1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 *
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
129 * license.
130 *
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 *
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 *
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
143 *
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
148 * OTHERWISE.
149 */
150
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
153
154 #include <stdio.h>
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 # include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #endif
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 # include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #endif
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
175
ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
177 {
178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 return (SSLv3_server_method());
180 else
181 return (NULL);
182 }
183
IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,ssl3_accept,ssl_undefined_function,ssl3_get_server_method)184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
185 ssl3_accept,
186 ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
187 #endif
188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
189 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
190 {
191 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
192
193 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
194
195 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
196 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
197 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
198 /*
199 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
200 * login name
201 */
202 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
203 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
204 } else {
205 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
206 }
207 }
208 return ret;
209 }
210 #endif
211
ssl3_accept(SSL * s)212 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
213 {
214 BUF_MEM *buf;
215 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
216 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
217 int ret = -1;
218 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
219
220 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
221 ERR_clear_error();
222 clear_sys_error();
223
224 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
225 cb = s->info_callback;
226 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
227 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
228
229 /* init things to blank */
230 s->in_handshake++;
231 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
232 SSL_clear(s);
233
234 if (s->cert == NULL) {
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
236 return (-1);
237 }
238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
239 /*
240 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
241 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
242 * handshakes anyway.
243 */
244 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
245 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
246 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
247 }
248 #endif
249
250 for (;;) {
251 state = s->state;
252
253 switch (s->state) {
254 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
255 s->renegotiate = 1;
256 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
257
258 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
259 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
260 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
261 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
262
263 s->server = 1;
264 if (cb != NULL)
265 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
266
267 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
269 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
270 return -1;
271 }
272 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
273
274 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
275 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
276 ret = -1;
277 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
278 goto end;
279 }
280 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
281 BUF_MEM_free(buf);
282 ret = -1;
283 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
284 goto end;
285 }
286 s->init_buf = buf;
287 }
288
289 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
290 ret = -1;
291 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
292 goto end;
293 }
294
295 s->init_num = 0;
296 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
297 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
298 /*
299 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
300 */
301 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
302
303 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
304 /*
305 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
306 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
307 */
308 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
309 ret = -1;
310 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
311 goto end;
312 }
313
314 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
315 ret = -1;
316 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
317 goto end;
318 }
319
320 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
321 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
322 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
323 !(s->options &
324 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
325 /*
326 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
327 * support secure renegotiation.
328 */
329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
330 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
331 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
332 ret = -1;
333 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
334 goto end;
335 } else {
336 /*
337 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
338 * HelloRequest
339 */
340 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
341 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
342 }
343 break;
344
345 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
346 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
347
348 s->shutdown = 0;
349 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
350 if (ret <= 0)
351 goto end;
352 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
353 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
354 s->init_num = 0;
355
356 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
357 ret = -1;
358 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
359 goto end;
360 }
361 break;
362
363 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
364 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
365 break;
366
367 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
368 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
369 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
370
371 s->shutdown = 0;
372 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
373 if (ret <= 0)
374 goto end;
375 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
376 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
377 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
378 {
379 int al;
380 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
381 /*
382 * callback indicates firther work to be done
383 */
384 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
385 goto end;
386 }
387 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
388 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
389 /*
390 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
391 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
392 */
393 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
395 ret = -1;
396 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
397 goto end;
398 }
399 }
400 #endif
401
402 s->renegotiate = 2;
403 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
404 s->init_num = 0;
405 break;
406
407 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
408 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
409 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
410 if (ret <= 0)
411 goto end;
412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
413 if (s->hit) {
414 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
415 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
416 else
417 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
418 }
419 #else
420 if (s->hit)
421 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
422 #endif
423 else
424 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
425 s->init_num = 0;
426 break;
427
428 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
429 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
430 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
431 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
432 if (!
433 (s->s3->tmp.
434 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 |
435 SSL_aSRP))
436 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
437 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
438 if (ret <= 0)
439 goto end;
440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
441 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
442 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
443 else
444 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
445 } else {
446 skip = 1;
447 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
448 }
449 #else
450 } else
451 skip = 1;
452
453 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
454 #endif
455 s->init_num = 0;
456 break;
457
458 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
459 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
460 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
461
462 /*
463 * clear this, it may get reset by
464 * send_server_key_exchange
465 */
466 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
467
468 /*
469 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
470 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
471 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
472 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
473 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
474 * key exchange.
475 */
476 if (0
477 /*
478 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
479 * provided
480 */
481 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
482 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
483 #endif
484 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
485 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
486 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
487 #endif
488 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
489 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
490 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
491 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
492 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
493 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
494 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
495 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
496 )
497 )
498 )
499 ) {
500 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
501 if (ret <= 0)
502 goto end;
503 } else
504 skip = 1;
505
506 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
507 s->init_num = 0;
508 break;
509
510 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
511 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
512 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
513 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
514 /*
515 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
516 * during re-negotiation:
517 */
518 (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len != 0 &&
519 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
520 /*
521 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
522 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
523 * RFC 2246):
524 */
525 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
526 /*
527 * ... except when the application insists on
528 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
529 * this for SSL 3)
530 */
531 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
532 /*
533 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
534 */
535 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
536 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
537 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
538 /*
539 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
540 * are omitted
541 */
542 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
543 /* no cert request */
544 skip = 1;
545 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
546 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
547 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
548 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
549 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
550 return -1;
551 }
552 }
553 } else {
554 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
555 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
556 if (ret <= 0)
557 goto end;
558 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
559 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
560 #else
561 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
562 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
563 #endif
564 s->init_num = 0;
565 }
566 break;
567
568 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
569 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
570 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
571 if (ret <= 0)
572 goto end;
573 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
574 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
575 s->init_num = 0;
576 break;
577
578 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
579
580 /*
581 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
582 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
583 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
584 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
585 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
586 * unconditionally.
587 */
588
589 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
590 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
591 ret = -1;
592 goto end;
593 }
594 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
595
596 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
597 break;
598
599 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
600 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
601 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
602 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
603 if (ret <= 0)
604 goto end;
605 }
606 s->init_num = 0;
607 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
608 break;
609
610 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
611 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
612 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
613 if (ret <= 0)
614 goto end;
615 if (ret == 2) {
616 /*
617 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
618 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
619 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
620 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
621 */
622 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
623 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
624 #else
625 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
626 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
627 else
628 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
629 #endif
630 s->init_num = 0;
631 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
632 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
633 s->init_num = 0;
634 if (!s->session->peer)
635 break;
636 /*
637 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer at this point and
638 * digest cached records.
