1 /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */ 2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58 /* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 112 #include <stdio.h> 113 #include <errno.h> 114 #define USE_SOCKETS 115 #include "ssl_locl.h" 116 #include <openssl/evp.h> 117 #include <openssl/buffer.h> 118 #include <openssl/rand.h> 119 120 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, 121 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment); 122 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s); 123 124 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) 125 { 126 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase 127 * packet by another n bytes. 128 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified 129 * by s->packet and s->packet_length. 130 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf 131 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) 132 */ 133 int i,len,left; 134 long align=0; 135 unsigned char *pkt; 136 SSL3_BUFFER *rb; 137 138 if (n <= 0) return n; 139 140 rb = &(s->s3->rbuf); 141 if (rb->buf == NULL) 142 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) 143 return -1; 144 145 left = rb->left; 146 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 147 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 148 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); 149 #endif 150 151 if (!extend) 152 { 153 /* start with empty packet ... */ 154 if (left == 0) 155 rb->offset = align; 156 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) 157 { 158 /* check if next packet length is large 159 * enough to justify payload alignment... */ 160 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset; 161 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA 162 && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128) 163 { 164 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted 165 * and its length field is insane, we can 166 * only be led to wrong decision about 167 * whether memmove will occur or not. 168 * Header values has no effect on memmove 169 * arguments and therefore no buffer 170 * overrun can be triggered. */ 171 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left); 172 rb->offset = align; 173 } 174 } 175 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset; 176 s->packet_length = 0; 177 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ 178 } 179 180 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets 181 * because the read operation returns the whole packet 182 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */ 183 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 184 { 185 if (left > 0 && n > left) 186 n = left; 187 } 188 189 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ 190 if (left >= n) 191 { 192 s->packet_length+=n; 193 rb->left=left-n; 194 rb->offset+=n; 195 return(n); 196 } 197 198 /* else we need to read more data */ 199 200 len = s->packet_length; 201 pkt = rb->buf+align; 202 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 203 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet', 204 * 'left' extra ones at the end */ 205 if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */ 206 { 207 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left); 208 s->packet = pkt; 209 rb->offset = len + align; 210 } 211 212 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */ 213 { 214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 215 return -1; 216 } 217 218 if (!s->read_ahead) 219 /* ignore max parameter */ 220 max = n; 221 else 222 { 223 if (max < n) 224 max = n; 225 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) 226 max = rb->len - rb->offset; 227 } 228 229 while (left < n) 230 { 231 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf 232 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to 233 * len+max if possible) */ 234 235 clear_sys_error(); 236 if (s->rbio != NULL) 237 { 238 s->rwstate=SSL_READING; 239 i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left); 240 } 241 else 242 { 243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); 244 i = -1; 245 } 246 247 if (i <= 0) 248 { 249 rb->left = left; 250 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && 251 SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER) 252 if (len+left == 0) 253 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); 254 return(i); 255 } 256 left+=i; 257 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because 258 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed 259 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */ 260 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 261 { 262 if (n > left) 263 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */ 264 } 265 } 266 267 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ 268 rb->offset += n; 269 rb->left = left - n; 270 s->packet_length += n; 271 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 272 return(n); 273 } 274 275 /* Call this to get a new input record. 276 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error 277 * or non-blocking IO. 278 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in 279 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record 280 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data 281 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes 282 */ 283 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ 284 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) 285 { 286 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al; 287 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1; 288 SSL3_RECORD *rr; 289 SSL_SESSION *sess; 290 unsigned char *p; 291 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 292 short version; 293 unsigned mac_size, orig_len; 294 size_t extra; 295 296 rr= &(s->s3->rrec); 297 sess=s->session; 298 299 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) 300 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA; 301 else 302 extra=0; 303 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) 304 { 305 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER 306 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */ 307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 308 return -1; 309 } 310 311 again: 312 /* check if we have the header */ 313 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || 314 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) 315 { 316 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0); 317 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */ 318 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY; 319 320 p=s->packet; 321 322 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ 323 rr->type= *(p++); 324 ssl_major= *(p++); 325 ssl_minor= *(p++); 326 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor; 327 n2s(p,rr->length); 328 #if 0 329 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length); 330 #endif 331 332 /* Lets check version */ 333 if (!s->first_packet) 334 { 335 if (version != s->version) 336 { 337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 338 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)) 339 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */ 340 s->version = (unsigned short)version; 341 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 342 goto f_err; 343 } 344 } 345 346 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) 