076 /* If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by
1077 * another iteration, so exit loop.
1078 */
1079 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
1080 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
1081 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1082 goto err;
1083 }
1084 }
1085
1086 err:
1087 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
1088 X509_CRL_free(crl);
1089 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
1090 return ok;
1091 }
1092
1093 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
1094
1095 static int
check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl,int notify)1096 check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
1097 {
1098 time_t *ptime;
1099 int i;
1100
1101 if (notify)
1102 ctx->current_crl = crl;
1103 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1104 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1105 else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
1106 return (1);
1107 else
1108 ptime = NULL;
1109
1110 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
1111 if (i == 0) {
1112 if (!notify)
1113 return 0;
1114 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
1115 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1116 return 0;
1117 }
1118
1119 if (i > 0) {
1120 if (!notify)
1121 return 0;
1122 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
1123 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1124 return 0;
1125 }
1126
1127 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) {
1128 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
1129
1130 if (i == 0) {
1131 if (!notify)
1132 return 0;
1133 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
1134 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1135 return 0;
1136 }
1137 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
1138 if ((i < 0) &&
1139 !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
1140 if (!notify)
1141 return 0;
1142 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
1143 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1144 return 0;
1145 }
1146 }
1147
1148 if (notify)
1149 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
1150
1151 return 1;
1152 }
1153
1154 static int
get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL ** pcrl,X509_CRL ** pdcrl,X509 ** pissuer,int * pscore,unsigned int * preasons,STACK_OF (X509_CRL)* crls)1155 get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
1156 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
1157 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1158 {
1159 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
1160 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
1161 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
1162 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
1163 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
1164
1165 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1166 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1167 reasons = *preasons;
1168 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
1169
1170 if (crl_score > best_score) {
1171 best_crl = crl;
1172 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
1173 best_score = crl_score;
1174 best_reasons = reasons;
1175 }
1176 }
1177
1178 if (best_crl) {
1179 if (*pcrl)
1180 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
1181 *pcrl = best_crl;
1182 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
1183 *pscore = best_score;
1184 *preasons = best_reasons;
1185 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1186 if (*pdcrl) {
1187 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
1188 *pdcrl = NULL;
1189 }
1190 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
1191 }
1192
1193 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
1194 return 1;
1195
1196 return 0;
1197 }
1198
1199 /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1200 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1201 */
1202
1203 static int
crl_extension_match(X509_CRL * a,X509_CRL * b,int nid)1204 crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1205 {
1206 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1207 int i;
1208
1209 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1210 if (i >= 0) {
1211 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1212 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1213 return 0;
1214 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1215 } else
1216 exta = NULL;
1217
1218 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1219
1220 if (i >= 0) {
1221 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1222 return 0;
1223 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1224 } else
1225 extb = NULL;
1226
1227 if (!exta && !extb)
1228 return 1;
1229
1230 if (!exta || !extb)
1231 return 0;
1232
1233 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1234 return 0;
1235
1236 return 1;
1237 }
1238
1239 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1240
1241 static int
check_delta_base(X509_CRL * delta,X509_CRL * base)1242 check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1243 {
1244 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1245 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1246 return 0;
1247 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1248 if (!base->crl_number)
1249 return 0;
1250 /* Issuer names must match */
1251 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
1252 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1253 return 0;
1254 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1255 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1256 return 0;
1257 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1258 return 0;
1259 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1260 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1261 return 0;
1262 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1263 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1264 return 1;
1265 return 0;
1266 }
1267
1268 /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
1269 * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
1270 */
1271
1272 static void
get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL ** dcrl,int * pscore,X509_CRL * base,STACK_OF (X509_CRL)* crls)1273 get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, X509_CRL *base,
1274 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1275 {
1276 X509_CRL *delta;
1277 int i;
1278
1279 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1280 return;
1281 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1282 return;
1283 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1284 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1285 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
1286 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1287 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1288 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1289 *dcrl = delta;
1290 return;
1291 }
1292 }
1293 *dcrl = NULL;
1294 }
1295
1296 /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
1297 * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
1298 * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
1299 * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
1300 * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1301 */
1302
1303 static int
get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 ** pissuer,unsigned int * preasons,X509_CRL * crl,X509 * x)1304 get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, unsigned int *preasons,
1305 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1306 {
1307 int crl_score = 0;
1308 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1309
1310 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1311
1312 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1313 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1314 return 0;
1315 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1316 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
1317 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1318 return 0;
