1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58
59 #include <ctype.h>
60 #include <stdio.h>
61 #include <time.h>
62 #include <errno.h>
63
64 #include "cryptlib.h"
65 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
66 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
67 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
68 #include <openssl/evp.h>
69 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509.h>
71 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
72 #include <openssl/objects.h>
73 #include "vpm_int.h"
74
75 /* CRL score values */
76
77 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
78
79 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
80
81 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
82
83 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
84
85 /* CRL times valid */
86
87 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
88
89 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
90
91 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
92
93 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
94
95 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
96
97 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
98
99 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
100
101 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
102
103 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
104
105 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
106
107 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
108
109 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
110
111 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
112
113 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
114 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
115 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
116 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
121 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
122 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
123
124 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
125 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
126 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
127 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
128 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
129 int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
130 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
131 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
132 int *pcrl_score);
133 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
134 unsigned int *preasons);
135 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
136 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
137 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
138 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
139
140 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
141 const char X509_version[] = "X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
142
null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX * e)143 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
144 {
145 return ok;
146 }
147
148 #if 0
149 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
150 {
151 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a, *b);
152 }
153 #endif
154 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
cert_self_signed(X509 * x)155 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
156 {
157 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
158 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
159 return 1;
160 else
161 return 0;
162 }
163
164 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
165
lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)166 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
167 {
168 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
169 X509 *xtmp = NULL;
170 int i;
171 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
172 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
173 if (certs == NULL)
174 return NULL;
175 /* Look for exact match */
176 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
177 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
178 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
179 break;
180 }
181 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
182 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
183 else
184 xtmp = NULL;
185 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
186 return xtmp;
187 }
188
X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)189 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
190 {
191 X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL;
192 int bad_chain = 0;
193 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
194 int depth, i, ok = 0;
195 int num, j, retry;
196 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
197 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
198 int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
199 int err;
200
201 if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
202 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
203 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
204 return -1;
205 }
206 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
207 /*
208 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
209 * cannot do another one.
210 */
211 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
212 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
213 return -1;
214 }
215
216 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
217
218 /*
219 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
220 * the first entry is in place
221 */
222 if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
223 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
224 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
225 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
226 ok = -1;
227 goto err;
228 }
229 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
230 ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
231
232 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
233 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
234 && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
235 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
236 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
237 ok = -1;
238 goto err;
239 }
240
241 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
242 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
243 depth = param->depth;
244
245 for (;;) {
246 /* If we have enough, we break */
247 if (depth < num)
248 break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
249 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
250 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
251 * later. */
252
253 /* If we are self signed, we break */
254 if (cert_self_signed(x))
255 break;
256 /*
257 * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
258 */
259 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
260 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
261 if (ok < 0) {
262 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
263 goto err;
264 }
265 /*
266 * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
267 * again later.
268 */
269 if (ok > 0) {
270 X509_free(xtmp);
271 break;
272 }
273 }
274
275 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
276 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) {
277 xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
278 if (xtmp != NULL) {
279 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
280 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
281 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
282 ok = -1;
283 goto err;
284 }
285 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
286 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
287 ctx->last_untrusted++;
288 x = xtmp;
289 num++;
290 /*
291 * reparse the full chain for the next one
292 */
293 continue;
294 }
295 }
296 break;
297 }
298
299 /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
300 j = num;
301 /*
302 * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
303 * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
304 * complain.
305 */
306
307 do {
308 /*
309 * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
310 */
311 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
312 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
313 if (cert_self_signed(x)) {
314 /* we have a self signed certificate */
315 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
316 /*
317 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
318 * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
319 * possible impersonation.
320 */
321 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
322 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
323 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
324 ctx->current_cert = x;
325 ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
326 if (ok == 1)
327 X509_free(xtmp);
328 bad_chain = 1;
329 ok = cb(0, ctx);
330 if (!ok)
331 goto err;
332 } else {
333 /*
334 * We have a match: replace certificate with store
335 * version so we get any trust settings.