347 { 348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 349 goto err; 350 } 351 352 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) 353 { 354 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 356 goto f_err; 357 } 358 359 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ 360 } 361 362 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ 363 364 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) 365 { 366 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ 367 i=rr->length; 368 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1); 369 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */ 370 /* now n == rr->length, 371 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */ 372 } 373 374 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */ 375 376 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, 377 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet 378 */ 379 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); 380 381 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' 382 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which 383 * need to be copied into rr->data by either 384 * the decryption or by the decompression 385 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer, 386 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ 387 388 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] 389 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */ 390 391 /* check is not needed I believe */ 392 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra) 393 { 394 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 396 goto f_err; 397 } 398 399 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ 400 rr->data=rr->input; 401 402 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0); 403 /* enc_err is: 404 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. 405 * 1: if the padding is valid 406 * -1: if the padding is invalid */ 407 if (enc_err == 0) 408 { 409 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED; 410 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); 411 goto f_err; 412 } 413 414 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG 415 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length); 416 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } 417 printf("\n"); 418 #endif 419 420 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ 421 if ((sess != NULL) && 422 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && 423 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) 424 { 425 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ 426 unsigned char *mac = NULL; 427 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 428 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); 429 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); 430 431 /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */ 432 orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8); 433 434 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was 435 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, 436 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different 437 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. 438 */ 439 if (orig_len < mac_size || 440 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ 441 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && 442 orig_len < mac_size+1)) 443 { 444 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 446 goto f_err; 447 } 448 449 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) 450 { 451 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes 452 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract 453 * the MAC in constant time from within the record, 454 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes. 455 * */ 456 mac = mac_tmp; 457 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len); 458 rr->length -= mac_size; 459 } 460 else 461 { 462 /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| 463 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's 464 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */ 465 rr->length -= mac_size; 466 mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; 467 } 468 469 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */); 470 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) 471 enc_err = -1; 472 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size) 473 enc_err = -1; 474 } 475 476 if (enc_err < 0) 477 { 478 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, 479 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption 480 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, 481 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this 482 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */ 483 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; 484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); 485 goto f_err; 486 } 487 488 /* r->length is now just compressed */ 489 if (s->expand != NULL) 490 { 491 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra) 492 { 493 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 495 goto f_err; 496 } 497 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) 498 { 499 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; 500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); 501 goto f_err; 502 } 503 } 504 505 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra) 506 { 507 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 509 goto f_err; 510 } 511 512 rr->off=0; 513 /* So at this point the following is true 514 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record 515 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record 516 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte 517 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment 518 * after use :-). 519 */ 520 521 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ 522 s->packet_length=0; 523 524 /* just read a 0 length packet */ 525 if (rr->length == 0) goto again; 526 527 #if 0 528 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length); 529 #endif 530 531 return(1); 532 533 f_err: 534 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 535 err: 536 return(ret); 537 } 538 const char *CAN_2003_0078_patch_ID="CAN-2003-0078 patch 2003-02-19"; 539 540 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl) 541 { 542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 543 int i; 544 SSL3_RECORD *rr; 545 546 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec); 547 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp, 548 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length); 549 if (i < 0) 550 return(0); 551 else 552 rr->length=i; 553 rr->data=rr->comp; 554 #endif 555 return(1); 556 } 557 558 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl) 559 { 560 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 561 int i; 562 SSL3_RECORD *wr; 563 564 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec); 565 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data, 566 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH, 567 wr->input,(int)wr->length); 568 if (i < 0) 569 return(0); 570 else 571 wr->length=i; 572 573 wr->input=wr->data; 574 #endif 575 return(1); 576 } 577 578 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type' 579 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. 