1319 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
1320 /* If no new reasons reject */
1321 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1322 return 0;
1323 }
1324 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1325 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1326 return 0;
1327 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1328 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
1329 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1330 return 0;
1331 } else
1332 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1333
1334 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1335 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1336
1337 /* Check expiry */
1338 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1339 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1340
1341 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1342 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1343
1344 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1345
1346 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1347 return 0;
1348
1349 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1350
1351 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
1352 /* If no new reasons reject */
1353 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1354 return 0;
1355 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1356 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1357 }
1358
1359 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1360
1361 return crl_score;
1362 }
1363
1364 static void
crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl,X509 ** pissuer,int * pcrl_score)1365 crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
1366 int *pcrl_score)
1367 {
1368 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1369 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1370 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1371 int i;
1372
1373 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1374 cidx++;
1375
1376 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1377
1378 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1379 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
1380 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1381 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1382 return;
1383 }
1384 }
1385
1386 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
1387 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1388 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1389 continue;
1390 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1391 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1392 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1393 return;
1394 }
1395 }
1396
1397 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1398
1399 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1400 return;
1401
1402 /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
1403 * set of untrusted certificates.
1404 */
1405 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
1406 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1407 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1408 continue;
1409 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1410 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1411 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1412 return;
1413 }
1414 }
1415 }
1416
1417 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1418 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1419 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
1420 * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in
1421 * practice.
1422 */
1423
1424 static int
check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)1425 check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1426 {
1427 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1428 int ret;
1429
1430 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1431 if (ctx->parent)
1432 return 0;
1433 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->store, x, ctx->untrusted)) {
1434 ret = -1;
1435 goto err;
1436 }
1437
1438 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1439 /* Copy verify params across */
1440 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1441
1442 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1443 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1444
1445 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1446 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1447
1448 if (ret <= 0)
1449 goto err;
1450
1451 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1452 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1453
1454 err:
1455 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1456 return ret;
1457 }
1458
1459 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
1460 * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
1461 * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
1462 * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
1463 * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
1464 * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
1465 */
1466
1467 static int
check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* cert_path,STACK_OF (X509)* crl_path)1468 check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1469 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1470 {
1471 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1472
1473 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1474 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1475 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1476 return 1;
1477 return 0;
1478 }
1479
1480 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1481 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1482 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1483 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1484 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1485 */
1486
1487 static int
idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME * a,DIST_POINT_NAME * b)1488 idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1489 {
1490 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1491 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1492 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1493 int i, j;
1494
1495 if (!a || !b)
1496 return 1;
1497 if (a->type == 1) {
1498 if (!a->dpname)
1499 return 0;
1500 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1501 if (b->type == 1) {
1502 if (!b->dpname)
1503 return 0;
1504 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1505 return 1;
1506 else
1507 return 0;
1508 }
1509 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1510 nm = a->dpname;
1511 gens = b->name.fullname;
1512 } else if (b->type == 1) {
1513 if (!b->dpname)
1514 return 0;
1515 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1516 gens = a->name.fullname;
1517 nm = b->dpname;
1518 }
1519
1520 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1521 if (nm) {
1522 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
1523 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1524 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1525 continue;
1526 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1527 return 1;
1528 }
1529 return 0;
1530 }
1531
1532 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1533
1534 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
1535 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1536 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
1537 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1538 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1539 return 1;
1540 }
1541 }
1542
1543 return 0;
1544 }
1545
1546 static int
crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT * dp,X509_CRL * crl,int crl_score)1547 crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1548 {
1549 int i;
1550 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1551
1552 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1553 if (!dp->CRLissuer)
1554 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1555 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
