1 2 1515 3 THE PRINCE 4 by Nicolo Machiavelli 5 translated by W. K. Marriott 6 CHAPTER I 7 HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, 8 AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED 9 10 ALL STATES, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have 11been and are either republics or principalities. 12 Principalities are either hereditary, in which the family has been 13long established; or they are new. 14 The new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, 15or they are, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary state of 16the prince who has acquired them, as was the kingdom of Naples to that 17of the King of Spain. 18 Such dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under a 19prince, or to live in freedom; and are acquired either by the arms 20of the prince himself, or of others, or else by fortune or by ability. 21 CHAPTER II 22 CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES 23 24 I WILL leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another 25place I have written of them at length, and will address myself only 26to principalities. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated 27above, and discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and 28preserved. 29 I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary 30states, and those long accustomed to the family of their prince, 31than new ones; for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs 32of his ancestors, and to deal prudently with circumstances as they 33arise, for a prince of average powers to maintain himself in his 34state, unless he be deprived of it by some extraordinary and excessive 35force; and if he should be so deprived of it, whenever anything 36sinister happens to the usurper, he will regain it. 37 We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not 38have withstood the attacks of the Venetians in '84, nor those of 39Pope Julius in '10, unless he had been long established in his 40dominions. For the hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity 41to offend; hence it happens that he will be more loved; and unless 42extraordinary vices cause him to be hated, it is reasonable to 43expect that his subjects will be naturally well disposed towards 44him; and in the antiquity and duration of his rule the memories and 45motives that make for change are lost, for one change always leaves 46the toothing for another. 47 CHAPTER III 48 CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES 49 50 BUT the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it 51be not entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which, 52taken collectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly 53from an inherent difficulty which there is in all new 54principalities; for men change their rulers willingly, hoping to 55better themselves, and this hope induces them to take up arms 56against him who rules: wherein they are deceived, because they 57afterwards find by experience they have gone from bad to worse. This 58follows also on another natural and common necessity, which always 59causes a new prince to burden those who have submitted to him with his 60soldiery and with infinite other hardships which he must put upon 61his new acquisition. 62 In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in 63seizing that principality, and you are not able to keep those 64friends who put you there because of your not being able to satisfy 65them in the way they expected, and you cannot take strong measures 66against them, feeling bound to them. For, although one may be very 67strong in armed forces, yet in entering a province one has always need 68of the goodwill of the natives. 69 For these reasons Louis XII, King of France, quickly occupied Milan, 70and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it only 71needed Lodovico's own forces; because those who had opened the gates 72to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future 73benefit, would not endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It is 74very true that, after acquiring rebellious provinces a second time, 75they are not so lightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with 76little reluctance, takes the opportunity of the rebellion to punish 77the delinquents, to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen 78himself in the weakest places. Thus to cause France to lose Milan 79the first time it was enough for the Duke Lodovico to raise 80insurrections on the borders; but to cause him to lose it a second 81time it was necessary to bring the whole world against him, and that 82his armies should be defeated and driven out of Italy; which 83followed from the causes above mentioned. 84 Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the 85second time. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it 86remains to name those for the second, and to see what resources he 87had, and what any one in his situation would have had for 88maintaining himself more securely in his acquisition than did the King 89of France. 90 Now I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an 91ancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same country 92and language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold 93them, especially when they have not been accustomed to 94self-government; and to hold them securely it is enough to have 95destroyed the family of the prince who was ruling them; because the 96two peoples, preserving in other things the old conditions, and not 97being unlike in customs, will live quietly together, as one has seen 98in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, and Normandy, which have been bound to 99France for so long a time: and, although there may be some 100difference in language, nevertheless the customs are alike, and the 101people will easily be able to get on amongst themselves. He who has 102annexed them, if he wishes to hold them, has only to bear in mind 103two considerations: the one, that the family of their former lord is 104extinguished; the other, that neither their laws nor their taxes are 105altered, so that in a very short time they will become entirely one 106body with the old principality. 107 But when states are acquired in a country differing in language, 108customs, or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great 109energy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most 110real helps would be that he who has acquired them should go and reside 111there. This would make his position more secure and durable, as it has 112made that of the Turk in Greece, who, notwithstanding all the other 113measures taken by him for holding that state, if he had not settled 114there, would not have been able to keep it. Because, if one is on 115the spot, disorders are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly 116remedy them; but if one is not at hand, they heard of only when they 117are one can no longer remedy them. Besides this, the country is not 118pillaged by your officials; the subjects are satisfied by prompt 119recourse to the prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have more cause 120to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, to fear him. He who would 121attack that state from the outside must have the utmost caution; as 122long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested from him 123with the greatest difficulty. 124 The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two 125places, which may be as keys to that state, for it necessary either to 126do this or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and 127infantry. A prince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or 128no expense he can send them out and keep them there, and he offends 129a minority only of the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to 130give them to the new inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining 131poor and scattered, are never able to injure him; whilst the rest 132being uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the same time are 133anxious not to err for fear it should happen to them as it has to 134those who have been despoiled. In conclusion, I say that these 135colonies are not costly, they are more faithful, they injure less, and 136the injured, as has been said, I being poor and scattered, cannot 137hurt. Upon this, one has to remark that men ought either to be well 138treated or crushed, because they can avenge themselves of lighter 139injuries, of more serious ones they cannot; therefore the injury 140that is to be done to a man ought to be of such a kind that one does 141not stand in fear of revenge. 142 But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends 143much more, having to consume on the garrison all income from the 144state, so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are 145exasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the 146shifting of the garrison up and down all become acquainted with 147hardship, and all become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst 148beaten on their own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every reason, 149therefore, such guards are as useless as a colony is useful. 150 Again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above 151respects ought to make himself the head and defender of his powerful 152neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking 153care that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any 154accident, get a footing there; for it will always happen that such a 155one will be introduced by those who are discontented, either through 156excess of ambition or through fear, as one has seen already. The 157Romans were brought into Greece by the Aetolians; and in every other 158country where they obtained a footing they were brought in by the 159inhabitants. And the usual course of affairs is that, as soon as a 160powerful foreigner enters a country, all the subject states are 161drawn to him, moved by the hatred which they feel against the ruling 162power. So that in respect to these subject states he has not to take 163any trouble to gain them over to himself, for the whole of them 164quickly rally to the state which he has acquired there. He has only to 165take care that they do not get hold of too much power and too much 166authority, and then with his own forces, and with their goodwill, he 167can easily keep down the more powerful of them, so as to remain 168entirely master in the country. And he who does not properly manage 169this business will soon lose what he has acquired, and whilst he 170does hold it he will have endless difficulties and troubles. 171 The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely 172these measures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations 173with the minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept 174down the greater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to 175gain authority. Greece appears to me sufficient for an example. The 176Achaeans and Aetolians were kept friendly by them, the kingdom of 177Macedonia was humbled, Antiochus was driven out; yet the merits of the 178Achaeans and Aetolians never secured for them permission to increase 179their power, nor did the persuasions of Philip ever induce the 180Romans to be his friends without first humbling him, nor did the 181influence of Antiochus make them agree that he should retain any 182lordship over the country. Because the Romans did in these instances 183what all prudent princes ought to do, who have to regard not only 184present troubles, but also future ones, for which they must prepare 185with every energy, because, when foreseen, it is easy to remedy 186them; but if you wait until they approach, the medicine is no longer 187in time because the malady has become incurable; for it happens in 188this, as the physicians say it happens in hectic fever, that in the 189beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but difficult to detect, 190but in the course of time, not having been either detected or 191treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect but difficult to 192cure. Thus it happens in affairs of state, for when the evils that 193arise have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise man to 194see), they can be quickly redressed, but when, through not having been 195foreseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way that every one can 196see them. there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, the Romans, 197foreseeing troubles, dealt with them at once, and, even to avoid a 198war, would not let them come to a head, for they knew that war is 199not to be avoided, but is only put off to the advantage of others; 200moreover they wished to fight with Philip and Antiochus in Greece so 201as not to have to do it in Italy; they could have avoided both, but 202this they did not wish; nor did that ever please them which is for 203ever in the mouths of the wise ones of our time:- Let us enjoy the 204benefits of the time- but rather the benefits of their own valour 205and prudence, for time drives everything before it, and is able to 206bring with it good as well as evil, and evil as well as good. 207 But let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of 208the things mentioned. I will speak of Louis [XII] (and not of 209Charles [VIII]) as the one whose conduct is the better to be observed, 210he having held possession of Italy for the longest period; and you 211will see that he has done the opposite to those things which ought 212to be done to retain a state composed of divers elements. 213 King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the 214Venetians, who desired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his 215intervention. I will not blame the course taken by the king, 216because, wishing to get a foothold in Italy, and having no friends 217there- seeing rather that every door was shut to him owing to the 218conduct of Charles- he was forced to accept those friendships which he 219could get, and he would have succeeded very quickly in his design if 220in other matters he had not made some mistakes. The king, however, 221having acquired Lombardy, regained at once the authority which Charles 222had lost: Genoa yielded; the Florentines became his friends; the 223Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, the Bentivoglio, my lady of 224Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of Pesaro, of Rimini, of Camerino, of 225Piombino, the Lucchesi, the Pisans, the Sienese- everybody made 226advances to him to become his friend. Then could the Venetians realize 227the rashness of the course taken by them, which, in order that they 228might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made the king master of 229two-thirds of Italy. 230 Let any one now consider with what little difficulty the king 231could have maintained his position in Italy had he observed the 232rules above laid down, and kept all his friends secure and 233protected; for although they were numerous they were both weak and 234timid, some afraid of the Church, some of the Venetians, and thus they 235would always have been forced to stand in with him, and by their means 236he could easily have made himself secure against those who remained 237powerful. But he was no sooner in Milan than he did the contrary by 238assisting Pope Alexander to occupy the Romagna. It never occurred to 239him that by this action he was weakening himself, depriving himself of 240friends and those who had thrown themselves into his lap, whilst he 241aggrandized the Church by adding much temporal power to the spiritual, 242thus giving it great authority. And having committed this prime error, 243he was obliged to follow it up, so much so that, to put an end to 244the ambition of Alexander, and to prevent his becoming the master of 245Tuscany, he was himself forced to come into Italy. 246 And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and 247deprived himself friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of Naples, 248divides it with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime 249arbiter of Italy he takes an associate, so that the ambitious of 250that country and the malcontents of his own should have where to 251shelter; and whereas he could have left in the kingdom his own 252pensioner as king, he drove him out, to put one there who was able 253to drive him, Louis, out in turn. 254 The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men 255always do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not 256blamed; but when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, 257then there is folly and blame. Therefore, if France could have 258attacked Naples with her own forces she ought to have done so; if 259she could not, then she ought not to have divided it. And if the 260partition which she made with the Venetians in Lombardy was 261justified by the excuse that by it she got a foothold in Italy, this 262other partition merited blame, for it had not the excuse of that 263necessity. 264 Therefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor 265powers, he increased the strength of one of the greater powers in 266Italy, he brought in a foreign power, he did not settle in the 267country, he did not send colonies. Which errors, if he had lived, were 268not enough to injure him had he not made a sixth by taking away 269their dominions from the Venetians; because, had he not aggrandized 270the Church, nor brought Spain into Italy, it would have been very 271reasonable and necessary to humble them; but having first taken 272these steps, he ought never to have consented to their ruin, for they, 273being powerful, would always have kept off others from designs on 274Lombardy, to which the Venetians would never have consented except 275to become masters themselves there; also because the others would 276not wish to take Lombardy from France in order to give it to the 277Venetians, and to run counter to both they would not have had the 278courage. 279 And if any one should say: King Louis yielded the Romagna to 280Alexander and the kingdom to Spain to avoid war, I answer for the 281reasons given above that a blunder ought never be perpetrated to avoid 282war, because it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to your 283disadvantage. And if another should allege the pledge which the king 284had given to the Pope that he would assist him in the enterprise, in 285exchange for the dissolution of his marriage and for the hat to Rouen, 286to that I reply what I shall write later on concerning the faith of 287princes, and how it ought to be kept. 288 Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the 289conditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries 290and wished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but 291much that is reasonable and quite natural. And on these matters I 292spoke at Nantes with Rouen, when Valentino,* as Cesare Borgia, the son 293of Pope Alexander, was usually called, occupied the Romagna, and on 294Cardinal Rouen observing to me that the Italians did not understand 295war, I replied to him that the French did not understand statecraft, 296meaning that otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach 297such greatness. And in fact it has been seen that the greatness of the 298Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and her ruin 299may be attributed to them. From this a general rule is drawn which 300never or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another becoming 301powerful is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about 302either by astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by 303him who has been raised to power. 304 305 * So called- in Italian- from the duchy of Valentinois, conferred on 306him by Louis XII. 307 CHAPTER IV 308 WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, 309 DID NOT REBEL AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH 310 311 CONSIDERING the difficulties which men have had to hold a newly 312acquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Great 313became the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst it was yet 314scarcely settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole 315empire would have rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained 316themselves, and had to meet no other difficulty than that which 317arose among themselves from their own ambitions. 318 I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found 319to be governed in two different ways: either by a prince, with a 320body of servants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by 321his favour and permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that 322dignity by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such 323barons have states and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords 324and hold them in natural affection. Those states that are governed 325by a prince and his servants hold their prince in more 326consideration, because in all the country there is no one who is 327recognized as superior to him, and if they yield obedience to 328another they do it as to a minister and official, and they do not bear 329him any particular affection. 330 The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and 331the King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one 332lord, the others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom into 333sanjaks, he sends there different administrators, and shifts and 334changes them as he chooses. But the King of France is placed in the 335midst of an ancient body of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects, 336and beloved by them; they have their own prerogatives, nor can the 337king take these away except at his peril. Therefore, he who 338considers both of these states will recognize great difficulties in 339seizing the state of the Turk, but, once it is conquered, great ease 340in holding it. The causes of the difficulties in seizing the kingdom 341of the Turk are that the usurper cannot be called in by the princes of 342the kingdom, nor can he hope to be assisted in his designs by the 343revolt of those whom the lord has around him. This arises from the 344reasons given above; for his ministers, being all slaves and 345bondmen, can only be corrupted with great difficulty, and one can 346expect little advantage from them when they have been corrupted, as 347they cannot carry the people with them, for the reasons assigned. 