| /openbsd/usr.bin/sndiod/ |
| H A D | fdpass.h | 395f8c55 Sun Dec 20 11:38:33 GMT 2015 ratchov <ratchov@openbsd.org> In case of a bug in sndiod, an attacker (a local user) could run
arbitrary code as user _sndio, i.e. get a second uid.
Mitigate the risk by implementing initial privilege separation as
follows. Break sndiod in two processes: a chroot()ed "worker" process
processing input, and a non-chroot()ed "helper" process opening
devices and passing descriptors to the worker.
With help from benno, claudio, semarie and gilles.
ok benno, semarie and tb
|
| H A D | Makefile | 395f8c55 Sun Dec 20 11:38:33 GMT 2015 ratchov <ratchov@openbsd.org> In case of a bug in sndiod, an attacker (a local user) could run
arbitrary code as user _sndio, i.e. get a second uid.
Mitigate the risk by implementing initial privilege separation as
follows. Break sndiod in two processes: a chroot()ed "worker" process
processing input, and a non-chroot()ed "helper" process opening
devices and passing descriptors to the worker.
With help from benno, claudio, semarie and gilles.
ok benno, semarie and tb
|
| H A D | miofile.c | 395f8c55 Sun Dec 20 11:38:33 GMT 2015 ratchov <ratchov@openbsd.org> In case of a bug in sndiod, an attacker (a local user) could run
arbitrary code as user _sndio, i.e. get a second uid.
Mitigate the risk by implementing initial privilege separation as
follows. Break sndiod in two processes: a chroot()ed "worker" process
processing input, and a non-chroot()ed "helper" process opening
devices and passing descriptors to the worker.
With help from benno, claudio, semarie and gilles.
ok benno, semarie and tb
|
| H A D | listen.c | 395f8c55 Sun Dec 20 11:38:33 GMT 2015 ratchov <ratchov@openbsd.org> In case of a bug in sndiod, an attacker (a local user) could run
arbitrary code as user _sndio, i.e. get a second uid.
Mitigate the risk by implementing initial privilege separation as
follows. Break sndiod in two processes: a chroot()ed "worker" process
processing input, and a non-chroot()ed "helper" process opening
devices and passing descriptors to the worker.
With help from benno, claudio, semarie and gilles.
ok benno, semarie and tb
|
| H A D | fdpass.c | 395f8c55 Sun Dec 20 11:38:33 GMT 2015 ratchov <ratchov@openbsd.org> In case of a bug in sndiod, an attacker (a local user) could run
arbitrary code as user _sndio, i.e. get a second uid.
Mitigate the risk by implementing initial privilege separation as
follows. Break sndiod in two processes: a chroot()ed "worker" process
processing input, and a non-chroot()ed "helper" process opening
devices and passing descriptors to the worker.
With help from benno, claudio, semarie and gilles.
ok benno, semarie and tb
|
| H A D | siofile.c | 395f8c55 Sun Dec 20 11:38:33 GMT 2015 ratchov <ratchov@openbsd.org> In case of a bug in sndiod, an attacker (a local user) could run
arbitrary code as user _sndio, i.e. get a second uid.
Mitigate the risk by implementing initial privilege separation as
follows. Break sndiod in two processes: a chroot()ed "worker" process
processing input, and a non-chroot()ed "helper" process opening
devices and passing descriptors to the worker.
With help from benno, claudio, semarie and gilles.
ok benno, semarie and tb
|
| H A D | sndiod.c | 395f8c55 Sun Dec 20 11:38:33 GMT 2015 ratchov <ratchov@openbsd.org> In case of a bug in sndiod, an attacker (a local user) could run
arbitrary code as user _sndio, i.e. get a second uid.
Mitigate the risk by implementing initial privilege separation as
follows. Break sndiod in two processes: a chroot()ed "worker" process
processing input, and a non-chroot()ed "helper" process opening
devices and passing descriptors to the worker.
With help from benno, claudio, semarie and gilles.
ok benno, semarie and tb
|