xref: /freebsd/crypto/openssh/monitor.c (revision bc5531de)
1 /* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.145 2015/02/20 22:17:21 djm Exp $ */
2 /*
3  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
4  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
5  * All rights reserved.
6  *
7  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
8  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
9  * are met:
10  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
12  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
13  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
14  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
15  *
16  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
17  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
18  * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
19  * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
20  * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
21  * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
22  * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
23  * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
24  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
25  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
26  */
27 
28 #include "includes.h"
29 
30 #include <sys/types.h>
31 #include <sys/socket.h>
32 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
33 #include <sys/wait.h>
34 
35 #include <errno.h>
36 #include <fcntl.h>
37 #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
38 #include <paths.h>
39 #endif
40 #include <pwd.h>
41 #include <signal.h>
42 #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
43 #include <stdint.h>
44 #endif
45 #include <stdlib.h>
46 #include <string.h>
47 #include <stdarg.h>
48 #include <stdio.h>
49 #include <unistd.h>
50 #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
51 #include <poll.h>
52 #else
53 # ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
54 #  include <sys/poll.h>
55 # endif
56 #endif
57 
58 #ifdef SKEY
59 #include <skey.h>
60 #endif
61 
62 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
63 #include <openssl/dh.h>
64 #endif
65 
66 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
67 #include "atomicio.h"
68 #include "xmalloc.h"
69 #include "ssh.h"
70 #include "key.h"
71 #include "buffer.h"
72 #include "hostfile.h"
73 #include "auth.h"
74 #include "cipher.h"
75 #include "kex.h"
76 #include "dh.h"
77 #ifdef TARGET_OS_MAC	/* XXX Broken krb5 headers on Mac */
78 #undef TARGET_OS_MAC
79 #include "zlib.h"
80 #define TARGET_OS_MAC 1
81 #else
82 #include "zlib.h"
83 #endif
84 #include "packet.h"
85 #include "auth-options.h"
86 #include "sshpty.h"
87 #include "channels.h"
88 #include "session.h"
89 #include "sshlogin.h"
90 #include "canohost.h"
91 #include "log.h"
92 #include "misc.h"
93 #include "servconf.h"
94 #include "monitor.h"
95 #include "monitor_mm.h"
96 #ifdef GSSAPI
97 #include "ssh-gss.h"
98 #endif
99 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
100 #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
101 #include "compat.h"
102 #include "ssh2.h"
103 #include "roaming.h"
104 #include "authfd.h"
105 #include "match.h"
106 #include "ssherr.h"
107 
108 #ifdef GSSAPI
109 static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
110 #endif
111 
112 /* Imports */
113 extern ServerOptions options;
114 extern u_int utmp_len;
115 extern u_char session_id[];
116 extern Buffer auth_debug;
117 extern int auth_debug_init;
118 extern Buffer loginmsg;
119 
120 /* State exported from the child */
121 static struct sshbuf *child_state;
122 
123 /* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
124 
125 int mm_answer_moduli(int, Buffer *);
126 int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
127 int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
128 int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
129 int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
130 int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
131 int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
132 int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
133 int mm_answer_skeyquery(int, Buffer *);
134 int mm_answer_skeyrespond(int, Buffer *);
135 int mm_answer_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
136 int mm_answer_keyverify(int, Buffer *);
137 int mm_answer_pty(int, Buffer *);
138 int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int, Buffer *);
139 int mm_answer_term(int, Buffer *);
140 int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
141 int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int, Buffer *);
142 int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, Buffer *);
143 int mm_answer_sesskey(int, Buffer *);
144 int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *);
145 
146 #ifdef USE_PAM
147 int mm_answer_pam_start(int, Buffer *);
148 int mm_answer_pam_account(int, Buffer *);
149 int mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int, Buffer *);
150 int mm_answer_pam_query(int, Buffer *);
151 int mm_answer_pam_respond(int, Buffer *);
152 int mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int, Buffer *);
153 #endif
154 
155 #ifdef GSSAPI
156 int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
157 int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
158 int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
159 int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
160 #endif
161 
162 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
163 int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
164 int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
165 #endif
166 
167 static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
168 
169 static Authctxt *authctxt;
170 
171 #ifdef WITH_SSH1
172 static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL;	/* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
173 #endif
174 
175 /* local state for key verify */
176 static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
177 static u_int key_bloblen = 0;
178 static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
179 static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
180 static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
181 static char *auth_method = "unknown";
182 static char *auth_submethod = NULL;
183 static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
184 static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
185 static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
186 
187 struct mon_table {
188 	enum monitor_reqtype type;
189 	int flags;
190 	int (*f)(int, Buffer *);
191 };
192 
193 #define MON_ISAUTH	0x0004	/* Required for Authentication */
194 #define MON_AUTHDECIDE	0x0008	/* Decides Authentication */
195 #define MON_ONCE	0x0010	/* Disable after calling */
196 #define MON_ALOG	0x0020	/* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
197 
198 #define MON_AUTH	(MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
199 
200 #define MON_PERMIT	0x1000	/* Request is permitted */
201 
202 struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
203 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
204     {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
205 #endif
206     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
207     {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
208     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
209     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
210     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
211 #ifdef USE_PAM
212     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
213     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
214     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
215     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
216     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
217     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
218 #endif
219 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
220     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
221 #endif
222 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
223     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
224     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
225 #endif
226 #ifdef SKEY
227     {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
228     {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
229 #endif
230     {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
231     {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
232 #ifdef GSSAPI
233     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
234     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
235     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
236     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
237 #endif
238     {0, 0, NULL}
239 };
240 
241 struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
242 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
243     {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
244 #endif
245     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
246     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
247     {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
248     {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
249 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
250     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
251     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
252 #endif
253     {0, 0, NULL}
254 };
255 
256 struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
257 #ifdef WITH_SSH1
258     {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
259     {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
260     {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
261     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
262     {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
263     {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_keyallowed},
264     {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
265     {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
266 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
267     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
268     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
