1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
5 *
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 */
11
12 #include <stdio.h>
13 #include <time.h>
14 #include <assert.h>
15 #include "../ssl_local.h"
16 #include "statem_local.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/md5.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/engine.h>
26 #include <openssl/trace.h>
27 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
28 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
29 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
30
31 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
32 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
33
34 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
35 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
36 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
37 WPACKET *pkt);
38
39 /*
40 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
41 *
42 * Return values are:
43 * 1: Yes
44 * 0: No
45 */
cert_req_allowed(SSL * s)46 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
47 {
48 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
49 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
50 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
51 || (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
52 return 0;
53
54 return 1;
55 }
56
57 /*
58 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
59 *
60 * Return values are:
61 * 1: Yes
62 * 0: No
63 */
key_exchange_expected(SSL * s)64 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
65 {
66 long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
67
68 /*
69 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
70 * ciphersuite or for SRP
71 */
72 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
73 | SSL_kSRP)) {
74 return 1;
75 }
76
77 return 0;
78 }
79
80 /*
81 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
82 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
83 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
84 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
85 *
86 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
87 * (transition not allowed)
88 */
ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL * s,int mt)89 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
90 {
91 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
92
93 /*
94 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
95 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
96 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
97 */
98
99 switch (st->hand_state) {
100 default:
101 break;
102
103 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
104 /*
105 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
106 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
107 */
108 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
109 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
110 return 1;
111 }
112 break;
113
114 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
115 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
116 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
117 return 1;
118 }
119 break;
120
121 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
122 if (s->hit) {
123 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
124 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
125 return 1;
126 }
127 } else {
128 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
129 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
130 return 1;
131 }
132 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
133 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
134 return 1;
135 }
136 }
137 break;
138
139 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
140 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
141 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
142 return 1;
143 }
144 break;
145
146 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
147 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
148 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
149 return 1;
150 }
151 break;
152
153 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
154 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
155 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
156 return 1;
157 }
158 break;
159
160 case TLS_ST_OK:
161 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
163 return 1;
164 }
165 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
166 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
167 return 1;
168 }
169 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
170 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
171 /* Restore digest for PHA before adding message.*/
172 # error Internal DTLS version error
173 #endif
174 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) {
175 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
176 /*
177 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
178 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
179 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
180 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
181 */
182 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
183 /* SSLfatal() already called */
184 return 0;
185 }
186 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
187 return 1;
188 }
189 }
190 break;
191 }
192
193 /* No valid transition found */
194 return 0;
195 }
196
197 /*
198 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
199 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
200 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
201 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
202 *
203 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
204 * (transition not allowed)
205 */
ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL * s,int mt)206 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
207 {
208 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
209 int ske_expected;
210
211 /*
212 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
213 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
214 */
215 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
216 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
217 goto err;
218 return 1;
219 }
220
221 switch (st->hand_state) {
222 default:
223 break;
224
225 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
226 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
227 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
228 return 1;
229 }
230
231 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
232 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
233 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
234 return 1;
235 }
236 }
237 break;
238
239 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
240 /*
241 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
242 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
243 * HelloRetryRequest.
244 */
245 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
246 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
247 return 1;
248 }
249 break;
250
251 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
252 if (s->hit) {
253 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
254 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
255 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
256 return 1;
257 }
258 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
259 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
260 return 1;
261 }
262 } else {
263 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
264 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
265 return 1;
266 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
267 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
268 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
269 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
270 /*
271 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
272 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
273 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
274 * the server is resuming.
275 */
276 s->hit = 1;
277 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
278 return 1;
279 } else if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
280 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
281 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
282 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
283 return 1;
284 }
285 } else {
286 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
287 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
288 if (ske_expected
289 || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
290 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
291 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
292 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
293 return 1;
294 }
295 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
296 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
297 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
298 return 1;
299 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
300 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
301 return 1;
302 }
303 }
304 }
305 break;
306
307 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
308 /*
309 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
310 * |ext.status_expected| is set
311 */
312 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
313 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
314 return 1;
315 }
316 /* Fall through */
317
318 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
319 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
320 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
321 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
322 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
323 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
324 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
325 return 1;
326 }
327 goto err;
328 }
329 /* Fall through */
330
331 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
332 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
333 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
334 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
335 return 1;
336 }
337 goto err;
338 }
339 /* Fall through */
340
341 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
342 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
343 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
344 return 1;
345 }
346 break;
347
348 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
349 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
350 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
351 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
352 return 1;
353 }
354 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
355 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
356 return 1;
357 }
358 break;
359
360 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
361 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
362 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
363 return 1;
364 }
365 break;
366
367 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
368 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
369 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
370 return 1;
371 }
372 break;
373
374 case TLS_ST_OK:
375 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
376 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
377 return 1;
378 }
379 break;
380 }
381
382 err:
383 /* No valid transition found */
384 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
385 BIO *rbio;
386
387 /*
388 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
389 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
390 */
391 s->init_num = 0;
392 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
393 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
394 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
395 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
396 return 0;
397 }
398 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
399 return 0;
400 }
401
402 /*
403 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
404 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
405 * server.
406 */
ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL * s)407 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
408 {
409 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
410
411 /*
412 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
413 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
414 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
415 */
416 switch (st->hand_state) {
417 default:
418 /* Shouldn't happen */
419 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
420 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
421
422 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
423 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
424 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
425 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
426 }
427 /*
428 * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
429 * we already sent close_notify
430 */
431 if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) {
432 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
433 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
434 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
435 }
436 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
437 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
438
439 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
440 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
441 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
442 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
443 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
444 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
445 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
446 else
447 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
448 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
449 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
450
451 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
452 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
453 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
454 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
455 }
456 /* Fall through */
457
458 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
459 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
460 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
461 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
462 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
463
464 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
465 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
466 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
467 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
468 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
469
470 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
471 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
472 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
473
474 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
475 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
476 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
477 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
478 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
479 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
480
481 case TLS_ST_OK:
482 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
483 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
484 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
485 }
486
487 /* Try to read from the server instead */
488 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
489 }
490 }
491
492 /*
493 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
494 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
495 */
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL * s)496 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
497 {
498 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
499
500 /*
501 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
502 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
503 * later
504 */
505 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
506 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
507
508 switch (st->hand_state) {
509 default:
510 /* Shouldn't happen */
511 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
512 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
513
514 case TLS_ST_OK:
515 if (!s->renegotiate) {
516 /*
517 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
518 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
519 */
520 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
521 }
522 /* Renegotiation */
523 /* fall thru */
524 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
525 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
526 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
527
528 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
529 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
530 /*
531 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
532 * actually selected a version yet.
533 */
534 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
535 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
536 else
537 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
538 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
539 }
540 /*
541 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
542 * we will be sent
543 */
544 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
545
546 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
547 /*
548 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
549 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
550 * because we did early data.