639 */
640 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
642 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
643 return -1;
644 }
645 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
646 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
647 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
648 return -1;
649 }
650 } else {
651 int offset = 0;
652 int dgst_num;
653
654 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
655 s->init_num = 0;
656
657 /*
658 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
659 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
660 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
661 * step
662 */
663 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
664 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
665 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
666 return -1;
667 }
668 }
669 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
670 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
671 int dgst_size;
672
673 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
674 EVP_MD_CTX_type
675 (s->
676 s3->handshake_dgst
677 [dgst_num]),
678 &(s->s3->
679 tmp.cert_verify_md
680 [offset]));
681 dgst_size =
682 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
683 if (dgst_size < 0) {
684 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
685 ret = -1;
686 goto end;
687 }
688 offset += dgst_size;
689 }
690 }
691 break;
692
693 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
694 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
695 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
696 if (ret <= 0)
697 goto end;
698
699 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
700 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
701 #else
702 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
703 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
704 else
705 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
706 #endif
707 s->init_num = 0;
708 break;
709
710 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
711 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
712 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
713 /*
714 * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
715 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the
716 * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be
717 * cautious.
718 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
719 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
720 * the client's Finished message is read.
721 */
722 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
723 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
724
725 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
726 if (ret <= 0)
727 goto end;
728 s->init_num = 0;
729 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
730 break;
731 #endif
732
733 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
734 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
735 /*
736 * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has
737 * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
738 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
739 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
740 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
741 * the client's Finished message is read.
742 */
743 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
744 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
745 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
746 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
747 if (ret <= 0)
748 goto end;
749 if (s->hit)
750 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
751 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
752 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
753 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
754 #endif
755 else
756 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
757 s->init_num = 0;
758 break;
759
760 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
761 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
762 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
763 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
764 if (ret <= 0)
765 goto end;
766 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
767 s->init_num = 0;
768 break;
769
770 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
771 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
772 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
773 if (ret <= 0)
774 goto end;
775 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
776 s->init_num = 0;
777 break;
778
779 #endif
780
781 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
782 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
783
784 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
785 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
786 ret = -1;
787 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
788 goto end;
789 }
790
791 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
792 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,
793 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
794
795 if (ret <= 0)
796 goto end;
797 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
798 s->init_num = 0;
799
800 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
801 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
802 {
803 ret = -1;
804 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
805 goto end;
806 }
807
808 break;
809
810 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
811 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
812 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
813 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
814 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
815 s->method->
816 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
817 s->method->
818 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
819 if (ret <= 0)
820 goto end;
821 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
822 if (s->hit) {
823 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
824 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
825 #else
826 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
827 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
828 } else
829 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
830 #endif
831 } else
832 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
833 s->init_num = 0;
834 break;
835
836 case SSL_ST_OK:
837 /* clean a few things up */
838 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
839
840 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
841 s->init_buf = NULL;
842
843 /* remove buffering on output */
844 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
845
846 s->init_num = 0;
847
848 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
849 * HelloRequest */
850 s->renegotiate = 0;
851 s->new_session = 0;
852
853 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
854
855 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
856 /* s->server=1; */
857 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
858
859 if (cb != NULL)
860 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
861 }
862
863 ret = 1;
864 goto end;
865 /* break; */
866
867 case SSL_ST_ERR:
868 default:
869 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
870 ret = -1;
871 goto end;
872 /* break; */
873 }
874
875 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
876 if (s->debug) {
877 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
878 goto end;
879 }
880
881 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
882 new_state = s->state;
883 s->state = state;
884 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
885 s->state = new_state;
886 }
887 }
888 skip = 0;
889 }
890 end:
891 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
892
893 s->in_handshake--;
894 if (cb != NULL)
895 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
896 return (ret);
897 }
898
ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL * s)899 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
900 {
901
902 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
903 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
904 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
905 }
906
907 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
908 return ssl_do_write(s);
909 }
910
ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL * s)911 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
912 {
913 int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1, cookie_valid = 0;
914 unsigned int cookie_len;
915 long n;
916 unsigned long id;
917 unsigned char *p, *d;
918 SSL_CIPHER *c;
919 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
920 unsigned char *q;
921 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
922 #endif
923 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
924
925 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
926 goto retry_cert;
927
928 /*
929 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
930 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
931 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
932 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
933 */
934 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
935 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
936 }
937 s->first_packet = 1;
938 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
939 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
940 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
941 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
942 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
943
944 if (!ok)
945 return ((int)n);
946 s->first_packet = 0;
947 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
948
949 /*
950 * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
951 * for session id length
952 */
953 if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
954 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
955 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
956 goto f_err;
957 }
958
959 /*
960 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
961 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
962 */
963 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
964 p += 2;
965
966 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
967 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
968 : (s->client_version < s->version)) {
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
970 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
971 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
972 /*
973 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
974 * number
975 */
976 s->version = s->client_version;
977 }
978 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
979 goto f_err;
980 }
981
982 /*
983 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
984 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
985 * cookie length...
986 */
987 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
988 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
989
990 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
991
992 if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1
993 >= (unsigned int)((d + n) - p)) {
994 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
996 goto f_err;
997 }
998 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
999
1000 if (cookie_length == 0)
1001 return 1;
1002 }
1003
1004 /* load the client random */
1005 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1006 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1007
1008 /* get the session-id */
1009 j = *(p++);
1010
1011 if ((d + n) - p < j) {
1012 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1013 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1014 goto f_err;
1015 }
1016
1017 if ((j < 0) || (j > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) {
1018 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1019 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1020 goto f_err;
1021 }
1022
1023 s->hit = 0;
1024 /*
1025 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1026 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1027 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1028 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1029 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
1030 * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1031 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1032 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1033 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1034 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
1035 */
1036 if ((s->new_session
1037 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1038 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1039 goto err;
1040 } else {
1041 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1042 /*
1043 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1044 * version.
1045 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1046 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1047 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1048 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1049 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1050 */
1051 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
1052 * session */
1053 s->hit = 1;
1054 } else if (i == -1)
1055 goto err;
1056 else { /* i == 0 */
1057
1058 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1059 goto err;
1060 }
1061 }
1062
1063 p += j;
1064
1065 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1066 /* cookie stuff */
1067 if ((d + n) - p < 1) {
1068 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1070 goto f_err;
1071 }
1072 cookie_len = *(p++);
1073
1074 if ((unsigned int)((d + n ) - p) < cookie_len) {
1075 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1077 goto f_err;
1078 }
1079
1080 /*
1081 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1082 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1083 * does not cause an overflow.
