| H A D | ip_reass.c | ff790bba Tue Aug 14 17:23:05 GMT 2018 Jonathan T. Looney <jtl@FreeBSD.org> Implement a limit on on the number of IPv4 reassembly queues per bucket.
There is a hashing algorithm which should distribute IPv4 reassembly
queues across the available buckets in a relatively even way. However,
if there is a flaw in the hashing algorithm which allows a large number
of IPv4 fragment reassembly queues to end up in a single bucket, a per-
bucket limit could help mitigate the performance impact of this flaw.
Implement such a limit, with a default of twice the maximum number of
reassembly queues divided by the number of buckets. Recalculate the
limit any time the maximum number of reassembly queues changes.
However, allow the user to override the value using a sysctl
(net.inet.ip.maxfragbucketsize).
Reviewed by: jhb
Security: FreeBSD-SA-18:10.ip
Security: CVE-2018-6923
ff790bba Tue Aug 14 17:23:05 GMT 2018 Jonathan T. Looney <jtl@FreeBSD.org> Implement a limit on on the number of IPv4 reassembly queues per bucket.
There is a hashing algorithm which should distribute IPv4 reassembly
queues across the available buckets in a relatively even way. However,
if there is a flaw in the hashing algorithm which allows a large number
of IPv4 fragment reassembly queues to end up in a single bucket, a per-
bucket limit could help mitigate the performance impact of this flaw.
Implement such a limit, with a default of twice the maximum number of
reassembly queues divided by the number of buckets. Recalculate the
limit any time the maximum number of reassembly queues changes.
However, allow the user to override the value using a sysctl
(net.inet.ip.maxfragbucketsize).
Reviewed by: jhb
Security: FreeBSD-SA-18:10.ip
Security: CVE-2018-6923
ff790bba Tue Aug 14 17:23:05 GMT 2018 Jonathan T. Looney <jtl@FreeBSD.org> Implement a limit on on the number of IPv4 reassembly queues per bucket.
There is a hashing algorithm which should distribute IPv4 reassembly
queues across the available buckets in a relatively even way. However,
if there is a flaw in the hashing algorithm which allows a large number
of IPv4 fragment reassembly queues to end up in a single bucket, a per-
bucket limit could help mitigate the performance impact of this flaw.
Implement such a limit, with a default of twice the maximum number of
reassembly queues divided by the number of buckets. Recalculate the
limit any time the maximum number of reassembly queues changes.
However, allow the user to override the value using a sysctl
(net.inet.ip.maxfragbucketsize).
Reviewed by: jhb
Security: FreeBSD-SA-18:10.ip
Security: CVE-2018-6923
ff790bba Tue Aug 14 17:23:05 GMT 2018 Jonathan T. Looney <jtl@FreeBSD.org> Implement a limit on on the number of IPv4 reassembly queues per bucket.
There is a hashing algorithm which should distribute IPv4 reassembly
queues across the available buckets in a relatively even way. However,
if there is a flaw in the hashing algorithm which allows a large number
of IPv4 fragment reassembly queues to end up in a single bucket, a per-
bucket limit could help mitigate the performance impact of this flaw.
Implement such a limit, with a default of twice the maximum number of
reassembly queues divided by the number of buckets. Recalculate the
limit any time the maximum number of reassembly queues changes.
However, allow the user to override the value using a sysctl
(net.inet.ip.maxfragbucketsize).
Reviewed by: jhb
Security: FreeBSD-SA-18:10.ip
Security: CVE-2018-6923
ff790bba Tue Aug 14 17:23:05 GMT 2018 Jonathan T. Looney <jtl@FreeBSD.org> Implement a limit on on the number of IPv4 reassembly queues per bucket.
There is a hashing algorithm which should distribute IPv4 reassembly
queues across the available buckets in a relatively even way. However,
if there is a flaw in the hashing algorithm which allows a large number
of IPv4 fragment reassembly queues to end up in a single bucket, a per-
bucket limit could help mitigate the performance impact of this flaw.
Implement such a limit, with a default of twice the maximum number of
reassembly queues divided by the number of buckets. Recalculate the
limit any time the maximum number of reassembly queues changes.
However, allow the user to override the value using a sysctl
(net.inet.ip.maxfragbucketsize).
Reviewed by: jhb
Security: FreeBSD-SA-18:10.ip
Security: CVE-2018-6923
ff790bba Tue Aug 14 17:23:05 GMT 2018 Jonathan T. Looney <jtl@FreeBSD.org> Implement a limit on on the number of IPv4 reassembly queues per bucket.
There is a hashing algorithm which should distribute IPv4 reassembly
queues across the available buckets in a relatively even way. However,
if there is a flaw in the hashing algorithm which allows a large number
of IPv4 fragment reassembly queues to end up in a single bucket, a per-
bucket limit could help mitigate the performance impact of this flaw.
Implement such a limit, with a default of twice the maximum number of
reassembly queues divided by the number of buckets. Recalculate the
limit any time the maximum number of reassembly queues changes.
However, allow the user to override the value using a sysctl
(net.inet.ip.maxfragbucketsize).
Reviewed by: jhb
Security: FreeBSD-SA-18:10.ip
Security: CVE-2018-6923
ff790bba Tue Aug 14 17:23:05 GMT 2018 Jonathan T. Looney <jtl@FreeBSD.org> Implement a limit on on the number of IPv4 reassembly queues per bucket.
There is a hashing algorithm which should distribute IPv4 reassembly
queues across the available buckets in a relatively even way. However,
if there is a flaw in the hashing algorithm which allows a large number
of IPv4 fragment reassembly queues to end up in a single bucket, a per-
bucket limit could help mitigate the performance impact of this flaw.
Implement such a limit, with a default of twice the maximum number of
reassembly queues divided by the number of buckets. Recalculate the
limit any time the maximum number of reassembly queues changes.
However, allow the user to override the value using a sysctl
(net.inet.ip.maxfragbucketsize).
Reviewed by: jhb
Security: FreeBSD-SA-18:10.ip
Security: CVE-2018-6923
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