580 */ 581 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) 582 { 583 const unsigned char *buf=buf_; 584 unsigned int tot,n,nw; 585 int i; 586 587 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 588 tot=s->s3->wnum; 589 s->s3->wnum=0; 590 591 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) 592 { 593 i=s->handshake_func(s); 594 if (i < 0) return(i); 595 if (i == 0) 596 { 597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 598 return -1; 599 } 600 } 601 602 n=(len-tot); 603 for (;;) 604 { 605 if (n > s->max_send_fragment) 606 nw=s->max_send_fragment; 607 else 608 nw=n; 609 610 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0); 611 if (i <= 0) 612 { 613 s->s3->wnum=tot; 614 return i; 615 } 616 617 if ((i == (int)n) || 618 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && 619 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) 620 { 621 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment 622 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */ 623 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0; 624 625 return tot+i; 626 } 627 628 n-=i; 629 tot+=i; 630 } 631 } 632 633 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, 634 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment) 635 { 636 unsigned char *p,*plen; 637 int i,mac_size,clear=0; 638 int prefix_len=0; 639 int eivlen; 640 long align=0; 641 SSL3_RECORD *wr; 642 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf); 643 SSL_SESSION *sess; 644 645 if (wb->buf == NULL) 646 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s)) 647 return -1; 648 649 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written 650 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */ 651 if (wb->left != 0) 652 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len)); 653 654 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ 655 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) 656 { 657 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); 658 if (i <= 0) 659 return(i); 660 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ 661 } 662 663 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) 664 return 0; 665 666 wr= &(s->s3->wrec); 667 sess=s->session; 668 669 if ( (sess == NULL) || 670 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || 671 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) 672 { 673 #if 1 674 clear=s->enc_write_ctx?0:1; /* must be AEAD cipher */ 675 #else 676 clear=1; 677 #endif 678 mac_size=0; 679 } 680 else 681 { 682 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); 683 if (mac_size < 0) 684 goto err; 685 } 686 687 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */ 688 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) 689 { 690 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites 691 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */ 692 693 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) 694 { 695 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; 696 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment 697 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later 698 * together with the actual payload) */ 699 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1); 700 if (prefix_len <= 0) 701 goto err; 702 703 if (prefix_len > 704 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) 705 { 706 /* insufficient space */ 707 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 708 goto err; 709 } 710 } 711 712 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; 713 } 714 715 if (create_empty_fragment) 716 { 717 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 718 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, 719 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so 720 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can 721 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */ 722 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 723 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); 724 #endif 725 p = wb->buf + align; 726 wb->offset = align; 727 } 728 else if (prefix_len) 729 { 730 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len; 731 } 732 else 733 { 734 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 735 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 736 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); 737 #endif 738 p = wb->buf + align; 739 wb->offset = align; 740 } 741 742 /* write the header */ 743 744 *(p++)=type&0xff; 745 wr->type=type; 746 747 *(p++)=(s->version>>8); 748 /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 749 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0 750 */ 751 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B 752 && !s->renegotiate 753 && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION) 754 *(p++) = 0x1; 755 else 756 *(p++)=s->version&0xff; 757 758 /* field where we are to write out packet length */ 759 plen=p; 760 p+=2; 761 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers and TLS version 1.1 or later */ 762 if (s->enc_write_ctx && s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION) 763 { 764 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx); 765 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) 766 { 767 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx); 768 if (eivlen <= 1) 769 eivlen = 0; 770 } 771 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ 772 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) 773 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 774 else 775 eivlen = 0; 776 } 777 else 778 eivlen = 0; 779 780 /* lets setup the record stuff. */ 781 wr->data=p + eivlen; 782 wr->length=(int)len; 783 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf; 784 785 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into 786 * wr->data */ 787 788 /* first we compress */ 789 if (s->compress != NULL) 790 { 791 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) 792 { 793 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); 794 goto err; 795 } 796 } 797 else 798 { 799 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length); 800 wr->input=wr->data; 801 } 802 803 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input 804 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length. 805 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */ 806 807 if (mac_size != 0) 808 { 809 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0) 810 goto err; 811 wr->length+=mac_size; 812 } 813 814 wr->input=p; 815 wr->data=p; 816 817 if (eivlen) 818 { 819 /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) 820 goto err; */ 821 wr->length += eivlen; 822 } 823 824 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */ 825 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1); 826 827 /* record length after mac and block padding */ 828 s2n(wr->length,plen); 829 830 /* we should now have 831 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is 832 * wr->length long */ 833 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */ 834 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 835 836 if (create_empty_fragment) 837 { 838 /* we are in a recursive call; 839 * just return the length, don't write out anything here 840 */ 841 return wr->length; 842 } 843 844 /* now let's set up wb */ 845 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length; 846 847 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */ 848 s->s3->wpend_tot=len; 849 