1084 */
1085 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
1086 /* too much data */
1087 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1089 goto f_err;
1090 }
1091
1092 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1093 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
1094 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1095
1096 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1097 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1098 cookie_len) == 0) {
1099 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1101 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1102 goto f_err;
1103 }
1104 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1105 }
1106 /* default verification */
1107 else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1108 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1109 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1111 goto f_err;
1112 }
1113 cookie_valid = 1;
1114 }
1115
1116 p += cookie_len;
1117 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1118 /* Select version to use */
1119 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1120 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
1121 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1122 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1123 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1125 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1126 s->version = s->client_version;
1127 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1128 goto f_err;
1129 } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1130 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
1131 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1132 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1133 } else {
1134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1135 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1136 s->version = s->client_version;
1137 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1138 goto f_err;
1139 }
1140 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1141 }
1142 }
1143
1144 if ((d + n ) - p < 2) {
1145 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1146 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1147 goto f_err;
1148 }
1149 n2s(p, i);
1150
1151 if (i == 0) {
1152 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1154 goto f_err;
1155 }
1156
1157 /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
1158 if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) {
1159 /* not enough data */
1160 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1161 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1162 goto f_err;
1163 }
1164 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) {
1165 goto err;
1166 }
1167 p += i;
1168
1169 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1170 if (s->hit) {
1171 j = 0;
1172 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1173
1174 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1175 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1176 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1177 #endif
1178 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1179 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1180 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1181 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1182 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1183 #endif
1184 if (c->id == id) {
1185 j = 1;
1186 break;
1187 }
1188 }
1189 /*
1190 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
1191 * CVE-2010-4180.
1192 */
1193 #if 0
1194 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1195 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
1196 /*
1197 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
1198 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
1199 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
1200 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
1201 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
1202 */
1203 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1204 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
1205 s->session->cipher = c;
1206 j = 1;
1207 }
1208 }
1209 #endif
1210 if (j == 0) {
1211 /*
1212 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1213 * to reuse it
1214 */
1215 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1217 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1218 goto f_err;
1219 }
1220 }
1221
1222 /* compression */
1223 i = *(p++);
1224 if ((d + n) - p < i) {
1225 /* not enough data */
1226 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1228 goto f_err;
1229 }
1230 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1231 q = p;
1232 #endif
1233 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
1234 if (p[j] == 0)
1235 break;
1236 }
1237
1238 p += i;
1239 if (j >= i) {
1240 /* no compress */
1241 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1243 goto f_err;
1244 }
1245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1246 /* TLS extensions */
1247 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1248 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d + n)) {
1249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1250 goto err;
1251 }
1252 }
1253
1254 /*
1255 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1256 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1257 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1258 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1259 */
1260 {
1261 unsigned char *pos;
1262 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1263 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1264 goto f_err;
1265 }
1266 }
1267
1268 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1269 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1270
1271 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1272 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1273 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1274 &pref_cipher,
1275 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1276 s->hit = 1;
1277 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1278 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1279
1280 ciphers = NULL;
1281
1282 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1283 pref_cipher =
1284 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1285 s->
1286 session->ciphers,
1287 SSL_get_ciphers
1288 (s));
1289 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1290 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1292 goto f_err;
1293 }
1294
1295 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1296
1297 if (s->cipher_list)
1298 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1299
1300 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1301 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1302
1303 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1304 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1305 }
1306 }
1307 #endif
1308
1309 /*
1310 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1311 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1312 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1313 */
1314 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1315 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1316 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1317 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1318 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1319 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1320 /* Can't disable compression */
1321 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
1322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1323 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1324 goto f_err;
1325 }
1326 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1327 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1328 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1329 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1330 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1331 break;
1332 }
1333 }
1334 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1336 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1337 goto f_err;
1338 }
1339 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1340 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
1341 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1342 break;
1343 }
1344 if (m >= i) {
1345 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1347 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1348 goto f_err;
1349 }
1350 } else if (s->hit)
1351 comp = NULL;
1352 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1353 /* See if we have a match */
1354 int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
1355
1356 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1357 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1358 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1359 v = comp->id;
1360 for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
1361 if (v == q[o]) {
1362 done = 1;
1363 break;
1364 }
1365 }
1366 if (done)
1367 break;
1368 }
1369 if (done)
1370 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1371 else
1372 comp = NULL;
1373 }
1374 #else
1375 /*
1376 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1377 * using compression.
1378 */
1379 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1381 goto f_err;
1382 }
1383 #endif
1384
1385 /*
1386 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1387 */
1388
1389 if (!s->hit) {
1390 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1391 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1392 #else
1393 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1394 #endif
1395 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1396 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1397 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1398 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1399 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1401 goto f_err;
1402 }
1403 ciphers = NULL;
1404 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1405 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1406 goto err;
1407 }
1408 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1409 retry_cert:
1410 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1411 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1412 if (rv == 0) {
1413 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1414 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1415 goto f_err;
1416 }
1417 if (rv < 0) {
1418 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1419 return -1;
1420 }
1421 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1422 }
1423 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1424
1425 if (c == NULL) {
1426 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1428 goto f_err;
1429 }
1430 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1431 } else {
1432 /* Session-id reuse */
1433 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1434 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1435 SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL;
1436 SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL;
1437
1438 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) {
1439 sk = s->session->ciphers;
1440 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
1441 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
1442 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1443 nc = c;
1444 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1445 ec = c;
1446 }
1447 if (nc != NULL)
1448 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc;
1449 else if (ec != NULL)
1450 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec;
1451 else
1452 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1453 } else
1454 #endif
1455 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1456 }
1457
1458 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1459 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1460 goto f_err;
1461 }
1462
1463 /*-
1464 * we now have the following setup.
1465 * client_random
1466 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1467 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1468 * compression - basically ignored right now
1469 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1470 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1471 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1472 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1473 */
1474
1475 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1476 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1477 if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s, &al)) {
1478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1479 goto f_err;
1480 }
1481 }
1482
1483 ret = cookie_valid ? 2 : 1;
1484 if (0) {
1485 f_err:
1486 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1487 err:
1488 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1489 }
1490
1491 if (ciphers != NULL)
1492 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1493 return ret;
1494 }
1495
ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL * s)1496 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1497 {
1498 unsigned char *buf;
1499 unsigned char *p, *d;
1500 int i, sl;
1501 int al = 0;
1502 unsigned long l;
1503
1504 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1505 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1506 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1507 p = s->s3->server_random;
1508 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1509 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1510 return -1;
1511 }
1512 #endif
1513 /* Do the message type and length last */
1514 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1515
1516 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1517 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1518
1519 /* Random stuff */
1520 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1521 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1522
1523 /*-
1524 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1525 * back in the server hello:
1526 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1527 * we send back the old session ID.
1528 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1529 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1530 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1531 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1532 * session ID.
1533 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1534 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1535 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1536 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1537 * to send back.