348Hence, he who attacks the Turk must bear in mind that he will find him 349united, and he will have to rely more on his own strength than on 350the revolt of others; but, if once the Turk has been conquered, and 351routed in the field in such a way that he cannot replace his armies, 352there is nothing to fear but the family of the prince, and, this being 353exterminated, there remains no one to fear, the others having no 354credit with the people; and as the conqueror did not rely on them 355before his victory, so he ought not to fear them after it. 356 The contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France, 357because one can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the 358kingdom, for one always finds malcontents and such as desire a change. 359Such men, for the reasons given, can open the way into the state and 360render the victory easy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you 361meet with infinite difficulties, both from those who have assisted you 362and from those you have crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have 363exterminated the family of the prince, because the lords that remain 364make themselves the heads of fresh movements against you, and as you 365are unable either to satisfy or exterminate them, that state is lost 366whenever time brings the opportunity. 367 Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of 368Darius, you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and 369therefore it was only necessary for Alexander, first to overthrow 370him in the field, and then to take the country from him. After which 371victory, Darius being killed, the state remained secure to 372Alexander, for the above reasons. And if his successors had been 373united they would have enjoyed it securely and at their ease, for 374there were no tumults raised in the kingdom except those they provoked 375themselves. 376 But it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states 377constituted like that of France. Hence arose those frequent rebellions 378against the Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many 379principalities there were in these states, of which, as long as the 380memory of them endured, the Romans always held an insecure possession; 381but with the power and long continuance of the empire the memory of 382them passed away, and the Romans then became secure possessors. And 383when fighting afterwards amongst themselves, each one was able to 384attach to himself his own parts of the country, according to the 385authority he had assumed there; and the family of the former lord 386being exterminated, none other than the Romans were acknowledged. 387 When these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with 388which Alexander held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties 389which others have had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many 390more; this is not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability 391in the conqueror, but by the want of uniformity in the subject state. 392 CHAPTER V 393 CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH 394 LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED 395 396 WHENEVER those states which have been acquired as stated have been 397accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are 398three courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin 399them, the next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit 400them to live under their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing 401within it an oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because 402such a government, being created by the prince, knows that it cannot 403stand without his friendship and interest, and does its utmost to 404support him; and therefore he who would keep a city accustomed to 405freedom will hold it more easily by the means of its own citizens than 406in any other way. 407 There are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans 408held Athens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy, 409nevertheless they lost them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, 410Carthage, and Numantia, dismantled them, and did not lose them. They 411wished to hold Greece as the Spartans held it, making it free and 412permitting its laws, and did not succeed. So to hold it they were 413compelled to dismantle many cities in the country, for in truth 414there is no safe way to retain them otherwise than by ruining them. 415And he who becomes master of a city accustomed to freedom and does not 416destroy it, may expect to be destroyed by it, for in rebellion it 417has always the watch-word of liberty and its ancient privileges as a 418rallying point, which neither time nor benefits will ever cause it 419to forget. And what ever you may do or provide against, they never 420forget that name or their privileges unless they are disunited or 421dispersed but at every chance they immediately rally to them, as 422Pisa after the hundred years she had been held in bondage by the 423Florentines. 424 But when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a 425prince, and his family is exterminated, they, being on the one hand 426accustomed to obey and on the other hand not having the old prince, 427cannot agree in making one from amongst themselves, and they do not 428know how to govern themselves. For this reason they are very slow to 429take up arms, and a prince can gain them to himself and secure them 430much more easily. But in republics there is more vitality, greater 431hatred, and more desire for vengeance, which will never permit them to 432allow the memory of their former liberty to rest; so that the safest 433way is to destroy them or to reside there. 434 CHAPTER VI 435 CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED 436 BY ONE'S OWN ARMS AND ABILITY 437 438 LET no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new 439principalities as I shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of 440prince and of state; because men, walking almost always in paths 441beaten by others, and following by imitation their deeds, are yet 442unable to keep entirely to the ways of others or attain to the power 443of those they imitate. A wise man ought always to follow the paths 444beaten by great men, and to imitate those who have been supreme, so 445that if his ability does not equal theirs, at least it will savour 446of it. Let him act like the clever archers who, designing to hit the 447mark which yet appears too far distant, and knowing the limits to 448which the strength of their bow attains, take aim much higher than the 449mark, not to reach by their strength or arrow to so great a height, 450but to be able with the aid of so high an aim to hit the mark they 451wish to reach. 452 I say, therefore, that in entirely new principalities, where there 453is a new prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them, 454accordingly as there is more or less ability in him who has acquired 455the state. Now, as the fact of becoming a prince from a private 456station presupposes either ability or fortune, it is clear that one or 457other of these two things will mitigate in some degree many 458difficulties. Nevertheless, he who has relied least on fortune is 459established the strongest. Further, it facilitates matters when the 460prince, having no other state, is compelled to reside there in person. 461 But to come to those who, by their own ability and not through 462fortune, have risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, 463Theseus, and such like are the most excellent examples. And although 464one may not discuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the 465will of God, yet he ought to be admired, if only for that favour which 466made him worthy to speak with God. But in considering Cyrus and others 467who have acquired or founded kingdoms, all will be found admirable; 468and if their particular deeds and conduct shall be considered, they 469will not be found inferior to those of Moses, although he had so great 470a preceptor. And in examining their actions and lives one cannot see 471that they owed anything to fortune beyond opportunity, which brought 472them the material to mould into the form which seemed best to them. 473Without that opportunity their powers of mind would have been 474extinguished, and without those powers the opportunity would have come 475in vain. 476 It was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he should find the people 477of Israel in Egypt enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order 478that they should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered out 479of bondage. It was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba, 480and that he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he 481should become King of Rome and founder of the fatherland. It was 482necessary that Cyrus should find the Persians discontented with the 483government of the Medes, and the Medes soft and effeminate through 484their long peace. Theseus could not have shown his ability had he 485not found the Athenians dispersed. These opportunities, therefore, 486made those men fortunate, and their high ability enabled them to 487recognize the opportunity whereby their country was ennobled and 488made famous. 489 Those who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire a 490principality with difficulty, but they it with ease. The 491difficulties they have in acquiring it arise in part from the new 492rules and methods which they are forced to introduce to establish 493their government and its security. And it ought to be remembered 494that there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to 495conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in 496the introduction of a new order of things. Because the innovator has 497for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and 498lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This 499coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws 500on their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not 501readily believe in new things until they have had a long experience of 502them. Thus it happens that whenever those who are hostile have the 503opportunity to attack they do it like partisans, whilst the others 504defend lukewarmly, in such wise that the prince is endangered along 505with them. 506 It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter 507thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves 508or have to depend on others: that is to say, whether, to consummate 509their enterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use force? In 510the first instance they always succeed badly, and never compass 511anything; but when they can rely on themselves and use force, then 512they are rarely endangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have 513conquered, and the unarmed ones have been destroyed. Besides the 514reasons mentioned, the nature of the people is variable, and whilst it 515is easy to persuade them, it is difficult to fix them in that 516persuasion. And thus it is necessary to take such measures that, 517when they believe no longer, it may be possible to make them believe 518by force. 519 If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could 520not have enforced their constitutions for long- as happened in our 521time to Fra Girolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new order 522of things immediately the multitude believed in him no longer, and 523he had no means of keeping steadfast those who believed or of making 524the unbelievers to believe. Therefore such as these have great 525difficulties in consummating their enterprise, for all their dangers 526are in the ascent, yet with ability they will overcome them; but 527when these are overcome, and those who envied them their success are 528exterminated, they will begin to be respected, and they will 529continue afterwards powerful, secure, honoured, and happy. 530 To these great examples I wish to add a lesser one; still it bears 531some resemblance to them, and I wish it to suffice me for all of a 532like kind: it is Hiero the Syracusan. This man rose from a private 533station to be Prince of Syracuse, nor did he, either, owe anything 534to fortune but opportunity; for the Syracusans, being oppressed, chose 535him for their captain, afterwards he was rewarded by being made 536their prince. He was of so great ability, even as a private citizen, 537that one who writes of him says he wanted nothing but a kingdom to 538be a king. This man abolished the old soldiery, organized the new, 539gave up old alliances, made new ones; and as he had his own soldiers 540and allies, on such foundations he was able to build any edifice: 541thus, whilst he had endured much trouble in acquiring, he had but 542little in keeping. 543 CHAPTER VII 544 CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED 545 EITHER BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE 546 547 THOSE who solely by good fortune become princes from being private 548citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they 549have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they 550have many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some 551state is given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows 552it; as happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the 553Hellespont, where princes were made by Darius, in order that they 554might hold the cities both for his security and his glory; as also 555were those emperors who, by the corruption of the soldiers, from being 556citizens came to empire. Such stand simply upon the goodwill and the 557fortune of him who has elevated them- two most inconstant and unstable 558things. Neither have they the knowledge requisite for the position; 559because, unless they are men of great worth and ability, it is not 560reasonable to expect that they should know how to command, having 561always lived in a private condition; besides, they cannot hold it 562because they have not forces which they can keep friendly and 563faithful. 564 States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature 565which are born and grow rapidly, cannot have their foundations and 566relations with other states fixed in such a way that the first storm 567will not overthrow them; unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly 568become princes are men of so much ability that they know they have 569to be prepared at once to hold that which fortune has thrown into 570their laps, and that those foundations, which others have laid 571before they became princes, they must lay afterwards. 572 Concerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability 573or fortune, I wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection, 574and these are Francesco Sforza and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by proper 575means and with great ability, from being a private person rose to be 576Duke of Milan, and that which he had acquired with a thousand 577anxieties he kept with little trouble. On the other hand, Cesare 578Borgia, called by the people Duke Valentino, acquired his state during 579the ascendancy of his father, and on its decline he lost it, 580notwithstanding that he had taken every measure and done all that 581ought to be done by a wise and able man to fix firmly his roots in the 582states which the arms and fortunes of others had bestowed on him. 583 Because, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his 584foundations may be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but 585they will be laid with trouble to the architect and danger to the 586building. If, therefore, all the steps taken by the duke be 587considered, it will be seen that he laid solid foundations for his 588future power, and I do not consider it superfluous to discuss them, 589because I do not know what better precepts to give a new prince than 590the example of his actions; and if his dispositions were of no 591avail, that was not his fault, but the extraordinary and extreme 592malignity of fortune. 593 Alexander VI, in wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had many 594immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see his 595way to make him master of any state that was not a state of the 596Church; and if he was willing to rob the Church he knew that the 597Duke of Milan and the Venetians would not consent, because Faenza 598and Rimini were already under the protection of the Venetians. Besides 599this, he saw the arms of Italy, especially those by which he might 600have been assisted, in hands that would fear the aggrandizement of the 601Pope, namely, the Orsini and the Colonna and their following. It 602behoved him, therefore, to upset this state of affairs and embroil the 603powers, so as to make himself securely master of part of their states. 604This was easy for him to do, because he found the Venetians, moved 605by other reasons, inclined to bring back the French into Italy; he 606would not only not oppose this, but he would render it more easy by 607dissolving the former marriage of King Louis. Therefore the king 608came into Italy with the assistance of the Venetians and the consent 609of Alexander. He was no sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers 610from him for the attempt on the Romagna, which yielded to him on the 611reputation of the king. The duke, therefore, having acquired the 612Romagna and beaten the Colonna, while wishing to hold that and to 613advance further, was hindered by two things: the one, his forces did 614not appear loyal to him, the other, the goodwill of France: that is to 615say, he feared that the forces of the Orsini, which was using, would 616not stand to him, that not only might they hinder him from winning 617more, but might themselves seize what he had won, and that the King 618might also do the same. Of the Orsini he had a warning when, after 619taking Faenza and attacking Bologna, he saw them go very unwillingly 620to that attack. And as to the king, he learned his mind when he 621himself, after taking the duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany, and the 622king made him desist from that undertaking; hence the duke decided 623to depend no more upon the arms and the luck of others. 624 For the first thing he weakened the Orsini and Colonna parties in 625Rome, by gaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen, 626making them his gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to 627their rank, honouring them with office and command in such a way 628that in a few months all attachment to the factions was destroyed 629and turned entirely to the duke. After this he awaited an 630opportunity to crush the Orsini, having scattered the adherents of the 631Colonna. This came to him soon and he used it well; for the Orsini, 632perceiving at length that the aggrandizement of the duke and the 633Church was ruin to them, called a meeting at Magione, in the territory 634of Perugia. From this sprung the rebellion at Urbino and the tumults 635in the Romagna, with endless dangers to the duke, all of which he 636overcame with the help of the French. Having restored his authority, 637not to leave it at risk by trusting either to the French or other 638outside forces, he had recourse to his wiles, and he knew so well 639how to conceal his mind that, by the mediation of Signor Paolo 640[Orsini]- whom the duke did not fail to secure with all kinds of 641attention, giving him money, apparel, and horses- the Orsini were 642reconciled, so that their simplicity brought them into his power at 643Sinigaglia. Having exterminated the leaders, and turned their 644partisans into his friends, the duke had laid sufficiently good 645foundations to his power, having all the Romagna and the duchy of 646Urbino; and the people now beginning to appreciate their prosperity, 647he gained them all over to himself. And as this point is worthy of 648notice, and to be imitated by others, I am not willing to leave it 649out. 650 When the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of 651weak masters, who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and 652gave them more cause for disunion than for union, so that the 653country was full of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence; and 654so, wishing to bring back peace and obedience to authority, he 655considered it necessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon he 656promoted Messer Ramiro d'Orco [de Lorqua], a swift and cruel man, to 657whom he gave the fullest power. This man in a short time restored 658peace and unity with the greatest success. Afterwards the duke 659considered that it was not advisable to confer such excessive 660authority, for he had no doubt but that he would become odious, so 661he set up a court of judgment in the country, under a most excellent 662president, wherein all cities had their advocates. And because he knew 663that the past severity had caused some hatred against himself, so, 664to clear himself in the minds of the people, and gain them entirely to 665himself, he desired to show that, if any cruelty had been practised, 666it had not originated with him, but in the natural sternness of the 667minister. Under this pretence he took Ramiro, and one morning caused 668him to be executed and left on the piazza at Cesena with the block and 669a bloody knife at his side. The barbarity of this spectacle caused the 670people to be at once satisfied and dismayed. 671 But let us return whence we started. I say that the duke, finding 672himself now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate 673dangers by having armed himself in his own way, and having in a 674great measure crushed those forces in his vicinity that could injure 675him if he wished to proceed with his conquest, had next to consider 676France, for he knew that the king, who too late was aware of his 677mistake, would not support him. And from this time he began to seek 678new alliances and to temporize with France in the expedition which she 679was making towards the kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards who 680were besieging Gaeta. It was his intention to secure himself against 681them, and this he would have quickly accomplished had Alexander lived. 