336 */
337 X509_free(x);
338 x = xtmp;
339 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
340 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
341 }
342 } else {
343 /*
344 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
345 */
346 chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
347 ctx->last_untrusted--;
348 num--;
349 j--;
350 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
351 }
352 }
353 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
354 for (;;) {
355 /* If we have enough, we break */
356 if (depth < num)
357 break;
358 /* If we are self signed, we break */
359 if (cert_self_signed(x))
360 break;
361 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
362
363 if (ok < 0) {
364 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
365 goto err;
366 }
367 if (ok == 0)
368 break;
369 x = xtmp;
370 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
371 X509_free(xtmp);
372 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
373 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
374 ok = -1;
375 goto err;
376 }
377 num++;
378 }
379
380 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
381 if ((trust = check_trust(ctx)) == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
382 /* Callback already issued */
383 ok = 0;
384 goto err;
385 }
386
387 /*
388 * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative
389 * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already
390 * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate
391 * chain checking
392 */
393 retry = 0;
394 if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
395 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
396 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
397 while (j-- > 1) {
398 xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
399 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
400 if (ok < 0) {
401 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
402 goto err;
403 }
404 /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
405 if (ok > 0) {
406 /*
407 * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
408 */
409 X509_free(xtmp);
410
411 /*
412 * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
413 * alternate chain
414 */
415 while (num > j) {
416 xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
417 X509_free(xtmp);
418 num--;
419 }
420 ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
421 retry = 1;
422 break;
423 }
424 }
425 }
426 } while (retry);
427
428 /*
429 * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
430 * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
431 * and set bad_chain == 1
432 */
433 if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) {
434 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
435 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
436 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
437 else
438 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
439 ctx->current_cert = x;
440 } else {
441
442 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss);
443 num++;
444 ctx->last_untrusted = num;
445 ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
446 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
447 chain_ss = NULL;
448 }
449
450 ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
451 bad_chain = 1;
452 ok = cb(0, ctx);
453 if (!ok)
454 goto err;
455 }
456
457 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
458 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
459
460 if (!ok)
461 goto err;
462
463 /* Check name constraints */
464
465 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
466
467 if (!ok)
468 goto err;
469
470 ok = check_id(ctx);
471
472 if (!ok)
473 goto err;
474
475 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
476 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
477
478 /*
479 * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
480 * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
481 */
482
483 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
484 if (!ok)
485 goto err;
486
487 err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
488 ctx->param->flags);
489 if (err != X509_V_OK) {
490 ctx->error = err;
491 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
492 ok = cb(0, ctx);
493 if (!ok)
494 goto err;
495 }
496
497 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
498 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
499 ok = ctx->verify(ctx);
500 else
501 ok = internal_verify(ctx);
502 if (!ok)
503 goto err;
504
505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
506 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
507 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
508 if (!ok)
509 goto err;
510 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
511 if (!ok)
512 goto err;
513 #endif
514
515 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
516 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
517 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
518 if (!ok)
519 goto err;
520 if (0) {
521 err:
522 /* Ensure we return an error */
523 if (ok > 0)
524 ok = 0;
525 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
526 }
527 if (sktmp != NULL)
528 sk_X509_free(sktmp);
529 if (chain_ss != NULL)
530 X509_free(chain_ss);
531
532 /* Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error */
533 if (ok <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK)
534 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
535 return ok;
536 }
537
538 /*
539 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
540 */
541
find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* sk,X509 * x)542 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
543 {
544 int i;
545 X509 *issuer;
546 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
547 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
548 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
549 return issuer;
550 }
551 return NULL;
552 }
553
554 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
555
check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x,X509 * issuer)556 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
557 {
558 int ret;
559 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
560 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
561 return 1;
562 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
563 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
564 return 0;
565
566 ctx->error = ret;
567 ctx->current_cert = x;
568 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
569 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
570 }
571
572 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
573
get_issuer_sk(X509 ** issuer,X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)574 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
575 {
576 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
577 if (*issuer) {
578 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
579 return 1;
580 } else
581 return 0;
582 }
583
584 /*
585 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
586 * purpose
587 */
588
check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)589 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
590 {
591 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
592 return 1;
593 #else
594 int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
595 X509 *x;
596 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
597 int proxy_path_length = 0;
598 int purpose;
599 int allow_proxy_certs;
600 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
601
602 /*-
603 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
604 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
605 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
606 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
607 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
608 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
609 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
610 */
611 must_be_ca = -1;
612
613 /* CRL path validation */
614 if (ctx->parent) {
615 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
616 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
617 } else {
618 allow_proxy_certs =
619 ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
620 /*
621 * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
622 * happy
623 */
624 if (ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
625 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
626 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
627 }
628
629 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
630 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
631 int ret;
632 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
633 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
634 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
635 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
636 ctx->error_depth = i;
637 ctx->current_cert = x;
638 ok = cb(0, ctx);
639 if (!ok)
640 goto end;
641 }
642 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
643 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
644 ctx->error_depth = i;
645 ctx->current_cert = x;
646 ok = cb(0, ctx);
647 if (!ok)
648 goto end;
649 }
650 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
651 switch (must_be_ca) {
652 case -1:
653 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
654 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
655 ret = 0;
656 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
657 } else
658 ret = 1;
659 break;
660 case 0:
661 if (ret != 0) {
662 ret = 0;
663 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
664 } else
665 ret = 1;
666 break;
667 default:
668 if ((ret == 0)
669 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
670 && (ret != 1))) {
671 ret = 0;
672 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
673 } else
674 ret = 1;
675 break;
676 }
677 if (ret == 0) {
678 ctx->error_depth = i;
679 ctx->current_cert = x;
680 ok = cb(0, ctx);
681 if (!ok)
682 goto end;
683 }
684 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
685 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
686 if ((ret == 0)
687 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
688 && (ret != 1))) {
689 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
690 ctx->error_depth = i;
691 ctx->current_cert = x;
692 ok = cb(0, ctx);
693 if (!ok)
694 goto end;
695 }
696 }
697 /* Check pathlen */
698 if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
699 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length))) {
700 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
701 ctx->error_depth = i;
702 ctx->current_cert = x;
703 ok = cb(0, ctx);
704 if (!ok)
705 goto end;
706 }
707 /* Increment path length if not a self issued intermediate CA */
708 if (i > 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) == 0)
709 plen++;
710 /*
711 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
712 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
713 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
714 */
715 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
716 /*
717 * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint
718 * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to
719 * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length
720 * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it.