1556 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1557 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1558 continue;
1559 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1560 return 1;
1561 }
1562 return 0;
1563 }
1564
1565 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1566
1567 static int
crl_crldp_check(X509 * x,X509_CRL * crl,int crl_score,unsigned int * preasons)1568 crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, unsigned int *preasons)
1569 {
1570 int i;
1571
1572 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1573 return 0;
1574 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
1575 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1576 return 0;
1577 } else {
1578 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1579 return 0;
1580 }
1581 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1582 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
1583 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1584 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
1585 if (!crl->idp ||
1586 idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
1587 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1588 return 1;
1589 }
1590 }
1591 }
1592 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) &&
1593 (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1594 return 1;
1595 return 0;
1596 }
1597
1598 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
1599 * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
1600 */
1601
1602 static int
get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL ** pcrl,X509_CRL ** pdcrl,X509 * x)1603 get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1604 {
1605 int ok;
1606 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1607 int crl_score = 0;
1608 unsigned int reasons;
1609 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1610 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1611 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1612
1613 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1614 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons,
1615 ctx->crls);
1616 if (ok)
1617 goto done;
1618
1619 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1620 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1621
1622 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1623 if (!skcrl && crl)
1624 goto done;
1625
1626 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1627
1628 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1629
1630 done:
1631
1632 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1633 if (crl) {
1634 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1635 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1636 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1637 *pcrl = crl;
1638 *pdcrl = dcrl;
1639 return 1;
1640 }
1641
1642 return 0;
1643 }
1644
1645 /* Check CRL validity */
1646 static int
check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl)1647 check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1648 {
1649 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1650 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1651 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1652
1653 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1654 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1655 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1656 if (ctx->current_issuer) {
1657 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1658 } else if (cnum < chnum) {
1659 /*
1660 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
1661 * is next certificate in chain.
1662 */
1663 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1664 } else {
1665 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1666 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1667 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
1668 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1669 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1670 if (!ok)
1671 goto err;
1672 }
1673 }
1674
1675 if (issuer) {
1676 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
1677 * been done
1678 */
1679 if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
1680 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1681 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1682 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
1683 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1684 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1685 if (!ok)
1686 goto err;
1687 }
1688
1689 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
1690 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1691 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1692 if (!ok)
1693 goto err;
1694 }
1695
1696 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
1697 if (check_crl_path(ctx,
1698 ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
1699 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1700 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1701 if (!ok)
1702 goto err;
1703 }
1704 }
1705
1706 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
1707 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1708 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1709 if (!ok)
1710 goto err;
1711 }
1712
1713
1714 }
1715
1716 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
1717 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1718 if (!ok)
1719 goto err;
1720 }
1721
1722 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1723 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1724
1725 if (!ikey) {
1726 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1727 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1728 if (!ok)
1729 goto err;
1730 } else {
1731 /* Verify CRL signature */
1732 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
1733 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1734 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1735 if (!ok)
1736 goto err;
1737 }
1738 }
1739 }
1740
1741 ok = 1;
1742
1743 err:
1744 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1745 return ok;
1746 }
1747
1748 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1749 static int
cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl,X509 * x)1750 cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1751 {
1752 int ok;
1753 X509_REVOKED *rev;
1754
1755 /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
1756 * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
1757 * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
1758 * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
1759 */
1760 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) &&
1761 (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
1762 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1763 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1764 if (!ok)
1765 return 0;
1766 }
1767 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
1768 * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
1769 */
1770 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
1771 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1772 return 2;
1773 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1774 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1775 if (!ok)
1776 return 0;
1777 }
1778
1779 return 1;
1780 }
1781
1782 int
x509_vfy_check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1783 x509_vfy_check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1784 {
1785 int ret;
1786
1787 if (ctx->parent)
1788 return 1;
1789
1790 /* X509_policy_check always allocates a new tree. */
1791 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
1792 ctx->tree = NULL;
1793
1794 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1795 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1796 if (ret == 0) {
1797 X509error(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1798 return 0;
1799 }
1800 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1801 if (ret == -1) {
1802 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
1803 * callback.
