1Index: openssl/Configure 2diff -u openssl/Configure:1.9.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.4.1 openssl/Configure:1.16 3--- openssl/Configure:1.9.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.4.1 Fri Jan 2 14:55:31 2015 4+++ openssl/Configure Fri Jan 2 14:56:42 2015 5@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ 6 7 # see INSTALL for instructions. 8 9-my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n"; 10+my $usage="Usage: Configure --pk11-libname=PK11_LIB_LOCATION --pk11-flavor=FLAVOR [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n"; 11 12 # Options: 13 # 14@@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ 15 # default). This needn't be set in advance, you can 16 # just as well use "make INSTALL_PREFIX=/whatever install". 17 # 18+# --pk11-libname PKCS#11 library name. 19+# (No default) 20+# 21+# --pk11-flavor either crypto-accelerator or sign-only 22+# (No default) 23+# 24 # --with-krb5-dir Declare where Kerberos 5 lives. The libraries are expected 25 # to live in the subdirectory lib/ and the header files in 26 # include/. A value is required. 27@@ -352,7 +358,7 @@ 28 "linux-armv4", "gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", 29 #### IA-32 targets... 30 "linux-ia32-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", 31-"linux-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", 32+"linux-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", 33 "linux-aout", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out", 34 #### 35 "linux-generic64","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", 36@@ -360,7 +366,7 @@ 37 "linux-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", 38 "linux-ia64-ecc","ecc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", 39 "linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", 40-"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", 41+"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", 42 "linux64-s390x", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", 43 #### So called "highgprs" target for z/Architecture CPUs 44 # "Highgprs" is kernel feature first implemented in Linux 2.6.32, see 45@@ -657,6 +663,10 @@ 46 my $idx_arflags = $idx++; 47 my $idx_multilib = $idx++; 48 49+# PKCS#11 engine patch 50+my $pk11_libname=""; 51+my $pk11_flavor=""; 52+ 53 my $prefix=""; 54 my $libdir=""; 55 my $openssldir=""; 56@@ -877,6 +887,14 @@ 57 $_ =~ s/%([0-9a-f]{1,2})/chr(hex($1))/gei; 58 $flags.=$_." "; 59 } 60+ elsif (/^--pk11-libname=(.*)$/) 61+ { 62+ $pk11_libname=$1; 63+ } 64+ elsif (/^--pk11-flavor=(.*)$/) 65+ { 66+ $pk11_flavor=$1; 67+ } 68 elsif (/^--prefix=(.*)$/) 69 { 70 $prefix=$1; 71@@ -1044,6 +1062,22 @@ 72 exit 0; 73 } 74 75+if (! $pk11_libname) 76+ { 77+ print STDERR "You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library.\n"; 78+ print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n"; 79+ exit 1; 80+ } 81+ 82+if (! $pk11_flavor 83+ || !($pk11_flavor eq "crypto-accelerator" || $pk11_flavor eq "sign-only")) 84+ { 85+ print STDERR "You must set --pk11-flavor.\n"; 86+ print STDERR "Choices are crypto-accelerator and sign-only.\n"; 87+ print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n"; 88+ exit 1; 89+ } 90+ 91 if ($target =~ m/^CygWin32(-.*)$/) { 92 $target = "Cygwin".$1; 93 } 94@@ -1121,6 +1155,25 @@ 95 $exp_cflags .= " -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_$ALGO"; 96 } 97 98+if ($pk11_flavor eq "crypto-accelerator") 99+ { 100+ $openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO\n"; 101+ $default_depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO"; 102+ $depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO"; 103+ $options .= " no-hw-pkcs11so"; 104+ print " no-hw-pkcs11so [pk11-flavor]"; 105+ print " OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO\n"; 106+ } 107+else 108+ { 109+ $openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA\n"; 110+ $default_depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA"; 111+ $depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA"; 112+ $options .= " no-hw-pkcs11ca"; 113+ print " no-hw-pkcs11ca [pk11-flavor]"; 114+ print " OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA\n"; 115+} 116+ 117 my $IsMK1MF=scalar grep /^$target$/,@MK1MF_Builds; 118 119 $exe_ext=".exe" if ($target eq "Cygwin" || $target eq "DJGPP" || $target =~ /^mingw/); 120@@ -1210,6 +1263,8 @@ 121 if ($flags ne "") { $cflags="$flags$cflags"; } 122 else { $no_user_cflags=1; } 123 124+$cflags="-DPK11_LIB_LOCATION=\"$pk11_libname\" $cflags"; 125+ 126 # Kerberos settings. The flavor must be provided from outside, either through 127 # the script "config" or manually. 128 if (!$no_krb5) 129@@ -1599,6 +1654,7 @@ 130 s/^VERSION=.*/VERSION=$version/; 131 s/^MAJOR=.*/MAJOR=$major/; 132 s/^MINOR=.*/MINOR=$minor/; 133+ s/^PK11_LIB_LOCATION=.*/PK11_LIB_LOCATION=$pk11_libname/; 134 s/^SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=$shlib_version_number/; 135 s/^SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=$shlib_version_history/; 136 s/^SHLIB_MAJOR=.*/SHLIB_MAJOR=$shlib_major/; 137Index: openssl/Makefile.org 138diff -u openssl/Makefile.org:1.5.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1 openssl/Makefile.org:1.10 139--- openssl/Makefile.org:1.5.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1 Mon Apr 14 12:42:45 2014 140+++ openssl/Makefile.org Mon Apr 14 12:44:20 2014 141@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ 142 INSTALL_PREFIX= 143 INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/ssl 144 145+# You must set this through --pk11-libname configure option. 146+PK11_LIB_LOCATION= 147+ 148 # Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --openssldir=DIR do change this! 149 OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl 150 151Index: openssl/README.pkcs11 152diff -u /dev/null openssl/README.pkcs11:1.8 153--- /dev/null Fri Jan 2 14:59:07 2015 154+++ openssl/README.pkcs11 Fri Oct 4 14:16:43 2013 155@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@ 156+ISC modified 157+============ 158+ 159+The previous key naming scheme was kept for backward compatibility. 160+ 161+The PKCS#11 engine exists in two flavors, crypto-accelerator and 162+sign-only. The first one is from the Solaris patch and uses the 163+PKCS#11 device for all crypto operations it supports. The second 164+is a stripped down version which provides only the useful 165+function (i.e., signature with a RSA private key in the device 166+protected key store and key loading). 167+ 168+As a hint PKCS#11 boards should use the crypto-accelerator flavor, 169+external PKCS#11 devices the sign-only. SCA 6000 is an example 170+of the first, AEP Keyper of the second. 171+ 172+Note it is mandatory to set a pk11-flavor (and only one) in 173+config/Configure. 174+ 175+It is highly recommended to compile in (vs. as a DSO) the engine. 176+The way to configure this is system dependent, on Unixes it is no-shared 177+(and is in general the default), on WIN32 it is enable-static-engine 178+(and still enable to build the OpenSSL libraries as DLLs). 179+ 180+PKCS#11 engine support for OpenSSL 0.9.8l 181+========================================= 182+ 183+[Nov 19, 2009] 184+ 185+Contents: 186+ 187+Overview 188+Revisions of the patch for 0.9.8 branch 189+FAQs 190+Feedback 191+ 192+Overview 193+======== 194+ 195+This patch containing code available in OpenSolaris adds support for PKCS#11 196+engine into OpenSSL and implements PKCS#11 v2.20. It is to be applied against 197+OpenSSL 0.9.8l source code distribution as shipped by OpenSSL.Org. Your system 198+must provide PKCS#11 backend otherwise the patch is useless. You provide the 199+PKCS#11 library name during the build configuration phase, see below. 200+ 201+Patch can be applied like this: 202+ 203+ # NOTE: use gtar if on Solaris 204+ tar xfzv openssl-0.9.8l.tar.gz 205+ # now download the patch to the current directory 206+ # ... 207+ cd openssl-0.9.8l 208+ # NOTE: must use gpatch if on Solaris (is part of the system) 209+ patch -p1 < path-to/pkcs11_engine-0.9.8l.patch.2009-11-19 210+ 211+It is designed to support pure acceleration for RSA, DSA, DH and all the 212+symetric ciphers and message digest algorithms that PKCS#11 and OpenSSL share 213+except for missing support for patented algorithms MDC2, RC3, RC5 and IDEA. 214+ 215+According to the PKCS#11 providers installed on your machine, it can support 216+following mechanisms: 217+ 218+ RSA, DSA, DH, RAND, DES-CBC, DES-EDE3-CBC, DES-ECB, DES-EDE3, RC4, 219+ AES-128-CBC, AES-192-CBC, AES-256-CBC, AES-128-ECB, AES-192-ECB, 220+ AES-256-ECB, AES-128-CTR, AES-192-CTR, AES-256-CTR, MD5, SHA1, SHA224, 221+ SHA256, SHA384, SHA512 222+ 223+Note that for AES counter mode the application must provide their own EVP 224+functions since OpenSSL doesn't support counter mode through EVP yet. You may 225+see OpenSSH source code (cipher.c) to get the idea how to do that. SunSSH is an 226+example of code that uses the PKCS#11 engine and deals with the fork-safety 227+problem (see engine.c and packet.c files if interested). 228+ 229+You must provide the location of PKCS#11 library in your system to the 230+configure script. You will be instructed to do that when you try to run the 231+config script: 232+ 233+ $ ./config 234+ Operating system: i86pc-whatever-solaris2 235+ Configuring for solaris-x86-cc 236+ You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library. 237+ See README.pkcs11 for more information. 238+ 239+Taking openCryptoki project on Linux AMD64 box as an example, you would run 240+configure script like this: 241+ 242+ ./config --pk11-libname=/usr/lib64/pkcs11/PKCS11_API.so 243+ 244+To check whether newly built openssl really supports PKCS#11 it's enough to run 245+"apps/openssl engine" and look for "(pkcs11) PKCS #11 engine support" in the 246+output. If you see no PKCS#11 engine support check that the built openssl binary 247+and the PKCS#11 library from --pk11-libname don't conflict on 32/64 bits. 248+ 249+The patch, during various phases of development, was tested on Solaris against 250+PKCS#11 engine available from Solaris Cryptographic Framework (Solaris 10 and 251+OpenSolaris) and also on Linux using PKCS#11 libraries from openCryptoki project 252+(see openCryptoki website http://sourceforge.net/projects/opencryptoki for more 253+information). Some Linux distributions even ship those libraries with the 254+system. The patch should work on any system that is supported by OpenSSL itself 255+and has functional PKCS#11 library. 256+ 257+The patch contains "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface 258+(Cryptoki)" - files cryptoki.h, pkcs11.h, pkcs11f.h and pkcs11t.h which are 259+copyrighted by RSA Security Inc., see pkcs11.h for more information. 260+ 261+Other added/modified code in this patch is copyrighted by Sun Microsystems, 262+Inc. and is released under the OpenSSL license (see LICENSE file for more 263+information). 264+ 265+Revisions of the patch for 0.9.8 branch 266+======================================= 267+ 268+2009-11-19 269+- adjusted for OpenSSL version 0.9.8l 270+ 271+- bugs and RFEs: 272+ 273+ 6479874 OpenSSL should support RSA key by reference/hardware keystores 274+ 6896677 PKCS#11 engine's hw_pk11_err.h needs to be split 275+ 6732677 make check to trigger Solaris specific code automatic in the 276+ PKCS#11 engine 277+ 278+2009-03-11 279+- adjusted for OpenSSL version 0.9.8j 280+ 281+- README.pkcs11 moved out of the patch, and is shipped together with it in a 282+ tarball instead so that it can be read before the patch is applied. 283+ 284+- fixed bugs: 285+ 286+ 6804216 pkcs#11 engine should support a key length range for RC4 287+ 6734038 Apache SSL web server using the pkcs11 engine fails to start if 288+ meta slot is disabled 289+ 290+2008-12-02 291+- fixed bugs and RFEs (most of the work done by Vladimir Kotal) 292+ 293+ 6723504 more granular locking in PKCS#11 engine 294+ 6667128 CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE assumption does not hold true 295+ 6710420 PKCS#11 engine source should be lint clean 296+ 6747327 PKCS#11 engine atfork handlers need to be aware of guys who take 297+ it seriously 298+ 6746712 PKCS#11 engine source code should be cstyle clean 299+ 6731380 return codes of several functions are not checked in the PKCS#11 300+ engine code 301+ 6746735 PKCS#11 engine should use extended FILE space API 302+ 6734038 Apache SSL web server using the pkcs11 engine fails to start if 303+ meta slot is disabled 304+ 305+2008-08-01 306+- fixed bug 307+ 308+ 6731839 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine no longer uses n2cp for symmetric ciphers 309+ and digests 310+ 311+- Solaris specific code for slot selection made automatic 312+ 313+2008-07-29 314+- update the patch to OpenSSL 0.9.8h version 315+- pkcs11t.h updated to the latest version: 316+ 317+ 6545665 make CKM_AES_CTR available to non-kernel users 318+ 319+- fixed bugs in the engine code: 320+ 321+ 6602801 PK11_SESSION cache has to employ reference counting scheme for 322+ asymmetric key operations 323+ 6605538 pkcs11 functions C_FindObjects[{Init,Final}]() not called 324+ atomically 325+ 6607307 pkcs#11 engine can't read RSA private keys 326+ 6652362 pk11_RSA_finish() is cutting corners 327+ 6662112 pk11_destroy_{rsa,dsa,dh}_key_objects() use locking in 328+ suboptimal way 329+ 6666625 pk11_destroy_{rsa,dsa,dh}_key_objects() should be more 330+ resilient to destroy failures 331+ 6667273 OpenSSL engine should not use free() but OPENSSL_free() 332+ 6670363 PKCS#11 engine fails to reuse existing symmetric keys 333+ 6678135 memory corruption in pk11_DH_generate_key() in pkcs#11 engine 334+ 6678503 DSA signature conversion in pk11_dsa_do_verify() ignores size 335+ of big numbers leading to failures 336+ 6706562 pk11_DH_compute_key() returns 0 in case of failure instead of 337+ -1 338+ 6706622 pk11_load_{pub,priv}key create corrupted RSA key references 339+ 6707129 return values from BN_new() in pk11_DH_generate_key() are not 340+ checked 341+ 6707274 DSA/RSA/DH PKCS#11 engine operations need to be resistant to 342+ structure reuse 343+ 6707782 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine pretends to be aware of 344+ OPENSSL_NO_{RSA,DSA,DH} 345+ defines but fails miserably 346+ 6709966 make check_new_*() to return values to indicate cache hit/miss 347+ 6705200 pk11_dh struct initialization in PKCS#11 engine is missing 348+ generate_params parameter 349+ 6709513 PKCS#11 engine sets IV length even for ECB modes 350+ 6728296 buffer length not initialized for C_(En|De)crypt_Final() in the 351+ PKCS#11 engine 352+ 6728871 PKCS#11 engine must reset global_session in pk11_finish() 353+ 354+- new features and enhancements: 355+ 356+ 6562155 OpenSSL pkcs#11 engine needs support for SHA224/256/384/512 357+ 6685012 OpenSSL pkcs#11 engine needs support for new cipher modes 358+ 6725903 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine shouldn't use soft token for symmetric 359+ ciphers and digests 360+ 361+2007-10-15 362+- update for 0.9.8f version 363+- update for "6607670 teach pkcs#11 engine how to use keys be reference" 364+ 365+2007-10-02 366+- draft for "6607670 teach pkcs#11 engine how to use keys be reference" 367+- draft for "6607307 pkcs#11 engine can't read RSA private keys" 368+ 369+2007-09-26 370+- 6375348 Using pkcs11 as the SSLCryptoDevice with Apache/OpenSSL causes 371+ significant performance drop 372+- 6573196 memory is leaked when OpenSSL is used with PKCS#11 engine 373+ 374+2007-05-25 375+- 6558630 race in OpenSSL pkcs11 engine when using symetric block ciphers 376+ 377+2007-05-19 378+- initial patch for 0.9.8e using latest OpenSolaris code 379+ 380+FAQs 381+==== 382+ 383+(1) my build failed on Linux distro with this error: 384+ 385+../libcrypto.a(hw_pk11.o): In function `pk11_library_init': 386+hw_pk11.c:(.text+0x20f5): undefined reference to `pthread_atfork' 387+ 388+Answer: 389+ 390+ - don't use "no-threads" when configuring 391+ - if you didn't then OpenSSL failed to create a threaded library by 392+ default. You may manually edit Configure and try again. Look for the 393+ architecture that Configure printed, for example: 394+ 395+Configured for linux-elf. 396+ 397+ - then edit Configure, find string "linux-elf" (inluding the quotes), 398+ and add flags to support threads to the 4th column of the 2nd string. 399+ If you build with GCC then adding "-pthread" should be enough. With 400+ "linux-elf" as an example, you would add " -pthread" right after 401+ "-D_REENTRANT", like this: 402+ 403+....-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:..... 404+ 405+(2) I'm using MinGW/MSYS environment and get undeclared reference error for 406+pthread_atfork() function when trying to build OpenSSL with the patch. 407+ 408+Answer: 409+ 410+ Sorry, pthread_atfork() is not implemented in the current pthread-win32 411+ (as of Nov 2009). You can not use the patch there. 412+ 413+ 414+Feedback 415+======== 416+ 417+Please send feedback to security-discuss@opensolaris.org. The patch was 418+created by Jan.Pechanec@Sun.COM from code available in OpenSolaris. 419+ 420+Latest version should be always available on http://blogs.sun.com/janp. 421+ 422Index: openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h 423diff -u openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.6.2.1.4.1.10.1 openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.8 424--- openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.6.2.1.4.1.10.1 Fri Jan 2 14:55:34 2015 425+++ openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h Fri Jan 2 14:56:43 2015 426@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@ 427 428 #endif /* OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND */ 429 430+#ifndef OPENSSL_THREADS 431+# define OPENSSL_THREADS 432+#endif 433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE 434 # define OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE 435 #endif 436@@ -82,6 +85,8 @@ 437 # endif 438 #endif 439 440+#define OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ 441+ 442 /* crypto/opensslconf.h.in */ 443 444 /* Generate 80386 code? */ 445@@ -128,7 +133,7 @@ 446 * This enables code handling data aligned at natural CPU word 447 * boundary. See crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c for further details. 448 */ 449-#undef RC4_CHUNK 450+#define RC4_CHUNK unsigned long 451 #endif 452 #endif 453 454@@ -136,7 +141,7 @@ 455 /* If this is set to 'unsigned int' on a DEC Alpha, this gives about a 456 * %20 speed up (longs are 8 bytes, int's are 4). */ 457 #ifndef DES_LONG 458-#define DES_LONG unsigned long 459+#define DES_LONG unsigned int 460 #endif 461 #endif 462 463@@ -147,9 +152,9 @@ 464 /* Should we define BN_DIV2W here? */ 465 466 /* Only one for the following should be defined */ 467-#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG 468+#define SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG 469 #undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT 470-#define THIRTY_TWO_BIT 471+#undef THIRTY_TWO_BIT 472 #endif 473 474 #if defined(HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H) 475@@ -161,7 +166,7 @@ 476 477 #if defined(HEADER_BF_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H) 478 #define CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H 479-#undef BF_PTR 480+#define BF_PTR2 481 #endif /* HEADER_BF_LOCL_H */ 482 483 #if defined(HEADER_DES_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_DES_LOCL_H) 484@@ -191,7 +196,7 @@ 485 /* Unroll the inner loop, this sometimes helps, sometimes hinders. 486 * Very mucy CPU dependant */ 487 #ifndef DES_UNROLL 488-#undef DES_UNROLL 489+#define DES_UNROLL 490 #endif 491 492 /* These default values were supplied by 493Index: openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c 494diff -u openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c:1.6.2.1 openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c:1.6 495--- openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c:1.6.2.1 Sun Jan 15 16:09:44 2012 496+++ openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c Mon Jun 13 17:13:31 2011 497@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ 498 { 499 SYSerr(SYS_F_FOPEN,get_last_sys_error()); 500 ERR_add_error_data(5,"fopen('",filename,"','",mode,"')"); 501- if (errno == ENOENT) 502+ if ((errno == ENOENT) || ((*mode == 'r') && (errno == EACCES))) 503 BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE,BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE); 504 else 505 BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE,ERR_R_SYS_LIB); 506Index: openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile 507diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.8.2.1.4.1 openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.9 508--- openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.8.2.1.4.1 Tue Jun 19 15:30:00 2012 509+++ openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile Tue Jun 19 16:18:00 2012 510@@ -22,13 +22,15 @@ 511 tb_rsa.c tb_dsa.c tb_ecdsa.c tb_dh.c tb_ecdh.c tb_rand.c tb_store.c \ 512 tb_cipher.c tb_digest.c tb_pkmeth.c tb_asnmth.c \ 513 eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c \ 514- eng_rsax.c eng_rdrand.c 515+ eng_rsax.c eng_rdrand.c \ 516+ hw_pk11.c hw_pk11_pub.c hw_pk11so.c hw_pk11so_pub.c 517 LIBOBJ= eng_err.o eng_lib.o eng_list.o eng_init.o eng_ctrl.o \ 518 eng_table.o eng_pkey.o eng_fat.o eng_all.o \ 519 tb_rsa.o tb_dsa.o tb_ecdsa.o tb_dh.o tb_ecdh.o tb_rand.o tb_store.o \ 520 tb_cipher.o tb_digest.o tb_pkmeth.o tb_asnmth.o \ 521 eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o \ 522- eng_rsax.o eng_rdrand.o 523+ eng_rsax.o eng_rdrand.o \ 524+ hw_pk11.o hw_pk11_pub.o hw_pk11so.o hw_pk11so_pub.o 525 526 SRC= $(LIBSRC) 527 528@@ -294,6 +296,83 @@ 529 eng_table.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h 530 eng_table.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h eng_int.h 531 eng_table.o: eng_table.c 532+hw_pk11.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/aes.h 533+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h 534+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h 535+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/dh.h 536+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/dsa.h ../../include/openssl/dso.h 537+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h 538+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h 539+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/err.h 540+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h 541+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/md5.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h 542+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h 543+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h 544+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/pem2.h 545+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h 546+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h 547+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h 548+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h 549+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11.c 550+hw_pk11.o: hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11ca.h pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h 551+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h 552+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h 553+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h 554+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dh.h ../../include/openssl/dsa.h 555+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h 556+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h 557+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h 558+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h 559+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h 560+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h 561+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h 562+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h 563+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pem.h 564+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h 565+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h 566+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h 567+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h 568+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h 569+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11_pub.c hw_pk11ca.h 570+hw_pk11_pub.o: pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h 571+hw_pk11so.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h 572+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h 573+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h 574+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h 575+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h 576+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h 577+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h 578+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/md5.h 579+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h 580+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h 581+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h 582+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/pem2.h 583+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h 584+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h 585+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h 586+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h 587+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h 588+hw_pk11so.o: hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11so.c hw_pk11so.h pkcs11.h 589+hw_pk11so.o: pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h 590+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h 591+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h 592+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h 593+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h 594+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h 595+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h 596+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h 597+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h 598+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h 599+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h 600+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h 601+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pem.h 602+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h 603+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h 604+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h 605+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h 606+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h 607+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11so.h 608+hw_pk11so_pub.o: hw_pk11so_pub.c pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h 609 tb_asnmth.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h 610 tb_asnmth.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h 611 tb_asnmth.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h 612Index: openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h 613diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h:1.4 614--- /dev/null Fri Jan 2 14:59:08 2015 615+++ openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h Thu Dec 18 00:14:12 2008 616@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ 617+/* 618+ * CDDL HEADER START 619+ * 620+ * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the 621+ * Common Development and Distribution License, Version 1.0 only 622+ * (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance 623+ * with the License. 624+ * 625+ * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE 626+ * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. 627+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions 628+ * and limitations under the License. 629+ * 630+ * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each 631+ * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. 632+ * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the 633+ * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying 634+ * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] 635+ * 636+ * CDDL HEADER END 637+ */ 638+/* 639+ * Copyright 2003 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. 640+ * Use is subject to license terms. 641+ */ 642+ 643+#ifndef _CRYPTOKI_H 644+#define _CRYPTOKI_H 645+ 646+/* ident "@(#)cryptoki.h 1.2 05/06/08 SMI" */ 647+ 648+#ifdef __cplusplus 649+extern "C" { 650+#endif 651+ 652+#ifndef CK_PTR 653+#define CK_PTR * 654+#endif 655+ 656+#ifndef CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION 657+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType name 658+#endif 659+ 660+#ifndef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION 661+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType name 662+#endif 663+ 664+#ifndef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER 665+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) returnType (* name) 666+#endif 667+ 668+#ifndef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION 669+#define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType (* name) 670+#endif 671+ 672+#ifndef NULL_PTR 673+#include <unistd.h> /* For NULL */ 674+#define NULL_PTR NULL 675+#endif 676+ 677+/* 678+ * pkcs11t.h defines TRUE and FALSE in a way that upsets lint 679+ */ 680+#ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE 681+#define CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE 682+#ifndef TRUE 683+#define TRUE 1 684+#endif /* TRUE */ 685+#ifndef FALSE 686+#define FALSE 0 687+#endif /* FALSE */ 688+#endif /* CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE */ 689+ 690+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO 691+ 692+#include "pkcs11.h" 693+ 694+/* Solaris specific functions */ 695+ 696+#include <stdlib.h> 697+ 698+/* 699+ * SUNW_C_GetMechSession will initialize the framework and do all 700+ * the necessary PKCS#11 calls to create a session capable of 701+ * providing operations on the requested mechanism 702+ */ 703+CK_RV SUNW_C_GetMechSession(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, 704+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR hSession); 705+ 706+/* 707+ * SUNW_C_KeyToObject will create a secret key object for the given 708+ * mechanism from the rawkey data. 709+ */ 710+CK_RV SUNW_C_KeyToObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, 711+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, const void *rawkey, size_t rawkey_len, 712+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR obj); 713+ 714+ 715+#ifdef __cplusplus 716+} 717+#endif 718+ 719+#endif /* _CRYPTOKI_H */ 720Index: openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c 721diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.5.2.1.4.1 openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.6 722--- openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.5.2.1.4.1 Tue Jun 19 15:30:00 2012 723+++ openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c Tue Jun 19 16:18:00 2012 724@@ -119,6 +119,14 @@ 725 #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG) 726 ENGINE_load_capi(); 727 #endif 728+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11 729+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA 730+ ENGINE_load_pk11ca(); 731+#endif 732+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO 733+ ENGINE_load_pk11so(); 734+#endif 735+#endif 736 #endif 737 ENGINE_register_all_complete(); 738 } 739Index: openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h 740diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.5.2.1.4.1 openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.6 741--- openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.5.2.1.4.1 Tue Jun 19 15:30:00 2012 742+++ openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h Tue Jun 19 16:18:00 2012 743@@ -343,6 +343,12 @@ 744 void ENGINE_load_ubsec(void); 745 void ENGINE_load_padlock(void); 746 void ENGINE_load_capi(void); 747+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA 748+void ENGINE_load_pk11ca(void); 749+#endif 750+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO 751+void ENGINE_load_pk11so(void); 752+#endif 753 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMP 754 void ENGINE_load_gmp(void); 755 #endif 756Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c 757diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c:1.33 758--- /dev/null Fri Jan 2 14:59:08 2015 759+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c Fri Oct 4 14:07:41 2013 760@@ -0,0 +1,4010 @@ 761+/* 762+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. 763+ * Use is subject to license terms. 764+ */ 765+ 766+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */ 767+/* 768+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for 769+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). 770+ * 771+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by 772+ * Afchine Madjlessi. 773+ */ 774+/* 775+ * ==================================================================== 776+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 777+ * 778+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 779+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 780+ * are met: 781+ * 782+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 783+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 784+ * 785+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 786+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 787+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 788+ * distribution. 789+ * 790+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 791+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: 792+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 793+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" 794+ * 795+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 796+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 797+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 798+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. 799+ * 800+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 801+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 802+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 803+ * 804+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 805+ * acknowledgment: 806+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 807+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" 808+ * 809+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 810+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 811+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 812+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 813+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 814+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 815+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 816+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 817+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 818+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 819+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 820+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 821+ * ==================================================================== 822+ * 823+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 824+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 825+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 826+ * 827+ */ 828+ 829+#include <stdio.h> 830+#include <stdlib.h> 831+#include <string.h> 832+#include <sys/types.h> 833+ 834+#include <openssl/e_os2.h> 835+#include <openssl/crypto.h> 836+#include <cryptlib.h> 837+#include <openssl/engine.h> 838+#include <openssl/dso.h> 839+#include <openssl/err.h> 840+#include <openssl/bn.h> 841+#include <openssl/md5.h> 842+#include <openssl/pem.h> 843+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 844+#include <openssl/rsa.h> 845+#endif 846+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 847+#include <openssl/dsa.h> 848+#endif 849+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 850+#include <openssl/dh.h> 851+#endif 852+#include <openssl/rand.h> 853+#include <openssl/objects.h> 854+#include <openssl/x509.h> 855+#include <openssl/aes.h> 856+#include <openssl/des.h> 857+ 858+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 859+typedef int pid_t; 860+#define getpid() GetCurrentProcessId() 861+#define NOPTHREADS 862+#ifndef NULL_PTR 863+#define NULL_PTR NULL 864+#endif 865+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 866+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name 867+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 868+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name 869+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ 870+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) 871+#else 872+#include <signal.h> 873+#include <unistd.h> 874+#include <dlfcn.h> 875+#endif 876+ 877+/* Debug mutexes */ 878+/*#undef DEBUG_MUTEX */ 879+#define DEBUG_MUTEX 880+ 881+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 882+/* for pthread error check on Linuxes */ 883+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX 884+#define __USE_UNIX98 885+#endif 886+#include <pthread.h> 887+#endif 888+ 889+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW 890+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 891+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA 892+ 893+/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */ 894+#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG" 895+/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */ 896+/* #undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 897+/* 898+ * Solaris specific code. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more 899+ * information. 900+ */ 901+#if defined(__SVR4) && defined(__sun) 902+#undef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION 903+#endif 904+ 905+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 906+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) 907+#include "cryptoki.h" 908+#include "pkcs11.h" 909+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) 910+#else 911+#include "cryptoki.h" 912+#include "pkcs11.h" 913+#endif 914+#include "hw_pk11ca.h" 915+#include "hw_pk11_err.c" 916+ 917+/* 918+ * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(), 919+ * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the 920+ * RSA keys by reference feature. 921+ */ 922+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 923+pthread_mutex_t *token_lock; 924+#endif 925+ 926+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION 927+/* 928+ * Tables for symmetric ciphers and digest mechs found in the pkcs11_kernel 929+ * library. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more information. 930+ */ 931+static int *hw_cnids; 932+static int *hw_dnids; 933+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ 934+ 935+/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */ 936+static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX]; 937+ 938+/* 939+ * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when 940+ * logging into the token. 941+ */ 942+CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags; 943+ 944+/* 945+ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for 946+ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given 947+ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be 948+ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already 949+ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each 950+ * PK11_SESSION object. 951+ * 952+ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the 953+ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also 954+ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another 955+ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in 956+ * invalid handle returned from the search operation. 957+ * 958+ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores. 959+ * They are also used for active list protection. 960+ */ 961+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 962+pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; 963+#endif 964+ 965+/* 966+ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one 967+ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session 968+ * list) for given algorithm type 969+ */ 970+PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; 971+ 972+/* 973+ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available 974+ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed 975+ * without losing the secret key objects. 976+ */ 977+static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 978+ 979+/* ENGINE level stuff */ 980+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e); 981+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e); 982+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e); 983+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)); 984+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e); 985+ 986+/* RAND stuff */ 987+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); 988+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); 989+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void); 990+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); 991+static int pk11_rand_status(void); 992+ 993+/* These functions are also used in other files */ 994+PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype); 995+void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); 996+ 997+/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */ 998+extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type); 999+extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type); 1000+ 1001+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1002+int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); 1003+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); 1004+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); 1005+#endif 1006+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 1007+int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); 1008+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); 1009+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); 1010+#endif 1011+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1012+int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); 1013+int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *session, CK_BBOOL uselock); 1014+#endif 1015+ 1016+/* Local helper functions */ 1017+static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void); 1018+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype); 1019+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); 1020+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); 1021+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, 1022+ CK_BBOOL persistent); 1023+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void); 1024+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void); 1025+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name); 1026+ 1027+/* Symmetric cipher and digest support functions */ 1028+static int cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid); 1029+static int pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids); 1030+static int pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids); 1031+static int pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, 1032+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc); 1033+static int pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp); 1034+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L 1035+static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, 1036+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl); 1037+#else 1038+static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, 1039+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl); 1040+#endif 1041+static int pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); 1042+static int pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, 1043+ const int **nids, int nid); 1044+static int pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, 1045+ const int **nids, int nid); 1046+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, 1047+ const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp); 1048+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key, 1049+ int key_len); 1050+static int md_nid_to_pk11(int nid); 1051+static int pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); 1052+static int pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, 1053+ size_t count); 1054+static int pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md); 1055+static int pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from); 1056+static int pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); 1057+ 1058+static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found); 1059+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, 1060+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, 1061+ int *local_cipher_nids); 1062+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, 1063+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, 1064+ int *local_digest_nids); 1065+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR, int slot_id, 1066+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids, 1067+ int id); 1068+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id, 1069+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, 1070+ int id); 1071+ 1072+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void); 1073+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void); 1074+ 1075+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION 1076+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void); 1077+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table); 1078+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ 1079+ 1080+/* Index for the supported ciphers */ 1081+enum pk11_cipher_id { 1082+ PK11_DES_CBC, 1083+ PK11_DES3_CBC, 1084+ PK11_DES_ECB, 1085+ PK11_DES3_ECB, 1086+ PK11_RC4, 1087+ PK11_AES_128_CBC, 1088+ PK11_AES_192_CBC, 1089+ PK11_AES_256_CBC, 1090+ PK11_AES_128_ECB, 1091+ PK11_AES_192_ECB, 1092+ PK11_AES_256_ECB, 1093+ PK11_AES_128_CTR, 1094+ PK11_AES_192_CTR, 1095+ PK11_AES_256_CTR, 1096+ PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, 1097+ PK11_CIPHER_MAX 1098+}; 1099+ 1100+/* Index for the supported digests */ 1101+enum pk11_digest_id { 1102+ PK11_MD5, 1103+ PK11_SHA1, 1104+ PK11_SHA224, 1105+ PK11_SHA256, 1106+ PK11_SHA384, 1107+ PK11_SHA512, 1108+ PK11_DIGEST_MAX 1109+}; 1110+ 1111+#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type, priv) \ 1112+ { \ 1113+ if (uselock) \ 1114+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ 1115+ if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \ 1116+ { \ 1117+ retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl, \ 1118+ priv ? sp->priv_persistent : sp->pub_persistent); \ 1119+ } \ 1120+ if (uselock) \ 1121+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ 1122+ } 1123+ 1124+static int cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX]; 1125+static int digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX]; 1126+static int cipher_count = 0; 1127+static int digest_count = 0; 1128+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE; 1129+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_recover = CK_FALSE; 1130+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dsa = CK_FALSE; 1131+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dh = CK_FALSE; 1132+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE; 1133+ 1134+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_st 1135+ { 1136+ enum pk11_cipher_id id; 1137+ int nid; 1138+ int iv_len; 1139+ int min_key_len; 1140+ int max_key_len; 1141+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; 1142+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type; 1143+ } PK11_CIPHER; 1144+ 1145+static PK11_CIPHER ciphers[] = 1146+ { 1147+ { PK11_DES_CBC, NID_des_cbc, 8, 8, 8, 1148+ CKK_DES, CKM_DES_CBC, }, 1149+ { PK11_DES3_CBC, NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, 24, 24, 1150+ CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_CBC, }, 1151+ { PK11_DES_ECB, NID_des_ecb, 0, 8, 8, 1152+ CKK_DES, CKM_DES_ECB, }, 1153+ { PK11_DES3_ECB, NID_des_ede3_ecb, 0, 24, 24, 1154+ CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_ECB, }, 1155+ { PK11_RC4, NID_rc4, 0, 16, 256, 1156+ CKK_RC4, CKM_RC4, }, 1157+ { PK11_AES_128_CBC, NID_aes_128_cbc, 16, 16, 16, 1158+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, 1159+ { PK11_AES_192_CBC, NID_aes_192_cbc, 16, 24, 24, 1160+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, 1161+ { PK11_AES_256_CBC, NID_aes_256_cbc, 16, 32, 32, 1162+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, 1163+ { PK11_AES_128_ECB, NID_aes_128_ecb, 0, 16, 16, 1164+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, 1165+ { PK11_AES_192_ECB, NID_aes_192_ecb, 0, 24, 24, 1166+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, 1167+ { PK11_AES_256_ECB, NID_aes_256_ecb, 0, 32, 32, 1168+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, 1169+ { PK11_AES_128_CTR, NID_aes_128_ctr, 16, 16, 16, 1170+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, 1171+ { PK11_AES_192_CTR, NID_aes_192_ctr, 16, 24, 24, 1172+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, 1173+ { PK11_AES_256_CTR, NID_aes_256_ctr, 16, 32, 32, 1174+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, 1175+ { PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, NID_bf_cbc, 8, 16, 16, 1176+ CKK_BLOWFISH, CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC, }, 1177+ }; 1178+ 1179+typedef struct PK11_DIGEST_st 1180+ { 1181+ enum pk11_digest_id id; 1182+ int nid; 1183+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type; 1184+ } PK11_DIGEST; 1185+ 1186+static PK11_DIGEST digests[] = 1187+ { 1188+ {PK11_MD5, NID_md5, CKM_MD5, }, 1189+ {PK11_SHA1, NID_sha1, CKM_SHA_1, }, 1190+ {PK11_SHA224, NID_sha224, CKM_SHA224, }, 1191+ {PK11_SHA256, NID_sha256, CKM_SHA256, }, 1192+ {PK11_SHA384, NID_sha384, CKM_SHA384, }, 1193+ {PK11_SHA512, NID_sha512, CKM_SHA512, }, 1194+ {0, NID_undef, 0xFFFF, }, 1195+ }; 1196+ 1197+/* 1198+ * Structure to be used for the cipher_data/md_data in 1199+ * EVP_CIPHER_CTX/EVP_MD_CTX structures in order to use the same pk11 1200+ * session in multiple cipher_update calls 1201+ */ 1202+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_STATE_st 1203+ { 1204+ PK11_SESSION *sp; 1205+ } PK11_CIPHER_STATE; 1206+ 1207+ 1208+/* 1209+ * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine gets 1210+ * called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID. 1211+ * 1212+ * Note how the PK11_CIPHER_STATE is used here. 1213+ */ 1214+ 1215+/* DES CBC EVP */ 1216+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_cbc = 1217+ { 1218+ NID_des_cbc, 1219+ 8, 8, 8, 1220+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, 1221+ pk11_cipher_init, 1222+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, 1223+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, 1224+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1225+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, 1226+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, 1227+ NULL 1228+ }; 1229+ 1230+/* 3DES CBC EVP */ 1231+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_cbc = 1232+ { 1233+ NID_des_ede3_cbc, 1234+ 8, 24, 8, 1235+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, 1236+ pk11_cipher_init, 1237+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, 1238+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, 1239+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1240+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, 1241+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, 1242+ NULL 1243+ }; 1244+ 1245+/* 1246+ * ECB modes don't use an Initial Vector so that's why set_asn1_parameters and 1247+ * get_asn1_parameters fields are set to NULL. 1248+ */ 1249+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_ecb = 1250+ { 1251+ NID_des_ecb, 1252+ 8, 8, 8, 1253+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, 1254+ pk11_cipher_init, 1255+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, 1256+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, 1257+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1258+ NULL, 1259+ NULL, 1260+ NULL 1261+ }; 1262+ 1263+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_ecb = 1264+ { 1265+ NID_des_ede3_ecb, 1266+ 8, 24, 8, 1267+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, 1268+ pk11_cipher_init, 1269+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, 1270+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, 1271+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1272+ NULL, 1273+ NULL, 1274+ NULL 1275+ }; 1276+ 1277+ 1278+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_cbc = 1279+ { 1280+ NID_aes_128_cbc, 1281+ 16, 16, 16, 1282+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, 1283+ pk11_cipher_init, 1284+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, 1285+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, 1286+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1287+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, 1288+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, 1289+ NULL 1290+ }; 1291+ 1292+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_cbc = 1293+ { 1294+ NID_aes_192_cbc, 1295+ 16, 24, 16, 1296+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, 1297+ pk11_cipher_init, 1298+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, 1299+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, 1300+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1301+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, 1302+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, 1303+ NULL 1304+ }; 1305+ 1306+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_cbc = 1307+ { 1308+ NID_aes_256_cbc, 1309+ 16, 32, 16, 1310+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, 1311+ pk11_cipher_init, 1312+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, 1313+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, 1314+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1315+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, 1316+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, 1317+ NULL 1318+ }; 1319+ 1320+/* 1321+ * ECB modes don't use IV so that's why set_asn1_parameters and 1322+ * get_asn1_parameters are set to NULL. 1323+ */ 1324+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ecb = 1325+ { 1326+ NID_aes_128_ecb, 1327+ 16, 16, 0, 1328+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, 1329+ pk11_cipher_init, 1330+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, 1331+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, 1332+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1333+ NULL, 1334+ NULL, 1335+ NULL 1336+ }; 1337+ 1338+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ecb = 1339+ { 1340+ NID_aes_192_ecb, 1341+ 16, 24, 0, 1342+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, 1343+ pk11_cipher_init, 1344+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, 1345+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, 1346+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1347+ NULL, 1348+ NULL, 1349+ NULL 1350+ }; 1351+ 1352+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ecb = 1353+ { 1354+ NID_aes_256_ecb, 1355+ 16, 32, 0, 1356+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, 1357+ pk11_cipher_init, 1358+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, 1359+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, 1360+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1361+ NULL, 1362+ NULL, 1363+ NULL 1364+ }; 1365+ 1366+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ctr = 1367+ { 1368+ NID_aes_128_ctr, 1369+ 16, 16, 16, 1370+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, 1371+ pk11_cipher_init, 1372+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, 1373+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, 1374+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1375+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, 1376+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, 1377+ NULL 1378+ }; 1379+ 1380+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ctr = 1381+ { 1382+ NID_aes_192_ctr, 1383+ 16, 24, 16, 1384+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, 1385+ pk11_cipher_init, 1386+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, 1387+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, 1388+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1389+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, 1390+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, 1391+ NULL 1392+ }; 1393+ 1394+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ctr = 1395+ { 1396+ NID_aes_256_ctr, 1397+ 16, 32, 16, 1398+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, 1399+ pk11_cipher_init, 1400+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, 1401+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, 1402+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1403+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, 1404+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, 1405+ NULL 1406+ }; 1407+ 1408+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_bf_cbc = 1409+ { 1410+ NID_bf_cbc, 1411+ 8, 16, 8, 1412+ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, 1413+ pk11_cipher_init, 1414+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, 1415+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, 1416+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1417+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, 1418+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, 1419+ NULL 1420+ }; 1421+ 1422+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_rc4 = 1423+ { 1424+ NID_rc4, 1425+ 1, 16, 0, 1426+ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, 1427+ pk11_cipher_init, 1428+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, 1429+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, 1430+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1431+ NULL, 1432+ NULL, 1433+ NULL 1434+ }; 1435+ 1436+static const EVP_MD pk11_md5 = 1437+ { 1438+ NID_md5, 1439+ NID_md5WithRSAEncryption, 1440+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, 1441+ 0, 1442+ pk11_digest_init, 1443+ pk11_digest_update, 1444+ pk11_digest_final, 1445+ pk11_digest_copy, 1446+ pk11_digest_cleanup, 1447+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, 1448+ MD5_CBLOCK, 1449+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1450+ }; 1451+ 1452+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha1 = 1453+ { 1454+ NID_sha1, 1455+ NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, 1456+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, 1457+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, 1458+ pk11_digest_init, 1459+ pk11_digest_update, 1460+ pk11_digest_final, 1461+ pk11_digest_copy, 1462+ pk11_digest_cleanup, 1463+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, 1464+ SHA_CBLOCK, 1465+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1466+ }; 1467+ 1468+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha224 = 1469+ { 1470+ NID_sha224, 1471+ NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, 1472+ SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH, 1473+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, 1474+ pk11_digest_init, 1475+ pk11_digest_update, 1476+ pk11_digest_final, 1477+ pk11_digest_copy, 1478+ pk11_digest_cleanup, 1479+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, 1480+ /* SHA-224 uses the same cblock size as SHA-256 */ 1481+ SHA256_CBLOCK, 1482+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1483+ }; 1484+ 1485+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha256 = 1486+ { 1487+ NID_sha256, 1488+ NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, 1489+ SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, 1490+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, 1491+ pk11_digest_init, 1492+ pk11_digest_update, 1493+ pk11_digest_final, 1494+ pk11_digest_copy, 1495+ pk11_digest_cleanup, 1496+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, 1497+ SHA256_CBLOCK, 1498+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1499+ }; 1500+ 1501+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha384 = 1502+ { 1503+ NID_sha384, 1504+ NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, 1505+ SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, 1506+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, 1507+ pk11_digest_init, 1508+ pk11_digest_update, 1509+ pk11_digest_final, 1510+ pk11_digest_copy, 1511+ pk11_digest_cleanup, 1512+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, 1513+ /* SHA-384 uses the same cblock size as SHA-512 */ 1514+ SHA512_CBLOCK, 1515+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1516+ }; 1517+ 1518+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha512 = 1519+ { 1520+ NID_sha512, 1521+ NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, 1522+ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH, 1523+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, 1524+ pk11_digest_init, 1525+ pk11_digest_update, 1526+ pk11_digest_final, 1527+ pk11_digest_copy, 1528+ pk11_digest_cleanup, 1529+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, 1530+ SHA512_CBLOCK, 1531+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1532+ }; 1533+ 1534+/* 1535+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. 