1 /*- 2 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD 3 * 4 * Copyright (c) 1999-2006 Robert N. M. Watson 5 * All rights reserved. 6 * 7 * This software was developed by Robert Watson for the TrustedBSD Project. 8 * 9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 11 * are met: 12 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 13 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 14 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 15 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 16 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 17 * 18 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND 19 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 20 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 21 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 22 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 23 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 24 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 25 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 26 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 27 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 28 * SUCH DAMAGE. 29 */ 30 /* 31 * Developed by the TrustedBSD Project. 32 * 33 * ACL support routines specific to POSIX.1e access control lists. These are 34 * utility routines for code common across file systems implementing POSIX.1e 35 * ACLs. 36 */ 37 38 #include <sys/cdefs.h> 39 __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); 40 41 #include <sys/param.h> 42 #include <sys/kernel.h> 43 #include <sys/module.h> 44 #include <sys/systm.h> 45 #include <sys/mount.h> 46 #include <sys/priv.h> 47 #include <sys/vnode.h> 48 #include <sys/errno.h> 49 #include <sys/stat.h> 50 #include <sys/acl.h> 51 52 /* 53 * Implement a version of vaccess() that understands POSIX.1e ACL semantics; 54 * the access ACL has already been prepared for evaluation by the file system 55 * and is passed via 'uid', 'gid', and 'acl'. Return 0 on success, else an 56 * errno value. 57 */ 58 int 59 vaccess_acl_posix1e(enum vtype type, uid_t file_uid, gid_t file_gid, 60 struct acl *acl, accmode_t accmode, struct ucred *cred, int *privused) 61 { 62 struct acl_entry *acl_other, *acl_mask; 63 accmode_t dac_granted; 64 accmode_t priv_granted; 65 accmode_t acl_mask_granted; 66 int group_matched, i; 67 68 KASSERT((accmode & ~(VEXEC | VWRITE | VREAD | VADMIN | VAPPEND)) == 0, 69 ("invalid bit in accmode")); 70 KASSERT((accmode & VAPPEND) == 0 || (accmode & VWRITE), 71 ("VAPPEND without VWRITE")); 72 73 /* 74 * Look for a normal, non-privileged way to access the file/directory 75 * as requested. If it exists, go with that. Otherwise, attempt to 76 * use privileges granted via priv_granted. In some cases, which 77 * privileges to use may be ambiguous due to "best match", in which 78 * case fall back on first match for the time being. 79 */ 80 if (privused != NULL) 81 *privused = 0; 82 83 /* 84 * Determine privileges now, but don't apply until we've found a DAC 85 * entry that matches but has failed to allow access. 86 * 87 * XXXRW: Ideally, we'd determine the privileges required before 88 * asking for them. 89 */ 90 priv_granted = 0; 91 92 if (type == VDIR) { 93 if ((accmode & VEXEC) && !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP)) 94 priv_granted |= VEXEC; 95 } else { 96 /* 97 * Ensure that at least one execute bit is on. Otherwise, 98 * a privileged user will always succeed, and we don't want 99 * this to happen unless the file really is executable. 100 */ 101 if ((accmode & VEXEC) && (acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(acl) & 102 (S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH)) != 0 && 103 !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_EXEC)) 104 priv_granted |= VEXEC; 105 } 106 107 if ((accmode & VREAD) && !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_READ)) 108 priv_granted |= VREAD; 109 110 if (((accmode & VWRITE) || (accmode & VAPPEND)) && 111 !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_WRITE)) 112 priv_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 113 114 if ((accmode & VADMIN) && !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN)) 115 priv_granted |= VADMIN; 116 117 /* 118 * The owner matches if the effective uid associated with the 119 * credential matches that of the ACL_USER_OBJ entry. While we're 120 * doing the first scan, also cache the location of the ACL_MASK and 121 * ACL_OTHER entries, preventing some future iterations. 122 */ 123 acl_mask = acl_other = NULL; 124 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { 125 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { 126 case ACL_USER_OBJ: 127 if (file_uid != cred->cr_uid) 128 break; 129 dac_granted = 0; 130 dac_granted |= VADMIN; 131 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 132 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 133 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ) 134 dac_granted |= VREAD; 135 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 136 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 137 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode) 138 return (0); 139 140 /* 141 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here. 142 */ 143 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) == 144 accmode) { 145 if (privused != NULL) 146 *privused = 1; 147 return (0); 148 } 149 goto error; 150 151 case ACL_MASK: 152 acl_mask = &acl->acl_entry[i]; 153 break; 154 155 case ACL_OTHER: 156 acl_other = &acl->acl_entry[i]; 157 break; 158 159 default: 160 break; 161 } 162 } 163 164 /* 165 * An ACL_OTHER entry should always exist in a valid access ACL. If 166 * it doesn't, then generate a serious failure. For now, this means 167 * a debugging message and EPERM, but in the future should probably 168 * be a panic. 