682 Such was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the 683future he had to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the 684Church might not be friendly to him and might seek to take from him 685that which Alexander had given him, so he decided to act in four ways. 686Firstly, by exterminating the families of those lords whom he had 687despoiled, so as to take away that pretext from the Pope. Secondly, by 688winning to himself all the gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb 689the Pope with their aid, as has been observed. Thirdly, by 690converting the college more to himself. Fourthly, by acquiring so much 691power before the Pope should die that he could by his own measures 692resist the first shock. Of these four things, at the death of 693Alexander, he had accomplished three. For he had killed as many of the 694dispossessed lords as he could lay hands on, and few had escaped; he 695had won over the Roman gentlemen, and he had the most numerous party 696in the college. And as to any fresh acquisition, he intended to become 697master of Tuscany, for he already possessed Perugia and Piombino, 698and Pisa was under his protection. And as he had no longer to study 699France (for the French were already driven out of the kingdom of 700Naples by the Spaniards, and in this way both were compelled to buy 701his goodwill), he pounced down upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and 702Siena yielded at once, partly through hatred and partly through fear 703of the Florentines; and the Florentines would have had no remedy had 704he continued to prosper, as he was prospering the year that 705Alexander died, for he had acquired so much power and reputation 706that he would have stood by himself, and no longer have depended on 707the luck and the forces of others, but solely on his own power and 708ability. 709 But Alexander died five years after he had first drawn the sword. He 710left the duke with the state of Romagna alone consolidated, with the 711rest in the air, between two most powerful hostile armies, and sick 712unto death. Yet there were in the duke such boldness and ability, 713and he knew so well how men are to be won or lost, and so firm were 714the foundations which in so short a time he had laid, that if he had 715not had those armies on his back, or if he had been in good health, he 716would have overcome all difficulties. And it is seen that his 717foundations were good, for the Romagna awaited him for more than a 718month. In Rome, although but half alive, he remained secure; and 719whilst the Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Orsini might come to Rome, 720they could not effect anything against him. If he could not have 721made Pope him whom he wished, at least the one whom he did not wish 722would not have been elected. But if he had been in sound health at the 723death of Alexander, everything would have been easy to him. On the day 724that Julius II was elected, he told me that he had thought of 725everything that might occur at the death of his father, and had 726provided a remedy for all, except that he had never anticipated 727that, when the death did happen, he himself would be on the point to 728die. 729 When all the actions of the duke are recalled, I do not know how 730to blame him, but rather it appears to me, as I have said, that I 731ought to offer him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or 732the arms of others, are raised to government. Because he, having a 733lofty spirit and far-reaching aims, could not have regulated his 734conduct otherwise, and only the shortness of the life of Alexander and 735his own sickness frustrated his designs. Therefore, he who considers 736it necessary to secure himself in his new principality, to win 737friends, to overcome either by force or fraud, to make himself beloved 738and feared by the people, to be followed and revered by the 739soldiers, to exterminate those who have power or reason to hurt him, 740to change the old order of things for new, to be severe and 741gracious, magnanimous and liberal, to destroy a disloyal soldiery 742and to create new, to maintain friendship with kings and princes in 743such a way that they must help him with zeal and offend with 744caution, cannot find a more lively example than the actions of this 745man. 746 Only can he be blamed for the election of Julius II, in whom he made 747a bad choice, because, as is said, not being able to elect a Pope to 748his own mind, he could have hindered any other from being elected 749Pope; and he ought never to have consented to the election of any 750cardinal whom he had injured or who had cause to fear him if they 751became pontiffs. For men injure either from fear or hatred. Those whom 752he had injured, amongst others, were San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna, 753San Giorgio, and Ascanio.* Any one of the others, on becoming Pope, 754would have had to fear him, Rouen and the Spaniards excepted; the 755latter from their relationship and obligations, the former from his 756influence, the kingdom of France having relations with him. Therefore, 757above everything, the duke ought to have created a Spaniard Pope, and, 758failing him, he ought to have consented to Rouen and not San Pietro ad 759Vincula. He who believes that new benefits will cause great personages 760to forget old injuries is deceived. Therefore, the duke erred in his 761choice, and it was the cause of his ultimate ruin. 762 763 * Julius II had been Cardinal of San Pietro ad Vincula; San 764Giorgio was Raffaells Riaxis, and Ascanio was Cardinal Ascanio Sforza. 765 CHAPTER VIII 766 CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY 767 BY WICKEDNESS 768 769 ALTHOUGH a prince may rise from a private station in two ways, 770neither of which can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius, 771yet it is manifest to me that I must not be silent on them, although 772one could be more copiously treated when I discuss republics. These 773methods are when, either by some wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends 774to the principality, or when by the favour of his fellow-citizens a 775private person becomes the prince of his country. And speaking of 776the first method, it will be illustrated by two examples- one ancient, 777the other modern- and without entering further into the subject, I 778consider these two examples will suffice those who may be compelled to 779follow them. 780 Agathocles, the Sicilian, became King of Syracuse not only from a 781private but from a low and abject position. This man, the son of a 782potter, through all the changes in his fortunes always led an infamous 783life. Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies with so much ability 784of mind and body that, having devoted himself to the military 785profession, he rose through its ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being 786established in that position, and having deliberately resolved to make 787himself prince and to seize by violence, without obligation to others, 788that which had been conceded to him by assent, he came to an 789understanding for this purpose with Hamilcar, the Carthaginian, who, 790with his army, was fighting in Sicily. One morning he assembled the 791people and senate of Syracuse, as if he had to discuss with them 792things relating to the Republic, and at a given signal the soldiers 793killed all the senators and the richest of the people; these dead, 794he seized and held the princedom of that city without any civil 795commotion. And although he was twice routed by the Carthaginians, 796and ultimately besieged, yet not only was he able to defend his 797city, but leaving part of his men for its defence, with the others 798he attacked Africa, and in a short time raised the siege of 799Syracuse. The Carthaginians, reduced to extreme necessity, were 800compelled to come to terms with Agathocles, and, leaving Sicily to 801him, had to be content with the possession of Africa. 802 Therefore, he who considers the actions and the genius of this man 803will see nothing, or little, which can be attributed to fortune, 804inasmuch as he attained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not by the 805favour of any one, but step by step in the military profession, 806which steps were gained with a thousand troubles and perils, and 807were afterwards boldly held by him with many hazards and dangers. 808Yet it cannot be called talent to slay fellow-citizens, to deceive 809friends, to be without faith, without mercy, without religion; such 810methods may gain empire, but not glory. Still, if the courage of 811Agathocles in entering into and extricating himself from dangers be 812considered, together with his greatness of mind in enduring overcoming 813hardships, it cannot be seen why he should be esteemed less than the 814most notable captain. Nevertheless, his barbarous cruelty and 815inhumanity with infinite wickednesses do not permit him to be 816celebrated among the most excellent men. What he achieved cannot be 817attributed either to fortune or to genius. 818 In our times, during the rule of Alexander VI, Oliverotto da 819Fermo, having been left an orphan many years before, was brought up by 820his maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, and in the early days of his 821youth sent to fight under Paolo Vitelli, that, being trained under his 822discipline, he might attain some high position in the military 823profession. After Paolo died, he fought under his brother 824Vitellozzo, and in a very short time, being endowed with wit and a 825vigorous body and mind, he became the first man in his profession. But 826it appearing to him a paltry thing to serve under others, he resolved, 827with the aid of some citizens of Fermo, to whom the slavery of their 828country was dearer than its liberty, and with the help of the Vitelli, 829to seize Fermo. So he wrote to Giovanni Fogliani that, having been 830away from home for many years, he wished to visit him and his city, 831and in some measure to look into his patrimony; and although he had 832not laboured to acquire anything except honour, yet, in order that the 833citizens should see he had not spent his time in vain, he desired to 834come honourably, so would be accompanied by one hundred horsemen, 835his friends and retainers; and he entreated Giovanni to arrange that 836he should be received honourably by the citizens of Fermo, all of 837which would be not only to his honour, but also to that of Giovanni 838himself, who had brought him up. 839 Giovanni, therefore, did not fail in any attentions due to his 840nephew, and he caused him to be honourably received by the Fermans, 841and he lodged him in his own house, where, having passed some days, 842and having arranged what was necessary for his wicked designs, 843Oliverotto gave a solemn banquet to which he invited Giovanni Fogliani 844and the chiefs of Fermo. When the viands and all the other 845entertainments that are usual in such banquets were finished, 846Oliverotto artfully began certain grave discourses, speaking of the 847greatness of Pope Alexander and his son Cesare, and of their 848enterprises, to which discourse Giovanni and others answered; but he 849rose at once, saying that such matters ought to be discussed in a more 850private place, and he betook himself to a chamber, whither Giovanni 851and the rest of the citizens went in after him. No sooner were they 852seated than soldiers issued from secret places and slaughtered 853Giovanni and the rest. After these murders Oliverotto, mounted on 854horseback, rode up and down the town and besieged the chief magistrate 855in the palace, so that in fear the people were forced to obey him, and 856to form a government, of which he made himself the prince. He killed 857all the malcontents who were able to injure him, and strengthened 858himself with new civil and military ordinances, in such a way that, in 859the year during which he held the principality, not only was he secure 860in the city of Fermo, but he had become formidable to all his 861neighbours. And his destruction would have been as difficult as that 862of Agathocles if he had not allowed himself to be overreached by 863Cesare Borgia, who took him with the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigaglia, 864as was stated above. Thus one year after he had committed this 865parricide, he was strangled, together with Vitellozzo, whom he had 866made his leader in valour and wickedness. 867 Some may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles, and his like, 868after infinite treacheries and cruelties, should live for long 869secure in his country, and defend himself from external enemies, and 870never be conspired against by his own citizens; seeing that many 871others, by means of cruelty, have never been able even in peaceful 872times to hold the state, still less in the doubtful times of war. I 873believe that this follows from severities being badly or properly 874used. Those may be called properly used, if of evil it is lawful to 875speak well, that are applied at one blow and are necessary to one's 876security, and that are not persisted in afterwards unless they can 877be turned to the advantage of the subjects. The badly employed are 878those which, notwithstanding they may be few in the commencement, 879multiply with time rather than decrease. Those who practise the 880first system are able, by aid of God or man, to mitigate in some 881degree their rule, as Agathocles did. It is impossible for those who 882follow the other to maintain themselves. 883 Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper 884ought to examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary 885for him to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have 886to repeat them daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able 887to reassure them, and win them to himself by benefits. He who does 888otherwise, either from timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to 889keep the knife in his hand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor 890can they attach themselves to him, owing to their continued and 891repeated wrongs. For injuries ought to be done all at one time, so 892that, being tasted less, they offend less; benefits ought to be 893given little by little, so that the flavour of them may last longer. 894 And above all things, a prince ought to live amongst his people in 895such a way that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good or 896evil, shall make him change; because if the necessity for this comes 897in troubled times, you are too late for harsh measures; and mild 898ones will not help you, for they will be considered as forced from 899you, and no one will be under any obligation to you for them. 900 CHAPTER IX 901 CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY 902 903 BUT coming to the other point- where a leading citizen becomes the 904prince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable 905violence, but by the favour of his fellow citizens- this may be called 906a civil principality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to 907attain to it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a 908principality is obtained either by the favour of the people or by 909the favour of the nobles. Because in all cities these two distinct 910parties are found, and from this it arises that the people do not wish 911to be ruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule 912and oppress the people; and from these two opposite desires there 913arises in cities one of three results, either a principality, 914self-government, or anarchy. 915 A principality is created either by the people or by the nobles, 916accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the 917nobles, seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the 918reputation of one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that 919under his shadow they can give vent to their ambitions. The people, 920finding they cannot resist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of 921one of themselves, and make him a prince so as to be defended by his 922authority. He who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of the 923nobles maintains himself with more difficulty than he who comes to 924it by the aid of the people, because the former finds himself with 925many around him who consider themselves his equals, and because of 926this he can neither rule nor manage them to his liking. But he who 927reaches sovereignty by popular favour finds himself alone, and has 928none around him, or few, who are not prepared to obey him. 929 Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to 930others, satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for 931their object is more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter 932wishing to oppress, whilst the former only desire not to be oppressed. 933It is to be added also that a prince can never secure himself 934against a hostile people, because of their being too many, whilst from 935the nobles he can secure himself, as they are few in number. The worst 936that a prince may expect from a hostile people is to be abandoned by 937them; but from hostile nobles he has not only to fear abandonment, but 938also that they will rise against him; for they, being in these affairs 939more far-seeing and astute, always come forward in time to save 940themselves, and to obtain favours from him whom they expect to 941prevail. Further, the prince is compelled to live always with the same 942people, but he can do well without the same nobles, being able to make 943and unmake them daily, and to give or take away authority when it 944pleases him. 945 Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought 946to be looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either 947shape their course in such a way as binds them entirely to your 948fortune, or they do not. Those who so bind themselves, and are not 949rapacious, ought to be honoured and loved; those who do not bind 950themselves may be dealt with in two ways; they may fail to do this 951through pusillanimity and a natural want of courage, in which case you 952ought to make use of them, especially of those who are of good 953counsel; and thus, whilst in prosperity you honour yourself, in 954adversity you have not to fear them. But when for their own 955ambitious ends they shun binding themselves, it is a token that they 956are giving more thought to themselves than to you, and a prince 957ought to guard against such, and to fear them as if they were open 958enemies, because in adversity they always help to ruin him. 959 Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people 960ought to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they 961only ask not to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to the 962people, becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above 963everything, to seek to win the people over to himself, and this he may 964easily do if he takes them under his protection. Because men, when 965they receive good from him of whom they were expecting evil, are bound 966more closely to their benefactor; thus the people quickly become 967more devoted to him than if he had been raised to the principality 968by their favours; and the prince can win their affections in many 969ways, but as these vary according to the circumstances one cannot give 970fixed rules, so I omit them; but, I repeat, it is necessary for a 971prince to have the people friendly, otherwise he has no security in 972adversity. 973 Nabis, Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece, 974and of a victorious Roman army, and against them he defended his 975country and his government; and for the overcoming of this peril it 976was only necessary for him to make himself secure against a few, but 977this would not have been sufficient if the people had been hostile. 978And do not let any one impugn this statement with the trite proverb 979that 'He who builds on the people, builds on the mud,' for this is 980true when a private citizen makes a foundation there, and persuades 981himself that the people will free him when he is oppressed by his 982enemies or by the magistrates; wherein he would find himself very 983often deceived, as happened to the Gracchi in Rome and to Messer 984Giorgio Scali in Florence. But granted a prince who has established 985himself as above, who can command, and is a man of courage, undismayed 986in adversity, who does not fail in other qualifications, and who, by 987his resolution and energy, keeps the whole people encouraged- such a 988one will never find himself deceived in them, and it will be shown 989that he has laid his foundations well. 990 These principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from 991the civil to the absolute order of government, for such princes either 992rule personally or through magistrates. In the latter case their 993government is weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on 994the goodwill of those citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and 995who, especially in troubled times, can destroy the government with 996great ease, either by intrigue or open defiance; and the prince has 997not the chance amid tumults to exercise absolute authority, because 998the citizens and subjects, accustomed to receive orders from 999magistrates, are not of a mind to obey him amid these confusions, 1000and there will always be in doubtful times a scarcity of men whom he 1001can trust. For such a prince cannot rely upon what he observes in 1002quiet times, when citizens had need of the state, because then every 1003one agrees with him; they all promise, and when death is far distant 1004they all wish to die for him; but in troubled times, when the state 1005has need of its citizens, then he finds but few. And so much the 1006more is this experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried 1007once. Therefore a wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his 1008citizens will always in every sort and kind of circumstance have 1009need of the state and of him, and then he will always find them 1010faithful. 1011 CHAPTER X 1012 CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH 1013 OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO BE MEASURED 1014 1015 IT IS necessary to consider another point in examining the character 1016of these principalities: that is, whether a prince has such power 1017that, in case of need, he can support himself with his own 1018resources, or whether he has always need of the assistance of 1019others. And to make this quite clear I say that I consider those are 1020able to support themselves by their own resources who can, either by 1021abundance of men or money, raise a sufficient army to join battle 1022against any one who comes to attack them; and I consider those 1023always to have need of others who cannot show themselves against the 1024enemy in the field, but are forced to defend themselves by 1025sheltering behind walls. The first case has been discussed, but we 1026will speak of it again should it recur. In the second case one can say 1027nothing except to encourage such princes to provision and fortify 1028their towns, and not on any account to defend the country. And whoever 1029shall fortify his town well, and shall have managed the other concerns 1030of his subjects in the way stated above, and to be often repeated, 1031will never be attacked without great caution, for men are always 1032adverse to enterprises where difficulties can be seen, and it will 1033be seen not to be an easy thing to attack one who has his town well 1034fortified, and is not hated by his people. 