1536+ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine 1537+ */ 1538+#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE 1539+#define PK11_CMD_PIN (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+1) 1540+#define PK11_CMD_SLOT (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+2) 1541+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] = 1542+ { 1543+ { 1544+ PK11_CMD_SO_PATH, 1545+ "SO_PATH", 1546+ "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library", 1547+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING 1548+ }, 1549+ { 1550+ PK11_CMD_PIN, 1551+ "PIN", 1552+ "Specifies the pin code", 1553+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING 1554+ }, 1555+ { 1556+ PK11_CMD_SLOT, 1557+ "SLOT", 1558+ "Specifies the slot (default is auto select)", 1559+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC, 1560+ }, 1561+ {0, NULL, NULL, 0} 1562+ }; 1563+ 1564+ 1565+static RAND_METHOD pk11_random = 1566+ { 1567+ pk11_rand_seed, 1568+ pk11_rand_bytes, 1569+ pk11_rand_cleanup, 1570+ pk11_rand_add, 1571+ pk11_rand_bytes, 1572+ pk11_rand_status 1573+ }; 1574+ 1575+ 1576+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */ 1577+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO 1578+#error "can't load both crypto-accelerator and sign-only PKCS#11 engines" 1579+#endif 1580+static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11"; 1581+static const char *engine_pk11_name = 1582+ "PKCS #11 engine support (crypto accelerator)"; 1583+ 1584+CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL; 1585+static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList"; 1586+ 1587+/* 1588+ * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function 1589+ * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether 1590+ * this is 32 or 64 bit build. 1591+ */ 1592+static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION; 1593+ 1594+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE; 1595+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE; 1596+/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */ 1597+CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0; 1598+static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0; 1599+static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0; 1600+char *pk11_pin = NULL; 1601+static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; 1602+static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = FALSE; 1603+static int pk11_pid = 0; 1604+ 1605+static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL; 1606+ 1607+/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */ 1608+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void) 1609+ { 1610+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 1611+ int type; 1612+ pthread_mutexattr_t attr; 1613+ 1614+ if (pthread_mutexattr_init(&attr) != 0) 1615+ { 1616+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 100); 1617+ return (0); 1618+ } 1619+ 1620+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX 1621+ if (pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK) != 0) 1622+ { 1623+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 101); 1624+ return (0); 1625+ } 1626+#endif 1627+ 1628+ if ((token_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL) 1629+ goto malloc_err; 1630+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(token_lock, &attr); 1631+ 1632+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1633+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); 1634+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL) 1635+ goto malloc_err; 1636+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], &attr); 1637+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ 1638+ 1639+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 1640+ find_lock[OP_DSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); 1641+ if (find_lock[OP_DSA] == NULL) 1642+ goto malloc_err; 1643+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DSA], &attr); 1644+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ 1645+ 1646+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1647+ find_lock[OP_DH] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); 1648+ if (find_lock[OP_DH] == NULL) 1649+ goto malloc_err; 1650+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DH], &attr); 1651+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ 1652+ 1653+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) 1654+ { 1655+ session_cache[type].lock = 1656+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); 1657+ if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL) 1658+ goto malloc_err; 1659+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, &attr); 1660+ } 1661+ 1662+ return (1); 1663+ 1664+malloc_err: 1665+ pk11_free_all_locks(); 1666+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1667+ return (0); 1668+#else 1669+ return (1); 1670+#endif 1671+ } 1672+ 1673+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void) 1674+ { 1675+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 1676+ int type; 1677+ 1678+ if (token_lock != NULL) 1679+ { 1680+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(token_lock); 1681+ OPENSSL_free(token_lock); 1682+ token_lock = NULL; 1683+ } 1684+ 1685+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1686+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL) 1687+ { 1688+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]); 1689+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]); 1690+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL; 1691+ } 1692+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ 1693+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 1694+ if (find_lock[OP_DSA] != NULL) 1695+ { 1696+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DSA]); 1697+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DSA]); 1698+ find_lock[OP_DSA] = NULL; 1699+ } 1700+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ 1701+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1702+ if (find_lock[OP_DH] != NULL) 1703+ { 1704+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DH]); 1705+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DH]); 1706+ find_lock[OP_DH] = NULL; 1707+ } 1708+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ 1709+ 1710+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) 1711+ { 1712+ if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL) 1713+ { 1714+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock); 1715+ OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock); 1716+ session_cache[type].lock = NULL; 1717+ } 1718+ } 1719+#endif 1720+ } 1721+ 1722+/* 1723+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support. 1724+ */ 1725+static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e) 1726+ { 1727+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1728+ const RSA_METHOD *rsa = NULL; 1729+ RSA_METHOD *pk11_rsa = PK11_RSA(); 1730+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ 1731+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) 1732+ if (!pk11_library_init(e)) 1733+ return (0); 1734+ 1735+ if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) || 1736+ !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name) || 1737+ !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, pk11_engine_ciphers) || 1738+ !ENGINE_set_digests(e, pk11_engine_digests)) 1739+ return (0); 1740+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1741+ if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE) 1742+ { 1743+ if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) || 1744+ !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) || 1745+ !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey)) 1746+ return (0); 1747+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 1748+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG); 1749+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 1750+ } 1751+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ 1752+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 1753+ if (pk11_have_dsa == CK_TRUE) 1754+ { 1755+ if (!ENGINE_set_DSA(e, PK11_DSA())) 1756+ return (0); 1757+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 1758+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DSA\n", PK11_DBG); 1759+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 1760+ } 1761+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ 1762+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1763+ if (pk11_have_dh == CK_TRUE) 1764+ { 1765+ if (!ENGINE_set_DH(e, PK11_DH())) 1766+ return (0); 1767+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 1768+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DH\n", PK11_DBG); 1769+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 1770+ } 1771+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ 1772+ if (pk11_have_random) 1773+ { 1774+ if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random)) 1775+ return (0); 1776+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 1777+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG); 1778+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 1779+ } 1780+ if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) || 1781+ !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) || 1782+ !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) || 1783+ !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) || 1784+ !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns)) 1785+ return (0); 1786+ 1787+/* 1788+ * Apache calls OpenSSL function RSA_blinding_on() once during startup 1789+ * which in turn calls bn_mod_exp. Since we do not implement bn_mod_exp 1790+ * here, we wire it back to the OpenSSL software implementation. 1791+ * Since it is used only once, performance is not a concern. 1792+ */ 1793+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1794+ rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(); 1795+ pk11_rsa->rsa_mod_exp = rsa->rsa_mod_exp; 1796+ pk11_rsa->bn_mod_exp = rsa->bn_mod_exp; 1797+ if (pk11_have_recover != CK_TRUE) 1798+ pk11_rsa->rsa_pub_dec = rsa->rsa_pub_dec; 1799+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ 1800+ 1801+ /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */ 1802+ ERR_load_pk11_strings(); 1803+ 1804+ return (1); 1805+ } 1806+ 1807+/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */ 1808+#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT 1809+#error "dynamic engine not supported" 1810+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id) 1811+ { 1812+ if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0)) 1813+ return (0); 1814+ 1815+ if (!bind_pk11(e)) 1816+ return (0); 1817+ 1818+ return (1); 1819+ } 1820+ 1821+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN() 1822+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper) 1823+ 1824+#else 1825+static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void) 1826+ { 1827+ ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); 1828+ 1829+ if (!ret) 1830+ return (NULL); 1831+ 1832+ if (!bind_pk11(ret)) 1833+ { 1834+ ENGINE_free(ret); 1835+ return (NULL); 1836+ } 1837+ 1838+ return (ret); 1839+ } 1840+ 1841+void 1842+ENGINE_load_pk11(void) 1843+ { 1844+ ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL; 1845+ 1846+ /* 1847+ * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to 1848+ * security reasons. We will link it in statically. 1849+ */ 1850+ /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */ 1851+ if (!pk11_dso) 1852+ pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0); 1853+ 1854+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) 1855+ { 1856+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); 1857+ return; 1858+ } 1859+ 1860+ e_pk11 = engine_pk11(); 1861+ if (!e_pk11) 1862+ { 1863+ DSO_free(pk11_dso); 1864+ pk11_dso = NULL; 1865+ return; 1866+ } 1867+ 1868+ /* 1869+ * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically 1870+ * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11 1871+ * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter 1872+ * needs cipher and digest algorithm information 1873+ */ 1874+ if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11)) 1875+ { 1876+ DSO_free(pk11_dso); 1877+ pk11_dso = NULL; 1878+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11); 1879+ return; 1880+ } 1881+ 1882+ ENGINE_add(e_pk11); 1883+ 1884+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11); 1885+ ERR_clear_error(); 1886+ } 1887+#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */ 1888+ 1889+/* 1890+ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and 1891+ * the function symbol names to bind to. 1892+ */ 1893+static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; 1894+ 1895+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void) 1896+ { 1897+ if (PK11_LIBNAME) 1898+ return (PK11_LIBNAME); 1899+ 1900+ return (def_PK11_LIBNAME); 1901+ } 1902+ 1903+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void) 1904+ { 1905+ if (PK11_LIBNAME) 1906+ OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME); 1907+ 1908+ PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; 1909+ } 1910+ 1911+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name) 1912+ { 1913+ free_PK11_LIBNAME(); 1914+ 1915+ return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0); 1916+ } 1917+ 1918+/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */ 1919+static void pk11_fork_prepare(void) 1920+ { 1921+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 1922+ int i; 1923+ 1924+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) 1925+ return; 1926+ 1927+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 1928+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); 1929+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); 1930+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); 1931+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) 1932+ { 1933+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); 1934+ } 1935+#endif 1936+ } 1937+ 1938+/* release all engine specific mutexes */ 1939+static void pk11_fork_parent(void) 1940+ { 1941+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 1942+ int i; 1943+ 1944+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) 1945+ return; 1946+ 1947+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) 1948+ { 1949+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); 1950+ } 1951+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); 1952+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); 1953+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 1954+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 1955+#endif 1956+ } 1957+ 1958+/* 1959+ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them 1960+ * accessible to all threads. 1961+ */ 1962+static void pk11_fork_child(void) 1963+ { 1964+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 1965+ int i; 1966+ 1967+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) 1968+ return; 1969+ 1970+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) 1971+ { 1972+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); 1973+ } 1974+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); 1975+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); 1976+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 1977+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 1978+#endif 1979+ } 1980+ 1981+/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */ 1982+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e) 1983+{ 1984+ return (pk11_library_init(e)); 1985+} 1986+ 1987+static CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS pk11_init_args = 1988+ { 1989+ NULL_PTR, /* CreateMutex */ 1990+ NULL_PTR, /* DestroyMutex */ 1991+ NULL_PTR, /* LockMutex */ 1992+ NULL_PTR, /* UnlockMutex */ 1993+ CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK, /* flags */ 1994+ NULL_PTR, /* pReserved */ 1995+ }; 1996+ 1997+/* 1998+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. 1999+ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also 2000+ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and 2001+ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function 2002+ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default. 2003+ */ 2004+/* ARGSUSED */ 2005+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e) 2006+ { 2007+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p; 2008+ CK_RV rv = CKR_OK; 2009+ CK_INFO info; 2010+ CK_ULONG ul_state_len; 2011+ int any_slot_found; 2012+ int i; 2013+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 2014+ struct sigaction sigint_act, sigterm_act, sighup_act; 2015+#endif 2016+ 2017+ /* 2018+ * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which 2019+ * is called from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still 2020+ * at least one existing functional reference to the engine 2021+ * (see engine(3) for more information), pk11_finish() is 2022+ * skipped. For example, this can happen if an application 2023+ * forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a fork() 2024+ * when the application is finishing the engine so that it can 2025+ * be reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional 2026+ * reference causes pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In 2027+ * that case we need the PID check so that we properly 2028+ * initialize the engine again. 2029+ */ 2030+ if (pk11_library_initialized) 2031+ { 2032+ if (pk11_pid == getpid()) 2033+ { 2034+ return (1); 2035+ } 2036+ else 2037+ { 2038+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 2039+ /* 2040+ * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case 2041+ * the application calls fork() without finishing the 2042+ * engine first. 2043+ */ 2044+ pk11_free_all_locks(); 2045+ } 2046+ } 2047+ 2048+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) 2049+ { 2050+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); 2051+ goto err; 2052+ } 2053+ 2054+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION 2055+ if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0) 2056+ goto err; 2057+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ 2058+ 2059+ /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */ 2060+ p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso, 2061+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST); 2062+ if (!p) 2063+ { 2064+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); 2065+ goto err; 2066+ } 2067+ 2068+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ 2069+ rv = p(&pFuncList); 2070+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 2071+ { 2072+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv); 2073+ goto err; 2074+ } 2075+ 2076+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 2077+ /* Not all PKCS#11 library are signal safe! */ 2078+ 2079+ (void) memset(&sigint_act, 0, sizeof(sigint_act)); 2080+ (void) memset(&sigterm_act, 0, sizeof(sigterm_act)); 2081+ (void) memset(&sighup_act, 0, sizeof(sighup_act)); 2082+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, NULL, &sigint_act); 2083+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, NULL, &sigterm_act); 2084+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, NULL, &sighup_act); 2085+#endif 2086+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); 2087+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 2088+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sigint_act, NULL); 2089+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigterm_act, NULL); 2090+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &sighup_act, NULL); 2091+#endif 2092+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) 2093+ { 2094+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); 2095+ goto err; 2096+ } 2097+ 2098+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info); 2099+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 2100+ { 2101+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv); 2102+ goto err; 2103+ } 2104+ 2105+ if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0) 2106+ goto err; 2107+ 2108+ /* 2109+ * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any 2110+ * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an 2111+ * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11 2112+ * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just 2113+ * because no slot was present. 2114+ */ 2115+ if (any_slot_found == 0) 2116+ return (1); 2117+ 2118+ if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 2119+ { 2120+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */ 2121+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, 2122+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); 2123+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 2124+ { 2125+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, 2126+ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); 2127+ goto err; 2128+ } 2129+ } 2130+ 2131+ /* 2132+ * Disable digest if C_GetOperationState is not supported since 2133+ * this function is required by OpenSSL digest copy function 2134+ */ 2135+ /* Keyper fails to return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED */ 2136+ if (pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(global_session, NULL, &ul_state_len) 2137+ != CKR_OK) { 2138+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 2139+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: C_GetOperationState() not supported, " 2140+ "setting digest_count to 0\n", PK11_DBG); 2141+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 2142+ digest_count = 0; 2143+ } 2144+ 2145+ pk11_library_initialized = TRUE; 2146+ pk11_pid = getpid(); 2147+ /* 2148+ * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks() 2149+ * will do the cleanup. 2150+ */ 2151+ if (!pk11_init_all_locks()) 2152+ goto err; 2153+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) 2154+ session_cache[i].head = NULL; 2155+ /* 2156+ * initialize active lists. We only use active lists 2157+ * for asymmetric ciphers. 2158+ */ 2159+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) 2160+ active_list[i] = NULL; 2161+ 2162+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 2163+ if (!pk11_atfork_initialized) 2164+ { 2165+ if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent, 2166+ pk11_fork_child) != 0) 2167+ { 2168+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED); 2169+ goto err; 2170+ } 2171+ pk11_atfork_initialized = TRUE; 2172+ } 2173+#endif 2174+ 2175+ return (1); 2176+ 2177+err: 2178+ return (0); 2179+ } 2180+ 2181+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */ 2182+/* ARGSUSED */ 2183+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e) 2184+ { 2185+ free_PK11_LIBNAME(); 2186+ ERR_unload_pk11_strings(); 2187+ if (pk11_pin) { 2188+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); 2189+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); 2190+ } 2191+ pk11_pin = NULL; 2192+ return (1); 2193+ } 2194+ 2195+/* 2196+ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11 2197+ * library. 2198+ */ 2199+/* ARGSUSED */ 2200+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e) 2201+ { 2202+ int i; 2203+ 2204+ if (pk11_pin) { 2205+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); 2206+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); 2207+ } 2208+ pk11_pin = NULL; 2209+ 2210+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) 2211+ { 2212+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED); 2213+ goto err; 2214+ } 2215+ 2216+ OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL); 2217+ 2218+ if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0) 2219+ goto err; 2220+ 2221+ /* free all active lists */ 2222+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) 2223+ pk11_free_active_list(i); 2224+ 2225+ pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session); 2226+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 2227+ 2228+ /* 2229+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function 2230+ * may have side-effects. 2231+ */ 2232+#if 0 2233+ pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL); 2234+#endif 2235+ 2236+ if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso)) 2237+ { 2238+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); 2239+ goto err; 2240+ } 2241+ pk11_dso = NULL; 2242+ pFuncList = NULL; 2243+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; 2244+ pk11_pid = 0; 2245+ /* 2246+ * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than 2247+ * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason 2248+ * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out 2249+ * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes 2250+ * the engine before calling fork(). 2251+ */ 2252+ pk11_free_all_locks(); 2253+ 2254+ return (1); 2255+ 2256+err: 2257+ return (0); 2258+ } 2259+ 2260+/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */ 2261+/* ARGSUSED */ 2262+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)) 2263+ { 2264+ int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1); 2265+ 2266+ switch (cmd) 2267+ { 2268+ case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH: 2269+ if (p == NULL) 2270+ { 2271+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); 2272+ return (0); 2273+ } 2274+ 2275+ if (initialized) 2276+ { 2277+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED); 2278+ return (0); 2279+ } 2280+ 2281+ return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p)); 2282+ case PK11_CMD_PIN: 2283+ if (pk11_pin) { 2284+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); 2285+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); 2286+ } 2287+ pk11_pin = NULL; 2288+ 2289+ if (p == NULL) 2290+ { 2291+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); 2292+ return (0); 2293+ } 2294+ 2295+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(p); 2296+ if (pk11_pin == NULL) 2297+ { 2298+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2299+ return (0); 2300+ } 2301+ return (1); 2302+ case PK11_CMD_SLOT: 2303+ SLOTID = (CK_SLOT_ID)i; 2304+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 2305+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: slot set\n", PK11_DBG); 2306+#endif 2307+ return (1); 2308+ default: 2309+ break; 2310+ } 2311+ 2312+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); 2313+ 2314+ return (0); 2315+ } 2316+ 2317+ 2318+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ 2319+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void) 2320+ { 2321+ return; 2322+ } 2323+ 2324+/* ARGSUSED */ 2325+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) 2326+ { 2327+ PK11_SESSION *sp; 2328+ 2329+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) 2330+ return; 2331+ 2332+ /* 2333+ * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since 2334+ * the calling functions do not care anyway 2335+ */ 2336+ pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num); 2337+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); 2338+ 2339+ return; 2340+ } 2341+ 2342+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) 2343+ { 2344+ pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0); 2345+ } 2346+ 2347+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) 2348+ { 2349+ CK_RV rv; 2350+ PK11_SESSION *sp; 2351+ 2352+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) 2353+ return (0); 2354+ 2355+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num); 2356+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 2357+ { 2358+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv); 2359+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); 2360+ return (0); 2361+ } 2362+ 2363+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); 2364+ return (1); 2365+ } 2366+ 2367+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ 2368+static int pk11_rand_status(void) 2369+ { 2370+ return (1); 2371+ } 2372+ 2373+/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */ 2374+static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) 2375+ { 2376+ switch (optype) 2377+ { 2378+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2379+ case OP_RSA: 2380+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) 2381+ { 2382+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); 2383+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; 2384+ } 2385+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) 2386+ { 2387+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); 2388+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; 2389+ } 2390+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL) 2391+ { 2392+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); 2393+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; 2394+ } 2395+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL) 2396+ { 2397+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); 2398+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; 2399+ } 2400+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) 2401+ { 2402+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); 2403+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; 2404+ } 2405+ break; 2406+#endif 2407+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2408+ case OP_DSA: 2409+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL) 2410+ { 2411+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num); 2412+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; 2413+ } 2414+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL) 2415+ { 2416+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num); 2417+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; 2418+ } 2419+ break; 2420+#endif 2421+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2422+ case OP_DH: 2423+ if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL) 2424+ { 2425+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num); 2426+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; 2427+ } 2428+ break; 2429+#endif 2430+ default: 2431+ break; 2432+ } 2433+ } 2434+ 2435+/* 2436+ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have 2437+ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here 2438+ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist. 2439+ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist. 2440+ */ 2441+PK11_SESSION * 2442+pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype) 2443+ { 2444+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist; 2445+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 2446+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock = NULL; 2447+#endif 2448+ static pid_t pid = 0; 2449+ pid_t new_pid; 2450+ CK_RV rv; 2451+ 2452+ switch (optype) 2453+ { 2454+ case OP_RSA: 2455+ case OP_DSA: 2456+ case OP_DH: 2457+ case OP_RAND: 2458+ case OP_DIGEST: 2459+ case OP_CIPHER: 2460+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 2461+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; 2462+#endif 2463+ break; 2464+ default: 2465+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 2466+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); 2467+ return (NULL); 2468+ } 2469+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 2470+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); 2471+#else 2472+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 2473+#endif 2474+ 2475+ /* 2476+ * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in 2477+ * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session 2478+ * here, with no PID information. 2479+ */ 2480+ if (pid == 0) 2481+ pid = getpid(); 2482+ 2483+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; 2484+ sp = freelist; 2485+ 2486+ /* 2487+ * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled 2488+ * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first 2489+ * structure from the freelist. 2490+ */ 2491+ if (sp == NULL) 2492+ { 2493+ if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL) 2494+ { 2495+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 2496+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2497+ goto err; 2498+ } 2499+ (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION)); 2500+ 2501+ /* 2502+ * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the 2503+ * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so 2504+ * mark them as unused. 2505+ */ 2506+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 2507+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 2508+ } 2509+ else 2510+ { 2511+ freelist = sp->next; 2512+ } 2513+ 2514+ /* 2515+ * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all 2516+ * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones. 2517+ */ 2518+ if (pid != (new_pid = getpid())) 2519+ { 2520+ pid = new_pid; 2521+ 2522+ /* 2523+ * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited 2524+ * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which 2525+ * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the 2526+ * head of the list). 2527+ */ 2528+ while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL) 2529+ { 2530+ freelist = sp1->next; 2531+ /* 2532+ * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions() 2533+ * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11 2534+ * sessions and destroy all objects. 2535+ */ 2536+ pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype); 2537+ OPENSSL_free(sp1); 2538+ } 2539+ 2540+ /* we have to free the active list as well. */ 2541+ pk11_free_active_list(optype); 2542+ 2543+ /* Initialize the process */ 2544+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); 2545+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) 2546+ { 2547+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, 2548+ rv); 2549+ OPENSSL_free(sp); 2550+ sp = NULL; 2551+ goto err; 2552+ } 2553+ 2554+ /* 2555+ * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this 2556+ * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one 2557+ * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found. 2558+ * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more 2559+ * information. 2560+ */ 2561+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION 2562+ if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0) 2563+ goto err; 2564+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ 2565+ if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0) 2566+ goto err; 2567+ 2568+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */ 2569+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, 2570+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); 2571+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 2572+ { 2573+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, 2574+ rv); 2575+ OPENSSL_free(sp); 2576+ sp = NULL; 2577+ goto err; 2578+ } 2579+ 2580+ /* 2581+ * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs 2582+ * re-initialization. 2583+ */ 2584+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) 2585+ { 2586+ OPENSSL_free(sp); 2587+ sp = NULL; 2588+ goto err; 2589+ } 2590+ if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0) 2591+ { 2592+ /* 2593+ * We will keep the session in the cache list and let 2594+ * the caller cope with the situation. 2595+ */ 2596+ freelist = sp; 2597+ sp = NULL; 2598+ goto err; 2599+ } 2600+ } 2601+ 2602+ if (sp->pid == 0) 2603+ { 2604+ /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */ 2605+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) 2606+ { 2607+ OPENSSL_free(sp); 2608+ sp = NULL; 2609+ } 2610+ } 2611+ 2612+ /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */ 2613+ session_cache[optype].head = freelist; 2614+ 2615+err: 2616+ if (sp != NULL) 2617+ sp->next = NULL; 2618+ 2619+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 2620+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); 2621+#else 2622+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 2623+#endif 2624+ 2625+ return (sp); 2626+ } 2627+ 2628+ 2629+void 2630+pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) 2631+ { 2632+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 2633+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; 2634+#endif 2635+ PK11_SESSION *freelist; 2636+ 2637+ /* 2638+ * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and 2639+ * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the 2640+ * next time we will ask for a new session. 2641+ */ 2642+ if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid()) 2643+ return; 2644+ 2645+ switch (optype) 2646+ { 2647+ case OP_RSA: 2648+ case OP_DSA: 2649+ case OP_DH: 2650+ case OP_RAND: 2651+ case OP_DIGEST: 2652+ case OP_CIPHER: 2653+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 2654+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; 2655+#endif 2656+ break; 2657+ default: 2658+ PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, 2659+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); 2660+ return; 2661+ } 2662+ 2663+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 2664+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); 2665+#else 2666+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 2667+#endif 2668+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; 2669+ sp->next = freelist; 2670+ session_cache[optype].head = sp; 2671+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 2672+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); 2673+#else 2674+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 2675+#endif 2676+ } 2677+ 2678+ 2679+/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */ 2680+static int pk11_free_all_sessions() 2681+ { 2682+ int ret = 1; 2683+ int type; 2684+ 2685+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2686+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL); 2687+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ 2688+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2689+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(NULL); 2690+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ 2691+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2692+ (void) pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(NULL); 2693+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ 2694+ (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(NULL); 2695+ 2696+ /* 2697+ * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will 2698+ * return 0 on exit. 2699+ */ 2700+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) 2701+ { 2702+ if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0) 2703+ ret = 0; 2704+ } 2705+ 2706+ return (ret); 2707+ } 2708+ 2709+/* 2710+ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many 2711+ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we 2712+ * return an error on return. 2713+ */ 2714+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype) 2715+ { 2716+ CK_RV rv; 2717+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; 2718+ PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL; 2719+ pid_t mypid = getpid(); 2720+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 2721+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; 2722+#endif 2723+ int ret = 1; 2724+ 2725+ switch (optype) 2726+ { 2727+ case OP_RSA: 2728+ case OP_DSA: 2729+ case OP_DH: 2730+ case OP_RAND: 2731+ case OP_DIGEST: 2732+ case OP_CIPHER: 2733+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 2734+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; 2735+#endif 2736+ break; 2737+ default: 2738+ PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 2739+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); 2740+ return (0); 2741+ } 2742+ 2743+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 2744+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); 2745+#else 2746+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 2747+#endif 2748+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; 2749+ while ((sp = freelist) != NULL) 2750+ { 2751+ if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid) 2752+ { 2753+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); 2754+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 2755+ { 2756+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 2757+ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); 2758+ ret = 0; 2759+ } 2760+ } 2761+ freelist = sp->next; 2762+ pk11_free_nums(sp, optype); 2763+ OPENSSL_free(sp); 2764+ } 2765+ 2766+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 2767+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); 2768+#else 2769+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 2770+#endif 2771+ return (ret); 2772+ } 2773+ 2774+ 2775+static int 2776+pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) 2777+ { 2778+ CK_RV rv; 2779+ CK_SLOT_ID myslot; 2780+ 2781+ switch (optype) 2782+ { 2783+ case OP_RSA: 2784+ case OP_DSA: 2785+ case OP_DH: 2786+ myslot = pubkey_SLOTID; 2787+ break; 2788+ case OP_RAND: 2789+ myslot = rand_SLOTID; 2790+ break; 2791+ case OP_DIGEST: 2792+ case OP_CIPHER: 2793+ myslot = SLOTID; 2794+ break; 2795+ default: 2796+ PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, 2797+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); 2798+ return (0); 2799+ } 2800+ 2801+ sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 2802+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 2803+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype); 2804+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 2805+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, 2806+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); 2807+ if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED) 2808+ { 2809+ /* 2810+ * We are probably a child process so force the 2811+ * reinitialize of the session 2812+ */ 2813+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; 2814+ if (!pk11_library_init(NULL)) 2815+ return (0); 2816+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, 2817+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); 2818+ } 2819+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 2820+ { 2821+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); 2822+ return (0); 2823+ } 2824+ 2825+ sp->pid = getpid(); 2826+ 2827+ switch (optype) 2828+ { 2829+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2830+ case OP_RSA: 2831+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 2832+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 2833+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; 2834+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; 2835+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; 2836+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; 2837+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; 2838+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; 2839+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; 2840+ break; 2841+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ 2842+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2843+ case OP_DSA: 2844+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 2845+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 2846+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL; 2847+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; 2848+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL; 2849+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; 2850+ break; 2851+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ 2852+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2853+ case OP_DH: 2854+ sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 2855+ sp->opdata_dh = NULL; 2856+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; 2857+ break; 2858+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ 2859+ case OP_CIPHER: 2860+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 2861+ sp->opdata_encrypt = -1; 2862+ break; 2863+ default: 2864+ break; 2865+ } 2866+ 2867+ /* 2868+ * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent 2869+ * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so. 2870+ */ 2871+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE; 2872+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE; 2873+ return (1); 2874+ } 2875+ 2876+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2877+/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */ 2878+int 2879+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) 2880+ { 2881+ int ret = 0; 2882+ 2883+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 2884+ { 2885+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key, 2886+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE); 2887+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 2888+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; 2889+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) 2890+ { 2891+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); 2892+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; 2893+ } 2894+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) 2895+ { 2896+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); 2897+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; 2898+ } 2899+ } 2900+ 2901+ return (ret); 2902+ } 2903+ 2904+/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */ 2905+int 2906+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) 2907+ { 2908+ int ret = 0; 2909+ 2910+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 2911+ { 2912+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key, 2913+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_TRUE); 2914+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 2915+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; 2916+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) 2917+ { 2918+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); 2919+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; 2920+ } 2921+ 2922+ /* 2923+ * For the RSA key by reference code, public components 'n'/'e' 2924+ * are the key components we use to check for the cache hit. We 2925+ * must free those as well. 2926+ */ 2927+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL) 2928+ { 2929+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); 2930+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; 2931+ } 2932+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL) 2933+ { 2934+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); 2935+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; 2936+ } 2937+ } 2938+ 2939+ return (ret); 2940+ } 2941+ 2942+/* 2943+ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all 2944+ * objects in the free list. 2945+ */ 2946+int 2947+pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) 2948+ { 2949+ int ret = 1; 2950+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; 2951+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; 2952+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE; 2953+ 2954+ if (session != NULL) 2955+ local_free_session = session; 2956+ else 2957+ { 2958+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 2959+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0); 2960+#else 2961+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 2962+#endif 2963+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head; 2964+ uselock = FALSE; 2965+ } 2966+ 2967+ /* 2968+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects 2969+ */ 2970+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) 2971+ { 2972+ local_free_session = sp->next; 2973+ 2974+ /* 2975+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the 2976+ * destroy operations fails. 