1804 */
1805 X509 *x;
1806 int i;
1807 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
1808 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1809 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1810 continue;
1811 ctx->current_cert = x;
1812 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1813 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1814 return 0;
1815 }
1816 return 1;
1817 }
1818 if (ret == -2) {
1819 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1820 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1821 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1822 }
1823
1824 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
1825 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1826 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1827 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1828 return 0;
1829 }
1830
1831 return 1;
1832 }
1833
1834 static int
check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1835 check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1836 {
1837 return x509_vfy_check_policy(ctx);
1838 }
1839
1840 /*
1841 * Inform the verify callback of an error.
1842 *
1843 * If x is not NULL it is the error cert, otherwise use the chain cert
1844 * at depth.
1845 *
1846 * If err is not X509_V_OK, that's the error value, otherwise leave
1847 * unchanged (presumably set by the caller).
1848 *
1849 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
1850 */
1851 static int
verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x,int depth,int err)1852 verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth, int err)
1853 {
1854 ctx->error_depth = depth;
1855 ctx->current_cert = (x != NULL) ? x : sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth);
1856 if (err != X509_V_OK)
1857 ctx->error = err;
1858 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1859 }
1860
1861
1862 /* Mimic OpenSSL '0 for failure' ick */
1863 static int
time_t_bogocmp(time_t a,time_t b)1864 time_t_bogocmp(time_t a, time_t b)
1865 {
1866 if (a == -1 || b == -1)
1867 return 0;
1868 if (a <= b)
1869 return -1;
1870 return 1;
1871 }
1872
1873 /*
1874 * Check certificate validity times.
1875 *
1876 * If depth >= 0, invoke verification callbacks on error, otherwise just return
1877 * the validation status.
1878 *
1879 * Return 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
1880 */
1881 int
x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x,int depth)1882 x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth)
1883 {
1884 time_t ptime;
1885 int i;
1886
1887 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1888 ptime = ctx->param->check_time;
1889 else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
1890 return 1;
1891 else
1892 ptime = time(NULL);
1893
1894 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)
1895 i = time_t_bogocmp(x->not_before, ptime);
1896 else
1897 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), &ptime);
1898
1899 if (i >= 0 && depth < 0)
1900 return 0;
1901 if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth,
1902 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD))
1903 return 0;
1904 if (i > 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth,
1905 X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID))
1906 return 0;
1907
1908 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)
1909 i = time_t_bogocmp(x->not_after, ptime);
1910 else
1911 i = X509_cmp_time_internal(X509_get_notAfter(x), &ptime, 1);
1912
1913 if (i <= 0 && depth < 0)
1914 return 0;
1915 if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth,
1916 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD))
1917 return 0;
1918 if (i < 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth,
1919 X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED))
1920 return 0;
1921
1922 return 1;
1923 }
1924
1925 static int
x509_vfy_internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int chain_verified)1926 x509_vfy_internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int chain_verified)
1927 {
1928 int n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1929 X509 *xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1930 X509 *xs;
1931
1932 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1933 xs = xi;
1934 else {
1935 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
1936 xs = xi;
1937 goto check_cert;
1938 }
1939 if (n <= 0)
1940 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, 0,
1941 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE);
1942 n--;
1943 ctx->error_depth = n;
1944 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1945 }
1946
1947 /*
1948 * Do not clear ctx->error=0, it must be "sticky", only the
1949 * user's callback is allowed to reset errors (at its own
1950 * peril).
1951 */
1952 while (n >= 0) {
1953
1954 /*
1955 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates
1956 * unless explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any
1957 * security and just wastes time. If the issuer's
1958 * public key is unusable, report the issuer
1959 * certificate and its depth (rather than the depth of
1960 * the subject).
1961 */
1962 if (!chain_verified && ( xs != xi ||
1963 (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) {
1964 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1965 if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
1966 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, xi != xs ? n+1 : n,
1967 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY))
1968 return 0;
1969 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
1970 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xs, n,
1971 X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE)) {
1972 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1973 return 0;
1974 }
1975 }
1976 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1977 }
1978 check_cert:
1979 /* Calls verify callback as needed */
1980 if (!chain_verified && !x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, n))
1981 return 0;
1982
1983 /*
1984 * Signal success at this depth. However, the
1985 * previous error (if any) is retained.