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf; 850 s->s3->wpend_type=type; 851 s->s3->wpend_ret=len; 852 853 /* we now just need to write the buffer */ 854 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len); 855 err: 856 return -1; 857 } 858 859 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */ 860 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, 861 unsigned int len) 862 { 863 int i; 864 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf); 865 866 /* XXXX */ 867 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len) 868 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) && 869 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) 870 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) 871 { 872 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); 873 return(-1); 874 } 875 876 for (;;) 877 { 878 clear_sys_error(); 879 if (s->wbio != NULL) 880 { 881 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; 882 i=BIO_write(s->wbio, 883 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]), 884 (unsigned int)wb->left); 885 } 886 else 887 { 888 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); 889 i= -1; 890 } 891 if (i == wb->left) 892 { 893 wb->left=0; 894 wb->offset+=i; 895 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && 896 SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER) 897 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 898 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 899 return(s->s3->wpend_ret); 900 } 901 else if (i <= 0) { 902 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || 903 s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { 904 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole 905 point in using a datagram service */ 906 wb->left = 0; 907 } 908 return(i); 909 } 910 wb->offset+=i; 911 wb->left-=i; 912 } 913 } 914 915 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. 916 * 'type' is one of the following: 917 * 918 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) 919 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) 920 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) 921 * 922 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first 923 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). 924 * 925 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as 926 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really 927 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. 928 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store 929 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol 930 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): 931 * Change cipher spec protocol 932 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored 933 * Alert protocol 934 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) 935 * Handshake protocol 936 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have 937 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages 938 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers 939 * Application data protocol 940 * none of our business 941 */ 942 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) 943 { 944 int al,i,j,ret; 945 unsigned int n; 946 SSL3_RECORD *rr; 947 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL; 948 949 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */ 950 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) 951 return(-1); 952 953 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) || 954 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) 955 { 956 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 957 return -1; 958 } 959 960 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) 961 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ 962 { 963 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment; 964 unsigned char *dst = buf; 965 unsigned int k; 966 967 /* peek == 0 */ 968 n = 0; 969 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) 970 { 971 *dst++ = *src++; 972 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--; 973 n++; 974 } 975 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ 976 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++) 977 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; 978 return n; 979 } 980 981 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */ 982 983 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) 984 { 985 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ 986 i=s->handshake_func(s); 987 if (i < 0) return(i); 988 if (i == 0) 989 { 990 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 991 return(-1); 992 } 993 } 994 start: 995 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 996 997 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record 998 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data 999 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read 1000 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */ 1001 rr = &(s->s3->rrec); 1002 1003 /* get new packet if necessary */ 1004 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) 1005 { 1006 ret=ssl3_get_record(s); 1007 if (ret <= 0) return(ret); 1008 } 1009 1010 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ 1011 1012 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, 1013 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ 1014 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) 1015 { 1016 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1017 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); 1018 goto f_err; 1019 } 1020 1021 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away 1022 * (even in 'peek' mode) */ 1023 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) 1024 { 1025 rr->length=0; 1026 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 1027 return(0); 1028 } 1029 1030 1031 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */ 1032 { 1033 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we 1034 * are doing a handshake for the first time */ 1035 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && 1036 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) 1037 { 1038 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); 1040 goto f_err; 1041 } 1042 1043 if (len <= 0) return(len); 1044 1045 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) 1046 n = rr->length; 1047 else 1048 n = (unsigned int)len; 1049 1050 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n); 1051 if (!peek) 1052 { 1053 rr->length-=n; 1054 rr->off+=n; 1055 if (rr->length == 0) 1056 { 1057 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; 1058 rr->off=0; 1059 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) 1060 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); 1061 } 1062 } 1063 return(n); 1064 } 1065 1066 1067 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake 1068 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */ 1069 1070 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, 1071 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. 