551 */
552 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
553 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
554 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
555 else
556 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
557 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
558
559 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
560 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
561
562 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
563 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
564 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
565
566 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
567 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req)
568 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
569 else
570 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
571 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
572
573 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
574 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
575 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
576
577 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
578 /*
579 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
580 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
581 */
582 /*
583 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
584 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
585 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
586 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
587 */
588 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) {
589 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
590 } else {
591 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
592 }
593 if (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
594 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
595 }
596 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
597
598 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
599 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
600 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
601
602 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
603 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
604 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
605 } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
606 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
607 } else {
608 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
609 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
610 #else
611 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.npn_seen)
612 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
613 else
614 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
615 #endif
616 }
617 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
618
619 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
620 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
621 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
622 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
623 #endif
624
625 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
626 if (s->hit) {
627 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
628 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
629 } else {
630 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
631 }
632
633 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
634 if (s->hit) {
635 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
636 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
637 } else {
638 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
639 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
640 }
641
642 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
643 /*
644 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
645 * convenient time.
646 */
647 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
648 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
649 /* SSLfatal() already called */
650 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
651 }
652 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
653 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
654 }
655 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
656 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
657 }
658 }
659
660 /*
661 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
662 * the client to the server.
663 */
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL * s,WORK_STATE wst)664 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
665 {
666 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
667
668 switch (st->hand_state) {
669 default:
670 /* No pre work to be done */
671 break;
672
673 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
674 s->shutdown = 0;
675 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
676 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
677 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
678 /* SSLfatal() already called */
679 return WORK_ERROR;
680 }
681 }
682 break;
683
684 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
685 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
686 if (s->hit) {
687 /*
688 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
689 * messages unless we need to.
690 */
691 st->use_timer = 0;
692 }
693 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
694 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
695 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
696 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
697 }
698 #endif
699 }
700 break;
701
702 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
703 /*
704 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
705 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
706 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
707 */
708 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
709 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
710 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
711 /* Fall through */
712
713 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
714 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1);
715
716 case TLS_ST_OK:
717 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
718 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
719 }
720
721 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
722 }
723
724 /*
725 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
726 * client to the server.
727 */
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL * s,WORK_STATE wst)728 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
729 {
730 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
731
732 s->init_num = 0;
733
734 switch (st->hand_state) {
735 default:
736 /* No post work to be done */
737 break;
738
739 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
740 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
741 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
742 /*
743 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
744 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
745 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
746 */
747 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
748 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
749 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
750 /* SSLfatal() already called */
751 return WORK_ERROR;
752 }
753 }
754 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
755 } else if (!statem_flush(s)) {
756 return WORK_MORE_A;
757 }
758
759 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
760 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
761 s->first_packet = 1;
762 }
763 break;
764
765 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
766 /*
767 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
768 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
769 */
770 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
771 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
772 break;
773
774 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
775 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
776 /* SSLfatal() already called */
777 return WORK_ERROR;
778 }
779 break;
780
781 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
782 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
783 break;
784 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
785 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
786 /*
787 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
788 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
789 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
790 */
791 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
792 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
793 return WORK_ERROR;
794 break;
795 }
796 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
797 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
798 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
799 #else
800 if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
801 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
802 else
803 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
804 #endif
805 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
806 /* SSLfatal() already called */
807 return WORK_ERROR;
808 }
809
810 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
811 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
812 /* SSLfatal() already called */
813 return WORK_ERROR;
814 }
815
816 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
818 if (s->hit) {
819 /*
820 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
821 * no SCTP used.
822 */
823 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
824 0, NULL);
825 }
826 #endif
827
828 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
829 }
830 break;
831
832 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
834 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
835 /*
836 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
837 * no SCTP used.
838 */
839 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
840 0, NULL);
841 }
842 #endif
843 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
844 return WORK_MORE_B;
845
846 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
847 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
848 /* SSLfatal() already called */
849 return WORK_ERROR;
850 }
851 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
852 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
853 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
854 /* SSLfatal() already called */
855 return WORK_ERROR;
856 }
857 }
858 }
859 break;
860
861 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
862 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
863 return WORK_MORE_A;
864 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
865 /* SSLfatal() already called */
866 return WORK_ERROR;
867 }
868 break;
869 }
870
871 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
872 }
873
874 /*
875 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
876 * client
877 *
878 * Valid return values are:
879 * 1: Success
880 * 0: Error
881 */
ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt,confunc_f * confunc,int * mt)882 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
883 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
884 {
885 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
886
887 switch (st->hand_state) {
888 default:
889 /* Shouldn't happen */
890 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
891 return 0;
892
893 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
894 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
895 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
896 else
897 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
898 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
899 break;
900
901 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
902 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
903 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
904 break;
905
906 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
907 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC
908 /* QUIC does not send EndOfEarlyData, RFC9001 S8.3 */
909 if (SSL_IS_QUIC(s)) {
910 *confunc = NULL;
911 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
912 break;
913 }
914 #endif
915 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
916 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
917 break;
918
919 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
920 *confunc = NULL;
921 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
922 break;
923
924 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
925 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
926 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
927 break;
928
929 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
930 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
931 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
932 break;
933
934 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
935 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
936 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
937 break;
938
939 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
940 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
941 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
942 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
943 break;
944 #endif
945 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
946 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
947 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
948 break;
949
950 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
951 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
952 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
953 break;
954 }
955
956 return 1;
957 }
958
959 /*
960 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
961 * reading. Excludes the message header.
962 */
ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL * s)963 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
964 {
965 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
966
967 switch (st->hand_state) {
968 default:
969 /* Shouldn't happen */
970 return 0;
971
972 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
973 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
974
975 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
976 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
977
978 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
979 return s->max_cert_list;
980
981 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
982 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
983
984 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
985 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
986
987 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
988 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
989
990 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
991 /*
992 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
993 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
994 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
995 */
996 return s->max_cert_list;
997
998 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
999 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
1000
1001 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1002 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1003 return 3;
1004 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1005
1006 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1007 return (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) ? SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS13
1008 : SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS12;
1009
1010 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1011 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1012
1013 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1014 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
1015
1016 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1017 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1018 }
1019 }
1020
1021 /*
1022 * Process a message that the client has received from the server.
