1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */ 2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58 59 #include <stdio.h> 60 #include <time.h> 61 #include <errno.h> 62 63 #include "cryptlib.h" 64 #include <openssl/crypto.h> 65 #include <openssl/lhash.h> 66 #include <openssl/buffer.h> 67 #include <openssl/evp.h> 68 #include <openssl/asn1.h> 69 #include <openssl/x509.h> 70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h> 71 #include <openssl/objects.h> 72 73 /* CRL score values */ 74 75 /* No unhandled critical extensions */ 76 77 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 78 79 /* certificate is within CRL scope */ 80 81 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 82 83 /* CRL times valid */ 84 85 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 86 87 /* Issuer name matches certificate */ 88 89 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 90 91 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ 92 93 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) 94 95 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ 96 97 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 98 99 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ 100 101 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 102 103 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ 104 105 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 106 107 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ 108 109 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 110 111 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e); 112 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); 113 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); 114 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 115 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 116 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 117 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 118 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 119 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 120 121 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, 122 unsigned int *preasons, 123 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); 124 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 125 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); 126 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score, 127 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); 128 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, 129 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score); 130 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, 131 unsigned int *preasons); 132 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); 133 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 134 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, 135 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); 136 137 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 138 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; 139 140 141 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) 142 { 143 return ok; 144 } 145 146 #if 0 147 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b) 148 { 149 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b); 150 } 151 #endif 152 153 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 154 { 155 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL; 156 int bad_chain = 0; 157 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param; 158 int depth,i,ok=0; 159 int num; 160 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 161 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL; 162 if (ctx->cert == NULL) 163 { 164 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); 165 return -1; 166 } 167 168 cb=ctx->verify_cb; 169 170 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is 171 * present and that the first entry is in place */ 172 if (ctx->chain == NULL) 173 { 174 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || 175 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert))) 176 { 177 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 178 goto end; 179 } 180 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 181 ctx->last_untrusted=1; 182 } 183 184 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */ 185 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL 186 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) 187 { 188 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 189 goto end; 190 } 191 192 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 193 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); 194 depth=param->depth; 195 196 197 for (;;) 198 { 199 /* If we have enough, we break */ 200 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take 201 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the 202 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error 203 * code later. 204 */ 205 206 /* If we are self signed, we break */ 207 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break; 208 209 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ 210 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) 211 { 212 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x); 213 if (xtmp != NULL) 214 { 215 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp)) 216 { 217 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 218 goto end; 219 } 220 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 221 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp); 222 ctx->last_untrusted++; 223 x=xtmp; 224 num++; 225 /* reparse the full chain for 226 * the next one */ 227 continue; 228 } 229 } 230 break; 231 } 232 233 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted 234 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one, 235 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */ 236 237 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it 238 * is self signed. 239 */ 240 241 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 242 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1); 243 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) 244 { 245 /* we have a self signed certificate */ 246 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) 247 { 248 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if 249 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact 250 * match to avoid possible impersonation. 251 */ 252 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); 253 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) 254 { 255 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; 256 ctx->current_cert=x; 257 ctx->error_depth=i-1; 258 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp); 259 bad_chain = 1; 260 ok=cb(0,ctx); 261 if (!ok) goto end; 262 } 263 else 264 { 265 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version 266 * so we get any trust settings. 