History log of /openbsd/sys/dev/rnd.c (Results 26 – 50 of 229)
Revision Date Author Comments
# 5ab2f231 06-Mar-2020 tobhe <tobhe@openbsd.org>

Make sure 'ts' is initialized.

ok deraadt@


# af3cc7ce 02-Mar-2020 deraadt <deraadt@openbsd.org>

previous commit accidentally aliased two unique timeouts
hit by millert


# e1e7ed06 01-Mar-2020 deraadt <deraadt@openbsd.org>

rename functions and types unrelated to the higher-level arc4 API
ok djm markus


# b8213689 20-Feb-2020 visa <visa@openbsd.org>

Replace field f_isfd with field f_flags in struct filterops to allow
adding more filter properties without cluttering the struct.

OK mpi@, anton@


# 94321eb4 31-Dec-2019 visa <visa@openbsd.org>

Use C99 designated initializers with struct filterops. In addition,
make the structs const so that the data are put in .rodata.

OK mpi@, deraadt@, anton@, bluhm@


# 9e9abf5b 28-Apr-2018 jasper <jasper@openbsd.org>

replace add_*_randomness with enqueue_randomness()

this gets rid of the source annotation which doesn't really add
anything other than adding complexitiy. randomess is generally
good enough that the

replace add_*_randomness with enqueue_randomness()

this gets rid of the source annotation which doesn't really add
anything other than adding complexitiy. randomess is generally
good enough that the few extra bits that the source type would
add are not worth it.

ok mikeb@ deraadt@

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# 86f75043 09-Feb-2018 deraadt <deraadt@openbsd.org>

Situation occur where bootloader cannot supply kernel with early
random data. But a new source of entropy arrived a few months ago
-- KARL generates highly disturbed images for some kernels (well,
no

Situation occur where bootloader cannot supply kernel with early
random data. But a new source of entropy arrived a few months ago
-- KARL generates highly disturbed images for some kernels (well,
not for bsd.rd)
This assumes the tail of text (just before etext[]) is readable.
We are trying to use a portable symbol name, and also avoid reading
a locore0 which has been unmapped...
ok mortimer

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# c6ded276 08-Feb-2018 mortimer <mortimer@openbsd.org>

Do not hardcode key length. Pointed out by jsing@

ok deraadt@


# 6d1ec4b9 08-Feb-2018 mortimer <mortimer@openbsd.org>

Use a temporary chacha instance to fill large randomdata sections. Avoids
grabbing the rnglock repeatedly.

ok deraadt@ djm@


# d351ff34 26-Nov-2017 mikeb <mikeb@openbsd.org>

Don't mention XOR as a mix-in function since addition is done since 1.180


# eea06480 19-Nov-2017 mikeb <mikeb@openbsd.org>

Remove interlocks between producers and consumers of randomness data

A lot of randomness event producers are executed in the interrupt
context increasing the time spent in the interrupt handler resu

Remove interlocks between producers and consumers of randomness data

A lot of randomness event producers are executed in the interrupt
context increasing the time spent in the interrupt handler resulting
in extra costs when adding randomness data to the pool. However, in
practice randomness event producers require interlocking between each
other, but not with with consumers due to the opportunistic nature of
event consumers.

To be able to take advantage of this idea, the ring buffer indexing
is now done with two free running producer and consumer counters modulo
power of 2 size of the ring buffer.

With input from and OK visa, tb, jasper

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# 8bcf35f4 30-Jul-2017 deraadt <deraadt@openbsd.org>

clang (and newer gcc at high -O) are unaware that objects placed in strange
sections, such as __attribute__((section(".openbsd.randomdata"))), may be
non-zero. In combination with "const" or "static

clang (and newer gcc at high -O) are unaware that objects placed in strange
sections, such as __attribute__((section(".openbsd.randomdata"))), may be
non-zero. In combination with "const" or "static" the compiler becomes even
more sure nothing can influence the object and assumes the value will be 0.
A few optimizations later, a security requirement has been removed.