269 #endif
270 #ifdef SKEY
271     {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
272     {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
273 #endif
274 #ifdef USE_PAM
275     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
276     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
277     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
278     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
279     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
280     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
281 #endif
282 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
283     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
284 #endif
285 #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
286     {0, 0, NULL}
287 };
288 
289 struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
290 #ifdef WITH_SSH1
291     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
292     {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
293     {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
294 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
295     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
296     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
297 #endif
298 #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
299     {0, 0, NULL}
300 };
301 
302 struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
303 
304 /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
305 
306 static void
307 monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
308 {
309 	while (ent->f != NULL) {
310 		if (ent->type == type) {
311 			ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
312 			ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
313 			return;
314 		}
315 		ent++;
316 	}
317 }
318 
319 static void
320 monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
321 {
322 	struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
323 
324 	while (ent->f != NULL) {
325 		if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
326 			ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
327 			ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
328 		}
329 		ent++;
330 	}
331 }
332 
333 void
334 monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
335 {
336 	struct mon_table *ent;
337 	int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
338 
339 	debug3("preauth child monitor started");
340 
341 	close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
342 	close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
343 	pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
344 
345 	authctxt = _authctxt;
346 	memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
347 
348 	authctxt->loginmsg = &loginmsg;
349 
350 	if (compat20) {
351 		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
352 
353 		/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
354 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
355 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
356 	} else {
357 		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
358 
359 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1);
360 	}
361 
362 	/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
363 	while (!authenticated) {
364 		partial = 0;
365 		auth_method = "unknown";
366 		auth_submethod = NULL;
367 		authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
368 
369 		/* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
370 		if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
371 			if (!compat20)
372 				fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported"
373 				    "with SSH protocol 1");
374 			if (authenticated &&
375 			    !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
376 			    auth_method, auth_submethod)) {
377 				debug3("%s: method %s: partial", __func__,
378 				    auth_method);
379 				authenticated = 0;
380 				partial = 1;
381 			}
382 		}
383 
384 		if (authenticated) {
385 			if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
386 				fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
387 				    __func__, ent->type);
388 			if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
389 			    !auth_root_allowed(auth_method))
390 				authenticated = 0;
391 #ifdef USE_PAM
392 			/* PAM needs to perform account checks after auth */
393 			if (options.use_pam && authenticated) {
394 				Buffer m;
395 
396 				buffer_init(&m);
397 				mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd,
398 				    MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m);
399 				authenticated = mm_answer_pam_account(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
400 				buffer_free(&m);
401 			}
402 #endif
403 		}
404 		if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
405 			auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial,
406 			    auth_method, auth_submethod);
407 			if (!authenticated)
408 				authctxt->failures++;
409 		}
410 	}
411 
412 	if (!authctxt->valid)
413 		fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
414 	if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
415 		fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__);
416 
417 	debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
418 	    __func__, authctxt->user);
419 
420 	mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
421 
422 	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
423 	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
424 		;
425 
426 	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
427 	close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
428 	pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
429 }
430 
431 static void
432 monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
433 {
434 	monitor_child_pid = pid;
435 }
436 
437 static void
438 monitor_child_handler(int sig)
439 {
440 	kill(monitor_child_pid, sig);
441 }
442 
443 void
444 monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
445 {
446 	close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
447 	pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
448 
449 	monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
450 	signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
451 	signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
452 	signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
453 #ifdef SIGXFSZ
454 	signal(SIGXFSZ, SIG_IGN);
455 #endif
456 
457 	if (compat20) {
458 		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
459 
460 		/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
461 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
462 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
463 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
464 	} else {
465 		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
466 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
467 	}
468 	if (!no_pty_flag) {
469 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
470 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
471 	}
472 
473 	for (;;)
474 		monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
475 }
476 
477 void
478 monitor_sync(struct monitor *pmonitor)
479 {
480 	if (options.compression) {
481 		/* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */
482 		mm_share_sync(&pmonitor->m_zlib, &pmonitor->m_zback);
483 	}
484 }
485 
486 /* Allocation functions for zlib */
487 static void *
488 mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
489 {
490 	size_t len = (size_t) size * ncount;
491 	void *address;
492 
493 	if (len == 0 || ncount > SIZE_MAX / size)
494 		fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size);
495 
496 	address = mm_malloc(mm, len);
497 
498 	return (address);
499 }
500 
501 static void
502 mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
503 {
504 	mm_free(mm, address);
505 }
506 
507 static int
508 monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
509 {
510 	Buffer logmsg;
511 	u_int len, level;
512 	char *msg;
513 
514 	buffer_init(&logmsg);
515 
516 	/* Read length */
517 	buffer_append_space(&logmsg, 4);
518 	if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
519 	    buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg)) {
520 		if (errno == EPIPE) {
521 			buffer_free(&logmsg);
522 			debug("%s: child log fd closed", __func__);
523 			close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
524 			pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
525 			return -1;
526 		}
527 		fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
528 	}
529 	len = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
530 	if (len <= 4 || len > 8192)
531 		fatal("%s: invalid log message length %u", __func__, len);
532 
533 	/* Read severity, message */
534 	buffer_clear(&logmsg);
535 	buffer_append_space(&logmsg, len);
536 	if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
537 	    buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg))
538 		fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
539 
540 	/* Log it */
541 	level = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
542 	msg = buffer_get_string(&logmsg, NULL);
543 	if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
544 		fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
545 		    __func__, level);
546 	do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
547 
548 	buffer_free(&logmsg);
549 	free(msg);
550 
551 	return 0;
552 }
553 
554 int
555 monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
556     struct mon_table **pent)
557 {
558 	Buffer m;
559 	int ret;
560 	u_char type;
561 	struct pollfd pfd[2];
562 
563 	for (;;) {
564 		memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
565 		pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd;
566 		pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
567 		pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd;
568 		pfd[1].events = pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 0 : POLLIN;
569 		if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) {
570 			if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
571 				continue;
572 			fatal("%s: poll: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
573 		}
574 		if (pfd[1].revents) {
575 			/*
576 			 * Drain all log messages before processing next
577 			 * monitor request.