267 */ 268 X509_free(x); 269 x = xtmp; 270 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); 271 ctx->last_untrusted=0; 272 } 273 } 274 else 275 { 276 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */ 277 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); 278 ctx->last_untrusted--; 279 num--; 280 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); 281 } 282 } 283 284 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ 285 for (;;) 286 { 287 /* If we have enough, we break */ 288 if (depth < num) break; 289 290 /* If we are self signed, we break */ 291 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break; 292 293 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); 294 295 if (ok < 0) return ok; 296 if (ok == 0) break; 297 298 x = xtmp; 299 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x)) 300 { 301 X509_free(xtmp); 302 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 303 return 0; 304 } 305 num++; 306 } 307 308 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ 309 310 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */ 311 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) 312 { 313 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) 314 { 315 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) 316 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; 317 else 318 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; 319 ctx->current_cert=x; 320 } 321 else 322 { 323 324 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss); 325 num++; 326 ctx->last_untrusted=num; 327 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss; 328 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; 329 chain_ss=NULL; 330 } 331 332 ctx->error_depth=num-1; 333 bad_chain = 1; 334 ok=cb(0,ctx); 335 if (!ok) goto end; 336 } 337 338 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ 339 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx); 340 341 if (!ok) goto end; 342 343 /* Check name constraints */ 344 345 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx); 346 347 if (!ok) goto end; 348 349 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */ 350 351 if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx); 352 353 if (!ok) goto end; 354 355 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ 356 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); 357 358 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters 359 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification. 360 */ 361 362 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); 363 if(!ok) goto end; 364 365 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */ 366 if (ctx->verify != NULL) 367 ok=ctx->verify(ctx); 368 else 369 ok=internal_verify(ctx); 370 if(!ok) goto end; 371 372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 373 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ 374 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx); 375 if (!ok) goto end; 376 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx); 377 if (!ok) goto end; 378 #endif 379 380 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ 381 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)) 382 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); 383 if(!ok) goto end; 384 if (0) 385 { 386 end: 387 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); 388 } 389 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp); 390 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss); 391 return ok; 392 } 393 394 395 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) 396 */ 397 398 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) 399 { 400 int i; 401 X509 *issuer; 402 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) 403 { 404 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); 405 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) 406 return issuer; 407 } 408 return NULL; 409 } 410 411 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ 412 413 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) 414 { 415 int ret; 416 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); 417 if (ret == X509_V_OK) 418 return 1; 419 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */ 420 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) 421 return 0; 422 423 ctx->error = ret; 424 ctx->current_cert = x; 425 ctx->current_issuer = issuer; 426 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 427 return 0; 428 } 429 430 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ 431 432 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 433 { 434 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); 435 if (*issuer) 436 { 437 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 438 return 1; 439 } 440 else 441 return 0; 442 } 443 444 445 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency 446 * with the supplied purpose 447 */ 448 449 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 450 { 451 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY 452 return 1; 453 #else 454 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0; 455 X509 *x; 456 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 457 int proxy_path_length = 0; 458 int purpose; 459 int allow_proxy_certs; 460 cb=ctx->verify_cb; 461 462 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: 463 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct 464 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). 465 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not 466 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. 467 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for 468 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. 469 */ 470 must_be_ca = -1; 471 472 /* CRL path validation */ 473 if (ctx->parent) 474 { 475 allow_proxy_certs = 0; 476 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; 477 } 478 else 479 { 480 allow_proxy_certs = 481 !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); 482 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their 483 software happy */ 484 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS")) 485 allow_proxy_certs = 1; 486 purpose = ctx->param->purpose; 487 } 488 489 /* Check all untrusted certificates */ 490 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) 491 { 492 int ret; 493 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 494 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) 495 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) 496 { 497 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION; 498 ctx->error_depth = i; 499 ctx->current_cert = x; 500 ok=cb(0,ctx); 501 if (!ok) goto end; 502 } 503 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) 504 { 505 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED; 506 ctx->error_depth = i; 507 ctx->current_cert = x; 508 ok=cb(0,ctx); 509 if (!ok) goto end; 510 } 511 ret = X509_check_ca(x); 512 switch(must_be_ca) 513 { 514 case -1: 515 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 516 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) 517 { 518 ret = 0; 519 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; 520 } 521 else 522 ret = 1; 523 break; 524 case 0: 525 if (ret != 0) 526 { 527 ret = 0; 528 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; 529 } 530 else 531 ret = 1; 532 break; 533 default: 534 if ((ret == 0) 535 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 536 && (ret != 1))) 537 { 538 ret = 0; 539 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; 540 } 541 else 542 ret = 1; 543 break; 544 } 545 if (ret == 0) 546 { 547 ctx->error_depth = i; 548 ctx->current_cert = x; 549 ok=cb(0,ctx); 550 if (!ok) goto end; 551 } 552 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) 553 { 554 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0); 555 if ((ret == 0) 556 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 557 && (ret != 1))) 558 { 559 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; 560 ctx->error_depth = i; 561 ctx->current_cert = x; 562 ok=cb(0,ctx); 563 if (!ok) goto end; 564 } 565 } 566 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */ 567 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) 568 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) 569 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) 570 { 571 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; 572 ctx->error_depth = i; 573 ctx->current_cert = x; 574 ok=cb(0,ctx); 575 if (!ok) goto end; 576 } 577 /* Increment path length if not self issued */ 578 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) 579 plen++; 580 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next 581 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE 582 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a 583 CA certificate. */ 584 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) 585 { 586 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) 587 { 588 ctx->error = 589 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; 590 ctx->error_depth = i; 591 ctx->current_cert = x; 592 ok=cb(0,ctx); 593 if (!ok) goto end; 594 } 595 proxy_path_length++; 596 must_be_ca = 0; 597 } 598 else 599 must_be_ca = 1; 600 } 601 ok = 1; 602 end: 603 return ok; 604 #endif 605 } 606 607 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 608 { 609 X509 *x; 610 int i, j, rv; 611 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */ 612 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) 613 { 614 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 615 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */ 616 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) 617 continue; 618 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in 619 * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly 620 * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be 621 * assumed it expects them to be obeyed. 622 */ 623 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) 624 { 625 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; 626 if (nc) 627 { 628 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); 629 if (rv != X509_V_OK) 630 { 631 ctx->error = rv; 632 ctx->error_depth = i; 633 ctx->current_cert = x; 634 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx)) 635 return 0; 636 } 637 } 638 } 639 } 640 return 1; 641 } 642 643 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 644 { 645 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY 646 return 1; 647 #else 648 int i, ok; 649 X509 *x; 650 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 651 cb=ctx->verify_cb; 652 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */ 653 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 654 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 655 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); 656 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) 657 return 1; 658 ctx->error_depth = i; 659 ctx->current_cert = x; 660 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) 661 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; 662 else 663 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED; 664 ok = cb(0, ctx); 665 return ok; 666 #endif 667 } 668 669 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 670 { 671 int i, last, ok; 672 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) 673 return 1; 674 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) 675 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 676 else 677 { 678 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */ 679 if (ctx->parent) 680 return 1; 681 last = 0; 682 } 683 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++) 684 { 685 ctx->error_depth = i; 686 ok = check_cert(ctx); 687 if (!ok) return ok; 688 } 689 return 1; 690 } 691 692 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 693 { 694 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; 695 X509 *x; 696 int ok, cnum; 697 cnum = ctx->error_depth; 698 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); 699 ctx->current_cert = x; 700 ctx->current_issuer = NULL; 701 ctx->current_crl_score = 0; 702 ctx->current_reasons = 0; 703 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) 704 { 705 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ 706 if (ctx->get_crl) 707 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); 708 else 709 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x); 710 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except 711 * notify callback 712 */ 713 if(!ok) 714 { 715 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; 716 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 717 goto err; 718 } 719 ctx->current_crl = crl; 720 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); 721 if (!ok) 722 goto err; 723 724 if (dcrl) 725 { 726 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl); 727 if (!ok) 728 goto err; 729 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x); 730 if (!ok) 731 goto err; 732 } 733 else 734 ok = 1; 735 736 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */ 737 if (ok != 2) 738 { 739 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); 740 if (!ok) 741 goto err; 742 } 743 744 X509_CRL_free(crl); 745 X509_CRL_free(dcrl); 746 crl = NULL; 747 dcrl = NULL; 748 } 749 err: 750 X509_CRL_free(crl); 751 X509_CRL_free(dcrl); 752 753 ctx->current_crl = NULL; 754 return ok; 755 756 } 757 758 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ 759 760 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) 761 { 762 time_t *ptime; 763 int i; 764 if (notify) 765 ctx->current_crl = crl; 766 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) 767 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; 768 else 769 ptime = NULL; 770 771 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); 772 if (i == 0) 773 { 774 if (!notify) 775 return 0; 776 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD; 777 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 778 return 0; 779 } 780 781 if (i > 0) 782 { 783 if (!notify) 784 return 0; 785 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID; 786 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 787 return 0; 788 } 789 790 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) 791 { 792 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); 793 794 if (i == 0) 795 { 796 if (!notify) 797 return 0; 798 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD; 799 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 800 return 0; 801 } 802 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */ 803 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) 804 { 805 if (!notify) 806 return 0; 807 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED; 808 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 809 return 0; 810 } 811 } 812 813 if (notify) 814 ctx->current_crl = NULL; 815 816 return 1; 817 } 818 819 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, 820 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, 821 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) 822 { 823 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore; 824 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0; 825 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert; 826 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; 827 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; 828 829 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) 830 { 831 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); 832 reasons = *preasons; 833 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x); 834 835 if (crl_score > best_score) 836 { 837 best_crl = crl; 838 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; 839 best_score = crl_score; 840 best_reasons = reasons; 841 } 842 } 843 844 if (best_crl) 845 { 846 if (*pcrl) 847 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl); 848 *pcrl = best_crl; 849 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer; 850 *pscore = best_score; 851 *preasons = best_reasons; 852 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); 853 if (*pdcrl) 854 { 855 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl); 856 *pdcrl = NULL; 857 } 858 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls); 859 } 860 861 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) 862 return 1; 863 864 return 0; 865 } 866 867 /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be 868 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical. 869 */ 870 