1538 */
1539 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1540 && !s->hit)
1541 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1542
1543 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1544 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1546 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1547 return -1;
1548 }
1549 *(p++) = sl;
1550 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1551 p += sl;
1552
1553 /* put the cipher */
1554 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1555 p += i;
1556
1557 /* put the compression method */
1558 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1559 *(p++) = 0;
1560 #else
1561 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1562 *(p++) = 0;
1563 else
1564 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1565 #endif
1566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1567 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1569 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1570 return -1;
1571 }
1572 if ((p =
1573 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1574 &al)) == NULL) {
1575 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1576 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1577 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1578 return -1;
1579 }
1580 #endif
1581 /* do the header */
1582 l = (p - d);
1583 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1584 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1585 }
1586
1587 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1588 return ssl_do_write(s);
1589 }
1590
ssl3_send_server_done(SSL * s)1591 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1592 {
1593
1594 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1595 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1596 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1597 }
1598
1599 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1600 return ssl_do_write(s);
1601 }
1602
ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL * s)1603 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1604 {
1605 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1606 unsigned char *q;
1607 int j, num;
1608 RSA *rsa;
1609 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1610 unsigned int u;
1611 #endif
1612 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1613 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1614 int j;
1615 # endif
1616 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1617 #endif
1618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1619 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
1620 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1621 int encodedlen = 0;
1622 int curve_id = 0;
1623 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1624 #endif
1625 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1626 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1627 unsigned char *p, *d;
1628 int al, i;
1629 unsigned long type;
1630 int n;
1631 CERT *cert;
1632 BIGNUM *r[4];
1633 int nr[4], kn;
1634 BUF_MEM *buf;
1635 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1636
1637 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1638 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1639 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1640 cert = s->cert;
1641
1642 buf = s->init_buf;
1643
1644 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1645 n = 0;
1646 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1647 if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
1648 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
1649 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1650 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1651 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1652 tmp.new_cipher),
1653 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1654 tmp.new_cipher));
1655 if (rsa == NULL) {
1656 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1657 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1658 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1659 goto f_err;
1660 }
1661 RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1662 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
1663 }
1664 if (rsa == NULL) {
1665 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1667 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1668 goto f_err;
1669 }
1670 r[0] = rsa->n;
1671 r[1] = rsa->e;
1672 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
1673 } else
1674 #endif
1675 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1676 if (type & SSL_kEDH) {
1677 dhp = cert->dh_tmp;
1678 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1679 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1680 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1681 tmp.new_cipher),
1682 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1683 tmp.new_cipher));
1684 if (dhp == NULL) {
1685 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1687 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1688 goto f_err;
1689 }
1690
1691 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1692 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1693 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1694 goto err;
1695 }
1696
1697 if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1698 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1699 goto err;
1700 }
1701
1702 s->s3->tmp.dh = dh;
1703 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1705 goto err;
1706 }
1707 r[0] = dh->p;
1708 r[1] = dh->g;
1709 r[2] = dh->pub_key;
1710 } else
1711 #endif
1712 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1713 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1714 const EC_GROUP *group;
1715
1716 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1717 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1718 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1719 goto err;
1720 }
1721
1722 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
1723 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
1724 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1725 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1726 if (nid != NID_undef)
1727 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1728 } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) {
1729 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1730 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1731 tmp.new_cipher),
1732 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
1733 s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1734 }
1735 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1736 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1738 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1739 goto f_err;
1740 }
1741
1742 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1743 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1744 ecdh = ecdhp;
1745 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
1746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1747 goto err;
1748 }
1749
1750 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
1751 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1752 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1753 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
1754 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1756 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1757 goto err;
1758 }
1759 }
1760
1761 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1762 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1763 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
1764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1765 goto err;
1766 }
1767
1768 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1769 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1770 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1771 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1772 goto err;
1773 }
1774
1775 /*
1776 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1777 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1778 * non-zero.
1779 */
1780 if ((curve_id =
1781 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1782 == 0) {
1783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1784 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1785 goto err;
1786 }
1787
1788 /*
1789 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1790 * allocate memory accordingly.
1791 */
1792 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1793 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1794 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1795 NULL, 0, NULL);
1796
1797 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1798 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
1799 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1800 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
1801 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1802 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1803 goto err;
1804 }
1805
1806 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1807 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1808 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1809 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1810
1811 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1812 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1813 goto err;
1814 }
1815
1816 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1817 bn_ctx = NULL;
1818
1819 /*
1820 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1821 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1822 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1823 * structure.
1824 */
1825 n = 4 + encodedlen;
1826
1827 /*
1828 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1829 * can set these to NULLs
1830 */
1831 r[0] = NULL;
1832 r[1] = NULL;
1833 r[2] = NULL;
1834 r[3] = NULL;
1835 } else
1836 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1837 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1838 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1839 /*
1840 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1841 */
1842 n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1843 } else
1844 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1845 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1846 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1847 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1848 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1849 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1850 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1851 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1852 goto err;
1853 }
1854 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1855 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1856 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1857 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1858 } else
1859 #endif
1860 {
1861 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1862 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1863 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1864 goto f_err;
1865 }
1866 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1867 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1869 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1870 n += 1 + nr[i];
1871 else
1872 #endif
1873 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1874 /*
1875 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
1876 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
1877 * as the prime, so use the length of the prime here
1878 */
1879 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kEDH)))
1880 n += 2 + nr[0];
1881 else
1882 #endif
1883 n += 2 + nr[i];
1884 }
1885
1886 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1887 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
1888 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1889 == NULL) {
1890 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1891 goto f_err;
1892 }
1893 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1894 /* Allow space for signature algorithm */
1895 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1896 kn += 2;
1897 /* Allow space for signature length */
1898 kn += 2;
1899 } else {
1900 pkey = NULL;
1901 kn = 0;
1902 }
1903
1904 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
1905 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1906 goto err;
1907 }
1908 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1909
1910 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1912 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1913 *p = nr[i];
1914 p++;
1915 } else
1916 #endif
1917 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1918 /*
1919 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
1920 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
1921 * as the prime
1922 */
1923 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kEDH))) {
1924 s2n(nr[0], p);
1925 for (j = 0; j < (nr[0] - nr[2]); ++j) {
1926 *p = 0;
1927 ++p;
1928 }
1929 } else
1930 #endif
1931 s2n(nr[i], p);
1932 BN_bn2bin(r[i], p);
1933 p += nr[i];
1934 }
1935
1936 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1937 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1938 /*
1939 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1940 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1941 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1942 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1943 */
1944 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1945 p += 1;
1946 *p = 0;
1947 p += 1;
1948 *p = curve_id;
1949 p += 1;
1950 *p = encodedlen;
1951 p += 1;
1952 memcpy((unsigned char *)p,
1953 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1954 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1955 encodedPoint = NULL;
1956 p += encodedlen;
1957 }
1958 #endif
1959
1960 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1961 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1962 size_t len = strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1963
1964 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1965 s2n(len, p);
1966 memcpy(p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, len);
1967 p += len;
1968 }
1969 #endif
1970
1971 /* not anonymous */
1972 if (pkey != NULL) {
1973 /*
1974 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1975 * points to the space at the end.
