1 /* $OpenBSD: t1_enc.c,v 1.122 2020/03/16 15:25:14 tb Exp $ */ 2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58 /* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 /* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 113 * 114 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by 115 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 116 * license. 117 * 118 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of 119 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites 120 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. 121 * 122 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in 123 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received 124 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. 125 * 126 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not 127 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third 128 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights 129 * to make use of the Contribution. 130 * 131 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN 132 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA 133 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY 134 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 135 * OTHERWISE. 136 */ 137 138 #include <limits.h> 139 #include <stdio.h> 140 141 #include "ssl_locl.h" 142 143 #include <openssl/evp.h> 144 #include <openssl/hmac.h> 145 #include <openssl/md5.h> 146 147 int tls1_PRF(SSL *s, const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, 148 const void *seed1, size_t seed1_len, const void *seed2, size_t seed2_len, 149 const void *seed3, size_t seed3_len, const void *seed4, size_t seed4_len, 150 const void *seed5, size_t seed5_len, unsigned char *out, size_t out_len); 151 152 void 153 tls1_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s) 154 { 155 freezero(S3I(s)->hs.key_block, S3I(s)->hs.key_block_len); 156 S3I(s)->hs.key_block = NULL; 157 S3I(s)->hs.key_block_len = 0; 158 } 159 160 void 161 tls1_record_sequence_increment(unsigned char *seq) 162 { 163 int i; 164 165 for (i = SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE - 1; i >= 0; i--) { 166 if (++seq[i] != 0) 167 break; 168 } 169 } 170 171 /* 172 * TLS P_hash() data expansion function - see RFC 5246, section 5. 173 */ 174 static int 175 tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, 176 const void *seed1, size_t seed1_len, const void *seed2, size_t seed2_len, 177 const void *seed3, size_t seed3_len, const void *seed4, size_t seed4_len, 178 const void *seed5, size_t seed5_len, unsigned char *out, size_t out_len) 179 { 180 unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 181 size_t A1_len, hmac_len; 182 EVP_MD_CTX ctx; 183 EVP_PKEY *mac_key; 184 int ret = 0; 185 int chunk; 186 size_t i; 187 188 chunk = EVP_MD_size(md); 189 OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0); 190 191 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); 192 193 mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, secret, secret_len); 194 if (!mac_key) 195 goto err; 196 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 197 goto err; 198 if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) 199 goto err; 200 if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) 201 goto err; 202 if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len)) 203 goto err; 204 if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len)) 205 goto err; 206 if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len)) 207 goto err; 208 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) 209 goto err; 210 211 for (;;) { 212 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 213 goto err; 214 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, A1, A1_len)) 215 goto err; 216 if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) 217 goto err; 218 if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) 219 goto err; 220 if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len)) 221 goto err; 222 if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len)) 223 goto err; 224 if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len)) 225 goto err; 226 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, hmac, &hmac_len)) 227 goto err; 228 229 if (hmac_len > out_len) 230 hmac_len = out_len; 231 232 for (i = 0; i < hmac_len; i++) 233 out[i] ^= hmac[i]; 234 235 out += hmac_len; 236 out_len -= hmac_len; 237 238 if (out_len == 0) 239 break; 240 241 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 242 goto err; 243 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, A1, A1_len)) 244 goto err; 245 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) 246 goto err; 247 } 248 ret = 1; 249 250 err: 251 EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); 252 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 253 254 explicit_bzero(A1, sizeof(A1)); 255 explicit_bzero(hmac, sizeof(hmac)); 256 257 return ret; 258 } 259 260 int 261 tls1_PRF(SSL *s, const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, 262 const void *seed1, size_t seed1_len, const void *seed2, size_t seed2_len, 263 const void *seed3, size_t seed3_len, const void *seed4, size_t seed4_len, 264 const void *seed5, size_t seed5_len, unsigned char *out, size_t out_len) 265 { 266 const EVP_MD *md; 267 size_t half_len; 268 269 memset(out, 0, out_len); 270 271 if (!ssl_get_handshake_evp_md(s, &md)) 272 return (0); 273 274 if (md->type == NID_md5_sha1) { 275 /* 276 * Partition secret between MD5 and SHA1, then XOR result. 