2977+ */ 2978+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) 2979+ { 2980+ ret = 0; 2981+ continue; 2982+ } 2983+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) 2984+ { 2985+ ret = 0; 2986+ continue; 2987+ } 2988+ } 2989+ 2990+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 2991+ if (session == NULL) 2992+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0); 2993+#else 2994+ if (session == NULL) 2995+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 2996+#endif 2997+ 2998+ return (ret); 2999+ } 3000+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ 3001+ 3002+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 3003+/* Destroy DSA public key from single session. */ 3004+int 3005+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) 3006+ { 3007+ int ret = 0; 3008+ 3009+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 3010+ { 3011+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key, 3012+ ret, uselock, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE); 3013+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 3014+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL; 3015+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL) 3016+ { 3017+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num); 3018+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; 3019+ } 3020+ } 3021+ 3022+ return (ret); 3023+ } 3024+ 3025+/* Destroy DSA private key from single session. */ 3026+int 3027+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) 3028+ { 3029+ int ret = 0; 3030+ 3031+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 3032+ { 3033+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key, 3034+ ret, uselock, OP_DSA, CK_TRUE); 3035+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 3036+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL; 3037+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL) 3038+ { 3039+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num); 3040+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; 3041+ } 3042+ } 3043+ 3044+ return (ret); 3045+ } 3046+ 3047+/* 3048+ * Destroy DSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all 3049+ * objects in the free list. 3050+ */ 3051+int 3052+pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) 3053+ { 3054+ int ret = 1; 3055+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; 3056+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; 3057+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE; 3058+ 3059+ if (session != NULL) 3060+ local_free_session = session; 3061+ else 3062+ { 3063+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 3064+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock) == 0); 3065+#else 3066+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 3067+#endif 3068+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DSA].head; 3069+ uselock = FALSE; 3070+ } 3071+ 3072+ /* 3073+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects 3074+ */ 3075+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) 3076+ { 3077+ local_free_session = sp->next; 3078+ 3079+ /* 3080+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the 3081+ * destroy operations fails. 3082+ */ 3083+ if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) 3084+ { 3085+ ret = 0; 3086+ continue; 3087+ } 3088+ if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) 3089+ { 3090+ ret = 0; 3091+ continue; 3092+ } 3093+ } 3094+ 3095+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 3096+ if (session == NULL) 3097+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock) == 0); 3098+#else 3099+ if (session == NULL) 3100+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 3101+#endif 3102+ 3103+ return (ret); 3104+ } 3105+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ 3106+ 3107+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 3108+/* Destroy DH key from single session. */ 3109+int 3110+pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) 3111+ { 3112+ int ret = 0; 3113+ 3114+ if (sp->opdata_dh_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 3115+ { 3116+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dh_key, 3117+ ret, uselock, OP_DH, CK_TRUE); 3118+ sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 3119+ sp->opdata_dh = NULL; 3120+ if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL) 3121+ { 3122+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num); 3123+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; 3124+ } 3125+ } 3126+ 3127+ return (ret); 3128+ } 3129+ 3130+/* 3131+ * Destroy DH key object wrapper. 3132+ * 3133+ * arg0: pointer to PKCS#11 engine session structure 3134+ * if session is NULL, try to destroy all objects in the free list 3135+ */ 3136+int 3137+pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) 3138+ { 3139+ int ret = 1; 3140+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; 3141+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; 3142+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE; 3143+ 3144+ if (session != NULL) 3145+ local_free_session = session; 3146+ else 3147+ { 3148+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 3149+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock) == 0); 3150+#else 3151+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 3152+#endif 3153+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DH].head; 3154+ uselock = FALSE; 3155+ } 3156+ 3157+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) 3158+ { 3159+ local_free_session = sp->next; 3160+ 3161+ /* 3162+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the 3163+ * destroy operations fails. 3164+ */ 3165+ if (pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, uselock) == 0) 3166+ { 3167+ ret = 0; 3168+ continue; 3169+ } 3170+ } 3171+ 3172+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 3173+ if (session == NULL) 3174+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock) == 0); 3175+#else 3176+ if (session == NULL) 3177+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 3178+#endif 3179+ 3180+ return (ret); 3181+ } 3182+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ 3183+ 3184+static int 3185+pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, 3186+ CK_BBOOL persistent) 3187+ { 3188+ CK_RV rv; 3189+ 3190+ /* 3191+ * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects 3192+ * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so 3193+ * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here. 3194+ */ 3195+ if (persistent == CK_TRUE) 3196+ return (1); 3197+ 3198+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh); 3199+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 3200+ { 3201+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, 3202+ rv); 3203+ return (0); 3204+ } 3205+ 3206+ return (1); 3207+ } 3208+ 3209+ 3210+/* Symmetric ciphers and digests support functions */ 3211+ 3212+static int 3213+cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid) 3214+ { 3215+ int i; 3216+ 3217+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; i++) 3218+ if (ciphers[i].nid == nid) 3219+ return (ciphers[i].id); 3220+ return (-1); 3221+ } 3222+ 3223+static int 3224+pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids) 3225+ { 3226+ if (cipher_count > 0) 3227+ *nids = cipher_nids; 3228+ else 3229+ *nids = NULL; 3230+ return (cipher_count); 3231+ } 3232+ 3233+static int 3234+pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids) 3235+ { 3236+ if (digest_count > 0) 3237+ *nids = digest_nids; 3238+ else 3239+ *nids = NULL; 3240+ return (digest_count); 3241+ } 3242+ 3243+/* 3244+ * Init context for encryption or decryption using a symmetric key. 3245+ */ 3246+static int pk11_init_symmetric(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, PK11_CIPHER *pcipher, 3247+ PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pmech) 3248+ { 3249+ CK_RV rv; 3250+ CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctr_params; 3251+ 3252+ /* 3253+ * We expect pmech->mechanism to be already set and 3254+ * pParameter/ulParameterLen initialized to NULL/0 before 3255+ * pk11_init_symetric() is called. 3256+ */ 3257+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->mechanism != 0); 3258+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->pParameter == NULL); 3259+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->ulParameterLen == 0); 3260+ 3261+ if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr || 3262+ ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr || 3263+ ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr) 3264+ { 3265+ pmech->pParameter = (void *)(&ctr_params); 3266+ pmech->ulParameterLen = sizeof (ctr_params); 3267+ /* 3268+ * For now, we are limited to the fixed length of the counter, 3269+ * it covers the whole counter block. That's what RFC 4344 3270+ * needs. For more information on internal structure of the 3271+ * counter block, see RFC 3686. If needed in the future, we can 3272+ * add code so that the counter length can be set via 3273+ * ENGINE_ctrl() function. 3274+ */ 3275+ ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8; 3276+ OPENSSL_assert(pcipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE); 3277+ (void) memcpy(ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); 3278+ } 3279+ else 3280+ { 3281+ if (pcipher->iv_len > 0) 3282+ { 3283+ pmech->pParameter = (void *)ctx->iv; 3284+ pmech->ulParameterLen = pcipher->iv_len; 3285+ } 3286+ } 3287+ 3288+ /* if we get here, the encryption needs to be reinitialized */ 3289+ if (ctx->encrypt) 3290+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, pmech, 3291+ sp->opdata_cipher_key); 3292+ else 3293+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, pmech, 3294+ sp->opdata_cipher_key); 3295+ 3296+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 3297+ { 3298+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, ctx->encrypt ? 3299+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT : PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv); 3300+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); 3301+ return (0); 3302+ } 3303+ 3304+ return (1); 3305+ } 3306+ 3307+/* ARGSUSED */ 3308+static int 3309+pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, 3310+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc) 3311+ { 3312+ CK_MECHANISM mech; 3313+ int index; 3314+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data; 3315+ PK11_SESSION *sp; 3316+ PK11_CIPHER *p_ciph_table_row; 3317+ 3318+ state->sp = NULL; 3319+ 3320+ index = cipher_nid_to_pk11(ctx->cipher->nid); 3321+ if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_CIPHER_MAX) 3322+ return (0); 3323+ 3324+ p_ciph_table_row = &ciphers[index]; 3325+ /* 3326+ * iv_len in the ctx->cipher structure is the maximum IV length for the 3327+ * current cipher and it must be less or equal to the IV length in our 3328+ * ciphers table. The key length must be in the allowed interval. From 3329+ * all cipher modes that the PKCS#11 engine supports only RC4 allows a 3330+ * key length to be in some range, all other NIDs have a precise key 3331+ * length. Every application can define its own EVP functions so this 3332+ * code serves as a sanity check. 3333+ * 3334+ * Note that the reason why the IV length in ctx->cipher might be 3335+ * greater than the actual length is that OpenSSL uses BLOCK_CIPHER_defs 3336+ * macro to define functions that return EVP structures for all DES 3337+ * modes. So, even ECB modes get 8 byte IV. 3338+ */ 3339+ if (ctx->cipher->iv_len < p_ciph_table_row->iv_len || 3340+ ctx->key_len < p_ciph_table_row->min_key_len || 3341+ ctx->key_len > p_ciph_table_row->max_key_len) { 3342+ PK11err(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM); 3343+ return (0); 3344+ } 3345+ 3346+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_CIPHER)) == NULL) 3347+ return (0); 3348+ 3349+ /* if applicable, the mechanism parameter is used for IV */ 3350+ mech.mechanism = p_ciph_table_row->mech_type; 3351+ mech.pParameter = NULL; 3352+ mech.ulParameterLen = 0; 3353+ 3354+ /* The key object is destroyed here if it is not the current key. */ 3355+ (void) check_new_cipher_key(sp, key, ctx->key_len); 3356+ 3357+ /* 3358+ * If the key is the same and the encryption is also the same, then 3359+ * just reuse it. However, we must not forget to reinitialize the 3360+ * context that was finalized in pk11_cipher_cleanup(). 3361+ */ 3362+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && 3363+ sp->opdata_encrypt == ctx->encrypt) 3364+ { 3365+ state->sp = sp; 3366+ if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0) 3367+ return (0); 3368+ 3369+ return (1); 3370+ } 3371+ 3372+ /* 3373+ * Check if the key has been invalidated. If so, a new key object 3374+ * needs to be created. 3375+ */ 3376+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 3377+ { 3378+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = pk11_get_cipher_key( 3379+ ctx, key, p_ciph_table_row->key_type, sp); 3380+ } 3381+ 3382+ if (sp->opdata_encrypt != ctx->encrypt && sp->opdata_encrypt != -1) 3383+ { 3384+ /* 3385+ * The previous encryption/decryption is different. Need to 3386+ * terminate the previous * active encryption/decryption here. 3387+ */ 3388+ if (!pk11_cipher_final(sp)) 3389+ { 3390+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); 3391+ return (0); 3392+ } 3393+ } 3394+ 3395+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 3396+ { 3397+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); 3398+ return (0); 3399+ } 3400+ 3401+ /* now initialize the context with a new key */ 3402+ if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0) 3403+ return (0); 3404+ 3405+ sp->opdata_encrypt = ctx->encrypt; 3406+ state->sp = sp; 3407+ 3408+ return (1); 3409+ } 3410+ 3411+/* 3412+ * When reusing the same key in an encryption/decryption session for a 3413+ * decryption/encryption session, we need to close the active session 3414+ * and recreate a new one. Note that the key is in the global session so 3415+ * that it needs not be recreated. 3416+ * 3417+ * It is more appropriate to use C_En/DecryptFinish here. At the time of this 3418+ * development, these two functions in the PKCS#11 libraries used return 3419+ * unexpected errors when passing in 0 length output. It may be a good 3420+ * idea to try them again if performance is a problem here and fix 3421+ * C_En/DecryptFinial if there are bugs there causing the problem. 3422+ */ 3423+static int 3424+pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp) 3425+ { 3426+ CK_RV rv; 3427+ 3428+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); 3429+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 3430+ { 3431+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); 3432+ return (0); 3433+ } 3434+ 3435+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, 3436+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); 3437+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 3438+ { 3439+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); 3440+ return (0); 3441+ } 3442+ 3443+ return (1); 3444+ } 3445+ 3446+/* 3447+ * An engine interface function. The calling function allocates sufficient 3448+ * memory for the output buffer "out" to hold the results. 3449+ */ 3450+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L 3451+static int 3452+pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, 3453+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl) 3454+#else 3455+static int 3456+pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, 3457+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) 3458+#endif 3459+ { 3460+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data; 3461+ PK11_SESSION *sp; 3462+ CK_RV rv; 3463+ unsigned long outl = inl; 3464+ 3465+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) 3466+ return (0); 3467+ 3468+ sp = (PK11_SESSION *) state->sp; 3469+ 3470+ if (!inl) 3471+ return (1); 3472+ 3473+ /* RC4 is the only stream cipher we support */ 3474+ if (ctx->cipher->nid != NID_rc4 && (inl % ctx->cipher->block_size) != 0) 3475+ return (0); 3476+ 3477+ if (ctx->encrypt) 3478+ { 3479+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptUpdate(sp->session, 3480+ (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl); 3481+ 3482+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 3483+ { 3484+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, 3485+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, rv); 3486+ return (0); 3487+ } 3488+ } 3489+ else 3490+ { 3491+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptUpdate(sp->session, 3492+ (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl); 3493+ 3494+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 3495+ { 3496+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, 3497+ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, rv); 3498+ return (0); 3499+ } 3500+ } 3501+ 3502+ /* 3503+ * For DES_CBC, DES3_CBC, AES_CBC, and RC4, the output size is always 3504+ * the same size of input. 3505+ * The application has guaranteed to call the block ciphers with 3506+ * correctly aligned buffers. 3507+ */ 3508+ if (inl != outl) 3509+ return (0); 3510+ 3511+ return (1); 3512+ } 3513+ 3514+/* 3515+ * Return the session to the pool. Calling C_EncryptFinal() and C_DecryptFinal() 3516+ * here is the right thing because in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), engine's 3517+ * do_cipher() is not even called, and in EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() it is called but 3518+ * the engine can't find out that it's the finalizing call. We wouldn't 3519+ * necessarily have to finalize the context here since reinitializing it with 3520+ * C_(Encrypt|Decrypt)Init() should be fine but for the sake of correctness, 3521+ * let's do it. Some implementations might leak memory if the previously used 3522+ * context is initialized without finalizing it first. 3523+ */ 3524+static int 3525+pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) 3526+ { 3527+ CK_RV rv; 3528+ CK_ULONG len = EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH; 3529+ CK_BYTE buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; 3530+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->cipher_data; 3531+ 3532+ if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL) 3533+ { 3534+ /* 3535+ * We are not interested in the data here, we just need to get 3536+ * rid of the context. 3537+ */ 3538+ if (ctx->encrypt) 3539+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptFinal( 3540+ state->sp->session, buf, &len); 3541+ else 3542+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptFinal( 3543+ state->sp->session, buf, &len); 3544+ 3545+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 3546+ { 3547+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, ctx->encrypt ? 3548+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL : PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, rv); 3549+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER); 3550+ return (0); 3551+ } 3552+ 3553+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER); 3554+ state->sp = NULL; 3555+ } 3556+ 3557+ return (1); 3558+ } 3559+ 3560+/* 3561+ * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with 3562+ * a particular NID in the ENGINE. This says what we'll do at the 3563+ * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with 3564+ */ 3565+/* ARGSUSED */ 3566+static int 3567+pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, 3568+ const int **nids, int nid) 3569+ { 3570+ if (!cipher) 3571+ return (pk11_usable_ciphers(nids)); 3572+ 3573+ switch (nid) 3574+ { 3575+ case NID_des_ede3_cbc: 3576+ *cipher = &pk11_3des_cbc; 3577+ break; 3578+ case NID_des_cbc: 3579+ *cipher = &pk11_des_cbc; 3580+ break; 3581+ case NID_des_ede3_ecb: 3582+ *cipher = &pk11_3des_ecb; 3583+ break; 3584+ case NID_des_ecb: 3585+ *cipher = &pk11_des_ecb; 3586+ break; 3587+ case NID_aes_128_cbc: 3588+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_cbc; 3589+ break; 3590+ case NID_aes_192_cbc: 3591+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_cbc; 3592+ break; 3593+ case NID_aes_256_cbc: 3594+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_cbc; 3595+ break; 3596+ case NID_aes_128_ecb: 3597+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ecb; 3598+ break; 3599+ case NID_aes_192_ecb: 3600+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ecb; 3601+ break; 3602+ case NID_aes_256_ecb: 3603+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ecb; 3604+ break; 3605+ case NID_bf_cbc: 3606+ *cipher = &pk11_bf_cbc; 3607+ break; 3608+ case NID_rc4: 3609+ *cipher = &pk11_rc4; 3610+ break; 3611+ case NID_aes_128_ctr: 3612+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ctr; 3613+ break; 3614+ case NID_aes_192_ctr: 3615+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ctr; 3616+ break; 3617+ case NID_aes_256_ctr: 3618+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ctr; 3619+ break; 3620+ default: 3621+ *cipher = NULL; 3622+ break; 3623+ } 3624+ return (*cipher != NULL); 3625+ } 3626+ 3627+/* ARGSUSED */ 3628+static int 3629+pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, 3630+ const int **nids, int nid) 3631+ { 3632+ if (!digest) 3633+ return (pk11_usable_digests(nids)); 3634+ 3635+ switch (nid) 3636+ { 3637+ case NID_md5: 3638+ *digest = &pk11_md5; 3639+ break; 3640+ case NID_sha1: 3641+ *digest = &pk11_sha1; 3642+ break; 3643+ case NID_sha224: 3644+ *digest = &pk11_sha224; 3645+ break; 3646+ case NID_sha256: 3647+ *digest = &pk11_sha256; 3648+ break; 3649+ case NID_sha384: 3650+ *digest = &pk11_sha384; 3651+ break; 3652+ case NID_sha512: 3653+ *digest = &pk11_sha512; 3654+ break; 3655+ default: 3656+ *digest = NULL; 3657+ break; 3658+ } 3659+ return (*digest != NULL); 3660+ } 3661+ 3662+ 3663+/* Create a secret key object in a PKCS#11 session */ 3664+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, 3665+ const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp) 3666+ { 3667+ CK_RV rv; 3668+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 3669+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_key = CKO_SECRET_KEY; 3670+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 6; 3671+ unsigned char key_buf[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX]; 3672+ 3673+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = 3674+ { 3675+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, 3676+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, 3677+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, 3678+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, 3679+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, 3680+ {CKA_VALUE, (void*) NULL, 0}, 3681+ }; 3682+ 3683+ /* 3684+ * Create secret key object in global_session. All other sessions 3685+ * can use the key handles. Here is why: 3686+ * OpenSSL will call EncryptInit and EncryptUpdate using a secret key. 3687+ * It may then call DecryptInit and DecryptUpdate using the same key. 3688+ * To use the same key object, we need to call EncryptFinal with 3689+ * a 0 length message. Currently, this does not work for 3DES 3690+ * mechanism. To get around this problem, we close the session and 3691+ * then create a new session to use the same key object. When a session 3692+ * is closed, all the object handles will be invalid. Thus, create key 3693+ * objects in a global session, an individual session may be closed to 3694+ * terminate the active operation. 3695+ */ 3696+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = global_session; 3697+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &obj_key; 3698+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; 3699+ if (ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX) 3700+ { 3701+ a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key; 3702+ } 3703+ else 3704+ { 3705+ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX); 3706+ memcpy(key_buf, key, ctx->key_len); 3707+ if ((key_type == CKK_DES) || 3708+ (key_type == CKK_DES2) || 3709+ (key_type == CKK_DES3)) 3710+ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[0]); 3711+ if ((key_type == CKK_DES2) || 3712+ (key_type == CKK_DES3)) 3713+ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[8]); 3714+ if (key_type == CKK_DES3) 3715+ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[16]); 3716+ a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key_buf; 3717+ } 3718+ a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = (unsigned long) ctx->key_len; 3719+ 3720+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, 3721+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); 3722+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 3723+ { 3724+ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX); 3725+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, 3726+ rv); 3727+ goto err; 3728+ } 3729+ 3730+ /* 3731+ * Save the key information used in this session. 3732+ * The max can be saved is PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX. 3733+ */ 3734+ if (ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX) 3735+ { 3736+ sp->opdata_key_len = PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX; 3737+ (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key, sp->opdata_key_len); 3738+ } 3739+ else 3740+ { 3741+ sp->opdata_key_len = ctx->key_len; 3742+ (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key_buf, sp->opdata_key_len); 3743+ } 3744+ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX); 3745+err: 3746+ 3747+ return (h_key); 3748+ } 3749+ 3750+static int 3751+md_nid_to_pk11(int nid) 3752+ { 3753+ int i; 3754+ 3755+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; i++) 3756+ if (digests[i].nid == nid) 3757+ return (digests[i].id); 3758+ return (-1); 3759+ } 3760+ 3761+static int 3762+pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) 3763+ { 3764+ CK_RV rv; 3765+ CK_MECHANISM mech; 3766+ int index; 3767+ PK11_SESSION *sp; 3768+ PK11_DIGEST *pdp; 3769+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; 3770+ 3771+ state->sp = NULL; 3772+ 3773+ index = md_nid_to_pk11(ctx->digest->type); 3774+ if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_DIGEST_MAX) 3775+ return (0); 3776+ 3777+ pdp = &digests[index]; 3778+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DIGEST)) == NULL) 3779+ return (0); 3780+ 3781+ /* at present, no parameter is needed for supported digests */ 3782+ mech.mechanism = pdp->mech_type; 3783+ mech.pParameter = NULL; 3784+ mech.ulParameterLen = 0; 3785+ 3786+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestInit(sp->session, &mech); 3787+ 3788+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 3789+ { 3790+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, rv); 3791+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DIGEST); 3792+ return (0); 3793+ } 3794+ 3795+ state->sp = sp; 3796+ 3797+ return (1); 3798+ } 3799+ 3800+static int 3801+pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) 3802+ { 3803+ CK_RV rv; 3804+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; 3805+ 3806+ /* 0 length message will cause a failure in C_DigestFinal */ 3807+ if (count == 0) 3808+ return (1); 3809+ 3810+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) 3811+ return (0); 3812+ 3813+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestUpdate(state->sp->session, (CK_BYTE *) data, 3814+ count); 3815+ 3816+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 3817+ { 3818+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, rv); 3819+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); 3820+ state->sp = NULL; 3821+ return (0); 3822+ } 3823+ 3824+ return (1); 3825+ } 3826+ 3827+static int 3828+pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md) 3829+ { 3830+ CK_RV rv; 3831+ unsigned long len; 3832+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; 3833+ len = ctx->digest->md_size; 3834+ 3835+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) 3836+ return (0); 3837+ 3838+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestFinal(state->sp->session, md, &len); 3839+ 3840+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 3841+ { 3842+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, rv); 3843+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); 3844+ state->sp = NULL; 3845+ return (0); 3846+ } 3847+ 3848+ if (ctx->digest->md_size != len) 3849+ return (0); 3850+ 3851+ /* 3852+ * Final is called and digest is returned, so return the session 3853+ * to the pool 3854+ */ 3855+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); 3856+ state->sp = NULL; 3857+ 3858+ return (1); 3859+ } 3860+ 3861+static int 3862+pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from) 3863+ { 3864+ CK_RV rv; 3865+ int ret = 0; 3866+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state, *state_to; 3867+ CK_BYTE_PTR pstate = NULL; 3868+ CK_ULONG ul_state_len; 3869+ 3870+ /* The copy-from state */ 3871+ state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) from->md_data; 3872+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) 3873+ goto err; 3874+ 3875+ /* Initialize the copy-to state */ 3876+ if (!pk11_digest_init(to)) 3877+ goto err; 3878+ state_to = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) to->md_data; 3879+ 3880+ /* Get the size of the operation state of the copy-from session */ 3881+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, NULL, 3882+ &ul_state_len); 3883+ 3884+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 3885+ { 3886+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, 3887+ rv); 3888+ goto err; 3889+ } 3890+ if (ul_state_len == 0) 3891+ { 3892+ goto err; 3893+ } 3894+ 3895+ pstate = OPENSSL_malloc(ul_state_len); 3896+ if (pstate == NULL) 3897+ { 3898+ PK11err(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3899+ goto err; 3900+ } 3901+ 3902+ /* Get the operation state of the copy-from session */ 3903+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, pstate, 3904+ &ul_state_len); 3905+ 3906+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 3907+ { 3908+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, 3909+ rv); 3910+ goto err; 3911+ } 3912+ 3913+ /* Set the operation state of the copy-to session */ 3914+ rv = pFuncList->C_SetOperationState(state_to->sp->session, pstate, 3915+ ul_state_len, 0, 0); 3916+ 3917+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 3918+ { 3919+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, 3920+ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, rv); 3921+ goto err; 3922+ } 3923+ 3924+ ret = 1; 3925+err: 3926+ if (pstate != NULL) 3927+ OPENSSL_free(pstate); 3928+ 3929+ return (ret); 3930+ } 3931+ 3932+/* Return any pending session state to the pool */ 3933+static int 3934+pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) 3935+ { 3936+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->md_data; 3937+ unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 3938+ 3939+ if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL) 3940+ { 3941+ /* 3942+ * If state->sp is not NULL then pk11_digest_final() has not 3943+ * been called yet. We must call it now to free any memory 3944+ * that might have been allocated in the token when 3945+ * pk11_digest_init() was called. pk11_digest_final() 3946+ * will return the session to the cache. 3947+ */ 3948+ if (!pk11_digest_final(ctx, buf)) 3949+ return (0); 3950+ } 3951+ 3952+ return (1); 3953+ } 3954+ 3955+/* 3956+ * Check if the new key is the same as the key object in the session. If the key 3957+ * is the same, no need to create a new key object. Otherwise, the old key 3958+ * object needs to be destroyed and a new one will be created. Return 1 for 3959+ * cache hit, 0 for cache miss. Note that we must check the key length first 3960+ * otherwise we could end up reusing a different, longer key with the same 3961+ * prefix. 3962+ */ 3963+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key, 3964+ int key_len) 3965+ { 3966+ if (sp->opdata_key_len != key_len || 3967+ memcmp(sp->opdata_key, key, key_len) != 0) 3968+ { 3969+ (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(sp); 3970+ return (0); 3971+ } 3972+ return (1); 3973+ } 3974+ 3975+/* Destroy one or more secret key objects. */ 3976+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) 3977+ { 3978+ int ret = 0; 3979+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; 3980+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; 3981+ 3982+ if (session != NULL) 3983+ local_free_session = session; 3984+ else 3985+ { 3986+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 3987+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock) == 0); 3988+#else 3989+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 3990+#endif 3991+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_CIPHER].head; 3992+ } 3993+ 3994+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) 3995+ { 3996+ local_free_session = sp->next; 3997+ 3998+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 3999+ { 4000+ /* 4001+ * The secret key object is created in the 4002+ * global_session. See pk11_get_cipher_key(). 4003+ */ 4004+ if (pk11_destroy_object(global_session, 4005+ sp->opdata_cipher_key, CK_FALSE) == 0) 4006+ goto err; 4007+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 4008+ } 4009+ } 4010+ ret = 1; 4011+err: 4012+ 4013+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 4014+ if (session == NULL) 4015+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock) == 0); 4016+#else 4017+ if (session == NULL) 4018+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 4019+#endif 4020+ 4021+ return (ret); 4022+ } 4023+ 4024+ 4025+/* 4026+ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported 4027+ * 4028+ * CKM_RSA_X_509 4029+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS 4030+ * CKM_DSA 4031+ * 4032+ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a 4033+ * public key slot. 4034+ * 4035+ * Symmetric ciphers optionally supported 4036+ * 4037+ * CKM_DES3_CBC 4038+ * CKM_DES_CBC 4039+ * CKM_AES_CBC 4040+ * CKM_DES3_ECB 4041+ * CKM_DES_ECB 4042+ * CKM_AES_ECB 4043+ * CKM_AES_CTR 4044+ * CKM_RC4 4045+ * CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC 4046+ * 4047+ * Digests optionally supported 4048+ * 4049+ * CKM_MD5 4050+ * CKM_SHA_1 4051+ * CKM_SHA224 4052+ * CKM_SHA256 4053+ * CKM_SHA384 4054+ * CKM_SHA512 4055+ * 4056+ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which 4057+ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of 4058+ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global 4059+ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key 4060+ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests. 4061+ */ 4062+static int 4063+pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found) 4064+ { 4065+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; 4066+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; 4067+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; 4068+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; 4069+ unsigned int i; 4070+ CK_RV rv; 4071+ CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar = 0; 4072+ CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE; 4073+ int slot_n_cipher = 0; 4074+ int slot_n_digest = 0; 4075+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0; 4076+ int current_slot_n_cipher = 0; 4077+ int current_slot_n_digest = 0; 4078+ 4079+ int local_cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX]; 4080+ int local_digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX]; 4081+ 4082+ /* let's initialize the output parameter */ 4083+ if (any_slot_found != NULL) 4084+ *any_slot_found = 0; 4085+ 4086+ /* Get slot list for memory allocation */ 4087+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount); 4088+ 4089+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 4090+ { 4091+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); 4092+ return (0); 4093+ } 4094+ 4095+ /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */ 4096+ if (ulSlotCount == 0) 4097+ { 4098+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4099+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG); 4100+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4101+ return (1); 4102+ } 4103+ 4104+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); 4105+ 4106+ if (pSlotList == NULL) 4107+ { 4108+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 4109+ return (0); 4110+ } 4111+ 4112+ /* Get the slot list for processing */ 4113+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount); 4114+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 4115+ { 4116+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); 4117+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); 4118+ return (0); 4119+ } 4120+ 4121+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4122+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME); 4123+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); 4124+ 4125+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); 4126+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4127+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) 4128+ { 4129+ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; 4130+ 4131+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4132+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); 4133+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4134+ /* Check if slot has random support. */ 4135+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); 4136+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 4137+ continue; 4138+ 4139+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4140+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); 4141+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4142+ 4143+ if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG) 4144+ { 4145+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4146+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG); 4147+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4148+ pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE; 4149+ rand_SLOTID = current_slot; 4150+ break; 4151+ } 4152+ } 4153+ 4154+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4155+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); 4156+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4157+ 4158+ pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; 4159+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) 4160+ { 4161+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE; 4162+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_recover = CK_FALSE; 4163+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_dsa = CK_FALSE; 4164+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_dh = CK_FALSE; 4165+ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; 4166+ 4167+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4168+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); 4169+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4170+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); 4171+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 4172+ continue; 4173+ 4174+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4175+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); 4176+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4177+ 4178+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 4179+ /* 4180+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing and 4181+ * verifying with CKM_RSA_PKCS. 4182+ */ 4183+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS, 4184+ &mech_info); 4185+ 4186+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && 4187+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY))) 4188+ { 4189+ /* 4190+ * Check if this slot is capable of encryption, 4191+ * decryption, sign, and verify with CKM_RSA_X_509. 4192+ */ 4193+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, 4194+ CKM_RSA_X_509, &mech_info); 4195+ 4196+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && 4197+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY) && 4198+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) && 4199+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT))) 4200+ { 4201+ slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE; 4202+ if (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER) 4203+ { 4204+ slot_has_recover = CK_TRUE; 4205+ } 4206+ } 4207+ } 4208+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ 4209+ 4210+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 4211+ /* 4212+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing and 4213+ * verifying with CKM_DSA. 4214+ */ 4215+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_DSA, 4216+ &mech_info); 4217+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && 4218+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY))) 4219+ { 4220+ slot_has_dsa = CK_TRUE; 4221+ } 4222+ 4223+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ 4224+ 4225+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 4226+ /* 4227+ * Check if this slot is capable of DH key generataion and 4228+ * derivation. 4229+ */ 4230+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, 4231+ CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &mech_info); 4232+ 4233+ if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR)) 4234+ { 4235+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, 4236+ CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, &mech_info); 4237+ if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE)) 4238+ { 4239+ slot_has_dh = CK_TRUE; 4240+ } 4241+ } 4242+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ 4243+ 4244+ if (!found_candidate_slot && 4245+ (slot_has_rsa || slot_has_dsa || slot_has_dh)) 4246+ { 4247+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4248+ fprintf(stderr, 4249+ "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot); 4250+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4251+ best_slot_sofar = current_slot; 4252+ pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa; 4253+ pk11_have_recover = slot_has_recover; 4254+ pk11_have_dsa = slot_has_dsa; 4255+ pk11_have_dh = slot_has_dh; 4256+ found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE; 4257+ /* 4258+ * Cache the flags for later use. We might 4259+ * need those if RSA keys by reference feature 4260+ * is used. 4261+ */ 4262+ pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags; 4263+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4264+ fprintf(stderr, 4265+ "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n", 4266+ PK11_DBG); 4267+ fprintf(stderr, 4268+ "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, 4269+ best_slot_sofar); 4270+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: pubkey flags changed to " 4271+ "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags); 4272+ } 4273+ else 4274+ { 4275+ fprintf(stderr, 4276+ "%s: no rsa/dsa/dh\n", PK11_DBG); 4277+ } 4278+#else 4279+ } /* if */ 4280+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4281+ } /* for */ 4282+ 4283+ if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE) 4284+ { 4285+ pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar; 4286+ } 4287+ 4288+ found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE; 4289+ best_slot_sofar = 0; 4290+ 4291+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4292+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking cipher/digest ==\n", PK11_DBG); 4293+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4294+ 4295+ SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; 4296+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) 4297+ { 4298+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4299+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); 4300+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4301+ 4302+ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; 4303+ current_slot_n_cipher = 0; 4304+ current_slot_n_digest = 0; 4305+ (void) memset(local_cipher_nids, 0, sizeof (local_cipher_nids)); 4306+ (void) memset(local_digest_nids, 0, sizeof (local_digest_nids)); 4307+ 4308+ pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pFuncList, current_slot, 4309+ ¤t_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids); 4310+ 4311+ pk11_find_digests(pFuncList, current_slot, 4312+ ¤t_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids); 4313+ 4314+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4315+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_cipher %d\n", PK11_DBG, 4316+ current_slot_n_cipher); 4317+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_digest %d\n", PK11_DBG, 4318+ current_slot_n_digest); 4319+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: best so far cipher/digest slot: %d\n", 4320+ PK11_DBG, best_slot_sofar); 4321+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4322+ 4323+ /* 4324+ * If the current slot supports more ciphers/digests than 4325+ * the previous best one we change the current best to this one, 4326+ * otherwise leave it where it is. 4327+ */ 4328+ if ((current_slot_n_cipher + current_slot_n_digest) > 4329+ (slot_n_cipher + slot_n_digest)) 4330+ { 4331+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4332+ fprintf(stderr, 4333+ "%s: changing best so far slot to %d\n", 4334+ PK11_DBG, current_slot); 4335+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4336+ best_slot_sofar = SLOTID = current_slot; 4337+ cipher_count = slot_n_cipher = current_slot_n_cipher; 4338+ digest_count = slot_n_digest = current_slot_n_digest; 4339+ (void) memcpy(cipher_nids, local_cipher_nids, 4340+ sizeof (local_cipher_nids)); 4341+ (void) memcpy(digest_nids, local_digest_nids, 4342+ sizeof (local_digest_nids)); 4343+ } 4344+ } 4345+ 4346+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4347+ fprintf(stderr, 4348+ "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID); 4349+ fprintf(stderr, 4350+ "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID); 4351+ fprintf(stderr, 4352+ "%s: chosen cipher/digest slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, SLOTID); 4353+ fprintf(stderr, 4354+ "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa); 4355+ fprintf(stderr, 4356+ "%s: pk11_have_recover %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_recover); 4357+ fprintf(stderr, 4358+ "%s: pk11_have_dsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dsa); 4359+ fprintf(stderr, 4360+ "%s: pk11_have_dh %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dh); 4361+ fprintf(stderr, 4362+ "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random); 4363+ fprintf(stderr, 4364+ "%s: cipher_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, cipher_count); 4365+ fprintf(stderr, 4366+ "%s: digest_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, digest_count); 4367+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4368+ 4369+ if (pSlotList != NULL) 4370+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); 4371+ 4372+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION 4373+ OPENSSL_free(hw_cnids); 4374+ OPENSSL_free(hw_dnids); 4375+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4376+ 4377+ if (any_slot_found != NULL) 4378+ *any_slot_found = 1; 4379+ return (1); 4380+ } 4381+ 4382+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, 4383+ int slot_id, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher, 4384+ int *local_cipher_nids, int id) 4385+ { 4386+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; 4387+ CK_RV rv; 4388+ 4389+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4390+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech); 4391+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4392+ rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info); 4393+ 4394+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 4395+ { 4396+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4397+ fprintf(stderr, " not found\n"); 4398+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4399+ return; 4400+ } 4401+ 4402+ if ((mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) && 4403+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT)) 4404+ { 4405+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION 4406+ if (nid_in_table(ciphers[id].nid, hw_cnids)) 4407+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4408+ { 4409+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4410+ fprintf(stderr, " usable\n"); 4411+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4412+ local_cipher_nids[(*current_slot_n_cipher)++] = 4413+ ciphers[id].nid; 4414+ } 4415+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION 4416+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4417+ else 4418+ { 4419+ fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n"); 4420+ } 4421+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4422+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4423+ } 4424+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4425+ else 4426+ { 4427+ fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n"); 4428+ } 4429+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4430+ 4431+ return; 4432+ } 4433+ 4434+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id, 4435+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, 4436+ int id) 4437+ { 4438+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; 4439+ CK_RV rv; 4440+ 4441+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4442+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech); 4443+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4444+ rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info); 4445+ 4446+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 4447+ { 4448+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4449+ fprintf(stderr, " not found\n"); 4450+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4451+ return; 4452+ } 4453+ 4454+ if (mech_info.flags & CKF_DIGEST) 4455+ { 4456+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION 4457+ if (nid_in_table(digests[id].nid, hw_dnids)) 4458+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4459+ { 4460+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4461+ fprintf(stderr, " usable\n"); 4462+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4463+ local_digest_nids[(*current_slot_n_digest)++] = 4464+ digests[id].nid; 4465+ } 4466+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION 4467+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4468+ else 4469+ { 4470+ fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n"); 4471+ } 4472+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4473+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4474+ } 4475+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4476+ else 4477+ { 4478+ fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n"); 4479+ } 4480+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4481+ 4482+ return; 4483+ } 4484+ 4485+/* Find what symmetric ciphers this slot supports. */ 4486+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, 4487+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids) 4488+ { 4489+ int i; 4490+ 4491+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; ++i) 4492+ { 4493+ pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(pflist, current_slot, 4494+ ciphers[i].mech_type, current_slot_n_cipher, 4495+ local_cipher_nids, ciphers[i].id); 4496+ } 4497+ } 4498+ 4499+/* Find what digest algorithms this slot supports. */ 4500+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, 4501+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids) 4502+ { 4503+ int i; 4504+ 4505+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; ++i) 4506+ { 4507+ pk11_get_digest(pflist, current_slot, digests[i].mech_type, 4508+ current_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids, digests[i].id); 4509+ } 4510+ } 4511+ 4512+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION 4513+/* 4514+ * It would be great if we could use pkcs11_kernel directly since this library 4515+ * offers hardware slots only. That's the easiest way to achieve the situation 4516+ * where we use the hardware accelerators when present and OpenSSL native code 4517+ * otherwise. That presumes the fact that OpenSSL native code is faster than the 4518+ * code in the soft token. It's a logical assumption - Crypto Framework has some 4519+ * inherent overhead so going there for the software implementation of a 4520+ * mechanism should be logically slower in contrast to the OpenSSL native code, 4521+ * presuming that both implementations are of similar speed. For example, the 4522+ * soft token for AES is roughly three times slower than OpenSSL for 64 byte 4523+ * blocks and still 20% slower for 8KB blocks. So, if we want to ship products 4524+ * that use the PKCS#11 engine by default, we must somehow avoid that regression 4525+ * on machines without hardware acceleration. That's why switching to the 4526+ * pkcs11_kernel library seems like a very good idea. 4527+ * 4528+ * The problem is that OpenSSL built with SunStudio is roughly 2x slower for 4529+ * asymmetric operations (RSA/DSA/DH) than the soft token built with the same 4530+ * compiler. That means that if we switched to pkcs11_kernel from the libpkcs11 4531+ * library, we would have had a performance regression on machines without 4532+ * hardware acceleration for asymmetric operations for all applications that use 4533+ * the PKCS#11 engine. There is one such application - Apache web server since 4534+ * it's shipped configured to use the PKCS#11 engine by default. Having said 4535+ * that, we can't switch to the pkcs11_kernel library now and have to come with 4536+ * a solution that, on non-accelerated machines, uses the OpenSSL native code 4537+ * for all symmetric ciphers and digests while it uses the soft token for 4538+ * asymmetric operations. 4539+ * 4540+ * This is the idea: dlopen() pkcs11_kernel directly and find out what 4541+ * mechanisms are there. We don't care about duplications (more slots can 4542+ * support the same mechanism), we just want to know what mechanisms can be 4543+ * possibly supported in hardware on that particular machine. As said before, 4544+ * pkcs11_kernel will show you hardware providers only. 4545+ * 4546+ * Then, we rely on the fact that since we use libpkcs11 library we will find 4547+ * the metaslot. When we go through the metaslot's mechanisms for symmetric 4548+ * ciphers and digests, we check that any found mechanism is in the table 4549+ * created using the pkcs11_kernel library. So, as a result we have two arrays 4550+ * of mechanisms that were advertised as supported in hardware which was the 4551+ * goal of that whole excercise. Thus, we can use libpkcs11 but avoid soft token 4552+ * code for symmetric ciphers and digests. See pk11_choose_slots() for more 4553+ * information. 4554+ * 4555+ * This is Solaris specific code, if SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION is not defined 4556+ * the code won't be used. 4557+ */ 4558+#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__amd64) 4559+static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/64/pkcs11_kernel.so.1"; 4560+#else 4561+static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/pkcs11_kernel.so.1"; 4562+#endif 4563+ 4564+/* 4565+ * Check hardware capabilities of the machines. The output are two lists, 4566+ * hw_cnids and hw_dnids, that contain hardware mechanisms found in all hardware 4567+ * providers together. They are not sorted and may contain duplicate mechanisms. 