578 			 */
579 			monitor_read_log(pmonitor);
580 			continue;
581 		}
582 		if (pfd[0].revents)
583 			break;  /* Continues below */
584 	}
585 
586 	buffer_init(&m);
587 
588 	mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
589 	type = buffer_get_char(&m);
590 
591 	debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type);
592 
593 	while (ent->f != NULL) {
594 		if (ent->type == type)
595 			break;
596 		ent++;
597 	}
598 
599 	if (ent->f != NULL) {
600 		if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
601 			fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__,
602 			    type);
603 		ret = (*ent->f)(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
604 		buffer_free(&m);
605 
606 		/* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
607 		if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
608 			debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__,
609 			    type);
610 			ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
611 		}
612 
613 		if (pent != NULL)
614 			*pent = ent;
615 
616 		return ret;
617 	}
618 
619 	fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type);
620 
621 	/* NOTREACHED */
622 	return (-1);
623 }
624 
625 /* allowed key state */
626 static int
627 monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
628 {
629 	/* make sure key is allowed */
630 	if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
631 	    timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
632 		return (0);
633 	return (1);
634 }
635 
636 static void
637 monitor_reset_key_state(void)
638 {
639 	/* reset state */
640 	free(key_blob);
641 	free(hostbased_cuser);
642 	free(hostbased_chost);
643 	key_blob = NULL;
644 	key_bloblen = 0;
645 	key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
646 	hostbased_cuser = NULL;
647 	hostbased_chost = NULL;
648 }
649 
650 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
651 int
652 mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
653 {
654 	DH *dh;
655 	int min, want, max;
656 
657 	min = buffer_get_int(m);
658 	want = buffer_get_int(m);
659 	max = buffer_get_int(m);
660 
661 	debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d",
662 	    __func__, min, want, max);
663 	/* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
664 	if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
665 		fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d",
666 		    __func__, min, want, max);
667 
668 	buffer_clear(m);
669 
670 	dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
671 	if (dh == NULL) {
672 		buffer_put_char(m, 0);
673 		return (0);
674 	} else {
675 		/* Send first bignum */
676 		buffer_put_char(m, 1);
677 		buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->p);
678 		buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->g);
679 
680 		DH_free(dh);
681 	}
682 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
683 	return (0);
684 }
685 #endif
686 
687 int
688 mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
689 {
690 	struct ssh *ssh = active_state; 	/* XXX */
691 	extern int auth_sock;			/* XXX move to state struct? */
692 	struct sshkey *key;
693 	struct sshbuf *sigbuf;
694 	u_char *p;
695 	u_char *signature;
696 	size_t datlen, siglen;
697 	int r, keyid, is_proof = 0;
698 	const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
699 
700 	debug3("%s", __func__);
701 
702 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 ||
703 	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0)
704 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
705 
706 	/*
707 	 * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
708 	 * SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
709 	 *
710 	 * Otherwise, verify the signature request is for a hostkey
711 	 * proof.
712 	 *
713 	 * XXX perform similar check for KEX signature requests too?
714 	 * it's not trivial, since what is signed is the hash, rather
715 	 * than the full kex structure...
716 	 */
717 	if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64) {
718 		/*
719 		 * Construct expected hostkey proof and compare it to what
720 		 * the client sent us.
721 		 */
722 		if (session_id2_len == 0) /* hostkeys is never first */
723 			fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu", __func__, datlen);
724 		if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) == NULL)
725 			fatal("%s: no hostkey for index %d", __func__, keyid);
726 		if ((sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
727 			fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
728 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, proof_req)) != 0 ||
729 		    (r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, session_id2,
730 		    session_id2_len) != 0) ||
731 		    (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0)
732 			fatal("%s: couldn't prepare private key "
733 			    "proof buffer: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
734 		if (datlen != sshbuf_len(sigbuf) ||
735 		    memcmp(p, sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf)) != 0)
736 			fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu",
737 			    __func__, datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf));
738 		sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
739 		is_proof = 1;
740 	}
741 
742 	/* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
743 	if (session_id2_len == 0) {
744 		session_id2_len = datlen;
745 		session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
746 		memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
747 	}
748 
749 	if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
750 		if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen,
751 		    datafellows)) != 0)
752 			fatal("%s: sshkey_sign failed: %s",
753 			    __func__, ssh_err(r));
754 	} else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
755 	    auth_sock > 0) {
756 		if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
757 		    p, datlen, datafellows)) != 0) {
758 			fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s",
759 			    __func__, ssh_err(r));
760 		}
761 	} else
762 		fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid);
763 
764 	debug3("%s: %s signature %p(%zu)", __func__,
765 	    is_proof ? "KEX" : "hostkey proof", signature, siglen);
766 
767 	sshbuf_reset(m);
768 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0)
769 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
770 
771 	free(p);
772 	free(signature);
773 
774 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
775 
776 	/* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
777 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
778 
779 	return (0);
780 }
781 
782 /* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
783 
784 int
785 mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
786 {
787 	char *username;
788 	struct passwd *pwent;
789 	int allowed = 0;
790 	u_int i;
791 
792 	debug3("%s", __func__);
793 
794 	if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
795 		fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__);
796 
797 	username = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
798 
799 	pwent = getpwnamallow(username);
800 
801 	authctxt->user = xstrdup(username);
802 	setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown");
803 	free(username);
804 
805 	buffer_clear(m);
806 
807 	if (pwent == NULL) {
808 		buffer_put_char(m, 0);
809 		authctxt->pw = fakepw();
810 		goto out;
811 	}
812 
813 	allowed = 1;
814 	authctxt->pw = pwent;
815 	authctxt->valid = 1;
816 
817 	buffer_put_char(m, 1);
818 	buffer_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(struct passwd));
819 	buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name);
820 	buffer_put_cstring(m, "*");
821 #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
822 	buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos);
823 #endif
824 #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
825 	buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class);
826 #endif
827 	buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir);
828 	buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell);
829 
830  out:
831 	buffer_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options));
832 
833 #define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
834 		if (options.x != NULL) \
835 			buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x); \
836 	} while (0)
837 #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
838 		for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) \
839 			buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x[i]); \
840 	} while (0)
841 	/* See comment in servconf.h */
842 	COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
843 #undef M_CP_STROPT
844 #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
845 
846 	/* Create valid auth method lists */
847 	if (compat20 && auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
848 		/*
849 		 * The monitor will continue long enough to let the child
850 		 * run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
851 		 * authentication to succeed.