721 *
722 * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start
723 * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC,
724 * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally,
725 * increment proxy_path_length.
726 */
727 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) {
728 if (proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
729 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
730 ctx->error_depth = i;
731 ctx->current_cert = x;
732 ok = cb(0, ctx);
733 if (!ok)
734 goto end;
735 }
736 proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen;
737 }
738 proxy_path_length++;
739 must_be_ca = 0;
740 } else
741 must_be_ca = 1;
742 }
743 ok = 1;
744 end:
745 return ok;
746 #endif
747 }
748
check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)749 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
750 {
751 X509 *x;
752 int i, j, rv;
753 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
754 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
755 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
756 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
757 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
758 continue;
759
760 /*
761 * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the
762 * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry
763 * added.
764 * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4))
765 */
766 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
767 X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x);
768 X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
769 X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL;
770 int last_object_nid = 0;
771 int err = X509_V_OK;
772 int last_object_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1;
773
774 /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */
775 if (last_object_loc < 1) {
776 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
777 goto proxy_name_done;
778 }
779
780 /*
781 * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as
782 * there is in issuer.
783 */
784 if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject)
785 != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer) + 1) {
786 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
787 goto proxy_name_done;
788 }
789
790 /*
791 * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a
792 * multivalued RDN
793 */
794 if (X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc)->set
795 == X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc - 1)->set) {
796 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
797 goto proxy_name_done;
798 }
799
800 /*
801 * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that
802 * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly
803 */
804 tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject);
805 if (tmpsubject == NULL) {
806 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
807 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
808 return 0;
809 }
810
811 tmpentry =
812 X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc);
813 last_object_nid =
814 OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry));
815
816 if (last_object_nid != NID_commonName
817 || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) {
818 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
819 }
820
821 X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry);
822 X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject);
823
824 proxy_name_done:
825 if (err != X509_V_OK) {
826 ctx->error = err;
827 ctx->error_depth = i;
828 ctx->current_cert = x;
829 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
830 return 0;
831 }
832 }
833
834 /*
835 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
836 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
837 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
838 * to be obeyed.
839 */
840 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
841 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
842 if (nc) {
843 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
844 switch (rv) {
845 case X509_V_OK:
846 continue;
847 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
848 ctx->error = rv;
849 return 0;
850 default:
851 ctx->error = rv;
852 ctx->error_depth = i;
853 ctx->current_cert = x;
854 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
855 return 0;
856 break;
857 }
858 }
859 }
860 }
861 return 1;
862 }
863
check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int errcode)864 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
865 {
866 ctx->error = errcode;
867 ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
868 ctx->error_depth = 0;
869 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
870 }
871
check_hosts(X509 * x,X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID * id)872 static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id)
873 {
874 int i;
875 int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts);
876 char *name;
877
878 if (id->peername != NULL) {
879 OPENSSL_free(id->peername);
880 id->peername = NULL;
881 }
882 for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
883 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i);
884 if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, id->hostflags, &id->peername) > 0)
885 return 1;
886 }
887 return n == 0;
888 }
889
check_id(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)890 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
891 {
892 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
893 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
894 X509 *x = ctx->cert;
895 if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0) {
896 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
897 return 0;
898 }
899 if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
900 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
901 return 0;
902 }
903 if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
904 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
905 return 0;
906 }
907 return 1;
908 }
909
check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)910 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
911 {
912 int i, ok;
913 X509 *x = NULL;
914 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
915 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
916 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
917 for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
918 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
919 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
920 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
921 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
922 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
923 /*
924 * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
925 * overridden.
926 */
927 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
928 ctx->error_depth = i;
929 ctx->current_cert = x;
930 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
931 ok = cb(0, ctx);
932 if (!ok)
933 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
934 }
935 }
936 /*
937 * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
938 * return success.
939 */
940 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
941 X509 *mx;
942 if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
943 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
944 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
945 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
946 if (mx) {
947 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
948 X509_free(x);
949 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
950 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
951 }
952 }
953
954 /*
955 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
956 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
957 */
958 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
959 }
960
check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)961 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
962 {
963 int i, last, ok;
964 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
965 return 1;
966 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
967 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
968 else {
969 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
970 if (ctx->parent)
971 return 1;
972 last = 0;
973 }
974 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
975 ctx->error_depth = i;
976 ok = check_cert(ctx);
977 if (!ok)
978 return ok;
979 }
980 return 1;
981 }
982
check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)983 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
984 {
985 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
986 X509 *x;
987 int ok, cnum;
988 unsigned int last_reasons;
989 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
990 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
991 ctx->current_cert = x;
992 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
993 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
994 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
995 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
996 return 1;
997 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
998 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
999 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
1000 if (ctx->get_crl)
1001 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
1002 else
1003 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
1004 /*
1005 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
1006 */
1007 if (!ok) {
1008 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
1009 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1010 goto err;
1011 }
1012 ctx->current_crl = crl;
1013 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
1014 if (!ok)
1015 goto err;
1016
1017 if (dcrl) {
1018 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
1019 if (!ok)
1020 goto err;
1021 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
1022 if (!ok)
1023 goto err;
1024 } else
1025 ok = 1;
1026
1027 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
1028 if (ok != 2) {
1029 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
1030 if (!ok)
1031 goto err;
1032 }
1033
1034 X509_CRL_free(crl);
1035 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
1036 crl = NULL;
1037 dcrl = NULL;
1038 /*
1039 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
1040 * so exit loop.
