xref: /dragonfly/crypto/openssh/auth.c (revision 8a0bcd56)
1 /* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.89 2010/08/04 05:42:47 djm Exp $ */
2 /*
3  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
4  *
5  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
6  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
7  * are met:
8  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
9  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
10  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
11  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
12  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
13  *
14  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
15  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
16  * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
17  * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
18  * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
19  * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
20  * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
21  * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
22  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
23  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
24  */
25 
26 #include "includes.h"
27 
28 #include <sys/types.h>
29 #include <sys/stat.h>
30 #include <sys/param.h>
31 
32 #include <netinet/in.h>
33 
34 #include <errno.h>
35 #include <fcntl.h>
36 #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
37 # include <paths.h>
38 #endif
39 #include <pwd.h>
40 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
41 #include <login.h>
42 #endif
43 #ifdef USE_SHADOW
44 #include <shadow.h>
45 #endif
46 #ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
47 #include <libgen.h>
48 #endif
49 #include <stdarg.h>
50 #include <stdio.h>
51 #include <string.h>
52 #include <unistd.h>
53 
54 #include "xmalloc.h"
55 #include "match.h"
56 #include "groupaccess.h"
57 #include "log.h"
58 #include "buffer.h"
59 #include "servconf.h"
60 #include "key.h"
61 #include "hostfile.h"
62 #include "auth.h"
63 #include "auth-options.h"
64 #include "canohost.h"
65 #include "uidswap.h"
66 #include "misc.h"
67 #include "packet.h"
68 #include "loginrec.h"
69 #ifdef GSSAPI
70 #include "ssh-gss.h"
71 #endif
72 #include "authfile.h"
73 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
74 
75 /* import */
76 extern ServerOptions options;
77 extern int use_privsep;
78 extern Buffer loginmsg;
79 extern struct passwd *privsep_pw;
80 
81 /* Debugging messages */
82 Buffer auth_debug;
83 int auth_debug_init;
84 
85 /*
86  * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed
87  * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false
88  * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed
89  * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't
90  * listed there, false will be returned.
91  * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
92  * Otherwise true is returned.
93  */
94 int
95 allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
96 {
97 	struct stat st;
98 	const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL;
99 	u_int i;
100 #ifdef USE_SHADOW
101 	struct spwd *spw = NULL;
102 #endif
103 
104 	/* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
105 	if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
106 		return 0;
107 
108 #ifdef USE_SHADOW
109 	if (!options.use_pam)
110 		spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
111 #ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
112 	if (!options.use_pam && spw != NULL && auth_shadow_acctexpired(spw))
113 		return 0;
114 #endif /* HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
115 #endif /* USE_SHADOW */
116 
117 	/* grab passwd field for locked account check */
118 	passwd = pw->pw_passwd;
119 #ifdef USE_SHADOW
120 	if (spw != NULL)
121 #ifdef USE_LIBIAF
122 		passwd = get_iaf_password(pw);
123 #else
124 		passwd = spw->sp_pwdp;
125 #endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
126 #endif
127 
128 	/* check for locked account */
129 	if (!options.use_pam && passwd && *passwd) {
130 		int locked = 0;
131 
132 #ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING
133 		if (strcmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING) == 0)
134 			 locked = 1;
135 #endif
136 #ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
137 		if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX,
138 		    strlen(LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX)) == 0)
139 			 locked = 1;
140 #endif
141 #ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR
142 		if (strstr(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR))
143 			locked = 1;
144 #endif
145 #ifdef USE_LIBIAF
146 		free((void *) passwd);
147 #endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
148 		if (locked) {
149 			logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked",
150 			    pw->pw_name);
151 			return 0;
152 		}
153 	}
154 
155 	/*
156 	 * Deny if shell does not exist or is not executable unless we
157 	 * are chrooting.
158 	 */
159 	if (options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
160 	    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) {
161 		char *shell = xstrdup((pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ?
