xref: /freebsd/share/man/man4/mac_partition.4 (revision 069ac184)
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8.\" DARPA CHATS research program.
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31.Dd July 25, 2015
32.Dt MAC_PARTITION 4
33.Os
34.Sh NAME
35.Nm mac_partition
36.Nd "process partition policy"
37.Sh SYNOPSIS
38To compile the process partition policy into your kernel,
39place the following lines in your kernel
40configuration file:
41.Bd -ragged -offset indent
42.Cd "options MAC"
43.Cd "options MAC_PARTITION"
44.Ed
45.Pp
46Alternately, to load the process partition module at boot time,
47place the following line in your kernel configuration file:
48.Bd -ragged -offset indent
49.Cd "options MAC"
50.Ed
51.Pp
52and in
53.Xr loader.conf 5 :
54.Bd -literal -offset indent
55mac_partition_load="YES"
56.Ed
57.Sh DESCRIPTION
58The
59.Nm
60policy module implements a process partition policy,
61which allows administrators to place running processes into
62.Dq partitions ,
63based on their numeric process partition
64(specified in the process's MAC label).
65Processes with a specified partition can only see processes that are in the
66same partition.
67If no partition is specified for a process, it can see all other processes
68in the system
69(subject to other MAC policy restrictions not defined in this man page).
70No provisions for placing processes into multiple partitions are available.
71.Ss Label Format
72Partition labels take on the following format:
73.Pp
74.Sm off
75.Dl Li partition / Ar value
76.Sm on
77.Pp
78Where
79.Ar value
80can be any integer value or
81.Dq Li none .
82For example:
83.Bd -literal -offset indent
84partition/1
85partition/20
86partition/none
87.Ed
88.Sh SEE ALSO
89.Xr mac 4 ,
90.Xr mac_biba 4 ,
91.Xr mac_bsdextended 4 ,
92.Xr mac_ddb 4 ,
93.Xr mac_ifoff 4 ,
94.Xr mac_lomac 4 ,
95.Xr mac_mls 4 ,
96.Xr mac_none 4 ,
97.Xr mac_portacl 4 ,
98.Xr mac_seeotheruids 4 ,
99.Xr mac_test 4 ,
100.Xr maclabel 7 ,
101.Xr mac 9
102.Sh HISTORY
103The
104.Nm
105policy module first appeared in
106.Fx 5.0
107and was developed by the
108.Tn TrustedBSD
109Project.
110.Sh AUTHORS
111This software was contributed to the
112.Fx
113Project by Network Associates Labs,
114the Security Research Division of Network Associates
115Inc.
116under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035
117.Pq Dq CBOSS ,
118as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
119.Sh BUGS
120While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of
121the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry
122point checks.
123As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on, in isolation,
124to protect against a malicious privileged user.
125