1023 */
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)1024 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1025 {
1026 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1027
1028 switch (st->hand_state) {
1029 default:
1030 /* Shouldn't happen */
1031 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1032 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1033
1034 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
1035 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
1036
1037 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1038 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
1039
1040 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1041 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
1042
1043 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1044 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1045
1046 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
1047 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
1048
1049 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
1050 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1051
1052 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1053 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
1054
1055 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1056 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
1057
1058 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1059 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1060
1061 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1062 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
1063
1064 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1065 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1066
1067 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1068 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1069
1070 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1071 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1072
1073 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1074 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1075 }
1076 }
1077
1078 /*
1079 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1080 * from the server
1081 */
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL * s,WORK_STATE wst)1082 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1083 {
1084 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1085
1086 switch (st->hand_state) {
1087 default:
1088 /* Shouldn't happen */
1089 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1090 return WORK_ERROR;
1091
1092 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1093 return tls_post_process_server_certificate(s, wst);
1094
1095 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1096 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1097 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1098 }
1099 }
1100
tls_construct_client_hello(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)1101 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1102 {
1103 unsigned char *p;
1104 size_t sess_id_len;
1105 int i, protverr;
1106 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1107 SSL_COMP *comp;
1108 #endif
1109 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1110 unsigned char *session_id;
1111
1112 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1113 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1114 if (protverr != 0) {
1115 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, protverr);
1116 return 0;
1117 }
1118
1119 if (sess == NULL
1120 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL)
1121 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1122 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1123 && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1124 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1125 return 0;
1126 }
1127 }
1128 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1129
1130 p = s->s3.client_random;
1131
1132 /*
1133 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1134 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1135 */
1136 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1137 size_t idx;
1138 i = 1;
1139 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3.client_random); idx++) {
1140 if (p[idx]) {
1141 i = 0;
1142 break;
1143 }
1144 }
1145 } else {
1146 i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
1147 }
1148
1149 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3.client_random),
1150 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
1151 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1152 return 0;
1153 }
1154
1155 /*-
1156 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1157 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1158 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1159 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1160 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1161 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1162 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1163 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1164 * 1.0.
1165 *
1166 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1167 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1168 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1169 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1170 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1171 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1172 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1173 * know that is maximum server supports.
1174 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1175 * containing version 1.0.
1176 *
1177 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1178 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1179 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1180 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1181 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1182 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1183 * the negotiated version.
1184 *
1185 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1186 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1187 */
1188 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1189 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1190 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1191 return 0;
1192 }
1193
1194 /* Session ID */
1195 session_id = s->session->session_id;
1196 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1197 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1198 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
1199 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
1200 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1201 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
1202 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1203 && RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->tmp_session_id,
1204 sess_id_len, 0) <= 0) {
1205 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1206 return 0;
1207 }
1208 } else {
1209 sess_id_len = 0;
1210 }
1211 } else {
1212 assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id));
1213 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1214 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1215 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1216 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
1217 }
1218 }
1219 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1220 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
1221 sess_id_len))
1222 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1223 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1224 return 0;
1225 }
1226
1227 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1228 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1229 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1230 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1231 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1232 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 return 0;
1234 }
1235 }
1236
1237 /* Ciphers supported */
1238 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1239 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1240 return 0;
1241 }
1242
1243 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) {
1244 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1245 return 0;
1246 }
1247 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1248 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1249 return 0;
1250 }
1251
1252 /* COMPRESSION */
1253 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1254 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1255 return 0;
1256 }
1257 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1258 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1259 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1260 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3.tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1261 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1262 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1263 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1264 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1265 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1266 return 0;
1267 }
1268 }
1269 }
1270 #endif
1271 /* Add the NULL method */
1272 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1273 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1274 return 0;
1275 }
1276
1277 /* TLS extensions */
1278 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
1279 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1280 return 0;
1281 }
1282
1283 return 1;
1284 }
1285
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)1286 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1287 {
1288 size_t cookie_len;
1289 PACKET cookiepkt;
1290
1291 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1292 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1293 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1294 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1295 }
1296
1297 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1298 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1299 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1300 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1301 }
1302
1303 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1304 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1305 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1306 }
1307 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1308
1309 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1310 }
1311
set_client_ciphersuite(SSL * s,const unsigned char * cipherchars)1312 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1313 {
1314 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1315 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1316 int i;
1317
1318 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1319 if (c == NULL) {
1320 /* unknown cipher */
1321 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1322 return 0;
1323 }
1324 /*
1325 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1326 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1327 */
1328 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1329 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1330 return 0;
1331 }
1332
1333 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1334 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1335 if (i < 0) {
1336 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1337 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1338 return 0;
1339 }
1340
1341 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1342 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1343 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1344 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1345 return 0;
1346 }
1347
1348 /*
1349 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1350 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1351 * set and use it for comparison.
1352 */
1353 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1354 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1355 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1356 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1357 /*
1358 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1359 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1360 */
1361 if (ssl_md(s->ctx, c->algorithm2)
1362 != ssl_md(s->ctx, s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1363 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1364 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1365 return 0;
1366 }
1367 } else {
1368 /*
1369 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1370 * ciphersuite.
1371 */
1372 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1373 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1374 return 0;
1375 }
1376 }
1377 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = c;
1378
1379 return 1;
1380 }
1381
tls_process_server_hello(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)1382 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1383 {
1384 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1385 size_t session_id_len;
1386 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1387 int hrr = 0;
1388 unsigned int compression;
1389 unsigned int sversion;
1390 unsigned int context;
1391 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1393 SSL_COMP *comp;
1394 #endif
1395
1396 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1397 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1398 goto err;
1399 }
1400
1401 /* load the server random */
1402 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1403 && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
1404 && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1405 && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
1406 s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
1407 hrr = 1;
1408 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1409 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1410 goto err;
1411 }
1412 } else {
1413 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1414 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1415 goto err;
1416 }
1417 }
1418
1419 /* Get the session-id. */
1420 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1421 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1422 goto err;
1423 }
1424 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1425 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1426 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1427 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1428 goto err;
1429 }
1430
1431 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1432 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1433 goto err;
1434 }
1435
1436 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1437 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1438 goto err;
1439 }
1440
1441 /* TLS extensions */
1442 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
1443 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1444 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1445 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1446 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1447 goto err;
1448 }
1449
1450 if (!hrr) {
1451 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
1452 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1453 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1454 &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
1455 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1456 goto err;
1457 }
1458
1459 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
1460 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1461 goto err;
1462 }
1463 }
1464
1465 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
1466 if (compression != 0) {
1467 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1468 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1469 goto err;
1470 }
1471
1472 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
1473 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
1474 session_id_len) != 0) {
1475 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
1476 goto err;
1477 }
1478 }
1479
1480 if (hrr) {
1481 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1482 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1483 goto err;
1484 }
1485
1486 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
1487 }
1488
1489 /*
1490 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1491 * are appropriate for this version.
1492 */
1493 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1494 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1495 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
1496 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1497 goto err;
1498 }
1499
1500 s->hit = 0;
1501
1502 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1503 /*
1504 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1505 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1506 */
1507 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1508 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1509 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1510 goto err;
1511 }
1512
1513 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1514 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1515 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1516 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
1517 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1518 goto err;
1519 }
1520 } else {
1521 /*
1522 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1523 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1524 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1525 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1526 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1527 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1528 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1529 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1530 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1531 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1532 */
1533 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1534 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1535 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1536 /*
1537 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1538 * backwards compat reasons
1539 */
1540 int master_key_length;
1541 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1542 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1543 &master_key_length,
1544 NULL, &pref_cipher,
1545 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1546 && master_key_length > 0) {
1547 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1548 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1549 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1550 } else {
1551 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1552 goto err;
1553 }
1554 }
1555
1556 if (session_id_len != 0
1557 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1558 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1559 session_id_len) == 0)
1560 s->hit = 1;
1561 }
1562
1563 if (s->hit) {
1564 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1565 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1566 /* actually a client application bug */
1567 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1568 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1569 goto err;
1570 }
1571 } else {
1572 /*
1573 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1574 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1575 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1576 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1577 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1578 */
1579 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1580 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss);
1581 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1582 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1583 goto err;
1584 }
1585 }
1586
1587 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1588 /*
1589 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1590 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1591 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1592 * used for resumption.