1976 */
1977 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1978 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1979 q = md_buf;
1980 j = 0;
1981 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1982 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1983 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1984 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,
1985 (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5
1986 : s->ctx->sha1,
1987 NULL) <= 0
1988 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1989 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1990 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1991 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1992 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n) <= 0
1993 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q,
1994 (unsigned int *)&i) <= 0) {
1995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1996 ERR_LIB_EVP);
1997 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1998 goto f_err;
1999 }
2000 q += i;
2001 j += i;
2002 }
2003 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
2004 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
2005 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
2006 goto err;
2007 }
2008 s2n(u, p);
2009 n += u + 2;
2010 } else
2011 #endif
2012 if (md) {
2013 /* send signature algorithm */
2014 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2015 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
2016 /* Should never happen */
2017 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2019 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2020 goto f_err;
2021 }
2022 p += 2;
2023 }
2024 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
2025 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2026 #endif
2027 if (EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
2028 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2029 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2030 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2031 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2032 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n) <= 0
2033 || EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
2034 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) {
2035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
2036 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2037 goto f_err;
2038 }
2039 s2n(i, p);
2040 n += i + 2;
2041 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2042 n += 2;
2043 } else {
2044 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2045 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2046 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2047 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2048 goto f_err;
2049 }
2050 }
2051
2052 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2053 }
2054
2055 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2056 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2057 return ssl_do_write(s);
2058 f_err:
2059 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2060 err:
2061 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2062 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
2063 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2064 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2065 #endif
2066 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2067 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2068 return (-1);
2069 }
2070
ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL * s)2071 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2072 {
2073 unsigned char *p, *d;
2074 int i, j, nl, off, n;
2075 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2076 X509_NAME *name;
2077 BUF_MEM *buf;
2078
2079 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
2080 buf = s->init_buf;
2081
2082 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2083
2084 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2085 p++;
2086 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
2087 d[0] = n;
2088 p += n;
2089 n++;
2090
2091 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2092 const unsigned char *psigs;
2093 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2094 if (nl > SSL_MAX_2_BYTE_LEN) {
2095 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2096 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2097 goto err;
2098 }
2099 s2n(nl, p);
2100 memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
2101 p += nl;
2102 n += nl + 2;
2103 }
2104
2105 off = n;
2106 p += 2;
2107 n += 2;
2108
2109 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2110 nl = 0;
2111 if (sk != NULL) {
2112 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2113 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2114 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2115 if (j > SSL_MAX_2_BYTE_LEN) {
2116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2117 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2118 goto err;
2119 }
2120 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2121 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
2122 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2123 ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2124 goto err;
2125 }
2126 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2127 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) {
2128 s2n(j, p);
2129 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2130 n += 2 + j;
2131 nl += 2 + j;
2132 } else {
2133 d = p;
2134 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2135 j -= 2;
2136 s2n(j, d);
2137 j += 2;
2138 n += j;
2139 nl += j;
2140 }
2141 if (nl > SSL_MAX_2_BYTE_LEN) {
2142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2143 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2144 goto err;
2145 }
2146 }
2147 }
2148 /* else no CA names */
2149 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2150 s2n(nl, p);
2151
2152 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2153
2154 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2155 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2156 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) {
2157 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2158 goto err;
2159 }
2160 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2161 /* do the header */
2162 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2163 *(p++) = 0;
2164 *(p++) = 0;
2165 *(p++) = 0;
2166 s->init_num += 4;
2167 }
2168 #endif
2169
2170 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2171 }
2172
2173 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2174 return ssl_do_write(s);
2175 err:
2176 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2177 return (-1);
2178 }
2179
ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL * s)2180 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2181 {
2182 int i, al, ok;
2183 long n;
2184 unsigned long alg_k;
2185 unsigned char *p;
2186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2187 RSA *rsa = NULL;
2188 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2189 #endif
2190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2191 BIGNUM *pub = NULL;
2192 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2193 #endif
2194 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2195 KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
2196 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2197
2198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2199 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2200 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2201 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2202 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2203 #endif
2204
2205 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2206 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2207 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2208 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
2209
2210 if (!ok)
2211 return ((int)n);
2212 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2213
2214 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2215
2216 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2217 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2218 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2219 int decrypt_len;
2220 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2221 size_t j, padding_len;
2222
2223 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2224 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
2225 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2226 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2227 /*
2228 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2229 */
2230 if (rsa == NULL) {
2231 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2233 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2234 goto f_err;
2235
2236 }
2237 } else {
2238 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2239 if ((pkey == NULL) ||
2240 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2241 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2243 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2244 goto f_err;
2245 }
2246 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2247 }
2248
2249 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2250 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2251 n2s(p, i);
2252 if (n != i + 2) {
2253 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
2254 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2256 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2257 goto f_err;
2258 } else
2259 p -= 2;
2260 } else
2261 n = i;
2262 }
2263
2264 /*
2265 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2266 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2267 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2268 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2269 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2270 */
2271 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2272 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2274 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2275 goto f_err;
2276 }
2277
2278 /*
2279 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2280 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2281 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2282 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2283 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2284 */
2285
2286 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2287 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2288 goto err;
2289
2290 /*
2291 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2292 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2293 */
2294 decrypt_len =
2295 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2296 if (decrypt_len < 0)
2297 goto err;
2298
2299 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2300
2301 /*
2302 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2303 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2304 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2305 */
2306 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2307 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2309 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2310 goto f_err;
2311 }
2312
2313 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2314 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(p[0], 0) &
2315 constant_time_eq_int_8(p[1], 2);
2316 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2317 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(p[j]);
2318 }
2319 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(p[padding_len - 1]);
2320 p += padding_len;
2321
2322 /*
2323 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2324 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2325 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2326 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2327 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2328 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2329 */
2330 version_good =
2331 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2332 version_good &=
2333 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2334
2335 /*
2336 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2337 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2338 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2339 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2340 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2341 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2342 * clients.