4568+ */ 4569+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void) 4570+ { 4571+ int i; 4572+ CK_RV rv; 4573+ void *handle; 4574+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p; 4575+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; 4576+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; 4577+ int n_cipher = 0, n_digest = 0; 4578+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist = NULL; 4579+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; 4580+ int *tmp_hw_cnids = NULL, *tmp_hw_dnids = NULL; 4581+ int hw_ctable_size, hw_dtable_size; 4582+ 4583+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4584+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION code running\n", 4585+ PK11_DBG); 4586+#endif 4587+ if ((handle = dlopen(pkcs11_kernel, RTLD_LAZY)) == NULL) 4588+ { 4589+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); 4590+ goto err; 4591+ } 4592+ 4593+ if ((p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)dlsym(handle, 4594+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST)) == NULL) 4595+ { 4596+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); 4597+ goto err; 4598+ } 4599+ 4600+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ 4601+ if (p(&pflist) != CKR_OK) 4602+ { 4603+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); 4604+ goto err; 4605+ } 4606+ 4607+ rv = pflist->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); 4608+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) 4609+ { 4610+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, 4611+ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); 4612+ goto err; 4613+ } 4614+ 4615+ if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK) 4616+ { 4617+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST); 4618+ goto err; 4619+ } 4620+ 4621+ /* no slots, set the hw mechanism tables as empty */ 4622+ if (ulSlotCount == 0) 4623+ { 4624+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4625+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no hardware mechanisms found\n", PK11_DBG); 4626+#endif 4627+ hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int)); 4628+ hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int)); 4629+ if (hw_cnids == NULL || hw_dnids == NULL) 4630+ { 4631+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, 4632+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 4633+ return (0); 4634+ } 4635+ /* this means empty tables */ 4636+ hw_cnids[0] = NID_undef; 4637+ hw_dnids[0] = NID_undef; 4638+ return (1); 4639+ } 4640+ 4641+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); 4642+ if (pSlotList == NULL) 4643+ { 4644+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 4645+ goto err; 4646+ } 4647+ 4648+ /* Get the slot list for processing */ 4649+ if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK) 4650+ { 4651+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST); 4652+ goto err; 4653+ } 4654+ 4655+ /* 4656+ * We don't care about duplicit mechanisms in multiple slots and also 4657+ * reserve one slot for the terminal NID_undef which we use to stop the 4658+ * search. 4659+ */ 4660+ hw_ctable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_CIPHER_MAX + 1; 4661+ hw_dtable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_DIGEST_MAX + 1; 4662+ tmp_hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_ctable_size * sizeof (int)); 4663+ tmp_hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_dtable_size * sizeof (int)); 4664+ if (tmp_hw_cnids == NULL || tmp_hw_dnids == NULL) 4665+ { 4666+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 4667+ goto err; 4668+ } 4669+ 4670+ /* 4671+ * Do not use memset since we should not rely on the fact that NID_undef 4672+ * is zero now. 4673+ */ 4674+ for (i = 0; i < hw_ctable_size; ++i) 4675+ tmp_hw_cnids[i] = NID_undef; 4676+ for (i = 0; i < hw_dtable_size; ++i) 4677+ tmp_hw_dnids[i] = NID_undef; 4678+ 4679+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4680+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, pkcs11_kernel); 4681+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: found %d hardware slots\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); 4682+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: now looking for mechs supported in hw\n", 4683+ PK11_DBG); 4684+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4685+ 4686+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) 4687+ { 4688+ if (pflist->C_GetTokenInfo(pSlotList[i], &token_info) != CKR_OK) 4689+ continue; 4690+ 4691+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4692+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); 4693+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4694+ 4695+ /* 4696+ * We are filling the hw mech tables here. Global tables are 4697+ * still NULL so all mechanisms are put into tmp tables. 4698+ */ 4699+ pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pflist, pSlotList[i], 4700+ &n_cipher, tmp_hw_cnids); 4701+ pk11_find_digests(pflist, pSlotList[i], 4702+ &n_digest, tmp_hw_dnids); 4703+ } 4704+ 4705+ /* 4706+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function 4707+ * may have side-effects. Also, C_Finalize() is triggered by 4708+ * dlclose(3C). 4709+ */ 4710+#if 0 4711+ pflist->C_Finalize(NULL); 4712+#endif 4713+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); 4714+ (void) dlclose(handle); 4715+ hw_cnids = tmp_hw_cnids; 4716+ hw_dnids = tmp_hw_dnids; 4717+ 4718+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4719+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: hw mechs check complete\n", PK11_DBG); 4720+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4721+ return (1); 4722+ 4723+err: 4724+ if (pSlotList != NULL) 4725+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); 4726+ if (tmp_hw_cnids != NULL) 4727+ OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_cnids); 4728+ if (tmp_hw_dnids != NULL) 4729+ OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_dnids); 4730+ 4731+ return (0); 4732+ } 4733+ 4734+/* 4735+ * Check presence of a NID in the table of NIDs. The table may be NULL (i.e., 4736+ * non-existent). 4737+ */ 4738+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table) 4739+ { 4740+ int i = 0; 4741+ 4742+ /* 4743+ * a special case. NULL means that we are initializing a new 4744+ * table. 4745+ */ 4746+ if (nid_table == NULL) 4747+ return (1); 4748+ 4749+ /* 4750+ * the table is never full, there is always at least one 4751+ * NID_undef. 4752+ */ 4753+ while (nid_table[i] != NID_undef) 4754+ { 4755+ if (nid_table[i++] == nid) 4756+ { 4757+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4758+ fprintf(stderr, " (NID %d in hw table, idx %d)", nid, i); 4759+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4760+ return (1); 4761+ } 4762+ } 4763+ 4764+ return (0); 4765+ } 4766+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4767+ 4768+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA */ 4769+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ 4770+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ 4771Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c 4772diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c:1.5 4773--- /dev/null Fri Jan 2 14:59:08 2015 4774+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c Tue Jun 14 00:43:26 2011 4775@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@ 4776+/* 4777+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. 4778+ * Use is subject to license terms. 4779+ */ 4780+ 4781+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c */ 4782+/* 4783+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for 4784+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). 4785+ * 4786+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by 4787+ * Afchine Madjlessi. 4788+ */ 4789+/* 4790+ * ==================================================================== 4791+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 4792+ * 4793+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 4794+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 4795+ * are met: 4796+ * 4797+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 4798+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 4799+ * 4800+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 4801+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 4802+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 4803+ * distribution. 4804+ * 4805+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 4806+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: 4807+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 4808+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" 4809+ * 4810+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 4811+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 4812+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 4813+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. 4814+ * 4815+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 4816+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 4817+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 4818+ * 4819+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 4820+ * acknowledgment: 4821+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 4822+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" 4823+ * 4824+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 4825+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 4826+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 4827+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 4828+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 4829+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 4830+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 4831+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 4832+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 4833+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 4834+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 4835+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 4836+ * ==================================================================== 4837+ * 4838+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 4839+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 4840+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 4841+ * 4842+ */ 4843+ 4844+#include <stdio.h> 4845+#include <openssl/err.h> 4846+#include "hw_pk11_err.h" 4847+ 4848+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ 4849+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR 4850+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_functs[]= 4851+{ 4852+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT, 0), "PK11_INIT"}, 4853+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FINISH, 0), "PK11_FINISH"}, 4854+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY, 0), "PK11_DESTROY"}, 4855+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CTRL, 0), "PK11_CTRL"}, 4856+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_RSA_INIT"}, 4857+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_RSA_FINISH"}, 4858+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY"}, 4859+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY"}, 4860+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_RSA_GEN_KEY"}, 4861+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC"}, 4862+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC"}, 4863+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC"}, 4864+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC"}, 4865+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_RSA_SIGN"}, 4866+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_RSA_VERIFY"}, 4867+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_ADD, 0), "PK11_RAND_ADD"}, 4868+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, 0), "PK11_RAND_BYTES"}, 4869+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 0), "PK11_GET_SESSION"}, 4870+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_SESSION, 0), "PK11_FREE_SESSION"}, 4871+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PUBKEY"}, 4872+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PRIV_KEY"}, 4873+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW"}, 4874+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW"}, 4875+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW"}, 4876+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW"}, 4877+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_DSA_SIGN"}, 4878+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_DSA_VERIFY"}, 4879+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_DSA_INIT"}, 4880+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DSA_FINISH"}, 4881+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY"}, 4882+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY"}, 4883+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_INIT, 0), "PK11_DH_INIT"}, 4884+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DH_FINISH"}, 4885+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH, 0), "PK11_MOD_EXP_DH"}, 4886+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_DH_KEY"}, 4887+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 0), "PK11_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS"}, 4888+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, 0), "PK11_SETUP_SESSION"}, 4889+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_DESTROY_OBJECT"}, 4890+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_INIT"}, 4891+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER"}, 4892+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_CIPHER_KEY"}, 4893+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_INIT"}, 4894+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_UPDATE"}, 4895+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_FINAL"}, 4896+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, 0), "PK11_CHOOSE_SLOT"}, 4897+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_FINAL"}, 4898+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, 0), "PK11_LIBRARY_INIT"}, 4899+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD, 0), "ENGINE_LOAD_PK11"}, 4900+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_GEN_KEY"}, 4901+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_COMP_KEY"}, 4902+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_COPY"}, 4903+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_CLEANUP"}, 4904+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_ADD"}, 4905+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_DELETE"}, 4906+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS"}, 4907+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC, 0), "PK11_INIT_SYMMETRIC"}, 4908+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, 0), "PK11_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS"}, 4909+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 0), "PK11_INIT_ALL_LOCKS"}, 4910+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, 0), "PK11_RETURN_SESSION"}, 4911+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PIN, 0), "PK11_GET_PIN"}, 4912+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_FIND_ONE_OBJECT"}, 4913+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS"}, 4914+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CACHE_PIN, 0), "PK11_CACHE_PIN"}, 4915+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, 0), "PK11_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY"}, 4916+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_LOGIN"}, 4917+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_RELOGIN"}, 4918+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, 0), "PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS"}, 4919+{ 0, NULL} 4920+}; 4921+ 4922+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_reasons[]= 4923+{ 4924+{ PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO already loaded"}, 4925+{ PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, "unable to load PKCS#11 DSO"}, 4926+{ PK11_R_NOT_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO not loaded"}, 4927+{ PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER, "null parameter passed"}, 4928+{ PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "command not implemented"}, 4929+{ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, "C_Initialize failed"}, 4930+{ PK11_R_FINALIZE, "C_Finalize failed"}, 4931+{ PK11_R_GETINFO, "C_GetInfo faile"}, 4932+{ PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, "C_GetSlotList failed"}, 4933+{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT, "no modulus or no exponent"}, 4934+{ PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID, "attr sensitive or invalid"}, 4935+{ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, "C_GetAttributeValue failed"}, 4936+{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS, "no modulus"}, 4937+{ PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT, "no exponent"}, 4938+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, "C_FindObjectsInit failed"}, 4939+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, "C_FindObjects failed"}, 4940+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, "C_FindObjectsFinal failed"}, 4941+{ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, "C_CreateObject failed"}, 4942+{ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, "C_DestroyObject failed"}, 4943+{ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, "C_OpenSession failed"}, 4944+{ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, "C_CloseSession failed"}, 4945+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, "C_EncryptInit failed"}, 4946+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, "C_Encrypt failed"}, 4947+{ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, "C_SignInit failed"}, 4948+{ PK11_R_SIGN, "C_Sign failed"}, 4949+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, "C_DecryptInit failed"}, 4950+{ PK11_R_DECRYPT, "C_Decrypt failed"}, 4951+{ PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, "C_VerifyRecover failed"}, 4952+{ PK11_R_VERIFY, "C_Verify failed"}, 4953+{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, "C_VerifyRecoverInit failed"}, 4954+{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, "C_VerifyRecover failed"}, 4955+{ PK11_R_GEN_KEY, "C_GenerateKeyPair failed"}, 4956+{ PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM, "C_SeedRandom failed"}, 4957+{ PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, "C_GenerateRandom failed"}, 4958+{ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH, "invalid message length"}, 4959+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE, "unknown algorithm type"}, 4960+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID, "unknown asn1 onject id"}, 4961+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE, "unknown padding type"}, 4962+{ PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED, "padding check failed"}, 4963+{ PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG, "digest too big"}, 4964+{ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, "malloc failure"}, 4965+{ PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "ctl command not implemented"}, 4966+{ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN, "data is bigger than mod"}, 4967+{ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS, "data is too larger for mod"}, 4968+{ PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT, "a dsa component is missing"}, 4969+{ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH, "invalid signature length"}, 4970+{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R, "missing r in dsa verify"}, 4971+{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S, "missing s in dsa verify"}, 4972+{ PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY, "inconsistent key type"}, 4973+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, "C_EncryptUpdate failed"}, 4974+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, "C_DecryptUpdate failed"}, 4975+{ PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, "C_DigestInit failed"}, 4976+{ PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, "C_DigestUpdate failed"}, 4977+{ PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, "C_DigestFinal failed"}, 4978+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL, "C_EncryptFinal failed"}, 4979+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, "C_DecryptFinal failed"}, 4980+{ PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT, "Slot does not support PRNG"}, 4981+{ PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO, "C_GetTokenInfo failed"}, 4982+{ PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, "C_DeriveKey failed"}, 4983+{ PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_GetOperationState failed"}, 4984+{ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_SetOperationState failed"}, 4985+{ PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE, "invalid PKCS#11 object handle"}, 4986+{ PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM, "IV or key length incorrect"}, 4987+{ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE, "invalid operation type"}, 4988+{ PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED, "failed to add NID" }, 4989+{ PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED, "atfork() failed" }, 4990+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, "C_Login() failed on token" }, 4991+{ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND, "more than one object found" }, 4992+{ PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI, "pkcs11 URI provided is invalid" }, 4993+{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN, "could not read PIN from terminal" }, 4994+{ PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND, "PIN not read from external command" }, 4995+{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND, "could not popen() dialog command" }, 4996+{ PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED, "pipe() failed" }, 4997+{ PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC, "bad passphrasedialog specification" }, 4998+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED, "token not initialized" }, 4999+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET, "token PIN required but not set" }, 5000+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED, "token PIN required but not provided" }, 5001+{ PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL, "missing mandatory 'object' keyword" }, 5002+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH, "token attrs provided do not match" }, 5003+{ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND, "private key not found in keystore" }, 5004+{ PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND, "specified object not found" }, 5005+{ PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID, "PIN set but caching policy invalid" }, 5006+{ PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED, "sysconf() failed" }, 5007+{ PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED, "mmap() failed" }, 5008+{ PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING, "PROC_LOCK_MEMORY privilege missing" }, 5009+{ PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED, "mlock() failed" }, 5010+{ PK11_R_FORK_FAILED, "fork() failed" }, 5011+{ 0, NULL} 5012+}; 5013+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ERR */ 5014+ 5015+static int pk11_lib_error_code = 0; 5016+static int pk11_error_init = 1; 5017+ 5018+static void 5019+ERR_load_pk11_strings(void) 5020+ { 5021+ if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0) 5022+ pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library(); 5023+ 5024+ if (pk11_error_init) 5025+ { 5026+ pk11_error_init = 0; 5027+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR 5028+ ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs); 5029+ ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons); 5030+#endif 5031+ } 5032+} 5033+ 5034+static void 5035+ERR_unload_pk11_strings(void) 5036+ { 5037+ if (pk11_error_init == 0) 5038+ { 5039+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR 5040+ ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs); 5041+ ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons); 5042+#endif 5043+ pk11_error_init = 1; 5044+ } 5045+} 5046+ 5047+void 5048+ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line) 5049+{ 5050+ if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0) 5051+ pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library(); 5052+ ERR_PUT_error(pk11_lib_error_code, function, reason, file, line); 5053+} 5054+ 5055+void 5056+PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv) 5057+{ 5058+ char tmp_buf[20]; 5059+ 5060+ PK11err(function, reason); 5061+ (void) BIO_snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv); 5062+ ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf); 5063+} 5064Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h 5065diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h:1.13 5066--- /dev/null Fri Jan 2 14:59:08 2015 5067+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h Fri Oct 4 14:04:20 2013 5068@@ -0,0 +1,440 @@ 5069+/* 5070+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. 5071+ * Use is subject to license terms. 5072+ */ 5073+ 5074+/* 5075+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for 5076+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). 5077+ * 5078+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by 5079+ * Afchine Madjlessi. 5080+ */ 5081+/* 5082+ * ==================================================================== 5083+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 5084+ * 5085+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 5086+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 5087+ * are met: 5088+ * 5089+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 5090+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 5091+ * 5092+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 5093+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 5094+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 5095+ * distribution. 5096+ * 5097+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 5098+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: 5099+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 5100+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" 5101+ * 5102+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 5103+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 5104+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 5105+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. 5106+ * 5107+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 5108+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 5109+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 5110+ * 5111+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 5112+ * acknowledgment: 5113+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 5114+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" 5115+ * 5116+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 5117+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 5118+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 5119+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 5120+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 5121+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 5122+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 5123+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 5124+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 5125+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 5126+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 5127+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 5128+ * ==================================================================== 5129+ * 5130+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 5131+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 5132+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 5133+ * 5134+ */ 5135+ 5136+#ifndef HW_PK11_ERR_H 5137+#define HW_PK11_ERR_H 5138+ 5139+void ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line); 5140+void PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv); 5141+#define PK11err(f, r) ERR_pk11_error((f), (r), __FILE__, __LINE__) 5142+ 5143+/* Error codes for the PK11 functions. */ 5144+ 5145+/* Function codes. */ 5146+ 5147+#define PK11_F_INIT 100 5148+#define PK11_F_FINISH 101 5149+#define PK11_F_DESTROY 102 5150+#define PK11_F_CTRL 103 5151+#define PK11_F_RSA_INIT 104 5152+#define PK11_F_RSA_FINISH 105 5153+#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY 106 5154+#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY 107 5155+#define PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY 108 5156+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC 109 5157+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC 110 5158+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC 111 5159+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC 112 5160+#define PK11_F_RSA_SIGN 113 5161+#define PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY 114 5162+#define PK11_F_RAND_ADD 115 5163+#define PK11_F_RAND_BYTES 116 5164+#define PK11_F_GET_SESSION 117 5165+#define PK11_F_FREE_SESSION 118 5166+#define PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY 119 5167+#define PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY 120 5168+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW 121 5169+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW 122 5170+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW 123 5171+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW 124 5172+#define PK11_F_DSA_SIGN 125 5173+#define PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY 126 5174+#define PK11_F_DSA_INIT 127 5175+#define PK11_F_DSA_FINISH 128 5176+#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY 129 5177+#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY 130 5178+#define PK11_F_DH_INIT 131 5179+#define PK11_F_DH_FINISH 132 5180+#define PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH 133 5181+#define PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY 134 5182+#define PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS 135 5183+#define PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION 136 5184+#define PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT 137 5185+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT 138 5186+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER 139 5187+#define PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY 140 5188+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT 141 5189+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE 142 5190+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL 143 5191+#define PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT 144 5192+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL 145 5193+#define PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT 146 5194+#define PK11_F_LOAD 147 5195+#define PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY 148 5196+#define PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY 149 5197+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY 150 5198+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP 151 5199+#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD 152 5200+#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE 153 5201+#define PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS 154 5202+#define PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC 155 5203+#define PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS 156 5204+#define PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS 157 5205+#define PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION 158 5206+#define PK11_F_GET_PIN 159 5207+#define PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT 160 5208+#define PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS 161 5209+#define PK11_F_CACHE_PIN 162 5210+#define PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY 163 5211+#define PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN 164 5212+#define PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN 165 5213+#define PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS 166 5214+ 5215+/* Reason codes. */ 5216+#define PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED 100 5217+#define PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE 101 5218+#define PK11_R_NOT_LOADED 102 5219+#define PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER 103 5220+#define PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 104 5221+#define PK11_R_INITIALIZE 105 5222+#define PK11_R_FINALIZE 106 5223+#define PK11_R_GETINFO 107 5224+#define PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST 108 5225+#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT 109 5226+#define PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID 110 5227+#define PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE 111 5228+#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS 112 5229+#define PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT 113 5230+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT 114 5231+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS 115 5232+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL 116 5233+#define PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT 118 5234+#define PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT 119 5235+#define PK11_R_OPENSESSION 120 5236+#define PK11_R_CLOSESESSION 121 5237+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT 122 5238+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPT 123 5239+#define PK11_R_SIGNINIT 124 5240+#define PK11_R_SIGN 125 5241+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT 126 5242+#define PK11_R_DECRYPT 127 5243+#define PK11_R_VERIFYINIT 128 5244+#define PK11_R_VERIFY 129 5245+#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT 130 5246+#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER 131 5247+#define PK11_R_GEN_KEY 132 5248+#define PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM 133 5249+#define PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM 134 5250+#define PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 135 5251+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE 136 5252+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID 137 5253+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE 138 5254+#define PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 139 5255+#define PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG 140 5256+#define PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE 141 5257+#define PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 142 5258+#define PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN 143 5259+#define PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS 144 5260+#define PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT 145 5261+#define PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 146 5262+#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R 147 5263+#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S 148 5264+#define PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY 149 5265+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE 150 5266+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE 151 5267+#define PK11_R_DIGESTINIT 152 5268+#define PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE 153 5269+#define PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL 154 5270+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL 155 5271+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL 156 5272+#define PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT 157 5273+#define PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO 158 5274+#define PK11_R_DERIVEKEY 159 5275+#define PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE 160 5276+#define PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE 161 5277+#define PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE 162 5278+#define PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM 163 5279+#define PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE 164 5280+#define PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED 165 5281+#define PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED 166 5282+ 5283+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED 167 5284+#define PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND 168 5285+#define PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI 169 5286+#define PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN 170 5287+#define PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND 171 5288+#define PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED 172 5289+#define PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND 173 5290+#define PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC 174 5291+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED 175 5292+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET 176 5293+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED 177 5294+#define PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL 178 5295+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH 179 5296+#define PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND 180 5297+#define PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND 181 5298+#define PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID 182 5299+#define PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED 183 5300+#define PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED 183 5301+#define PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING 184 5302+#define PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED 185 5303+#define PK11_R_FORK_FAILED 186 5304+ 5305+/* max byte length of a symetric key we support */ 5306+#define PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX 32 5307+ 5308+#ifdef NOPTHREADS 5309+/* 5310+ * CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE lock is primarily used for the protection of the 5311+ * free_session list and active_list but generally serves as a global 5312+ * per-process lock for the whole engine. 5313+ * 5314+ * We reuse CRYPTO_LOCK_EC lock (which is defined in OpenSSL for EC method) as 5315+ * the global engine lock. This is not optimal w.r.t. performance but 5316+ * it's safe. 5317+ */ 5318+#define CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE CRYPTO_LOCK_EC 5319+#endif 5320+ 5321+/* 5322+ * This structure encapsulates all reusable information for a PKCS#11 5323+ * session. A list of these objects is created on behalf of the 5324+ * calling application using an on-demand method. Each operation 5325+ * type (see PK11_OPTYPE below) has its own per-process list. 5326+ * Each of the lists is basically a cache for faster PKCS#11 object 5327+ * access to avoid expensive C_Find{,Init,Final}Object() calls. 5328+ * 5329+ * When a new request comes in, an object will be taken from the list 5330+ * (if there is one) or a new one is created to handle the request 5331+ * (if the list is empty). See pk11_get_session() on how it is done. 5332+ */ 5333+typedef struct PK11_st_SESSION 5334+ { 5335+ struct PK11_st_SESSION *next; 5336+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; /* PK11 session handle */ 5337+ pid_t pid; /* Current process ID */ 5338+ CK_BBOOL pub_persistent; /* is pub key in keystore? */ 5339+ CK_BBOOL priv_persistent;/* is priv key in keystore? */ 5340+ union 5341+ { 5342+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 5343+ struct 5344+ { 5345+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */ 5346+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */ 5347+ RSA *rsa_pub; /* pub key addr */ 5348+ BIGNUM *rsa_n_num; /* pub modulus */ 5349+ BIGNUM *rsa_e_num; /* pub exponent */ 5350+ RSA *rsa_priv; /* priv key addr */ 5351+ BIGNUM *rsa_pn_num; /* pub modulus */ 5352+ BIGNUM *rsa_pe_num; /* pub exponent */ 5353+ BIGNUM *rsa_d_num; /* priv exponent */ 5354+ } u_RSA; 5355+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ 5356+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 5357+ struct 5358+ { 5359+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */ 5360+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */ 5361+ DSA *dsa_pub; /* pub key addr */ 5362+ BIGNUM *dsa_pub_num; /* pub key */ 5363+ DSA *dsa_priv; /* priv key addr */ 5364+ BIGNUM *dsa_priv_num; /* priv key */ 5365+ } u_DSA; 5366+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ 5367+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 5368+ struct 5369+ { 5370+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dh_key; /* key handle */ 5371+ DH *dh; /* dh key addr */ 5372+ BIGNUM *dh_priv_num; /* priv dh key */ 5373+ } u_DH; 5374+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ 5375+ struct 5376+ { 5377+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE cipher_key; /* key handle */ 5378+ unsigned char key[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX]; 5379+ int key_len; /* priv key len */ 5380+ int encrypt; /* 1/0 enc/decr */ 5381+ } u_cipher; 5382+ } opdata_u; 5383+ } PK11_SESSION; 5384+ 5385+#define opdata_rsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub_key 5386+#define opdata_rsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv_key 5387+#define opdata_rsa_pub opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub 5388+#define opdata_rsa_priv opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv 5389+#define opdata_rsa_n_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_n_num 5390+#define opdata_rsa_e_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_e_num 5391+#define opdata_rsa_pn_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pn_num 5392+#define opdata_rsa_pe_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pe_num 5393+#define opdata_rsa_d_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_d_num 5394+#define opdata_dsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_key 5395+#define opdata_dsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_key 5396+#define opdata_dsa_pub opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub 5397+#define opdata_dsa_pub_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_num 5398+#define opdata_dsa_priv opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv 5399+#define opdata_dsa_priv_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_num 5400+#define opdata_dh_key opdata_u.u_DH.dh_key 5401+#define opdata_dh opdata_u.u_DH.dh 5402+#define opdata_dh_priv_num opdata_u.u_DH.dh_priv_num 5403+#define opdata_cipher_key opdata_u.u_cipher.cipher_key 5404+#define opdata_key opdata_u.u_cipher.key 5405+#define opdata_key_len opdata_u.u_cipher.key_len 5406+#define opdata_encrypt opdata_u.u_cipher.encrypt 5407+ 5408+/* 5409+ * We have 3 different groups of operation types: 5410+ * 1) asymmetric operations 5411+ * 2) random operations 5412+ * 3) symmetric and digest operations 5413+ * 5414+ * This division into groups stems from the fact that it's common that hardware 5415+ * providers may support operations from one group only. For example, hardware 5416+ * providers on UltraSPARC T2, n2rng(7d), ncp(7d), and n2cp(7d), each support 5417+ * only a single group of operations. 5418+ * 5419+ * For every group a different slot can be chosen. That means that we must have 5420+ * at least 3 different lists of cached PKCS#11 sessions since sessions from 5421+ * different groups may be initialized in different slots. 5422+ * 5423+ * To provide locking granularity in multithreaded environment, the groups are 5424+ * further splitted into types with each type having a separate session cache. 5425+ */ 5426+typedef enum PK11_OPTYPE_ENUM 5427+ { 5428+ OP_RAND, 5429+ OP_RSA, 5430+ OP_DSA, 5431+ OP_DH, 5432+ OP_CIPHER, 5433+ OP_DIGEST, 5434+ OP_MAX 5435+ } PK11_OPTYPE; 5436+ 5437+/* 5438+ * This structure contains the heads of the lists forming the object caches 5439+ * and locks associated with the lists. 5440+ */ 5441+typedef struct PK11_st_CACHE 5442+ { 5443+ PK11_SESSION *head; 5444+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 5445+ pthread_mutex_t *lock; 5446+#endif 5447+ } PK11_CACHE; 5448+ 5449+/* structure for tracking handles of asymmetric key objects */ 5450+typedef struct PK11_active_st 5451+ { 5452+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h; 5453+ unsigned int refcnt; 5454+ struct PK11_active_st *prev; 5455+ struct PK11_active_st *next; 5456+ } PK11_active; 5457+ 5458+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 5459+extern pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[]; 5460+#endif 5461+extern PK11_active *active_list[]; 5462+/* 5463+ * These variables are specific for the RSA keys by reference code. See 5464+ * hw_pk11_pub.c for explanation. 5465+ */ 5466+extern CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags; 5467+ 5468+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 5469+#define LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ 5470+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(find_lock[alg_type]) == 0) 5471+#define UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ 5472+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(find_lock[alg_type]) == 0) 5473+#else 5474+#define LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ 5475+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE) 5476+#define UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ 5477+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE) 5478+#endif 5479+ 5480+extern PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype); 5481+extern void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); 5482+extern int pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); 5483+ 5484+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 5485+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); 5486+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); 5487+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); 5488+extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, 5489+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); 5490+extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, 5491+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); 5492+extern RSA_METHOD *PK11_RSA(void); 5493+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ 5494+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 5495+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); 5496+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); 5497+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); 5498+extern DSA_METHOD *PK11_DSA(void); 5499+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ 5500+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 5501+extern int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); 5502+extern int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); 5503+extern DH_METHOD *PK11_DH(void); 5504+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ 5505+ 5506+extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList; 5507+ 5508+#endif /* HW_PK11_ERR_H */ 5509Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c 5510diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c:1.42 5511--- /dev/null Fri Jan 2 14:59:08 2015 5512+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c Fri Oct 4 14:27:06 2013 5513@@ -0,0 +1,3556 @@ 5514+/* 5515+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. 5516+ * Use is subject to license terms. 5517+ */ 5518+ 5519+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */ 5520+/* 5521+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for 5522+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). 5523+ * 5524+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by 5525+ * Afchine Madjlessi. 5526+ */ 5527+/* 5528+ * ==================================================================== 5529+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 5530+ * 5531+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 5532+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 5533+ * are met: 5534+ * 5535+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 5536+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 5537+ * 5538+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 5539+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 5540+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 5541+ * distribution. 5542+ * 5543+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 5544+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: 5545+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 5546+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" 5547+ * 5548+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 5549+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 5550+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 5551+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. 5552+ * 5553+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 5554+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 5555+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 5556+ * 5557+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 5558+ * acknowledgment: 5559+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 5560+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" 5561+ * 5562+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 5563+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 5564+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 5565+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 5566+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 5567+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 5568+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 5569+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 5570+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 5571+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 5572+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 5573+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 5574+ * ==================================================================== 5575+ * 5576+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 5577+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 5578+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 5579+ * 5580+ */ 5581+ 5582+#include <stdio.h> 5583+#include <stdlib.h> 5584+#include <string.h> 5585+#include <sys/types.h> 5586+ 5587+#include <openssl/e_os2.h> 5588+#include <openssl/crypto.h> 5589+#include <cryptlib.h> 5590+#include <openssl/engine.h> 5591+#include <openssl/dso.h> 5592+#include <openssl/err.h> 5593+#include <openssl/bn.h> 5594+#include <openssl/pem.h> 5595+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 5596+#include <openssl/rsa.h> 5597+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ 5598+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 5599+#include <openssl/dsa.h> 5600+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ 5601+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 5602+#include <openssl/dh.h> 5603+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ 5604+#include <openssl/rand.h> 5605+#include <openssl/objects.h> 5606+#include <openssl/x509.h> 5607+ 5608+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 5609+#define NOPTHREADS 5610+typedef int pid_t; 5611+#define HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE 5612+static char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt); 5613+#ifndef NULL_PTR 5614+#define NULL_PTR NULL 5615+#endif 5616+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 5617+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name 5618+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 5619+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name 5620+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ 5621+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) 5622+#else 5623+#include <unistd.h> 5624+#endif 5625+ 5626+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 5627+#include <pthread.h> 5628+#endif 5629+ 5630+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW 5631+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 5632+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA 5633+ 5634+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 5635+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) 5636+#include "cryptoki.h" 5637+#include "pkcs11.h" 5638+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) 5639+#else 5640+#include "cryptoki.h" 5641+#include "pkcs11.h" 5642+#endif 5643+#include "hw_pk11ca.h" 5644+#include "hw_pk11_err.h" 5645+ 5646+static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE; 5647+extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID; 5648+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 5649+extern pthread_mutex_t *token_lock; 5650+#endif 5651+ 5652+#if !(defined(HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE) || (defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun))) 5653+#define getpassphrase(x) getpass(x) 5654+#endif 5655+ 5656+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 5657+/* RSA stuff */ 5658+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, 5659+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); 5660+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, 5661+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); 5662+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, 5663+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); 5664+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, 5665+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); 5666+static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa); 5667+static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa); 5668+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, 5669+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa); 5670+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L 5671+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, 5672+ unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, 5673+ const RSA *rsa); 5674+#else 5675+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, 5676+ unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, 5677+ const RSA *rsa); 5678+#endif 5679+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_file, 5680+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); 5681+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file, 5682+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); 5683+ 5684+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, 5685+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); 5686+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, 5687+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); 5688+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, 5689+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); 5690+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, 5691+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); 5692+ 5693+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr, 5694+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); 5695+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr, 5696+ BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, 5697+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); 5698+ 5699+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); 5700+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); 5701+#endif 5702+ 5703+/* DSA stuff */ 5704+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 5705+static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa); 5706+static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa); 5707+static DSA_SIG *pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, 5708+ DSA *dsa); 5709+static int pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, 5710+ DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa); 5711+ 5712+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr, 5713+ BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); 5714+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr, 5715+ BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); 5716+ 5717+static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa); 5718+static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa); 5719+#endif 5720+ 5721+/* DH stuff */ 5722+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 5723+static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh); 5724+static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh); 5725+static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh); 5726+static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, 5727+ const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh); 5728+ 5729+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, DH **key_ptr, 5730+ BIGNUM **priv_key, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); 5731+ 5732+static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh); 5733+#endif 5734+ 5735+static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, 5736+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey); 5737+static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue, 5738+ CK_ULONG *ulValueLen); 5739+static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn); 5740+ 5741+static int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, 5742+ CK_BBOOL is_private); 5743+ 5744+/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */ 5745+#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL 5746+static char *read_mode_flags = "rF"; 5747+#else 5748+static char *read_mode_flags = "r"; 5749+#endif 5750+ 5751+/* 5752+ * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list 5753+ * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error 5754+ * variable and jump to the specified label. 