1072 */ 1073 { 1074 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0; 1075 unsigned char *dest = NULL; 1076 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; 1077 1078 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) 1079 { 1080 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment; 1081 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment; 1082 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; 1083 } 1084 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) 1085 { 1086 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment; 1087 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment; 1088 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len; 1089 } 1090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1091 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) 1092 { 1093 tls1_process_heartbeat(s); 1094 1095 /* Exit and notify application to read again */ 1096 rr->length = 0; 1097 s->rwstate=SSL_READING; 1098 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); 1099 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); 1100 return(-1); 1101 } 1102 #endif 1103 1104 if (dest_maxlen > 0) 1105 { 1106 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */ 1107 if (rr->length < n) 1108 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */ 1109 1110 /* now move 'n' bytes: */ 1111 while (n-- > 0) 1112 { 1113 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++]; 1114 rr->length--; 1115 } 1116 1117 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) 1118 goto start; /* fragment was too small */ 1119 } 1120 } 1121 1122 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; 1123 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. 1124 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */ 1125 1126 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ 1127 if ((!s->server) && 1128 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && 1129 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && 1130 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) 1131 { 1132 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; 1133 1134 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || 1135 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || 1136 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) 1137 { 1138 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1139 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); 1140 goto f_err; 1141 } 1142 1143 if (s->msg_callback) 1144 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1145 1146 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && 1147 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && 1148 !s->s3->renegotiate) 1149 { 1150 ssl3_renegotiate(s); 1151 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) 1152 { 1153 i=s->handshake_func(s); 1154 if (i < 0) return(i); 1155 if (i == 0) 1156 { 1157 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1158 return(-1); 1159 } 1160 1161 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) 1162 { 1163 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */ 1164 { 1165 BIO *bio; 1166 /* In the case where we try to read application data, 1167 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with 1168 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may 1169 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ 1170 s->rwstate=SSL_READING; 1171 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); 1172 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); 1173 BIO_set_retry_read(bio); 1174 return(-1); 1175 } 1176 } 1177 } 1178 } 1179 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, 1180 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */ 1181 goto start; 1182 } 1183 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't 1184 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. 1185 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve) 1186 */ 1187 if (s->server && 1188 SSL_is_init_finished(s) && 1189 !s->s3->send_connection_binding && 1190 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && 1191 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && 1192 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && 1193 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) && 1194 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 1195 1196 { 1197 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/ 1198 rr->length = 0; 1199 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1200 goto start; 1201 } 1202 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) 1203 { 1204 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0]; 1205 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1]; 1206 1207 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0; 1208 1209 if (s->msg_callback) 1210 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1211 1212 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 1213 cb=s->info_callback; 1214 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 1215 cb=s->ctx->info_callback; 1216 1217 if (cb != NULL) 1218 { 1219 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; 1220 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); 1221 } 1222 1223 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */ 1224 { 1225 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; 1226 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) 1227 { 1228 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; 1229 return(0); 1230 } 1231 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested 1232 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with 1233 * a fatal alert because if application tried to 1234 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and 1235 * expects it to succeed. 1236 * 1237 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we 1238 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on. 1239 */ 1240 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) 1241 { 1242 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1244 goto f_err; 1245 } 1246 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME 1247 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME) 1248 return(0); 1249 #endif 1250 } 1251 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */ 1252 { 1253 char tmp[16]; 1254 1255 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 1256 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; 1257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); 1258 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr); 1259 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp); 1260 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; 1261 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session); 1262 return(0); 1263 } 1264 else 1265 { 1266 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); 1268 goto f_err; 1269 } 1270 1271 goto start; 1272 } 1273 1274 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */ 1275 { 1276 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 1277 rr->length=0; 1278 return(0); 1279 } 1280 1281 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) 1282 { 1283 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know 1284 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */ 1285 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) || 1286 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) 1287 { 1288 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1289 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); 1290 goto f_err; 1291 } 1292 1293 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ 1294 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) 1295 { 1296 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 1298 goto f_err; 1299 } 1300 1301 rr->length=0; 1302 1303 if (s->msg_callback) 1304 