1035 The cities of Germany are absolutely free, they own but little 1036country around them, and they yield obedience to the emperor when it 1037suits them, nor do they fear this or any other power they may have 1038near them, because they are fortified in such a way that every one 1039thinks the taking of them by assault would be tedious and difficult, 1040seeing they have proper ditches and walls, they have sufficient 1041artillery, and they always keep in public depots enough for one year's 1042eating, drinking, and firing. And beyond this, to keep the people 1043quiet and without loss to the state, they always have the means of 1044giving work to the community in those labours that are the life and 1045strength of the city, and on the pursuit of which the people are 1046supported; they also hold military exercises in repute, and moreover 1047have many ordinances to uphold them. 1048 Therefore, a prince who has a strong city, and had not made 1049himself odious, will not be attacked, or if any one should attack he 1050will only be driven off with disgrace; again, because that affairs 1051of this world are so changeable, it is almost impossible to keep an 1052army a whole year in the field without being interfered with. And 1053whoever should reply: If the people have property outside the city, 1054and see it burnt, they will not remain patient, and the long siege and 1055self-interest will make them forget their prince; to this I answer 1056that a powerful and courageous prince will overcome all such 1057difficulties by giving at one time hope to his subjects that the 1058evil will not be for long, at another time fear of the cruelty of 1059the enemy, then preserving himself adroitly from those subjects who 1060seem to him to be too bold. 1061 Further, the enemy would naturally on his arrival at once burn and 1062ruin the country at the time when the spirits of the people are 1063still hot and ready for the defence; and, therefore, so much the 1064less ought the prince to hesitate; because after a time, when 1065spirits have cooled, the damage is already done, the ills are 1066incurred, and there is no longer any remedy; and therefore they are so 1067much the more ready to unite with their prince, he appearing to be 1068under obligations to them now that their houses have been burnt and 1069their possessions ruined in his defence. For it is the nature of men 1070to be bound by the benefits they confer as much as by those they 1071receive. Therefore, if everything is well considered, it wilt not be 1072difficult for a wise prince to keep the minds of his citizens 1073steadfast from first to last, when he does not fail to support and 1074defend them. 1075 CHAPTER XI 1076 CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES 1077 1078 IT ONLY remains now to speak of ecclesiastical principalities, 1079touching which all difficulties are prior to getting possession, 1080because they are acquired either by capacity or good fortune, and they 1081can be held without either; for they are sustained by the ordinances 1082of religion, which are so all-powerful, and of such a character that 1083the principalities may be held no matter how their princes behave 1084and live. These princes alone have states and do not defend them, they 1085have subjects and do not rule them; and the states, although 1086unguarded, are not taken from them, and the subjects, although not 1087ruled, do not care, and they have neither the desire nor the ability 1088to alienate themselves. Such principalities only are secure and happy. 1089But being upheld by powers, to which the human mind cannot reach, I 1090shall speak no more of them, because, being exalted and maintained 1091by God, it would be the act of a presumptuous and rash man to 1092discuss them. 1093 Nevertheless, if any one should ask of me how comes it that the 1094Church has attained such greatness in temporal power, seeing that from 1095Alexander backwards the Italian potentates (not only those who have 1096been called potentates, but every baron and lord, though the smallest) 1097have valued the temporal power very slightly- yet now a king of France 1098trembles before it, and it has been able to drive him from Italy, 1099and to ruin the Venetians- although this may be very manifest, it does 1100not appear to me superfluous to recall it in some measure to memory. 1101 Before Charles, King of France, passed into Italy, this country 1102was under the dominion of the Pope, the Venetians, the King of Naples, 1103the Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These potentates had two 1104principal anxieties: the one, that no foreigner should enter Italy 1105under arms; the other, that none of themselves should seize more 1106territory. Those about whom there was the most anxiety were the Pope 1107and the Venetians. To restrain the Venetians the union of all the 1108others was necessary, as it was for the defence of Ferrara; and to 1109keep down the Pope they made use of the barons of Rome, who, being 1110divided into two factions, Orsini and Colonna, had always a pretext 1111for disorder, and, standing with arms in their hands under the eyes of 1112the Pontiff, kept the pontificate weak and powerless. And although 1113there might arise sometimes a courageous pope, such as Sixtus [IV], 1114yet neither fortune nor wisdom could rid him of these annoyances. 1115And the short life of a pope is also a cause of weakness; for in the 1116ten years, which is the average life of a pope, he can with difficulty 1117lower one of the factions; and if, so to speak, one pope should almost 1118destroy the Colonna, another would arise hostile to the Orsini, who 1119would support their opponents, and yet would not have time to ruin the 1120Orsini. This was the reason why the temporal powers of the pope were 1121little esteemed in Italy. 1122 Alexander VI arose afterwards, who of all the pontiffs that have 1123ever been showed how a pope with both money and arms was able to 1124prevail; and through the instrumentality of the Duke Valentino, and by 1125reason of the entry of the French, he brought about all those things 1126which I have discussed above in the actions of the duke. And 1127although his intention was not to aggrandize the Church, but the duke, 1128nevertheless, what he did contributed to the greatness of the 1129Church, which, after his death and the ruin of the duke, became the 1130heir to all his labours. 1131 Pope Julius came afterwards and found the Church strong, 1132possessing all the Romagna, the barons of Rome reduced to impotence, 1133and, through the chastisements Alexander, the factions wiped out; he 1134also found the way open to accumulate money in a manner such as had 1135never been practised before Alexander's time. Such things Julius not 1136only followed, but improved upon, and he intended to gain Bologna, 1137to ruin the Venetians, and to drive the French out of Italy. All of 1138these enterprises prospered with him, and so much the more to his 1139credit, inasmuch as he did everything to strengthen the Church and not 1140any private person. He kept also the Orsini and Colonna factions 1141within the bounds in which he found them; and although there was among 1142them some mind to make disturbance, nevertheless he held two things 1143firm: the one, the greatness of the church, with which he terrified 1144them; and the other, not allowing them to have their own cardinals, 1145who caused the disorders among them. For whenever these factions 1146have their cardinals they do not remain quiet for long, because 1147cardinals foster the factions in Rome and out of it, and the barons 1148are compelled to support them, and thus from the ambitions of prelates 1149arise disorders and tumults among the barons. For these reasons his 1150Holiness Pope Leo found the pontificate most powerful, and it is to be 1151hoped that, if others made it great in arms, he will make it still 1152greater and more venerated by his goodness and infinite other virtues. 1153 CHAPTER XII 1154 HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE, 1155 AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES 1156 1157 HAVING discoursed particularly on the characteristics of such 1158principalities as in the beginning I proposed to discuss, and having 1159considered in some degree the causes of their being good or bad, and 1160having shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire them and 1161to hold them, it now remains for me to discuss generally the means 1162of offence and defence which belong to each of them. 1163 We have seen above how necessary it is for a prince to have his 1164foundations well laid, otherwise it follows of necessity he will go to 1165ruin. The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or 1166composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good 1167laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are 1168well armed they have good laws. I shall leave the laws out of the 1169discussion and shall speak of the arms. 1170 I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his 1171state are either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or 1172mixed. Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if 1173one holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm 1174nor safe; for they are disunited, ambitious and without discipline, 1175unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have 1176neither the fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is 1177deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed 1178by them, and in war by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other 1179attraction or reason for keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, 1180which is not sufficient to make them willing to die for you. They 1181are ready enough to be your soldiers whilst you do not make war, but 1182if war comes they take themselves off or run from the foe; which I 1183should have little trouble to prove, for the ruin of Italy has been 1184caused by nothing else than by resting all her hopes for many years on 1185mercenaries, and although they formerly made some display and appeared 1186valiant amongst themselves, yet when the foreigners came they showed 1187what they were. Thus it was that Charles, King of France, was 1188allowed to seize Italy with chalk in hand;* and he who told us that 1189our sins were the cause of it told the truth, but they were not the 1190sins he imagined, but those which I have related. And as they were the 1191sins of princes, it is the princes who have also suffered the penalty. 1192 1193 * With which to chalk up the billets for his soldiers. 1194 1195 I wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of these arms. The 1196mercenary captains are either capable men or they are not; if they 1197are, you cannot trust them, because they always aspire to their own 1198greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their master, or others 1199contrary to your intentions; but if the captain is not skilful, you 1200are ruined in the usual way. 1201 And if it be urged that whoever is armed will act in the same way, 1202whether mercenary or not, I reply that when arms have to be resorted 1203to, either by a prince or a republic, then the prince ought to go in 1204person and perform the duty of captain; the republic has to send its 1205citizens, and when one is sent who does not turn out satisfactorily, 1206it ought to recall him, and when one is worthy, to hold him by the 1207laws so that he does not leave the command. And experience has shown 1208princes and republics, single-handed, making the greatest progress, 1209and mercenaries doing nothing except damage; and it is more 1210difficult to bring a republic, armed with its own arms, under the sway 1211of one of its citizens than it is to bring one armed with foreign 1212arms. Rome and Sparta stood for many ages armed and free. The Switzers 1213are completely armed and quite free. 1214 Of ancient mercenaries, for example, there are the Carthaginians, 1215who were oppressed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war 1216with the Romans, although the Carthaginians had their own citizens for 1217captains. After the death of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was made 1218captain of their soldiers by the Thebans, and after victory he took 1219away their liberty. 1220 Duke Filippo being dead, the Milanese enlisted Francesco Sforza 1221against the Venetians, and he, having overcome the enemy at 1222Caravaggio, allied himself with them to crush the Milanese, his 1223masters. His father, Sforza, having been engaged by Queen Johanna of 1224Naples, left her unprotected, so that she was forced to throw 1225herself into the arms of the King of Aragon, in order to save her 1226kingdom. And if the Venetians and Florentines formerly extended 1227their dominions by these arms, and yet their captains did not make 1228themselves princes, but have defended them, I reply that the 1229Florentines in this case have been favoured by chance, for of the able 1230captains, of whom they might have stood in fear, some have not 1231conquered, some have been opposed, and others have turned their 1232ambitions elsewhere. One who did not conquer was Giovanni Acuto,* 1233and since he did not conquer his fidelity cannot be proved; but 1234every one will acknowledge that, had he conquered, the Florentines 1235would have stood at his discretion. Sforza had the Bracceschi always 1236against him, so they watched each other. Francesco turned his ambition 1237to Lombardy; Braccio against the Church and the kingdom of Naples. But 1238let us come to that which happened a short while ago. The 1239Florentines appointed as their captain Paolo Vitelli, a most prudent 1240man, who from a private position had risen to the greatest renown. 1241If this man had taken Pisa, nobody can deny that it would have been 1242proper for the Florentines to keep in with him, for if he became the 1243soldier of their enemies they had no means of resisting, and if they 1244held to him they must obey him. The Venetians, if their achievements 1245are considered, will be seen to have acted safely and gloriously so 1246long as they sent to war their own men, when with armed gentlemen 1247and plebeians they did valiantly. This was before they turned to 1248enterprises on land, but when they began to fight on land they forsook 1249this virtue and followed the custom of Italy. And in the beginning 1250of their expansion on land, through not having much territory, and 1251because of their great reputation, they had not much to fear from 1252their captains; but when they expanded, as under Carmignola, they 1253had a taste of this mistake; for, having found him a most valiant 1254man (they beat the Duke of Milan under his leadership), and, on the 1255other hand, knowing how lukewarm he was in the war, they feared they 1256would no longer conquer under him, and for this reason they were not 1257willing, nor were they able, to let him go; and so, not to lose 1258again that which they had acquired, they were compelled, in order to 1259secure themselves, to murder him. They had afterwards for their 1260captains Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the Count 1261of Pitigliano, and the like, under whom they had to dread loss and not 1262gain, as happened afterwards at Vaila, where in one battle they lost 1263that which in eight hundred years they had acquired with so much 1264trouble. Because from such arms conquests come but slowly, long 1265delayed and inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous. 1266 1267 * As Sir John Hawkwood, the English leader of mercenaries, was 1268called by the Italians. 1269 1270 And as with these examples I have reached Italy, which has been 1271ruled for many years by mercenaries, I wish to discuss them more 1272seriously, in order that, having seen their rise and progress, one may 1273be better prepared to counteract them. You must understand that the 1274empire has recently come to be repudiated in Italy, that the Pope 1275has acquired more temporal power, and that Italy has been divided up 1276into more states, for the reason that many of the great cities took up 1277arms against their nobles, who, formerly favoured by the emperor, were 1278oppressing them, whilst the Church was favouring them so as to gain 1279authority in temporal power: in many others their citizens became 1280princes. From this it came to pass that Italy fell partly into the 1281hands of the Church and of republics, and, the Church consisting of 1282priests and the republic of citizens unaccustomed to arms, both 1283commenced to enlist foreigners. 1284 The first who gave renown to this soldiery was Alberigo da Conio, 1285a native of the Romagna. From the school of this man sprang, among 1286others, Braccio and Sforza, who in their time were the arbiters of 1287Italy. After these came all the other captains who till now have 1288directed the arms of Italy; and the end of all their valour has 1289been, that she has been overrun by Charles, robbed by Louis, ravaged 1290by Ferdinand, and insulted by the Switzers. The principle that has 1291guided them has been, first, to lower the credit of infantry so that 1292they might increase their own. They did this because, subsisting on 1293their pay and without territory, they were unable to support many 1294soldiers, and a few infantry did not give them any authority; so 1295they were led to employ cavalry, with a moderate force of which they 1296were maintained and honoured; and affairs were brought to such a 1297pass that, in an army of twenty thousand soldiers, there were not to 1298be found two thousand foot soldiers. They had, besides this, used 1299every art to lessen fatigue and danger to themselves and their 1300soldiers, not killing in the fray, but taking prisoners and liberating 1301without ransom. They did not attack towns at night, nor did the 1302garrisons of the towns attack encampments at night; they did not 1303surround the camp either with stockade or ditch, nor did they campaign 1304in the winter. All these things were permitted by their military 1305rules, and devised by them to avoid, as I have said, both fatigue 1306and dangers; thus they have brought Italy to slavery and contempt. 1307 CHAPTER XIII 1308 CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE'S OWN 1309 1310 AUXILIARIES, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a 1311prince is called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done 1312by Pope Julius in the most recent times; for he, having, in the 1313enterprise against Ferrara, had poor proof of his mercenaries, 1314turned to auxiliaries, and stipulated with Ferdinand, King of Spain, 1315for his assistance with men and arms. These arms may be useful and 1316good in themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always 1317disadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is 1318their captive. 1319 And although ancient histories may be full of examples, I do not 1320wish to leave this recent one of Pope Julius II, the peril of which 1321cannot fall to be perceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threw 1322himself entirely into the hands of the foreigner. But his good fortune 1323brought about a third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of 1324his rash choice; because, having auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and 1325the Switzers having risen and driven out the conquerors (against all 1326expectation, both his and others), it so came to pass that he did 1327not become prisoner to his enemies, they having fled, nor to his 1328auxiliaries, he having conquered by other arms than theirs. 1329 The Florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand 1330Frenchmen to take Pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other 1331time of their troubles. 1332 The Emperor of Constantinople, to oppose his neighbours, sent ten 1333thousand Turks into Greece, who, on the war being finished, were not 1334willing to quit; this was the beginning of the servitude of Greece 1335to the infidels. 1336 Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these 1337arms, for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because 1338with them the ruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield 1339obedience to others; but with mercenaries, when they have conquered, 1340more time and better opportunities are needed to injure you; they 1341are not all of one community, they are found and paid by you, and a 1342third party, which you have made their head, is not able all at once 1343to assume enough authority to injure you. In conclusion, in 1344mercenaries dastardy is most dangerous; in auxiliaries, valour. The 1345wise prince, therefore, has always avoided these arms and turned to 1346his own; and has been willing rather to lose with them than to conquer 1347with others, not deeming that a real victory which is gained with 1348the arms of others. 1349 I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This 1350duke entered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French 1351soldiers, and with them he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards, 1352such forces not appearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries, 1353discerning less danger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli; 1354whom presently, on handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and 1355dangerous, he destroyed and turned to his own men. And the 1356difference between one and the other of these forces can easily be 1357seen when one considers the difference there was in the reputation 1358of the duke, when he had the French, when he had the Orsini and 1359Vitelli, and when he relied on his own soldiers, on whose fidelity 1360he could always count and found it ever increasing; he was never 1361esteemed more highly than when every one saw that he was complete 1362master of his own forces. 1363 I was not intending to go beyond Italian and recent examples, but 1364I am unwilling to leave out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of 1365those I have named above. This man, as I have said, made head of the 1366army by the Syracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery, 1367constituted like our Italian condottieri, was of no use; and it 1368appearing to him that he could neither keep them nor let them go, he 1369had them all cut to pieces, and afterwards made war with his own 1370forces and not with aliens. 