1593 */
1594 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1595 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1596 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1597 if (session_id_len > 0)
1598 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1599 session_id_len);
1600 }
1601 }
1602
1603 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1604 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1605 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1606 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1607 goto err;
1608 }
1609 /*
1610 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1611 * version.
1612 */
1613 s->s3.tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1614 s->s3.tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1615
1616 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1617 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1618 goto err;
1619 }
1620
1621 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1622 if (compression != 0) {
1623 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1624 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1625 goto err;
1626 }
1627 /*
1628 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1629 * using compression.
1630 */
1631 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1632 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1633 goto err;
1634 }
1635 #else
1636 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1637 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1638 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1639 goto err;
1640 }
1641 if (compression == 0)
1642 comp = NULL;
1643 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1644 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1645 goto err;
1646 } else {
1647 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1648 }
1649
1650 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1651 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1652 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1653 goto err;
1654 } else {
1655 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
1656 }
1657 #endif
1658
1659 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1660 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1661 goto err;
1662 }
1663
1664 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1665 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1666 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1667 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1668 size_t labellen;
1669
1670 /*
1671 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1672 * no SCTP used.
1673 */
1674 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1675 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1676
1677 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
1678 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
1679 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
1680 labellen += 1;
1681
1682 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1683 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1684 labelbuffer,
1685 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1686 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1687 goto err;
1688 }
1689
1690 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1691 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1692 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1693 }
1694 #endif
1695
1696 /*
1697 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1698 * we're done with this message
1699 */
1700 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1701 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1702 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1703 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1704 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1705 goto err;
1706 }
1707
1708 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1709 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1710 err:
1711 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1712 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1713 }
1714
tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL * s,PACKET * extpkt)1715 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s,
1716 PACKET *extpkt)
1717 {
1718 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1719
1720 /*
1721 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1722 * should not be used.
1723 */
1724 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
1725 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
1726
1727 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1728 &extensions, NULL, 1)
1729 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1730 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1731 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1732 goto err;
1733 }
1734
1735 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1736 extensions = NULL;
1737
1738 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0 && s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1739 /*
1740 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1741 * ClientHello will not change
1742 */
1743 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1744 goto err;
1745 }
1746
1747 /*
1748 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1749 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1750 */
1751 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
1752 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1753 goto err;
1754 }
1755
1756 /*
1757 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1758 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1759 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1760 * for HRR messages.
1761 */
1762 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1763 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1764 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1765 goto err;
1766 }
1767
1768 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1769 err:
1770 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1771 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1772 }
1773
1774 /* prepare server cert verification by setting s->session->peer_chain from pkt */
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)1775 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1776 {
1777 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1778 X509 *x = NULL;
1779 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1780 size_t chainidx;
1781 unsigned int context = 0;
1782
1783 if ((s->session->peer_chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1784 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1785 goto err;
1786 }
1787
1788 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1789 || context != 0
1790 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1791 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1792 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1793 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1794 goto err;
1795 }
1796 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1797 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1798 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1799 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1800 goto err;
1801 }
1802
1803 certstart = certbytes;
1804 x = X509_new_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq);
1805 if (x == NULL) {
1806 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1807 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1808 goto err;
1809 }
1810 if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes,
1811 cert_len) == NULL) {
1812 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1813 goto err;
1814 }
1815
1816 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1817 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1818 goto err;
1819 }
1820
1821 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1822 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1823 PACKET extensions;
1824
1825 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1826 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1827 goto err;
1828 }
1829 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1830 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1831 NULL, chainidx == 0)
1832 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1833 rawexts, x, chainidx,
1834 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1835 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1836 /* SSLfatal already called */
1837 goto err;
1838 }
1839 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1840 }
1841
1842 if (!sk_X509_push(s->session->peer_chain, x)) {
1843 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1844 goto err;
1845 }
1846 x = NULL;
1847 }
1848 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1849
1850 err:
1851 X509_free(x);
1852 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
1853 s->session->peer_chain = NULL;
1854 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1855 }
1856
1857 /*
1858 * Verify the s->session->peer_chain and check server cert type.
1859 * On success set s->session->peer and s->session->verify_result.
1860 * Else the peer certificate verification callback may request retry.
1861 */
tls_post_process_server_certificate(SSL * s,WORK_STATE wst)1862 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1863 {
1864 X509 *x;
1865 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1866 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1867 size_t certidx;
1868 int i;
1869
1870 if (s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY)
1871 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1872 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, s->session->peer_chain);
1873 if (i > 0 && s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY) {
1874 return WORK_MORE_A;
1875 }
1876 /*
1877 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1878 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1879 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1880 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1881 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1882 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1883 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1884 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1885 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1886 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1887 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1888 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1889 */
1890 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1891 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
1892 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1893 return WORK_ERROR;
1894 }
1895 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1896
1897 /*
1898 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1899 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1900 */
1901 x = sk_X509_value(s->session->peer_chain, 0);
1902
1903 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1904
1905 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1906 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1907 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1908 return WORK_ERROR;
1909 }
1910
1911 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
1912 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1913 return WORK_ERROR;
1914 }
1915 /*
1916 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1917 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1918 * type.
1919 */
1920 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1921 if ((clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1922 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1923 return WORK_ERROR;
1924 }
1925 }
1926
1927 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1928 X509_up_ref(x);
1929 s->session->peer = x;
1930 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1931
1932 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1933 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1934 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1935 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1936 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1937 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1938 return WORK_ERROR;
1939 }
1940 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1941 }
1942
tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)1943 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1944 {
1945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1946 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1947
1948 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1949
1950 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1951 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1952 return 0;
1953 }
1954
1955 /*
1956 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1957 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1958 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1959 * identity.
