xref: /freebsd/contrib/ntp/libntp/authreadkeys.c (revision 224e0c2f)
1 /*
2  * authreadkeys.c - routines to support the reading of the key file
3  */
4 #include <config.h>
5 #include <stdio.h>
6 #include <ctype.h>
7 
8 #include "ntpd.h"	/* Only for DPRINTF */
9 #include "ntp_fp.h"
10 #include "ntp.h"
11 #include "ntp_syslog.h"
12 #include "ntp_stdlib.h"
13 #include "ntp_keyacc.h"
14 
15 #ifdef OPENSSL
16 #include "openssl/objects.h"
17 #include "openssl/evp.h"
18 #endif	/* OPENSSL */
19 
20 /* Forwards */
21 static char *nexttok (char **);
22 
23 /*
24  * nexttok - basic internal tokenizing routine
25  */
26 static char *
27 nexttok(
28 	char	**str
29 	)
30 {
31 	register char *cp;
32 	char *starttok;
33 
34 	cp = *str;
35 
36 	/*
37 	 * Space past white space
38 	 */
39 	while (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t')
40 		cp++;
41 
42 	/*
43 	 * Save this and space to end of token
44 	 */
45 	starttok = cp;
46 	while (*cp != '\0' && *cp != '\n' && *cp != ' '
47 	       && *cp != '\t' && *cp != '#')
48 		cp++;
49 
50 	/*
51 	 * If token length is zero return an error, else set end of
52 	 * token to zero and return start.
53 	 */
54 	if (starttok == cp)
55 		return NULL;
56 
57 	if (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t')
58 		*cp++ = '\0';
59 	else
60 		*cp = '\0';
61 
62 	*str = cp;
63 	return starttok;
64 }
65 
66 
67 /* TALOS-CAN-0055: possibly DoS attack by setting the key file to the
68  * log file. This is hard to prevent (it would need to check two files
69  * to be the same on the inode level, which will not work so easily with
70  * Windows or VMS) but we can avoid the self-amplification loop: We only
71  * log the first 5 errors, silently ignore the next 10 errors, and give
72  * up when when we have found more than 15 errors.
73  *
74  * This avoids the endless file iteration we will end up with otherwise,
75  * and also avoids overflowing the log file.
76  *
77  * Nevertheless, once this happens, the keys are gone since this would
78  * require a save/swap strategy that is not easy to apply due to the
79  * data on global/static level.
80  */
81 
82 static const u_int nerr_loglimit = 5u;
83 static const u_int nerr_maxlimit = 15;
84 
85 static void log_maybe(u_int*, const char*, ...) NTP_PRINTF(2, 3);
86 
87 typedef struct keydata KeyDataT;
88 struct keydata {
89 	KeyDataT *next;		/* queue/stack link		*/
90 	KeyAccT  *keyacclist;	/* key access list		*/
91 	keyid_t   keyid;	/* stored key ID		*/
92 	u_short   keytype;	/* stored key type		*/
93 	u_short   seclen;	/* length of secret		*/
94 	u_char    secbuf[1];	/* begin of secret (formal only)*/
95 };
96 
97 static void
98 log_maybe(
99 	u_int      *pnerr,
100 	const char *fmt  ,
101 	...)
102 {
103 	va_list ap;
104 	if ((NULL == pnerr) || (++(*pnerr) <= nerr_loglimit)) {
105 		va_start(ap, fmt);
106 		mvsyslog(LOG_ERR, fmt, ap);
107 		va_end(ap);
108 	}
109 }
110 
111 static void
112 free_keydata(
113 	KeyDataT *node
114 	)
115 {
116 	KeyAccT *kap;
117 
118 	if (node) {
119 		while (node->keyacclist) {
120 			kap = node->keyacclist;
121 			node->keyacclist = kap->next;
122 			free(kap);
123 		}
124 
125 		/* purge secrets from memory before free()ing it */
126 		memset(node, 0, sizeof(*node) + node->seclen);
127 		free(node);
128 	}
129 }
130 
131 /*
132  * authreadkeys - (re)read keys from a file.