1041 */
1042 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
1043 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
1044 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1045 goto err;
1046 }
1047 }
1048 err:
1049 X509_CRL_free(crl);
1050 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
1051
1052 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
1053 return ok;
1054
1055 }
1056
1057 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
1058
check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl,int notify)1059 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
1060 {
1061 time_t *ptime;
1062 int i;
1063 if (notify)
1064 ctx->current_crl = crl;
1065 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1066 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1067 else
1068 ptime = NULL;
1069
1070 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
1071 if (i == 0) {
1072 if (!notify)
1073 return 0;
1074 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
1075 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1076 return 0;
1077 }
1078
1079 if (i > 0) {
1080 if (!notify)
1081 return 0;
1082 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
1083 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1084 return 0;
1085 }
1086
1087 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) {
1088 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
1089
1090 if (i == 0) {
1091 if (!notify)
1092 return 0;
1093 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
1094 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1095 return 0;
1096 }
1097 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
1098 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
1099 if (!notify)
1100 return 0;
1101 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
1102 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1103 return 0;
1104 }
1105 }
1106
1107 if (notify)
1108 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
1109
1110 return 1;
1111 }
1112
get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL ** pcrl,X509_CRL ** pdcrl,X509 ** pissuer,int * pscore,unsigned int * preasons,STACK_OF (X509_CRL)* crls)1113 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
1114 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
1115 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1116 {
1117 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
1118 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
1119 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
1120 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
1121 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
1122
1123 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1124 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1125 reasons = *preasons;
1126 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
1127 if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0)
1128 continue;
1129 /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
1130 if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) {
1131 int day, sec;
1132 if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(best_crl),
1133 X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0)
1134 continue;
1135 /*
1136 * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
1137 * and |sec|.
1138 */
1139 if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0)
1140 continue;
1141 }
1142 best_crl = crl;
1143 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
1144 best_score = crl_score;
1145 best_reasons = reasons;
1146 }
1147
1148 if (best_crl) {
1149 if (*pcrl)
1150 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
1151 *pcrl = best_crl;
1152 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
1153 *pscore = best_score;
1154 *preasons = best_reasons;
1155 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1156 if (*pdcrl) {
1157 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
1158 *pdcrl = NULL;
1159 }
1160 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
1161 }
1162
1163 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
1164 return 1;
1165
1166 return 0;
1167 }
1168
1169 /*
1170 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1171 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1172 */
1173
crl_extension_match(X509_CRL * a,X509_CRL * b,int nid)1174 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1175 {
1176 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1177 int i;
1178 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1179 if (i >= 0) {
1180 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1181 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1182 return 0;
1183 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1184 } else
1185 exta = NULL;
1186
1187 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1188
1189 if (i >= 0) {
1190
1191 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1192 return 0;
1193 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1194 } else
1195 extb = NULL;
1196
1197 if (!exta && !extb)
1198 return 1;
1199
1200 if (!exta || !extb)
1201 return 0;
1202
1203 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1204 return 0;
1205
1206 return 1;
1207 }
1208
1209 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1210
check_delta_base(X509_CRL * delta,X509_CRL * base)1211 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1212 {
1213 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1214 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1215 return 0;
1216 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1217 if (!base->crl_number)
1218 return 0;
1219 /* Issuer names must match */
1220 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1221 return 0;
1222 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1223 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1224 return 0;
1225 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1226 return 0;
1227 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1228 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1229 return 0;
1230 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1231 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1232 return 1;
1233 return 0;
1234 }
1235
1236 /*
1237 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1238 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1239 */
1240
get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL ** dcrl,int * pscore,X509_CRL * base,STACK_OF (X509_CRL)* crls)1241 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1242 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1243 {
1244 X509_CRL *delta;
1245 int i;
1246 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1247 return;
1248 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1249 return;
1250 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1251 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1252 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
1253 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1254 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1255 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1256 *dcrl = delta;
1257 return;
1258 }
1259 }
1260 *dcrl = NULL;
1261 }
1262
1263 /*
1264 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1265 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1266 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1267 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1268 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1269 */
1270
get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 ** pissuer,unsigned int * preasons,X509_CRL * crl,X509 * x)1271 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1272 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1273 {
1274
1275 int crl_score = 0;
1276 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1277
1278 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1279
1280 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1281 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1282 return 0;
1283 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1284 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
1285 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1286 return 0;
1287 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
1288 /* If no new reasons reject */
1289 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1290 return 0;
1291 }
1292 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1293 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1294 return 0;
1295 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1296 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
1297 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1298 return 0;
1299 } else
1300 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1301
1302 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1303 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1304
1305 /* Check expiry */
1306 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1307 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1308
1309 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1310 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1311
1312 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1313
1314 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1315 return 0;
1316
1317 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1318
1319 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
1320 /* If no new reasons reject */
1321 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1322 return 0;
1323 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1324 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1325 }
1326
1327 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1328
1329 return crl_score;
1330
1331 }
1332
crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl,X509 ** pissuer,int * pcrl_score)1333 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1334 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1335 {
1336 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1337 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1338 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1339 int i;
1340
1341 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1342 cidx++;
1343
1344 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1345
1346 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1347 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
1348 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1349 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1350 return;
1351 }
1352 }
1353
1354 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
1355 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1356 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1357 continue;
1358 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1359 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1360 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1361 return;
1362 }
1363 }
1364
1365 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1366
1367 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1368 return;
1369
1370 /*
1371 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1372 * untrusted certificates.