5755+ */ 5756+#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \ 5757+ { \ 5758+ if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \ 5759+ { \ 5760+ var = TRUE; \ 5761+ if (unlock) \ 5762+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ 5763+ goto label; \ 5764+ } \ 5765+ } 5766+ 5767+/* 5768+ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the 5769+ * entry otherwise return NULL. 5770+ * 5771+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list 5772+ * held. 5773+ */ 5774+static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) 5775+ { 5776+ PK11_active *entry; 5777+ 5778+ for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next) 5779+ if (entry->h == h) 5780+ return (entry); 5781+ 5782+ return (NULL); 5783+ } 5784+ 5785+/* 5786+ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a 5787+ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of 5788+ * failure. 5789+ * 5790+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list 5791+ * held. 5792+ */ 5793+int 5794+pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) 5795+ { 5796+ PK11_active *entry = NULL; 5797+ 5798+ if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 5799+ { 5800+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); 5801+ return (-1); 5802+ } 5803+ 5804+ /* search for entry in the active list */ 5805+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL) 5806+ entry->refcnt++; 5807+ else 5808+ { 5809+ /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */ 5810+ entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active)); 5811+ if (entry == NULL) 5812+ { 5813+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 5814+ return (-1); 5815+ } 5816+ entry->h = h; 5817+ entry->refcnt = 1; 5818+ entry->prev = NULL; 5819+ entry->next = NULL; 5820+ /* connect the newly created entry to the list */ 5821+ if (active_list[type] == NULL) 5822+ active_list[type] = entry; 5823+ else /* make the entry first in the list */ 5824+ { 5825+ entry->next = active_list[type]; 5826+ active_list[type]->prev = entry; 5827+ active_list[type] = entry; 5828+ } 5829+ } 5830+ 5831+ return (entry->refcnt); 5832+ } 5833+ 5834+/* 5835+ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it. 5836+ * 5837+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list 5838+ * held. 5839+ */ 5840+void 5841+pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type) 5842+ { 5843+ PK11_active *prev_entry; 5844+ 5845+ /* remove the entry from the list and free it */ 5846+ if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL) 5847+ { 5848+ prev_entry->next = entry->next; 5849+ if (entry->next != NULL) 5850+ entry->next->prev = prev_entry; 5851+ } 5852+ else 5853+ { 5854+ active_list[type] = entry->next; 5855+ /* we were the first but not the only one */ 5856+ if (entry->next != NULL) 5857+ entry->next->prev = NULL; 5858+ } 5859+ 5860+ /* sanitization */ 5861+ entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 5862+ entry->prev = NULL; 5863+ entry->next = NULL; 5864+ OPENSSL_free(entry); 5865+ } 5866+ 5867+/* Free all entries from the active list. */ 5868+void 5869+pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type) 5870+ { 5871+ PK11_active *entry; 5872+ 5873+ /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */ 5874+ switch (type) 5875+ { 5876+ case OP_RSA: 5877+ case OP_DSA: 5878+ case OP_DH: 5879+ break; 5880+ default: 5881+ return; 5882+ } 5883+ 5884+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ 5885+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(type); 5886+ while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL) 5887+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type); 5888+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type); 5889+ } 5890+ 5891+/* 5892+ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle, 5893+ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it. 5894+ * 5895+ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references, 5896+ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error. 5897+ * 5898+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list 5899+ * held. 5900+ */ 5901+int 5902+pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) 5903+ { 5904+ PK11_active *entry = NULL; 5905+ 5906+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL) 5907+ { 5908+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); 5909+ return (-1); 5910+ } 5911+ 5912+ OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0); 5913+ entry->refcnt--; 5914+ if (entry->refcnt == 0) 5915+ { 5916+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type); 5917+ return (1); 5918+ } 5919+ 5920+ return (0); 5921+ } 5922+ 5923+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 5924+/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ 5925+static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa = 5926+ { 5927+ "PKCS#11 RSA method", 5928+ pk11_RSA_public_encrypt, /* rsa_pub_encrypt */ 5929+ pk11_RSA_public_decrypt, /* rsa_pub_decrypt */ 5930+ pk11_RSA_private_encrypt, /* rsa_priv_encrypt */ 5931+ pk11_RSA_private_decrypt, /* rsa_priv_decrypt */ 5932+ NULL, /* rsa_mod_exp */ 5933+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ 5934+ pk11_RSA_init, /* init */ 5935+ pk11_RSA_finish, /* finish */ 5936+ RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER, /* flags */ 5937+ NULL, /* app_data */ 5938+ pk11_RSA_sign, /* rsa_sign */ 5939+ pk11_RSA_verify /* rsa_verify */ 5940+ }; 5941+ 5942+RSA_METHOD * 5943+PK11_RSA(void) 5944+ { 5945+ return (&pk11_rsa); 5946+ } 5947+#endif 5948+ 5949+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 5950+/* Our internal DSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ 5951+static DSA_METHOD pk11_dsa = 5952+ { 5953+ "PKCS#11 DSA method", 5954+ pk11_dsa_do_sign, /* dsa_do_sign */ 5955+ NULL, /* dsa_sign_setup */ 5956+ pk11_dsa_do_verify, /* dsa_do_verify */ 5957+ NULL, /* dsa_mod_exp */ 5958+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ 5959+ pk11_DSA_init, /* init */ 5960+ pk11_DSA_finish, /* finish */ 5961+ 0, /* flags */ 5962+ NULL /* app_data */ 5963+ }; 5964+ 5965+DSA_METHOD * 5966+PK11_DSA(void) 5967+ { 5968+ return (&pk11_dsa); 5969+ } 5970+#endif 5971+ 5972+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 5973+/* 5974+ * PKCS #11 V2.20, section 11.2 specifies that the number of bytes needed for 5975+ * output buffer may somewhat exceed the precise number of bytes needed, but 5976+ * should not exceed it by a large amount. That may be caused, for example, by 5977+ * rounding it up to multiple of X in the underlying bignum library. 8 should be 5978+ * enough. 5979+ */ 5980+#define DH_BUF_RESERVE 8 5981+ 5982+/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ 5983+static DH_METHOD pk11_dh = 5984+ { 5985+ "PKCS#11 DH method", 5986+ pk11_DH_generate_key, /* generate_key */ 5987+ pk11_DH_compute_key, /* compute_key */ 5988+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ 5989+ pk11_DH_init, /* init */ 5990+ pk11_DH_finish, /* finish */ 5991+ 0, /* flags */ 5992+ NULL, /* app_data */ 5993+ NULL /* generate_params */ 5994+ }; 5995+ 5996+DH_METHOD * 5997+PK11_DH(void) 5998+ { 5999+ return (&pk11_dh); 6000+ } 6001+#endif 6002+ 6003+/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */ 6004+#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36 6005+ 6006+/* Lengths of DSA data and signature */ 6007+#define DSA_DATA_LEN 20 6008+#define DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN 40 6009+ 6010+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE; 6011+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE; 6012+ 6013+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 6014+/* 6015+ * Similiar to OpenSSL to take advantage of the paddings. The goal is to 6016+ * support all paddings in this engine although PK11 library does not 6017+ * support all the paddings used in OpenSSL. 6018+ * The input errors should have been checked in the padding functions. 6019+ */ 6020+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, 6021+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) 6022+ { 6023+ int i, num = 0, r = -1; 6024+ unsigned char *buf = NULL; 6025+ 6026+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); 6027+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) 6028+ { 6029+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 6030+ goto err; 6031+ } 6032+ 6033+ switch (padding) 6034+ { 6035+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: 6036+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen); 6037+ break; 6038+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 6039+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: 6040+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0); 6041+ break; 6042+#endif 6043+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: 6044+ i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen); 6045+ break; 6046+ case RSA_NO_PADDING: 6047+ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); 6048+ break; 6049+ default: 6050+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); 6051+ goto err; 6052+ } 6053+ if (i <= 0) goto err; 6054+ 6055+ /* PK11 functions are called here */ 6056+ r = pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa); 6057+err: 6058+ if (buf != NULL) 6059+ { 6060+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); 6061+ OPENSSL_free(buf); 6062+ } 6063+ return (r); 6064+ } 6065+ 6066+ 6067+/* 6068+ * Similar to Openssl to take advantage of the paddings. The input errors 6069+ * should be catched in the padding functions 6070+ */ 6071+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, 6072+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) 6073+ { 6074+ int i, num = 0, r = -1; 6075+ unsigned char *buf = NULL; 6076+ 6077+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); 6078+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) 6079+ { 6080+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 6081+ goto err; 6082+ } 6083+ 6084+ switch (padding) 6085+ { 6086+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: 6087+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen); 6088+ break; 6089+ case RSA_NO_PADDING: 6090+ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); 6091+ break; 6092+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: 6093+ default: 6094+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); 6095+ goto err; 6096+ } 6097+ if (i <= 0) goto err; 6098+ 6099+ /* PK11 functions are called here */ 6100+ r = pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa); 6101+err: 6102+ if (buf != NULL) 6103+ { 6104+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); 6105+ OPENSSL_free(buf); 6106+ } 6107+ return (r); 6108+ } 6109+ 6110+/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */ 6111+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, 6112+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) 6113+ { 6114+ BIGNUM f; 6115+ int j, num = 0, r = -1; 6116+ unsigned char *p; 6117+ unsigned char *buf = NULL; 6118+ 6119+ BN_init(&f); 6120+ 6121+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); 6122+ 6123+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) 6124+ { 6125+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 6126+ goto err; 6127+ } 6128+ 6129+ /* 6130+ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things 6131+ * and chops off the top '0' bytes 6132+ */ 6133+ if (flen > num) 6134+ { 6135+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, 6136+ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); 6137+ goto err; 6138+ } 6139+ 6140+ /* make data into a big number */ 6141+ if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, &f) == NULL) 6142+ goto err; 6143+ 6144+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) 6145+ { 6146+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, 6147+ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); 6148+ goto err; 6149+ } 6150+ 6151+ /* PK11 functions are called here */ 6152+ r = pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa); 6153+ 6154+ /* 6155+ * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning. 6156+ * Needs to skip these 0's paddings here. 6157+ */ 6158+ for (j = 0; j < r; j++) 6159+ if (buf[j] != 0) 6160+ break; 6161+ 6162+ p = buf + j; 6163+ j = r - j; /* j is only used with no-padding mode */ 6164+ 6165+ switch (padding) 6166+ { 6167+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: 6168+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, p, j, num); 6169+ break; 6170+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 6171+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: 6172+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, p, j, num, NULL, 0); 6173+ break; 6174+#endif 6175+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: 6176+ r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, p, j, num); 6177+ break; 6178+ case RSA_NO_PADDING: 6179+ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, j, num); 6180+ break; 6181+ default: 6182+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); 6183+ goto err; 6184+ } 6185+ if (r < 0) 6186+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); 6187+ 6188+err: 6189+ BN_clear_free(&f); 6190+ if (buf != NULL) 6191+ { 6192+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); 6193+ OPENSSL_free(buf); 6194+ } 6195+ return (r); 6196+ } 6197+ 6198+/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */ 6199+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, 6200+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) 6201+ { 6202+ BIGNUM f; 6203+ int i, num = 0, r = -1; 6204+ unsigned char *p; 6205+ unsigned char *buf = NULL; 6206+ 6207+ BN_init(&f); 6208+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); 6209+ buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num); 6210+ if (buf == NULL) 6211+ { 6212+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 6213+ goto err; 6214+ } 6215+ 6216+ /* 6217+ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things 6218+ * and chops off the top '0' bytes 6219+ */ 6220+ if (flen > num) 6221+ { 6222+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); 6223+ goto err; 6224+ } 6225+ 6226+ if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, &f) == NULL) 6227+ goto err; 6228+ 6229+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) 6230+ { 6231+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, 6232+ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); 6233+ goto err; 6234+ } 6235+ 6236+ /* PK11 functions are called here */ 6237+ r = pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa); 6238+ 6239+ /* 6240+ * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning. 6241+ * Needs to skip these 0's here 6242+ */ 6243+ for (i = 0; i < r; i++) 6244+ if (buf[i] != 0) 6245+ break; 6246+ 6247+ p = buf + i; 6248+ i = r - i; /* i is only used with no-padding mode */ 6249+ 6250+ switch (padding) 6251+ { 6252+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: 6253+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, p, i, num); 6254+ break; 6255+ case RSA_NO_PADDING: 6256+ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, i, num); 6257+ break; 6258+ default: 6259+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); 6260+ goto err; 6261+ } 6262+ if (r < 0) 6263+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); 6264+ 6265+err: 6266+ BN_clear_free(&f); 6267+ if (buf != NULL) 6268+ { 6269+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); 6270+ OPENSSL_free(buf); 6271+ } 6272+ return (r); 6273+ } 6274+ 6275+/* 6276+ * This function implements RSA public encryption using C_EncryptInit and 6277+ * C_Encrypt pk11 interfaces. Note that the CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. 6278+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. 6279+ */ 6280+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, 6281+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) 6282+ { 6283+ CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted = flen; 6284+ int retval = -1; 6285+ CK_RV rv; 6286+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; 6287+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; 6288+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 6289+ PK11_SESSION *sp; 6290+ 6291+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) 6292+ return (-1); 6293+ 6294+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); 6295+ 6296+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; 6297+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 6298+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = 6299+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, 6300+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, 6301+ sp->session); 6302+ 6303+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 6304+ { 6305+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, p_mech, 6306+ h_pub_key); 6307+ 6308+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 6309+ { 6310+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, 6311+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, rv); 6312+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 6313+ return (-1); 6314+ } 6315+ 6316+ rv = pFuncList->C_Encrypt(sp->session, 6317+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_encrypted); 6318+ 6319+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 6320+ { 6321+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, 6322+ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, rv); 6323+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 6324+ return (-1); 6325+ } 6326+ retval = bytes_encrypted; 6327+ } 6328+ 6329+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 6330+ return (retval); 6331+ } 6332+ 6333+ 6334+/* 6335+ * This function implements RSA private encryption using C_SignInit and 6336+ * C_Sign pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. 6337+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. 6338+ */ 6339+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, 6340+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) 6341+ { 6342+ CK_ULONG ul_sig_len = flen; 6343+ int retval = -1; 6344+ CK_RV rv; 6345+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; 6346+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; 6347+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 6348+ PK11_SESSION *sp; 6349+ 6350+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) 6351+ return (-1); 6352+ 6353+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); 6354+ 6355+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; 6356+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 6357+ { 6358+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = 6359+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, 6360+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, 6361+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session); 6362+ } 6363+ 6364+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 6365+ { 6366+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, 6367+ h_priv_key); 6368+ 6369+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 6370+ { 6371+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, 6372+ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); 6373+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 6374+ return (-1); 6375+ } 6376+ 6377+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, 6378+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &ul_sig_len); 6379+ 6380+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 6381+ { 6382+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, PK11_R_SIGN, 6383+ rv); 6384+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 6385+ return (-1); 6386+ } 6387+ 6388+ retval = ul_sig_len; 6389+ } 6390+ 6391+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 6392+ return (retval); 6393+ } 6394+ 6395+ 6396+/* 6397+ * This function implements RSA private decryption using C_DecryptInit and 6398+ * C_Decrypt pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism is used here. 6399+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. 6400+ */ 6401+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, 6402+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) 6403+ { 6404+ CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen; 6405+ int retval = -1; 6406+ CK_RV rv; 6407+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; 6408+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; 6409+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; 6410+ PK11_SESSION *sp; 6411+ 6412+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) 6413+ return (-1); 6414+ 6415+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); 6416+ 6417+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; 6418+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 6419+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = 6420+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, 6421+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, 6422+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session); 6423+ 6424+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 6425+ { 6426+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, p_mech, 6427+ h_priv_key); 6428+ 6429+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 6430+ { 6431+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, 6432+ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv); 6433+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 6434+ return (-1); 6435+ } 6436+ 6437+ rv = pFuncList->C_Decrypt(sp->session, 6438+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted); 6439+ 6440+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 6441+ { 6442+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, 6443+ PK11_R_DECRYPT, rv); 6444+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 6445+ return (-1); 6446+ } 6447+ retval = bytes_decrypted; 6448+ } 6449+ 6450+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 6451+ return (retval); 6452+ } 6453+ 6454+ 6455+/* 6456+ * This function implements RSA public decryption using C_VerifyRecoverInit 6457+ * and C_VerifyRecover pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. 6458+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. 6459+ */ 6460+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, 6461+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) 6462+ { 6463+ CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen; 6464+ int retval = -1; 6465+ CK_RV rv; 6466+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; 6467+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; 6468+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 6469+ PK11_SESSION *sp; 6470+ 6471+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) 6472+ return (-1); 6473+ 6474+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); 6475+ 6476+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; 6477+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 6478+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = 6479+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, 6480+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, 6481+ sp->session); 6482+ 6483+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 6484+ { 6485+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecoverInit(sp->session, 6486+ p_mech, h_pub_key); 6487+ 6488+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 6489+ { 6490+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, 6491+ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, rv); 6492+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 6493+ return (-1); 6494+ } 6495+ 6496+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecover(sp->session, 6497+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted); 6498+ 6499+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 6500+ { 6501+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, 6502+ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, rv); 6503+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 6504+ return (-1); 6505+ } 6506+ retval = bytes_decrypted; 6507+ } 6508+ 6509+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 6510+ return (retval); 6511+ } 6512+ 6513+static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa) 6514+ { 6515+ /* 6516+ * This flag in the RSA_METHOD enables the new rsa_sign, 6517+ * rsa_verify functions. See rsa.h for details. 6518+ */ 6519+ rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER; 6520+ 6521+ return (1); 6522+ } 6523+ 6524+static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa) 6525+ { 6526+ /* 6527+ * Since we are overloading OpenSSL's native RSA_eay_finish() we need 6528+ * to do the same as in the original function, i.e. to free bignum 6529+ * structures. 6530+ */ 6531+ if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL) 6532+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); 6533+ if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL) 6534+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); 6535+ if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL) 6536+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); 6537+ 6538+ return (1); 6539+ } 6540+ 6541+/* 6542+ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from 6543+ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11. 6544+ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c 6545+ */ 6546+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, 6547+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa) 6548+ { 6549+ X509_SIG sig; 6550+ ASN1_TYPE parameter; 6551+ int i, j = 0; 6552+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL; 6553+ X509_ALGOR algor; 6554+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; 6555+ CK_RV rv; 6556+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0}; 6557+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; 6558+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; 6559+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; 6560+ int ret = 0; 6561+ unsigned long ulsiglen; 6562+ 6563+ /* Encode the digest */ 6564+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ 6565+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1) 6566+ { 6567+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) 6568+ { 6569+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 6570+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); 6571+ goto err; 6572+ } 6573+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; 6574+ s = (unsigned char *)m; 6575+ } 6576+ else 6577+ { 6578+ sig.algor = &algor; 6579+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); 6580+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) 6581+ { 6582+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 6583+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); 6584+ goto err; 6585+ } 6586+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) 6587+ { 6588+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 6589+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID); 6590+ goto err; 6591+ } 6592+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; 6593+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL; 6594+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; 6595+ 6596+ sig.digest = &digest; 6597+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; 6598+ sig.digest->length = m_len; 6599+ 6600+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); 6601+ } 6602+ 6603+ j = RSA_size(rsa); 6604+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j) 6605+ { 6606+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG); 6607+ goto err; 6608+ } 6609+ 6610+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1) 6611+ { 6612+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1)); 6613+ if (s == NULL) 6614+ { 6615+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 6616+ goto err; 6617+ } 6618+ p = s; 6619+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); 6620+ } 6621+ 6622+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) 6623+ goto err; 6624+ 6625+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); 6626+ 6627+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; 6628+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 6629+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = 6630+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, 6631+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, 6632+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, 6633+ sp->session); 6634+ 6635+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 6636+ { 6637+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key); 6638+ 6639+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 6640+ { 6641+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); 6642+ goto err; 6643+ } 6644+ 6645+ ulsiglen = j; 6646+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret, 6647+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen); 6648+ *siglen = ulsiglen; 6649+ 6650+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 6651+ { 6652+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv); 6653+ goto err; 6654+ } 6655+ ret = 1; 6656+ } 6657+ 6658+err: 6659+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL)) 6660+ { 6661+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1)); 6662+ OPENSSL_free(s); 6663+ } 6664+ 6665+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 6666+ return (ret); 6667+ } 6668+ 6669+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L 6670+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, 6671+ unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, 6672+ const RSA *rsa) 6673+#else 6674+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, 6675+ unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, 6676+ const RSA *rsa) 6677+#endif 6678+ { 6679+ X509_SIG sig; 6680+ ASN1_TYPE parameter; 6681+ int i, j = 0; 6682+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL; 6683+ X509_ALGOR algor; 6684+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; 6685+ CK_RV rv; 6686+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0}; 6687+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; 6688+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key; 6689+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; 6690+ int ret = 0; 6691+ 6692+ /* Encode the digest */ 6693+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ 6694+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1) 6695+ { 6696+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) 6697+ { 6698+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, 6699+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); 6700+ goto err; 6701+ } 6702+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; 6703+ s = (unsigned char *)m; 6704+ } 6705+ else 6706+ { 6707+ sig.algor = &algor; 6708+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); 6709+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) 6710+ { 6711+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, 6712+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); 6713+ goto err; 6714+ } 6715+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) 6716+ { 6717+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, 6718+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID); 6719+ goto err; 6720+ } 6721+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; 6722+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL; 6723+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; 6724+ sig.digest = &digest; 6725+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; 6726+ sig.digest->length = m_len; 6727+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); 6728+ } 6729+ 6730+ j = RSA_size(rsa); 6731+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j) 6732+ { 6733+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG); 6734+ goto err; 6735+ } 6736+ 6737+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1) 6738+ { 6739+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1)); 6740+ if (s == NULL) 6741+ { 6742+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 6743+ goto err; 6744+ } 6745+ p = s; 6746+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); 6747+ } 6748+ 6749+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) 6750+ goto err; 6751+ 6752+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); 6753+ 6754+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; 6755+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 6756+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = 6757+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, 6758+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, 6759+ sp->session); 6760+ 6761+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 6762+ { 6763+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech, 6764+ h_pub_key); 6765+ 6766+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 6767+ { 6768+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, 6769+ rv); 6770+ goto err; 6771+ } 6772+ rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, s, i, 6773+ (CK_BYTE_PTR)sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen); 6774+ 6775+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 6776+ { 6777+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv); 6778+ goto err; 6779+ } 6780+ ret = 1; 6781+ } 6782+ 6783+err: 6784+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL)) 6785+ { 6786+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1)); 6787+ OPENSSL_free(s); 6788+ } 6789+ 6790+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 6791+ return (ret); 6792+ } 6793+ 6794+static int hndidx_rsa = -1; 6795+ 6796+#define MAXATTR 1024 6797+ 6798+/* 6799+ * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the 6800+ * PKCS#11 token. 6801+ */ 6802+/* ARGSUSED */ 6803+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *privkey_file, 6804+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) 6805+ { 6806+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 6807+ FILE *privkey; 6808+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 6809+ RSA *rsa = NULL; 6810+ PK11_SESSION *sp; 6811+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ 6812+ CK_RV rv; 6813+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE; 6814+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; 6815+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; 6816+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; 6817+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ 6818+ 6819+ /* we look for private keys only */ 6820+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = 6821+ { 6822+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)}, 6823+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)}, 6824+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} 6825+ }; 6826+ 6827+ /* 6828+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA 6829+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we 6830+ * never ask for private components. 6831+ */ 6832+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = 6833+ { 6834+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ 6835+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ 6836+ }; 6837+ 6838+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) 6839+ return (NULL); 6840+ 6841+ /* 6842+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now. 6843+ */ 6844+ if (strstr(privkey_file, "pkcs11:") == privkey_file) 6845+ { 6846+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(privkey_file, ":") + 1; 6847+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); 6848+ 6849+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, 6850+ CK_TRUE) == 0) 6851+ goto err; 6852+ 6853+ /* see find_lock array definition 6854+ for more info on object locking */ 6855+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 6856+ 6857+ /* 6858+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure 6859+ * if we can't find it. 6860+ */ 6861+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, 6862+ &ks_key) == 0) 6863+ { 6864+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 6865+ goto err; 6866+ } 6867+ 6868+ if (hndidx_rsa == -1) 6869+ hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, 6870+ "pkcs11 RSA HSM key handle", 6871+ NULL, NULL, NULL); 6872+ 6873+ /* 6874+ * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm 6875+ * according to the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer 6876+ * as NULL, and non-NULL RSA private pointer. However, 6877+ * it is easier just to recreate everything. We expect 6878+ * the keys to be loaded once and used many times. We 6879+ * do not check the return value because even in case 6880+ * of failure the sp structure will have both key 6881+ * pointer and object handle cleaned and 6882+ * pk11_destroy_object() reports the failure to the 6883+ * OpenSSL error message buffer. 6884+ */ 6885+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, FALSE); 6886+ 6887+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key; 6888+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ 6889+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_TRUE; 6890+ 6891+ /* 6892+ * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not 6893+ * use it now for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for 6894+ * consistency reasons. 6895+ */ 6896+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) 6897+ { 6898+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 6899+ goto err; 6900+ } 6901+ 6902+ /* 6903+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure, 6904+ * everything else is 0 or NULL. 6905+ */ 6906+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER | RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY; 6907+ RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, (void *) ks_key); 6908+ 6909+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, 6910+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) 6911+ { 6912+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 6913+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, 6914+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); 6915+ goto err; 6916+ } 6917+ 6918+ /* 6919+ * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we 6920+ * must take care of handle management ourselves. 6921+ */ 6922+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, TRUE, rollback, err); 6923+ 6924+ /* 6925+ * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export 6926+ * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp). 6927+ */ 6928+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); 6929+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); 6930+ /* 6931+ * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as 6932+ * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key 6933+ * in the keystore. 6934+ */ 6935+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], 6936+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); 6937+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], 6938+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); 6939+ 6940+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 6941+ 6942+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) 6943+ goto err; 6944+ 6945+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) 6946+ goto err; 6947+ } 6948+ else if ((privkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) 6949+ { 6950+ pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); 6951+ (void) fclose(privkey); 6952+ if (pkey != NULL) 6953+ { 6954+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); 6955+ if (rsa != NULL) 6956+ { 6957+ /* 6958+ * This will always destroy the RSA 6959+ * object since we have a new RSA 6960+ * structure here. 6961+ */ 6962+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); 6963+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE; 6964+ 6965+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = 6966+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, 6967+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, 6968+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, 6969+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, 6970+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session); 6971+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 6972+ goto err; 6973+ } 6974+ else 6975+ goto err; 6976+ } 6977+ } 6978+ 6979+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 6980+ return (pkey); 6981+err: 6982+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 6983+ if (rsa != NULL) 6984+ RSA_free(rsa); 6985+ if (pkey != NULL) 6986+ { 6987+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 6988+ pkey = NULL; 6989+ } 6990+ rollback = rollback; 6991+ return (pkey); 6992+ } 6993+ 6994+/* 6995+ * Load RSA public key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the 6996+ * PKCS#11 token. 6997+ */ 6998+/* ARGSUSED */ 6999+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, 7000+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) 7001+ { 7002+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 7003+ FILE *pubkey; 7004+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 7005+ RSA *rsa = NULL; 7006+ PK11_SESSION *sp; 7007+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ 7008+ CK_RV rv; 7009+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE; 7010+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; 7011+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; 7012+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ 7013+ 7014+ /* we look for public keys only */ 7015+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = 7016+ { 7017+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)}, 7018+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)}, 7019+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} 7020+ }; 7021+ 7022+ /* 7023+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA 7024+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. 7025+ */ 7026+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = 7027+ { 7028+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ 7029+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ 7030+ }; 7031+ 7032+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) 7033+ return (NULL); 7034+ 7035+ /* 7036+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now. 7037+ */ 7038+ if (strstr(pubkey_file, "pkcs11:") == pubkey_file) 7039+ { 7040+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(pubkey_file, ":") + 1; 7041+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); 7042+ 7043+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, 7044+ CK_FALSE) == 0) 7045+ goto err; 7046+ 7047+ /* see find_lock array definition 7048+ for more info on object locking */ 7049+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 7050+ 7051+ /* 7052+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure 7053+ * if we can't find it. 7054+ */ 7055+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, 7056+ &ks_key) == 0) 7057+ { 7058+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 7059+ goto err; 7060+ } 7061+ 7062+ /* 7063+ * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA 7064+ * structure. No cache hit is possible. 7065+ */ 7066+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, FALSE); 7067+ 7068+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key; 7069+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ 7070+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_TRUE; 7071+ 7072+ /* 7073+ * Cache the RSA public structure pointer. 7074+ */ 7075+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) 7076+ { 7077+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 7078+ goto err; 7079+ } 7080+ 7081+ /* 7082+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure, 7083+ * everything else is 0 or NULL. 7084+ */ 7085+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER; 7086+ 7087+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, 7088+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) 7089+ { 7090+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 7091+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, 7092+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); 7093+ goto err; 7094+ } 7095+ 7096+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); 7097+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); 7098+ 7099+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 7100+ 7101+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) 7102+ goto err; 7103+ 7104+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) 7105+ goto err; 7106+ 7107+ /* 7108+ * Create a session object from it so that when calling 7109+ * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The 7110+ * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA 7111+ * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for 7112+ * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears 7113+ * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if 7114+ * we always have a session key. Note that this is different 7115+ * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that 7116+ * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore 7117+ * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case. 7118+ */ 7119+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = 7120+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, 7121+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, 7122+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session); 7123+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 7124+ goto err; 7125+ } 7126+ else if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) 7127+ { 7128+ pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); 7129+ (void) fclose(pubkey); 7130+ if (pkey != NULL) 7131+ { 7132+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); 7133+ if (rsa != NULL) 7134+ { 7135+ /* 7136+ * This will always destroy the RSA 7137+ * object since we have a new RSA 7138+ * structure here. 7139+ */ 7140+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); 7141+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE; 7142+ 7143+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = 7144+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, 7145+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, 7146+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session); 7147+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 7148+ goto err; 7149+ } 7150+ else 7151+ goto err; 7152+ } 7153+ } 7154+ 7155+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 7156+ return (pkey); 7157+err: 7158+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 7159+ if (rsa != NULL) 7160+ RSA_free(rsa); 7161+ if (pkey != NULL) 7162+ { 7163+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 7164+ pkey = NULL; 7165+ } 7166+ return (pkey); 7167+ } 7168+ 7169+/* 7170+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure. 7171+ * The *rsa_n_num and *rsa_e_num pointers are non-NULL for RSA public keys. 7172+ */ 7173+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, 7174+ RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, 7175+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) 7176+ { 7177+ CK_RV rv; 7178+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 7179+ CK_ULONG found; 7180+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; 7181+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; 7182+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8; 7183+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; 7184+ 7185+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = 7186+ { 7187+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, 7188+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, 7189+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, 7190+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, 7191+ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, 7192+ {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, 7193+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, 7194+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0} 7195+ }; 7196+ 7197+ int i; 7198+ 7199+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; 7200+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; 7201+ 7202+ a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); 7203+ a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( 7204+ (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen); 7205+ if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL) 7206+ { 7207+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 7208+ goto malloc_err; 7209+ } 7210+ 7211+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[6].pValue); 7212+ 7213+ a_key_template[7].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e); 7214+ a_key_template[7].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( 7215+ (size_t)a_key_template[7].ulValueLen); 7216+ if (a_key_template[7].pValue == NULL) 7217+ { 7218+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 7219+ goto malloc_err; 7220+ } 7221+ 7222+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[7].pValue); 7223+ 7224+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ 7225+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 7226+ 7227+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, 7228+ ul_key_attr_count); 7229+ 7230+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 7231+ { 7232+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 7233+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); 7234+ goto err; 7235+ } 7236+ 7237+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); 7238+ 7239+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 7240+ { 7241+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); 7242+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 7243+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); 7244+ goto err; 7245+ } 7246+ 7247+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); 7248+ 7249+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 7250+ { 7251+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 7252+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); 7253+ goto err; 7254+ } 7255+ 7256+ if (found == 0) 7257+ { 7258+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, 7259+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); 7260+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 7261+ { 7262+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 7263+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); 7264+ goto err; 7265+ } 7266+ } 7267+ 7268+ if (rsa_n_num != NULL) 7269+ if ((*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL) 7270+ { 7271+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 7272+ rollback = TRUE; 7273+ goto err; 7274+ } 7275+ if (rsa_e_num != NULL) 7276+ if ((*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL) 7277+ { 7278+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 7279+ BN_free(*rsa_n_num); 7280+ *rsa_n_num = NULL; 7281+ rollback = TRUE; 7282+ goto err; 7283+ } 7284+ 7285+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ 7286+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err); 7287+ if (key_ptr != NULL) 7288+ *key_ptr = rsa; 7289+ 7290+err: 7291+ if (rollback) 7292+ { 7293+ /* 7294+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() 7295+ * since we are doing rollback. 