133  */
134 int
135 authreadkeys(
136 	const char *file
137 	)
138 {
139 	FILE	*fp;
140 	char	*line;
141 	char	*token;
142 	keyid_t	keyno;
143 	int	keytype;
144 	char	buf[512];		/* lots of room for line */
145 	u_char	keystr[32];		/* Bug 2537 */
146 	size_t	len;
147 	size_t	j;
148 	u_int   nerr;
149 	KeyDataT *list = NULL;
150 	KeyDataT *next = NULL;
151 	/*
152 	 * Open file.  Complain and return if it can't be opened.
153 	 */
154 	fp = fopen(file, "r");
155 	if (fp == NULL) {
156 		msyslog(LOG_ERR, "authreadkeys: file '%s': %m",
157 		    file);
158 		goto onerror;
159 	}
160 	INIT_SSL();
161 
162 	/*
163 	 * Now read lines from the file, looking for key entries. Put
164 	 * the data into temporary store for later propagation to avoid
165 	 * two-pass processing.
166 	 */
167 	nerr = 0;
168 	while ((line = fgets(buf, sizeof buf, fp)) != NULL) {
169 		if (nerr > nerr_maxlimit)
170 			break;
171 		token = nexttok(&line);
172 		if (token == NULL)
173 			continue;
174 
175 		/*
176 		 * First is key number.  See if it is okay.
177 		 */
178 		keyno = atoi(token);
179 		if (keyno < 1) {
180 			log_maybe(&nerr,
181 				  "authreadkeys: cannot change key %s",
182 				  token);
183 			continue;
184 		}
185 
186 		if (keyno > NTP_MAXKEY) {
187 			log_maybe(&nerr,
188 				  "authreadkeys: key %s > %d reserved for Autokey",
189 				  token, NTP_MAXKEY);
190 			continue;
191 		}
192 
193 		/*
194 		 * Next is keytype. See if that is all right.
195 		 */
196 		token = nexttok(&line);
197 		if (token == NULL) {
198 			log_maybe(&nerr,
199 				  "authreadkeys: no key type for key %d",
200 				  keyno);
201 			continue;
202 		}
203 
204 		/* We want to silently ignore keys where we do not
205 		 * support the requested digest type. OTOH, we want to
206 		 * make sure the file is well-formed.  That means we
207 		 * have to process the line completely and have to
208 		 * finally throw away the result... This is a bit more
209 		 * work, but it also results in better error detection.
210 		 */
211 #ifdef OPENSSL
212 		/*
213 		 * The key type is the NID used by the message digest
214 		 * algorithm. There are a number of inconsistencies in
215 		 * the OpenSSL database. We attempt to discover them
216 		 * here and prevent use of inconsistent data later.
217 		 */
218 		keytype = keytype_from_text(token, NULL);
219 		if (keytype == 0) {
220 			log_maybe(NULL,
221 				  "authreadkeys: invalid type for key %d",
222 				  keyno);
223 		} else if (EVP_get_digestbynid(keytype) == NULL) {
224 			log_maybe(NULL,
225 				  "authreadkeys: no algorithm for key %d",
226 				  keyno);
227 			keytype = 0;
228 		}
229 #else	/* !OPENSSL follows */
230 		/*
231 		 * The key type is unused, but is required to be 'M' or
232 		 * 'm' for compatibility.
233 		 */
234 		if (!(*token == 'M' || *token == 'm')) {
235 			log_maybe(NULL,
236 				  "authreadkeys: invalid type for key %d",
237 				  keyno);
238 			keytype = 0;
239 		} else {
240 			keytype = KEY_TYPE_MD5;
241 		}
242 #endif	/* !OPENSSL */
243 
244 		/*
245 		 * Finally, get key and insert it. If it is longer than 20
246 		 * characters, it is a binary string encoded in hex;
247 		 * otherwise, it is a text string of printable ASCII
248 		 * characters.