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1305 1306 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1; 1307 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) 1308 goto err; 1309 else 1310 goto start; 1311 } 1312 1313 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */ 1314 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) 1315 { 1316 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) && 1317 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) 1318 { 1319 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and 1320 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting 1321 * protocol violations): */ 1322 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server) 1323 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT 1324 :SSL_ST_CONNECT; 1325 #else 1326 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; 1327 #endif 1328 s->renegotiate=1; 1329 s->new_session=1; 1330 } 1331 i=s->handshake_func(s); 1332 if (i < 0) return(i); 1333 if (i == 0) 1334 { 1335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1336 return(-1); 1337 } 1338 1339 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) 1340 { 1341 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */ 1342 { 1343 BIO *bio; 1344 /* In the case where we try to read application data, 1345 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with 1346 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may 1347 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ 1348 s->rwstate=SSL_READING; 1349 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); 1350 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); 1351 BIO_set_retry_read(bio); 1352 return(-1); 1353 } 1354 } 1355 goto start; 1356 } 1357 1358 switch (rr->type) 1359 { 1360 default: 1361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS 1362 /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: 1363 * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert. 1364 */ 1365 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) 1366 { 1367 rr->length = 0; 1368 goto start; 1369 } 1370 #endif 1371 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); 1373 goto f_err; 1374 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: 1375 case SSL3_RT_ALERT: 1376 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: 1377 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception 1378 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that 1379 * should not happen when type != rr->type */ 1380 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1382 goto f_err; 1383 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: 1384 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data, 1385 * but have application data. If the library was 1386 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data 1387 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data 1388 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started), 1389 * we will indulge it. 1390 */ 1391 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && 1392 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && 1393 (( 1394 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) && 1395 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) && 1396 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A) 1397 ) || ( 1398 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) && 1399 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) && 1400 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) 1401 ) 1402 )) 1403 { 1404 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2; 1405 return(-1); 1406 } 1407 else 1408 { 1409 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1410 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); 1411 goto f_err; 1412 } 1413 } 1414 /* not reached */ 1415 1416 f_err: 1417 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1418 err: 1419 return(-1); 1420 } 1421 1422 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) 1423 { 1424 int i; 1425 const char *sender; 1426 int slen; 1427 1428 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) 1429 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; 1430 else 1431 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ; 1432 1433 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) 1434 { 1435 if (s->session == NULL) 1436 { 1437 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */ 1438 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 1439 return (0); 1440 } 1441 1442 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; 1443 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0); 1444 } 1445 1446 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i)) 1447 return(0); 1448 1449 /* we have to record the message digest at 1450 * this point so we can get it before we read 1451 * the finished message */ 1452 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) 1453 { 1454 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; 1455 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; 1456 } 1457 else 1458 { 1459 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; 1460 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; 1461 } 1462 1463 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, 1464 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); 1465 1466 return(1); 1467 } 1468 1469 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) 1470 { 1471 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */ 1472 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc); 1473 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION) 1474 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */ 1475 if (desc < 0) return -1; 1476 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */ 1477 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL)) 1478 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session); 1479 1480 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1; 1481 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level; 1482 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc; 1483 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */ 1484 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); 1485 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written 1486 * some time in the future */ 1487 return -1; 1488 } 1489 1490 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) 1491 { 1492 int i,j; 1493 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; 1494 1495 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0; 1496 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0); 1497 if (i <= 0) 1498 { 1499 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1; 1500 } 1501 else 1502 { 1503 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. 1504 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, 1505 * we will not worry too much. */ 1506 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) 1507 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); 1508 1509 if (s->msg_callback) 1510 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1511 1512 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 1513 cb=s->info_callback; 1514 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 1515 cb=s->ctx->info_callback; 1516 1517 if (cb != NULL) 1518 { 1519 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1]; 1520 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j); 1521 } 1522 } 1523 return(i); 1524 } 1525