1371 I wish also to recall to memory an instance from the Old Testament 1372applicable to this subject. David offered himself to Saul to fight 1373with Goliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage, 1374Saul armed him with his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as 1375he had them on his back, saying he could make no use of them, and that 1376he wished to meet the enemy with his sling and his knife. In 1377conclusion, the arms of others either fall from your back, or they 1378weigh you down, or they bind you fast. 1379 Charles VII, the father of King Louis XI, having by good fortune and 1380valour liberated France from the English, recognized the necessity 1381of being armed with forces of his own, and he established in his 1382kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and infantry. Afterwards his 1383son, King Louis, abolished the infantry and began to enlist the 1384Switzers, which mistake, followed by others, is, as is now seen, a 1385source of peril to that kingdom; because, having raised the reputation 1386of the Switzers, he has entirely diminished the value of his own arms, 1387for he has destroyed the infantry altogether; and his men-at-arms he 1388has subordinated to others, for, being as they are so accustomed to 1389fight along with Switzers, it does not appear that they can now 1390conquer without them. Hence it arises that the French cannot stand 1391against the Switzers, and without the Switzers they do not come off 1392well against others. The armies of the French have thus become 1393mixed, partly mercenary and partly national, both of which arms 1394together are much better than mercenaries alone or auxiliaries 1395alone, yet much inferior to one's own forces. And this example 1396proves it, the kingdom of France would be unconquerable if the 1397ordinance of Charles had been enlarged or maintained. 1398 But the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks 1399well at first, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I 1400have said above of hectic fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a 1401principality cannot recognize evils until they are upon him, he is not 1402truly wise; and this insight is given to few. And if the first 1403disaster to the Roman Empire should be examined, it will be found to 1404have commenced only with the enlisting of the Goths; because from that 1405time the vigour of the Roman Empire began to decline, and all that 1406valour which had raised it passed away to others. 1407 I conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having 1408its own forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good 1409fortune, not having the valour which in adversity would defend it. And 1410it has always been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing 1411can be so uncertain or unstable as fame or power not founded on its 1412own strength. And one's own forces are those which are composed 1413either of subjects, citizens, or dependants; all others are 1414mercenaries or auxiliaries. And the way to take ready one's own forces 1415will be easily found if the rules suggested by me shall be reflected 1416upon, and if one will consider how Philip, the father of Alexander the 1417Great, and many republics and princes have armed and organized 1418themselves, to which rules I entirely commit myself. 1419 CHAPTER XIV 1420 THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE 1421 ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ART OF WAR 1422 1423 A PRINCE ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select 1424anything else for his study, than war and its rules and discipline; 1425for this is the sole art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of 1426such force that it not only upholds those who are born princes, but it 1427often enables men to rise from a private station to that rank. And, on 1428the contrary, it is seen that when princes have thought more of ease 1429than of arms they have lost their states. And the first cause of 1430your losing it is to neglect this art; and what enables you to acquire 1431a state is to be master of the art. Francesco Sforza, through being 1432martial, from a private person became Duke of Milan; and the sons, 1433through avoiding the hardships and troubles of arms, from dukes became 1434private persons. For among other evils which being unarmed brings you, 1435it causes you to be despised, and this is one of those ignominies 1436against which a prince ought to guard himself, as is shown later on. 1437Because there is nothing proportionate between the armed and the 1438unarmed; and it is not reasonable that he who is armed should yield 1439obedience willingly to him who is unarmed, or that the unarmed man 1440should be secure among armed servants. Because, there being in the one 1441disdain and in the other suspicion, it is not possible for them to 1442work well together. And therefore a prince who does not understand the 1443art of war, over and above the other misfortunes already mentioned, 1444cannot be respected by his soldiers, nor can he rely on them. He ought 1445never, therefore, to have out of his thoughts this subject of war, and 1446in peace he should addict himself more to its exercise than in war; 1447this he can do in two ways, the one by action, the other by study. 1448 As regards action, he ought above all things to keep his men well 1449organized and drilled, to follow incessantly the chase, by which he 1450accustoms his body to hardships, and learns something of the nature of 1451localities, and gets to find out how the mountains rise, how the 1452valleys open out, how the plains lie, and to understand the nature 1453of rivers and marshes, and in all this to take the greatest care. 1454Which knowledge is useful in two ways. Firstly, he learns to know 1455his country, and is better able to undertake its defence; 1456afterwards, by means of the knowledge and observation of that 1457locality, he understands with ease any other which it may be necessary 1458for him to study hereafter; because the hills, valleys, and plains, 1459and rivers and marshes that are, for instance, in Tuscany, have a 1460certain resemblance to those of other countries, so that with a 1461knowledge of the aspect of one country one can easily arrive at a 1462knowledge of others. And the prince that lacks this skill lacks the 1463essential which it is desirable that a captain should possess, for 1464it teaches him to surprise his enemy, to select quarters, to lead 1465armies, to array the battle, to besiege towns to advantage. 1466 Philopoemen, Prince of the Achaeans, among other praises which 1467writers have bestowed on him, is commended because in time of peace he 1468never had anything in his mind but the rules of war; and when he was 1469in the country with friends, he often stopped and reasoned with 1470them: "If the enemy should be upon that hill, and we should find 1471ourselves here with our army, with whom would be the advantage? How 1472should one best advance to meet him, keeping the ranks? If we should 1473wish to retreat, how ought we to set about it? If they should retreat, 1474how ought we to pursue?" And he would set forth to them, as he went, 1475all the chances that could befall an army; he would listen to their 1476opinion and state his, confirming it with reasons, so that by these 1477continual discussions there could never arise, in time of war, any 1478unexpected circumstances that he could deal with. 1479 But to exercise the intellect the prince should read histories, 1480and study there the actions of illustrious men, to see how they have 1481borne themselves in war, to examine the causes of their victories 1482and defeat, so as to avoid the latter and imitate the former; and 1483above all do as an illustrious man did, who took as an exemplar one 1484who had been praised and famous before him, and whose achievements and 1485deeds he always kept in his mind, as it is said Alexander the Great 1486imitated Achilles, Caesar Alexander, Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads 1487the life of Cyrus, written by Xenophon, will recognize afterwards in 1488the life of Scipio how that imitation was his glory, and how in 1489chastity, affability, humanity, and liberality Scipio conformed to 1490those things which have been written of Cyrus by Xenophon. A wise 1491prince ought to observe some such rules, and never in peaceful times 1492stand idle, but increase his resources with industry in such a way 1493that they may be available to him in adversity, so that if fortune 1494changes it may find him prepared to resist her blows. 1495 CHAPTER XV 1496 CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, 1497 ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED 1498 1499 IT REMAINS now to see what ought to be the rules of conduct for a 1500prince towards subject and friends. And as I know that many have 1501written on this point, I expect I shall be considered presumptuous 1502in mentioning it again, especially as in discussing it I shall 1503depart from the methods of other people. But, it being my intention to 1504write a thing which shall be useful to him who apprehends it, it 1505appears to me more appropriate to follow up the real truth of a matter 1506than the imagination of it; for many have pictured republics and 1507principalities which in fact have never been known or seen, because 1508how one lives is so far distant from how one ought to live, that he 1509who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner effects 1510his ruin than his preservation; for a man who wishes to act entirely 1511up to his professions of virtue soon meets with what destroys him 1512among so much that is evil. 1513 Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know 1514how to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to 1515necessity. Therefore, putting on one side imaginary things 1516concerning a prince, and discussing those which are real, I say that 1517all men when they are spoken of, and chiefly princes for being more 1518highly placed, are remarkable for some of those qualities which 1519bring them either blame or praise; and thus it is that one is 1520reputed liberal, another miserly, using a Tuscan term (because an 1521avaricious person in our language is still he who desires to possess 1522by robbery, whilst we call one miserly who deprives himself too much 1523of the use of his own); one is reputed generous, one rapacious; one 1524cruel, one compassionate; one faithless, another faithful; one 1525effeminate and cowardly, another bold and brave; one affable, 1526another haughty; one lascivious, another chaste; one sincere, 1527another cunning; one hard, another easy; one grave, another frivolous; 1528one religious, another unbelieving, and the like. And I know that 1529every one will confess that it would be most praiseworthy in a 1530prince to exhibit all the above qualities that are considered good; 1531but because they can neither be entirely possessed nor observed, for 1532human conditions do not permit it, it is necessary for him to be 1533sufficiently prudent that he may know how to avoid the reproach of 1534those vices which would lose him his state; and also to keep 1535himself, if it be possible, from those which would not lose him it; 1536but this not being possible, he may with less hesitation abandon 1537himself to them. And again, he need not make himself uneasy at 1538incurring a reproach for those vices without which the state can 1539only be saved with difficulty, for if everything is considered 1540carefully, it will be found that something which looks like virtue, if 1541followed, would be his ruin; whilst something else, which looks like 1542vice, yet followed brings him security and prosperity. 1543 CHAPTER XVI 1544 CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS 1545 1546 COMMENCING then with the first of the above-named characteristics, I 1547say that it would be well to be reputed liberal. Nevertheless, 1548liberality exercised in a way that does not bring you the reputation 1549for it, injures you; for if one exercises it honestly and as it should 1550be exercised, it may not become known, and you will not avoid the 1551reproach of its opposite. Therefore, any one wishing to maintain among 1552men the name of liberal is obliged to avoid no attribute of 1553magnificence; so that a prince thus inclined will consume in such acts 1554all his property, and will be compelled in the end, if he wish to 1555maintain the name of liberal, to unduly weigh down his people, and tax 1556them, and do everything he can to get money. This will soon make him 1557odious to his subjects, and becoming poor he will be little valued 1558by any one; thus, with his liberality, having offended many and 1559rewarded few, he is affected by the very first trouble and 1560imperilled by whatever may be the first danger; recognizing this 1561himself, and wishing to draw back from it, he runs at once into the 1562reproach of being miserly. 1563 Therefore, a prince, not being able to exercise this virtue of 1564liberality in such a way that it is recognized, except to his cost, if 1565he is wise he ought not to fear the reputation of being mean, for in 1566time he will come to be more considered than if liberal, seeing that 1567with his economy his revenues are enough, that he can defend himself 1568against all attacks, and is able to engage in enterprises without 1569burdening his people; thus it comes to pass that he exercises 1570liberality towards all from whom he does not take, who are numberless, 1571and meanness towards those to whom he does not give, who are few. 1572 We have not seen great things done in our time except by those who 1573have been considered mean; the rest have failed. Pope Julius the 1574Second was assisted in reaching the papacy by a reputation for 1575liberality, yet he did not strive afterwards to keep it up, when he 1576made war on the King of France; and he made many wars without imposing 1577any extraordinary tax on his subjects, for he supplied his 1578additional expenses out of his long thriftiness. The present King of 1579Spain would not have undertaken or conquered in so many enterprises if 1580he had been reputed liberal. A prince, therefore, provided that he has 1581not to rob his subjects, that he can defend himself, that he does 1582not become poor and abject, that he is not forced to become rapacious, 1583ought to hold of little account a reputation for being mean, for it is 1584one of those vices which will enable him to govern. 1585 And if any one should say: Caesar obtained empire by liberality, and 1586many others have reached the highest positions by having been liberal, 1587and by being considered so, I answer: Either you are a prince in fact, 1588or in a way to become one. In the first case this liberality is 1589dangerous, in the second it is very necessary to be considered 1590liberal; and Caesar was one of those who wished to become 1591pre-eminent in Rome; but if he had survived after becoming so, and had 1592not moderated his expenses, he would have destroyed his government. 1593And if any one should reply: Many have been princes, and have done 1594great things with armies, who have been considered very liberal, I 1595reply: Either a prince spends that which is his own or his subjects' 1596or else that of others. In the first case he ought to be sparing, in 1597the second he ought not to neglect any opportunity for liberality. And 1598to the price who goes forth with his army, supporting it by pillage, 1599sack, and extortion, handling that which belongs to others, this 1600liberality is necessary, otherwise he would not be followed by 1601soldiers. And of that which is neither yours nor your subjects' you 1602can be a ready giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander; because it 1603does not take away your reputation if you squander that of others, but 1604adds to it; it is only squandering your own that injures you. 1605 And there is nothing wastes so rapidly as liberality, for even 1606whilst you exercise it you lose the power to do so, and so become 1607either poor or despised, or else, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and 1608hated. And a prince should guard himself, above all things, against 1609being despised and hated; and liberality leads you to both. 1610Therefore it is wiser to have a reputation for meanness which brings 1611reproach without hatred, than to be compelled through seeking a 1612reputation for liberality to incur a name for rapacity which begets 1613reproach with hatred. 1614 CHAPTER XVII 1615 CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND 1616 WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN FEARED 1617 1618 COMING now to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that 1619every prince ought to desire to be considered clement and not cruel. 1620Nevertheless he ought to take care not to misuse this clemency. Cesare 1621Borgia was considered cruel; notwithstanding, his cruelty reconciled 1622the Romagna, unified it, and restored it to peace and loyalty. And 1623if this be rightly considered, he will be seen to have been much 1624more merciful than the Florentine people, who, to avoid a reputation 1625for cruelty, permitted Pistoia to be destroyed. Therefore a prince, so 1626long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought not to mind 1627the reproach of cruelty; because with a few examples he will be more 1628merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to 1629arise, from which follow murders or robberies; for these are wont to 1630injure the whole people, whilst those executions which originate 1631with a prince offend the individual only. 1632 And of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince to avoid the 1633imputation of cruelty, owing to new states being full of dangers. 1634Hence Virgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the inhumanity of her 1635reign owing to its being new, saying: 1636 1637 Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt 1638 Moliri, et late fines custode tueri.* 1639 1640 * ...against my will, my fate, 1641 A throne unsettled, and an infant state, 1642 Bid me defend my realms with all my pow'rs, 1643 And guard with these severities my shores. 1644 1645 Nevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor should 1646he himself show fear, but proceed in a temperate manner with 1647prudence and humanity, so that too much confidence may not make him 1648incautious and too much distrust render him intolerable. 1649 Upon this a question arises: whether it be better to be loved than 1650feared or feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish 1651to be both, but, because it is difficult to unite them in one 1652person, is much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, 1653either must be dispensed with. Because this is to be asserted in 1654general of men, that they are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, 1655covetous, and as long as you succeed they are yours entirely; they 1656will offer you their blood, property, life and children, as is said 1657above, when the need is far distant; but when it approaches they 1658turn against you. And that prince who, relying entirely on their 1659promises, has neglected other precautions, is ruined; because 1660friendships that are obtained by payments, and not by greatness or 1661nobility of mind, may indeed be earned, but they are not secured, 1662and in time of need cannot be relied upon; and men have less scruple 1663in offending one who is beloved than one who is feared, for love is 1664preserved by the link of obligation which, owing to the baseness of 1665men, is broken at every opportunity for their advantage; but fear 1666preserves you by a dread of punishment which never fails. 1667 Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if 1668he does not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very 1669well being feared whilst he is not hated, which will always be as long 1670as he abstains from the property of his citizens and subjects and from 1671their women. But when it is necessary for him to proceed against the 1672life of someone, he must do it on proper justification and for 1673manifest cause, but above all things he must keep his hands off the 1674property of others, because men more quickly forget the death of their 1675father than the loss of their patrimony. Besides, pretexts for 1676taking away the property are never wanting; for he who has once 1677begun to live by robbery will always find pretexts for seizing what 1678belongs to others; but reasons for taking life, on the contrary, are 1679more difficult to find and sooner lapse. But when a prince is with his 1680army, and has under control a multitude of soldiers, then it is 1681quite necessary for him to disregard the reputation of cruelty, for 1682without it he would never hold his army united or disposed to its 1683duties. 1684 Among the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this one is enumerated: that 1685having led an enormous army, composed of many various races of men, to 1686fight in foreign lands, no dissensions arose either among them or 1687against the prince, whether in his bad or in his good fortune. This 1688arose from nothing else than his inhuman cruelty, which, with his 1689boundless valour, made him revered and terrible in the sight of his 1690soldiers, but without that cruelty, his other virtues were not 1691sufficient to produce this effect. And shortsighted writers admire his 1692deeds from one point of view and from another condemn the principal 1693cause of them. That it is true his other virtues would not have been 1694sufficient for him may be proved by the case of Scipio, that most 1695excellent man, not of his own times but within the memory of man, 1696against whom, nevertheless, his army rebelled in Spain; this arose 1697from nothing but his too great forbearance, which gave his soldiers 1698more licence than is consistent with military discipline. For this 1699he was upbraided in the Senate by Fabius Maximus, and called the 1700corrupter of the Roman soldiery. The Locrians were laid waste by a 1701legate of Scipio, yet they were not avenged by him, nor was the 1702insolence of the legate punished, owing entirely to his easy nature. 1703Insomuch that someone in the Senate, wishing to excuse him, said there 1704were many men who knew much better how not to err than to correct 1705the errors of others. This disposition, if he had been continued in 1706the command, would have destroyed in time the fame and glory of 1707Scipio; but, he being under the control of the Senate, this 1708injurious characteristic not only concealed itself, but contributed to 1709his glory. 1710 Returning to the question of being feared or loved, I come to the 1711conclusion that, men loving according to their own will and fearing 1712according to that of the prince, a wise prince should establish 1713himself on that which is in his own control and not in that of others; 1714he must endeavour only to avoid hatred, as is noted. 