871 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid) 872 { 873 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb; 874 int i; 875 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1); 876 if (i >= 0) 877 { 878 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */ 879 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1) 880 return 0; 881 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i)); 882 } 883 else 884 exta = NULL; 885 886 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1); 887 888 if (i >= 0) 889 { 890 891 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1) 892 return 0; 893 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i)); 894 } 895 else 896 extb = NULL; 897 898 if (!exta && !extb) 899 return 1; 900 901 if (!exta || !extb) 902 return 0; 903 904 905 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb)) 906 return 0; 907 908 return 1; 909 } 910 911 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */ 912 913 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) 914 { 915 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */ 916 if (!delta->base_crl_number) 917 return 0; 918 /* Base must have a CRL number */ 919 if (!base->crl_number) 920 return 0; 921 /* Issuer names must match */ 922 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), 923 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta))) 924 return 0; 925 /* AKID and IDP must match */ 926 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) 927 return 0; 928 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) 929 return 0; 930 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */ 931 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) 932 return 0; 933 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ 934 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) 935 return 1; 936 return 0; 937 } 938 939 /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring 940 * or retrieve a chain of deltas... 941 */ 942 943 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, 944 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) 945 { 946 X509_CRL *delta; 947 int i; 948 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS)) 949 return; 950 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST)) 951 return; 952 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) 953 { 954 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); 955 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) 956 { 957 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0)) 958 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA; 959 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); 960 *dcrl = delta; 961 return; 962 } 963 } 964 *dcrl = NULL; 965 } 966 967 /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'. 968 * The return value is a mask of several criteria. 969 * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. 970 * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if 971 * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. 972 */ 973 974 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, 975 unsigned int *preasons, 976 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) 977 { 978 979 int crl_score = 0; 980 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; 981 982 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */ 983 984 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */ 985 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) 986 return 0; 987 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */ 988 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) 989 { 990 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) 991 return 0; 992 } 993 else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) 994 { 995 /* If no new reasons reject */ 996 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) 997 return 0; 998 } 999 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */ 1000 else if (crl->base_crl_number) 1001 return 0; 1002 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */ 1003 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) 1004 { 1005 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT)) 1006 return 0; 1007 } 1008 else 1009 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME; 1010 1011 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) 1012 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL; 1013 1014 /* Check expiry */ 1015 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) 1016 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; 1017 1018 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */ 1019 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score); 1020 1021 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */ 1022 1023 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID)) 1024 return 0; 1025 1026 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */ 1027 1028 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) 1029 { 1030 /* If no new reasons reject */ 1031 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) 1032 return 0; 1033 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons; 1034 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; 1035 } 1036 1037 *preasons = tmp_reasons; 1038 1039 return crl_score; 1040 1041 } 1042 1043 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, 1044 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) 1045 { 1046 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; 1047 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); 1048 int cidx = ctx->error_depth; 1049 int i; 1050 1051 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) 1052 cidx++; 1053 1054 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); 1055 1056 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) 1057 { 1058 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) 1059 { 1060 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT; 1061 *pissuer = crl_issuer; 1062 return; 1063 } 1064 } 1065 1066 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) 1067 { 1068 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); 1069 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) 1070 continue; 1071 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) 1072 { 1073 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH; 1074 *pissuer = crl_issuer; 1075 return; 1076 } 1077 } 1078 1079 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ 1080 1081 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) 1082 return; 1083 1084 /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the 1085 * set of untrusted certificates. 1086 */ 1087 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) 1088 { 1089 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); 1090 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) 1091 continue; 1092 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) 1093 { 1094 *pissuer = crl_issuer; 1095 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; 1096 return; 1097 } 1098 } 1099 } 1100 1101 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new 1102 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the 1103 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking 1104 * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in 1105 * practice. 