852 		 */
853 		debug("%s: no valid authentication method lists", __func__);
854 	}
855 
856 	debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
857 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
858 
859 	/* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */
860 	if (!compat20)
861 		monitor_permit_authentications(1);
862 	else {
863 		/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
864 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
865 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
866 	}
867 #ifdef USE_PAM
868 	if (options.use_pam)
869 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1);
870 #endif
871 
872 	return (0);
873 }
874 
875 int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int sock, Buffer *m)
876 {
877 	char *banner;
878 
879 	buffer_clear(m);
880 	banner = auth2_read_banner();
881 	buffer_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "");
882 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
883 	free(banner);
884 
885 	return (0);
886 }
887 
888 int
889 mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
890 {
891 	monitor_permit_authentications(1);
892 
893 	authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
894 	authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
895 	debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
896 	    __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
897 
898 	if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
899 		free(authctxt->style);
900 		authctxt->style = NULL;
901 	}
902 
903 	return (0);
904 }
905 
906 int
907 mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
908 {
909 	static int call_count;
910 	char *passwd;
911 	int authenticated;
912 	u_int plen;
913 
914 	passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
915 	/* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
916 	authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
917 	    auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
918 	explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
919 	free(passwd);
920 
921 	buffer_clear(m);
922 	buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
923 
924 	debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
925 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
926 
927 	call_count++;
928 	if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
929 		auth_method = "none";
930 	else
931 		auth_method = "password";
932 
933 	/* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
934 	return (authenticated);
935 }
936 
937 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
938 int
939 mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
940 {
941 	char *name, *infotxt;
942 	u_int numprompts;
943 	u_int *echo_on;
944 	char **prompts;
945 	u_int success;
946 
947 	success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
948 	    &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
949 
950 	buffer_clear(m);
951 	buffer_put_int(m, success);
952 	if (success)
953 		buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[0]);
954 
955 	debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
956 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
957 
958 	if (success) {
959 		free(name);
960 		free(infotxt);
961 		free(prompts);
962 		free(echo_on);
963 	}
964 
965 	return (0);
966 }
967 
968 int
969 mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
970 {
971 	char *response;
972 	int authok;
973 
974 	if (authctxt->as == 0)
975 		fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__);
976 
977 	response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
978 	authok = options.challenge_response_authentication &&
979 	    auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
980 	authctxt->as = NULL;
981 	debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok);
982 	free(response);
983 
984 	buffer_clear(m);
985 	buffer_put_int(m, authok);
986 
987 	debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
988 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
989 
990 	if (compat20) {
991 		auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
992 		auth_submethod = "bsdauth";
993 	} else
994 		auth_method = "bsdauth";
995 
996 	return (authok != 0);
997 }
998 #endif
999 
1000 #ifdef SKEY
1001 int
1002 mm_answer_skeyquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
1003 {
1004 	struct skey skey;
1005 	char challenge[1024];
1006 	u_int success;
1007 
1008 	success = _compat_skeychallenge(&skey, authctxt->user, challenge,
1009 	    sizeof(challenge)) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
1010 
1011 	buffer_clear(m);
1012 	buffer_put_int(m, success);
1013 	if (success)
1014 		buffer_put_cstring(m, challenge);
1015 
1016 	debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
1017 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY, m);
1018 
1019 	return (0);
1020 }
1021 
1022 int
1023 mm_answer_skeyrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
1024 {
1025 	char *response;
1026 	int authok;
1027 
1028 	response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1029 
1030 	authok = (options.challenge_response_authentication &&
1031 	    authctxt->valid &&
1032 	    skey_haskey(authctxt->pw->pw_name) == 0 &&
1033 	    skey_passcheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, response) != -1);
1034 
1035 	free(response);
1036 
1037 	buffer_clear(m);
1038 	buffer_put_int(m, authok);
1039 
1040 	debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
1041 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND, m);
1042 
1043 	auth_method = "skey";
1044 
1045 	return (authok != 0);
1046 }
1047 #endif
1048 
1049 #ifdef USE_PAM
1050 int
1051 mm_answer_pam_start(int sock, Buffer *m)
1052 {
1053 	if (!options.use_pam)
1054 		fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
1055 
1056 	start_pam(authctxt);
1057 
1058 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 1);
1059 
1060 	return (0);
1061 }
1062 
1063 int
1064 mm_answer_pam_account(int sock, Buffer *m)
1065 {
1066 	u_int ret;
1067 
1068 	if (!options.use_pam)
1069 		fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
1070 
1071 	ret = do_pam_account();
1072 
1073 	buffer_put_int(m, ret);
1074 	buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg));
1075 
1076 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, m);
1077 
1078 	return (ret);
1079 }
1080 
1081 static void *sshpam_ctxt, *sshpam_authok;
1082 extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device;
1083 
1084 int
1085 mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1086 {
1087 	debug3("%s", __func__);
1088 	sshpam_ctxt = (sshpam_device.init_ctx)(authctxt);