1986 */
1987 ctx->current_issuer = xi;
1988 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1989 ctx->error_depth = n;
1990 if (!ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx))
1991 return 0;
1992
1993 if (--n >= 0) {
1994 xi = xs;
1995 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1996 }
1997 }
1998 return 1;
1999 }
2000
2001 static int
internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2002 internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2003 {
2004 return x509_vfy_internal_verify(ctx, 0);
2005 }
2006
2007 /*
2008 * Internal verify, but with a chain where the verification
2009 * math has already been performed.
2010 */
2011 int
x509_vfy_callback_indicate_completion(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2012 x509_vfy_callback_indicate_completion(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2013 {
2014 return x509_vfy_internal_verify(ctx, 1);
2015 }
2016
2017 int
X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME * ctm)2018 X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
2019 {
2020 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
2021 }
2022
2023 /*
2024 * Compare a possibly unvalidated ASN1_TIME string against a time_t
2025 * using RFC 5280 rules for the time string. If *cmp_time is NULL
2026 * the current system time is used.
2027 *
2028 * XXX NOTE that unlike what you expect a "cmp" function to do in C,
2029 * XXX this one is "special", and returns 0 for error.
2030 *
2031 * Returns:
2032 * -1 if the ASN1_time is earlier than OR the same as *cmp_time.
2033 * 1 if the ASN1_time is later than *cmp_time.
2034 * 0 on error.
2035 */
2036 static int
X509_cmp_time_internal(const ASN1_TIME * ctm,time_t * cmp_time,int is_notafter)2037 X509_cmp_time_internal(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time, int is_notafter)
2038 {
2039 time_t compare, cert_time;
2040
2041 if (cmp_time == NULL)
2042 compare = time(NULL);
2043 else
2044 compare = *cmp_time;
2045
2046 if ((cert_time = x509_verify_asn1_time_to_time_t(ctm, is_notafter)) ==
2047 -1)
2048 return 0; /* invalid time */
2049
2050 if (cert_time <= compare)
2051 return -1; /* 0 is used for error, so map same to less than */
2052
2053 return 1;
2054 }
2055
2056 int
X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME * ctm,time_t * cmp_time)2057 X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
2058 {
2059 return X509_cmp_time_internal(ctm, cmp_time, 0);
2060 }
2061
2062
2063 ASN1_TIME *
X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME * s,long adj)2064 X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
2065 {
2066 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
2067 }
2068
2069 ASN1_TIME *
X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME * s,long offset_sec,time_t * in_time)2070 X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_time)
2071 {
2072 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_time);
2073 }
2074
2075 ASN1_TIME *
X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME * s,int offset_day,long offset_sec,time_t * in_time)2076 X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_time)
2077 {
2078 time_t t;
2079 if (in_time == NULL)
2080 t = time(NULL);
2081 else
2082 t = *in_time;
2083
2084 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
2085 }
2086
2087 int
X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY * pkey,STACK_OF (X509)* chain)2088 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2089 {
2090 EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
2091 int i, j;
2092
2093 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
2094 return 1;
2095
2096 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2097 ktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
2098 if (ktmp == NULL) {
2099 X509error(X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
2100 return 0;
2101 }
2102 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
2103 break;
2104 else
2105 ktmp = NULL;
2106 }
2107 if (ktmp == NULL) {
2108 X509error(X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
2109 return 0;
2110 }
2111
2112 /* first, populate the other certs */
2113 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
2114 if ((ktmp2 = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j))) == NULL)
2115 return 0;
2116 if (!EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp))
2117 return 0;
2118 }
2119
2120 if (pkey != NULL)
2121 if (!EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp))
2122 return 0;
2123 return 1;
2124 }
2125
2126 int
X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void * argp,CRYPTO_EX_new * new_func,CRYPTO_EX_dup * dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free * free_func)2127 X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
2128 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
2129 {
2130 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
2131 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
2132 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX,
2133 argl, argp, new_func, dup_func, free_func);
2134 }
2135
2136 int
X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int idx,void * data)2137 X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2138 {
2139 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
2140 }
2141
2142 void *
X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int idx)2143 X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2144 {
2145 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
2146 }
2147
2148 int
X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2149 X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2150 {
2151 return ctx->error;
2152 }
2153
2154 void
X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int err)2155 X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2156 {
2157 ctx->error = err;
2158 }
2159
2160 int
X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2161 X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2162 {
2163 return ctx->error_depth;