1106 */ 1107 1108 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 1109 { 1110 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx; 1111 int ret; 1112 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ 1113 if (ctx->parent) 1114 return 0; 1115 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted)) 1116 return -1; 1117 1118 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; 1119 /* Copy verify params across */ 1120 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); 1121 1122 crl_ctx.parent = ctx; 1123 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; 1124 1125 /* Verify CRL issuer */ 1126 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); 1127 1128 if (ret <= 0) 1129 goto err; 1130 1131 /* Check chain is acceptable */ 1132 1133 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); 1134 err: 1135 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); 1136 return ret; 1137 } 1138 1139 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path 1140 * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a 1141 * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised 1142 * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must 1143 * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain... 1144 * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version 1145 */ 1146 1147 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 1148 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, 1149 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) 1150 { 1151 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta; 1152 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); 1153 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); 1154 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta)) 1155 return 1; 1156 return 0; 1157 } 1158 1159 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. 1160 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. 1161 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. 1162 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES. 1163 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match. 1164 */ 1165 1166 1167 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) 1168 { 1169 X509_NAME *nm = NULL; 1170 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; 1171 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; 1172 int i, j; 1173 if (!a || !b) 1174 return 1; 1175 if (a->type == 1) 1176 { 1177 if (!a->dpname) 1178 return 0; 1179 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ 1180 if (b->type == 1) 1181 { 1182 if (!b->dpname) 1183 return 0; 1184 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) 1185 return 1; 1186 else 1187 return 0; 1188 } 1189 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ 1190 nm = a->dpname; 1191 gens = b->name.fullname; 1192 } 1193 else if (b->type == 1) 1194 { 1195 if (!b->dpname) 1196 return 0; 1197 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ 1198 gens = a->name.fullname; 1199 nm = b->dpname; 1200 } 1201 1202 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ 1203 if (nm) 1204 { 1205 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) 1206 { 1207 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); 1208 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) 1209 continue; 1210 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) 1211 return 1; 1212 } 1213 return 0; 1214 } 1215 1216 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ 1217 1218 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) 1219 { 1220 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); 1221 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) 1222 { 1223 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); 1224 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) 1225 return 1; 1226 } 1227 } 1228 1229 return 0; 1230 1231 } 1232 1233 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) 1234 { 1235 int i; 1236 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); 1237 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ 1238 if (!dp->CRLissuer) 1239 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME); 1240 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) 1241 { 1242 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); 1243 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) 1244 continue; 1245 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm)) 1246 return 1; 1247 } 1248 return 0; 1249 } 1250 1251 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */ 1252 1253 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, 1254 unsigned int *preasons) 1255 { 1256 int i; 1257 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) 1258 return 0; 1259 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) 1260 { 1261 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) 1262 return 0; 1263 } 1264 else 1265 { 1266 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) 1267 return 0; 1268 } 1269 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons; 1270 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) 1271 { 1272 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); 1273 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) 1274 { 1275 if (!crl->idp || 1276 idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) 1277 { 1278 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; 1279 return 1; 1280 } 1281 } 1282 } 1283 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)) 1284 return 1; 1285 return 0; 1286 } 1287 1288 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. 1289 * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too 1290 */ 1291 1292 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 1293 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) 1294 { 1295 int ok; 1296 X509 *issuer = NULL; 1297 int crl_score = 0; 1298 unsigned int reasons; 1299 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; 1300 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; 1301 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); 1302 reasons = ctx->current_reasons; 1303 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, 1304 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); 1305 1306 if (ok) 1307 goto done; 1308 1309 /* Lookup CRLs from store */ 1310 1311 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); 1312 1313 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ 1314 if (!skcrl && crl) 1315 goto done; 1316 1317 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl); 1318 1319 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); 1320 1321 done: 1322 1323 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ 1324 if (crl) 1325 { 1326 ctx->current_issuer = issuer; 1327 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score; 1328 ctx->current_reasons = reasons; 1329 *pcrl = crl; 1330 *pdcrl = dcrl; 1331 return 1; 1332 } 1333 1334 return 0; 1335 } 1336 1337 /* Check CRL validity */ 1338 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) 1339 { 1340 X509 *issuer = NULL; 1341 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; 1342 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum; 1343 cnum = ctx->error_depth; 1344 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 1345 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ 1346 if (ctx->current_issuer) 1347 issuer = ctx->current_issuer; 1348 1349 /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer 1350 * is next certificate in chain. 