1089 	sshpam_authok = NULL;
1090 	buffer_clear(m);
1091 	if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL) {
1092 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, 1);
1093 		buffer_put_int(m, 1);
1094 	} else {
1095 		buffer_put_int(m, 0);
1096 	}
1097 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, m);
1098 	return (0);
1099 }
1100 
1101 int
1102 mm_answer_pam_query(int sock, Buffer *m)
1103 {
1104 	char *name = NULL, *info = NULL, **prompts = NULL;
1105 	u_int i, num = 0, *echo_on = 0;
1106 	int ret;
1107 
1108 	debug3("%s", __func__);
1109 	sshpam_authok = NULL;
1110 	ret = (sshpam_device.query)(sshpam_ctxt, &name, &info, &num, &prompts, &echo_on);
1111 	if (ret == 0 && num == 0)
1112 		sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
1113 	if (num > 1 || name == NULL || info == NULL)
1114 		ret = -1;
1115 	buffer_clear(m);
1116 	buffer_put_int(m, ret);
1117 	buffer_put_cstring(m, name);
1118 	free(name);
1119 	buffer_put_cstring(m, info);
1120 	free(info);
1121 	buffer_put_int(m, num);
1122 	for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
1123 		buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[i]);
1124 		free(prompts[i]);
1125 		buffer_put_int(m, echo_on[i]);
1126 	}
1127 	free(prompts);
1128 	free(echo_on);
1129 	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
1130 	auth_submethod = "pam";
1131 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m);
1132 	return (0);
1133 }
1134 
1135 int
1136 mm_answer_pam_respond(int sock, Buffer *m)
1137 {
1138 	char **resp;
1139 	u_int i, num;
1140 	int ret;
1141 
1142 	debug3("%s", __func__);
1143 	sshpam_authok = NULL;
1144 	num = buffer_get_int(m);
1145 	if (num > 0) {
1146 		resp = xcalloc(num, sizeof(char *));
1147 		for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
1148 			resp[i] = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1149 		ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, resp);
1150 		for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
1151 			free(resp[i]);
1152 		free(resp);
1153 	} else {
1154 		ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, NULL);
1155 	}
1156 	buffer_clear(m);
1157 	buffer_put_int(m, ret);
1158 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m);
1159 	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
1160 	auth_submethod = "pam";
1161 	if (ret == 0)
1162 		sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
1163 	return (0);
1164 }
1165 
1166 int
1167 mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1168 {
1169 	int r = sshpam_authok != NULL && sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt;
1170 
1171 	debug3("%s", __func__);
1172 	(sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt);
1173 	sshpam_ctxt = sshpam_authok = NULL;
1174 	buffer_clear(m);
1175 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
1176 	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
1177 	auth_submethod = "pam";
1178 	return r;
1179 }
1180 #endif
1181 
1182 int
1183 mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1184 {
1185 	Key *key;
1186 	char *cuser, *chost;
1187 	u_char *blob;
1188 	u_int bloblen;
1189 	enum mm_keytype type = 0;
1190 	int allowed = 0;
1191 
1192 	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1193 
1194 	type = buffer_get_int(m);
1195 	cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1196 	chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1197 	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1198 
1199 	key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1200 
1201 	if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) ||
1202 	    (!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY))
1203 		fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __func__);
1204 
1205 	debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
1206 
1207 	if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
1208 		/* These should not make it past the privsep child */
1209 		if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
1210 		    (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0)
1211 			fatal("%s: passed a SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 key", __func__);
1212 
1213 		switch (type) {
1214 		case MM_USERKEY:
1215 			allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
1216 			    !auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key) &&
1217 			    match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
1218 			    options.pubkey_key_types,
1219 			    strlen(options.pubkey_key_types), 0) == 1 &&
1220 			    user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key);
1221 			pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
1222 			auth_method = "publickey";
1223 			if (options.pubkey_authentication && allowed != 1)
1224 				auth_clear_options();
1225 			break;
1226 		case MM_HOSTKEY:
1227 			allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
1228 			    match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
1229 			    options.hostbased_key_types,
1230 			    strlen(options.hostbased_key_types), 0) == 1 &&
1231 			    hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
1232 			    cuser, chost, key);
1233 			pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key,
1234 			    "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"",
1235 			    cuser, chost);
1236 			auth_method = "hostbased";
1237 			break;
1238 #ifdef WITH_SSH1
1239 		case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
1240 			key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
1241 			allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
1242 			    auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
1243 			    cuser, chost, key);
1244 			if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && allowed != 1)
1245 				auth_clear_options();
1246 			auth_method = "rsa";
1247 			break;
1248 #endif
1249 		default:
1250 			fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
1251 			break;
1252 		}
1253 	}
1254 	if (key != NULL)
1255 		key_free(key);
1256 
1257 	/* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
1258 	monitor_reset_key_state();
1259 
1260 	if (allowed) {
1261 		/* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
1262 		key_blob = blob;
1263 		key_bloblen = bloblen;
1264 		key_blobtype = type;
1265 		hostbased_cuser = cuser;
1266 		hostbased_chost = chost;
1267 	} else {
1268 		/* Log failed attempt */
1269 		auth_log(authctxt, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL);
1270 		free(blob);
1271 		free(cuser);
1272 		free(chost);
1273 	}
1274 
1275 	debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