1715 CHAPTER XVIII 1716 CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH 1717 1718 EVERY one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, 1719and to live with integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless our 1720experience has been that those princes who have done great things have 1721held good faith of little account, and have known how to circumvent 1722the intellect of men by craft, and in the end have overcome those 1723who have relied on their word. You must know there are two ways of 1724contesting, the one by the law, the other by force; the first method 1725is proper to men, the second to beasts; but because the first is 1726frequently not sufficient, it is necessary to have recourse to the 1727second. Therefore it is necessary for a prince to understand how to 1728avail himself of the beast and the man. This has been figuratively 1729taught to princes by ancient writers, who describe how Achilles and 1730many other princes of old were given to the Centaur Chiron to nurse, 1731who brought them up in his discipline; which means solely that, as 1732they had for a teacher one who was half beast and half man, so it is 1733necessary for a prince to know how to make use of both natures, and 1734that one without the other is not durable. A prince, therefore, 1735being compelled knowingly to adopt the beast, ought to choose the 1736fox and the lion; because the lion cannot defend himself against 1737snares and the fox cannot defend himself against wolves. Therefore, it 1738is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion to 1739terrify the wolves. Those who rely simply on the lion do not 1740understand what they are about. Therefore a wise lord cannot, nor 1741ought he to, keep faith when such observance may be turned against 1742him, and when the reasons that caused him to pledge it exist no 1743longer. If men were entirely good this precept would not hold, but 1744because they are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are 1745not bound to observe it with them. Nor will there ever be wanting to a 1746prince legitimate reasons to excuse this nonobservance. Of this 1747endless modern examples could be given, showing how many treaties 1748and engagements have been made void and of no effect through the 1749faithlessness of princes; and he who has known best how to employ 1750the fox has succeeded best. 1751 But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this 1752characteristic, and to be a great pretender and dissembler; and men 1753are so simple, and so subject to present necessities, that he who 1754seeks to deceive will always find someone who will allow himself to be 1755deceived. One recent example I cannot pass over in silence. 1756Alexander VI did nothing else but deceive men, nor ever thought of 1757doing otherwise, and he always found victims; for there never was a 1758man who had greater power in asserting, or who with greater oaths 1759would affirm a thing, yet would observe it less; nevertheless his 1760deceits always succeeded according to his wishes, because he well 1761understood this side of mankind. 1762 Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good 1763qualities I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to 1764have them. And I shall dare to say this also, that to have them and 1765always to observe them is injurious, and that to appear to have them 1766is useful; to appear merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, 1767and to be so, but with a mind so framed that should you require not to 1768be so, you may be able and know how to change to the opposite. 1769 And you have to understand this, that a prince, especially a new 1770one, cannot observe all those things for which men are esteemed, being 1771often forced, in order to maintain the state, to act contrary to 1772faith, friendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore it is necessary 1773for him to have a mind ready to turn itself accordingly as the winds 1774and variations of fortune force it, yet, as I have said above, not 1775to diverge from the good if he can avoid doing so, but, if 1776compelled, then to know how to set about it. 1777 For this reason a prince ought to take care that he never lets 1778anything slip from his lips that is not replete with the above-named 1779five qualities, that he may appear to him who sees and hears him 1780altogether merciful, faithful, humane, upright, and religious. There 1781is nothing more necessary to appear to have than this last quality, 1782inasmuch as men judge generally more by the eye than by the hand, 1783because it belongs to everybody to see you, to few to come in touch 1784with you. Every one sees what you appear to be, few really know what 1785you are, and those few dare not oppose themselves to the opinion of 1786the many, who have the majesty of the state to defend them; and in the 1787actions of all men, and especially of princes, which it is not prudent 1788to challenge, one judges by the result. 1789 For that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and 1790holding his state, the means will always be considered honest, and 1791he will be praised by everybody because the vulgar are always taken by 1792what a thing seems to be and by what comes of it; and in the world 1793there are only the vulgar, for the few find a place there only when 1794the many have no ground to rest on. 1795 One prince* of the present time, whom it is not well to name, 1796never preaches anything else but peace and good faith, and to both 1797he is most hostile, and either, if he had kept it, would have deprived 1798him of reputation and kingdom many a time. 1799 1800 * Maximilian I, Holy Roman Emperor. 1801 CHAPTER XIX 1802 THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED 1803 1804 Now, concerning the characteristics of which mention is made 1805above, I have spoken of the more important ones, the others I wish 1806to discuss briefly under this generality, that the prince must 1807consider, as has been in part said before, how to avoid those things 1808which will make him hated or contemptible; and as often as he shall 1809have succeeded he will have fulfilled his part, and he need not fear 1810any danger in other reproaches. 1811 It makes him hated above all things, as I have said, to be 1812rapacious, and to be a violator of the property and women of his 1813subjects, from both of which he must abstain. And when neither their 1814property nor honour is touched, the majority of men live content, 1815and he has only to contend with the ambition of a few, whom he can 1816curb with ease in many ways. 1817 It makes him contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous, 1818effeminate, mean-spirited, irresolute, from all of which a prince 1819should guard himself as from a rock; and he should endeavour to show 1820in his actions greatness, courage, gravity, and fortitude; and in 1821his private dealings with his subjects let him show that his judgments 1822are irrevocable, and maintain himself in such reputation that no one 1823can hope either to deceive him or to get round him. 1824 That prince is highly esteemed who conveys this impression of 1825himself, and he who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired 1826against; for, provided it is well known that he is an excellent man 1827and revered by his people, he can only be attacked with difficulty. 1828For this reason a prince ought to have two fears, one from within, 1829on account of his subjects, the other from without, on account of 1830external powers. From the latter he is defended by being well armed 1831and having good allies, and if he is well armed he will have good 1832friends, and affairs will always remain quiet within when they are 1833quiet without, unless they should have been already disturbed by 1834conspiracy; and even should affairs outside be disturbed, if he has 1835carried out his preparations and has lived as I have said, as long 1836as he does not despair, he will resist every attack, as I said Nabis 1837the Spartan did. 1838 But concerning his subjects, when affairs outside are disturbed he 1839has only to fear that they will conspire secretly, from which a prince 1840can easily secure himself by avoiding being hated and despised, and by 1841keeping the people satisfied with him, which it is most necessary 1842for him to accomplish, as I said above at length. And one of the 1843most efficacious remedies that a prince can have against 1844conspiracies is not to be hated and despised by the people, for he who 1845conspires against a prince always expects to please them by his 1846removal; but when the conspirator can only look forward to offending 1847them, he will not have the courage to take such a course, for the 1848difficulties that confront a conspirator are infinite. And as 1849experience shows, many have been the conspiracies, but few have been 1850successful; because he who conspires cannot act alone, nor can he take 1851a companion except from those whom he believes to be malcontents, 1852and as soon as you have opened your mind to a malcontent you have 1853given him the material with which to content himself, for by 1854denouncing you he can look for every advantage; so that, seeing the 1855gain from this course to be assured, and seeing the other to be 1856doubtful and full of dangers, he must be a very rare friend, or a 1857thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to keep faith with you. 1858 And, to reduce the matter into a small compass, I say that, on the 1859side of the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect 1860of punishment to terrify him; but on the side of the prince there is 1861the majesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends 1862and the state to defend him; so that, adding to all these things the 1863popular goodwill, it is impossible that any one should be so rash as 1864to conspire. For whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before 1865the execution of his plot, in this case he has also to fear the sequel 1866to the crime; because on account of it he has the people for an enemy, 1867and thus cannot hope for any escape. 1868 Endless examples could be given on this subject, but I will be 1869content with one, brought to pass within the memory of our fathers. 1870Messer Annibale Bentivoglio, who was prince in Bologna (grandfather of 1871the present Annibale), having been murdered by the Canneschi, who 1872had conspired against him, not one of his family survived but Messer 1873Giovanni, who was in childhood: immediately after his assassination 1874the people rose and murdered all the Canneschi. This sprung from the 1875popular goodwill which the house of Bentivoglio enjoyed in those 1876days in Bologna; which was so great that, although none remained there 1877after the death of Annibale who were able to rule the state, the 1878Bolognese, having information that there was one of the Bentivoglio 1879family in Florence, who up to that time had been considered the son of 1880a blacksmith, sent to Florence for him and gave him the government 1881of their city, and it was ruled by him until Messer Giovanni came in 1882due course to the government. 1883 For this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon 1884conspiracies of little account when his people hold him in esteem; but 1885when it is hostile to him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to 1886fear everything and everybody. And well-ordered states and wise 1887princes have taken every care not to drive the nobles to 1888desperation, and to keep the people satisfied and contented, for 1889this is one of the most important objects a prince can have. 1890 Among the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is France, 1891and in it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty 1892and security of the king; of these the first is the parliament and its 1893authority, because he who founded the kingdom, knowing the ambition of 1894the nobility and their boldness, considered that a bit in their mouths 1895would be necessary to hold them in; and, on the other side, knowing 1896the hatred of the people, founded in fear, against the nobles, he 1897wished to protect them, yet he was not anxious for this to be the 1898particular care of the king; therefore, to take away the reproach 1899which he would be liable to from the nobles for favouring the 1900people, and from the people for favouring the nobles, he set up an 1901arbiter, who should be one who could beat down the great and favour 1902the lesser without reproach to the king. Neither could you have a 1903better or a more prudent arrangement, or a greater source of 1904security to the king and kingdom. From this one can draw another 1905important conclusion, that princes ought to leave affairs of 1906reproach to the management of others, and keep those of grace in their 1907own hands. And further, I consider that a prince ought to cherish 1908the nobles, but not so as to make himself hated by the people. 1909 It may appear, perhaps, to some who have examined the lives and 1910deaths of the Roman emperors that many of them would be an example 1911contrary to my opinion, seeing that some of them lived nobly and 1912showed great qualities of soul, nevertheless they have lost their 1913empire or have been killed by subjects who have conspired against 1914them. Wishing, therefore, to answer these objections, I will recall 1915the characters of some of the emperors, and will show that the 1916causes of their ruin were not different to those alleged by me; at the 1917same time I will only submit for consideration those things that are 1918noteworthy to him who studies the affairs of those times. 1919 It seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded 1920to the empire from Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus; they were 1921Marcus and his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus and his son 1922Antoninus Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus. 1923 There is first to note that, whereas in other principalities the 1924ambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be 1925contended with, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to 1926put up with the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers, a matter so 1927beset with difficulties that it was the ruin of many; for it was a 1928hard thing to give satisfaction both to soldiers and people; because 1929the people loved peace, and for this reason they loved the 1930unaspiring prince, whilst the soldiers loved the warlike prince who 1931was bold, cruel, and rapacious, which qualities they were quite 1932willing he should exercise upon the people, so that they could get 1933double pay and give vent to their greed and cruelty. Hence it arose 1934that those emperors were always overthrown who, either by birth or 1935training, had no great authority, and most of them, especially those 1936who came new to the principality, recognizing the difficulty of 1937these two opposing humours, were inclined to give satisfaction to 1938the soldiers, caring little about injuring the people. Which course 1939was necessary, because, as princes cannot help being hated by someone, 1940they ought, in the first place, to avoid being hated by every one, and 1941when they cannot compass this, they ought to endeavour with the utmost 1942diligence to avoid the hatred of the most powerful. Therefore, those 1943emperors who through inexperience had need of special favour adhered 1944more readily to the soldiers than to the people; a course which turned 1945out advantageous to them or not, accordingly as the prince knew how to 1946maintain authority over them. 1947 From these causes it arose that Marcus, [Aurelius], Pertinax, and 1948Alexander, being all men of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to 1949cruelty, humane, and benignant, came to a sad end except Marcus; he 1950alone lived and died honoured, because he had succeeded to the 1951throne by hereditary title, and owed nothing either to the soldiers or 1952the people; and afterwards, being possessed of many virtues which made 1953him respected, he always kept both orders in their places whilst he 1954lived, and was neither hated nor despised. 1955 But Pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers, 1956who, being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus, could not 1957endure the honest life to which Pertinax wished to reduce them; 1958thus, having given cause for hatred, to which hatred there was added 1959contempt for his old age, he was overthrown at the very beginning of 1960his administration. And here it should be noted that hatred is 1961acquired as much by good works as by bad ones, therefore, as I said 1962before, a prince wishing to keep his state is very often forced to 1963do evil; for when that body is corrupt whom you think you have need of 1964to maintain yourself- it may be either the people or the soldiers or 1965the nobles- you have to submit to its humours and to gratify them, and 1966then good works will do you harm. 1967 But let us come to Alexander, who was a man of such great 1968goodness, that among the other praises which are accorded him is this, 1969that in the fourteen years he held the empire no one was ever put to 1970death by him unjudged; nevertheless, being considered effeminate and a 1971man who allowed himself to be governed by his mother, he became 1972despised, the army conspired against him, and murdered him. 1973 Turning now to the opposite characters of Commodus, Severus, 1974Antoninus Caracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them all cruel and 1975rapacious- men who, to satisfy their soldiers, did not hesitate to 1976commit every kind of iniquity against the people; and all, except 1977Severus, came to a bad end; but in Severus there was so much valour 1978that, keeping the soldiers friendly, although the people were 1979oppressed by him, he reigned successfully; for his valour made him 1980so much admired in the sight of the soldiers and people that the 1981latter were kept in a way astonished and awed and the former 1982respectful and satisfied. And because the actions of this man, as a 1983new prince, were great, I wish to show briefly that he knew well how 1984to counterfeit the fox and the lion, which natures, as I said above, 1985it is necessary for a prince to imitate. 1986 Knowing the sloth of the Emperor Julian, he persuaded the army in 1987Sclavonia, of which he was captain, that it would be right to go to 1988Rome and avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been killed by the 1989praetorian soldiers; and under this pretext, without appearing to 1990aspire to the throne, he moved the army on Rome, and reached Italy 1991before it was known that he had started. On his arrival at Rome, the 1992Senate, through fear, elected him emperor and killed Julian. After 1993this there remained for Severus, who wished to make himself master 1994of the whole empire, two difficulties; one in Asia, where Niger, 1995head of the Asiatic army, had caused himself to be proclaimed emperor; 1996the other in the west where Albinus was, who also aspired to the 1997throne. And as he considered it dangerous to declare himself hostile 1998to both, he decided to attack Niger and to deceive Albinus. To the 1999latter he wrote that, being elected emperor by the Senate, he was 2000willing to share that dignity with him and sent him the title of 2001Caesar; and, moreover, that the Senate had made Albinus his colleague; 2002which things were accepted by Albinus as true. But after Severus had 2003conquered and killed Niger, and settled oriental affairs, he 2004returned to Rome and complained to the Senate that Albinus, little 2005recognizing the benefits that he had received from him, had by 2006treachery sought to murder him, and for this ingratitude he was 2007compelled to punish him. Afterwards he sought him out in France, and 2008took from him his government and life. He who will, therefore, 2009carefully examine the actions of this man will find him a most valiant 2010lion and a most cunning fox; he will find him feared and respected 2011by every one, and not hated by the army; and it need not be wondered 2012at that he, the new man, well, because his supreme renown always 2013protected him from that hatred which the people might have conceived 2014against him for his violence. 2015 But his son Antoninus was a most eminent man, and had very excellent 2016qualities, which made him admirable in the sight of the people and 2017acceptable to the soldiers, for he was a warlike man, most enduring of 2018fatigue, a despiser of all delicate food and other luxuries, which 2019caused him to be beloved by the armies. Nevertheless, his ferocity and 2020cruelties were so great and so unheard of that, after endless single 2021murders, he killed a large number of the people of Rome and all 2022those of Alexandria. He became hated by the whole world, and also 2023feared by those he had around him, to such an extent that he was 2024murdered in the midst of his army by a centurion. And here it must 2025be noted that such-like deaths, which are deliberately inflicted 2026with a resolved and desperate courage, cannot be avoided by princes, 2027because any one who does not fear to die can inflict them; but a 2028prince may fear them the less because they are very rare; he has 2029only to be careful not to do any grave injury to those whom he employs 2030or has around him in the service of the state. Antoninus had not taken 2031this care, but had contumeliously killed a brother of that 2032centurion, whom also he daily threatened, yet retained in his 2033bodyguard; which, as it turned out, was a rash thing to do, and proved 2034the emperor's ruin. 2035 But let us come to Commodus, to whom it should have been very easy 2036to hold the empire, for, being the son of Marcus, he had inherited it, 2037and he had only to follow in the footsteps of his father to please his 2038people and soldiers; but, being by nature cruel and brutal, he gave 2039himself up to amusing the soldiers and corrupting them, so that he 2040might indulge his rapacity upon the people; on the other hand, not 2041maintaining his dignity, often descending to the theatre to compete 2042with gladiators, and doing other vile things, little worthy of the 2043imperial majesty, he fell into contempt with the soldiers, and being 2044hated by one party and despised by the other, he was conspired against 2045and killed. 