1351 */ 1352 else if (cnum < chnum) 1353 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); 1354 else 1355 { 1356 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); 1357 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ 1358 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) 1359 { 1360 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER; 1361 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1362 if(!ok) goto err; 1363 } 1364 } 1365 1366 if(issuer) 1367 { 1368 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already 1369 * been done 1370 */ 1371 if (!crl->base_crl_number) 1372 { 1373 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ 1374 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && 1375 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) 1376 { 1377 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN; 1378 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1379 if(!ok) goto err; 1380 } 1381 1382 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) 1383 { 1384 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE; 1385 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1386 if(!ok) goto err; 1387 } 1388 1389 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) 1390 { 1391 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) 1392 { 1393 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR; 1394 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1395 if(!ok) goto err; 1396 } 1397 } 1398 1399 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) 1400 { 1401 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION; 1402 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1403 if(!ok) goto err; 1404 } 1405 1406 1407 } 1408 1409 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) 1410 { 1411 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1); 1412 if (!ok) 1413 goto err; 1414 } 1415 1416 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ 1417 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer); 1418 1419 if(!ikey) 1420 { 1421 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; 1422 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1423 if (!ok) goto err; 1424 } 1425 else 1426 { 1427 /* Verify CRL signature */ 1428 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) 1429 { 1430 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; 1431 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1432 if (!ok) goto err; 1433 } 1434 } 1435 } 1436 1437 ok = 1; 1438 1439 err: 1440 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey); 1441 return ok; 1442 } 1443 1444 /* Check certificate against CRL */ 1445 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) 1446 { 1447 int ok; 1448 X509_REVOKED *rev; 1449 /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained 1450 * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate 1451 * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since 1452 * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries. 1453 */ 1454 if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) 1455 { 1456 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) 1457 return 1; 1458 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION; 1459 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1460 if(!ok) 1461 return 0; 1462 } 1463 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL 1464 * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL. 1465 */ 1466 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) 1467 { 1468 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) 1469 return 2; 1470 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; 1471 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1472 if (!ok) 1473 return 0; 1474 } 1475 1476 return 1; 1477 } 1478 1479 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1480 { 1481 int ret; 1482 if (ctx->parent) 1483 return 1; 1484 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, 1485 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); 1486 if (ret == 0) 1487 { 1488 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1489 return 0; 1490 } 1491 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ 1492 if (ret == -1) 1493 { 1494 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify 1495 * callback. 1496 */ 1497 X509 *x; 1498 int i; 1499 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) 1500 { 1501 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 1502 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) 1503 continue; 1504 ctx->current_cert = x; 1505 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; 1506 if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1507 return 0; 1508 } 1509 return 1; 1510 } 1511 if (ret == -2) 1512 { 1513 ctx->current_cert = NULL; 1514 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; 1515 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1516 } 1517 1518 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) 1519 { 1520 ctx->current_cert = NULL; 1521 ctx->error = X509_V_OK; 1522 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) 1523 return 0; 1524 } 1525 1526 return 1; 1527 } 1528 1529 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 1530 { 1531 time_t *ptime; 1532 int i; 1533 1534 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) 1535 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; 1536 else 1537 ptime = NULL; 1538 1539 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime); 1540 if (i == 0) 1541 { 1542 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; 1543 ctx->current_cert=x; 1544 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1545 return 0; 1546 } 1547 1548 if (i > 0) 1549 { 1550 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; 1551 ctx->current_cert=x; 1552 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1553 return 0; 1554 } 1555 1556 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime); 1557 if (i == 0) 1558 { 1559 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; 1560 ctx->current_cert=x; 1561 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1562 return 0; 1563 } 1564 1565 if (i < 0) 1566 { 1567 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; 1568 ctx->current_cert=x; 1569 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1570 return 0; 1571 } 1572 1573 return 1; 1574 } 1575 1576 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1577 { 1578 int ok=0,n; 1579 X509 *xs,*xi; 1580 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; 1581 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 1582 1583 cb=ctx->verify_cb; 1584 1585 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 1586 ctx->error_depth=n-1; 1587 n--; 1588 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); 1589 1590 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) 1591 xs=xi; 1592 else 1593 { 1594 if (n <= 0) 1595 { 1596 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; 1597 ctx->current_cert=xi; 1598 ok=cb(0,ctx); 1599 goto end; 1600 } 1601 else 1602 { 1603 n--; 1604 ctx->error_depth=n; 1605 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); 1606 } 1607 } 1608 1609 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */ 1610 while (n >= 0) 1611 { 1612 ctx->error_depth=n; 1613 1614 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless 1615 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and 1616 * just wastes time. 1617 */ 1618 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) 1619 { 1620 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) 1621 { 1622 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; 1623 ctx->current_cert=xi; 1624 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); 1625 if (!ok) goto end; 1626 } 1627 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0) 1628 { 1629 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; 1630 ctx->current_cert=xs; 1631 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); 1632 if (!ok) 1633 { 1634 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 1635 goto end; 1636 } 1637 } 1638 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 1639 pkey=NULL; 1640 } 1641 1642 xs->valid = 1; 1643 1644 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs); 1645 if (!ok) 1646 goto end; 1647 1648 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ 1649 ctx->current_issuer=xi; 1650 ctx->current_cert=xs; 1651 ok=(*cb)(1,ctx); 1652 if (!ok) goto end; 1653 1654 n--; 1655 if (n >= 0) 1656 { 1657 xi=xs; 1658 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); 1659 } 1660 } 1661 ok=1; 1662 end: 1663 return ok; 1664 } 1665 1666 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) 1667 { 1668 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); 1669 } 1670 1671 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) 1672 { 1673 char *str; 1674 ASN1_TIME atm; 1675 long offset; 1676 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p; 1677 int i,j; 1678 1679 p=buff1; 1680 i=ctm->length; 1681 str=(char *)ctm->data; 1682 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) 1683 { 1684 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0; 1685 memcpy(p,str,10); 1686 p+=10; 1687 str+=10; 1688 } 1689 else 1690 { 1691 if (i < 13) return 0; 1692 memcpy(p,str,12); 1693 p+=12; 1694 str+=12; 1695 } 1696 1697 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) 1698 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; } 1699 else 1700 { 1701 *(p++)= *(str++); 1702 *(p++)= *(str++); 1703 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */ 1704 if (*str == '.') 