/openbsd/lib/libcrypto/ecdh/ |
H A D | ecdh.c | 230 size_t secret_len = 0; in ECDH_compute_key() local 243 if (!eckey->meth->compute_key(&secret, &secret_len, pub_key, eckey)) in ECDH_compute_key() 248 if (KDF(secret, secret_len, out, &out_len) == NULL) { in ECDH_compute_key() 253 if (out_len < secret_len) { in ECDH_compute_key() 258 out_len = secret_len; in ECDH_compute_key() 270 freezero(secret, secret_len); in ECDH_compute_key()
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/openbsd/regress/lib/libcrypto/dh/ |
H A D | dhtest.c | 95 int flags, buf_len, secret_len; in main() local 148 secret_len = DH_compute_key(buf, DH_get0_pub_key(dh), dh); in main() 151 for (i = 0; i < secret_len; i++) { in main() 156 if (secret_len < 4) { in main()
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/openbsd/lib/libcrypto/hkdf/ |
H A D | hkdf.c | 32 const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len, const uint8_t *salt, in HKDF() argument 38 if (!HKDF_extract(prk, &prk_len, digest, secret, secret_len, salt, in HKDF() 52 const EVP_MD *digest, const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len, in HKDF_extract() argument 61 if (HMAC(digest, salt, salt_len, secret, secret_len, out_key, &len) == in HKDF_extract()
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H A D | hkdf.h | 37 const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len, const uint8_t *salt, 47 const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len,
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/openbsd/lib/libssl/ |
H A D | t1_enc.c | 160 tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, in tls1_P_hash() argument 179 mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, secret, secret_len); in tls1_P_hash() 247 tls1_PRF(SSL *s, const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, in tls1_PRF() argument 265 half_len = secret_len - (secret_len / 2); in tls1_PRF() 271 secret += secret_len - half_len; in tls1_PRF() 280 if (!tls1_P_hash(md, secret, secret_len, seed1, seed1_len, in tls1_PRF()
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H A D | ssl.h | 372 typedef int (*tls_session_secret_cb_fn)(SSL *s, void *secret, int *secret_len, 1636 size_t secret_len); 1682 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len); 1694 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len);
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H A D | ssl_sess.c | 1073 void *secret, int *secret_len, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers, in SSL_set_session_secret_cb() argument
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H A D | ssl_local.h | 1409 int tls1_PRF(SSL *s, const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len,
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/openbsd/usr.sbin/pppd/ |
H A D | chap.c | 397 int secret_len; local 442 secret, &secret_len, 0)) { 443 secret_len = 0; /* assume null secret if can't find one */ 461 MD5Update(&mdContext, secret, secret_len); 489 int secret_len, old_state; local 552 secret, &secret_len, 1)) { 565 MD5Update(&mdContext, secret, secret_len);
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H A D | auth.c | 941 get_secret(unit, client, server, secret, secret_len, save_addrs) in get_secret() argument 946 int *secret_len; 982 *secret_len = len;
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/openbsd/usr.sbin/unbound/util/ |
H A D | edns.c | 158 const uint8_t* secret, size_t secret_len, int v4, in edns_cookie_server_validate() argument 168 if(secret_len != 16 || /* RFC9018 cookies have 16 byte secrets */ in edns_cookie_server_validate()
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H A D | edns.h | 165 size_t cookie_len, const uint8_t* secret, size_t secret_len, int v4,
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H A D | configparser.y | 3880 size_t secret_len = sizeof(secret); variable 3883 if(sldns_str2wire_hex_buf($2, secret, &secret_len) 3884 || (secret_len != 16)) 3887 cfg_parser->cfg->cookie_secret_len = secret_len;
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/openbsd/sbin/unwind/libunbound/util/ |
H A D | edns.c | 158 const uint8_t* secret, size_t secret_len, int v4, in edns_cookie_server_validate() argument 168 if(secret_len != 16 || /* RFC9018 cookies have 16 byte secrets */ in edns_cookie_server_validate()
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H A D | edns.h | 165 size_t cookie_len, const uint8_t* secret, size_t secret_len, int v4,
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H A D | configparser.y | 3880 size_t secret_len = sizeof(secret); variable 3883 if(sldns_str2wire_hex_buf($2, secret, &secret_len) 3884 || (secret_len != 16)) 3887 cfg_parser->cfg->cookie_secret_len = secret_len;
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/openbsd/usr.sbin/nsd/ |
H A D | nsd.c | 909 size_t secret_len = 0; in cookie_secret_file_read() local 912 secret_len = strlen(secret); in cookie_secret_file_read() 913 if( secret_len == 0 ) { break; } in cookie_secret_file_read() 914 assert( secret_len <= sizeof(secret) ); in cookie_secret_file_read() 915 secret_len = secret[secret_len - 1] == '\n' ? secret_len - 1 : secret_len; in cookie_secret_file_read() 916 if( secret_len != NSD_COOKIE_SECRET_SIZE * 2 ) { corrupt++; break; } in cookie_secret_file_read() 918 secret[secret_len] = '\0'; in cookie_secret_file_read()
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/openbsd/regress/lib/libssl/quic/ |
H A D | quictest.c | 51 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len) in quic_set_read_secret() argument 62 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len) in quic_set_write_secret() argument
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/openbsd/regress/lib/libssl/unit/ |
H A D | tls_prf.c | 22 int tls1_PRF(SSL *s, const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len,
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/openbsd/lib/libfido2/src/ |
H A D | assert.c | 547 const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len) in fido_assert_set_hmac_secret() argument 549 if (idx >= assert->stmt_len || (secret_len != 32 && secret_len != 64) || in fido_assert_set_hmac_secret() 551 secret_len) < 0) in fido_assert_set_hmac_secret()
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/openbsd/lib/libcrypto/sm2/ |
H A D | sm2_crypt.c | 182 sm2_kdf(uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len, in sm2_kdf() argument 211 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, secret, secret_len)) { in sm2_kdf()
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