7296+ */ 7297+ if (found == 0) 7298+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); 7299+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 7300+ } 7301+ 7302+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 7303+ 7304+malloc_err: 7305+ for (i = 6; i <= 7; i++) 7306+ { 7307+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) 7308+ { 7309+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); 7310+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; 7311+ } 7312+ } 7313+ 7314+ return (h_key); 7315+ } 7316+ 7317+/* 7318+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure. 7319+ * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys. 7320+ */ 7321+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE 7322+pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, 7323+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) 7324+ { 7325+ CK_RV rv; 7326+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 7327+ int i; 7328+ CK_ULONG found; 7329+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; 7330+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; 7331+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14; 7332+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; 7333+ 7334+ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */ 7335+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = 7336+ { 7337+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, 7338+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, 7339+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, 7340+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, 7341+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, 7342+ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, 7343+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, 7344+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, 7345+ {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, 7346+ {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, 7347+ {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, 7348+ {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, 7349+ {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, 7350+ {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, 7351+ }; 7352+ 7353+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0) { 7354+ h_key = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa); 7355+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 7356+ goto set; 7357+ } 7358+ 7359+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; 7360+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; 7361+ 7362+ /* Put the private key components into the template */ 7363+ if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue, 7364+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || 7365+ init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue, 7366+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 || 7367+ init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue, 7368+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 || 7369+ init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue, 7370+ &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 || 7371+ init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue, 7372+ &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 || 7373+ init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue, 7374+ &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 || 7375+ init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue, 7376+ &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 || 7377+ init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue, 7378+ &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0) 7379+ { 7380+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 7381+ goto malloc_err; 7382+ } 7383+ 7384+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ 7385+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 7386+ 7387+ /* 7388+ * We are getting the private key but the private 'd' 7389+ * component is NULL. That means this is key by reference RSA 7390+ * key. In that case, we can use only public components for 7391+ * searching for the private key handle. 7392+ */ 7393+ if (rsa->d == NULL) 7394+ { 7395+ ul_key_attr_count = 8; 7396+ /* 7397+ * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing 7398+ * session keys. 7399+ */ 7400+ a_key_template[2].pValue = &mytrue; 7401+ } 7402+ 7403+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, 7404+ ul_key_attr_count); 7405+ 7406+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 7407+ { 7408+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 7409+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); 7410+ goto err; 7411+ } 7412+ 7413+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); 7414+ 7415+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 7416+ { 7417+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); 7418+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 7419+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); 7420+ goto err; 7421+ } 7422+ 7423+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); 7424+ 7425+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 7426+ { 7427+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 7428+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); 7429+ goto err; 7430+ } 7431+ 7432+ if (found == 0) 7433+ { 7434+ /* 7435+ * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components 7436+ * only so we tried to find the private key in the 7437+ * keystore. If it was really a token key we have a 7438+ * problem. Note that for other key types we just 7439+ * create a new session key using the private 7440+ * components from the RSA structure. 7441+ */ 7442+ if (rsa->d == NULL) 7443+ { 7444+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 7445+ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND); 7446+ goto err; 7447+ } 7448+ 7449+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, 7450+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); 7451+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 7452+ { 7453+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 7454+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); 7455+ goto err; 7456+ } 7457+ } 7458+ 7459+set: 7460+ if (rsa_d_num != NULL) 7461+ { 7462+ /* 7463+ * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never 7464+ * extract private components from the keystore. In 7465+ * that case 'd' was set to NULL and we expect the 7466+ * application to properly cope with that. It is 7467+ * documented in openssl(5). In general, if keys by 7468+ * reference are used we expect it to be used 7469+ * exclusively using the high level API and then there 7470+ * is no problem. If the application expects the 7471+ * private components to be read from the keystore 7472+ * then that is not a supported way of usage. 7473+ */ 7474+ if (rsa->d != NULL && (*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL) 7475+ { 7476+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 7477+ rollback = TRUE; 7478+ goto err; 7479+ } 7480+ else 7481+ *rsa_d_num = NULL; 7482+ } 7483+ 7484+ /* 7485+ * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well 7486+ * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache 7487+ * 'n'/'e' components as well. 7488+ */ 7489+ *rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n); 7490+ *rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e); 7491+ 7492+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ 7493+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err); 7494+ if (key_ptr != NULL) 7495+ *key_ptr = rsa; 7496+ 7497+err: 7498+ if (rollback) 7499+ { 7500+ /* 7501+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() 7502+ * since we are doing rollback. 7503+ */ 7504+ if (found == 0 && 7505+ (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) == 0) 7506+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); 7507+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 7508+ } 7509+ 7510+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 7511+ 7512+malloc_err: 7513+ /* 7514+ * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components. 7515+ * They need to be freed upon exit or error. 7516+ */ 7517+ for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++) 7518+ { 7519+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) 7520+ { 7521+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0, 7522+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen); 7523+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); 7524+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; 7525+ } 7526+ } 7527+ 7528+ return (h_key); 7529+ } 7530+ 7531+/* 7532+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle 7533+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. 7534+ */ 7535+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) 7536+ { 7537+ /* 7538+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the 7539+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA 7540+ * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values 7541+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. 7542+ * 7543+ * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public 7544+ * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we 7545+ * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public 7546+ * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for 7547+ * both data signing and verifying. 7548+ */ 7549+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) || 7550+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) || 7551+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0) || 7552+ (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) 7553+ { 7554+ /* 7555+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of 7556+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer 7557+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() 7558+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. 7559+ */ 7560+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE); 7561+ return (0); 7562+ } 7563+ return (1); 7564+ } 7565+ 7566+/* 7567+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle 7568+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. 7569+ */ 7570+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) 7571+ { 7572+ /* 7573+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making 7574+ * the check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent 7575+ * of RSA key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure 7576+ * should be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the 7577+ * public component since with the keys by reference 7578+ * mechanism, private components are not in the RSA 7579+ * structure. Also, see check_new_rsa_key_pub() about why we 7580+ * compare the handle as well. 7581+ */ 7582+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) || 7583+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, rsa->n) != 0) || 7584+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, rsa->e) != 0) || 7585+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num == NULL) || 7586+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num == NULL) || 7587+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) 7588+ { 7589+ /* 7590+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of 7591+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer 7592+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() 7593+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. 7594+ */ 7595+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE); 7596+ return (0); 7597+ } 7598+ return (1); 7599+ } 7600+#endif 7601+ 7602+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 7603+/* The DSA function implementation */ 7604+/* ARGSUSED */ 7605+static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa) 7606+ { 7607+ return (1); 7608+ } 7609+ 7610+/* ARGSUSED */ 7611+static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa) 7612+ { 7613+ return (1); 7614+ } 7615+ 7616+ 7617+static DSA_SIG * 7618+pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa) 7619+ { 7620+ BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL; 7621+ int i; 7622+ DSA_SIG *dsa_sig = NULL; 7623+ 7624+ CK_RV rv; 7625+ CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0}; 7626+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa; 7627+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; 7628+ 7629+ /* 7630+ * The signature is the concatenation of r and s, 7631+ * each is 20 bytes long 7632+ */ 7633+ unsigned char sigret[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN]; 7634+ unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN; 7635+ unsigned int siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN / 2; 7636+ 7637+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; 7638+ 7639+ if ((dsa->p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL) || (dsa->g == NULL)) 7640+ { 7641+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT); 7642+ goto ret; 7643+ } 7644+ 7645+ i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */ 7646+ if (dlen > i) 7647+ { 7648+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); 7649+ goto ret; 7650+ } 7651+ 7652+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL) 7653+ goto ret; 7654+ 7655+ (void) check_new_dsa_key_priv(sp, dsa); 7656+ 7657+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key; 7658+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 7659+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = 7660+ pk11_get_private_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, 7661+ &sp->opdata_dsa_priv, 7662+ &sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, sp->session); 7663+ 7664+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 7665+ { 7666+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key); 7667+ 7668+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 7669+ { 7670+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); 7671+ goto ret; 7672+ } 7673+ 7674+ (void) memset(sigret, 0, siglen); 7675+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, 7676+ (unsigned char*) dgst, dlen, sigret, 7677+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &siglen); 7678+ 7679+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 7680+ { 7681+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv); 7682+ goto ret; 7683+ } 7684+ } 7685+ 7686+ 7687+ if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL) 7688+ { 7689+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 7690+ goto ret; 7691+ } 7692+ 7693+ if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL) 7694+ { 7695+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 7696+ goto ret; 7697+ } 7698+ 7699+ if ((dsa_sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) 7700+ { 7701+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 7702+ goto ret; 7703+ } 7704+ 7705+ if (BN_bin2bn(sigret, siglen2, r) == NULL || 7706+ BN_bin2bn(&sigret[siglen2], siglen2, s) == NULL) 7707+ { 7708+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 7709+ goto ret; 7710+ } 7711+ 7712+ dsa_sig->r = r; 7713+ dsa_sig->s = s; 7714+ 7715+ret: 7716+ if (dsa_sig == NULL) 7717+ { 7718+ if (r != NULL) 7719+ BN_free(r); 7720+ if (s != NULL) 7721+ BN_free(s); 7722+ } 7723+ 7724+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA); 7725+ return (dsa_sig); 7726+ } 7727+ 7728+static int 7729+pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA_SIG *sig, 7730+ DSA *dsa) 7731+ { 7732+ int i; 7733+ CK_RV rv; 7734+ int retval = 0; 7735+ CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0}; 7736+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa; 7737+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key; 7738+ 7739+ unsigned char sigbuf[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN]; 7740+ unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN; 7741+ unsigned long siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2; 7742+ 7743+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; 7744+ 7745+ if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0) 7746+ { 7747+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, 7748+ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R); 7749+ goto ret; 7750+ } 7751+ 7752+ if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0) 7753+ { 7754+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, 7755+ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S); 7756+ goto ret; 7757+ } 7758+ 7759+ i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */ 7760+ 7761+ if (dlen > i) 7762+ { 7763+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, 7764+ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); 7765+ goto ret; 7766+ } 7767+ 7768+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL) 7769+ goto ret; 7770+ 7771+ (void) check_new_dsa_key_pub(sp, dsa); 7772+ 7773+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key; 7774+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 7775+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = 7776+ pk11_get_public_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, &sp->opdata_dsa_pub, 7777+ &sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, sp->session); 7778+ 7779+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 7780+ { 7781+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech, 7782+ h_pub_key); 7783+ 7784+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 7785+ { 7786+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, 7787+ rv); 7788+ goto ret; 7789+ } 7790+ 7791+ /* 7792+ * The representation of each of the two big numbers could 7793+ * be shorter than DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2 bytes so we need 7794+ * to act accordingly and shift if necessary. 7795+ */ 7796+ (void) memset(sigbuf, 0, siglen); 7797+ BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigbuf + siglen2 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r)); 7798+ BN_bn2bin(sig->s, &sigbuf[siglen2] + siglen2 - 7799+ BN_num_bytes(sig->s)); 7800+ 7801+ rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, 7802+ (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen); 7803+ 7804+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 7805+ { 7806+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv); 7807+ goto ret; 7808+ } 7809+ } 7810+ 7811+ retval = 1; 7812+ret: 7813+ 7814+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA); 7815+ return (retval); 7816+ } 7817+ 7818+ 7819+/* 7820+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given dsa structure. 7821+ * The *dsa_pub_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA public keys. 7822+ */ 7823+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, 7824+ DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) 7825+ { 7826+ CK_RV rv; 7827+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; 7828+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 7829+ CK_ULONG found; 7830+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA; 7831+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8; 7832+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; 7833+ int i; 7834+ 7835+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = 7836+ { 7837+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, 7838+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, 7839+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, 7840+ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, 7841+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */ 7842+ {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */ 7843+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */ 7844+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* pub_key - y */ 7845+ }; 7846+ 7847+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; 7848+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; 7849+ 7850+ if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[4].pValue, 7851+ &a_key_template[4].ulValueLen) == 0 || 7852+ init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[5].pValue, 7853+ &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 || 7854+ init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[6].pValue, 7855+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || 7856+ init_template_value(dsa->pub_key, &a_key_template[7].pValue, 7857+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0) 7858+ { 7859+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 7860+ goto malloc_err; 7861+ } 7862+ 7863+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ 7864+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); 7865+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, 7866+ ul_key_attr_count); 7867+ 7868+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 7869+ { 7870+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, 7871+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); 7872+ goto err; 7873+ } 7874+ 7875+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); 7876+ 7877+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 7878+ { 7879+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); 7880+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, 7881+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); 7882+ goto err; 7883+ } 7884+ 7885+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); 7886+ 7887+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 7888+ { 7889+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, 7890+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); 7891+ goto err; 7892+ } 7893+ 7894+ if (found == 0) 7895+ { 7896+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, 7897+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); 7898+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 7899+ { 7900+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, 7901+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); 7902+ goto err; 7903+ } 7904+ } 7905+ 7906+ if (dsa_pub_num != NULL) 7907+ if ((*dsa_pub_num = BN_dup(dsa->pub_key)) == NULL) 7908+ { 7909+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 7910+ rollback = TRUE; 7911+ goto err; 7912+ } 7913+ 7914+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ 7915+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err); 7916+ if (key_ptr != NULL) 7917+ *key_ptr = dsa; 7918+ 7919+err: 7920+ if (rollback) 7921+ { 7922+ /* 7923+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() 7924+ * since we are doing rollback. 7925+ */ 7926+ if (found == 0) 7927+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); 7928+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 7929+ } 7930+ 7931+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); 7932+ 7933+malloc_err: 7934+ for (i = 4; i <= 7; i++) 7935+ { 7936+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) 7937+ { 7938+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); 7939+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; 7940+ } 7941+ } 7942+ 7943+ return (h_key); 7944+ } 7945+ 7946+/* 7947+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given dsa structure 7948+ * The *dsa_priv_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA private keys. 7949+ */ 7950+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, 7951+ DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) 7952+ { 7953+ CK_RV rv; 7954+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 7955+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; 7956+ int i; 7957+ CK_ULONG found; 7958+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA; 7959+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 9; 7960+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; 7961+ 7962+ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */ 7963+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = 7964+ { 7965+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, 7966+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, 7967+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, 7968+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, 7969+ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, 7970+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */ 7971+ {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */ 7972+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */ 7973+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* priv_key - x */ 7974+ }; 7975+ 7976+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; 7977+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; 7978+ 7979+ /* Put the private key components into the template */ 7980+ if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[5].pValue, 7981+ &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 || 7982+ init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[6].pValue, 7983+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || 7984+ init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[7].pValue, 7985+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 || 7986+ init_template_value(dsa->priv_key, &a_key_template[8].pValue, 7987+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0) 7988+ { 7989+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 7990+ goto malloc_err; 7991+ } 7992+ 7993+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ 7994+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); 7995+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, 7996+ ul_key_attr_count); 7997+ 7998+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 7999+ { 8000+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, 8001+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); 8002+ goto err; 8003+ } 8004+ 8005+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); 8006+ 8007+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8008+ { 8009+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); 8010+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, 8011+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); 8012+ goto err; 8013+ } 8014+ 8015+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); 8016+ 8017+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8018+ { 8019+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, 8020+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); 8021+ goto err; 8022+ } 8023+ 8024+ if (found == 0) 8025+ { 8026+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, 8027+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); 8028+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8029+ { 8030+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, 8031+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); 8032+ goto err; 8033+ } 8034+ } 8035+ 8036+ if (dsa_priv_num != NULL) 8037+ if ((*dsa_priv_num = BN_dup(dsa->priv_key)) == NULL) 8038+ { 8039+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 8040+ rollback = TRUE; 8041+ goto err; 8042+ } 8043+ 8044+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ 8045+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err); 8046+ if (key_ptr != NULL) 8047+ *key_ptr = dsa; 8048+ 8049+err: 8050+ if (rollback) 8051+ { 8052+ /* 8053+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() 8054+ * since we are doing rollback. 8055+ */ 8056+ if (found == 0) 8057+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); 8058+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 8059+ } 8060+ 8061+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); 8062+ 8063+malloc_err: 8064+ /* 8065+ * 5 to 8 entries in the key template are key components. 8066+ * They need to be freed apon exit or error. 8067+ */ 8068+ for (i = 5; i <= 8; i++) 8069+ { 8070+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) 8071+ { 8072+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0, 8073+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen); 8074+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); 8075+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; 8076+ } 8077+ } 8078+ 8079+ return (h_key); 8080+ } 8081+ 8082+/* 8083+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle 8084+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. 8085+ */ 8086+static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa) 8087+ { 8088+ /* 8089+ * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the 8090+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public key component of DSA 8091+ * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value 8092+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. 8093+ */ 8094+ if ((sp->opdata_dsa_pub != dsa) || 8095+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, dsa->pub_key) != 0)) 8096+ { 8097+ /* 8098+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of 8099+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer 8100+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() 8101+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. 8102+ */ 8103+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE); 8104+ return (0); 8105+ } 8106+ return (1); 8107+ } 8108+ 8109+/* 8110+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle 8111+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. 8112+ */ 8113+static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa) 8114+ { 8115+ /* 8116+ * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the 8117+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only private key component of DSA 8118+ * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value 8119+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. 8120+ */ 8121+ if ((sp->opdata_dsa_priv != dsa) || 8122+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, dsa->priv_key) != 0)) 8123+ { 8124+ /* 8125+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of 8126+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer 8127+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() 8128+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. 8129+ */ 8130+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE); 8131+ return (0); 8132+ } 8133+ return (1); 8134+ } 8135+#endif 8136+ 8137+ 8138+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 8139+/* The DH function implementation */ 8140+/* ARGSUSED */ 8141+static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh) 8142+ { 8143+ return (1); 8144+ } 8145+ 8146+/* ARGSUSED */ 8147+static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh) 8148+ { 8149+ return (1); 8150+ } 8151+ 8152+/* 8153+ * Generate DH key-pair. 8154+ * 8155+ * Warning: Unlike OpenSSL's DH_generate_key(3) we ignore dh->priv_key 8156+ * and override it even if it is set. OpenSSL does not touch dh->priv_key 8157+ * if set and just computes dh->pub_key. It looks like PKCS#11 standard 8158+ * is not capable of providing this functionality. This could be a problem 8159+ * for applications relying on OpenSSL's semantics. 8160+ */ 8161+static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh) 8162+ { 8163+ CK_ULONG i; 8164+ CK_RV rv, rv1; 8165+ int reuse_mem_len = 0, ret = 0; 8166+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; 8167+ CK_BYTE_PTR reuse_mem; 8168+ 8169+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0}; 8170+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 8171+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 8172+ 8173+ CK_ULONG ul_pub_key_attr_count = 3; 8174+ CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_template[] = 8175+ { 8176+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, 8177+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, 8178+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0} 8179+ }; 8180+ 8181+ CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3; 8182+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] = 8183+ { 8184+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, 8185+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, 8186+ {CKA_DERIVE, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)} 8187+ }; 8188+ 8189+ CK_ULONG pub_key_attr_result_count = 1; 8190+ CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_result[] = 8191+ { 8192+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} 8193+ }; 8194+ 8195+ CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1; 8196+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] = 8197+ { 8198+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} 8199+ }; 8200+ 8201+ pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p); 8202+ if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > 0) 8203+ { 8204+ /* 8205+ * We must not increase ulValueLen by DH_BUF_RESERVE since that 8206+ * could cause the same rounding problem. See definition of 8207+ * DH_BUF_RESERVE above. 8208+ */ 8209+ pub_key_template[1].pValue = 8210+ OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + 8211+ DH_BUF_RESERVE); 8212+ if (pub_key_template[1].pValue == NULL) 8213+ { 8214+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 8215+ goto err; 8216+ } 8217+ 8218+ i = BN_bn2bin(dh->p, pub_key_template[1].pValue); 8219+ } 8220+ else 8221+ goto err; 8222+ 8223+ pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g); 8224+ if (pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen > 0) 8225+ { 8226+ pub_key_template[2].pValue = 8227+ OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + 8228+ DH_BUF_RESERVE); 8229+ if (pub_key_template[2].pValue == NULL) 8230+ { 8231+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 8232+ goto err; 8233+ } 8234+ 8235+ i = BN_bn2bin(dh->g, pub_key_template[2].pValue); 8236+ } 8237+ else 8238+ goto err; 8239+ 8240+ /* 8241+ * Note: we are only using PK11_SESSION structure for getting 8242+ * a session handle. The objects created in this function are 8243+ * destroyed before return and thus not cached. 8244+ */ 8245+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL) 8246+ goto err; 8247+ 8248+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateKeyPair(sp->session, 8249+ &mechanism, 8250+ pub_key_template, 8251+ ul_pub_key_attr_count, 8252+ priv_key_template, 8253+ ul_priv_key_attr_count, 8254+ &h_pub_key, 8255+ &h_priv_key); 8256+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8257+ { 8258+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GEN_KEY, rv); 8259+ goto err; 8260+ } 8261+ 8262+ /* 8263+ * Reuse the larger memory allocated. We know the larger memory 8264+ * should be sufficient for reuse. 8265+ */ 8266+ if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen) 8267+ { 8268+ reuse_mem = pub_key_template[1].pValue; 8269+ reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE; 8270+ } 8271+ else 8272+ { 8273+ reuse_mem = pub_key_template[2].pValue; 8274+ reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE; 8275+ } 8276+ 8277+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key, 8278+ pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count); 8279+ rv1 = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key, 8280+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); 8281+ 8282+ if (rv != CKR_OK || rv1 != CKR_OK) 8283+ { 8284+ rv = (rv != CKR_OK) ? rv : rv1; 8285+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 8286+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); 8287+ goto err; 8288+ } 8289+ 8290+ if (((CK_LONG) pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0 || 8291+ ((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0) 8292+ { 8293+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE); 8294+ goto err; 8295+ } 8296+ 8297+ /* Reuse the memory allocated */ 8298+ pub_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem; 8299+ pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len; 8300+ 8301+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key, 8302+ pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count); 8303+ 8304+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8305+ { 8306+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 8307+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); 8308+ goto err; 8309+ } 8310+ 8311+ if (pub_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) 8312+ { 8313+ if (dh->pub_key == NULL) 8314+ if ((dh->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL) 8315+ { 8316+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 8317+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 8318+ goto err; 8319+ } 8320+ dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(pub_key_result[0].pValue, 8321+ pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->pub_key); 8322+ if (dh->pub_key == NULL) 8323+ { 8324+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 8325+ goto err; 8326+ } 8327+ } 8328+ 8329+ /* Reuse the memory allocated */ 8330+ priv_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem; 8331+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len; 8332+ 8333+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key, 8334+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); 8335+ 8336+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8337+ { 8338+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 8339+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); 8340+ goto err; 8341+ } 8342+ 8343+ if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) 8344+ { 8345+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL) 8346+ if ((dh->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL) 8347+ { 8348+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 8349+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 8350+ goto err; 8351+ } 8352+ dh->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(priv_key_result[0].pValue, 8353+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->priv_key); 8354+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL) 8355+ { 8356+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 8357+ goto err; 8358+ } 8359+ } 8360+ 8361+ ret = 1; 8362+ 8363+err: 8364+ 8365+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 8366+ { 8367+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_pub_key); 8368+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8369+ { 8370+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 8371+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); 8372+ } 8373+ } 8374+ 8375+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 8376+ { 8377+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_priv_key); 8378+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8379+ { 8380+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 8381+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); 8382+ } 8383+ } 8384+ 8385+ for (i = 1; i <= 2; i++) 8386+ { 8387+ if (pub_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) 8388+ { 8389+ OPENSSL_free(pub_key_template[i].pValue); 8390+ pub_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; 8391+ } 8392+ } 8393+ 8394+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH); 8395+ return (ret); 8396+ } 8397+ 8398+static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, 8399+ DH *dh) 8400+ { 8401+ unsigned int i; 8402+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, NULL_PTR, 0}; 8403+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_SECRET_KEY; 8404+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; 8405+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_derived_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 8406+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 8407+ 8408+ CK_ULONG seclen; 8409+ CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3; 8410+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] = 8411+ { 8412+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_class)}, 8413+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)}, 8414+ {CKA_VALUE_LEN, &seclen, sizeof (seclen)}, 8415+ }; 8416+ 8417+ CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1; 8418+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] = 8419+ { 8420+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} 8421+ }; 8422+ 8423+ CK_RV rv; 8424+ int ret = -1; 8425+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; 8426+ 8427+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL) 8428+ goto err; 8429+ 8430+ priv_key_template[0].pValue = &key_class; 8431+ priv_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; 8432+ seclen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p); 8433+ 8434+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL) 8435+ goto err; 8436+ 8437+ mechanism.ulParameterLen = BN_num_bytes(pub_key); 8438+ mechanism.pParameter = OPENSSL_malloc(mechanism.ulParameterLen); 8439+ if (mechanism.pParameter == NULL) 8440+ { 8441+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 8442+ goto err; 8443+ } 8444+ BN_bn2bin(pub_key, mechanism.pParameter); 8445+ 8446+ (void) check_new_dh_key(sp, dh); 8447+ 8448+ h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key; 8449+ if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 8450+ h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key = 8451+ pk11_get_dh_key((DH*) dh, &sp->opdata_dh, 8452+ &sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, sp->session); 8453+ 8454+ if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 8455+ { 8456+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT); 8457+ goto err; 8458+ } 8459+ 8460+ rv = pFuncList->C_DeriveKey(sp->session, 8461+ &mechanism, 8462+ h_key, 8463+ priv_key_template, 8464+ ul_priv_key_attr_count, 8465+ &h_derived_key); 8466+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8467+ { 8468+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, rv); 8469+ goto err; 8470+ } 8471+ 8472+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key, 8473+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); 8474+ 8475+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8476+ { 8477+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, 8478+ rv); 8479+ goto err; 8480+ } 8481+ 8482+ if (((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0) 8483+ { 8484+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE); 8485+ goto err; 8486+ } 8487+ priv_key_result[0].pValue = 8488+ OPENSSL_malloc(priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen); 8489+ if (!priv_key_result[0].pValue) 8490+ { 8491+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 8492+ goto err; 8493+ } 8494+ 8495+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key, 8496+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); 8497+ 8498+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8499+ { 8500+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, 8501+ rv); 8502+ goto err; 8503+ } 8504+ 8505+ /* 8506+ * OpenSSL allocates the output buffer 'key' which is the same 8507+ * length of the public key. It is long enough for the derived key 8508+ */ 8509+ if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) 8510+ { 8511+ /* 8512+ * CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE mechanism is not supposed to strip 8513+ * leading zeros from a computed shared secret. However, 8514+ * OpenSSL always did it so we must do the same here. The 8515+ * vagueness of the spec regarding leading zero bytes was 8516+ * finally cleared with TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) saying that leading 8517+ * zeros are stripped before the computed data is used as the 8518+ * pre-master secret. 8519+ */ 8520+ for (i = 0; i < priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen; ++i) 8521+ { 8522+ if (((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue)[i] != 0) 8523+ break; 8524+ } 8525+ 8526+ (void) memcpy(key, ((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue) + i, 8527+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i); 8528+ ret = priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i; 8529+ } 8530+ 8531+err: 8532+ 8533+ if (h_derived_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 8534+ { 8535+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_derived_key); 8536+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8537+ { 8538+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, 8539+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); 8540+ } 8541+ } 8542+ if (priv_key_result[0].pValue) 8543+ { 8544+ OPENSSL_free(priv_key_result[0].pValue); 8545+ priv_key_result[0].pValue = NULL; 8546+ } 8547+ 8548+ if (mechanism.pParameter) 8549+ { 8550+ OPENSSL_free(mechanism.pParameter); 8551+ mechanism.pParameter = NULL; 8552+ } 8553+ 8554+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH); 8555+ return (ret); 8556+ } 8557+ 8558+ 8559+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, 8560+ DH **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dh_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) 8561+ { 8562+ CK_RV rv; 8563+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 8564+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; 8565+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_DH; 8566+ CK_ULONG found; 8567+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; 8568+ int i; 8569+ 8570+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7; 8571+ CK_ATTRIBUTE key_template[] = 8572+ { 8573+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (class)}, 8574+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)}, 8575+ {CKA_DERIVE, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, 8576+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, 8577+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *) NULL, 0}, 8578+ {CKA_BASE, (void *) NULL, 0}, 8579+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *) NULL, 0}, 8580+ }; 8581+ 8582+ key_template[0].pValue = &class; 8583+ key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; 8584+ 8585+ key_template[4].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p); 8586+ key_template[4].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( 8587+ (size_t)key_template[4].ulValueLen); 8588+ if (key_template[4].pValue == NULL) 8589+ { 8590+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 8591+ goto malloc_err; 8592+ } 8593+ 8594+ BN_bn2bin(dh->p, key_template[4].pValue); 8595+ 8596+ key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g); 8597+ key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( 8598+ (size_t)key_template[5].ulValueLen); 8599+ if (key_template[5].pValue == NULL) 8600+ { 8601+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 8602+ goto malloc_err; 8603+ } 8604+ 8605+ BN_bn2bin(dh->g, key_template[5].pValue); 8606+ 8607+ key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->priv_key); 8608+ key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( 8609+ (size_t)key_template[6].ulValueLen); 8610+ if (key_template[6].pValue == NULL) 8611+ { 8612+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 8613+ goto malloc_err; 8614+ } 8615+ 8616+ BN_bn2bin(dh->priv_key, key_template[6].pValue); 8617+ 8618+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ 8619+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); 8620+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_template, 8621+ ul_key_attr_count); 8622+ 8623+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8624+ { 8625+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); 8626+ goto err; 8627+ } 8628+ 8629+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); 8630+ 8631+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8632+ { 8633+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); 8634+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); 8635+ goto err; 8636+ } 8637+ 8638+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); 8639+ 8640+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8641+ { 8642+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, 8643+ rv); 8644+ goto err; 8645+ } 8646+ 8647+ if (found == 0) 8648+ { 8649+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, 8650+ key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); 8651+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8652+ { 8653+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, 8654+ rv); 8655+ goto err; 8656+ } 8657+ } 8658+ 8659+ if (dh_priv_num != NULL) 8660+ if ((*dh_priv_num = BN_dup(dh->priv_key)) == NULL) 8661+ { 8662+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 8663+ rollback = TRUE; 8664+ goto err; 8665+ } 8666+ 8667+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ 8668+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DH, FALSE, rollback, err); 8669+ if (key_ptr != NULL) 8670+ *key_ptr = dh; 8671+ 8672+err: 8673+ if (rollback) 8674+ { 8675+ /* 8676+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() 8677+ * since we are doing rollback. 8678+ */ 8679+ if (found == 0) 8680+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); 8681+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 8682+ } 8683+ 8684+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); 8685+ 8686+malloc_err: 8687+ for (i = 4; i <= 6; i++) 8688+ { 8689+ if (key_template[i].pValue != NULL) 8690+ { 8691+ OPENSSL_free(key_template[i].pValue); 8692+ key_template[i].pValue = NULL; 8693+ } 8694+ } 8695+ 8696+ return (h_key); 8697+ } 8698+ 8699+/* 8700+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle 8701+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. 8702+ * 8703+ * Note: we rely on pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects() to set sp->opdata_dh 8704+ * to CK_INVALID_HANDLE even when it fails to destroy the object. 8705+ */ 8706+static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh) 8707+ { 8708+ /* 8709+ * Provide protection against DH structure reuse by making the 8710+ * check for cache hit stronger. Private key component of DH key 8711+ * is unique so it is sufficient to compare it with value cached 8712+ * in PK11_SESSION structure. 8713+ */ 8714+ if ((sp->opdata_dh != dh) || 8715+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, dh->priv_key) != 0)) 8716+ { 8717+ /* 8718+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of 8719+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer 8720+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() 8721+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. 8722+ */ 8723+ (void) pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, TRUE); 8724+ return (0); 8725+ } 8726+ return (1); 8727+ } 8728+#endif 8729+ 8730+/* 8731+ * Local function to simplify key template population 8732+ * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error 8733+ */ 8734+static int 8735+init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value, 8736+ CK_ULONG *ul_value_len) 8737+ { 8738+ CK_ULONG len = 0; 8739+ 8740+ /* 8741+ * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is 8742+ * easier to check that here than individually in the callers. 8743+ */ 8744+ if (bn != NULL) 8745+ len = BN_num_bytes(bn); 8746+ 8747+ if (bn == NULL || len == 0) 8748+ return (1); 8749+ 8750+ *ul_value_len = len; 8751+ *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len); 8752+ if (*p_value == NULL) 8753+ return (0); 8754+ 8755+ BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value); 8756+ 8757+ return (1); 8758+ } 8759+ 8760+static void 8761+attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn) 8762+ { 8763+ if (attr->ulValueLen > 0) 8764+ *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL); 8765+ } 8766+ 8767+/* 8768+ * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the 8769+ * object or if we find more objects based on the template we got. 8770+ * Assume object store locked. 8771+ * 8772+ * Returns: 8773+ * 1 OK 8774+ * 0 no object or more than 1 object found 8775+ */ 8776+static int 8777+find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, 8778+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey) 8779+ { 8780+ CK_RV rv; 8781+ CK_ULONG objcnt; 8782+ 8783+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK) 8784+ { 8785+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, 8786+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); 8787+ return (0); 8788+ } 8789+ 8790+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt); 8791+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8792+ { 8793+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); 8794+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, 8795+ rv); 8796+ return (0); 8797+ } 8798+ 8799+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); 8800+ 8801+ if (objcnt > 1) 8802+ { 8803+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, 8804+ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND); 8805+ return (0); 8806+ } 8807+ else if (objcnt == 0) 8808+ { 8809+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND); 8810+ return (0); 8811+ } 8812+ return (1); 8813+ } 8814+ 8815+/* from uri stuff */ 8816+ 8817+extern char *pk11_pin; 8818+ 8819+static int pk11_get_pin(void); 8820+ 8821+static int 8822+pk11_get_pin(void) 8823+{ 8824+ char *pin; 8825+ 8826+ /* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */ 8827+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 8828+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); 8829+#else 8830+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 8831+#endif 8832+ pin = getpassphrase("Enter PIN: "); 8833+ if (pin == NULL) 8834+ { 8835+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN); 8836+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 8837+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 8838+#else 8839+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 8840+#endif 8841+ return (0); 8842+ } 8843+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(pin); 8844+ if (pk11_pin == NULL) 8845+ { 8846+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 8847+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 8848+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 8849+#else 8850+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 8851+#endif 8852+ return (0); 8853+ } 8854+ memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin)); 8855+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 8856+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 8857+#else 8858+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 8859+#endif 8860+ return (1); 8861+ } 8862+ 8863+/* 8864+ * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of 8865+ * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from 8866+ * multiple threads. 8867+ * 8868+ * Returns: 8869+ * 1 on success 8870+ * 0 on failure 8871+ */ 8872+static int 8873+pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, 8874+ CK_BBOOL is_private) 8875+ { 8876+ CK_RV rv; 8877+ 8878+#if 0 8879+ /* doesn't work on the AEP Keyper??? */ 8880+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) 8881+ { 8882+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 8883+ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED); 8884+ return (0); 8885+ } 8886+#endif 8887+ 8888+ /* 8889+ * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been 8890+ * even initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we 8891+ * are supposed to always log in if we are going to access 8892+ * private keys. However, we may need to log in even for 8893+ * accessing public keys in case that the CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED 8894+ * flag is set. 8895+ */ 8896+ if (((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) || 8897+ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) && 8898+ (~pubkey_token_flags & CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED)) 8899+ { 8900+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET); 8901+ return (0); 8902+ } 8903+ 8904+ /* 8905+ * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread 8906+ * gets into pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We 8907+ * cannot avoid it since we cannot guard fork() in there with 8908+ * a lock because we could end up in a dead lock in the 8909+ * child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded environment 8910+ * so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to 8911+ * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call 8912+ * fork() held a lock, making future unlocking impossible. We 8913+ * lock right before C_Login(). 8914+ */ 8915+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) || 8916+ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) 8917+ { 8918+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) 8919+ { 8920+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0)) 8921+ { 8922+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 8923+ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED); 8924+ return (0); 8925+ } 8926+ } 8927+ 8928+ /* 8929+ * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from 8930+ * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here. 8931+ * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in 8932+ * the engine. 