2164 }
2165
2166 void
X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int depth)2167 X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2168 {
2169 ctx->error_depth = depth;
2170 }
2171
2172 X509 *
X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2173 X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2174 {
2175 return ctx->current_cert;
2176 }
2177
2178 void
X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)2179 X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2180 {
2181 ctx->current_cert = x;
2182 }
2183
STACK_OF(X509)2184 STACK_OF(X509) *
2185 X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2186 {
2187 return ctx->chain;
2188 }
2189
STACK_OF(X509)2190 STACK_OF(X509) *
2191 X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *xs)
2192 {
2193 return xs->chain;
2194 }
2195
STACK_OF(X509)2196 STACK_OF(X509) *
2197 X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2198 {
2199 int i;
2200 X509 *x;
2201 STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
2202
2203 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain)))
2204 return NULL;
2205 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2206 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2207 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
2208 }
2209 return chain;
2210 }
2211
2212 X509 *
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2213 X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2214 {
2215 return ctx->current_issuer;
2216 }
2217
2218 X509_CRL *
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2219 X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2220 {
2221 return ctx->current_crl;
2222 }
2223
2224 X509_STORE_CTX *
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2225 X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2226 {
2227 return ctx->parent;
2228 }
2229
2230 X509_STORE *
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_store(X509_STORE_CTX * xs)2231 X509_STORE_CTX_get0_store(X509_STORE_CTX *xs)
2232 {
2233 return xs->store;
2234 }
2235
2236 void
X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)2237 X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2238 {
2239 ctx->cert = x;
2240 }
2241
2242 void
X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* sk)2243 X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2244 {
2245 ctx->untrusted = sk;
2246 }
2247
2248 void
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509_CRL)* sk)2249 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2250 {
2251 ctx->crls = sk;
2252 }
2253
2254 int
X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int purpose)2255 X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2256 {
2257 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2258 }
2259
2260 int
X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int trust)2261 X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2262 {
2263 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2264 }
2265
2266 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
2267 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
2268 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
2269 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
2270 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
2271 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
2272 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
2273 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
2274 */
2275
2276 int
X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int def_purpose,int purpose,int trust)2277 X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2278 int purpose, int trust)
2279 {
2280 int idx;
2281
2282 /* If purpose not set use default */
2283 if (!purpose)
2284 purpose = def_purpose;
2285 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2286 if (purpose) {
2287 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
2288 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2289 if (idx == -1) {
2290 X509error(X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2291 return 0;
2292 }
2293 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2294 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2295 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2296 if (idx == -1) {
2297 X509error(X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2298 return 0;
2299 }
2300 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2301 }
2302 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2303 if (!trust)
2304 trust = ptmp->trust;
2305 }
2306 if (trust) {
2307 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2308 if (idx == -1) {
2309 X509error(X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2310 return 0;
2311 }
2312 }
2313
2314 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
2315 ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2316 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
2317 ctx->param->trust = trust;
2318 return 1;
2319 }
2320
2321 X509_STORE_CTX *
X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)2322 X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2323 {
2324 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2325
2326 ctx = calloc(1, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2327 if (!ctx) {
2328 X509error(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2329 return NULL;
2330 }
2331 return ctx;
2332 }
2333
2334 void
X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2335 X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2336 {
2337 if (ctx == NULL)
2338 return;
2339
2340 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2341 free(ctx);
2342 }
2343
2344 int
X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_STORE * store,X509 * x509,STACK_OF (X509)* chain)2345 X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2346 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2347 {
2348 int param_ret = 1;
2349
2350 /*
2351 * Make sure everything is initialized properly even in case of an
2352 * early return due to an error.