1276 	    __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
1277 
1278 	buffer_clear(m);
1279 	buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1280 	buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1281 
1282 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
1283 
1284 	if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1285 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
1286 
1287 	return (0);
1288 }
1289 
1290 static int
1291 monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
1292 {
1293 	Buffer b;
1294 	char *p, *userstyle;
1295 	u_int len;
1296 	int fail = 0;
1297 
1298 	buffer_init(&b);
1299 	buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1300 
1301 	if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
1302 		p = buffer_ptr(&b);
1303 		len = buffer_len(&b);
1304 		if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1305 		    (len < session_id2_len) ||
1306 		    (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1307 			fail++;
1308 		buffer_consume(&b, session_id2_len);
1309 	} else {
1310 		p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
1311 		if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1312 		    (len != session_id2_len) ||
1313 		    (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1314 			fail++;
1315 		free(p);
1316 	}
1317 	if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
1318 		fail++;
1319 	p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1320 	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
1321 	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
1322 	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
1323 	if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
1324 		logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1325 		    userstyle, p);
1326 		fail++;
1327 	}
1328 	free(userstyle);
1329 	free(p);
1330 	buffer_skip_string(&b);
1331 	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
1332 		if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
1333 			fail++;
1334 	} else {
1335 		p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1336 		if (strcmp("publickey", p) != 0)
1337 			fail++;
1338 		free(p);
1339 		if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
1340 			fail++;
1341 		buffer_skip_string(&b);
1342 	}
1343 	buffer_skip_string(&b);
1344 	if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
1345 		fail++;
1346 	buffer_free(&b);
1347 	return (fail == 0);
1348 }
1349 
1350 static int
1351 monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
1352     char *chost)
1353 {
1354 	Buffer b;
1355 	char *p, *userstyle;
1356 	u_int len;
1357 	int fail = 0;
1358 
1359 	buffer_init(&b);
1360 	buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1361 
1362 	p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
1363 	if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1364 	    (len != session_id2_len) ||
1365 	    (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1366 		fail++;
1367 	free(p);
1368 
1369 	if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
1370 		fail++;
1371 	p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1372 	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
1373 	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
1374 	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
1375 	if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
1376 		logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1377 		    userstyle, p);
1378 		fail++;
1379 	}
1380 	free(userstyle);
1381 	free(p);
1382 	buffer_skip_string(&b);	/* service */
1383 	p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1384 	if (strcmp(p, "hostbased") != 0)
1385 		fail++;
1386 	free(p);
1387 	buffer_skip_string(&b);	/* pkalg */
1388 	buffer_skip_string(&b);	/* pkblob */
1389 
1390 	/* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
1391 	p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1392 	if (((len = strlen(p)) > 0) && p[len - 1] == '.')
1393 		p[len - 1] = '\0';
1394 	if (strcmp(p, chost) != 0)
1395 		fail++;
1396 	free(p);
1397 
1398 	/* verify client user */
1399 	p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1400 	if (strcmp(p, cuser) != 0)
1401 		fail++;
1402 	free(p);
1403 
1404 	if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
1405 		fail++;
1406 	buffer_free(&b);
1407 	return (fail == 0);
1408 }
1409 
1410 int
1411 mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
1412 {
1413 	Key *key;
1414 	u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
1415 	u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
1416 	int verified = 0;
1417 	int valid_data = 0;
1418 
1419 	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1420 	signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
1421 	data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
1422 
1423 	if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
1424 	  !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
1425 		fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1426 
1427 	key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1428 	if (key == NULL)
1429 		fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__);
1430 
1431 	switch (key_blobtype) {
1432 	case MM_USERKEY:
1433 		valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
1434 		break;
1435 	case MM_HOSTKEY:
1436 		valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
1437 		    hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
1438 		break;
1439 	default:
1440 		valid_data = 0;
1441 		break;
1442 	}
1443 	if (!valid_data)
1444 		fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
1445 
1446 	verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
1447 	debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
1448 	    __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
1449 
1450 	/* If auth was successful then record key to ensure it isn't reused */
1451 	if (verified == 1)
1452 		auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key);
1453 	else
1454 		key_free(key);
1455 
1456 	free(blob);
1457 	free(signature);
1458 	free(data);
1459 
1460 	auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased";
1461 
1462 	monitor_reset_key_state();
1463 
1464 	buffer_clear(m);
1465 	buffer_put_int(m, verified);
1466 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
1467 
1468 	return (verified == 1);
1469 }
1470 
1471 static void
1472 mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
1473 {
1474 	socklen_t fromlen;
1475 	struct sockaddr_storage from;
1476 
1477 	/*
1478 	 * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
1479 	 * the address be 0.0.0.0.
