1 /* $OpenBSD: x509_cmp.c,v 1.35 2019/03/13 20:34:00 tb Exp $ */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58
59 #include <ctype.h>
60 #include <stdio.h>
61 #include <string.h>
62
63 #include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
64
65 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
66 #include <openssl/err.h>
67 #include <openssl/objects.h>
68 #include <openssl/x509.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
70
71 int
X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 * a,const X509 * b)72 X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
73 {
74 int i;
75 X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
76
77 ai = a->cert_info;
78 bi = b->cert_info;
79 i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber);
80 if (i)
81 return (i);
82 return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer));
83 }
84
85 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
86 unsigned long
X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 * a)87 X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
88 {
89 unsigned long ret = 0;
90 EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
91 unsigned char md[16];
92 char *f;
93
94 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
95 f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer, NULL, 0);
96 if (f == NULL)
97 goto err;
98 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
99 goto err;
100 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
101 goto err;
102 free(f);
103 f = NULL;
104 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,
105 (unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
106 (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length))
107 goto err;
108 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
109 goto err;
110 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
111 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)) &
112 0xffffffffL;
113
114 err:
115 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
116 free(f);
117 return (ret);
118 }
119 #endif
120
121 int
X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 * a,const X509 * b)122 X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
123 {
124 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer));
125 }
126
127 int
X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 * a,const X509 * b)128 X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
129 {
130 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject));
131 }
132
133 int
X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL * a,const X509_CRL * b)134 X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
135 {
136 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer));
137 }
138
139 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
140 int
X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL * a,const X509_CRL * b)141 X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
142 {
143 return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
144 }
145 #endif
146
147 X509_NAME *
X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 * a)148 X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a)
149 {
150 return (a->cert_info->issuer);
151 }
152
153 unsigned long
X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 * x)154 X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
155 {
156 return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
157 }
158
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
160 unsigned long
X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 * x)161 X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
162 {
163 return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer));
164 }
165 #endif
166
167 X509_NAME *
X509_get_subject_name(const X509 * a)168 X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a)
169 {
170 return (a->cert_info->subject);
171 }
172
173 ASN1_INTEGER *
X509_get_serialNumber(X509 * a)174 X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
175 {
176 return (a->cert_info->serialNumber);
177 }
178
179 const ASN1_INTEGER *
X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 * a)180 X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *a)
181 {
182 return (a->cert_info->serialNumber);
183 }
184
185 unsigned long
X509_subject_name_hash(X509 * x)186 X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
187 {
188 return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
189 }
190
191 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
192 unsigned long
X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 * x)193 X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
194 {
195 return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject));
196 }
197 #endif
198
199 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
200 /* Compare two certificates: they must be identical for
201 * this to work. NB: Although "cmp" operations are generally
202 * prototyped to take "const" arguments (eg. for use in
203 * STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these operations may
204 * involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
205 * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point
206 * where the "depth-first" constification tree has to halt
207 * with an evil cast.
208 */
209 int
X509_cmp(const X509 * a,const X509 * b)210 X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
211 {
212 /* ensure hash is valid */
213 X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
214 X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
215
216 return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
217 }
218 #endif
219
220 int
X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME * a,const X509_NAME * b)221 X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
222 {
223 int ret;
224
225 /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
226 if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
227 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
228 if (ret < 0)
229 return -2;
230 }
231 if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
232 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
233 if (ret < 0)
234 return -2;
235 }
236 ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
237 if (ret)
238 return ret;
239 return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
240 }
241
242 unsigned long
X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME * x)243 X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
244 {
245 unsigned long ret = 0;
246 unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
247
248 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
249 i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
250 if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
251 NULL))
252 return 0;
253
254 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
255 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)) &
256 0xffffffffL;
257 return (ret);
258 }
259
260
261 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
262 /* I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
263 * this is reasonably efficient. */
264
265 unsigned long
X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME * x)266 X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
267 {
268 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
269 unsigned long ret = 0;
270 unsigned char md[16];
271
272 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
273 i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
274 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
275 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL) &&
276 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) &&
277 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL))
278 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) |
279 ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
280 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) |
281 ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)) &
282 0xffffffffL;
283 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
284
285 return (ret);
286 }
287 #endif
288
289 /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
290 X509 *
X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF (X509)* sk,X509_NAME * name,ASN1_INTEGER * serial)291 X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
292 ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
293 {
294 int i;
295 X509_CINF cinf;
296 X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
297
298 if (!sk)
299 return NULL;
300
301 x.cert_info = &cinf;
302 cinf.serialNumber = serial;
303 cinf.issuer = name;
304
305 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
306 x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
307 if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
308 return (x509);
309 }
310 return (NULL);
311 }
312
313 X509 *
X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF (X509)* sk,X509_NAME * name)314 X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
315 {
316 X509 *x509;
317 int i;
318
319 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
320 x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
321 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
322 return (x509);
323 }
324 return (NULL);
325 }
326
327 EVP_PKEY *
X509_get_pubkey(X509 * x)328 X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
329 {
330 if (x == NULL || x->cert_info == NULL)
331 return (NULL);
332 return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
333 }
334
335 EVP_PKEY *
X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 * x)336 X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x)
337 {
338 if (x == NULL || x->cert_info == NULL)
339 return (NULL);
340 return (X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info->key));
341 }
342
343 ASN1_BIT_STRING *
X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 * x)344 X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
345 {
346 if (!x)
347 return NULL;
348 return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
349 }
350
351 int
X509_check_private_key(const X509 * x,const EVP_PKEY * k)352 X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k)
353 {
354 const EVP_PKEY *xk;
355 int ret;
356
357 xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
358
359 if (xk)
360 ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
361 else
362 ret = -2;
363
364 switch (ret) {
365 case 1:
366 break;
367 case 0:
368 X509error(X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
369 break;
370 case -1:
371 X509error(X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
372 break;
373 case -2:
374 X509error(X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
375 }
376 if (ret > 0)
377 return 1;
378 return 0;
379 }
380
381 /*
382 * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
383 * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
384 * each X509 structure.
385 */
STACK_OF(X509)386 STACK_OF(X509) *
387 X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
388 {
389 STACK_OF(X509) *ret;
390 size_t i;
391
392 ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
393 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++)
394 X509_up_ref(sk_X509_value(ret, i));
395
396 return ret;
397 }
398