249 		 */
250 		token = nexttok(&line);
251 		if (token == NULL) {
252 			log_maybe(&nerr,
253 				  "authreadkeys: no key for key %d", keyno);
254 			continue;
255 		}
256 		next = NULL;
257 		len = strlen(token);
258 		if (len <= 20) {	/* Bug 2537 */
259 			next = emalloc(sizeof(KeyDataT) + len);
260 			next->keyacclist = NULL;
261 			next->keyid   = keyno;
262 			next->keytype = keytype;
263 			next->seclen  = len;
264 			memcpy(next->secbuf, token, len);
265 		} else {
266 			static const char hex[] = "0123456789abcdef";
267 			u_char	temp;
268 			char	*ptr;
269 			size_t	jlim;
270 
271 			jlim = min(len, 2 * sizeof(keystr));
272 			for (j = 0; j < jlim; j++) {
273 				ptr = strchr(hex, tolower((unsigned char)token[j]));
274 				if (ptr == NULL)
275 					break;	/* abort decoding */
276 				temp = (u_char)(ptr - hex);
277 				if (j & 1)
278 					keystr[j / 2] |= temp;
279 				else
280 					keystr[j / 2] = temp << 4;
281 			}
282 			if (j < jlim) {
283 				log_maybe(&nerr,
284 					  "authreadkeys: invalid hex digit for key %d",
285 					  keyno);
286 				continue;
287 			}
288 			len = jlim/2; /* hmmmm.... what about odd length?!? */
289 			next = emalloc(sizeof(KeyDataT) + len);
290 			next->keyacclist = NULL;
291 			next->keyid   = keyno;
292 			next->keytype = keytype;
293 			next->seclen  = len;
294 			memcpy(next->secbuf, keystr, len);
295 		}
296 
297 		token = nexttok(&line);
298 		DPRINTF(0, ("authreadkeys: full access list <%s>\n", (token) ? token : "NULL"));
299 		if (token != NULL) {	/* A comma-separated IP access list */
300 			char *tp = token;
301 
302 			while (tp) {
303 				char *i;
304 				sockaddr_u addr;
305 
306 				i = strchr(tp, (int)',');
307 				if (i)
308 					*i = '\0';
309 				DPRINTF(0, ("authreadkeys: access list:  <%s>\n", tp));
310 
311 				if (is_ip_address(tp, AF_UNSPEC, &addr)) {
312 					next->keyacclist = keyacc_new_push(
313 						next->keyacclist, &addr);
314 				} else {
315 					log_maybe(&nerr,
316 						  "authreadkeys: invalid IP address <%s> for key %d",
317 						  tp, keyno);
318 				}
319 
320 				if (i) {
321 					tp = i + 1;
322 				} else {
323 					tp = 0;
324 				}
325 			}
326 		}
327 
328 		/* check if this has to be weeded out... */
329 		if (0 == keytype) {
330 			free_keydata(next);
331 			next = NULL;
332 			continue;
333 		}
334 
335 		INSIST(NULL != next);
336 		next->next = list;
337 		list = next;
338 	}
339 	fclose(fp);
340 	if (nerr > 0) {
341 		const char * why = "";
342 		if (nerr > nerr_maxlimit)
343 			why = " (emergency break)";
344 		msyslog(LOG_ERR,
345 			"authreadkeys: rejecting file '%s' after %u error(s)%s",
346 			file, nerr, why);
347 		goto onerror;
348 	}
349 
350 	/* first remove old file-based keys */
351 	auth_delkeys();
352 	/* insert the new key material */
353 	while (NULL != (next = list)) {
354 		list = next->next;
355 		MD5auth_setkey(next->keyid, next->keytype,
356 			       next->secbuf, next->seclen, next->keyacclist);
357 		next->keyacclist = NULL; /* consumed by MD5auth_setkey */
358 		free_keydata(next);
359 	}
360 	return (1);
361 
362   onerror:
363 	/* Mop up temporary storage before bailing out. */
364 	while (NULL != (next = list)) {
365 		list = next->next;
366 		free_keydata(next);
367 	}
368 	return (0);
369 }
370