277 * If the secret length is odd, a one byte overlap is used. 278 */ 279 half_len = secret_len - (secret_len / 2); 280 if (!tls1_P_hash(EVP_md5(), secret, half_len, seed1, seed1_len, 281 seed2, seed2_len, seed3, seed3_len, seed4, seed4_len, 282 seed5, seed5_len, out, out_len)) 283 return (0); 284 285 secret += secret_len - half_len; 286 if (!tls1_P_hash(EVP_sha1(), secret, half_len, seed1, seed1_len, 287 seed2, seed2_len, seed3, seed3_len, seed4, seed4_len, 288 seed5, seed5_len, out, out_len)) 289 return (0); 290 291 return (1); 292 } 293 294 if (!tls1_P_hash(md, secret, secret_len, seed1, seed1_len, 295 seed2, seed2_len, seed3, seed3_len, seed4, seed4_len, 296 seed5, seed5_len, out, out_len)) 297 return (0); 298 299 return (1); 300 } 301 302 static int 303 tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, int num) 304 { 305 if (num < 0) 306 return (0); 307 308 return tls1_PRF(s, 309 s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, 310 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, 311 s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 312 s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 313 NULL, 0, NULL, 0, km, num); 314 } 315 316 /* 317 * tls1_aead_ctx_init allocates aead_ctx, if needed. It returns 1 on success 318 * and 0 on failure. 319 */ 320 static int 321 tls1_aead_ctx_init(SSL_AEAD_CTX **aead_ctx) 322 { 323 if (*aead_ctx != NULL) { 324 EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&(*aead_ctx)->ctx); 325 return (1); 326 } 327 328 *aead_ctx = malloc(sizeof(SSL_AEAD_CTX)); 329 if (*aead_ctx == NULL) { 330 SSLerrorx(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 331 return (0); 332 } 333 334 return (1); 335 } 336 337 static int 338 tls1_change_cipher_state_aead(SSL *s, char is_read, const unsigned char *key, 339 unsigned int key_len, const unsigned char *iv, unsigned int iv_len) 340 { 341 const EVP_AEAD *aead = S3I(s)->tmp.new_aead; 342 SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead_ctx; 343 344 /* XXX - Need to avoid clearing write state for DTLS. */ 345 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 346 return 0; 347 348 if (is_read) { 349 ssl_clear_cipher_read_state(s); 350 if (!tls1_aead_ctx_init(&s->internal->aead_read_ctx)) 351 return 0; 352 aead_ctx = s->internal->aead_read_ctx; 353 } else { 354 ssl_clear_cipher_write_state(s); 355 if (!tls1_aead_ctx_init(&s->internal->aead_write_ctx)) 356 return 0; 357 aead_ctx = s->internal->aead_write_ctx; 358 } 359 360 if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(&aead_ctx->ctx, aead, key, key_len, 361 EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH, NULL)) 362 return (0); 363 if (iv_len > sizeof(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce)) { 364 SSLerrorx(ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 365 return (0); 366 } 367 memcpy(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce, iv, iv_len); 368 aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len = iv_len; 369 aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len = 8; /* always the case, currently. */ 370 aead_ctx->variable_nonce_in_record = 371 (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm2 & 372 SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_VARIABLE_NONCE_IN_RECORD) != 0; 373 aead_ctx->xor_fixed_nonce = 374 S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305; 375 aead_ctx->tag_len = EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(aead); 376 377 if (aead_ctx->xor_fixed_nonce) { 378 if (aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead) || 379 aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len > EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead)) { 380 SSLerrorx(ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 381 return (0); 382 } 383 } else { 384 if (aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len + aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len != 385 EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead)) { 386 SSLerrorx(ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 387 return (0); 388 } 389 } 390 391 return (1); 392 } 393 394 /* 395 * tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher performs the work needed to switch cipher 396 * states when using EVP_CIPHER. The argument is_read is true iff this function 397 * is being called due to reading, as opposed to writing, a ChangeCipherSpec 398 * message. 399 */ 400 static int 401 tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(SSL *s, char is_read, 402 const unsigned char *mac_secret, unsigned int mac_secret_size, 403 const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_len, const unsigned char *iv, 404 unsigned int iv_len) 405 { 406 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx; 407 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; 408 EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx; 409 EVP_PKEY *mac_key; 410 const EVP_MD *mac; 411 int mac_type; 412 413 cipher = S3I(s)->tmp.new_sym_enc; 414 mac = S3I(s)->tmp.new_hash; 415 mac_type = S3I(s)->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type; 416 417 if (is_read) { 418 if (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) 419 s->internal->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; 420 else 421 