1705 { 1706 str++; 1707 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++; 1708 } 1709 1710 } 1711 *(p++)='Z'; 1712 *(p++)='\0'; 1713 1714 if (*str == 'Z') 1715 offset=0; 1716 else 1717 { 1718 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-')) 1719 return 0; 1720 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60; 1721 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0'); 1722 if (*str == '-') 1723 offset= -offset; 1724 } 1725 atm.type=ctm->type; 1726 atm.flags = 0; 1727 atm.length=sizeof(buff2); 1728 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2; 1729 1730 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL) 1731 return 0; 1732 1733 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) 1734 { 1735 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0'); 1736 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ 1737 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0'); 1738 if (j < 50) j+=100; 1739 1740 if (i < j) return -1; 1741 if (i > j) return 1; 1742 } 1743 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2); 1744 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ 1745 return -1; 1746 else 1747 return i; 1748 } 1749 1750 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) 1751 { 1752 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); 1753 } 1754 1755 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) 1756 { 1757 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm); 1758 } 1759 1760 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, 1761 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) 1762 { 1763 time_t t; 1764 1765 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm; 1766 else time(&t); 1767 1768 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) 1769 { 1770 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) 1771 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec); 1772 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) 1773 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, 1774 offset_sec); 1775 } 1776 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); 1777 } 1778 1779 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 1780 { 1781 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2; 1782 int i,j; 1783 1784 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1; 1785 1786 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++) 1787 { 1788 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i)); 1789 if (ktmp == NULL) 1790 { 1791 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); 1792 return 0; 1793 } 1794 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) 1795 break; 1796 else 1797 { 1798 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); 1799 ktmp=NULL; 1800 } 1801 } 1802 if (ktmp == NULL) 1803 { 1804 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); 1805 return 0; 1806 } 1807 1808 /* first, populate the other certs */ 1809 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--) 1810 { 1811 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j)); 1812 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp); 1813 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2); 1814 } 1815 1816 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp); 1817 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); 1818 return 1; 1819 } 1820 1821 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, 1822 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) 1823 { 1824 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by 1825 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */ 1826 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp, 1827 new_func, dup_func, free_func); 1828 } 1829 1830 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) 1831 { 1832 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data); 1833 } 1834 1835 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) 1836 { 1837 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx); 1838 } 1839 1840 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1841 { 1842 return ctx->error; 1843 } 1844 1845 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) 1846 { 1847 ctx->error=err; 1848 } 1849 1850 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1851 { 1852 return ctx->error_depth; 1853 } 1854 1855 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1856 { 1857 return ctx->current_cert; 1858 } 1859 1860 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1861 { 1862 return ctx->chain; 1863 } 1864 1865 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1866 { 1867 int i; 1868 X509 *x; 1869 STACK_OF(X509) *chain; 1870 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL; 1871 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) 1872 { 1873 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); 1874 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 1875 } 1876 return chain; 1877 } 1878 1879 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1880 { 1881 return ctx->current_issuer; 1882 } 1883 1884 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1885 { 1886 return ctx->current_crl; 1887 } 1888 1889 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1890 { 1891 return ctx->parent; 1892 } 1893 1894 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 1895 { 1896 ctx->cert=x; 1897 } 1898 1899 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) 1900 { 1901 ctx->untrusted=sk; 1902 } 1903 1904 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) 1905 { 1906 ctx->crls=sk; 1907 } 1908 1909 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) 1910 { 1911 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); 1912 } 1913 1914 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) 1915 { 1916 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); 1917 } 1918 1919 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust 1920 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its 1921 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by 1922 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default 1923 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value. 1924 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own 1925 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they 1926 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server. 