169 */ 170 if (acl_other == NULL) { 171 /* 172 * XXX This should never happen 173 */ 174 printf("vaccess_acl_posix1e: ACL_OTHER missing\n"); 175 return (EPERM); 176 } 177 178 /* 179 * Checks against ACL_USER, ACL_GROUP_OBJ, and ACL_GROUP fields are 180 * masked by an ACL_MASK entry, if any. As such, first identify the 181 * ACL_MASK field, then iterate through identifying potential user 182 * matches, then group matches. If there is no ACL_MASK, assume that 183 * the mask allows all requests to succeed. 184 */ 185 if (acl_mask != NULL) { 186 acl_mask_granted = 0; 187 if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 188 acl_mask_granted |= VEXEC; 189 if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_READ) 190 acl_mask_granted |= VREAD; 191 if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 192 acl_mask_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 193 } else 194 acl_mask_granted = VEXEC | VREAD | VWRITE | VAPPEND; 195 196 /* 197 * Check ACL_USER ACL entries. There will either be one or no 198 * matches; if there is one, we accept or rejected based on the 199 * match; otherwise, we continue on to groups. 200 */ 201 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { 202 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { 203 case ACL_USER: 204 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != cred->cr_uid) 205 break; 206 dac_granted = 0; 207 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 208 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 209 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ) 210 dac_granted |= VREAD; 211 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 212 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 213 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted; 214 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode) 215 return (0); 216 /* 217 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here. 218 */ 219 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) != 220 accmode) 221 goto error; 222 223 if (privused != NULL) 224 *privused = 1; 225 return (0); 226 } 227 } 228 229 /* 230 * Group match is best-match, not first-match, so find a "best" 231 * match. Iterate across, testing each potential group match. Make 232 * sure we keep track of whether we found a match or not, so that we 233 * know if we should try again with any available privilege, or if we 234 * should move on to ACL_OTHER. 235 */ 236 group_matched = 0; 237 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { 238 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { 239 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 240 if (!groupmember(file_gid, cred)) 241 break; 242 dac_granted = 0; 243 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 244 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 245 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ) 246 dac_granted |= VREAD; 247 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 248 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 249 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted; 250 251 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode) 252 return (0); 253 254 group_matched = 1; 255 break; 256 257 case ACL_GROUP: 258 if (!groupmember(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id, cred)) 259 break; 260 dac_granted = 0; 261 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 262 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 263 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ) 264 dac_granted |= VREAD; 265 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 266 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 267 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted; 268 269 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode) 270 return (0); 271 272 group_matched = 1; 273 break; 274 275 default: 276 break; 277 } 278 } 279 280 if (group_matched == 1) { 281 /* 282 * There was a match, but it did not grant rights via pure 283 * DAC. Try again, this time with privilege. 284 */ 285 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { 286 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { 287 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 288 if (!groupmember(file_gid, cred)) 289 break; 290 dac_granted = 0; 291 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 292 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 293 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ) 294 dac_granted |= VREAD; 295 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 296 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 297 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted; 298 299 /* 300 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here. 301 */ 302 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) 303 != accmode) 304 break; 305 306 if (privused != NULL) 307 *privused = 1; 308 return (0); 309 310 case ACL_GROUP: 311 if (!groupmember(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id, 312 cred)) 313 break; 314 dac_granted = 0; 315 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 316 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 317 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ) 318 dac_granted |= VREAD; 319 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 320 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 321 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted; 322 323 /* 324 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here. 325 */ 326 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) 327 != accmode) 328 break; 329 330 if (privused != NULL) 331 *privused = 1; 332 return (0); 333 334 default: 335 break; 336 } 337 } 338 /* 339 * Even with privilege, group membership was not sufficient. 