2046 It remains to discuss the character of Maximinus. He was a very 2047warlike man, and the armies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of 2048Alexander, of whom I have already spoken, killed him and elected 2049Maximinus to the throne. This he did not possess for long, for two 2050things made him hated and despised; the one, his having kept sheep 2051in Thrace, which brought him into contempt (it being well known to 2052all, and considered a great indignity by every one), and the other, 2053his having at the accession to his dominions deferred going to Rome 2054and taking possession of the imperial seat; he had also gained a 2055reputation for the utmost ferocity by having, through his prefects 2056in Rome and elsewhere in the empire, practised many cruelties, so that 2057the whole world was moved to anger at the meanness of his birth and to 2058fear at his barbarity. First Africa rebelled, then the Senate with all 2059the people of Rome, and all Italy conspired against him, to which 2060may be added his own army: this latter, besieging Aquileia and meeting 2061with difficulties in taking it, were disgusted with his cruelties, and 2062fearing him less when they found so many against him, murdered him. 2063 I do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who, 2064being thoroughly contemptible, were quickly wiped out; but I will 2065bring this discourse to a conclusion by saying that princes in our 2066times have this difficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to 2067their soldiers in a far less degree, because, notwithstanding one 2068has to give them some indulgence, that is soon done; none of these 2069princes have armies that are veterans in the governance and 2070administration of provinces, as were the armies of the Roman Empire; 2071and whereas it was then more necessary to give satisfaction to the 2072soldiers than to the people, it is now more necessary to all 2073princes, except the Turk and the Soldan, to satisfy the people 2074rather than the soldiers, because the people are the more powerful. 2075 From the above I have excepted the Turk, who always keeps round 2076him twelve infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend the 2077security and strength of the kingdom, and it is necessary that, 2078putting aside every consideration for the people, he should keep 2079them his friends. The kingdom of the Soldan is similar; being entirely 2080in the hands of soldiers, follows again that, without regard to the 2081people, he must keep them his friends. But you must note that the 2082state of the Soldan is unlike all other principalities, for the reason 2083that it is like the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called 2084either an hereditary or a newly formed principality; because the 2085sons of the old prince not the heirs, but he who is elected to that 2086position by those who have authority, and the sons remain only 2087noblemen. And this being an ancient custom, it cannot be called a 2088new principality, because there are none of those difficulties in it 2089that are met with in new ones; for although the prince is new, the 2090constitution of the state is old, and it is framed so as to receive 2091him as if he were its hereditary lord. 2092 But returning to the subject of our discourse, I say that whoever 2093will consider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has 2094been fatal to the above-named emperors, and it will be recognized also 2095how it happened that, a number of them acting in one way and a 2096number in another, only one in each way came to a happy end and the 2097rest to unhappy ones. Because it would have been useless and dangerous 2098for Pertinax and Alexander, being new princes, to imitate Marcus, 2099who was heir to the principality; and likewise it would have been 2100utterly destructive to Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to have 2101imitated Severus, they not having sufficient valour to enable them 2102to tread in his footsteps. Therefore a prince, new to the 2103principality, cannot imitate the actions of Marcus, nor, again, is 2104it necessary to follow those of Severus, but he ought to take from 2105Severus those parts which are necessary to found his state, and from 2106Marcus those which are proper and glorious to keep a state that may 2107already be stable and firm. 2108 CHAPTER XX 2109 ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH 2110 PRINCES OFTEN RESORT, ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL? 2111 2112 1. SOME princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed 2113their subjects; others have kept their subject towns by factions; 2114others have fostered enmities against themselves; others have laid 2115themselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in the 2116beginning of their governments; some have built fortresses; some 2117have overthrown and destroyed them. And although one cannot give a 2118final judgment on all one of these things unless one possesses the 2119particulars of those states in which a decision has to be made, 2120nevertheless I will speak as comprehensively as the matter of itself 2121will admit. 2122 2. There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; 2123rather when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them, 2124because, by arming them, those arms become yours, those men who were 2125distrusted become faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, 2126and your subjects become your adherents. And whereas all subjects 2127cannot be armed, yet when those whom you do arm are benefited, the 2128others can be handled more freely, and this difference in their 2129treatment, which they quite understand, makes the former your 2130dependants, and the latter, considering it to be necessary that 2131those who have the most danger and service should have the most 2132reward, excuse you. But when you disarm them, you at once offend 2133them by showing that you distrust them, either for cowardice or for 2134want of loyalty, and either of these opinions breeds hatred against 2135you. And because you cannot remain unarmed, it follows that you turn 2136to mercenaries, which are of the character already shown; even if they 2137should be good they would not be sufficient to defend you against 2138powerful enemies and distrusted subjects. Therefore, as I have said, a 2139new prince in a new principality has always distributed arms. 2140Histories are full of examples. But when a prince acquires a new 2141state, which he adds as a province to his old one, then it is 2142necessary to disarm the men of that state, except those who have 2143been his adherents in acquiring it; and these again, with time and 2144opportunity, should be rendered soft and effeminate; and matters 2145should be managed in such a way that all the armed men in the state 2146shall be your own soldiers who in your old state were living near you. 2147 3. Our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were 2148accustomed to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions 2149and Pisa by fortresses; and with this idea they fostered quarrels in 2150some of their tributary towns so as to keep possession of them the 2151more easily. This may have been well enough in those times when 2152Italy was in a way balanced, but I do not believe that it can be 2153accepted as a precept for to-day, because I do not believe that 2154factions can ever be of use; rather it is certain that when the 2155enemy comes upon you in divided cities you are quickly lost, because 2156the weakest party will always assist the outside forces and the 2157other will not be able to resist. The Venetians, moved, as I 2158believe, by the above reasons, fostered the Guelph and Ghibelline 2159factions in their tributary cities; and although they never allowed 2160them to come to bloodshed, yet they nursed these disputes amongst 2161them, so that the citizens, distracted by their differences, should 2162not unite against them. Which, as we saw, did not afterwards turn 2163out as expected, because, after the rout at Vaila, one party at once 2164took courage and seized the state. Such methods argue, therefore, 2165weakness in the prince, because these factions will never be permitted 2166in a vigorous principality; such methods for enabling one the more 2167easily to manage subjects are only useful in times of peace, but if 2168war comes this policy proves fallacious. 2169 4. Without doubt princes become great when they overcome the 2170difficulties and obstacles by which they are confronted, and therefore 2171fortune, especially when she desires to make a new prince great, who 2172has a greater necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one, 2173causes enemies to arise and form designs against him, in order that he 2174may have the opportunity of overcoming them, and by them to mount 2175higher, as by a ladder which his enemies have raised. For this 2176reason many consider that a wise prince, when he has the 2177opportunity, ought with craft to foster some animosity against 2178himself, so that, having crushed it, his renown may rise higher. 2179 5. Princes, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and 2180assistance in those men who in the beginning of their rule were 2181distrusted than among those who in the beginning were trusted. 2182Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, ruled his state more by those 2183who had been distrusted than by others. But on this question one 2184cannot speak generally, for it varies so much with the individual; I 2185will only say this, that those men who at the commencement of a 2186princedom have been hostile, if they are of a description to need 2187assistance to support themselves, can always be gained over with the 2188greatest ease, and they will be tightly held to serve the prince 2189with fidelity, inasmuch as they know it to be very necessary for 2190them to cancel by deeds the bad impression which he had formed of 2191them; and thus the prince always extracts more profit from them than 2192from those who, serving him in too much security, may neglect his 2193affairs. And since the matter demands it, I must not fail to warn a 2194prince, who by means of secret favours has acquired a new state, 2195that he must well consider the reasons which induced those to favour 2196him who did so; and if it be not a natural affection towards him, 2197but only discontent with their government, then he will only keep them 2198friendly with great trouble and difficulty, for it will be 2199impossible to satisfy them. And weighing well the reasons for this 2200in those examples which can be taken from ancient and modern 2201affairs, we shall find that it is easier for the prince to make 2202friends of those men who were contented under the former government, 2203and are therefore his enemies, than of those who, being discontented 2204with it, were favourable to him and encouraged him to seize it. 2205 6. It has been a custom with princes, in order to hold their 2206states more securely, to build fortresses that may serve as a bridle 2207and bit to those who might design to work against them, and as a place 2208of refuge from a first attack. I praise this system because it has 2209been made use of formerly. Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo Vitelli 2210in our times has been seen to demolish two fortresses in Citta di 2211Castello so that he might keep that state; Guidubaldo, Duke of Urbino, 2212on returning to his dominion, whence he had been driven by Cesare 2213Borgia, razed to the foundations all the fortresses in that 2214province, and considered that without them it would be more 2215difficult to lose it; the Bentivoglio returning to Bologna came to a 2216similar decision. Fortresses, therefore, are useful or not according 2217to circumstances; if they do you good in one way they injure you in 2218another. And this question can be reasoned thus: the prince who has 2219more to fear from the people than from foreigners ought to build 2220fortresses, but he who has more to fear from foreigners than from 2221the people ought to leave them alone. The castle of Milan, built by 2222Francesco Sforza, has made, and will make, more trouble for the 2223house of Sforza than any other disorder in the state. For this 2224reason the best possible fortress is- not to be hated by the people, 2225because, although you may hold the fortresses, yet they will not 2226save you if the people hate you, for there will never be wanting 2227foreigners to assist a people who have taken arms against you. It 2228has not been seen in our times that such fortresses have been of use 2229to any prince, unless to the Countess of Forli, when the Count 2230Girolamo, her consort, was killed; for by that means she was able to 2231withstand the popular attack and wait for assistance from Milan, and 2232thus recover her state; and the posture of affairs was such at that 2233time that the foreigners could not assist the people. But fortresses 2234were of little value to her afterwards when Cesare Borgia attacked 2235her, and when the people, her enemy, were allied with foreigners. 2236Therefore it would have been safer for her, both then and before, 2237not to have been hated by the people than to have had the fortresses. 2238All these things considered then, I shall praise him who builds 2239fortresses as well as him who does not, and I shall blame whoever, 2240trusting in them, cares little about being hated by the people. 2241 CHAPTER XXI 2242 HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF 2243 SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN 2244 2245 NOTHING makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and 2246setting a fine example. We have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the 2247present King of Spain. He can almost be called a new prince, because 2248he has risen, by fame and glory, from being an insignificant king to 2249be the foremost king in Christendom; and if you will consider his 2250deeds you will find them all great and some of them extraordinary. 2251In the beginning of his reign he attacked Granada, and this enterprise 2252was the foundation of his dominions. He did this quietly at first 2253and without any fear of hindrance, for he held the minds of the barons 2254of Castile occupied in thinking of the war and not anticipating any 2255innovations; thus they did not perceive that by these means he was 2256acquiring power and authority over them. He was able with the money of 2257the Church and of the people to sustain his armies, and by that long 2258war to lay the foundation for the military skill which has since 2259distinguished him. Further, always using religion as a plea, so as 2260to undertake greater schemes, he devoted himself with a pious 2261cruelty to driving out and clearing his kingdom of the Moors; nor 2262could there be a more admirable example, nor one more rare. Under this 2263same cloak he assailed Africa, he came down on Italy, he has finally 2264attacked France; and thus his achievements and designs have always 2265been great, and have kept the minds of his people in suspense and 2266admiration and occupied with the issue of them. And his actions have 2267arisen in such a way, one out of the other, that men have never been 2268given time to work steadily against him. 2269 Again, it much assists a prince to set unusual examples in 2270internal affairs, similar to those which are related of Messer Bernabo 2271da Milano, who, when he had the opportunity, by any one in civil 2272life doing some extraordinary thing, either good or bad, would take 2273some method of rewarding or punishing him, which would be much 2274spoken about. And a prince ought, above all things, always to 2275endeavour in every action to gain for himself the reputation of 2276being a great and remarkable man. 2277 A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a 2278downright enemy, that to say, when, without any reservation, he 2279declares himself in favour of one party against the other; which 2280course will always be more advantageous than standing neutral; because 2281if two of your powerful neighbours come to blows, they are of such a 2282character that, if one of them conquers, you have either to fear him 2283or not. In either case it will always be more advantageous for you 2284to declare yourself and to make war strenuously; because, in the first 2285case, if you do not declare yourself, you will invariably fall a 2286prey to the conqueror, to the pleasure and satisfaction of him who has 2287been conquered, and you will have no reasons to offer, nor anything to 2288protect or to shelter you. Because he who conquers does not want 2289doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time of trial; and he who 2290loses will not harbour you because you did not willingly, sword in 2291hand, court his fate. 2292 Antiochus went into Greece, being sent for by the Aetolians to drive 2293out the Romans. He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of 2294the Romans, exhorting them to remain neutral; and on the other hand 2295the Romans urged them to take up arms. This question came to be 2296discussed in the council of the Achaeans, where the legate of 2297Antiochus urged them to stand neutral. To this the Roman legate 2298answered: "As for that which has been said, that it is better and more 2299advantageous for your state not to interfere in our war, nothing can 2300be more erroneous; because by not interfering you will be left, 2301without favour or consideration, the guerdon of the conqueror." Thus 2302it will always happen that he who is not your friend will demand 2303your neutrality, whilst he who is your friend will entreat you to 2304declare yourself with arms. And irresolute princes, to avoid present 2305dangers, generally follow the neutral path, and are generally 2306ruined. But when a prince declares himself gallantly in favour of 2307one side, if the party with whom he allies himself conquers, 2308although the victor may be powerful and may have him at his mercy, yet 2309he is indebted to him, and there is established a bond of amity; and 2310men are never so shameless as to become a monument of ingratitude by 2311oppressing you. Victories after all are never so complete that the 2312victor must not show some regard, especially to justice. But if he 2313with whom you ally yourself loses, you may be sheltered by him, and 2314whilst he is able he may aid you, and you become companions in a 2315fortune that may rise again. 2316 In the second case, when those who fight are of such a character 2317that you have no anxiety as to who may conquer, so much the more is it 2318greater prudence to be allied, because you assist at the destruction 2319of one by the aid of another who, if he had been wise, would have 2320saved him; and conquering, as it is impossible that he should not with 2321your assistance, he remains at your discretion. And here it is to be 2322noted that a prince ought to take care never to make an alliance 2323with one more powerful than himself for the purpose of attacking 2324others, unless necessity compels him, as is said above; because if 2325he conquers you are at his discretion, and princes ought to avoid as 2326much as possible being at the discretion of any one. The Venetians 2327joined with France against the Duke of Milan, and this alliance, which 2328caused their ruin, could have been avoided. But when it cannot be 2329avoided, as happened to the Florentines when the Pope and Spain sent 2330armies to attack Lombardy, then in such a case, for the above reasons, 2331the prince ought to favour one of the parties. 2332 Never let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe 2333courses; rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones, 2334because it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to 2335avoid one trouble without running into another; but prudence 2336consists in knowing how to distinguish the character of troubles, 2337and for choice to take the lesser evil. 2338 A prince ought also to show himself a patron of ability, and to 2339honour the proficient in every art. At the same time he should 2340encourage his citizens to practise their callings peaceably, both in 2341commerce and agriculture, and in every other following, so that the 2342one should not be deterred from improving his possessions for fear 2343lest they be taken away from him or another from opening up trade 2344for fear of taxes; but the prince ought to offer rewards to whoever 2345wishes to do these things and designs in any way to honour his city or 2346state. 2347 Further, he ought to entertain the people with festivals and 2348spectacles at convenient seasons of the year; and as every city is 2349divided into guilds or into societies, he ought to hold such bodies in 2350esteem, and associate with them sometimes, and show himself an example 2351of courtesy and liberality; nevertheless, always maintaining the 2352majesty of his rank, for this he must never consent to abate in 2353anything. 2354 CHAPTER XXII 2355 CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES 2356 2357 THE choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince, and 2358they are good or not according to the discrimination of the prince. 2359And the first opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his 2360understanding, is by observing the men he has around him; and when 2361they are capable and faithful he may always be considered wise, 2362because he has known how to recognize the capable and to keep them 2363faithful. But when they are otherwise one cannot form a good opinion 2364of him, for the prime error which he made was in choosing them. 2365 There were none who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the servant of 2366Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who would not consider Pandolfo to 2367be a very clever man in having Venafro for his servant. Because 2368there are three classes of intellects: one which comprehends by 2369itself; another which appreciates what others comprehend; and a 2370third which neither comprehends by itself nor by the showing of 2371others; the first is the most excellent, the second is good, the third 2372is useless. Therefore, it follows necessarily that, if Pandolfo was 2373not in the first rank, he was in the second, for whenever one has 2374judgment to know good or bad when it is said and done, although he 2375himself may not have the initiative, yet he can recognize the good and 2376the bad in his servant, and the one he can praise and the other 2377correct; thus the servant cannot hope to deceive him, and is kept 2378honest. 2379 But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is 2380one test which never falls; when you see the servant thinking more 2381of his own interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own 2382profit in everything, such a man will never make a good servant, nor 2383will you ever be able to trust him; because he who has the state of 2384another in his hands ought never to think of himself, but always of 2385his prince, and never pay any attention to matters in which the prince 2386is not concerned. 