2343 */
2344 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2345 unsigned char workaround_good;
2346 workaround_good =
2347 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2348 workaround_good &=
2349 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2350 version_good |= workaround_good;
2351 }
2352
2353 /*
2354 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2355 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2356 */
2357 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2358
2359 /*
2360 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2361 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2362 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2363 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2364 */
2365 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2366 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
2367 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2368 }
2369
2370 s->session->master_key_length =
2371 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2372 s->
2373 session->master_key,
2374 p,
2375 sizeof
2376 (rand_premaster_secret));
2377 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2378 } else
2379 #endif
2380 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2381 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2382 int idx = -1;
2383 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2384 if (n > 1) {
2385 n2s(p, i);
2386 } else {
2387 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
2388 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2390 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2391 goto f_err;
2392 }
2393 i = 0;
2394 }
2395 if (n && n != i + 2) {
2396 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
2397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2398 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2399 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2400 goto f_err;
2401 } else {
2402 p -= 2;
2403 i = (int)n;
2404 }
2405 }
2406 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2407 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2408 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2409 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2410 if (idx >= 0) {
2411 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2412 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2413 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
2414 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2416 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2417 goto f_err;
2418 }
2419 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2420 } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
2421 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2423 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2424 goto f_err;
2425 } else
2426 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
2427
2428 if (n == 0L) {
2429 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2430 EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2431 if (clkey) {
2432 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2433 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2434 }
2435 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2436 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2438 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2439 goto f_err;
2440 }
2441 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2442 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2443 } else
2444 pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
2445 if (pub == NULL) {
2446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2447 goto err;
2448 }
2449
2450 i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
2451
2452 if (i <= 0) {
2453 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2454 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2455 BN_clear_free(pub);
2456 goto f_err;
2457 }
2458
2459 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2460 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
2461 if (dh_clnt)
2462 DH_free(dh_clnt);
2463 else
2464 BN_clear_free(pub);
2465 pub = NULL;
2466 s->session->master_key_length =
2467 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2468 s->
2469 session->master_key,
2470 p, i);
2471 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2472 if (dh_clnt)
2473 return 2;
2474 } else
2475 #endif
2476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2477 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
2478 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2479 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2480 krb5_data authenticator;
2481 krb5_data enc_pms;
2482 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2483 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2484 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2485 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2486 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2487 int padl, outl;
2488 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2489 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2490 int kerr = 0;
2491
2492 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2493
2494 if (!kssl_ctx)
2495 kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2496
2497 n2s(p, i);
2498 enc_ticket.length = i;
2499
2500 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
2501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2502 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2503 goto err;
2504 }
2505
2506 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2507 p += enc_ticket.length;
2508
2509 n2s(p, i);
2510 authenticator.length = i;
2511
2512 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
2513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2514 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2515 goto err;
2516 }
2517
2518 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2519 p += authenticator.length;
2520
2521 n2s(p, i);
2522 enc_pms.length = i;
2523 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2524 p += enc_pms.length;
2525
2526 /*
2527 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
2528 */
2529 if (enc_pms.length > sizeof(pms)) {
2530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2531 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2532 goto err;
2533 }
2534
2535 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2536 enc_pms.length + 6)) {
2537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2538 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2539 goto err;
2540 }
2541
2542 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2543 &kssl_err)) != 0) {
2544 # ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2545 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2546 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2547 if (kssl_err.text)
2548 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2549 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2550 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2551 goto err;
2552 }
2553
2554 /*
2555 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
2556 * return authtime == 0.
2557 */
2558 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2559 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
2560 # ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2561 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2562 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2563 if (kssl_err.text)
2564 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2565 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2567 goto err;
2568 }
2569
2570 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
2571 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2572 goto err;
2573 }
2574 # ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2575 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2576 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2577
2578 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2579 if (enc == NULL)
2580 goto err;
2581
2582 memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv)); /* per RFC 1510 */
2583
2584 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
2585 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2586 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2587 goto err;
2588 }
2589 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
2590 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2591 {
2592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2593 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2594 kerr = 1;
2595 goto kclean;
2596 }
2597 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2598 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2599 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2600 kerr = 1;
2601 goto kclean;
2602 }
2603 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
2604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2605 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2606 kerr = 1;
2607 goto kclean;
2608 }
2609 outl += padl;
2610 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2611 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2612 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2613 kerr = 1;
2614 goto kclean;
2615 }
2616 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
2617 && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
2618 /*
2619 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2620 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
2621 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
2622 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
2623 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
2624 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2625 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
2626 * cipher)
2627 */
2628 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
2629 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2630 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2631 kerr = 1;
2632 goto kclean;
2633 }
2634 }
2635
2636 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2637
2638 s->session->master_key_length =
2639 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2640 s->
2641 session->master_key,
2642 pms, outl);
2643
2644 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
2645 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2646 if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) {
2647 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2648 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ,
2649 len);
2650 }
2651 }
2652
2653 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2654 * but it caused problems for apache.
2655 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2656 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2657 */
2658
2659 kclean:
2660 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, sizeof(pms));
2661 if (kerr)
2662 goto err;
2663 } else
2664 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2665
2666 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2667 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2668 int ret = 1;
2669 int field_size = 0;
2670 const EC_KEY *tkey;
2671 const EC_GROUP *group;
2672 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2673
2674 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2675 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2677 goto err;
2678 }
2679
2680 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2681 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2682 /* use the certificate */
2683 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2684 } else {
2685 /*
2686 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2687 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2688 */
2689 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2690 }
2691
2692 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2693 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2694
2695 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2696 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2698 goto err;
2699 }
2700
2701 /* Let's get client's public key */
2702 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
2703 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2704 goto err;
2705 }
2706
2707 if (n == 0L) {
2708 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2709
2710 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
2711 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2713 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2714 goto f_err;
2715 }
2716 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2717 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
2718 /*
2719 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2720 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2721 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2722 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2723 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2724 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2725 */
2726 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2728 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2729 goto f_err;
2730 }
2731
2732 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2733 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
2734 pkey.ec)) == 0) {
2735 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2736 goto err;
2737 }
2738 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2739 } else {
2740 /*
2741 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2742 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2743 */
2744 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
2745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2746 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2747 goto err;
2748 }
2749
2750 /* Get encoded point length */
2751 i = *p;
2752 p += 1;
2753 if (n != 1 + i) {
2754 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2755 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2756 goto f_err;
2757 }
2758 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
2759 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2760 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2761 goto f_err;
2762 }
2763 /*
2764 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
2765 * to the start
2766 */
2767 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2768 }
2769
2770 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2771 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2772 if (field_size <= 0) {
2773 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2774 goto err;
2775 }
2776 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
2777 NULL);
2778 if (i <= 0) {
2779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2780 goto err;
2781 }
2782
2783 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2784 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2785 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2786 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2787 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2788 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2789
2790 /* Compute the master secret */
2791 s->session->master_key_length =
2792 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2793 s->
2794 session->master_key,
2795 p, i);
2796
2797 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2798 return (ret);
2799 } else
2800 #endif
2801 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2802 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2803 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2804 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
2805 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2806 int psk_err = 1;
2807 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2808
2809 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2810
2811 n2s(p, i);
2812 if (n != i + 2) {
2813 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2814 goto psk_err;
2815 }
2816 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2817 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2818 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2819 goto psk_err;
2820 }
2821 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2823 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2824 goto psk_err;
2825 }
2826
2827 /*
2828 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
2829 */
2830 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2831 memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
2832 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2833 psk_or_pre_ms,
2834 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2835 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
2836
2837 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2839 goto psk_err;
2840 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
2841 /*
2842 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2843 */
2844 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2845 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2846 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2847 goto psk_err;
2848 }
2849
2850 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2851 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
2852 t = psk_or_pre_ms;
2853 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2854 s2n(psk_len, t);
2855 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2856 t += psk_len;
2857 s2n(psk_len, t);
2858
2859 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2860 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2861 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
2862 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2863 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2864 goto psk_err;
2865 }
2866
2867 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2868 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2869 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2870 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2871 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
2872 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2873 goto psk_err;
2874 }
2875
2876 s->session->master_key_length =
2877 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2878 s->
2879 session->master_key,
2880 psk_or_pre_ms,
2881 pre_ms_len);
2882 psk_err = 0;
2883 psk_err:
2884 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2885 if (psk_err != 0)
2886 goto f_err;
2887 } else
2888 #endif
2889 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2890 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2891 int param_len;
2892
2893 n2s(p, i);
2894 param_len = i + 2;
2895 if (param_len > n) {
2896 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2897 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2898 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2899 goto f_err;
2900 }
2901 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
2902 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2903 goto err;
2904 }
2905 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2906 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2907 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2908 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2909 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2910 goto f_err;
2911 }
2912 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2913 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2914 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2915 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2916 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2917 goto err;
2918 }
2919
2920 if ((s->session->master_key_length =
2921 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
2922 s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
2923 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2924 goto err;
2925 }
2926
2927 p += i;
2928 } else
2929 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2930 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2931 int ret = 0;
2932 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2933 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2934 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2935 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2936 unsigned long alg_a;
2937 int Ttag, Tclass;
2938 long Tlen;
2939
2940 /* Get our certificate private key */
2941 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2942 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2943 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2944 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2945 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2946
2947 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2948 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2949 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2950 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2951 goto f_err;
2952 }
2953 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2954 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2955 goto gerr;
2956 }
2957 /*
2958 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2959 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2960 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2961 * client certificate for authorization only.