1927 */ 1928 1929 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, 1930 int purpose, int trust) 1931 { 1932 int idx; 1933 /* If purpose not set use default */ 1934 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose; 1935 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ 1936 if (purpose) 1937 { 1938 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; 1939 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); 1940 if (idx == -1) 1941 { 1942 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, 1943 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); 1944 return 0; 1945 } 1946 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); 1947 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) 1948 { 1949 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); 1950 if (idx == -1) 1951 { 1952 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, 1953 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); 1954 return 0; 1955 } 1956 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); 1957 } 1958 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ 1959 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust; 1960 } 1961 if (trust) 1962 { 1963 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); 1964 if (idx == -1) 1965 { 1966 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, 1967 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); 1968 return 0; 1969 } 1970 } 1971 1972 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose; 1973 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust; 1974 return 1; 1975 } 1976 1977 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) 1978 { 1979 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; 1980 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); 1981 if (!ctx) 1982 { 1983 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1984 return NULL; 1985 } 1986 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); 1987 return ctx; 1988 } 1989 1990 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1991 { 1992 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); 1993 OPENSSL_free(ctx); 1994 } 1995 1996 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, 1997 STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 1998 { 1999 int ret = 1; 2000 ctx->ctx=store; 2001 ctx->current_method=0; 2002 ctx->cert=x509; 2003 ctx->untrusted=chain; 2004 ctx->crls = NULL; 2005 ctx->last_untrusted=0; 2006 ctx->other_ctx=NULL; 2007 ctx->valid=0; 2008 ctx->chain=NULL; 2009 ctx->error=0; 2010 ctx->explicit_policy=0; 2011 ctx->error_depth=0; 2012 ctx->current_cert=NULL; 2013 ctx->current_issuer=NULL; 2014 ctx->current_crl=NULL; 2015 ctx->current_crl_score=0; 2016 ctx->current_reasons=0; 2017 ctx->tree = NULL; 2018 ctx->parent = NULL; 2019 2020 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); 2021 2022 if (!ctx->param) 2023 { 2024 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2025 return 0; 2026 } 2027 2028 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set 2029 * use defaults. 2030 */ 2031 2032 2033 if (store) 2034 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); 2035 else 2036 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; 2037 2038 if (store) 2039 { 2040 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; 2041 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; 2042 } 2043 else 2044 ctx->cleanup = 0; 2045 2046 if (ret) 2047 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, 2048 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); 2049 2050 if (ret == 0) 2051 { 2052 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2053 return 0; 2054 } 2055 2056 if (store && store->check_issued) 2057 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; 2058 else 2059 ctx->check_issued = check_issued; 2060 2061 if (store && store->get_issuer) 2062 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; 2063 else 2064 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; 2065 2066 if (store && store->verify_cb) 2067 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; 2068 else 2069 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; 2070 2071 if (store && store->verify) 2072 ctx->verify = store->verify; 2073 else 2074 ctx->verify = internal_verify; 2075 2076 if (store && store->check_revocation) 2077 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; 2078 else 2079 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; 2080 2081 if (store && store->get_crl) 2082 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; 2083 else 2084 ctx->get_crl = NULL; 2085 2086 if (store && store->check_crl) 2087 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; 2088 else 2089 ctx->check_crl = check_crl; 2090 2091 if (store && store->cert_crl) 2092 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; 2093 else 2094 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; 2095 2096 if (store && store->lookup_certs) 2097 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; 2098 else 2099 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs; 2100 2101 if (store && store->lookup_crls) 2102 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; 2103 else 2104 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls; 2105 2106 ctx->check_policy = check_policy; 2107 2108 2109 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As 2110 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a 2111 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */ 2112 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */ 2113 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, 2114 &(ctx->ex_data))) 2115 { 2116 OPENSSL_free(ctx); 2117 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2118 return 0; 2119 } 2120 return 1; 2121 } 2122 2123 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. 2124 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. 2125 */ 2126 2127 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) 2128 { 2129 ctx->other_ctx = sk; 2130 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; 2131 } 2132 2133 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2134 { 2135 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx); 2136 if (ctx->param != NULL) 2137 { 2138 if (ctx->parent == NULL) 2139 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); 2140 ctx->param=NULL; 2141 } 2142 if (ctx->tree != NULL) 2143 { 2144 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); 2145 ctx->tree=NULL; 2146 } 2147 if (ctx->chain != NULL) 2148 { 2149 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free); 2150 ctx->chain=NULL; 2151 } 2152 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); 2153 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); 2154 } 2155 2156 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) 2157 { 2158 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); 2159 } 2160 2161 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) 2162 { 2163 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); 2164 } 2165 2166 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t) 2167 { 2168 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); 2169 } 2170 2171 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 2172 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) 2173 { 2174 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb; 2175 } 2176 2177 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2178 { 2179 return ctx->tree; 2180 } 2181 2182 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2183 { 2184 return ctx->explicit_policy; 2185 } 2186 2187 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) 2188 { 2189 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; 2190 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); 2191 if (!param) 2192 return 0; 2193 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); 2194 } 2195 2196 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2197 { 2198 return ctx->param; 2199 } 2200 2201 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) 2202 { 2203 if (ctx->param) 2204 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); 2205 ctx->param = param; 2206 } 2207 2208 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509) 2209 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509) 2210 2211 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME) 2212 2213 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) 2214 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) 2215