1960 */
1961 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1962 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1963 return 0;
1964 }
1965
1966 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1967 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1968 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1969 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1970 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1971 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1972 return 0;
1973 }
1974
1975 return 1;
1976 #else
1977 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1978 return 0;
1979 #endif
1980 }
1981
tls_process_ske_srp(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt,EVP_PKEY ** pkey)1982 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
1983 {
1984 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1985 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1986
1987 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1988 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1989 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1990 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1991 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1992 return 0;
1993 }
1994
1995 if ((s->srp_ctx.N =
1996 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1997 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1998 || (s->srp_ctx.g =
1999 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
2000 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
2001 || (s->srp_ctx.s =
2002 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
2003 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
2004 || (s->srp_ctx.B =
2005 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
2006 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
2007 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2008 return 0;
2009 }
2010
2011 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
2012 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2013 return 0;
2014 }
2015
2016 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2017 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2018 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2019
2020 return 1;
2021 #else
2022 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2023 return 0;
2024 #endif
2025 }
2026
tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt,EVP_PKEY ** pkey)2027 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2028 {
2029 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
2030 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
2031 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
2032 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2033 OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
2034 OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = NULL;
2035 int ret = 0;
2036
2037 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2038 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2039 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
2040 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2041 return 0;
2042 }
2043
2044 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
2045 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
2046 NULL);
2047 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
2048 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
2049 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
2050 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2051 goto err;
2052 }
2053
2054 tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
2055 if (tmpl == NULL
2056 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p)
2057 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g)
2058 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
2059 bnpub_key)
2060 || (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl)) == NULL) {
2061 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2062 goto err;
2063 }
2064
2065 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(s->ctx->libctx, "DH", s->ctx->propq);
2066 if (pctx == NULL) {
2067 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2068 goto err;
2069 }
2070 if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx) <= 0
2071 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &peer_tmp, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) <= 0) {
2072 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2073 goto err;
2074 }
2075
2076 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2077 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, peer_tmp, s->ctx->propq);
2078 if (pctx == NULL
2079 /*
2080 * EVP_PKEY_param_check() will verify that the DH params are using
2081 * a safe prime. In this context, because we're using ephemeral DH,
2082 * we're ok with it not being a safe prime.
2083 * EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick() skips the safe prime check.
2084 */
2085 || EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick(pctx) != 1
2086 || EVP_PKEY_public_check(pctx) != 1) {
2087 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2088 goto err;
2089 }
2090
2091 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2092 EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(peer_tmp),
2093 0, peer_tmp)) {
2094 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2095 goto err;
2096 }
2097
2098 s->s3.peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2099 peer_tmp = NULL;
2100
2101 /*
2102 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2103 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2104 */
2105 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2106 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2107 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2108
2109 ret = 1;
2110
2111 err:
2112 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
2113 OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
2114 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2115 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2116 BN_free(p);
2117 BN_free(g);
2118 BN_free(bnpub_key);
2119
2120 return ret;
2121 }
2122
tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt,EVP_PKEY ** pkey)2123 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2124 {
2125 PACKET encoded_pt;
2126 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2127
2128 /*
2129 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2130 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2131 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2132 */
2133 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2134 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2135 return 0;
2136 }
2137 /*
2138 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2139 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2140 */
2141 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
2142 || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) {
2143 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2144 return 0;
2145 }
2146
2147 if ((s->s3.peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(s, curve_id)) == NULL) {
2148 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2149 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2150 return 0;
2151 }
2152
2153 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2154 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2155 return 0;
2156 }
2157
2158 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(s->s3.peer_tmp,
2159 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2160 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt)) <= 0) {
2161 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2162 return 0;
2163 }
2164
2165 /*
2166 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2167 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2168 * and ECDSA.
2169 */
2170 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2171 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2172 else if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2173 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2174 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2175
2176 /* Cache the agreed upon group in the SSL_SESSION */
2177 s->session->kex_group = curve_id;
2178 return 1;
2179 }
2180
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)2181 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2182 {
2183 long alg_k;
2184 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2185 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2186 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2187 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2188
2189 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2190
2191 save_param_start = *pkt;
2192
2193 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.peer_tmp);
2194 s->s3.peer_tmp = NULL;
2195
2196 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2197 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
2198 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2199 goto err;
2200 }
2201 }
2202
2203 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2204 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2205 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2206 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2207 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2208 goto err;
2209 }
2210 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2211 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2212 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2213 goto err;
2214 }
2215 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2216 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2217 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2218 goto err;
2219 }
2220 } else if (alg_k) {
2221 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2222 goto err;
2223 }
2224
2225 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2226 if (pkey != NULL) {
2227 PACKET params;
2228 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2229 unsigned char *tbs;
2230 size_t tbslen;
2231 int rv;
2232
2233 /*
2234 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2235 * equals the length of the parameters.
2236 */
2237 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2238 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2239 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2240 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2241 goto err;
2242 }
2243
2244 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2245 unsigned int sigalg;
2246
2247 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2248 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2249 goto err;
2250 }
2251 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
2252 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2253 goto err;
2254 }
2255 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2256 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2257 goto err;
2258 }
2259
2260 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2261 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2262 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
2263 goto err;
2264 }
2265 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2266 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
2267 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md));
2268
2269 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2270 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2271 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2272 goto err;
2273 }
2274
2275 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2276 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2277 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2278 goto err;
2279 }
2280
2281 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx,
2282 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
2283 s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq, pkey,
2284 NULL) <= 0) {
2285 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2286 goto err;
2287 }
2288 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2289 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2290 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2291 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2292 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2293 goto err;
2294 }
2295 }
2296 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2297 PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
2298 if (tbslen == 0) {
2299 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2300 goto err;
2301 }
2302
2303 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2304 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2305 OPENSSL_free(tbs);
2306 if (rv <= 0) {
2307 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2308 goto err;
2309 }
2310 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2311 md_ctx = NULL;
2312 } else {
2313 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2314 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2315 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2316 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2317 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2318 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DATA);
2319 }
2320 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2321 goto err;
2322 }
2323 /* still data left over */
2324 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2325 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2326 goto err;
2327 }
2328 }
2329
2330 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2331 err:
2332 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2333 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2334 }
2335
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)2336 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2337 {
2338 size_t i;
2339
2340 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2341 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2342 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2343
2344 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2345 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2346 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2347
2348 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
2349 /*
2350 * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
2351 * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
2352 * we just ignore it
2353 */
2354 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2355 }
2356
2357 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2358 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.ctype);
2359 s->s3.tmp.ctype = NULL;
2360 s->s3.tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2361 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2362 s->pha_context = NULL;
2363 s->pha_context_len = 0;
2364
2365 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) ||
2366 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) {
2367 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2368 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2369 }
2370
2371 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2372 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2373 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2374 }
2375 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2376 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2377 &rawexts, NULL, 1)
2378 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2379 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2380 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2381 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2382 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2383 }
2384 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2385 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2386 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2387 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2388 }
2389 } else {
2390 PACKET ctypes;
2391
2392 /* get the certificate types */
2393 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2394 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2395 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2396 }
2397
2398 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3.tmp.ctype, &s->s3.tmp.ctype_len)) {
2399 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2400 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2401 }
2402
2403 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2404 PACKET sigalgs;
2405
2406 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2407 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2408 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2409 }
2410
2411 /*
2412 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2413 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2414 */
2415 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) {
2416 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2417 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2418 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2419 }
2420 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2421 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2422 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2423 }
2424 }
2425
2426 /* get the CA RDNs */
2427 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2428 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2429 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2430 }
2431 }
2432
2433 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2434 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2435 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2436 }
2437
2438 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2439 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 1;
2440
2441 /*
2442 * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
2443 * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
2444 * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
2445 * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
2446 * SSL_get1_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
2447 * client_cert_cb.