1373 */
1374 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
1375 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1376 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1377 continue;
1378 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1379 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1380 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1381 return;
1382 }
1383 }
1384 }
1385
1386 /*
1387 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1388 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1389 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1390 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1391 */
1392
check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)1393 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1394 {
1395 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1396 int ret;
1397 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1398 if (ctx->parent)
1399 return 0;
1400 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1401 return -1;
1402
1403 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1404 /* Copy verify params across */
1405 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1406
1407 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1408 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1409
1410 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1411 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1412
1413 if (ret <= 0)
1414 goto err;
1415
1416 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1417
1418 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1419 err:
1420 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1421 return ret;
1422 }
1423
1424 /*
1425 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1426 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1427 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1428 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1429 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1430 * RFC5280 version
1431 */
1432
check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* cert_path,STACK_OF (X509)* crl_path)1433 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1434 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1435 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1436 {
1437 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1438 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1439 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1440 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1441 return 1;
1442 return 0;
1443 }
1444
1445 /*-
1446 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1447 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1448 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1449 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1450 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1451 */
1452
idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME * a,DIST_POINT_NAME * b)1453 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1454 {
1455 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1456 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1457 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1458 int i, j;
1459 if (!a || !b)
1460 return 1;
1461 if (a->type == 1) {
1462 if (!a->dpname)
1463 return 0;
1464 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1465 if (b->type == 1) {
1466 if (!b->dpname)
1467 return 0;
1468 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1469 return 1;
1470 else
1471 return 0;
1472 }
1473 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1474 nm = a->dpname;
1475 gens = b->name.fullname;
1476 } else if (b->type == 1) {
1477 if (!b->dpname)
1478 return 0;
1479 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1480 gens = a->name.fullname;
1481 nm = b->dpname;
1482 }
1483
1484 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1485 if (nm) {
1486 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
1487 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1488 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1489 continue;
1490 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1491 return 1;
1492 }
1493 return 0;
1494 }
1495
1496 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1497
1498 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
1499 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1500 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
1501 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1502 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1503 return 1;
1504 }
1505 }
1506
1507 return 0;
1508
1509 }
1510
crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT * dp,X509_CRL * crl,int crl_score)1511 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1512 {
1513 int i;
1514 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1515 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1516 if (!dp->CRLissuer)
1517 return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1518 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
1519 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1520 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1521 continue;
1522 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1523 return 1;
1524 }
1525 return 0;
1526 }
1527
1528 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1529
crl_crldp_check(X509 * x,X509_CRL * crl,int crl_score,unsigned int * preasons)1530 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1531 unsigned int *preasons)
1532 {
1533 int i;
1534 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1535 return 0;
1536 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
1537 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1538 return 0;
1539 } else {
1540 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1541 return 0;
1542 }
1543 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1544 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
1545 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1546 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
1547 if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
1548 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1549 return 1;
1550 }
1551 }
1552 }
1553 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
1554 && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1555 return 1;
1556 return 0;
1557 }
1558
1559 /*
1560 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1561 * to find a delta CRL too
1562 */
1563
get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL ** pcrl,X509_CRL ** pdcrl,X509 * x)1564 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1565 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1566 {
1567 int ok;
1568 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1569 int crl_score = 0;
1570 unsigned int reasons;
1571 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1572 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1573 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1574 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1575 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1576 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1577
1578 if (ok)
1579 goto done;
1580
1581 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1582
1583 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1584
1585 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1586 if (!skcrl && crl)
1587 goto done;
1588
1589 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1590
1591 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1592
1593 done:
1594
1595 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1596 if (crl) {
1597 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1598 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1599 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1600 *pcrl = crl;
1601 *pdcrl = dcrl;
1602 return 1;
1603 }
1604
1605 return 0;
1606 }
1607
1608 /* Check CRL validity */
check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl)1609 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1610 {
1611 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1612 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1613 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1614 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1615 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1616 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1617 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1618 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1619
1620 /*
1621 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1622 * certificate in chain.