s->internal->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; 422 423 ssl_clear_cipher_read_state(s); 424 425 if ((cipher_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) 426 goto err; 427 s->enc_read_ctx = cipher_ctx; 428 if ((mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) 429 goto err; 430 s->read_hash = mac_ctx; 431 } else { 432 if (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) 433 s->internal->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; 434 else 435 s->internal->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; 436 437 /* 438 * DTLS fragments retain a pointer to the compression, cipher 439 * and hash contexts, so that it can restore state in order 440 * to perform retransmissions. As such, we cannot free write 441 * contexts that are used for DTLS - these are instead freed 442 * by DTLS when its frees a ChangeCipherSpec fragment. 443 */ 444 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 445 ssl_clear_cipher_write_state(s); 446 447 if ((cipher_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) 448 goto err; 449 s->internal->enc_write_ctx = cipher_ctx; 450 if ((mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) 451 goto err; 452 s->internal->write_hash = mac_ctx; 453 } 454 455 EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv, !is_read); 456 457 if ((mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, mac_secret, 458 mac_secret_size)) == NULL) 459 goto err; 460 EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, mac, NULL, mac_key); 461 EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); 462 463 if (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT) { 464 int nid; 465 if (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm2 & SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94) 466 nid = NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet; 467 else 468 nid = NID_id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z; 469 470 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipher_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GOST_SET_SBOX, nid, 0); 471 if (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_GOST89MAC) 472 EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mac_ctx, EVP_MD_CTRL_GOST_SET_SBOX, nid, 0); 473 } 474 475 return (1); 476 477 err: 478 SSLerrorx(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 479 return (0); 480 } 481 482 int 483 tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) 484 { 485 const unsigned char *client_write_mac_secret, *server_write_mac_secret; 486 const unsigned char *client_write_key, *server_write_key; 487 const unsigned char *client_write_iv, *server_write_iv; 488 const unsigned char *mac_secret, *key, *iv; 489 int mac_secret_size, key_len, iv_len; 490 unsigned char *key_block, *seq; 491 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; 492 const EVP_AEAD *aead; 493 char is_read, use_client_keys; 494 495 cipher = S3I(s)->tmp.new_sym_enc; 496 aead = S3I(s)->tmp.new_aead; 497 498 /* 499 * is_read is true if we have just read a ChangeCipherSpec message, 500 * that is we need to update the read cipherspec. Otherwise we have 501 * just written one. 502 */ 503 is_read = (which & SSL3_CC_READ) != 0; 504 505 /* 506 * use_client_keys is true if we wish to use the keys for the "client 507 * write" direction. This is the case if we're a client sending a 508 * ChangeCipherSpec, or a server reading a client's ChangeCipherSpec. 509 */ 510 use_client_keys = ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) || 511 (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)); 512 513 /* 514 * Reset sequence number to zero - for DTLS this is handled in 515 * dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(). 516 */ 517 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 518 seq = is_read ? S3I(s)->read_sequence : S3I(s)->write_sequence; 519 memset(seq, 0, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE); 520 } 521 522 if (aead != NULL) { 523 key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead); 524 iv_len = SSL_CIPHER_AEAD_FIXED_NONCE_LEN(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher); 525 } else { 526 key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher); 527 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); 528 } 529 530 mac_secret_size = S3I(s)->tmp.new_mac_secret_size; 531 532 key_block = S3I(s)->hs.key_block; 533 client_write_mac_secret = key_block; 534 key_block += mac_secret_size; 535 server_write_mac_secret = key_block; 536 key_block += mac_secret_size; 537 client_write_key = key_block; 538 key_block += key_len; 539 server_write_key = key_block; 540 key_block += key_len; 541 client_write_iv = key_block; 542 key_block += iv_len; 543 server_write_iv = key_block; 544 key_block += iv_len; 545 546 if (use_client_keys) { 547 mac_secret = client_write_mac_secret; 548 key = client_write_key; 549 iv = client_write_iv; 550 } else { 551 mac_secret = server_write_mac_secret; 552 key = server_write_key; 553 iv = server_write_iv; 554 } 555 556 if (key_block - S3I(s)->hs.key_block != S3I(s)->hs.key_block_len) { 557 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 558 goto err2; 559 } 560 561 if (is_read) { 562 memcpy(S3I(s)->read_mac_secret, mac_secret, mac_secret_size); 563 S3I(s)->read_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; 564 } else { 565 memcpy(S3I(s)->write_mac_secret, mac_secret, mac_secret_size); 