2353 *
2354 * While this 'ctx' can be reused, X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup() will have
2355 * freed everything and memset ex_data anyway. This also allows us
2356 * to safely use X509_STORE_CTX variables from the stack which will
2357 * have uninitialized data.
2358 */
2359 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
2360
2361 /*
2362 * Start with this set to not valid - it will be set to valid
2363 * in X509_verify_cert.
2364 */
2365 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
2366
2367 /*
2368 * Set values other than 0. Keep this in the same order as
2369 * X509_STORE_CTX except for values that may fail. All fields that
2370 * may fail should go last to make sure 'ctx' is as consistent as
2371 * possible even on early exits.
2372 */
2373 ctx->store = store;
2374 ctx->cert = x509;
2375 ctx->untrusted = chain;
2376
2377 if (store && store->verify)
2378 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2379 else
2380 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2381
2382 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2383 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2384 else
2385 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2386
2387 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2388 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2389 else
2390 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2391
2392 if (store && store->check_issued)
2393 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2394 else
2395 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2396
2397 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2398 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2399 else
2400 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2401
2402 if (store && store->get_crl)
2403 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2404 else
2405 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2406
2407 if (store && store->check_crl)
2408 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2409 else
2410 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2411
2412 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2413 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2414 else
2415 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2416
2417 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2418
2419 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2420 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2421 else
2422 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2423
2424 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2425 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2426 else
2427 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2428
2429 if (store && store->cleanup)
2430 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2431 else
2432 ctx->cleanup = NULL;
2433
2434 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2435 if (!ctx->param) {
2436 X509error(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2437 return 0;
2438 }
2439
2440 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
2441 * use defaults.
2442 */
2443 if (store)
2444 param_ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2445 else
2446 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2447
2448 if (param_ret)
2449 param_ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2450 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2451
2452 if (param_ret == 0) {
2453 X509error(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2454 return 0;
2455 }
2456
2457 if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2458 &(ctx->ex_data)) == 0) {
2459 X509error(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2460 return 0;
2461 }
2462 return 1;
2463 }
2464
2465 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
2466 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2467 */
2468
2469 void
X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* sk)2470 X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2471 {
2472 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2473 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2474 }
2475
2476 void
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* sk)2477 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2478 {
2479 X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(ctx, sk);
2480 }
2481
2482 void
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2483 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2484 {
2485 if (ctx->cleanup)
2486 ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2487 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2488 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2489 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2490 ctx->param = NULL;
2491 }
2492 if (ctx->tree != NULL) {
2493 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2494 ctx->tree = NULL;
2495 }
2496 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
2497 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2498 ctx->chain = NULL;
2499 }
2500 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX,
2501 ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2502 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2503 }
2504
2505 void
X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int depth)2506 X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2507 {
2508 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2509 }
2510
2511 void
X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,unsigned long flags)2512 X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2513 {
2514 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2515 }
2516
2517 void
X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,unsigned long flags,time_t t)2518 X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
2519 {
2520 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2521 }
2522
2523 int
X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2524 (*X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx))(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)
2525 {
2526 return ctx->verify_cb;
2527 }
2528
2529 void
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int (* verify_cb)(int,X509_STORE_CTX *))2530 X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2531 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2532 {
2533 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
2534 }
2535
2536 int
X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2537 (*X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx))(X509_STORE_CTX *)
2538 {
2539 return ctx->verify;
2540 }
2541
2542 void
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int (* verify)(X509_STORE_CTX *))2543 X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int (*verify)(X509_STORE_CTX *))
2544 {
2545 ctx->verify = verify;
2546 }
2547
2548 X509 *
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2549 X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2550 {
2551 return ctx->cert;
2552 }
2553
STACK_OF(X509)2554 STACK_OF(X509) *
2555 X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2556 {
2557 return ctx->untrusted;
2558 }
2559
2560 void
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* sk)2561 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2562 {
2563 ctx->untrusted = sk;
2564 }
2565
2566 void
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* sk)2567 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2568 {
2569 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2570 ctx->chain = sk;
2571 }
2572
2573 X509_POLICY_TREE *
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2574 X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2575 {
2576 return ctx->tree;
2577 }
2578
2579 int
X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2580 X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2581 {
2582 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2583 }
2584
2585 int
X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2586 X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2587 {
2588 return ctx->num_untrusted;
2589 }
2590
2591 int
X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,const char * name)2592 X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2593 {
2594 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2595 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2596 if (!param)
2597 return 0;
2598 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2599 }
2600
2601 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2602 X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2603 {
2604 return ctx->param;
2605 }
2606
2607 void
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_VERIFY_PARAM * param)2608 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2609 {
2610 if (ctx->param)
2611 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2612 ctx->param = param;
2613 }
2614
2615 /*
2616 * Check if |bits| are adequate for |security level|.