1623 */
1624 else if (cnum < chnum)
1625 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1626 else {
1627 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1628 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1629 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
1630 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1631 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1632 if (!ok)
1633 goto err;
1634 }
1635 }
1636
1637 if (issuer) {
1638 /*
1639 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1640 */
1641 if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
1642 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1643 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1644 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
1645 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1646 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1647 if (!ok)
1648 goto err;
1649 }
1650
1651 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
1652 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1653 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1654 if (!ok)
1655 goto err;
1656 }
1657
1658 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
1659 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
1660 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1661 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1662 if (!ok)
1663 goto err;
1664 }
1665 }
1666
1667 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
1668 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1669 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1670 if (!ok)
1671 goto err;
1672 }
1673
1674 }
1675
1676 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
1677 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1678 if (!ok)
1679 goto err;
1680 }
1681
1682 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1683 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1684
1685 if (!ikey) {
1686 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1687 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1688 if (!ok)
1689 goto err;
1690 } else {
1691 int rv;
1692 rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1693 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
1694 ctx->error = rv;
1695 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1696 if (!ok)
1697 goto err;
1698 }
1699 /* Verify CRL signature */
1700 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
1701 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1702 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1703 if (!ok)
1704 goto err;
1705 }
1706 }
1707 }
1708
1709 ok = 1;
1710
1711 err:
1712 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1713 return ok;
1714 }
1715
1716 /* Check certificate against CRL */
cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl,X509 * x)1717 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1718 {
1719 int ok;
1720 X509_REVOKED *rev;
1721 /*
1722 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1723 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1724 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
1725 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1726 */
1727 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1728 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
1729 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1730 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1731 if (!ok)
1732 return 0;
1733 }
1734 /*
1735 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
1736 * is not removeFromCRL.
1737 */
1738 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
1739 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1740 return 2;
1741 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1742 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1743 if (!ok)
1744 return 0;
1745 }
1746
1747 return 1;
1748 }
1749
check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1750 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1751 {
1752 int ret;
1753 if (ctx->parent)
1754 return 1;
1755 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1756 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1757 if (ret == 0) {
1758 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1759 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
1760 return 0;
1761 }
1762 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1763 if (ret == -1) {
1764 /*
1765 * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
1766 */
1767 X509 *x;
1768 int i;
1769 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
1770 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1771 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1772 continue;
1773 ctx->current_cert = x;
1774 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1775 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1776 return 0;
1777 }
1778 return 1;
1779 }
1780 if (ret == -2) {
1781 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1782 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1783 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1784 }
1785
1786 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
1787 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1788 /*
1789 * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
1790 * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
1791 * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
1792 * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
1793 */
1794 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1795 return 0;
1796 }
1797
1798 return 1;
1799 }
1800
check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)1801 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1802 {
1803 time_t *ptime;
1804 int i;
1805
1806 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1807 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1808 else
1809 ptime = NULL;
1810
1811 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1812 if (i == 0) {
1813 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1814 ctx->current_cert = x;
1815 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1816 return 0;
1817 }
1818
1819 if (i > 0) {
1820 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1821 ctx->current_cert = x;
1822 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1823 return 0;
1824 }
1825
1826 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1827 if (i == 0) {
1828 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1829 ctx->current_cert = x;
1830 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1831 return 0;
1832 }
1833
1834 if (i < 0) {
1835 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1836 ctx->current_cert = x;
1837 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1838 return 0;
1839 }
1840
1841 return 1;
1842 }
1843
internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1844 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1845 {
1846 int ok = 0, n;
1847 X509 *xs, *xi;
1848 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1849 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1850
1851 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1852
1853 n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1854 ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
1855 n--;
1856 xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1857
1858 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1859 xs = xi;
1860 else {
1861 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
1862 xs = xi;
1863 goto check_cert;
1864 }
1865 if (n <= 0) {
1866 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1867 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1868 ok = cb(0, ctx);
1869 goto end;
1870 } else {
1871 n--;
1872 ctx->error_depth = n;
1873 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1874 }
1875 }
1876
1877 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1878 while (n >= 0) {
1879 ctx->error_depth = n;
1880
1881 /*
1882 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1883 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
1884 * time.
1885 */
1886 if (!xs->valid
1887 && (xs != xi
1888 || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) {
1889 if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
1890 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1891 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1892 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1893 if (!ok)
1894 goto end;
1895 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
1896 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1897 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1898 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1899 if (!ok) {
1900 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1901 goto end;
1902 }
1903 }
1904 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1905 pkey = NULL;
1906 }
1907
1908 xs->valid = 1;
1909
1910 check_cert:
1911 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1912 if (!ok)
1913 goto end;
1914
1915 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1916 ctx->current_issuer = xi;
1917 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1918 ok = (*cb) (1, ctx);
1919 if (!ok)
1920 goto end;
1921
1922 n--;
1923 if (n >= 0) {
1924 xi = xs;
1925 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1926 }
1927 }
1928 ok = 1;
1929 end:
1930 return ok;
1931 }
1932
X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME * ctm)1933 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1934 {
1935 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1936 }
1937
X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME * ctm,time_t * cmp_time)1938 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1939 {
1940 static const size_t utctime_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
1941 static const size_t generalizedtime_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
1942 ASN1_TIME *asn1_cmp_time = NULL;
1943 int i, day, sec, ret = 0;
1944
1945 /*
1946 * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280.
1947 * In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1948 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1949 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1950 *
1951 * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement:
1952 * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate
1953 * validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity
1954 * dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime."
1955 */
1956 switch (ctm->type) {
1957 case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
1958 if (ctm->length != (int)(utctime_length))
1959 return 0;
1960 break;
1961 case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
1962 if (ctm->length != (int)(generalizedtime_length))
1963 return 0;
1964 break;
1965 default:
1966 return 0;
1967 }
1968
1969 /**
1970 * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more
1971 * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280.
1972 * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods.