2962 */
2963 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2964 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2965 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2966 ERR_clear_error();
2967 }
2968 /* Decrypt session key */
2969 if (ASN1_get_object
2970 ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
2971 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2972 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2973 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2974 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2975 goto gerr;
2976 }
2977 start = p;
2978 inlen = Tlen;
2979 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2980 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2981 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2982 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2983 goto gerr;
2984 }
2985 /* Generate master secret */
2986 s->session->master_key_length =
2987 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2988 s->
2989 session->master_key,
2990 premaster_secret, 32);
2991 OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret));
2992 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2993 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2994 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2995 ret = 2;
2996 else
2997 ret = 1;
2998 gerr:
2999 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
3000 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3001 if (ret)
3002 return ret;
3003 else
3004 goto err;
3005 } else {
3006 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3007 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3008 goto f_err;
3009 }
3010
3011 return (1);
3012 f_err:
3013 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3014 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
3015 err:
3016 #endif
3017 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
3018 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
3019 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
3020 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
3021 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
3022 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
3023 #endif
3024 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3025 return (-1);
3026 }
3027
ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL * s)3028 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
3029 {
3030 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3031 unsigned char *p;
3032 int al, ok, ret = 0;
3033 long n;
3034 int type = 0, i, j;
3035 X509 *peer;
3036 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
3037 EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
3038 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3039
3040 /*
3041 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received
3042 * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non
3043 * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even
3044 * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static
3045 * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the
3046 * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here.
3047 */
3048 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
3049 ret = 1;
3050 goto end;
3051 }
3052
3053 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3054 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
3055 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
3056 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
3057 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
3058
3059 if (!ok)
3060 return ((int)n);
3061
3062 peer = s->session->peer;
3063 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
3064 if (pkey == NULL) {
3065 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3066 goto f_err;
3067 }
3068
3069 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
3070
3071 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3072 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3073 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3074 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3075 goto f_err;
3076 }
3077
3078 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3079 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3080 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3081 /*
3082 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
3083 * length field
3084 */
3085 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3086 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) {
3087 i = 64;
3088 } else {
3089 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3090 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3091 if (rv == -1) {
3092 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3093 goto f_err;
3094 } else if (rv == 0) {
3095 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3096 goto f_err;
3097 }
3098 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3099 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3100 #endif
3101 p += 2;
3102 n -= 2;
3103 }
3104 n2s(p, i);
3105 n -= 2;
3106 if (i > n) {
3107 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3108 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3109 goto f_err;
3110 }
3111 }
3112 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3113 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
3114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3115 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3116 goto f_err;
3117 }
3118
3119 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3120 long hdatalen = 0;
3121 void *hdata;
3122 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3123 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
3124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3125 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3126 goto f_err;
3127 }
3128 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3129 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3130 EVP_MD_name(md));
3131 #endif
3132 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3133 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
3134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3135 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3136 goto f_err;
3137 }
3138
3139 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
3140 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3141 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3142 goto f_err;
3143 }
3144 } else
3145 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3146 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
3147 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3148 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3149 pkey->pkey.rsa);
3150 if (i < 0) {
3151 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3153 goto f_err;
3154 }
3155 if (i == 0) {
3156 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3157 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3158 goto f_err;
3159 }
3160 } else
3161 #endif
3162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3163 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3164 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3165 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3166 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
3167 if (j <= 0) {
3168 /* bad signature */
3169 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3171 goto f_err;
3172 }
3173 } else
3174 #endif
3175 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3176 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3177 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3178 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3179 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
3180 if (j <= 0) {
3181 /* bad signature */
3182 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3184 goto f_err;
3185 }
3186 } else
3187 #endif
3188 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
3189 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3190 unsigned char signature[64];
3191 int idx;
3192 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3193 if (pctx == NULL) {
3194 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3196 goto f_err;
3197 }
3198 if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) {
3199 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3200 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3202 goto f_err;
3203 }
3204 if (i != 64) {
3205 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3206 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
3207 #endif
3208 }
3209 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
3210 signature[63 - idx] = p[idx];
3211 }
3212 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3213 32);
3214 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3215 if (j <= 0) {
3216 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3218 goto f_err;
3219 }
3220 } else {
3221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3222 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3223 goto f_err;
3224 }
3225
3226 ret = 1;
3227 if (0) {
3228 f_err:
3229 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3230 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3231 }
3232 end:
3233 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3234 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3235 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3236 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3237 }
3238 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3239 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3240 return (ret);
3241 }
3242
ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL * s)3243 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3244 {
3245 int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
3246 X509 *x = NULL;
3247 unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
3248 const unsigned char *p, *q;
3249 unsigned char *d;
3250 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3251
3252 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3253 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
3254 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
3255 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3256
3257 if (!ok)
3258 return ((int)n);
3259
3260 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
3261 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3262 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3264 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3265 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3266 goto f_err;
3267 }
3268 /*
3269 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
3270 */
3271 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
3272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3273 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3274 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3275 goto f_err;
3276 }
3277 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3278 return (1);
3279 }
3280
3281 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
3282 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3284 goto f_err;
3285 }
3286 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3287
3288 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3289 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3290 goto err;
3291 }
3292
3293 n2l3(p, llen);
3294 if (llen + 3 != n) {
3295 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3296 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3297 goto f_err;
3298 }
3299 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
3300 if (nc + 3 > llen) {
3301 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3303 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3304 goto f_err;
3305 }
3306 n2l3(p, l);
3307 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
3308 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3310 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3311 goto f_err;
3312 }
3313
3314 q = p;
3315 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
3316 if (x == NULL) {
3317 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3318 goto err;
3319 }
3320 if (p != (q + l)) {
3321 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3323 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3324 goto f_err;
3325 }
3326 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3328 goto err;
3329 }
3330 x = NULL;
3331 nc += l + 3;
3332 }
3333
3334 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3335 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3336 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3337 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3339 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3340 goto f_err;
3341 }
3342 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3343 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3344 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3346 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3347 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3348 goto f_err;
3349 }
3350 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3351 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
3352 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3353 goto f_err;
3354 }
3355 } else {
3356 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3357 if (i <= 0) {
3358 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3360 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3361 goto f_err;
3362 }
3363 }
3364
3365 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3366 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3367 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3368 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3369
3370 /*
3371 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
3372 * arrive here.