566 S3I(s)->write_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; 567 } 568 569 if (aead != NULL) { 570 return tls1_change_cipher_state_aead(s, is_read, key, key_len, 571 iv, iv_len); 572 } 573 574 return tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(s, is_read, 575 mac_secret, mac_secret_size, key, key_len, iv, iv_len); 576 577 err2: 578 return (0); 579 } 580 581 int 582 tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s) 583 { 584 unsigned char *key_block; 585 int mac_type = NID_undef, mac_secret_size = 0; 586 int key_block_len, key_len, iv_len; 587 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; 588 const EVP_AEAD *aead = NULL; 589 const EVP_MD *mac = NULL; 590 int ret = 0; 591 592 if (S3I(s)->hs.key_block_len != 0) 593 return (1); 594 595 if (s->session->cipher && 596 (s->session->cipher->algorithm_mac & SSL_AEAD)) { 597 if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(s->session, &aead)) { 598 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE); 599 return (0); 600 } 601 key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead); 602 iv_len = SSL_CIPHER_AEAD_FIXED_NONCE_LEN(s->session->cipher); 603 } else { 604 if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session, &cipher, &mac, &mac_type, 605 &mac_secret_size)) { 606 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE); 607 return (0); 608 } 609 key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher); 610 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); 611 } 612 613 S3I(s)->tmp.new_aead = aead; 614 S3I(s)->tmp.new_sym_enc = cipher; 615 S3I(s)->tmp.new_hash = mac; 616 S3I(s)->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type; 617 S3I(s)->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; 618 619 tls1_cleanup_key_block(s); 620 621 if ((key_block = reallocarray(NULL, mac_secret_size + key_len + iv_len, 622 2)) == NULL) { 623 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 624 goto err; 625 } 626 key_block_len = (mac_secret_size + key_len + iv_len) * 2; 627 628 S3I(s)->hs.key_block_len = key_block_len; 629 S3I(s)->hs.key_block = key_block; 630 631 if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, key_block, key_block_len)) 632 goto err; 633 634 if (!(s->internal->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS) && 635 s->method->internal->version <= TLS1_VERSION) { 636 /* 637 * Enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with 638 * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) 639 */ 640 S3I(s)->need_empty_fragments = 1; 641 642 if (s->session->cipher != NULL) { 643 if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL) 644 S3I(s)->need_empty_fragments = 0; 645 646 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 647 if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4) 648 S3I(s)->need_empty_fragments = 0; 649 #endif 650 } 651 } 652 653 ret = 1; 654 655 err: 656 return (ret); 657 } 658 659 /* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively. 660 * 661 * Returns: 662 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too 663 * short etc). 664 * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. 665 * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending, 666 * an internal error occured. 667 */ 668 int 669 tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) 670 { 671 const SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead; 672 const EVP_CIPHER *enc; 673 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; 674 SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL *rec; 675 unsigned char *seq; 676 unsigned long l; 677 int bs, i, j, k, ret, mac_size = 0; 678 679 if (send) { 680 aead = s->internal->aead_write_ctx; 681 rec = &S3I(s)->wrec; 682 seq = S3I(s)->write_sequence; 683 } else { 684 aead = s->internal->aead_read_ctx; 685 rec = &S3I(s)->rrec; 686 seq = S3I(s)->read_sequence; 687 } 688 689 if (aead) { 690 unsigned char ad[13], *in, *out, nonce[16]; 691 size_t out_len, pad_len = 0; 692 unsigned int nonce_used; 693 694 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 695 dtls1_build_sequence_number(ad, seq, 696 send ? D1I(s)->w_epoch : D1I(s)->r_epoch); 697 } else { 698 memcpy(ad, seq, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE); 699 tls1_record_sequence_increment(seq); 700 } 701 702 ad[8] = rec->type; 703 ad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); 704 ad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); 705 706 if (aead->variable_nonce_len > 8 || 707 aead->variable_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce)) 708 return -1; 709 710 if (aead->xor_fixed_nonce) { 711 if (aead->fixed_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce) || 712 aead->variable_nonce_len > aead->fixed_nonce_len) 713 return -1; /* Should never happen. */ 714 pad_len = aead->fixed_nonce_len - aead->variable_nonce_len; 715 } else { 716 if (aead->fixed_nonce_len + 717 aead->variable_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce)) 718 return -1; /* Should never happen. */ 719 } 720 721 if (send) { 722 size_t len = rec->length; 723 size_t eivlen = 0; 724 in = rec->input; 725 out = rec->data; 726 727 if (aead->xor_fixed_nonce) { 728 /* 729 * The sequence number is left zero 730 * padded, then xored with the fixed 731 * nonce. 