1973 */
1974 for (i = 0; i < ctm->length - 1; i++) {
1975 if (!isdigit(ctm->data[i]))
1976 return 0;
1977 }
1978 if (ctm->data[ctm->length - 1] != 'Z')
1979 return 0;
1980
1981 /*
1982 * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no
1983 * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t,
1984 * so we go through ASN.1
1985 */
1986 asn1_cmp_time = X509_time_adj(NULL, 0, cmp_time);
1987 if (asn1_cmp_time == NULL)
1988 goto err;
1989 if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, ctm, asn1_cmp_time))
1990 goto err;
1991
1992 /*
1993 * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=.
1994 * The return value 0 is reserved for errors.
1995 */
1996 ret = (day >= 0 && sec >= 0) ? -1 : 1;
1997
1998 err:
1999 ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time);
2000 return ret;
2001 }
2002
X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME * s,long adj)2003 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
2004 {
2005 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
2006 }
2007
X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME * s,long offset_sec,time_t * in_tm)2008 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
2009 {
2010 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
2011 }
2012
X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME * s,int offset_day,long offset_sec,time_t * in_tm)2013 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
2014 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
2015 {
2016 time_t t;
2017
2018 if (in_tm)
2019 t = *in_tm;
2020 else
2021 time(&t);
2022
2023 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
2024 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
2025 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
2026 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
2027 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
2028 }
2029 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
2030 }
2031
X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY * pkey,STACK_OF (X509)* chain)2032 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2033 {
2034 EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
2035 int i, j;
2036
2037 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
2038 return 1;
2039
2040 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2041 ktmp = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
2042 if (ktmp == NULL) {
2043 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
2044 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
2045 return 0;
2046 }
2047 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
2048 break;
2049 else {
2050 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
2051 ktmp = NULL;
2052 }
2053 }
2054 if (ktmp == NULL) {
2055 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
2056 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
2057 return 0;
2058 }
2059
2060 /* first, populate the other certs */
2061 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
2062 ktmp2 = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j));
2063 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp);
2064 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
2065 }
2066
2067 if (pkey != NULL)
2068 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
2069 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
2070 return 1;
2071 }
2072
2073 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
2074
X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL * base,X509_CRL * newer,EVP_PKEY * skey,const EVP_MD * md,unsigned int flags)2075 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
2076 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
2077 {
2078 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
2079 int i;
2080 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
2081 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
2082 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
2083 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
2084 return NULL;
2085 }
2086 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
2087 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
2088 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
2089 return NULL;
2090 }
2091 /* Issuer names must match */
2092 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
2093 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
2094 return NULL;
2095 }
2096 /* AKID and IDP must match */
2097 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
2098 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
2099 return NULL;
2100 }
2101 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
2102 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
2103 return NULL;
2104 }
2105 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
2106 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
2107 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
2108 return NULL;
2109 }
2110 /* CRLs must verify */
2111 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
2112 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
2113 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
2114 return NULL;
2115 }
2116 /* Create new CRL */
2117 crl = X509_CRL_new();
2118 if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
2119 goto memerr;
2120 /* Set issuer name */
2121 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
2122 goto memerr;
2123
2124 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
2125 goto memerr;
2126 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
2127 goto memerr;
2128
2129 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2130
2131 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
2132 goto memerr;
2133
2134 /*
2135 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
2136 * number to correct value too.
2137 */
2138
2139 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
2140 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
2141 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2142 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
2143 goto memerr;
2144 }
2145
2146 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2147
2148 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2149
2150 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) {
2151 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2152 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
2153 /*
2154 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
2155 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2156 */
2157 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) {
2158 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2159 if (!rvtmp)
2160 goto memerr;
2161 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
2162 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2163 goto memerr;
2164 }
2165 }
2166 }
2167 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2168
2169 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2170 goto memerr;
2171
2172 return crl;
2173
2174 memerr:
2175 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2176 if (crl)
2177 X509_CRL_free(crl);
2178 return NULL;
2179 }
2180
X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void * argp,CRYPTO_EX_new * new_func,CRYPTO_EX_dup * dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free * free_func)2181 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
2182 CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
2183 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
2184 CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
2185 {
2186 /*
2187 * This function is (usually) called only once, by
2188 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
2189 */
2190 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
2191 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
2192 }
2193
X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int idx,void * data)2194 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2195 {
2196 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
2197 }
2198
X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int idx)2199 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2200 {
2201 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
2202 }
2203
X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2204 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2205 {
2206 return ctx->error;
2207 }
2208
X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int err)2209 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2210 {
2211 ctx->error = err;
2212 }
2213
X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2214 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2215 {
2216 return ctx->error_depth;
2217 }
2218
X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2219 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2220 {
2221 return ctx->current_cert;
2222 }
2223
STACK_OF(X509)2224 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2225 {
2226 return ctx->chain;
2227 }
2228
STACK_OF(X509)2229 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2230 {
2231 if (!ctx->chain)
2232 return NULL;
2233 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2234 }
2235
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2236 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2237 {
2238 return ctx->current_issuer;
2239 }
2240
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2241 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2242 {
2243 return ctx->current_crl;
2244 }
2245
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2246 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2247 {
2248 return ctx->parent;
2249 }
2250
X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)2251 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2252 {
2253 ctx->cert = x;
2254 }
2255
X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* sk)2256 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2257 {
2258 ctx->untrusted = sk;
2259 }
2260
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509_CRL)* sk)2261 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2262 {
2263 ctx->crls = sk;
2264 }
2265
X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int purpose)2266 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2267 {
2268 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2269 }
2270
X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int trust)2271 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2272 {
2273 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2274 }
2275
2276 /*
2277 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2278 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2279 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2280 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2281 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2282 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2283 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2284 * client/server.