162 		    _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell); /* empty = /bin/sh */
163 
164 		if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) {
165 			logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
166 			    "does not exist", pw->pw_name, shell);
167 			xfree(shell);
168 			return 0;
169 		}
170 		if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 ||
171 		    (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) {
172 			logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
173 			    "is not executable", pw->pw_name, shell);
174 			xfree(shell);
175 			return 0;
176 		}
177 		xfree(shell);
178 	}
179 
180 	if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 ||
181 	    options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
182 		hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
183 		ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
184 	}
185 
186 	/* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
187 	if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
188 		for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
189 			if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
190 			    options.deny_users[i])) {
191 				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
192 				    "because listed in DenyUsers",
193 				    pw->pw_name, hostname);
194 				return 0;
195 			}
196 	}
197 	/* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
198 	if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
199 		for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++)
200 			if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
201 			    options.allow_users[i]))
202 				break;
203 		/* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
204 		if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
205 			logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
206 			    "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname);
207 			return 0;
208 		}
209 	}
210 	if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
211 		/* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
212 		if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
213 			logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
214 			    "not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname);
215 			return 0;
216 		}
217 
218 		/* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */
219 		if (options.num_deny_groups > 0)
220 			if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
221 			    options.num_deny_groups)) {
222 				ga_free();
223 				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
224 				    "because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
225 				    pw->pw_name, hostname);
226 				return 0;
227 			}
228 		/*
229 		 * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups
230 		 * isn't listed there
231 		 */
232 		if (options.num_allow_groups > 0)
233 			if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
234 			    options.num_allow_groups)) {
235 				ga_free();
236 				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
237 				    "because none of user's groups are listed "
238 				    "in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname);
239 				return 0;
240 			}
241 		ga_free();
242 	}
243 
244 #ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER
245 	if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw, &loginmsg))
246 		return 0;
247 #endif
248 
249 	/* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
250 	return 1;
251 }
252 
253 void
254 auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
255 {
256 	void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
257 	char *authmsg;
258 
259 	if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed)
260 		return;
261 
262 	/* Raise logging level */
263 	if (authenticated == 1 ||
264 	    !authctxt->valid ||
265 	    authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 ||
266 	    strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
267 		authlog = logit;
268 
269 	if (authctxt->postponed)
270 		authmsg = "Postponed";
271 	else
272 		authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
273 
274 	authlog("%s %s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s",
275 	    authmsg,
276 	    method,
277 	    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
278 	    authctxt->user,
279 	    get_remote_ipaddr(),
280 	    get_remote_port(),
281 	    info);
282 
283 #ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
284 	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed &&
285 	    (strcmp(method, "password") == 0 ||
286 	    strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 ||
287 	    strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0))
288 		record_failed_login(authctxt->user,
289 		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
290 # ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
291 	if (authenticated)
292 		sys_auth_record_login(authctxt->user,
293 		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh", &loginmsg);
294 # endif
295 #endif
296 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
297 	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed)
298 		audit_event(audit_classify_auth(method));
299 #endif
300 }
301 
302 /*
303  * Check whether root logins are disallowed.
304  */
305 int
306 auth_root_allowed(char *method)
307 {
308 	switch (options.permit_root_login) {
309 	case PERMIT_YES:
310 		return 1;
311 	case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
312 		if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0)
313 			return 1;
314 		break;
315 	case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
316 		if (forced_command) {
317 			logit("Root login accepted for forced command.");
318 			return 1;
319 		}
320 		break;
321 	}
322 	logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
323 	return 0;
324 }
325 
326 
327 /*
328  * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename
329  * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%',
330  * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username.