340 * Return failure. 341 */ 342 goto error; 343 } 344 345 /* 346 * Fall back on ACL_OTHER. ACL_MASK is not applied to ACL_OTHER. 347 */ 348 dac_granted = 0; 349 if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 350 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 351 if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_READ) 352 dac_granted |= VREAD; 353 if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 354 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 355 356 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode) 357 return (0); 358 /* 359 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here. 360 */ 361 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) == accmode) { 362 if (privused != NULL) 363 *privused = 1; 364 return (0); 365 } 366 367 error: 368 return ((accmode & VADMIN) ? EPERM : EACCES); 369 } 370 371 /* 372 * For the purposes of filesystems maintaining the _OBJ entries in an inode 373 * with a mode_t field, this routine converts a mode_t entry to an 374 * acl_perm_t. 375 */ 376 acl_perm_t 377 acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm(acl_tag_t tag, mode_t mode) 378 { 379 acl_perm_t perm = 0; 380 381 switch(tag) { 382 case ACL_USER_OBJ: 383 if (mode & S_IXUSR) 384 perm |= ACL_EXECUTE; 385 if (mode & S_IRUSR) 386 perm |= ACL_READ; 387 if (mode & S_IWUSR) 388 perm |= ACL_WRITE; 389 return (perm); 390 391 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 392 if (mode & S_IXGRP) 393 perm |= ACL_EXECUTE; 394 if (mode & S_IRGRP) 395 perm |= ACL_READ; 396 if (mode & S_IWGRP) 397 perm |= ACL_WRITE; 398 return (perm); 399 400 case ACL_OTHER: 401 if (mode & S_IXOTH) 402 perm |= ACL_EXECUTE; 403 if (mode & S_IROTH) 404 perm |= ACL_READ; 405 if (mode & S_IWOTH) 406 perm |= ACL_WRITE; 407 return (perm); 408 409 default: 410 printf("acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm: invalid tag (%d)\n", tag); 411 return (0); 412 } 413 } 414 415 /* 416 * Given inode information (uid, gid, mode), return an acl entry of the 417 * appropriate type. 418 */ 419 struct acl_entry 420 acl_posix1e_mode_to_entry(acl_tag_t tag, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode) 421 { 422 struct acl_entry acl_entry; 423 424 acl_entry.ae_tag = tag; 425 acl_entry.ae_perm = acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm(tag, mode); 426 acl_entry.ae_entry_type = 0; 427 acl_entry.ae_flags = 0; 428 switch(tag) { 429 case ACL_USER_OBJ: 430 acl_entry.ae_id = uid; 431 break; 432 433 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 434 acl_entry.ae_id = gid; 435 break; 436 437 case ACL_OTHER: 438 acl_entry.ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; 439 break; 440 441 default: 442 acl_entry.ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; 443 printf("acl_posix1e_mode_to_entry: invalid tag (%d)\n", tag); 444 } 445 446 return (acl_entry); 447 } 448 449 /* 450 * Utility function to generate a file mode given appropriate ACL entries. 451 */ 452 mode_t 453 acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(struct acl_entry *acl_user_obj_entry, 454 struct acl_entry *acl_group_obj_entry, struct acl_entry *acl_other_entry) 455 { 456 mode_t mode; 457 458 mode = 0; 459 if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 460 mode |= S_IXUSR; 461 if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ) 462 mode |= S_IRUSR; 463 if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 464 mode |= S_IWUSR; 465 if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 466 mode |= S_IXGRP; 467 if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ) 468 mode |= S_IRGRP; 469 if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 470 mode |= S_IWGRP; 471 if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 472 mode |= S_IXOTH; 473 if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ) 474 mode |= S_IROTH; 475 if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 476 mode |= S_IWOTH; 477 478 return (mode); 479 } 480 481 /* 482 * Utility function to generate a file mode given a complete POSIX.1e access 483 * ACL. Note that if the ACL is improperly formed, this may result in a 484 * panic. 