732 */ 733 memset(nonce, 0, pad_len); 734 memcpy(nonce + pad_len, ad, 735 aead->variable_nonce_len); 736 for (i = 0; i < aead->fixed_nonce_len; i++) 737 nonce[i] ^= aead->fixed_nonce[i]; 738 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 739 } else { 740 /* 741 * When sending we use the sequence number as 742 * the variable part of the nonce. 743 */ 744 memcpy(nonce, aead->fixed_nonce, 745 aead->fixed_nonce_len); 746 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 747 memcpy(nonce + nonce_used, ad, 748 aead->variable_nonce_len); 749 nonce_used += aead->variable_nonce_len; 750 } 751 752 /* 753 * In do_ssl3_write, rec->input is moved forward by 754 * variable_nonce_len in order to leave space for the 755 * variable nonce. Thus we can copy the sequence number 756 * bytes into place without overwriting any of the 757 * plaintext. 758 */ 759 if (aead->variable_nonce_in_record) { 760 memcpy(out, ad, aead->variable_nonce_len); 761 len -= aead->variable_nonce_len; 762 eivlen = aead->variable_nonce_len; 763 } 764 765 ad[11] = len >> 8; 766 ad[12] = len & 0xff; 767 768 if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(&aead->ctx, 769 out + eivlen, &out_len, len + aead->tag_len, nonce, 770 nonce_used, in + eivlen, len, ad, sizeof(ad))) 771 return -1; 772 if (aead->variable_nonce_in_record) 773 out_len += aead->variable_nonce_len; 774 } else { 775 /* receive */ 776 size_t len = rec->length; 777 778 if (rec->data != rec->input) 779 return -1; /* internal error - should never happen. */ 780 out = in = rec->input; 781 782 if (len < aead->variable_nonce_len) 783 return 0; 784 785 if (aead->xor_fixed_nonce) { 786 /* 787 * The sequence number is left zero 788 * padded, then xored with the fixed 789 * nonce. 790 */ 791 memset(nonce, 0, pad_len); 792 memcpy(nonce + pad_len, ad, 793 aead->variable_nonce_len); 794 for (i = 0; i < aead->fixed_nonce_len; i++) 795 nonce[i] ^= aead->fixed_nonce[i]; 796 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 797 } else { 798 memcpy(nonce, aead->fixed_nonce, 799 aead->fixed_nonce_len); 800 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 801 802 memcpy(nonce + nonce_used, 803 aead->variable_nonce_in_record ? in : ad, 804 aead->variable_nonce_len); 805 nonce_used += aead->variable_nonce_len; 806 } 807 808 if (aead->variable_nonce_in_record) { 809 in += aead->variable_nonce_len; 810 len -= aead->variable_nonce_len; 811 out += aead->variable_nonce_len; 812 } 813 814 if (len < aead->tag_len) 815 return 0; 816 len -= aead->tag_len; 817 818 ad[11] = len >> 8; 819 ad[12] = len & 0xff; 820 821 if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(&aead->ctx, out, &out_len, len, 822 nonce, nonce_used, in, len + aead->tag_len, ad, 823 sizeof(ad))) 824 return -1; 825 826 rec->data = rec->input = out; 827 } 828 829 rec->length = out_len; 830 831 return 1; 832 } 833 834 if (send) { 835 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->internal->write_hash)) { 836 int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->internal->write_hash); 837 OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); 838 } 839 ds = s->internal->enc_write_ctx; 840 if (s->internal->enc_write_ctx == NULL) 841 enc = NULL; 842 else { 843 int ivlen = 0; 844 enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->internal->enc_write_ctx); 845 if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && 846 EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) 847 ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc); 848 if (ivlen > 1) { 849 if (rec->data != rec->input) { 850 #ifdef DEBUG 851 /* we can't write into the input stream: 852 * Can this ever happen?? (steve) 853 */ 854 fprintf(stderr, 855 "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n", 856 __FILE__, __LINE__); 857 #endif 858 } else 859 arc4random_buf(rec->input, ivlen); 860 } 861 } 862 } else { 863 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) { 864 int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); 865 OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); 866 } 867 ds = s->enc_read_ctx; 868 if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) 869 enc = NULL; 870 else 871 enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); 872 } 873 874 if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) { 875 memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length); 876 rec->input = rec->data; 877 ret = 1; 878 } else { 879 l = rec->length; 880 bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher); 881 882 if (bs != 1 && send) { 883 i = bs - ((int)l % bs); 884 885 /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */ 886 887 /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */ 888 j = i - 1; 889 for (k = (int)l; k < (int)(l + i); k++) 890 rec->input[k] = j; 891 l += i; 892 rec->length += i; 893 } 894 895 if (!send) { 896 if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) 897 return 0; 898 } 899 900 i = EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l); 901 if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & 902 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) ? (i < 0) : (i == 0)) 903 return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */ 904 905 ret = 1; 906 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) 907 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); 908 if ((bs != 1) && !send) 909 ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size); 910 } 911 return ret; 912 } 913 914 int 915 tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, int