8933+ * 8934+ * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once. 8935+ * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy. 8936+ */ 8937+ 8938+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 8939+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); 8940+#else 8941+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 8942+#endif 8943+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) 8944+ { 8945+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, 8946+ CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin, 8947+ strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK) 8948+ { 8949+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 8950+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); 8951+ goto err_locked; 8952+ } 8953+ 8954+ *login_done = CK_TRUE; 8955+ 8956+ } 8957+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 8958+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 8959+#else 8960+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 8961+#endif 8962+ } 8963+ else 8964+ { 8965+ /* 8966+ * If token does not require login we take it as the 8967+ * login was done. 8968+ */ 8969+ *login_done = CK_TRUE; 8970+ } 8971+ 8972+ return (1); 8973+ 8974+err_locked: 8975+ if (pk11_pin) { 8976+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); 8977+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); 8978+ } 8979+ pk11_pin = NULL; 8980+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 8981+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 8982+#else 8983+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 8984+#endif 8985+ return (0); 8986+ } 8987+ 8988+/* 8989+ * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the 8990+ * parent. There are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login() 8991+ * but still it is quite different so we need a separate function for 8992+ * this. 8993+ * 8994+ * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is 8995+ * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once. 8996+ * 8997+ * Returns: 8998+ * 1 on success 8999+ * 0 on failure 9000+ */ 9001+int 9002+pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) 9003+ { 9004+ CK_RV rv; 9005+ 9006+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0)) 9007+ return (0); 9008+ 9009+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 9010+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); 9011+#else 9012+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 9013+#endif 9014+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER, 9015+ (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pk11_pin, strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK) 9016+ { 9017+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, 9018+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); 9019+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 9020+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 9021+#else 9022+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 9023+#endif 9024+ return (0); 9025+ } 9026+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 9027+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 9028+#else 9029+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 9030+#endif 9031+ 9032+ return (1); 9033+ } 9034+ 9035+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 9036+char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt) 9037+ { 9038+ static char buf[128]; 9039+ HANDLE h; 9040+ DWORD cc, mode; 9041+ int cnt; 9042+ 9043+ h = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE); 9044+ fputs(prompt, stderr); 9045+ fflush(stderr); 9046+ fflush(stdout); 9047+ FlushConsoleInputBuffer(h); 9048+ GetConsoleMode(h, &mode); 9049+ SetConsoleMode(h, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT); 9050+ 9051+ for (cnt = 0; cnt < sizeof(buf) - 1; cnt++) 9052+ { 9053+ ReadFile(h, buf + cnt, 1, &cc, NULL); 9054+ if (buf[cnt] == '\r') 9055+ break; 9056+ fputc('*', stdout); 9057+ fflush(stderr); 9058+ fflush(stdout); 9059+ } 9060+ 9061+ SetConsoleMode(h, mode); 9062+ buf[cnt] = '\0'; 9063+ fputs("\n", stderr); 9064+ return buf; 9065+ } 9066+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */ 9067+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA */ 9068+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ 9069+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ 9070Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h 9071diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h:1.4 9072--- /dev/null Fri Jan 2 14:59:08 2015 9073+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h Wed Jun 15 21:12:20 2011 9074@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ 9075+/* Redefine all pk11/PK11 external symbols to pk11ca/PK11CA */ 9076+ 9077+#define token_lock pk11ca_token_lock 9078+#define find_lock pk11ca_find_lock 9079+#define active_list pk11ca_active_list 9080+#define pubkey_token_flags pk11ca_pubkey_token_flags 9081+#define pubkey_SLOTID pk11ca_pubkey_SLOTID 9082+#define ERR_pk11_error ERR_pk11ca_error 9083+#define PK11err_add_data PK11CAerr_add_data 9084+#define pk11_get_session pk11ca_get_session 9085+#define pk11_return_session pk11ca_return_session 9086+#define pk11_active_add pk11ca_active_add 9087+#define pk11_active_delete pk11ca_active_delete 9088+#define pk11_active_remove pk11ca_active_remove 9089+#define pk11_free_active_list pk11ca_free_active_list 9090+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_rsa_key_objects 9091+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub pk11ca_destroy_rsa_object_pub 9092+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv pk11ca_destroy_rsa_object_priv 9093+#define pk11_load_privkey pk11ca_load_privkey 9094+#define pk11_load_pubkey pk11ca_load_pubkey 9095+#define PK11_RSA PK11CA_RSA 9096+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_dsa_key_objects 9097+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub pk11ca_destroy_dsa_object_pub 9098+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv pk11ca_destroy_dsa_object_priv 9099+#define PK11_DSA PK11CA_DSA 9100+#define pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_dh_key_objects 9101+#define pk11_destroy_dh_object pk11ca_destroy_dh_object 9102+#define PK11_DH PK11CA_DH 9103+#define pk11_token_relogin pk11ca_token_relogin 9104+#define pFuncList pk11ca_pFuncList 9105+#define pk11_pin pk11ca_pin 9106+#define ENGINE_load_pk11 ENGINE_load_pk11ca 9107Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c 9108diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c:1.8 9109--- /dev/null Fri Jan 2 14:59:08 2015 9110+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c Fri Oct 4 14:05:16 2013 9111@@ -0,0 +1,1775 @@ 9112+/* 9113+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. 9114+ * Use is subject to license terms. 9115+ */ 9116+ 9117+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */ 9118+/* 9119+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for 9120+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). 9121+ * 9122+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by 9123+ * Afchine Madjlessi. 9124+ */ 9125+/* 9126+ * ==================================================================== 9127+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 9128+ * 9129+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 9130+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 9131+ * are met: 9132+ * 9133+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 9134+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 9135+ * 9136+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 9137+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 9138+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 9139+ * distribution. 9140+ * 9141+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 9142+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: 9143+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 9144+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" 9145+ * 9146+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 9147+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 9148+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 9149+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. 9150+ * 9151+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 9152+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 9153+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 9154+ * 9155+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 9156+ * acknowledgment: 9157+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 9158+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" 9159+ * 9160+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 9161+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 9162+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 9163+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 9164+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 9165+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 9166+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 9167+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 9168+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 9169+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 9170+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 9171+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 9172+ * ==================================================================== 9173+ * 9174+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 9175+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 9176+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 9177+ * 9178+ */ 9179+ 9180+/* Modified to keep only RNG and RSA Sign */ 9181+ 9182+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 9183+#error RSA is disabled 9184+#endif 9185+ 9186+#include <stdio.h> 9187+#include <stdlib.h> 9188+#include <string.h> 9189+#include <sys/types.h> 9190+ 9191+#include <openssl/e_os2.h> 9192+#include <openssl/crypto.h> 9193+#include <cryptlib.h> 9194+#include <openssl/engine.h> 9195+#include <openssl/dso.h> 9196+#include <openssl/err.h> 9197+#include <openssl/bn.h> 9198+#include <openssl/md5.h> 9199+#include <openssl/pem.h> 9200+#include <openssl/rsa.h> 9201+#include <openssl/rand.h> 9202+#include <openssl/objects.h> 9203+#include <openssl/x509.h> 9204+ 9205+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 9206+typedef int pid_t; 9207+#define getpid() GetCurrentProcessId() 9208+#define NOPTHREADS 9209+#ifndef NULL_PTR 9210+#define NULL_PTR NULL 9211+#endif 9212+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 9213+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name 9214+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 9215+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name 9216+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ 9217+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) 9218+#else 9219+#include <signal.h> 9220+#include <unistd.h> 9221+#include <dlfcn.h> 9222+#endif 9223+ 9224+/* Debug mutexes */ 9225+/*#undef DEBUG_MUTEX */ 9226+#define DEBUG_MUTEX 9227+ 9228+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 9229+/* for pthread error check on Linuxes */ 9230+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX 9231+#define __USE_UNIX98 9232+#endif 9233+#include <pthread.h> 9234+#endif 9235+ 9236+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW 9237+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 9238+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO 9239+ 9240+/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */ 9241+#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG" 9242+/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */ 9243+/*#undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 9244+ 9245+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 9246+#define OPENSSL_NO_DSA 9247+#endif 9248+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 9249+#define OPENSSL_NO_DH 9250+#endif 9251+ 9252+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 9253+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) 9254+#include "cryptoki.h" 9255+#include "pkcs11.h" 9256+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) 9257+#else 9258+#include "cryptoki.h" 9259+#include "pkcs11.h" 9260+#endif 9261+#include "hw_pk11so.h" 9262+#include "hw_pk11_err.c" 9263+ 9264+/* 9265+ * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(), 9266+ * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the 9267+ * RSA keys by reference feature. 9268+ */ 9269+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 9270+pthread_mutex_t *token_lock; 9271+#endif 9272+ 9273+/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */ 9274+static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX]; 9275+ 9276+/* 9277+ * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when 9278+ * logging into the token. 9279+ */ 9280+CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags; 9281+ 9282+/* 9283+ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for 9284+ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given 9285+ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be 9286+ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already 9287+ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each 9288+ * PK11_SESSION object. 9289+ * 9290+ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the 9291+ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also 9292+ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another 9293+ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in 9294+ * invalid handle returned from the search operation. 9295+ * 9296+ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores. 9297+ * They are also used for active list protection. 9298+ */ 9299+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 9300+pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; 9301+#endif 9302+ 9303+/* 9304+ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one 9305+ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session 9306+ * list) for given algorithm type 9307+ */ 9308+PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; 9309+ 9310+/* 9311+ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available 9312+ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed 9313+ * without losing the secret key objects. 9314+ */ 9315+static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 9316+ 9317+/* ENGINE level stuff */ 9318+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e); 9319+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e); 9320+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e); 9321+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)); 9322+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e); 9323+ 9324+/* RAND stuff */ 9325+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); 9326+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); 9327+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void); 9328+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); 9329+static int pk11_rand_status(void); 9330+ 9331+/* These functions are also used in other files */ 9332+PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype); 9333+void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); 9334+ 9335+/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */ 9336+extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type); 9337+extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type); 9338+ 9339+int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); 9340+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); 9341+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); 9342+ 9343+/* Local helper functions */ 9344+static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void); 9345+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype); 9346+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); 9347+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, 9348+ CK_BBOOL persistent); 9349+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void); 9350+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void); 9351+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name); 9352+ 9353+static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found); 9354+ 9355+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void); 9356+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void); 9357+ 9358+#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type, priv) \ 9359+ { \ 9360+ if (uselock) \ 9361+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ 9362+ if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \ 9363+ { \ 9364+ retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl, \ 9365+ priv ? sp->priv_persistent : sp->pub_persistent); \ 9366+ } \ 9367+ if (uselock) \ 9368+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ 9369+ } 9370+ 9371+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE; 9372+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE; 9373+ 9374+/* 9375+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. 9376+ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine 9377+ */ 9378+#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE 9379+#define PK11_CMD_PIN (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+1) 9380+#define PK11_CMD_SLOT (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+2) 9381+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] = 9382+ { 9383+ { 9384+ PK11_CMD_SO_PATH, 9385+ "SO_PATH", 9386+ "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library", 9387+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING 9388+ }, 9389+ { 9390+ PK11_CMD_PIN, 9391+ "PIN", 9392+ "Specifies the pin code", 9393+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING 9394+ }, 9395+ { 9396+ PK11_CMD_SLOT, 9397+ "SLOT", 9398+ "Specifies the slot (default is auto select)", 9399+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC, 9400+ }, 9401+ {0, NULL, NULL, 0} 9402+ }; 9403+ 9404+ 9405+static RAND_METHOD pk11_random = 9406+ { 9407+ pk11_rand_seed, 9408+ pk11_rand_bytes, 9409+ pk11_rand_cleanup, 9410+ pk11_rand_add, 9411+ pk11_rand_bytes, 9412+ pk11_rand_status 9413+ }; 9414+ 9415+ 9416+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */ 9417+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA 9418+#error "can't load both crypto-accelerator and sign-only PKCS#11 engines" 9419+#endif 9420+static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11"; 9421+static const char *engine_pk11_name = "PKCS #11 engine support (sign only)"; 9422+ 9423+CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL; 9424+static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList"; 9425+ 9426+/* 9427+ * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function 9428+ * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether 9429+ * this is 32 or 64 bit build. 9430+ */ 9431+static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION; 9432+ 9433+/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */ 9434+CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0; 9435+static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0; 9436+static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0; 9437+char *pk11_pin = NULL; 9438+static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; 9439+static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = FALSE; 9440+static int pk11_pid = 0; 9441+ 9442+static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL; 9443+ 9444+/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */ 9445+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void) 9446+ { 9447+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 9448+ int type; 9449+ pthread_mutexattr_t attr; 9450+ 9451+ if (pthread_mutexattr_init(&attr) != 0) 9452+ { 9453+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 100); 9454+ return (0); 9455+ } 9456+ 9457+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX 9458+ if (pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK) != 0) 9459+ { 9460+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 101); 9461+ return (0); 9462+ } 9463+#endif 9464+ 9465+ if ((token_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL) 9466+ goto malloc_err; 9467+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(token_lock, &attr); 9468+ 9469+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); 9470+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL) 9471+ goto malloc_err; 9472+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], &attr); 9473+ 9474+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) 9475+ { 9476+ session_cache[type].lock = 9477+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); 9478+ if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL) 9479+ goto malloc_err; 9480+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, &attr); 9481+ } 9482+ 9483+ return (1); 9484+ 9485+malloc_err: 9486+ pk11_free_all_locks(); 9487+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 9488+ return (0); 9489+#else 9490+ return (1); 9491+#endif 9492+ } 9493+ 9494+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void) 9495+ { 9496+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 9497+ int type; 9498+ 9499+ if (token_lock != NULL) 9500+ { 9501+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(token_lock); 9502+ OPENSSL_free(token_lock); 9503+ token_lock = NULL; 9504+ } 9505+ 9506+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL) 9507+ { 9508+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]); 9509+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]); 9510+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL; 9511+ } 9512+ 9513+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) 9514+ { 9515+ if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL) 9516+ { 9517+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock); 9518+ OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock); 9519+ session_cache[type].lock = NULL; 9520+ } 9521+ } 9522+#endif 9523+ } 9524+ 9525+/* 9526+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support. 9527+ */ 9528+static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e) 9529+ { 9530+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) 9531+ if (!pk11_library_init(e)) 9532+ return (0); 9533+ 9534+ if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) || 9535+ !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name)) 9536+ return (0); 9537+ 9538+ if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE) 9539+ { 9540+ if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) || 9541+ !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) || 9542+ !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey)) 9543+ return (0); 9544+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 9545+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG); 9546+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 9547+ } 9548+ 9549+ if (pk11_have_random) 9550+ { 9551+ if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random)) 9552+ return (0); 9553+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 9554+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG); 9555+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 9556+ } 9557+ if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) || 9558+ !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) || 9559+ !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) || 9560+ !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) || 9561+ !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns)) 9562+ return (0); 9563+ 9564+ /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */ 9565+ ERR_load_pk11_strings(); 9566+ 9567+ return (1); 9568+ } 9569+ 9570+/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */ 9571+#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT 9572+#error "dynamic engine not supported" 9573+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id) 9574+ { 9575+ if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0)) 9576+ return (0); 9577+ 9578+ if (!bind_pk11(e)) 9579+ return (0); 9580+ 9581+ return (1); 9582+ } 9583+ 9584+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN() 9585+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper) 9586+ 9587+#else 9588+static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void) 9589+ { 9590+ ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); 9591+ 9592+ if (!ret) 9593+ return (NULL); 9594+ 9595+ if (!bind_pk11(ret)) 9596+ { 9597+ ENGINE_free(ret); 9598+ return (NULL); 9599+ } 9600+ 9601+ return (ret); 9602+ } 9603+ 9604+void 9605+ENGINE_load_pk11(void) 9606+ { 9607+ ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL; 9608+ 9609+ /* 9610+ * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to 9611+ * security reasons. We will link it in statically. 9612+ */ 9613+ /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */ 9614+ if (!pk11_dso) 9615+ pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0); 9616+ 9617+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) 9618+ { 9619+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); 9620+ return; 9621+ } 9622+ 9623+ e_pk11 = engine_pk11(); 9624+ if (!e_pk11) 9625+ { 9626+ DSO_free(pk11_dso); 9627+ pk11_dso = NULL; 9628+ return; 9629+ } 9630+ 9631+ /* 9632+ * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically 9633+ * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11 9634+ * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter 9635+ * needs cipher and digest algorithm information 9636+ */ 9637+ if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11)) 9638+ { 9639+ DSO_free(pk11_dso); 9640+ pk11_dso = NULL; 9641+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11); 9642+ return; 9643+ } 9644+ 9645+ ENGINE_add(e_pk11); 9646+ 9647+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11); 9648+ ERR_clear_error(); 9649+ } 9650+#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */ 9651+ 9652+/* 9653+ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and 9654+ * the function symbol names to bind to. 9655+ */ 9656+static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; 9657+ 9658+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void) 9659+ { 9660+ if (PK11_LIBNAME) 9661+ return (PK11_LIBNAME); 9662+ 9663+ return (def_PK11_LIBNAME); 9664+ } 9665+ 9666+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void) 9667+ { 9668+ if (PK11_LIBNAME) 9669+ OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME); 9670+ 9671+ PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; 9672+ } 9673+ 9674+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name) 9675+ { 9676+ free_PK11_LIBNAME(); 9677+ 9678+ return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0); 9679+ } 9680+ 9681+/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */ 9682+static void pk11_fork_prepare(void) 9683+ { 9684+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 9685+ int i; 9686+ 9687+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) 9688+ return; 9689+ 9690+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 9691+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); 9692+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) 9693+ { 9694+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); 9695+ } 9696+#endif 9697+ } 9698+ 9699+/* release all engine specific mutexes */ 9700+static void pk11_fork_parent(void) 9701+ { 9702+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 9703+ int i; 9704+ 9705+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) 9706+ return; 9707+ 9708+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) 9709+ { 9710+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); 9711+ } 9712+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 9713+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 9714+#endif 9715+ } 9716+ 9717+/* 9718+ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them 9719+ * accessible to all threads. 9720+ */ 9721+static void pk11_fork_child(void) 9722+ { 9723+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 9724+ int i; 9725+ 9726+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) 9727+ return; 9728+ 9729+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) 9730+ { 9731+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); 9732+ } 9733+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 9734+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 9735+#endif 9736+ } 9737+ 9738+/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */ 9739+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e) 9740+{ 9741+ return (pk11_library_init(e)); 9742+} 9743+ 9744+static CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS pk11_init_args = 9745+ { 9746+ NULL_PTR, /* CreateMutex */ 9747+ NULL_PTR, /* DestroyMutex */ 9748+ NULL_PTR, /* LockMutex */ 9749+ NULL_PTR, /* UnlockMutex */ 9750+ CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK, /* flags */ 9751+ NULL_PTR, /* pReserved */ 9752+ }; 9753+ 9754+/* 9755+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. 9756+ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also 9757+ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and 9758+ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function 9759+ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default. 9760+ */ 9761+/* ARGSUSED */ 9762+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e) 9763+ { 9764+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p; 9765+ CK_RV rv = CKR_OK; 9766+ CK_INFO info; 9767+ int any_slot_found; 9768+ int i; 9769+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 9770+ struct sigaction sigint_act, sigterm_act, sighup_act; 9771+#endif 9772+ 9773+ /* 9774+ * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which 9775+ * is called from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still 9776+ * at least one existing functional reference to the engine 9777+ * (see engine(3) for more information), pk11_finish() is 9778+ * skipped. For example, this can happen if an application 9779+ * forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a fork() 9780+ * when the application is finishing the engine so that it can 9781+ * be reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional 9782+ * reference causes pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In 9783+ * that case we need the PID check so that we properly 9784+ * initialize the engine again. 9785+ */ 9786+ if (pk11_library_initialized) 9787+ { 9788+ if (pk11_pid == getpid()) 9789+ { 9790+ return (1); 9791+ } 9792+ else 9793+ { 9794+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 9795+ /* 9796+ * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case 9797+ * the application calls fork() without finishing the 9798+ * engine first. 9799+ */ 9800+ pk11_free_all_locks(); 9801+ } 9802+ } 9803+ 9804+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) 9805+ { 9806+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); 9807+ goto err; 9808+ } 9809+ 9810+ /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */ 9811+ p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso, 9812+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST); 9813+ if (!p) 9814+ { 9815+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); 9816+ goto err; 9817+ } 9818+ 9819+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ 9820+ rv = p(&pFuncList); 9821+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 9822+ { 9823+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv); 9824+ goto err; 9825+ } 9826+ 9827+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 9828+ /* Not all PKCS#11 library are signal safe! */ 9829+ 9830+ (void) memset(&sigint_act, 0, sizeof(sigint_act)); 9831+ (void) memset(&sigterm_act, 0, sizeof(sigterm_act)); 9832+ (void) memset(&sighup_act, 0, sizeof(sighup_act)); 9833+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, NULL, &sigint_act); 9834+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, NULL, &sigterm_act); 9835+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, NULL, &sighup_act); 9836+#endif 9837+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); 9838+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 9839+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sigint_act, NULL); 9840+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigterm_act, NULL); 9841+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &sighup_act, NULL); 9842+#endif 9843+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) 9844+ { 9845+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); 9846+ goto err; 9847+ } 9848+ 9849+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info); 9850+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 9851+ { 9852+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv); 9853+ goto err; 9854+ } 9855+ 9856+ if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0) 9857+ goto err; 9858+ 9859+ /* 9860+ * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any 9861+ * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an 9862+ * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11 9863+ * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just 9864+ * because no slot was present. 9865+ */ 9866+ if (any_slot_found == 0) 9867+ return (1); 9868+ 9869+ if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 9870+ { 9871+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */ 9872+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, 9873+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); 9874+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 9875+ { 9876+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, 9877+ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); 9878+ goto err; 9879+ } 9880+ } 9881+ 9882+ pk11_library_initialized = TRUE; 9883+ pk11_pid = getpid(); 9884+ /* 9885+ * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks() 9886+ * will do the cleanup. 9887+ */ 9888+ if (!pk11_init_all_locks()) 9889+ goto err; 9890+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) 9891+ session_cache[i].head = NULL; 9892+ /* 9893+ * initialize active lists. We only use active lists 9894+ * for asymmetric ciphers. 9895+ */ 9896+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) 9897+ active_list[i] = NULL; 9898+ 9899+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 9900+ if (!pk11_atfork_initialized) 9901+ { 9902+ if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent, 9903+ pk11_fork_child) != 0) 9904+ { 9905+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED); 9906+ goto err; 9907+ } 9908+ pk11_atfork_initialized = TRUE; 9909+ } 9910+#endif 9911+ 9912+ return (1); 9913+ 9914+err: 9915+ return (0); 9916+ } 9917+ 9918+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */ 9919+/* ARGSUSED */ 9920+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e) 9921+ { 9922+ free_PK11_LIBNAME(); 9923+ ERR_unload_pk11_strings(); 9924+ if (pk11_pin) { 9925+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); 9926+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); 9927+ } 9928+ pk11_pin = NULL; 9929+ return (1); 9930+ } 9931+ 9932+/* 9933+ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11 9934+ * library. 9935+ */ 9936+/* ARGSUSED */ 9937+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e) 9938+ { 9939+ int i; 9940+ 9941+ if (pk11_pin) { 9942+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); 9943+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); 9944+ } 9945+ pk11_pin = NULL; 9946+ 9947+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) 9948+ { 9949+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED); 9950+ goto err; 9951+ } 9952+ 9953+ OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL); 9954+ 9955+ if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0) 9956+ goto err; 9957+ 9958+ /* free all active lists */ 9959+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) 9960+ pk11_free_active_list(i); 9961+ 9962+ pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session); 9963+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 9964+ 9965+ /* 9966+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function 9967+ * may have side-effects. 9968+ */ 9969+#if 0 9970+ pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL); 9971+#endif 9972+ 9973+ if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso)) 9974+ { 9975+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); 9976+ goto err; 9977+ } 9978+ pk11_dso = NULL; 9979+ pFuncList = NULL; 9980+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; 9981+ pk11_pid = 0; 9982+ /* 9983+ * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than 9984+ * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason 9985+ * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out 9986+ * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes 9987+ * the engine before calling fork(). 9988+ */ 9989+ pk11_free_all_locks(); 9990+ 9991+ return (1); 9992+ 9993+err: 9994+ return (0); 9995+ } 9996+ 9997+/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */ 9998+/* ARGSUSED */ 9999+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)) 10000+ { 10001+ int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1); 10002+ 10003+ switch (cmd) 10004+ { 10005+ case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH: 10006+ if (p == NULL) 10007+ { 10008+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); 10009+ return (0); 10010+ } 10011+ 10012+ if (initialized) 10013+ { 10014+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED); 10015+ return (0); 10016+ } 10017+ 10018+ return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p)); 10019+ case PK11_CMD_PIN: 10020+ if (pk11_pin) { 10021+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); 10022+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); 10023+ } 10024+ pk11_pin = NULL; 10025+ 10026+ if (p == NULL) 10027+ { 10028+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); 10029+ return (0); 10030+ } 10031+ 10032+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(p); 10033+ if (pk11_pin == NULL) 10034+ { 10035+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 10036+ return (0); 10037+ } 10038+ return (1); 10039+ case PK11_CMD_SLOT: 10040+ SLOTID = (CK_SLOT_ID)i; 10041+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 10042+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: slot set\n", PK11_DBG); 10043+#endif 10044+ return (1); 10045+ default: 10046+ break; 10047+ } 10048+ 10049+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); 10050+ 10051+ return (0); 10052+ } 10053+ 10054+ 10055+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ 10056+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void) 10057+ { 10058+ return; 10059+ } 10060+ 10061+/* ARGSUSED */ 10062+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) 10063+ { 10064+ PK11_SESSION *sp; 10065+ 10066+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) 10067+ return; 10068+ 10069+ /* 10070+ * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since 10071+ * the calling functions do not care anyway 10072+ */ 10073+ pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num); 10074+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); 10075+ 10076+ return; 10077+ } 10078+ 10079+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) 10080+ { 10081+ pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0); 10082+ } 10083+ 10084+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) 10085+ { 10086+ CK_RV rv; 10087+ PK11_SESSION *sp; 10088+ 10089+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) 10090+ return (0); 10091+ 10092+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num); 10093+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 10094+ { 10095+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv); 10096+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); 10097+ return (0); 10098+ } 10099+ 10100+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); 10101+ return (1); 10102+ } 10103+ 10104+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ 10105+static int pk11_rand_status(void) 10106+ { 10107+ return (1); 10108+ } 10109+ 10110+/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */ 10111+static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) 10112+ { 10113+ switch (optype) 10114+ { 10115+ case OP_RSA: 10116+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) 10117+ { 10118+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); 10119+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; 10120+ } 10121+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) 10122+ { 10123+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); 10124+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; 10125+ } 10126+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL) 10127+ { 10128+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); 10129+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; 10130+ } 10131+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL) 10132+ { 10133+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); 10134+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; 10135+ } 10136+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) 10137+ { 10138+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); 10139+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; 10140+ } 10141+ break; 10142+ default: 10143+ break; 10144+ } 10145+ } 10146+ 10147+/* 10148+ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have 10149+ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here 10150+ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist. 10151+ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist. 10152+ */ 10153+PK11_SESSION * 10154+pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype) 10155+ { 10156+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist; 10157+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 10158+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock = NULL; 10159+#endif 10160+ static pid_t pid = 0; 10161+ pid_t new_pid; 10162+ CK_RV rv; 10163+ 10164+ switch (optype) 10165+ { 10166+ case OP_RSA: 10167+ case OP_DSA: 10168+ case OP_DH: 10169+ case OP_RAND: 10170+ case OP_DIGEST: 10171+ case OP_CIPHER: 10172+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 10173+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; 10174+#endif 10175+ break; 10176+ default: 10177+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 10178+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); 10179+ return (NULL); 10180+ } 10181+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 10182+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); 10183+#else 10184+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 10185+#endif 10186+ 10187+ /* 10188+ * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in 10189+ * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session 10190+ * here, with no PID information. 10191+ */ 10192+ if (pid == 0) 10193+ pid = getpid(); 10194+ 10195+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; 10196+ sp = freelist; 10197+ 10198+ /* 10199+ * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled 10200+ * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first 10201+ * structure from the freelist. 10202+ */ 10203+ if (sp == NULL) 10204+ { 10205+ if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL) 10206+ { 10207+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 10208+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 10209+ goto err; 10210+ } 10211+ (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION)); 10212+ 10213+ /* 10214+ * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the 10215+ * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so 10216+ * mark them as unused. 10217+ */ 10218+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 10219+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 10220+ } 10221+ else 10222+ { 10223+ freelist = sp->next; 10224+ } 10225+ 10226+ /* 10227+ * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all 10228+ * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones. 10229+ */ 10230+ if (pid != (new_pid = getpid())) 10231+ { 10232+ pid = new_pid; 10233+ 10234+ /* 10235+ * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited 10236+ * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which 10237+ * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the 10238+ * head of the list). 10239+ */ 10240+ while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL) 10241+ { 10242+ freelist = sp1->next; 10243+ /* 10244+ * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions() 10245+ * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11 10246+ * sessions and destroy all objects. 10247+ */ 10248+ pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype); 10249+ OPENSSL_free(sp1); 10250+ } 10251+ 10252+ /* we have to free the active list as well. */ 10253+ pk11_free_active_list(optype); 10254+ 10255+ /* Initialize the process */ 10256+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); 10257+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) 10258+ { 10259+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, 10260+ rv); 10261+ OPENSSL_free(sp); 10262+ sp = NULL; 10263+ goto err; 10264+ } 10265+ 10266+ /* 10267+ * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this 10268+ * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one 10269+ * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found. 10270+ * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more 10271+ * information. 10272+ */ 10273+ if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0) 10274+ goto err; 10275+ 10276+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */ 10277+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, 10278+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); 10279+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 10280+ { 10281+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, 10282+ rv); 10283+ OPENSSL_free(sp); 10284+ sp = NULL; 10285+ goto err; 10286+ } 10287+ 10288+ /* 10289+ * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs 10290+ * re-initialization. 10291+ */ 10292+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) 10293+ { 10294+ OPENSSL_free(sp); 10295+ sp = NULL; 10296+ goto err; 10297+ } 10298+ if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0) 10299+ { 10300+ /* 10301+ * We will keep the session in the cache list and let 10302+ * the caller cope with the situation. 10303+ */ 10304+ freelist = sp; 10305+ sp = NULL; 10306+ goto err; 10307+ } 10308+ } 10309+ 10310+ if (sp->pid == 0) 10311+ { 10312+ /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */ 10313+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) 10314+ { 10315+ OPENSSL_free(sp); 10316+ sp = NULL; 10317+ } 10318+ } 10319+ 10320+ /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */ 10321+ session_cache[optype].head = freelist; 10322+ 10323+err: 10324+ if (sp != NULL) 10325+ sp->next = NULL; 10326+ 10327+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 10328+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); 10329+#else 10330+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 10331+#endif 10332+ 10333+ return (sp); 10334+ } 10335+ 10336+ 10337+void 10338+pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) 10339+ { 10340+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 10341+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; 10342+#endif 10343+ PK11_SESSION *freelist; 10344+ 10345+ /* 10346+ * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and 10347+ * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the 10348+ * next time we will ask for a new session. 10349+ */ 10350+ if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid()) 10351+ return; 10352+ 10353+ switch (optype) 10354+ { 10355+ case OP_RSA: 10356+ case OP_DSA: 10357+ case OP_DH: 10358+ case OP_RAND: 10359+ case OP_DIGEST: 10360+ case OP_CIPHER: 10361+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 10362+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; 10363+#endif 10364+ break; 10365+ default: 10366+ PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, 10367+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); 10368+ return; 10369+ } 10370+ 10371+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 10372+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); 10373+#else 10374+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 10375+#endif 10376+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; 10377+ sp->next = freelist; 10378+ session_cache[optype].head = sp; 10379+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 10380+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); 10381+#else 10382+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 10383+#endif 10384+ } 10385+ 10386+ 10387+/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */ 10388+static int pk11_free_all_sessions() 10389+ { 10390+ int ret = 1; 10391+ int type; 10392+ 10393+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL); 10394+ 10395+ /* 10396+ * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will 10397+ * return 0 on exit. 10398+ */ 10399+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) 10400+ { 10401+ if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0) 10402+ ret = 0; 10403+ } 10404+ 10405+ return (ret); 10406+ } 10407+ 10408+/* 10409+ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many 10410+ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we 10411+ * return an error on return. 10412+ */ 10413+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype) 10414+ { 10415+ CK_RV rv; 10416+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; 10417+ PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL; 10418+ pid_t mypid = getpid(); 10419+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 10420+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; 10421+#endif 10422+ int ret = 1; 10423+ 10424+ switch (optype) 10425+ { 10426+ case OP_RSA: 10427+ case OP_DSA: 10428+ case OP_DH: 10429+ case OP_RAND: 10430+ case OP_DIGEST: 10431+ case OP_CIPHER: 10432+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 10433+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; 10434+#endif 10435+ break; 10436+ default: 10437+ PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 10438+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); 10439+ return (0); 10440+ } 10441+ 10442+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 10443+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); 10444+#else 10445+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 10446+#endif 10447+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; 10448+ while ((sp = freelist) != NULL) 10449+ { 10450+ if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid) 10451+ { 10452+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); 10453+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 10454+ { 10455+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 10456+ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); 10457+ ret = 0; 10458+ } 10459+ } 10460+ freelist = sp->next; 10461+ pk11_free_nums(sp, optype); 10462+ OPENSSL_free(sp); 10463+ } 10464+ 10465+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 10466+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); 10467+#else 10468+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 10469+#endif 10470+ return (ret); 10471+ } 10472+ 10473+ 10474+static int 10475+pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) 10476+ { 10477+ CK_RV rv; 10478+ CK_SLOT_ID myslot; 10479+ 10480+ switch (optype) 10481+ { 10482+ case OP_RSA: 10483+ myslot = pubkey_SLOTID; 10484+ break; 10485+ case OP_RAND: 10486+ myslot = rand_SLOTID; 10487+ break; 10488+ default: 10489+ PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, 10490+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); 10491+ return (0); 10492+ } 10493+ 10494+ sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 10495+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 10496+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype); 10497+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 10498+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, 10499+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); 10500+ if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED) 10501+ { 10502+ /* 10503+ * We are probably a child process so force the 10504+ * reinitialize of the session 10505+ */ 10506+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; 10507+ if (!pk11_library_init(NULL)) 10508+ return (0); 10509+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, 10510+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); 10511+ } 10512+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 10513+ { 10514+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); 10515+ return (0); 10516+ } 10517+ 10518+ sp->pid = getpid(); 10519+ 10520+ if (optype == OP_RSA) 10521+ { 10522+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 10523+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 10524+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; 10525+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; 10526+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; 10527+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; 10528+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; 10529+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; 10530+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; 10531+ } 10532+ 10533+ /* 10534+ * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent 10535+ * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so. 10536+ */ 10537+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE; 10538+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE; 10539+ return (1); 10540+ } 10541+ 10542+/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */ 10543+int 10544+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) 10545+ { 10546+ int ret = 0; 10547+ 10548+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 10549+ { 10550+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key, 10551+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE); 10552+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 10553+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; 10554+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) 10555+ { 10556+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); 10557+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; 10558+ } 10559+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) 10560+ { 10561+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); 10562+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; 10563+ } 10564+ } 10565+ 10566+ return (ret); 10567+ } 10568+ 10569+/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */ 10570+int 10571+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) 10572+ { 10573+ int ret = 0; 10574+ 10575+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 10576+ { 10577+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key, 10578+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_TRUE); 10579+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 10580+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; 10581+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) 10582+ { 10583+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); 10584+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; 10585+ } 10586+ 10587+ /* 10588+ * For the RSA key by reference code, public components 'n'/'e' 10589+ * are the key components we use to check for the cache hit. We 10590+ * must free those as well. 10591+ */ 10592+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL) 10593+ { 10594+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); 10595+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; 10596+ } 10597+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL) 10598+ { 10599+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); 10600+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; 10601+ } 10602+ } 10603+ 10604+ return (ret); 10605+ } 10606+ 10607+/* 10608+ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all 10609+ * objects in the free list. 10610+ */ 10611+int 10612+pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) 10613+ { 10614+ int ret = 1; 10615+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; 10616+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; 10617+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE; 10618+ 10619+ if (session != NULL) 10620+ local_free_session = session; 10621+ else 10622+ { 10623+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 10624+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0); 10625+#else 10626+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 10627+#endif 10628+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head; 10629+ uselock = FALSE; 10630+ } 10631+ 10632+ /* 10633+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects 10634+ */ 10635+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) 10636+ { 10637+ local_free_session = sp->next; 10638+ 10639+ /* 10640+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the 10641+ * destroy operations fails. 