1480 	 */
1481 	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
1482 	fromlen = sizeof(from);
1483 	if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
1484 		if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
1485 		    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
1486 			debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1487 			cleanup_exit(255);
1488 		}
1489 	}
1490 	/* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
1491 	record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
1492 	    get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
1493 	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
1494 }
1495 
1496 static void
1497 mm_session_close(Session *s)
1498 {
1499 	debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
1500 	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
1501 		debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
1502 		session_pty_cleanup2(s);
1503 	}
1504 	session_unused(s->self);
1505 }
1506 
1507 int
1508 mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
1509 {
1510 	extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1511 	Session *s;
1512 	int res, fd0;
1513 
1514 	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1515 
1516 	buffer_clear(m);
1517 	s = session_new();
1518 	if (s == NULL)
1519 		goto error;
1520 	s->authctxt = authctxt;
1521 	s->pw = authctxt->pw;
1522 	s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid;
1523 	res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
1524 	if (res == 0)
1525 		goto error;
1526 	pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
1527 
1528 	buffer_put_int(m, 1);
1529 	buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
1530 
1531 	/* We need to trick ttyslot */
1532 	if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
1533 		fatal("%s: dup2", __func__);
1534 
1535 	mm_record_login(s, authctxt->pw);
1536 
1537 	/* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
1538 	close(0);
1539 
1540 	/* send messages generated by record_login */
1541 	buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg));
1542 	buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
1543 
1544 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1545 
1546 	if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 ||
1547 	    mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1)
1548 		fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
1549 
1550 	/* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
1551 	if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
1552 		fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1553 	if (fd0 != 0)
1554 		error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0);
1555 
1556 	/* slave is not needed */
1557 	close(s->ttyfd);
1558 	s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
1559 	/* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
1560 	s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
1561 
1562 	debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
1563 
1564 	return (0);
1565 
1566  error:
1567 	if (s != NULL)
1568 		mm_session_close(s);
1569 	buffer_put_int(m, 0);
1570 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1571 	return (0);
1572 }
1573 
1574 int
1575 mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, Buffer *m)
1576 {
1577 	Session *s;
1578 	char *tty;
1579 
1580 	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1581 
1582 	tty = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1583 	if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
1584 		mm_session_close(s);
1585 	buffer_clear(m);
1586 	free(tty);
1587 	return (0);
1588 }
1589 
1590 #ifdef WITH_SSH1
1591 int
1592 mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m)
1593 {
1594 	BIGNUM *p;
1595 	int rsafail;
1596 
1597 	/* Turn off permissions */
1598 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 0);
1599 
1600 	if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
1601 		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1602 
1603 	buffer_get_bignum2(m, p);
1604 
1605 	rsafail = ssh1_session_key(p);
1606 
1607 	buffer_clear(m);
1608 	buffer_put_int(m, rsafail);
1609 	buffer_put_bignum2(m, p);
1610 
1611 	BN_clear_free(p);
1612 
1613 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m);
1614 
1615 	/* Turn on permissions for sessid passing */
1616 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, 1);
1617 
1618 	return (0);
1619 }
1620 
1621 int
1622 mm_answer_sessid(int sock, Buffer *m)
1623 {
1624 	int i;
1625 
1626 	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1627 
1628 	if (buffer_len(m) != 16)
1629 		fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __func__);
1630 	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
1631 		session_id[i] = buffer_get_char(m);
1632 
1633 	/* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
1634 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
1635 
1636 	return (0);
1637 }
1638 
1639 int
1640 mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1641 {
1642 	BIGNUM *client_n;
1643 	Key *key = NULL;
1644 	u_char *blob = NULL;
1645 	u_int blen = 0;
1646 	int allowed = 0;
1647 
1648 	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1649 
1650 	auth_method = "rsa";
1651 	if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) {
1652 		if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
1653 			fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1654 		buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n);
1655 		allowed = auth_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, client_n, &key);
1656 		BN_clear_free(client_n);
1657 	}
1658 	buffer_clear(m);
1659 	buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1660 	buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1661 
1662 	/* clear temporarily storage (used by generate challenge) */
1663 	monitor_reset_key_state();
1664 
1665 	if (allowed && key != NULL) {
1666 		key->type = KEY_RSA;	/* cheat for key_to_blob */
1667 		if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
1668 			fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
1669 		buffer_put_string(m, blob, blen);
1670 
1671 		/* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
1672 		key_blob = blob;
1673 		key_bloblen = blen;
1674 		key_blobtype = MM_RSAUSERKEY;
1675 	}
1676 	if (key != NULL)
1677 		key_free(key);
1678 
1679 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m);
1680 
1681 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
1682 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 0);
1683 	return (0);
1684 }
1685 
1686 int
1687 mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int sock, Buffer *m)
1688 {
1689 	Key *key = NULL;
1690 	u_char *blob;
1691 	u_int blen;
1692 
1693 	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1694 
1695 	if (!authctxt->valid)
1696 		fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1697 	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1698 	if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1699 		fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1700 	if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1701 		fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __func__);
1702 	if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1703 		fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1704 	if (key->type != KEY_RSA)
1705 		fatal("%s: received bad key type %d", __func__, key->type);
1706 	key->type = KEY_RSA1;
1707 	if (ssh1_challenge)
1708 		BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1709 	ssh1_challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key);
1710 
1711 	buffer_clear(m);
1712 	buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge);
1713 
1714 	debug3("%s sending reply", __func__);
1715 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m);
1716 
1717 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1);
1718 
1719 	free(blob);
1720 	key_free(key);
1721 	return (0);
1722 }
1723 
1724 int
1725 mm_answer_rsa_response(int sock, Buffer *m)
1726 {
1727 	Key *key = NULL;
1728 	u_char *blob, *response;
1729 	u_int blen, len;
1730 	int success;
1731 
1732 	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1733 
1734 	if (!authctxt->valid)
1735 		fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1736 	if (ssh1_challenge == NULL)
1737 		fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __func__);
1738 
1739 	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1740 	if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1741 		fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1742 	if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1743 		fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __func__, key_blobtype);
1744 	if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1745 		fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1746 	response = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1747 	if (len != 16)
1748 		fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __func__);
1749 	success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response);
1750 
1751 	free(blob);
1752 	key_free(key);
1753 	free(response);
1754 
1755 	auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_RSAUSERKEY ? "rsa" : "rhosts-rsa";
1756 
1757 	/* reset state */
1758 	BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1759 	ssh1_challenge = NULL;
1760 	monitor_reset_key_state();