2387 On the other to keep his servant honest the prince ought to study 2388him, honouring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing 2389with him the honours and cares; and at the same time let him see 2390that he cannot stand alone, so that many honours not make him desire 2391more, many riches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make 2392him dread changes. When, therefore, servants, and princes towards 2393servants, are thus disposed, they can trust each other, but when it is 2394otherwise, the end will always be disastrous for either one or the 2395other. 2396 CHAPTER XXIII 2397 HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED 2398 2399 I DO NOT wish to leave out an important branch of this subject, 2400for it is a danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved, 2401unless they are very careful and discriminating. It is that of 2402flatterers, of whom courts arc full, because men are so 2403self-complacent in their own affairs, and in a way so deceived in 2404them, that they are preserved with difficulty from this pest, and if 2405they wish to defend themselves they run the danger of falling into 2406contempt. Because there is no other way of guarding oneself from 2407flatterers except letting men understand that to tell you the truth 2408does not offend you; but when every one may tell you the truth, 2409respect for you abates. 2410 Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the 2411wise men in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking 2412the truth to him, and then only of those things of which he 2413inquires, and of none others; but he ought to question them upon 2414everything, and listen to their opinions, and afterwards form his 2415own conclusions. With these councillors, separately and 2416collectively, he ought to carry himself in such a way that each of 2417them should know that, the more freely he shall speak, the more he 2418shall be preferred; outside of these, he should listen to no one, 2419pursue the thing resolved on, and be steadfast in his resolutions. 2420He who does otherwise is either overthrown by flatterers, or is so 2421often changed by varying opinions that he falls into contempt. 2422 I wish on this subject to adduce a modern example. Fra Luca, the man 2423of affairs to Maximilian, the present emperor, speaking of his 2424majesty, said: He consulted with no one, yet never got his own way 2425in anything. This arose because of his following a practice the 2426opposite to the above; for the emperor is a secretive man- he does not 2427communicate his designs to any one, nor does he receive opinions on 2428them. But as in carrying them into effect they become revealed and 2429known, they are at once obstructed by those men whom he has around 2430him, and he, being pliant, is diverted from them. Hence it follows 2431that those things he does one day he undoes the next, and no one 2432ever understands what he wishes or intends to do, and no one can 2433rely on his resolutions. 2434 A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when 2435he wishes and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage 2436every one from offering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he 2437ought to be a constant inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener 2438concerning the things of which he inquired; also, on learning that any 2439one, on any consideration, has not told him the truth, he should let 2440his anger be felt. 2441 And if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an 2442impression of his wisdom is not so through his own ability, but 2443through the good advisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they 2444are deceived, because this is an axiom which never fails: that a 2445prince who is not wise himself will never take good advice, unless 2446by chance he has yielded his affairs entirely to one person who 2447happens to be a very prudent man. In this case indeed he may be well 2448governed, but it would not be for long, because such a governor 2449would in a short time take away his state from him. 2450 But if a prince who is not experienced should take counsel from more 2451than one he will never get united counsels, nor will he know how to 2452unite them. Each of the counsellors will think of his own interests, 2453and the prince will not know how to control them or to see through 2454them. And they are not to be found otherwise, because men will 2455always prove untrue to you unless they are kept honest by 2456constraint. Therefore it must be inferred that good counsels, 2457whencesoever they come, are born of the wisdom of the prince, and 2458not the wisdom of the prince from good counsels. 2459 CHAPTER XXIV 2460 THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES 2461 2462 THE previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new 2463prince to appear well established, and render him at once more 2464secure and fixed in the state than if he had been long seated there. 2465For the actions of a new prince are more narrowly observed than 2466those of an hereditary one, and when they are seen to be able they 2467gain more men and bind far tighter than ancient blood; because men are 2468attracted more by the present than by the past, and when they find the 2469present good they enjoy it and seek no further; they will also make 2470the utmost defence for a prince if he fails them not in other 2471things. Thus it will be a double glory to him to have established a 2472new principality, and adorned and strengthened it with good laws, good 2473arms, good allies, and with a good example; so will it be a double 2474disgrace to him who, born a prince, shall lose his state by want of 2475wisdom. 2476 And if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states 2477in Italy in our times, such as the King of Naples, the Duke of 2478Milan, and others, there will be found in them, firstly, one common 2479defect in regard to arms from the causes which have been discussed 2480at length; in the next place, some one of them will be seen, either to 2481have had the people hostile, or if he has had the people friendly, 2482he has not known how to secure the nobles. In the absence of these 2483defects states that have power enough to keep an army in the field 2484cannot be lost. 2485 Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but he who 2486was conquered by Titus Quintius, had not much territory compared to 2487the greatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him, yet 2488being a warlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure 2489the nobles, he sustained the war against his enemies for many years, 2490and if in the end he lost the dominion of some cities, nevertheless he 2491retained the kingdom. 2492 Therefore, do not let our princes accuse fortune for the loss of 2493their principalities after so many years' possession, but rather their 2494own sloth, because in quiet times they never thought there could be 2495a change (it is a common defect in man not to make any provision in 2496the calm against the tempest), and when afterwards the bad times 2497came they thought of flight and not of defending themselves, and 2498they hoped that the people, disgusted with the insolence of the 2499conquerors, would recall them. This course, when others fail, may be 2500good, but it is very bad to have neglected all other expedients for 2501that, since you would never wish to fall because you trusted to be 2502able to find someone later on to restore you. This again either does 2503not happen, or, if it does, it will not be for your security, 2504because that deliverance is of no avail which does not depend upon 2505yourself; those only are reliable, certain, and durable that depend on 2506yourself and your valour. 2507 CHAPTER XXV 2508 WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS, 2509 AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER 2510 2511 IT is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the 2512opinion that the affairs of the world are in such wise governed by 2513fortune and by God that men with their wisdom cannot direct them and 2514that no one can even help them; and because of this they would have us 2515believe that it is not necessary to labour much in affairs, but to let 2516chance govern them. This opinion has been more credited in our times 2517because of the great changes in affairs which have been seen, and 2518may still be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture. Sometimes 2519pondering over this, I am in some degree inclined to their opinion. 2520Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I hold it to be true 2521that Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions, but that she 2522still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little less. 2523 I compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood 2524overflows the plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, bearing 2525away the soil from place to place; everything flies before it, all 2526yield to its violence, without being able in any way to withstand 2527it; and yet, though its nature be such, it does not follow therefore 2528that men, when the weather becomes fair, shall not make provision, 2529both with defences and barriers, in such a manner that, rising 2530again, the waters may pass away by canal, and their force be neither 2531so unrestrained nor so dangerous. So it happens with fortune, who 2532shows her power where valour has not prepared to resist her, and 2533thither she turns her forces where she knows that barriers and 2534defences have not been raised to constrain her. 2535 And if you will consider Italy, which is the seat of these 2536changes, and which has given to them their impulse, you will see it to 2537be an open country without barriers and without any defence. For if it 2538had been defended by proper valour, as are Germany, Spain, and France, 2539either this invasion would not have made the great changes it has made 2540or it would not have come at all. And this I consider enough to say 2541concerning resistance to fortune in general. 2542 But confining myself more to the particular, I say that a prince may 2543be seen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow without having shown any 2544change of disposition or character. This, I believe, arises firstly 2545from causes that have already been discussed at length, namely, that 2546the prince who relies entirely upon fortune is lost when it changes. I 2547believe also that he will be successful who directs his actions 2548according to the spirit of the times, and that he whose actions do not 2549accord with the times will not be successful. Because men are seen, in 2550affairs that lead to the end which every man has before him, namely, 2551glory and riches, to get there by various methods; one with caution, 2552another with haste; one by force, another by skill; one by patience, 2553another by its opposite; and each one succeeds in reaching the goal by 2554a different method. One can also see of two cautious men the one 2555attain his end, the other fail; and similarly, two men by different 2556observances are equally successful, the one being cautious, the 2557other impetuous; all this arises from nothing else than whether or not 2558they conform in their methods to the spirit of the times. This follows 2559from what I have said, that two men working differently bring about 2560the same effect, and of two working similarly, one attains his 2561object and the other does not. 2562 Changes in estate also issue from this, for if, to one who governs 2563himself with caution and patience, times and affairs converge in 2564such a way that his administration is successful, his fortune is made; 2565but if times and affairs change, he is ruined if he does not change 2566his course of action. But a man is not often found sufficiently 2567circumspect to know how to accommodate himself to the change, both 2568because he cannot deviate from what nature inclines him to, and also 2569because, having always prospered by acting in one way, he cannot be 2570persuaded that it is well to leave it; and, therefore, the cautious 2571man, when it is time to turn adventurous, does not know how to do 2572it, hence he is ruined; but had he changed his conduct with the 2573times fortune would not have changed. 2574 Pope Julius II went to work impetuously in all his affairs, and 2575found the times and circumstances conform so well to that line of 2576action that he always met with success. Consider his first 2577enterprise against Bologna, Messer Giovanni Bentivogli being still 2578alive. The Venetians were not agreeable to it, nor was the King of 2579Spain, and he had the enterprise still under discussion with the 2580King of France; nevertheless he personally entered upon the expedition 2581with his accustomed boldness and energy, a move which made Spain and 2582the Venetians stand irresolute and passive, the latter from fear, 2583the former from desire to recover all the kingdom of Naples; on the 2584other hand, he drew after him the King of France, because that king, 2585having observed the movement, and desiring to make the Pope his friend 2586so as to humble the Venetians, found it impossible to refuse him 2587soldiers without manifestly offending him. Therefore Julius with his 2588impetuous action accomplished what no other pontiff with simple 2589human wisdom could have done; for if he had waited in Rome until he 2590could get away, with his plans arranged and everything fixed, as any 2591other pontiff would have done, he would never have succeeded. 2592Because the King of France would have made a thousand excuses, and the 2593others would have raised a thousand fears. 2594 I will leave his other actions alone, as they were all alike, and 2595they all succeeded, for the shortness of his life did not let him 2596experience the contrary; but if circumstances had arisen which 2597required him to go cautiously, his ruin would have followed, because 2598he would never have deviated from those ways to which nature 2599inclined him. 2600 I conclude therefore that, fortune being changeful and mankind 2601steadfast in their ways, so long as the two are in agreement men are 2602successful, but unsuccessful when they fall out. For my part I 2603consider that it is better to be adventurous than cautious, because 2604fortune is a woman, and if you wish to keep her under it is 2605necessary to beat and ill-use her; and it is seen that she allows 2606herself to be mastered by the adventurous rather than by those who 2607go to work more coldly. She is, therefore, always, woman-like, a lover 2608of young men, because they are less cautious, more violent, and with 2609more audacity command her. 2610 CHAPTER XXVI 2611 AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS 2612 2613 HAVING carefully considered the subject of the above discourses, and 2614wondering within myself whether the present times were propitious to a 2615new prince, and whether there were the elements that would give an 2616opportunity to a wise and virtuous one to introduce a new order of 2617things which would do honour to him and good to the people of this 2618country, it appears to me that so many things concur to favour a new 2619prince that I never knew a time more fit than the present. 2620 And if, as I said, it was necessary that the people of Israel should 2621be captive so as to make manifest the ability of Moses; that the 2622Persians should be oppressed by the Medes so as to discover the 2623greatness of the soul of Cyrus; and that the Athenians should be 2624dispersed to illustrate the capabilities of Theseus: then at the 2625present time, in order to discover the virtue of an Italian spirit, it 2626was necessary that Italy should be reduced to the extremity she is now 2627in, that she should be more enslaved than the Hebrews, more 2628oppressed than the Persians, more scattered than the Athenians; 2629without head, without order, beaten, despoiled, torn, overrun; and 2630to have endured every kind of desolation. 2631 Although lately some spark may have been shown by one, which made us 2632think he was ordained by God for our redemption, nevertheless it was 2633afterwards seen, in the height of his career, that fortune rejected 2634him; so that Italy, left as without life, waits for him who shall 2635yet heal her wounds and put an end to the ravaging and plundering of 2636Lombardy, to the swindling and taxing of the kingdom and of Tuscany, 2637and cleanse those sores that for long have festered. It is seen how 2638she entreats God to send someone who shall deliver her from these 2639wrongs and barbarous insolencies. It is seen also that she is ready 2640and willing to follow a banner if only someone will raise it. 2641 Nor is there to be seen at present one in whom she can place more 2642hope than in your illustrious house, with its valour and fortune, 2643favoured by God and by the Church of which it is now the chief, and 2644which could be made the head of this redemption. This will not be 2645difficult if you will recall to yourself the actions and lives of 2646the men I have named. And although they were great and wonderful 2647men, yet they were men, and each one of them had no more opportunity 2648than the present offers, for their enterprises were neither more 2649just nor easier than this, nor was God more their friend than He is 2650yours. 2651 With us there is great justice, because that war is just which is 2652necessary, and arms are hallowed when there is no other hope but in 2653them. Here there is the greatest willingness, and where the 2654willingness is great the difficulties cannot be great if you will only 2655follow those men to whom I have directed your attention. Further 2656than this, how extraordinarily the ways of God have been manifested 2657beyond example: the sea is divided, a cloud has led the way, the 2658rock has poured forth water, it has rained manna, everything has 2659contributed to your greatness; you ought to do the rest. God is not 2660willing to do everything, and thus take away our free will and that 2661share of glory which belongs to us. 2662 And it is not to be wondered at if none of the above-named 2663Italians have been able to accomplish all that is expected from your 2664illustrious house; and if in so many revolutions in Italy, and in so 2665many campaigns, it has always appeared as if military virtue were 2666exhausted, this has happened because the old order of things was not 2667good, and none of us have known how to find a new one. And nothing 2668honours a man more than to establish new laws and new ordinances 2669when he himself was newly risen. Such things when they are well 2670founded and dignified will make him revered and admired, and in 2671Italy there are not wanting opportunities to bring such into use in 2672every form. 2673 Here there is great valour in the limbs whilst it fails in the head. 2674Look attentively at the duels and the hand-to-hand combats, how 2675superior the Italians are in strength, dexterity, and subtlety. But 2676when it comes to armies they do not bear comparison, and this 2677springs entirely from the insufficiency of the leaders, since those 2678who are capable are not obedient, and each one seems to himself to 2679know, there having never been any one so distinguished above the rest, 2680either by valour or fortune, that others would yield to him. Hence 2681it is that for so long a time, and during so much fighting in the past 2682twenty years, whenever there has been an army wholly Italian, it has 2683always given a poor account of itself; as witness Taro, Alessandria, 2684Capua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna, Mestre. 2685 If, therefore, your illustrious house wishes to follow those 2686remarkable men who have redeemed their country, it is necessary before 2687all things, as a true foundation for every enterprise, to be 2688provided with your own forces, because there can be no more 2689faithful, truer, or better soldiers. And although singly they are 2690good, altogether they will be much better when they find themselves 2691commanded by their prince, honoured by him, and maintained at his 2692expense. Therefore it is necessary to be prepared with such arms, so 2693that you can be defended against foreigners by Italian valour. 2694 And although Swiss and Spanish infantry may be considered very 2695formidable, nevertheless there is a defect in both, by reason of which 2696a third order would not only be able to oppose them, but might be 2697relied upon to overthrow them. For the Spaniards cannot resist 2698cavalry, and the Switzers are afraid of infantry whenever they 2699encounter them in close combat. Owing to this, as has been and may 2700again be seen, the Spaniards are unable to resist French cavalry, 2701and the Switzers are overthrown by infantry. And although a complete 2702proof of this latter cannot be shown, nevertheless there was some 2703evidence of it at the battle of Ravenna, when the Spanish infantry 2704were confronted by German battalions, who follow the same tactics as 2705the Swiss; when the Spaniards, by agility of body and with the aid 2706of their shields, got in under the pikes of the Germans and stood 2707out of danger, able to attack, while the Germans stood helpless, 2708and, if the cavalry had not dashed up, all would have been over with 2709them. It is possible, therefore, knowing the defects of both these 2710infantries, to invent a new one, which will resist cavalry and not 2711be afraid of infantry; this need not create a new order of arms, but a 2712variation upon the old. And these are the kind of improvements which 2713confer reputation and power upon a new prince. 2714 This opportunity, therefore, ought not to be allowed to pass for 2715letting Italy at last see her liberator appear. Nor can one express 2716the love with which he would be received in all those provinces 2717which have suffered so much from these foreign scourings, with what 2718thirst for revenge, with what stubborn faith, with what devotion, with 2719what tears. What door would be closed to him? Who would refuse 2720obedience to him? What envy would hinder him? What Italian would 2721refuse him homage? To all of us this barbarous dominion stinks. Let, 2722therefore, your illustrious house take up this charge with that 2723courage and hope with which all just enterprises are undertaken, so 2724that under its standard our native country may be ennobled, and 2725under its auspices may be verified that saying of Petrarch: 2726 2727 Virtu contro al Furore 2728 Prendera l'arme, e fia il combatter corto: 2729 Che l'antico valore 2730 Negli italici cuor non e ancor morto.* 2731 2732 * Virtue against fury shall advance the fight, 2733 And it i' th' combat soon shall put to flight; 2734 For the old Roman, valour is not dead, 2735 Nor in th' Italians' breasts extinguished. 2736 2737 2738 THE END 2739 2740 2741