331  *
332  * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
333  */
334 static char *
335 expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
336 {
337 	char *file, ret[MAXPATHLEN];
338 	int i;
339 
340 	file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir,
341 	    "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
342 
343 	/*
344 	 * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
345 	 * compatible and prepend the '%h/'
346 	 */
347 	if (*file == '/')
348 		return (file);
349 
350 	i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file);
351 	if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret))
352 		fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long");
353 	xfree(file);
354 	return (xstrdup(ret));
355 }
356 
357 char *
358 authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *pw)
359 {
360 	return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_keys_file, pw);
361 }
362 
363 char *
364 authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *pw)
365 {
366 	return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_keys_file2, pw);
367 }
368 
369 char *
370 authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *pw)
371 {
372 	if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL)
373 		return NULL;
374 	return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_principals_file, pw);
375 }
376 
377 /* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
378 HostStatus
379 check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
380     const char *sysfile, const char *userfile)
381 {
382 	Key *found;
383 	char *user_hostfile;
384 	struct stat st;
385 	HostStatus host_status;
386 
387 	/* Check if we know the host and its host key. */
388 	found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type);
389 	host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(sysfile, host, key, found, NULL);
390 
391 	if (host_status != HOST_OK && userfile != NULL) {
392 		user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
393 		if (options.strict_modes &&
394 		    (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
395 		    ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
396 		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
397 			logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
398 			    "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
399 			    pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
400 			auth_debug_add("Ignored %.200s: bad ownership or modes",
401 			    user_hostfile);
402 		} else {
403 			temporarily_use_uid(pw);
404 			host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(user_hostfile,
405 			    host, key, found, NULL);
406 			restore_uid();
407 		}
408 		xfree(user_hostfile);
409 	}
410 	key_free(found);
411 
412 	debug2("check_key_in_hostfiles: key %s for %s", host_status == HOST_OK ?
413 	    "ok" : "not found", host);
414 	return host_status;
415 }
416 
417 
418 /*
419  * Check a given file for security. This is defined as all components
420  * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of
421  * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
422  *
423  * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
424  *
425  * Takes an open file descriptor, the file name, a uid and and
426  * error buffer plus max size as arguments.
427  *
428  * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
429  */
430 static int
431 secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
432     char *err, size_t errlen)
433 {
434 	uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid;
435 	char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN];
436 	char *cp;
437 	int comparehome = 0;
438 	struct stat st;
439 
440 	if (realpath(file, buf) == NULL) {
441 		snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", file,
442 		    strerror(errno));
443 		return -1;
444 	}
445 	if (realpath(pw->pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
446 		comparehome = 1;
447 
448 	/* check the open file to avoid races */
449 	if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0 ||
450 	    (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
451 	    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
452 		snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
453 		    buf);
454 		return -1;
455 	}
456 
457 	/* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
458 	for (;;) {
459 		if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
460 			snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
461 			return -1;
462 		}
463 		strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
464 
465 		debug3("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
466 		if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
467 		    (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
468 		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
469 			snprintf(err, errlen,
470 			    "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
471 			return -1;
472 		}
473 
474 		/* If are past the homedir then we can stop */
475 		if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) {
476 			debug3("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
477 			    buf);
478 			break;
479 		}
480 		/*
481 		 * dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
482 		 * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
483 		 */
484 		if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
485 			break;
486 	}
487 	return 0;
488 }
489 
490 static FILE *
491 auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes,
492     int log_missing, char *file_type)
493 {
494 	char line[1024];
495 	struct stat st;
496 	int fd;
497 	FILE *f;
498 
499 	if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) {
500 		if (log_missing || errno != ENOENT)
501 			debug("Could not open %s '%s': %s", file_type, file,
502 			   strerror(errno));
503 		return NULL;
504 	}
505 
506 	if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
507 		close(fd);
508 		return NULL;
509 	}
510 	if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
511 		logit("User %s %s %s is not a regular file",
512 		    pw->pw_name, file_type, file);
513 		close(fd);
514 		return NULL;
515 	}
516 	unset_nonblock(fd);
517 	if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
518 		close(fd);
519 		return NULL;
520 	}
521 	if (options.strict_modes &&
522 	    secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
523 		fclose(f);
524 		logit("Authentication refused: %s", line);
525 		auth_debug_add("Ignored %s: %s", file_type, line);
526 		return NULL;
527 	}
528 
529 	return f;
530 }
531 
532 
533 FILE *
534 auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
535 {
536 	return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 1, "authorized keys");
537 }
538 
539 FILE *
540 auth_openprincipals(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
541 {
542 	return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 0,
543 	    "authorized principals");
544 }
545 
546 struct passwd *
547 getpwnamallow(const char *user)
548 {
549 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
550 	extern login_cap_t *lc;
551 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
552 	auth_session_t *as;
553 #endif
554 #endif
555 	struct passwd *pw;
556 
557 	parse_server_match_config(&options, user,
558 	    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), get_remote_ipaddr());
559 
560 #if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB)
561 	aix_setauthdb(user);
562 #endif
563 
564 	pw = getpwnam(user);
565 
566 #if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB)
567 	aix_restoreauthdb();
568 #endif
569 #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
570 	/*
571 	 * Windows usernames are case-insensitive.  To avoid later problems
572 	 * when trying to match the username, the user is only allowed to
573 	 * login if the username is given in the same case as stored in the
574 	 * user database.