3373 */
3374 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3375 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3376 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3378 goto err;
3379 }
3380 }
3381 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3382 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3383 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
3384 /*
3385 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3386 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3387 */
3388
3389 sk = NULL;
3390
3391 ret = 1;
3392 if (0) {
3393 f_err:
3394 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3395 err:
3396 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3397 }
3398
3399 if (x != NULL)
3400 X509_free(x);
3401 if (sk != NULL)
3402 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3403 return (ret);
3404 }
3405
ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL * s)3406 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3407 {
3408 CERT_PKEY *cpk;
3409
3410 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
3411 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3412 if (cpk == NULL) {
3413 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3414 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3415 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) {
3416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
3417 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3418 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3419 return (0);
3420 }
3421 }
3422
3423 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
3424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3425 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3426 return (0);
3427 }
3428 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3429 }
3430
3431 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3432 return ssl_do_write(s);
3433 }
3434
3435 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3436 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL * s)3437 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3438 {
3439 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3440 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3441 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3442
3443 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
3444 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
3445 const unsigned char *const_p;
3446 int len, slen_full, slen;
3447 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3448 unsigned int hlen;
3449 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3450 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3451 unsigned char key_name[16];
3452
3453 /* get session encoding length */
3454 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3455 /*
3456 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3457 * long
3458 */
3459 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3460 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3461 return -1;
3462 }
3463 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3464 if (!senc) {
3465 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3466 return -1;
3467 }
3468
3469 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3470 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3471
3472 p = senc;
3473 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3474 goto err;
3475
3476 /*
3477 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3478 */
3479 const_p = senc;
3480 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3481 if (sess == NULL)
3482 goto err;
3483 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3484
3485 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3486 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3487 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3488 goto err;
3489 }
3490 p = senc;
3491 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3492 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3493 goto err;
3494 }
3495 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3496
3497 /*-
3498 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3499 * follows handshake_header_length +
3500 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3501 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3502 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3503 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3504 */
3505 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3506 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3507 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3508 goto err;
3509
3510 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3511 /*
3512 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3513 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3514 */
3515 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3516 /* if 0 is returned, write en empty ticket */
3517 int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3518 &hctx, 1);
3519
3520 if (ret == 0) {
3521 l2n(0, p); /* timeout */
3522 s2n(0, p); /* length */
3523 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET,
3524 p - ssl_handshake_start(s));
3525 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3526 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3527 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3528 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3529 return ssl_do_write(s);
3530 }
3531 if (ret < 0)
3532 goto err;
3533 } else {
3534 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3535 goto err;
3536 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3537 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3538 goto err;
3539 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3540 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL))
3541 goto err;
3542 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3543 }
3544
3545 /*
3546 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3547 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3548 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3549 */
3550 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3551
3552 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3553 p += 2;
3554 /* Output key name */
3555 macstart = p;
3556 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3557 p += 16;
3558 /* output IV */
3559 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3560 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3561 /* Encrypt session data */
3562 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3563 goto err;
3564 p += len;
3565 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
3566 goto err;
3567 p += len;
3568
3569 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3570 goto err;
3571 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
3572 goto err;
3573
3574 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3575 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3576
3577 p += hlen;
3578 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3579 /* Total length */
3580 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3581 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3582 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3583 s2n(len - 6, p);
3584 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3585 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3586 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3587 }
3588
3589 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3590 return ssl_do_write(s);
3591 err:
3592 if (senc)
3593 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3594 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3595 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3596 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3597 return -1;
3598 }
3599
ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL * s)3600 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3601 {
3602 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
3603 unsigned char *p;
3604 size_t msglen;
3605
3606 /*-
3607 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3608 * follows handshake_header_length +
3609 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3610 * + (ocsp response)
3611 */
3612 msglen = 4 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3613 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + msglen)) {
3614 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3615 return -1;
3616 }
3617
3618 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3619
3620 /* status type */
3621 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3622 /* length of OCSP response */
3623 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3624 /* actual response */
3625 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3626
3627 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, msglen);
3628 }
3629
3630 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3631 return (ssl_do_write(s));
3632 }
3633
3634 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3635 /*
3636 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3637 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3638 */
ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL * s)3639 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3640 {
3641 int ok;
3642 int proto_len, padding_len;
3643 long n;
3644 const unsigned char *p;
3645
3646 /*
3647 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3648 * extension in their ClientHello
3649 */
3650 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
3651 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
3652 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3653 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3654 return -1;
3655 }
3656
3657 /* See the payload format below */
3658 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3659 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3660 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3661 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
3662
3663 if (!ok)
3664 return ((int)n);
3665
3666 /*
3667 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3668 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3669 * ssl3_get_finished).
3670 */
3671 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3672 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3673 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3674 return -1;
3675 }
3676
3677 if (n < 2) {
3678 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3679 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3680 }
3681
3682 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3683
3684 /*-
3685 * The payload looks like:
3686 * uint8 proto_len;
3687 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3688 * uint8 padding_len;
3689 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3690 */
3691 proto_len = p[0];
3692 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) {
3693 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3694 return 0;
3695 }
3696 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3697 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) {
3698 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3699 return 0;
3700 }
3701
3702 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3703 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
3704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3705 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3706 return 0;
3707 }
3708 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3709 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3710
3711 return 1;
3712 }
3713 # endif
3714
3715 #endif
3716