2285 */
2286
X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int def_purpose,int purpose,int trust)2287 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2288 int purpose, int trust)
2289 {
2290 int idx;
2291 /* If purpose not set use default */
2292 if (!purpose)
2293 purpose = def_purpose;
2294 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2295 if (purpose) {
2296 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
2297 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2298 if (idx == -1) {
2299 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2300 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2301 return 0;
2302 }
2303 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2304 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2305 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2306 if (idx == -1) {
2307 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2308 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2309 return 0;
2310 }
2311 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2312 }
2313 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2314 if (!trust)
2315 trust = ptmp->trust;
2316 }
2317 if (trust) {
2318 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2319 if (idx == -1) {
2320 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2321 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2322 return 0;
2323 }
2324 }
2325
2326 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
2327 ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2328 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
2329 ctx->param->trust = trust;
2330 return 1;
2331 }
2332
X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)2333 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2334 {
2335 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2336 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2337 if (!ctx) {
2338 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2339 return NULL;
2340 }
2341 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2342 return ctx;
2343 }
2344
X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2345 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2346 {
2347 if (!ctx)
2348 return;
2349 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2350 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2351 }
2352
X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_STORE * store,X509 * x509,STACK_OF (X509)* chain)2353 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2354 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2355 {
2356 int ret = 1;
2357 ctx->ctx = store;
2358 ctx->current_method = 0;
2359 ctx->cert = x509;
2360 ctx->untrusted = chain;
2361 ctx->crls = NULL;
2362 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
2363 ctx->other_ctx = NULL;
2364 ctx->valid = 0;
2365 ctx->chain = NULL;
2366 ctx->error = 0;
2367 ctx->explicit_policy = 0;
2368 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2369 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
2370 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
2371 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
2372 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
2373 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
2374 ctx->tree = NULL;
2375 ctx->parent = NULL;
2376 /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
2377 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
2378
2379 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2380 if (!ctx->param) {
2381 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2382 return 0;
2383 }
2384
2385 /*
2386 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2387 */
2388 if (store)
2389 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2390 else
2391 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2392
2393 if (store) {
2394 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2395 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, else must be idempotent */
2396 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2397 } else
2398 ctx->cleanup = 0;
2399
2400 if (ret)
2401 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2402 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2403
2404 if (ret == 0) {
2405 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2406 goto err;
2407 }
2408
2409 if (store && store->check_issued)
2410 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2411 else
2412 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2413
2414 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2415 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2416 else
2417 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2418
2419 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2420 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2421 else
2422 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2423
2424 if (store && store->verify)
2425 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2426 else
2427 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2428
2429 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2430 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2431 else
2432 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2433
2434 if (store && store->get_crl)
2435 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2436 else
2437 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2438
2439 if (store && store->check_crl)
2440 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2441 else
2442 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2443
2444 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2445 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2446 else
2447 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2448
2449 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2450 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2451 else
2452 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2453
2454 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2455 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2456 else
2457 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2458
2459 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2460
2461 if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2462 &ctx->ex_data))
2463 return 1;
2464 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2465
2466 err:
2467 /*
2468 * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not
2469 * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so.
2470 */
2471 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2472 return 0;
2473 }
2474
2475 /*
2476 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2477 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2478 */
2479
X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* sk)2480 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2481 {
2482 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2483 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2484 }
2485
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2486 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2487 {
2488 /*
2489 * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls
2490 * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free()
2491 * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the
2492 * pointers below after they're freed!
2493 */
2494 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
2495 if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
2496 ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2497 ctx->cleanup = NULL;
2498 }
2499 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2500 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2501 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2502 ctx->param = NULL;
2503 }
2504 if (ctx->tree != NULL) {
2505 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2506 ctx->tree = NULL;
2507 }
2508 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
2509 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2510 ctx->chain = NULL;
2511 }
2512 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2513 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2514 }
2515
X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int depth)2516 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2517 {
2518 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2519 }
2520
X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,unsigned long flags)2521 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2522 {
2523 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2524 }
2525
X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,unsigned long flags,time_t t)2526 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
2527 time_t t)
2528 {
2529 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2530 }
2531
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int (* verify_cb)(int,X509_STORE_CTX *))2532 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2533 int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2534 {
2535 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
2536 }
2537
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2538 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2539 {
2540 return ctx->tree;
2541 }
2542
X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2543 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2544 {
2545 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2546 }
2547
X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,const char * name)2548 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2549 {
2550 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2551 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2552 if (!param)
2553 return 0;
2554 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2555 }
2556
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2557 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2558 {
2559 return ctx->param;
2560 }
2561
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_VERIFY_PARAM * param)2562 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2563 {
2564 if (ctx->param)
2565 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2566 ctx->param = param;
2567 }
2568
2569 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2570
2571 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2572
2573 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2574
2575 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2576
2577 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2578