2448 */
2449 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
2450 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2451
2452 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2453 }
2454
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)2455 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2456 {
2457 unsigned int ticklen;
2458 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2459 unsigned int sess_len;
2460 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2461 PACKET nonce;
2462 EVP_MD *sha256 = NULL;
2463
2464 PACKET_null_init(&nonce);
2465
2466 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2467 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2468 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2469 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)))
2470 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2471 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen)
2472 : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) {
2473 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2474 goto err;
2475 }
2476
2477 /*
2478 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2479 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2480 * be 0 here in that instance
2481 */
2482 if (ticklen == 0)
2483 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2484
2485 /*
2486 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2487 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2488 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2489 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2490 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2491 * cache.
2492 */
2493 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2494 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2495
2496 /*
2497 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2498 * one
2499 */
2500 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2501 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2502 goto err;
2503 }
2504
2505 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0
2506 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2507 /*
2508 * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
2509 * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
2510 * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2511 */
2512 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2513 }
2514
2515 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2516 s->session = new_sess;
2517 }
2518
2519 s->session->time = time(NULL);
2520 ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s->session);
2521
2522 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2523 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2524 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2525
2526 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2527 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2528 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2529 goto err;
2530 }
2531 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2532 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2533 goto err;
2534 }
2535
2536 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2537 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2538 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2539
2540 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2541 PACKET extpkt;
2542
2543 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2544 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2545 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2546 goto err;
2547 }
2548
2549 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2550 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts,
2551 NULL, 1)
2552 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2553 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2554 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2555 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2556 goto err;
2557 }
2558 }
2559
2560 /*
2561 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2562 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2563 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2564 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2565 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2566 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2567 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2568 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 hash of the
2569 * ticket.
2570 */
2571 sha256 = EVP_MD_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "SHA2-256", s->ctx->propq);
2572 if (sha256 == NULL) {
2573 /* Error is already recorded */
2574 SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2575 goto err;
2576 }
2577 /*
2578 * We use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2579 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2580 */
2581 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2582 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2583 sha256, NULL)) {
2584 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2585 goto err;
2586 }
2587 EVP_MD_free(sha256);
2588 sha256 = NULL;
2589 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2590 s->session->not_resumable = 0;
2591
2592 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2593 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2594 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
2595 int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
2596 size_t hashlen;
2597 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
2598
2599 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
2600 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
2601 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2602 goto err;
2603 }
2604 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
2605
2606 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
2607 nonce_label,
2608 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
2609 PACKET_data(&nonce),
2610 PACKET_remaining(&nonce),
2611 s->session->master_key,
2612 hashlen, 1)) {
2613 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2614 goto err;
2615 }
2616 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
2617
2618 OPENSSL_free(exts);
2619 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2620 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2621 }
2622
2623 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2624 err:
2625 EVP_MD_free(sha256);
2626 OPENSSL_free(exts);
2627 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2628 }
2629
2630 /*
2631 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2632 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2633 */
tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)2634 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2635 {
2636 size_t resplen;
2637 unsigned int type;
2638
2639 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2640 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2641 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2642 return 0;
2643 }
2644 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2645 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2646 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2647 return 0;
2648 }
2649 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2650 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2651 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0;
2652 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2653 return 0;
2654 }
2655 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2656 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2657 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2658 return 0;
2659 }
2660
2661 return 1;
2662 }
2663
2664
tls_process_cert_status(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)2665 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2666 {
2667 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
2668 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2669 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2670 }
2671
2672 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2673 }
2674
2675 /*
2676 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2677 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2678 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2679 * on failure.
2680 */
tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL * s)2681 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s)
2682 {
2683 /*
2684 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2685 * the server
2686 */
2687 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2688 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2689 return 0;
2690 }
2691
2692 /*
2693 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2694 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2695 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2696 */
2697 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2698 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2699 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2700
2701 if (ret == 0) {
2702 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
2703 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2704 return 0;
2705 }
2706 if (ret < 0) {
2707 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2708 SSL_R_OCSP_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
2709 return 0;
2710 }
2711 }
2712 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2713 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2714 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2715 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2716 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2717 return 0;
2718 }
2719 }
2720 #endif
2721
2722 return 1;
2723 }
2724
tls_process_server_done(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)2725 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2726 {
2727 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2728 /* should contain no data */
2729 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2730 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2731 }
2732 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2733 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2734 if (ssl_srp_calc_a_param_intern(s) <= 0) {
2735 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2736 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2737 }
2738 }
2739 #endif
2740
2741 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
2742 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2743 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2744 }
2745
2746 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2747 }
2748
tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)2749 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2750 {
2751 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2752 int ret = 0;
2753 /*
2754 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2755 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2756 * strnlen.
2757 */
2758 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2759 size_t identitylen = 0;
2760 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2761 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2762 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2763 size_t psklen = 0;
2764
2765 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2766 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2767 goto err;
2768 }
2769
2770 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2771
2772 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2773 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2774 psk, sizeof(psk));
2775
2776 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2777 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2778 psklen = PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN; /* Avoid overrunning the array on cleanse */
2779 goto err;
2780 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2781 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2782 goto err;
2783 }
2784
2785 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2786 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2787 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2788 goto err;
2789 }
2790
2791 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2792 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2793 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2794 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2795 goto err;
2796 }
2797
2798 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
2799 s->s3.tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2800 s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
2801 tmppsk = NULL;
2802 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2803 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2804 tmpidentity = NULL;
2805
2806 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2807 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2808 goto err;
2809 }
2810
2811 ret = 1;
2812
2813 err:
2814 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2815 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2816 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2817 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2818
2819 return ret;
2820 #else
2821 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2822 return 0;
2823 #endif
2824 }
2825
tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)2826 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2827 {
2828 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2829 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2830 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2831 size_t enclen;
2832 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2833 size_t pmslen = 0;
2834
2835 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2836 /*
2837 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2838 */
2839 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2840 return 0;
2841 }
2842
2843 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2844 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "RSA")) {
2845 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2846 return 0;
2847 }
2848
2849 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2850 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2851 if (pms == NULL) {
2852 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2853 return 0;
2854 }
2855
2856 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2857 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2858 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms + 2, pmslen - 2, 0) <= 0) {
2859 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2860 goto err;
2861 }
2862
2863 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2864 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2865 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2866 goto err;
2867 }
2868
2869 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, pkey, s->ctx->propq);
2870 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2871 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2872 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2873 goto err;
2874 }
2875 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2876 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2877 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2878 goto err;
2879 }
2880 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2881 pctx = NULL;
2882
2883 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2884 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2885 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2886 goto err;
2887 }
2888
2889 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2890 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
2891 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2892 goto err;
2893 }
2894
2895 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
2896 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2897
2898 return 1;
2899 err:
2900 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2901 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2902
2903 return 0;
2904 }
2905
tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)2906 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2907 {
2908 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2909 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2910 int prime_len;
2911 unsigned char *encoded_pub = NULL;
2912 size_t encoded_pub_len, pad_len;
2913 int ret = 0;
2914
2915 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
2916 if (skey == NULL) {
2917 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2918 goto err;
2919 }
2920
2921 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
2922 if (ckey == NULL) {
2923 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2924 goto err;
2925 }
2926
2927 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2928 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2929 goto err;
2930 }
2931
2932 /* send off the data */
2933
2934 /* Generate encoding of server key */
2935 encoded_pub_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encoded_pub);
2936 if (encoded_pub_len == 0) {
2937 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2938 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2939 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
2940 }
2941
2942 /*
2943 * For interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2944 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2945 * as the prime.