str_len, unsigned char *out) 916 { 917 unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 918 size_t hash_len; 919 920 if (str_len < 0) 921 return 0; 922 923 if (!tls1_transcript_hash_value(s, buf, sizeof(buf), &hash_len)) 924 return 0; 925 926 if (!tls1_PRF(s, s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, 927 str, str_len, buf, hash_len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 928 out, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH)) 929 return 0; 930 931 return TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH; 932 } 933 934 int 935 tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) 936 { 937 SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL *rec; 938 unsigned char *seq; 939 EVP_MD_CTX *hash; 940 size_t md_size, orig_len; 941 EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx; 942 unsigned char header[13]; 943 int stream_mac = (send ? 944 (ssl->internal->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) : 945 (ssl->internal->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM)); 946 int t; 947 948 if (send) { 949 rec = &(ssl->s3->internal->wrec); 950 seq = &(ssl->s3->internal->write_sequence[0]); 951 hash = ssl->internal->write_hash; 952 } else { 953 rec = &(ssl->s3->internal->rrec); 954 seq = &(ssl->s3->internal->read_sequence[0]); 955 hash = ssl->read_hash; 956 } 957 958 t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); 959 OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0); 960 md_size = t; 961 962 /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */ 963 if (stream_mac) { 964 mac_ctx = hash; 965 } else { 966 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac, hash)) 967 return -1; 968 mac_ctx = &hmac; 969 } 970 971 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) 972 dtls1_build_sequence_number(header, seq, 973 send ? D1I(ssl)->w_epoch : D1I(ssl)->r_epoch); 974 else 975 memcpy(header, seq, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE); 976 977 orig_len = rec->length + md_size + rec->padding_length; 978 979 header[8] = rec->type; 980 header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8); 981 header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version); 982 header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8; 983 header[12] = (rec->length) & 0xff; 984 985 if (!send && 986 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && 987 ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) { 988 /* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any 989 * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of 990 * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a 991 * timing-oracle. */ 992 if (!ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx, 993 md, &md_size, header, rec->input, 994 rec->length + md_size, orig_len, 995 ssl->s3->internal->read_mac_secret, 996 ssl->s3->internal->read_mac_secret_size)) 997 return -1; 998 } else { 999 EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)); 1000 EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length); 1001 t = EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size); 1002 OPENSSL_assert(t > 0); 1003 } 1004 1005 if (!stream_mac) 1006 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); 1007 1008 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) 1009 tls1_record_sequence_increment(seq); 1010 1011 return (md_size); 1012 } 1013 1014 int 1015 tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, 1016 int len) 1017 { 1018 if (len < 0) 1019 return 0; 1020 1021 if (!tls1_PRF(s, p, len, 1022 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE, 1023 s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, NULL, 0, 1024 s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, NULL, 0, 1025 s->session->master_key, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)) 1026 return 0; 1027 1028 return (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); 1029 } 1030 1031 int 1032 tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, 1033 const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context, 1034 size_t contextlen, int use_context) 1035 { 1036 unsigned char *val = NULL; 1037 size_t vallen, currentvalpos; 1038 int rv; 1039 1040 /* construct PRF arguments 1041 * we construct the PRF argument ourself rather than passing separate 1042 * values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the concatenation of values 1043 * does not create a prohibited label. 1044 */ 1045 vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2; 1046 if (use_context) { 1047 vallen += 2 + contextlen; 1048 } 1049 1050 val = malloc(vallen); 1051 if (val == NULL) 1052 goto err2; 1053 currentvalpos = 0; 1054 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *) label, llen); 1055 currentvalpos += llen; 1056 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1057 currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1058 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1059 currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1060 1061 if (use_context) { 1062 val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff; 1063 currentvalpos++; 1064 val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff; 1065 currentvalpos++; 1066 if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL)) { 1067 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen); 1068 } 1069 } 1070 1071 /* disallow prohibited labels 1072 * note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited label len) = 1073 * 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and the 1074 * comparisons won't have buffer overflow 1075 */ 1076 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, 1077 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1078 goto err1; 1079 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, 1080 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1081 goto err1; 1082 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, 1083 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1084 goto err1; 1085 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, 1086 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1087 goto err1; 1088 1089 rv = tls1_PRF(s, s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, 1090 val, vallen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, out, olen); 1091 1092 goto ret; 1093 err1: 1094 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL); 1095 rv = 0; 1096 goto ret; 1097 err2: 1098 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1099 rv = 0; 1100 ret: 1101 free(val); 1102 1103 return (rv); 1104 } 1105 1106 int 1107 tls1_alert_code(int code) 1108 { 1109 switch (code) { 1110 case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: 1111 return (SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY); 1112 case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: 1113 return (SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 1114 case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: 1115 return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC); 1116 case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: 1117 return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 1118 case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: 1119 return (TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW); 1120 case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE: 1121 return (SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE); 1122 case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: 1123 return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1124 case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE: 1125 return (-1); 1126 case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: 1127 return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE); 1128 case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE: 1129 return (SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE); 1130 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED: 1131 return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED); 1132 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED: 1133 return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED); 1134 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN: 1135 return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN); 1136 case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: 1137 return (SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); 1138 case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: 1139 return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA); 1140 case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: 1141 return (TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED); 1142 case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR: 1143 return (TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 1144 case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: 1145 return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR); 1146 case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: 1147 return (TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION); 1148 case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: 1149 return (TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); 1150 case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY: 1151 return (TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY); 1152 case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: 1153 return (TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1154 case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK: 1155 return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); 1156 case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED: 1157 return (TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED); 1158 case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: 1159 return (TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1160 case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: 1161 return (TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION); 1162 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: 1163 return (TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE); 1164 case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: 1165 return (TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME); 1166 case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: 1167 return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE); 1168 case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: 1169 return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE); 1170 case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY: 1171 return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY); 1172 default: 1173 return (-1); 1174 } 1175 } 1176