575 	 */
576 	if (pw != NULL && strcmp(user, pw->pw_name) != 0) {
577 		logit("Login name %.100s does not match stored username %.100s",
578 		    user, pw->pw_name);
579 		pw = NULL;
580 	}
581 #endif
582 	if (pw == NULL) {
583 		logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s",
584 		    user, get_remote_ipaddr());
585 #ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
586 		record_failed_login(user,
587 		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
588 #endif
589 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
590 		audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER);
591 #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
592 		return (NULL);
593 	}
594 	if (!allowed_user(pw))
595 		return (NULL);
596 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
597 	if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) {
598 		debug("unable to get login class: %s", user);
599 		return (NULL);
600 	}
601 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
602 	if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 ||
603 	    auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) {
604 		debug("Approval failure for %s", user);
605 		pw = NULL;
606 	}
607 	if (as != NULL)
608 		auth_close(as);
609 #endif
610 #endif
611 	if (pw != NULL)
612 		return (pwcopy(pw));
613 	return (NULL);
614 }
615 
616 /* Returns 1 if key is revoked by revoked_keys_file, 0 otherwise */
617 int
618 auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key)
619 {
620 	char *key_fp;
621 
622 	if (options.revoked_keys_file == NULL)
623 		return 0;
624 
625 	switch (key_in_file(key, options.revoked_keys_file, 0)) {
626 	case 0:
627 		/* key not revoked */
628 		return 0;
629 	case -1:
630 		/* Error opening revoked_keys_file: refuse all keys */
631 		error("Revoked keys file is unreadable: refusing public key "
632 		    "authentication");
633 		return 1;
634 	case 1:
635 		/* Key revoked */
636 		key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
637 		error("WARNING: authentication attempt with a revoked "
638 		    "%s key %s ", key_type(key), key_fp);
639 		xfree(key_fp);
640 		return 1;
641 	}
642 	fatal("key_in_file returned junk");
643 }
644 
645 void
646 auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...)
647 {
648 	char buf[1024];
649 	va_list args;
650 
651 	if (!auth_debug_init)
652 		return;
653 
654 	va_start(args, fmt);
655 	vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
656 	va_end(args);
657 	buffer_put_cstring(&auth_debug, buf);
658 }
659 
660 void
661 auth_debug_send(void)
662 {
663 	char *msg;
664 
665 	if (!auth_debug_init)
666 		return;
667 	while (buffer_len(&auth_debug)) {
668 		msg = buffer_get_string(&auth_debug, NULL);
669 		packet_send_debug("%s", msg);
670 		xfree(msg);
671 	}
672 }
673 
674 void
675 auth_debug_reset(void)
676 {
677 	if (auth_debug_init)
678 		buffer_clear(&auth_debug);
679 	else {
680 		buffer_init(&auth_debug);
681 		auth_debug_init = 1;
682 	}
683 }
684 
685 struct passwd *
686 fakepw(void)
687 {
688 	static struct passwd fake;
689 
690 	memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake));
691 	fake.pw_name = "NOUSER";
692 	fake.pw_passwd =
693 	    "$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK";
694 	fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER";
695 	fake.pw_uid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (uid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_uid;
696 	fake.pw_gid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (gid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_gid;
697 #ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
698 	fake.pw_class = "";
699 #endif
700 	fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist";
701 	fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist";
702 
703 	return (&fake);
704 }
705