1761 
1762 	buffer_clear(m);
1763 	buffer_put_int(m, success);
1764 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m);
1765 
1766 	return (success);
1767 }
1768 #endif
1769 
1770 int
1771 mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
1772 {
1773 	extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1774 	int res, status;
1775 
1776 	debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__);
1777 
1778 	/* The child is terminating */
1779 	session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close);
1780 
1781 #ifdef USE_PAM
1782 	if (options.use_pam)
1783 		sshpam_cleanup();
1784 #endif
1785 
1786 	while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
1787 		if (errno != EINTR)
1788 			exit(1);
1789 
1790 	res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
1791 
1792 	/* Terminate process */
1793 	exit(res);
1794 }
1795 
1796 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
1797 /* Report that an audit event occurred */
1798 int
1799 mm_answer_audit_event(int socket, Buffer *m)
1800 {
1801 	ssh_audit_event_t event;
1802 
1803 	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1804 
1805 	event = buffer_get_int(m);
1806 	switch(event) {
1807 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
1808 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
1809 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
1810 	case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
1811 	case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
1812 	case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
1813 	case SSH_INVALID_USER:
1814 		audit_event(event);
1815 		break;
1816 	default:
1817 		fatal("Audit event type %d not permitted", event);
1818 	}
1819 
1820 	return (0);
1821 }
1822 
1823 int
1824 mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buffer *m)
1825 {
1826 	u_int len;
1827 	char *cmd;
1828 
1829 	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1830 	cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1831 	/* sanity check command, if so how? */
1832 	audit_run_command(cmd);
1833 	free(cmd);
1834 	return (0);
1835 }
1836 #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
1837 
1838 void
1839 monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1840 {
1841 	struct ssh *ssh = active_state;	/* XXX */
1842 	struct kex *kex;
1843 	int r;
1844 
1845 	debug3("%s: packet_set_state", __func__);
1846 	if ((r = ssh_packet_set_state(ssh, child_state)) != 0)
1847                 fatal("%s: packet_set_state: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1848 	sshbuf_free(child_state);
1849 	child_state = NULL;
1850 
1851 	if ((kex = ssh->kex) != 0) {
1852 		/* XXX set callbacks */
1853 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1854 		kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1855 		kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1856 		kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
1857 		kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
1858 # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
1859 		kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
1860 # endif
1861 #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
1862 		kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
1863 		kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
1864 		kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
1865 		kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
1866 		kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
1867 	}
1868 
1869 	/* Update with new address */
1870 	if (options.compression) {
1871 		ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, pmonitor->m_zlib,
1872 		    (ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc,
1873 		    (ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree);
1874 	}
1875 }
1876 
1877 /* This function requries careful sanity checking */
1878 
1879 void
1880 mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1881 {
1882 	debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__);
1883 
1884 	if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
1885 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
1886 	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT,
1887 	    child_state);
1888 	debug3("%s: GOT new keys", __func__);
1889 }
1890 
1891 
1892 /* XXX */
1893 
1894 #define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
1895 	if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \
1896 		fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
1897 } while (0)
1898 
1899 static void
1900 monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
1901 {
1902 	int pair[2];
1903 
1904 	if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
1905 		fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1906 	FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1907 	FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1908 	mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
1909 	mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
1910 
1911 	if (do_logfds) {
1912 		if (pipe(pair) == -1)
1913 			fatal("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1914 		FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1915 		FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1916 		mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0];
1917 		mon->m_log_sendfd = pair[1];
1918 	} else
1919 		mon->m_log_recvfd = mon->m_log_sendfd = -1;
1920 }
1921 
1922 #define MM_MEMSIZE	65536
1923 
1924 struct monitor *
1925 monitor_init(void)
1926 {
1927 	struct ssh *ssh = active_state;			/* XXX */
1928 	struct monitor *mon;
1929 
1930 	mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
1931 
1932 	monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
1933 
1934 	/* Used to share zlib space across processes */
1935 	if (options.compression) {
1936 		mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE);
1937 		mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE);
1938 
1939 		/* Compression needs to share state across borders */
1940 		ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, mon->m_zlib,
1941 		    (ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc,
1942 		    (ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree);
1943 	}
1944 
1945 	return mon;
1946 }
1947 
1948 void
1949 monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
1950 {
1951 	monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
1952 }
1953 
1954 #ifdef GSSAPI
1955 int
1956 mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1957 {
1958 	gss_OID_desc goid;
1959 	OM_uint32 major;
1960 	u_int len;
1961 
1962 	goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1963 	goid.length = len;
1964 
1965 	major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
1966 
1967 	free(goid.elements);
1968 
1969 	buffer_clear(m);
1970 	buffer_put_int(m, major);
1971 
1972 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
1973 
1974 	/* Now we have a context, enable the step */
1975 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1);
1976 
1977 	return (0);
1978 }
1979 
1980 int
1981 mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1982 {
1983 	gss_buffer_desc in;
1984 	gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1985 	OM_uint32 major, minor;
1986 	OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
1987 	u_int len;
1988 
1989 	in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1990 	in.length = len;
1991 	major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
1992 	free(in.value);
1993 
1994 	buffer_clear(m);
1995 	buffer_put_int(m, major);
1996 	buffer_put_string(m, out.value, out.length);
1997 	buffer_put_int(m, flags);
1998 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
1999 
2000 	gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
2001 
2002 	if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
2003 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
2004 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
2005 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
2006 	}
2007 	return (0);
2008 }
2009 
2010 int
2011 mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
2012 {
2013 	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
2014 	OM_uint32 ret;
2015 	u_int len;
2016 
2017 	gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
2018 	gssbuf.length = len;
2019 	mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
2020 	mic.length = len;
2021 
2022 	ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
2023 
2024 	free(gssbuf.value);
2025 	free(mic.value);
2026 
2027 	buffer_clear(m);
2028 	buffer_put_int(m, ret);
2029 
2030 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
2031 
2032 	if (!GSS_ERROR(ret))
2033 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
2034 
2035 	return (0);
2036 }
2037 
2038 int
2039 mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
2040 {
2041 	int authenticated;
2042 
2043 	authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
2044 
2045 	buffer_clear(m);
2046 	buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
2047 
2048 	debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
2049 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
2050 
2051 	auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
2052 
2053 	/* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
2054 	return (authenticated);
2055 }
2056 #endif /* GSSAPI */
2057 
2058