2617 * Returns 1 if ok, 0 otherwise.
2618 */
2619 static int
enough_bits_for_security_level(int bits,int level)2620 enough_bits_for_security_level(int bits, int level)
2621 {
2622 /*
2623 * Sigh. OpenSSL does this silly squashing, so we will
2624 * too. Derp for Derp compatibility being important.
2625 */
2626 if (level < 0)
2627 level = 0;
2628 if (level > 5)
2629 level = 5;
2630
2631 switch (level) {
2632 case 0:
2633 return 1;
2634 case 1:
2635 return bits >= 80;
2636 case 2:
2637 return bits >= 112;
2638 case 3:
2639 return bits >= 128;
2640 case 4:
2641 return bits >= 192;
2642 case 5:
2643 return bits >= 256;
2644 default:
2645 return 0;
2646 }
2647 }
2648
2649 /*
2650 * Check whether the public key of |cert| meets the security level of |ctx|.
2651 *
2652 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
2653 */
2654 static int
check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * cert)2655 check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
2656 {
2657 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
2658 int bits;
2659
2660 /* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */
2661 if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert)) == NULL)
2662 return 0;
2663
2664 if ((bits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey)) <= 0)
2665 return 0;
2666
2667 return enough_bits_for_security_level(bits, ctx->param->security_level);
2668 }
2669
2670 /*
2671 * Check whether the signature digest algorithm of |cert| meets the security
2672 * level of |ctx|. Do not check trust anchors (self-signed or not).
2673 *
2674 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
2675 */
2676 static int
check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * cert)2677 check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
2678 {
2679 const EVP_MD *md;
2680 int bits, nid, md_nid;
2681
2682 if ((nid = X509_get_signature_nid(cert)) == NID_undef)
2683 return 0;
2684
2685 /*
2686 * Look up signature algorithm digest.
2687 */
2688
2689 if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(nid, &md_nid, NULL))
2690 return 0;
2691
2692 if (md_nid == NID_undef)
2693 return 0;
2694
2695 if ((md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)) == NULL)
2696 return 0;
2697
2698 /* Assume 4 bits of collision resistance for each hash octet. */
2699 bits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
2700
2701 return enough_bits_for_security_level(bits, ctx->param->security_level);
2702 }
2703
2704 int
x509_vfy_check_security_level(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2705 x509_vfy_check_security_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2706 {
2707 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
2708 int i;
2709
2710 if (ctx->param->security_level <= 0)
2711 return 1;
2712
2713 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
2714 X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
2715
2716 /*
2717 * We've already checked the security of the leaf key, so here
2718 * we only check the security of issuer keys.
2719 */
2720 if (i > 0) {
2721 if (!check_key_level(ctx, cert) &&
2722 !verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i,
2723 X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL))
2724 return 0;
2725 }
2726
2727 /*
2728 * We also check the signature algorithm security of all certs
2729 * except those of the trust anchor at index num - 1.
2730 */
2731 if (i == num - 1)
2732 break;
2733
2734 if (!check_sig_level(ctx, cert) &&
2735 !verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK))
2736 return 0;
2737 }
2738 return 1;
2739 }
2740