2946 */
2947 prime_len = EVP_PKEY_get_size(ckey);
2948 pad_len = prime_len - encoded_pub_len;
2949 if (pad_len > 0) {
2950 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, pad_len, &keybytes)) {
2951 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2952 goto err;
2953 }
2954 memset(keybytes, 0, pad_len);
2955 }
2956
2957 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_pub, encoded_pub_len)) {
2958 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2959 goto err;
2960 }
2961
2962 ret = 1;
2963 err:
2964 OPENSSL_free(encoded_pub);
2965 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2966 return ret;
2967 }
2968
tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)2969 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2970 {
2971 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2972 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2973 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2974 int ret = 0;
2975
2976 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
2977 if (skey == NULL) {
2978 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2979 return 0;
2980 }
2981
2982 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
2983 if (ckey == NULL) {
2984 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2985 goto err;
2986 }
2987
2988 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2989 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2990 goto err;
2991 }
2992
2993 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2994 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2995
2996 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2997 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2998 goto err;
2999 }
3000
3001 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
3002 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3003 goto err;
3004 }
3005
3006 ret = 1;
3007 err:
3008 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3009 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3010 return ret;
3011 }
3012
tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)3013 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3014 {
3015 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3016 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3017 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3018 X509 *peer_cert;
3019 size_t msglen;
3020 unsigned int md_len;
3021 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3022 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3023 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3024 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3025 size_t pmslen = 0;
3026
3027 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3028 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3029
3030 /*
3031 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3032 */
3033 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3034 if (peer_cert == NULL) {
3035 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3036 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3037 return 0;
3038 }
3039
3040 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx,
3041 X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert),
3042 s->ctx->propq);
3043 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3044 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3045 return 0;
3046 }
3047 /*
3048 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3049 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3050 * certificate key for key exchange
3051 */
3052
3053 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3054 pmslen = 32;
3055 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3056 if (pms == NULL) {
3057 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3058 goto err;
3059 }
3060
3061 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3062 /* Generate session key
3063 */
3064 || RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms, pmslen, 0) <= 0) {
3065 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3066 goto err;
3067 };
3068 /*
3069 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3070 * data
3071 */
3072 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3073 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3074 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3075 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.client_random,
3076 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3077 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.server_random,
3078 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3079 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3080 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3081 goto err;
3082 }
3083 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3084 ukm_hash = NULL;
3085 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3086 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) <= 0) {
3087 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3088 goto err;
3089 }
3090 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3091 /*
3092 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3093 */
3094 msglen = 255;
3095 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3096 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3097 goto err;
3098 }
3099
3100 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3101 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3102 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3103 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3104 goto err;
3105 }
3106
3107 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3108 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3109 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3110
3111 return 1;
3112 err:
3113 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3114 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3115 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3116 return 0;
3117 #else
3118 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3119 return 0;
3120 #endif
3121 }
3122
3123 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(const SSL * s)3124 int ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(const SSL *s)
3125 {
3126 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_MAGMA) != 0)
3127 return NID_magma_ctr;
3128 else if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_KUZNYECHIK) != 0)
3129 return NID_kuznyechik_ctr;
3130
3131 return NID_undef;
3132 }
3133
ossl_gost_ukm(const SSL * s,unsigned char * dgst_buf)3134 int ossl_gost_ukm(const SSL *s, unsigned char *dgst_buf)
3135 {
3136 EVP_MD_CTX * hash = NULL;
3137 unsigned int md_len;
3138 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_evp_md_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, s->ctx->propq);
3139
3140 if (md == NULL)
3141 return 0;
3142
3143 if ((hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL
3144 || EVP_DigestInit(hash, md) <= 0
3145 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3146 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3147 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(hash, dgst_buf, &md_len) <= 0) {
3148 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash);
3149 ssl_evp_md_free(md);
3150 return 0;
3151 }
3152
3153 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash);
3154 ssl_evp_md_free(md);
3155 return 1;
3156 }
3157 #endif
3158
tls_construct_cke_gost18(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)3159 static int tls_construct_cke_gost18(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3160 {
3161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3162 /* GOST 2018 key exchange message creation */
3163 unsigned char rnd_dgst[32], tmp[255];
3164 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3165 X509 *peer_cert;
3166 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3167 size_t pmslen = 0;
3168 size_t msglen;
3169 int cipher_nid = ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s);
3170
3171 if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) {
3172 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3173 return 0;
3174 }
3175
3176 if (ossl_gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3177 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3178 goto err;
3179 }
3180
3181 /* Pre-master secret - random bytes */
3182 pmslen = 32;
3183 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3184 if (pms == NULL) {
3185 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3186 goto err;
3187 }
3188
3189 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms, pmslen, 0) <= 0) {
3190 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3191 goto err;
3192 }
3193
3194 /* Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
3195 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3196 if (peer_cert == NULL) {
3197 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3198 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3199 goto err;
3200 }
3201
3202 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx,
3203 X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert),
3204 s->ctx->propq);
3205 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3206 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3207 goto err;
3208 }
3209
3210 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0 ) {
3211 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3212 goto err;
3213 };
3214
3215 /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code */
3216 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3217 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3218 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3219 goto err;
3220 }
3221
3222 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3223 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) <= 0) {
3224 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3225 goto err;
3226 }
3227
3228 msglen = 255;
3229 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3230 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3231 goto err;
3232 }
3233
3234 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3235 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3236 goto err;
3237 }
3238
3239 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3240 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3241 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3242
3243 return 1;
3244 err:
3245 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3246 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3247 return 0;
3248 #else
3249 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3250 return 0;
3251 #endif
3252 }
3253
tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)3254 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3255 {
3256 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3257 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3258
3259 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3260 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3261 &abytes)) {
3262 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3263 return 0;
3264 }
3265 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3266
3267 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3268 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3269 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3270 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3271 return 0;
3272 }
3273
3274 return 1;
3275 #else
3276 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3277 return 0;
3278 #endif
3279 }
3280
tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)3281 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3282 {
3283 unsigned long alg_k;
3284
3285 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3286
3287 /*
3288 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3289 * no need to do so here.