Until a better annotation arrives in compilers, be warned: Do not mix
const or static with these random objects, you won't get what you want.
Spotted in a regression test by bluhm, long discussion with kettenis.

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# 5e91f97f 15-Mar-2017 deraadt <deraadt@openbsd.org>

spelling and whitespace


# 0eadb61c 08-Dec-2016 deraadt <deraadt@openbsd.org>

fix spelling errors and typos, from Michael W. Bombardieri


# b082a761 18-Oct-2016 deraadt <deraadt@openbsd.org>

when openbsd.randomdata was made readonly, the proto seed copy got done
too late, leading to poor rng in the kernel early on. a behavioural
artifact in vmm spotted the issue.
ok tedu guenther mlarkin


# 9cabb338 07-Oct-2016 tedu <tedu@openbsd.org>

another unused variable bites the dust. spotted by deraadt


# 3f324a2e 07-Oct-2016 tedu <tedu@openbsd.org>

the old time delta code is no longer used. nothing reads these values.
remove it another relic of the superstitious past.
ok deraadt millert mikeb


# ba72b79e 23-Sep-2016 deraadt <deraadt@openbsd.org>

kern.arandom no longer exists
from rob pierce


# bc29f908 22-Sep-2016 deraadt <deraadt@openbsd.org>

Stop pushing version & cfdata into as entropy, since the contents are
known and we rely on the bootpath to prime us anyways.
This also solves the issue raised by kettenis, of version potentially
bein

Stop pushing version & cfdata into as entropy, since the contents are
known and we rely on the bootpath to prime us anyways.
This also solves the issue raised by kettenis, of version potentially
being non-word aligned
ok kettenis djm

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# 8ef0cf3a 04-Sep-2016 kettenis <kettenis@openbsd.org>

Rototil the _rs_clearseed() function once more such that we don't map pages
beyond the end of .text/.rodata.

ok deraadt@


# 4e2bbb16 03-Sep-2016 kettenis <kettenis@openbsd.org>

Since the initial entropy pool is 8192 bytes, we need three pages to create
the alias mapping when clearing it, since there is no guarantee the pool is
page aligned.

ok deraadt@


# e0b1a45a 01-Sep-2016 deraadt <deraadt@openbsd.org>

openbsd.randomdata became RO in userland due to the RELRO work. We should
also do so in the kernel, which gains us RO ssp cookie, which will prevent
spraying attacks.

The random layer was openbsd.r

openbsd.randomdata became RO in userland due to the RELRO work. We should
also do so in the kernel, which gains us RO ssp cookie, which will prevent
spraying attacks.

The random layer was openbsd.randomdata annotating working entropy/chacha
buffers which in turn required them to be RW. To make that work again,
so we need to copy RO seeds to RW working buffers, and later clear the
RO seed buffers afterwards using a temporary RW mapping.

help & ok kettenis, ok guenther

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# 6c7b00ba 15-Jul-2016 tom <tom@openbsd.org>

Remove unused re_nbits from dev/rnd.c

"another leftover of the bean counter"

od tedu@ deraadt@


# 97dabd71 23-May-2016 deraadt <deraadt@openbsd.org>

remove the sysctl kern.random counters, since none of the remaining
ones are capable of giving valuable works vs does-not-work evidence.
ok tedu


# 83a0fc52 17-May-2016 tedu <tedu@openbsd.org>

Change the random event buffer from a queue to an endless ring. This way
we don't drop any events when the queue is full. They are instead mixed
into previous events.
The mixing function selected is

Change the random event buffer from a queue to an endless ring. This way
we don't drop any events when the queue is full. They are instead mixed
into previous events.
The mixing function selected is addition instead of xor to reduce the
possibility that new values effectively erase existing ones.
Convert some types to u_int to ensure defined overflow.
ok deraadt djm

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