485 */ 486 mode_t 487 acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(struct acl *acl) 488 { 489 struct acl_entry *acl_mask, *acl_user_obj, *acl_group_obj, *acl_other; 490 int i; 491 492 /* 493 * Find the ACL entries relevant to a POSIX permission mode. 494 */ 495 acl_user_obj = acl_group_obj = acl_other = acl_mask = NULL; 496 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { 497 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { 498 case ACL_USER_OBJ: 499 acl_user_obj = &acl->acl_entry[i]; 500 break; 501 502 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 503 acl_group_obj = &acl->acl_entry[i]; 504 break; 505 506 case ACL_OTHER: 507 acl_other = &acl->acl_entry[i]; 508 break; 509 510 case ACL_MASK: 511 acl_mask = &acl->acl_entry[i]; 512 break; 513 514 case ACL_USER: 515 case ACL_GROUP: 516 break; 517 518 default: 519 panic("acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode: bad ae_tag"); 520 } 521 } 522 523 if (acl_user_obj == NULL || acl_group_obj == NULL || acl_other == NULL) 524 panic("acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode: missing base ae_tags"); 525 526 /* 527 * POSIX.1e specifies that if there is an ACL_MASK entry, we replace 528 * the mode "group" bits with its permissions. If there isn't, we 529 * use the ACL_GROUP_OBJ permissions. 530 */ 531 if (acl_mask != NULL) 532 return (acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(acl_user_obj, acl_mask, 533 acl_other)); 534 else 535 return (acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(acl_user_obj, acl_group_obj, 536 acl_other)); 537 } 538 539 /* 540 * Perform a syntactic check of the ACL, sufficient to allow an implementing 541 * filesystem to determine if it should accept this and rely on the POSIX.1e 542 * ACL properties. 543 */ 544 int 545 acl_posix1e_check(struct acl *acl) 546 { 547 int num_acl_user_obj, num_acl_user, num_acl_group_obj, num_acl_group; 548 int num_acl_mask, num_acl_other, i; 549 550 /* 551 * Verify that the number of entries does not exceed the maximum 552 * defined for acl_t. 553 * 554 * Verify that the correct number of various sorts of ae_tags are 555 * present: 556 * Exactly one ACL_USER_OBJ 557 * Exactly one ACL_GROUP_OBJ 558 * Exactly one ACL_OTHER 559 * If any ACL_USER or ACL_GROUP entries appear, then exactly one 560 * ACL_MASK entry must also appear. 561 * 562 * Verify that all ae_perm entries are in ACL_PERM_BITS. 563 * 564 * Verify all ae_tag entries are understood by this implementation. 565 * 566 * Note: Does not check for uniqueness of qualifier (ae_id) field. 567 */ 568 num_acl_user_obj = num_acl_user = num_acl_group_obj = num_acl_group = 569 num_acl_mask = num_acl_other = 0; 570 if (acl->acl_cnt > ACL_MAX_ENTRIES) 571 return (EINVAL); 572 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { 573 /* 574 * Check for a valid tag. 575 */ 576 switch(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { 577 case ACL_USER_OBJ: 578 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */ 579 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) 580 return (EINVAL); 581 num_acl_user_obj++; 582 break; 583 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 584 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */ 585 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) 586 return (EINVAL); 587 num_acl_group_obj++; 588 break; 589 case ACL_USER: 590 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) 591 return (EINVAL); 592 num_acl_user++; 593 break; 594 case ACL_GROUP: 595 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) 596 return (EINVAL); 597 num_acl_group++; 598 break; 599 case ACL_OTHER: 600 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */ 601 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) 602 return (EINVAL); 603 num_acl_other++; 604 break; 605 case ACL_MASK: 606 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */ 607 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) 608 return (EINVAL); 609 num_acl_mask++; 610 break; 611 default: 612 return (EINVAL); 613 } 614 /* 615 * Check for valid perm entries. 616 */ 617 if ((acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm | ACL_PERM_BITS) != 618 ACL_PERM_BITS) 619 return (EINVAL); 620 } 621 if ((num_acl_user_obj != 1) || (num_acl_group_obj != 1) || 622 (num_acl_other != 1) || (num_acl_mask != 0 && num_acl_mask != 1)) 623 return (EINVAL); 624 if (((num_acl_group != 0) || (num_acl_user != 0)) && 625 (num_acl_mask != 1)) 626 return (EINVAL); 627 return (0); 628 } 629 630 /* 631 * Given a requested mode for a new object, and a default ACL, combine the 632 * two to produce a new mode. Be careful not to clear any bits that aren't 633 * intended to be affected by the POSIX.1e ACL. Eventually, this might also 634 * take the cmask as an argument, if we push that down into 635 * per-filesystem-code. 636 */ 637 mode_t 638 acl_posix1e_newfilemode(mode_t cmode, struct acl *dacl) 639 { 640 mode_t mode; 641 642 mode = cmode; 643 /* 644 * The current composition policy is that a permission bit must be 645 * set in *both* the ACL and the requested creation mode for it to 646 * appear in the resulting mode/ACL. First clear any possibly 647 * effected bits, then reconstruct. 648 */ 649 mode &= ACL_PRESERVE_MASK; 650 mode |= (ACL_OVERRIDE_MASK & cmode & acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(dacl)); 651 652 return (mode); 653 } 654 655 static int 656 acl_posix1e_modload(module_t mod, int what, void *arg) 657 { 658 int ret; 659 660 ret = 0; 661 662 switch (what) { 663 case MOD_LOAD: 664 case MOD_SHUTDOWN: 665 break; 666 667 case MOD_QUIESCE: 668 /* XXX TODO */ 669 ret = 0; 670 break; 671 672 case MOD_UNLOAD: 673 /* XXX TODO */ 674 ret = 0; 675 break; 676 default: 677 ret = EINVAL; 678 break; 679 } 680 681 return (ret); 682 } 683 684 static moduledata_t acl_posix1e_mod = { 685 "acl_posix1e", 686 acl_posix1e_modload, 687 NULL 688 }; 689 690 DECLARE_MODULE(acl_posix1e, acl_posix1e_mod, SI_SUB_VFS, SI_ORDER_FIRST); 691 MODULE_VERSION(acl_posix1e, 1); 692