3290 */
3291 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3292 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
3293 goto err;
3294
3295 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3296 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
3297 goto err;
3298 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3299 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
3300 goto err;
3301 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3302 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
3303 goto err;
3304 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3305 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
3306 goto err;
3307 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) {
3308 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost18(s, pkt))
3309 goto err;
3310 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3311 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
3312 goto err;
3313 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3314 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3315 goto err;
3316 }
3317
3318 return 1;
3319 err:
3320 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.pms, s->s3.tmp.pmslen);
3321 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
3322 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = 0;
3323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3324 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
3325 s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
3326 s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0;
3327 #endif
3328 return 0;
3329 }
3330
tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL * s)3331 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3332 {
3333 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3334 size_t pmslen = 0;
3335
3336 pms = s->s3.tmp.pms;
3337 pmslen = s->s3.tmp.pmslen;
3338
3339 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3340 /* Check for SRP */
3341 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3342 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3343 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3344 goto err;
3345 }
3346 return 1;
3347 }
3348 #endif
3349
3350 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3351 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3352 goto err;
3353 }
3354 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3355 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3356 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3357 pms = NULL;
3358 pmslen = 0;
3359 goto err;
3360 }
3361 pms = NULL;
3362 pmslen = 0;
3363
3364 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3365 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3366 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3367 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3368 size_t labellen;
3369
3370 /*
3371 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3372 * used.
3373 */
3374 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3375 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3376
3377 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3378 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3379 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3380 labellen += 1;
3381
3382 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3383 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3384 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3385 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3386 goto err;
3387 }
3388
3389 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3390 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3391 }
3392 #endif
3393
3394 return 1;
3395 err:
3396 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3397 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
3398 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = 0;
3399 return 0;
3400 }
3401
3402 /*
3403 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3404 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3405 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3406 */
ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL * s)3407 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3408 {
3409 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3410 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3411 return 0;
3412 /*
3413 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3414 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3415 */
3416 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3417 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3418 return 0;
3419 return 1;
3420 }
3421
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL * s,WORK_STATE wst)3422 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3423 {
3424 X509 *x509 = NULL;
3425 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3426 int i;
3427
3428 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3429 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3430 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3431 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3432 if (i < 0) {
3433 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3434 return WORK_MORE_A;
3435 }
3436 if (i == 0) {
3437 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3438 return WORK_ERROR;
3439 }
3440 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3441 }
3442 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) {
3443 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3444 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3445 }
3446 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3447 }
3448
3449 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3450 wst = WORK_MORE_B;
3451 }
3452
3453 /* We need to get a client cert */
3454 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3455 /*
3456 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3457 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3458 */
3459 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3460 if (i < 0) {
3461 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3462 return WORK_MORE_B;
3463 }
3464 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3465 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3466 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3467 i = 0;
3468 } else if (i == 1) {
3469 i = 0;
3470 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3471 }
3472
3473 X509_free(x509);
3474 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3475 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3476 i = 0;
3477 if (i == 0) {
3478 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3479 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0;
3480 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3481 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3482 } else {
3483 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 2;
3484 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3485 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3486 return WORK_ERROR;
3487 }
3488 }
3489 }
3490
3491 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
3492 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3493 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3494 }
3495
3496 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3497 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3498 return WORK_ERROR;
3499 }
3500
tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)3501 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3502 {
3503 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3504 if (s->pha_context == NULL) {
3505 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3506 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3507 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3508 return 0;
3509 }
3510 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
3511 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3512 return 0;
3513 }
3514 }
3515 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3516 (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3517 : s->cert->key)) {
3518 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3519 return 0;
3520 }
3521
3522 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
3523 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3524 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3525 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3526 /*
3527 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3528 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3529 */
3530 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3531 return 0;
3532 }
3533
3534 return 1;
3535 }
3536
ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL * s)3537 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3538 {
3539 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3540 size_t idx;
3541 long alg_k, alg_a;
3542
3543 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3544 alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3545
3546 /* we don't have a certificate */
3547 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3548 return 1;
3549
3550 /* This is the passed certificate */
3551 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
3552
3553 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3554 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3555 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3556 return 0;
3557 }
3558
3559 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3560 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3561 return 1;
3562 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3563 return 0;
3564 }
3565
3566 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3567 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3568 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3569 return 0;
3570 }
3571
3572 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3.peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3573 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3574 return 0;
3575 }
3576
3577 return 1;
3578 }
3579
3580 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
tls_construct_next_proto(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)3581 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3582 {
3583 size_t len, padding_len;
3584 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3585
3586 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3587 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3588
3589 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3590 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3591 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3592 return 0;
3593 }
3594
3595 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3596
3597 return 1;
3598 }
3599 #endif
3600
tls_process_hello_req(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)3601 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3602 {
3603 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3604 /* should contain no data */
3605 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3606 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3607 }
3608
3609 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3610 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3611 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3612 }
3613
3614 /*
3615 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3616 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3617 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3618 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3619 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3620 */
3621 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
3622 SSL_renegotiate(s);
3623 else
3624 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3625
3626 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3627 }
3628
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)3629 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3630 {
3631 PACKET extensions;
3632 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3633
3634 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3635 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3636 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3637 goto err;
3638 }
3639
3640 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3641 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3642 NULL, 1)
3643 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3644 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
3645 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3646 goto err;
3647 }
3648
3649 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3650 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3651
3652 err:
3653 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3654 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3655 }
3656
ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL * s,X509 ** px509,EVP_PKEY ** ppkey)3657 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3658 {
3659 int i = 0;
3660 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3661 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3662 i = tls_engine_load_ssl_client_cert(s, px509, ppkey);
3663 if (i != 0)
3664 return i;
3665 }
3666 #endif
3667 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3668 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3669 return i;
3670 }
3671
ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL * s,STACK_OF (SSL_CIPHER)* sk,WPACKET * pkt)3672 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3673 {
3674 int i;
3675 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3676 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3677
3678 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3679 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) {
3680 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
3681 return 0;
3682 }
3683
3684 if (sk == NULL) {
3685 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3686 return 0;
3687 }
3688
3689 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3690 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3691 # error Max cipher length too short
3692 # endif
3693 /*
3694 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3695 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3696 * use TLS v1.2
3697 */
3698 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3699 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3700 else
3701 #endif
3702 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3703 maxlen = 0xfffe;
3704
3705 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3706 maxlen -= 2;
3707 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3708 maxlen -= 2;
3709
3710 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3711 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3712
3713 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3714 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3715 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3716 continue;
3717
3718 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3719 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3720 return 0;
3721 }
3722
3723 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3724 if (!maxverok) {
3725 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3726 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
3727 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver))
3728 maxverok = 1;
3729 } else {
3730 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3.tmp.max_ver
3731 && c->min_tls <= s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
3732 maxverok = 1;
3733 }
3734 }
3735
3736 totlen += len;
3737 }
3738
3739 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3740 const char *maxvertext =
3741 !maxverok
3742 ? "No ciphers enabled for max supported SSL/TLS version"
3743 : NULL;
3744
3745 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE,
3746 maxvertext);
3747 return 0;
3748 }
3749
3750 if (totlen != 0) {
3751 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3752 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3753 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3754 };
3755 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3756 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3757 return 0;
3758 }
3759 }
3760 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3761 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3762 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3763 };
3764 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3765 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3766 return 0;
3767 }
3768 }
3769 }
3770
3771 return 1;
3772 }
3773
tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)3774 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3775 {
3776 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3777 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3778 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3779 return 0;
3780 }
3781
3782 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;
3783 return 1;
3784 }
3785