10642+ */ 10643+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) 10644+ { 10645+ ret = 0; 10646+ continue; 10647+ } 10648+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) 10649+ { 10650+ ret = 0; 10651+ continue; 10652+ } 10653+ } 10654+ 10655+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 10656+ if (session == NULL) 10657+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0); 10658+#else 10659+ if (session == NULL) 10660+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 10661+#endif 10662+ 10663+ return (ret); 10664+ } 10665+ 10666+static int 10667+pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, 10668+ CK_BBOOL persistent) 10669+ { 10670+ CK_RV rv; 10671+ 10672+ /* 10673+ * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects 10674+ * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so 10675+ * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here. 10676+ */ 10677+ if (persistent == CK_TRUE) 10678+ return (1); 10679+ 10680+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh); 10681+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 10682+ { 10683+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, 10684+ rv); 10685+ return (0); 10686+ } 10687+ 10688+ return (1); 10689+ } 10690+ 10691+ 10692+/* 10693+ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported 10694+ * 10695+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS 10696+ * 10697+ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a 10698+ * public key slot. 10699+ * 10700+ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which 10701+ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of 10702+ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global 10703+ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key 10704+ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests. 10705+ */ 10706+static int 10707+pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found) 10708+ { 10709+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; 10710+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; 10711+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; 10712+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; 10713+ unsigned int i; 10714+ CK_RV rv; 10715+ CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar = 0; 10716+ CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE; 10717+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0; 10718+ 10719+ /* let's initialize the output parameter */ 10720+ if (any_slot_found != NULL) 10721+ *any_slot_found = 0; 10722+ 10723+ /* Get slot list for memory allocation */ 10724+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount); 10725+ 10726+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 10727+ { 10728+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); 10729+ return (0); 10730+ } 10731+ 10732+ /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */ 10733+ if (ulSlotCount == 0) 10734+ { 10735+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 10736+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG); 10737+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 10738+ return (1); 10739+ } 10740+ 10741+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); 10742+ 10743+ if (pSlotList == NULL) 10744+ { 10745+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 10746+ return (0); 10747+ } 10748+ 10749+ /* Get the slot list for processing */ 10750+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount); 10751+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 10752+ { 10753+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); 10754+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); 10755+ return (0); 10756+ } 10757+ 10758+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 10759+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME); 10760+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); 10761+ 10762+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); 10763+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 10764+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) 10765+ { 10766+ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; 10767+ 10768+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 10769+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); 10770+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 10771+ /* Check if slot has random support. */ 10772+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); 10773+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 10774+ continue; 10775+ 10776+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 10777+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); 10778+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 10779+ 10780+ if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG) 10781+ { 10782+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 10783+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG); 10784+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 10785+ pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE; 10786+ rand_SLOTID = current_slot; 10787+ break; 10788+ } 10789+ } 10790+ 10791+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 10792+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); 10793+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 10794+ 10795+ pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; 10796+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) 10797+ { 10798+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE; 10799+ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; 10800+ 10801+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 10802+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); 10803+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 10804+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); 10805+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 10806+ continue; 10807+ 10808+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 10809+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); 10810+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 10811+ 10812+ /* 10813+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing with CKM_RSA_PKCS. 10814+ */ 10815+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS, 10816+ &mech_info); 10817+ 10818+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN))) 10819+ { 10820+ slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE; 10821+ } 10822+ 10823+ if (!found_candidate_slot && slot_has_rsa) 10824+ { 10825+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 10826+ fprintf(stderr, 10827+ "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot); 10828+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 10829+ best_slot_sofar = current_slot; 10830+ pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa; 10831+ found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE; 10832+ /* 10833+ * Cache the flags for later use. We might 10834+ * need those if RSA keys by reference feature 10835+ * is used. 10836+ */ 10837+ pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags; 10838+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 10839+ fprintf(stderr, 10840+ "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n", 10841+ PK11_DBG); 10842+ fprintf(stderr, 10843+ "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, 10844+ best_slot_sofar); 10845+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: pubkey flags changed to " 10846+ "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags); 10847+ } 10848+ else 10849+ { 10850+ fprintf(stderr, 10851+ "%s: no rsa\n", PK11_DBG); 10852+ } 10853+#else 10854+ } /* if */ 10855+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 10856+ } /* for */ 10857+ 10858+ if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE) 10859+ { 10860+ pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar; 10861+ } 10862+ 10863+ /*SLOTID = pSlotList[0];*/ 10864+ 10865+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 10866+ fprintf(stderr, 10867+ "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID); 10868+ fprintf(stderr, 10869+ "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID); 10870+ fprintf(stderr, 10871+ "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa); 10872+ fprintf(stderr, 10873+ "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random); 10874+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 10875+ 10876+ if (pSlotList != NULL) 10877+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); 10878+ 10879+ if (any_slot_found != NULL) 10880+ *any_slot_found = 1; 10881+ return (1); 10882+ } 10883+ 10884+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO */ 10885+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ 10886+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ 10887Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h 10888diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h:1.4 10889--- /dev/null Fri Jan 2 14:59:08 2015 10890+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h Wed Jun 15 21:12:20 2011 10891@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ 10892+/* Redefine all pk11/PK11 external symbols to pk11so/PK11SO */ 10893+ 10894+#define token_lock pk11so_token_lock 10895+#define find_lock pk11so_find_lock 10896+#define active_list pk11so_active_list 10897+#define pubkey_token_flags pk11so_pubkey_token_flags 10898+#define pubkey_SLOTID pk11so_pubkey_SLOTID 10899+#define ERR_pk11_error ERR_pk11so_error 10900+#define PK11err_add_data PK11SOerr_add_data 10901+#define pk11_get_session pk11so_get_session 10902+#define pk11_return_session pk11so_return_session 10903+#define pk11_active_add pk11so_active_add 10904+#define pk11_active_delete pk11so_active_delete 10905+#define pk11_active_remove pk11so_active_remove 10906+#define pk11_free_active_list pk11so_free_active_list 10907+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects pk11so_destroy_rsa_key_objects 10908+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub pk11so_destroy_rsa_object_pub 10909+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv pk11so_destroy_rsa_object_priv 10910+#define pk11_load_privkey pk11so_load_privkey 10911+#define pk11_load_pubkey pk11so_load_pubkey 10912+#define PK11_RSA PK11SO_RSA 10913+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects pk11so_destroy_dsa_key_objects 10914+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub pk11so_destroy_dsa_object_pub 10915+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv pk11so_destroy_dsa_object_priv 10916+#define PK11_DSA PK11SO_DSA 10917+#define pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects pk11so_destroy_dh_key_objects 10918+#define pk11_destroy_dh_object pk11so_destroy_dh_object 10919+#define PK11_DH PK11SO_DH 10920+#define pk11_token_relogin pk11so_token_relogin 10921+#define pFuncList pk11so_pFuncList 10922+#define pk11_pin pk11so_pin 10923+#define ENGINE_load_pk11 ENGINE_load_pk11so 10924Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c 10925diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c:1.10 10926--- /dev/null Fri Jan 2 14:59:08 2015 10927+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c Fri Oct 4 14:05:38 2013 10928@@ -0,0 +1,1642 @@ 10929+/* 10930+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. 10931+ * Use is subject to license terms. 10932+ */ 10933+ 10934+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */ 10935+/* 10936+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for 10937+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). 10938+ * 10939+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by 10940+ * Afchine Madjlessi. 10941+ */ 10942+/* 10943+ * ==================================================================== 10944+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 10945+ * 10946+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 10947+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 10948+ * are met: 10949+ * 10950+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 10951+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 10952+ * 10953+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 10954+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 10955+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 10956+ * distribution. 10957+ * 10958+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 10959+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: 10960+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 10961+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" 10962+ * 10963+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 10964+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 10965+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 10966+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. 10967+ * 10968+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 10969+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 10970+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 10971+ * 10972+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 10973+ * acknowledgment: 10974+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 10975+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" 10976+ * 10977+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 10978+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 10979+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 10980+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 10981+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 10982+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 10983+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 10984+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 10985+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 10986+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 10987+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 10988+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 10989+ * ==================================================================== 10990+ * 10991+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 10992+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 10993+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 10994+ * 10995+ */ 10996+ 10997+/* Modified to keep only RNG and RSA Sign */ 10998+ 10999+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 11000+#error RSA is disabled 11001+#endif 11002+ 11003+#include <stdio.h> 11004+#include <stdlib.h> 11005+#include <string.h> 11006+#include <sys/types.h> 11007+ 11008+#include <openssl/e_os2.h> 11009+#include <openssl/crypto.h> 11010+#include <cryptlib.h> 11011+#include <openssl/engine.h> 11012+#include <openssl/dso.h> 11013+#include <openssl/err.h> 11014+#include <openssl/bn.h> 11015+#include <openssl/pem.h> 11016+#include <openssl/rsa.h> 11017+#include <openssl/rand.h> 11018+#include <openssl/objects.h> 11019+#include <openssl/x509.h> 11020+ 11021+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 11022+#define NOPTHREADS 11023+typedef int pid_t; 11024+#define HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE 11025+static char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt); 11026+#ifndef NULL_PTR 11027+#define NULL_PTR NULL 11028+#endif 11029+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 11030+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name 11031+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 11032+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name 11033+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ 11034+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) 11035+#else 11036+#include <unistd.h> 11037+#endif 11038+ 11039+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 11040+#include <pthread.h> 11041+#endif 11042+ 11043+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW 11044+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 11045+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO 11046+ 11047+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 11048+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) 11049+#include "cryptoki.h" 11050+#include "pkcs11.h" 11051+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) 11052+#else 11053+#include "cryptoki.h" 11054+#include "pkcs11.h" 11055+#endif 11056+#include "hw_pk11so.h" 11057+#include "hw_pk11_err.h" 11058+ 11059+static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE; 11060+extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID; 11061+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 11062+extern pthread_mutex_t *token_lock; 11063+#endif 11064+ 11065+#if !(defined(HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE) || (defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun))) 11066+#define getpassphrase(x) getpass(x) 11067+#endif 11068+ 11069+/* RSA stuff */ 11070+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, 11071+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa); 11072+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_file, 11073+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); 11074+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file, 11075+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); 11076+ 11077+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr, 11078+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); 11079+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr, 11080+ BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, 11081+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); 11082+ 11083+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); 11084+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); 11085+ 11086+static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, 11087+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey); 11088+static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue, 11089+ CK_ULONG *ulValueLen); 11090+static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn); 11091+ 11092+static int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, 11093+ CK_BBOOL is_private); 11094+ 11095+/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */ 11096+#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL 11097+static char *read_mode_flags = "rF"; 11098+#else 11099+static char *read_mode_flags = "r"; 11100+#endif 11101+ 11102+/* 11103+ * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list 11104+ * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error 11105+ * variable and jump to the specified label. 11106+ */ 11107+#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \ 11108+ { \ 11109+ if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \ 11110+ { \ 11111+ var = TRUE; \ 11112+ if (unlock) \ 11113+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ 11114+ goto label; \ 11115+ } \ 11116+ } 11117+ 11118+/* 11119+ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the 11120+ * entry otherwise return NULL. 11121+ * 11122+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list 11123+ * held. 11124+ */ 11125+static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) 11126+ { 11127+ PK11_active *entry; 11128+ 11129+ for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next) 11130+ if (entry->h == h) 11131+ return (entry); 11132+ 11133+ return (NULL); 11134+ } 11135+ 11136+/* 11137+ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a 11138+ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of 11139+ * failure. 11140+ * 11141+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list 11142+ * held. 11143+ */ 11144+int 11145+pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) 11146+ { 11147+ PK11_active *entry = NULL; 11148+ 11149+ if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 11150+ { 11151+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); 11152+ return (-1); 11153+ } 11154+ 11155+ /* search for entry in the active list */ 11156+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL) 11157+ entry->refcnt++; 11158+ else 11159+ { 11160+ /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */ 11161+ entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active)); 11162+ if (entry == NULL) 11163+ { 11164+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 11165+ return (-1); 11166+ } 11167+ entry->h = h; 11168+ entry->refcnt = 1; 11169+ entry->prev = NULL; 11170+ entry->next = NULL; 11171+ /* connect the newly created entry to the list */ 11172+ if (active_list[type] == NULL) 11173+ active_list[type] = entry; 11174+ else /* make the entry first in the list */ 11175+ { 11176+ entry->next = active_list[type]; 11177+ active_list[type]->prev = entry; 11178+ active_list[type] = entry; 11179+ } 11180+ } 11181+ 11182+ return (entry->refcnt); 11183+ } 11184+ 11185+/* 11186+ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it. 11187+ * 11188+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list 11189+ * held. 11190+ */ 11191+void 11192+pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type) 11193+ { 11194+ PK11_active *prev_entry; 11195+ 11196+ /* remove the entry from the list and free it */ 11197+ if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL) 11198+ { 11199+ prev_entry->next = entry->next; 11200+ if (entry->next != NULL) 11201+ entry->next->prev = prev_entry; 11202+ } 11203+ else 11204+ { 11205+ active_list[type] = entry->next; 11206+ /* we were the first but not the only one */ 11207+ if (entry->next != NULL) 11208+ entry->next->prev = NULL; 11209+ } 11210+ 11211+ /* sanitization */ 11212+ entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 11213+ entry->prev = NULL; 11214+ entry->next = NULL; 11215+ OPENSSL_free(entry); 11216+ } 11217+ 11218+/* Free all entries from the active list. */ 11219+void 11220+pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type) 11221+ { 11222+ PK11_active *entry; 11223+ 11224+ /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */ 11225+ switch (type) 11226+ { 11227+ case OP_RSA: 11228+ break; 11229+ default: 11230+ return; 11231+ } 11232+ 11233+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ 11234+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(type); 11235+ while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL) 11236+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type); 11237+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type); 11238+ } 11239+ 11240+/* 11241+ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle, 11242+ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it. 11243+ * 11244+ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references, 11245+ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error. 11246+ * 11247+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list 11248+ * held. 11249+ */ 11250+int 11251+pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) 11252+ { 11253+ PK11_active *entry = NULL; 11254+ 11255+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL) 11256+ { 11257+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); 11258+ return (-1); 11259+ } 11260+ 11261+ OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0); 11262+ entry->refcnt--; 11263+ if (entry->refcnt == 0) 11264+ { 11265+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type); 11266+ return (1); 11267+ } 11268+ 11269+ return (0); 11270+ } 11271+ 11272+/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ 11273+static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa; 11274+ 11275+RSA_METHOD * 11276+PK11_RSA(void) 11277+ { 11278+ const RSA_METHOD *rsa; 11279+ 11280+ if (pk11_rsa.name == NULL) 11281+ { 11282+ rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(); 11283+ memcpy(&pk11_rsa, rsa, sizeof(*rsa)); 11284+ pk11_rsa.name = "PKCS#11 RSA method"; 11285+ pk11_rsa.rsa_sign = pk11_RSA_sign; 11286+ } 11287+ return (&pk11_rsa); 11288+ } 11289+ 11290+/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */ 11291+#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36 11292+ 11293+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE; 11294+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE; 11295+ 11296+/* 11297+ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from 11298+ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11. 11299+ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c 11300+ */ 11301+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, 11302+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa) 11303+ { 11304+ X509_SIG sig; 11305+ ASN1_TYPE parameter; 11306+ int i, j = 0; 11307+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL; 11308+ X509_ALGOR algor; 11309+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; 11310+ CK_RV rv; 11311+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0}; 11312+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; 11313+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; 11314+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; 11315+ int ret = 0; 11316+ unsigned long ulsiglen; 11317+ 11318+ /* Encode the digest */ 11319+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ 11320+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1) 11321+ { 11322+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) 11323+ { 11324+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 11325+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); 11326+ goto err; 11327+ } 11328+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; 11329+ s = (unsigned char *)m; 11330+ } 11331+ else 11332+ { 11333+ sig.algor = &algor; 11334+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); 11335+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) 11336+ { 11337+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 11338+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); 11339+ goto err; 11340+ } 11341+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) 11342+ { 11343+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 11344+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID); 11345+ goto err; 11346+ } 11347+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; 11348+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL; 11349+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; 11350+ 11351+ sig.digest = &digest; 11352+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; 11353+ sig.digest->length = m_len; 11354+ 11355+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); 11356+ } 11357+ 11358+ j = RSA_size(rsa); 11359+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j) 11360+ { 11361+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG); 11362+ goto err; 11363+ } 11364+ 11365+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1) 11366+ { 11367+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1)); 11368+ if (s == NULL) 11369+ { 11370+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 11371+ goto err; 11372+ } 11373+ p = s; 11374+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); 11375+ } 11376+ 11377+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) 11378+ goto err; 11379+ 11380+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); 11381+ 11382+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; 11383+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 11384+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = 11385+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, 11386+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, 11387+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, 11388+ sp->session); 11389+ 11390+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 11391+ { 11392+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key); 11393+ 11394+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 11395+ { 11396+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); 11397+ goto err; 11398+ } 11399+ 11400+ ulsiglen = j; 11401+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret, 11402+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen); 11403+ *siglen = ulsiglen; 11404+ 11405+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 11406+ { 11407+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv); 11408+ goto err; 11409+ } 11410+ ret = 1; 11411+ } 11412+ 11413+err: 11414+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL)) 11415+ { 11416+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1)); 11417+ OPENSSL_free(s); 11418+ } 11419+ 11420+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 11421+ return (ret); 11422+ } 11423+ 11424+static int hndidx_rsa = -1; 11425+ 11426+#define MAXATTR 1024 11427+ 11428+/* 11429+ * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the 11430+ * PKCS#11 token. 11431+ */ 11432+/* ARGSUSED */ 11433+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *privkey_file, 11434+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) 11435+ { 11436+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 11437+ FILE *privkey; 11438+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 11439+ RSA *rsa = NULL; 11440+ PK11_SESSION *sp; 11441+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ 11442+ CK_RV rv; 11443+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE; 11444+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; 11445+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; 11446+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; 11447+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ 11448+ 11449+ /* we look for private keys only */ 11450+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = 11451+ { 11452+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)}, 11453+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)}, 11454+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} 11455+ }; 11456+ 11457+ /* 11458+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA 11459+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we 11460+ * never ask for private components. 11461+ */ 11462+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = 11463+ { 11464+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ 11465+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ 11466+ }; 11467+ 11468+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) 11469+ return (NULL); 11470+ 11471+ /* 11472+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now. 11473+ */ 11474+ if (strstr(privkey_file, "pkcs11:") == privkey_file) 11475+ { 11476+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(privkey_file, ":") + 1; 11477+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); 11478+ 11479+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, 11480+ CK_TRUE) == 0) 11481+ goto err; 11482+ 11483+ /* see find_lock array definition 11484+ for more info on object locking */ 11485+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 11486+ 11487+ /* 11488+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure 11489+ * if we can't find it. 11490+ */ 11491+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, 11492+ &ks_key) == 0) 11493+ { 11494+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 11495+ goto err; 11496+ } 11497+ 11498+ if (hndidx_rsa == -1) 11499+ hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, 11500+ "pkcs11 RSA HSM key handle", 11501+ NULL, NULL, NULL); 11502+ 11503+ /* 11504+ * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm 11505+ * according to the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer 11506+ * as NULL, and non-NULL RSA private pointer. However, 11507+ * it is easier just to recreate everything. We expect 11508+ * the keys to be loaded once and used many times. We 11509+ * do not check the return value because even in case 11510+ * of failure the sp structure will have both key 11511+ * pointer and object handle cleaned and 11512+ * pk11_destroy_object() reports the failure to the 11513+ * OpenSSL error message buffer. 11514+ */ 11515+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, FALSE); 11516+ 11517+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key; 11518+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ 11519+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_TRUE; 11520+ 11521+ /* 11522+ * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not 11523+ * use it now for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for 11524+ * consistency reasons. 11525+ */ 11526+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) 11527+ { 11528+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 11529+ goto err; 11530+ } 11531+ 11532+ /* 11533+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure, 11534+ * everything else is 0 or NULL. 11535+ */ 11536+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER | RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY; 11537+ RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, (void *) ks_key); 11538+ 11539+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, 11540+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) 11541+ { 11542+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 11543+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, 11544+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); 11545+ goto err; 11546+ } 11547+ 11548+ /* 11549+ * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we 11550+ * must take care of handle management ourselves. 11551+ */ 11552+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, TRUE, rollback, err); 11553+ 11554+ /* 11555+ * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export 11556+ * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp). 11557+ */ 11558+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); 11559+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); 11560+ /* 11561+ * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as 11562+ * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key 11563+ * in the keystore. 11564+ */ 11565+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], 11566+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); 11567+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], 11568+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); 11569+ 11570+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 11571+ 11572+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) 11573+ goto err; 11574+ 11575+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) 11576+ goto err; 11577+ } 11578+ else if ((privkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) 11579+ { 11580+ pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); 11581+ (void) fclose(privkey); 11582+ if (pkey != NULL) 11583+ { 11584+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); 11585+ if (rsa != NULL) 11586+ { 11587+ /* 11588+ * This will always destroy the RSA 11589+ * object since we have a new RSA 11590+ * structure here. 11591+ */ 11592+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); 11593+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE; 11594+ 11595+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = 11596+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, 11597+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, 11598+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, 11599+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, 11600+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session); 11601+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 11602+ goto err; 11603+ } 11604+ else 11605+ goto err; 11606+ } 11607+ } 11608+ 11609+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 11610+ return (pkey); 11611+err: 11612+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 11613+ if (rsa != NULL) 11614+ RSA_free(rsa); 11615+ if (pkey != NULL) 11616+ { 11617+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 11618+ pkey = NULL; 11619+ } 11620+ rollback = rollback; 11621+ return (pkey); 11622+ } 11623+ 11624+/* 11625+ * Load RSA public key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the 11626+ * PKCS#11 token. 11627+ */ 11628+/* ARGSUSED */ 11629+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, 11630+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) 11631+ { 11632+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 11633+ FILE *pubkey; 11634+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 11635+ RSA *rsa = NULL; 11636+ PK11_SESSION *sp; 11637+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ 11638+ CK_RV rv; 11639+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE; 11640+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; 11641+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; 11642+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ 11643+ 11644+ /* we look for public keys only */ 11645+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = 11646+ { 11647+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)}, 11648+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)}, 11649+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} 11650+ }; 11651+ 11652+ /* 11653+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA 11654+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. 11655+ */ 11656+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = 11657+ { 11658+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ 11659+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ 11660+ }; 11661+ 11662+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) 11663+ return (NULL); 11664+ 11665+ /* 11666+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now. 11667+ */ 11668+ if (strstr(pubkey_file, "pkcs11:") == pubkey_file) 11669+ { 11670+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(pubkey_file, ":") + 1; 11671+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); 11672+ 11673+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, 11674+ CK_FALSE) == 0) 11675+ goto err; 11676+ 11677+ /* see find_lock array definition 11678+ for more info on object locking */ 11679+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 11680+ 11681+ /* 11682+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure 11683+ * if we can't find it. 11684+ */ 11685+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, 11686+ &ks_key) == 0) 11687+ { 11688+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 11689+ goto err; 11690+ } 11691+ 11692+ /* 11693+ * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA 11694+ * structure. No cache hit is possible. 11695+ */ 11696+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, FALSE); 11697+ 11698+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key; 11699+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ 11700+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_TRUE; 11701+ 11702+ /* 11703+ * Cache the RSA public structure pointer. 11704+ */ 11705+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) 11706+ { 11707+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 11708+ goto err; 11709+ } 11710+ 11711+ /* 11712+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure, 11713+ * everything else is 0 or NULL. 11714+ */ 11715+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER; 11716+ 11717+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, 11718+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) 11719+ { 11720+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 11721+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, 11722+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); 11723+ goto err; 11724+ } 11725+ 11726+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); 11727+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); 11728+ 11729+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 11730+ 11731+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) 11732+ goto err; 11733+ 11734+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) 11735+ goto err; 11736+ 11737+ /* 11738+ * Create a session object from it so that when calling 11739+ * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The 11740+ * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA 11741+ * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for 11742+ * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears 11743+ * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if 11744+ * we always have a session key. Note that this is different 11745+ * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that 11746+ * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore 11747+ * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case. 11748+ */ 11749+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = 11750+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, 11751+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, 11752+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session); 11753+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 11754+ goto err; 11755+ } 11756+ else if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) 11757+ { 11758+ pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); 11759+ (void) fclose(pubkey); 11760+ if (pkey != NULL) 11761+ { 11762+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); 11763+ if (rsa != NULL) 11764+ { 11765+ /* 11766+ * This will always destroy the RSA 11767+ * object since we have a new RSA 11768+ * structure here. 11769+ */ 11770+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); 11771+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE; 11772+ 11773+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = 11774+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, 11775+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, 11776+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session); 11777+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 11778+ goto err; 11779+ } 11780+ else 11781+ goto err; 11782+ } 11783+ } 11784+ 11785+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 11786+ return (pkey); 11787+err: 11788+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 11789+ if (rsa != NULL) 11790+ RSA_free(rsa); 11791+ if (pkey != NULL) 11792+ { 11793+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 11794+ pkey = NULL; 11795+ } 11796+ return (pkey); 11797+ } 11798+ 11799+/* 11800+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure. 11801+ * The *rsa_n_num and *rsa_e_num pointers are non-NULL for RSA public keys. 11802+ */ 11803+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, 11804+ RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, 11805+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) 11806+ { 11807+ CK_RV rv; 11808+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 11809+ CK_ULONG found; 11810+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; 11811+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; 11812+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8; 11813+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; 11814+ 11815+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = 11816+ { 11817+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, 11818+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, 11819+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, 11820+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, 11821+ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, 11822+ {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, 11823+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, 11824+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0} 11825+ }; 11826+ 11827+ int i; 11828+ 11829+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; 11830+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; 11831+ 11832+ a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); 11833+ a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( 11834+ (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen); 11835+ if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL) 11836+ { 11837+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 11838+ goto malloc_err; 11839+ } 11840+ 11841+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[6].pValue); 11842+ 11843+ a_key_template[7].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e); 11844+ a_key_template[7].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( 11845+ (size_t)a_key_template[7].ulValueLen); 11846+ if (a_key_template[7].pValue == NULL) 11847+ { 11848+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 11849+ goto malloc_err; 11850+ } 11851+ 11852+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[7].pValue); 11853+ 11854+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ 11855+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 11856+ 11857+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, 11858+ ul_key_attr_count); 11859+ 11860+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 11861+ { 11862+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 11863+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); 11864+ goto err; 11865+ } 11866+ 11867+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); 11868+ 11869+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 11870+ { 11871+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); 11872+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 11873+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); 11874+ goto err; 11875+ } 11876+ 11877+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); 11878+ 11879+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 11880+ { 11881+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 11882+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); 11883+ goto err; 11884+ } 11885+ 11886+ if (found == 0) 11887+ { 11888+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, 11889+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); 11890+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 11891+ { 11892+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 11893+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); 11894+ goto err; 11895+ } 11896+ } 11897+ 11898+ if (rsa_n_num != NULL) 11899+ if ((*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL) 11900+ { 11901+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 11902+ rollback = TRUE; 11903+ goto err; 11904+ } 11905+ if (rsa_e_num != NULL) 11906+ if ((*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL) 11907+ { 11908+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 11909+ BN_free(*rsa_n_num); 11910+ *rsa_n_num = NULL; 11911+ rollback = TRUE; 11912+ goto err; 11913+ } 11914+ 11915+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ 11916+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err); 11917+ if (key_ptr != NULL) 11918+ *key_ptr = rsa; 11919+ 11920+err: 11921+ if (rollback) 11922+ { 11923+ /* 11924+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() 11925+ * since we are doing rollback. 11926+ */ 11927+ if (found == 0) 11928+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); 11929+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 11930+ } 11931+ 11932+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 11933+ 11934+malloc_err: 11935+ for (i = 6; i <= 7; i++) 11936+ { 11937+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) 11938+ { 11939+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); 11940+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; 11941+ } 11942+ } 11943+ 11944+ return (h_key); 11945+ } 11946+ 11947+/* 11948+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure. 11949+ * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys. 11950+ */ 11951+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE 11952+pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, 11953+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) 11954+ { 11955+ CK_RV rv; 11956+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 11957+ int i; 11958+ CK_ULONG found; 11959+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; 11960+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; 11961+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14; 11962+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; 11963+ 11964+ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */ 11965+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = 11966+ { 11967+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, 11968+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, 11969+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, 11970+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, 11971+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, 11972+ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, 11973+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, 11974+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, 11975+ {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, 11976+ {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, 11977+ {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, 11978+ {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, 11979+ {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, 11980+ {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, 11981+ }; 11982+ 11983+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0) { 11984+ h_key = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa); 11985+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 11986+ goto set; 11987+ } 11988+ 11989+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; 11990+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; 11991+ 11992+ /* Put the private key components into the template */ 11993+ if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue, 11994+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || 11995+ init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue, 11996+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 || 11997+ init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue, 11998+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 || 11999+ init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue, 12000+ &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 || 12001+ init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue, 12002+ &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 || 12003+ init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue, 12004+ &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 || 12005+ init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue, 12006+ &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 || 12007+ init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue, 12008+ &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0) 12009+ { 12010+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 12011+ goto malloc_err; 12012+ } 12013+ 12014+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ 12015+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 12016+ 12017+ /* 12018+ * We are getting the private key but the private 'd' 12019+ * component is NULL. That means this is key by reference RSA 12020+ * key. In that case, we can use only public components for 12021+ * searching for the private key handle. 12022+ */ 12023+ if (rsa->d == NULL) 12024+ { 12025+ ul_key_attr_count = 8; 12026+ /* 12027+ * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing 12028+ * session keys. 12029+ */ 12030+ a_key_template[2].pValue = &mytrue; 12031+ } 12032+ 12033+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, 12034+ ul_key_attr_count); 12035+ 12036+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 12037+ { 12038+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 12039+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); 12040+ goto err; 12041+ } 12042+ 12043+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); 12044+ 12045+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 12046+ { 12047+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); 12048+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 12049+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); 12050+ goto err; 12051+ } 12052+ 12053+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); 12054+ 12055+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 12056+ { 12057+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 12058+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); 12059+ goto err; 12060+ } 12061+ 12062+ if (found == 0) 12063+ { 12064+ /* 12065+ * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components 12066+ * only so we tried to find the private key in the 12067+ * keystore. If it was really a token key we have a 12068+ * problem. Note that for other key types we just 12069+ * create a new session key using the private 12070+ * components from the RSA structure. 12071+ */ 12072+ if (rsa->d == NULL) 12073+ { 12074+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 12075+ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND); 12076+ goto err; 12077+ } 12078+ 12079+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, 12080+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); 12081+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 12082+ { 12083+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 12084+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); 12085+ goto err; 12086+ } 12087+ } 12088+ 12089+set: 12090+ if (rsa_d_num != NULL) 12091+ { 12092+ /* 12093+ * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never 12094+ * extract private components from the keystore. In 12095+ * that case 'd' was set to NULL and we expect the 12096+ * application to properly cope with that. It is 12097+ * documented in openssl(5). In general, if keys by 12098+ * reference are used we expect it to be used 12099+ * exclusively using the high level API and then there 12100+ * is no problem. If the application expects the 12101+ * private components to be read from the keystore 12102+ * then that is not a supported way of usage. 12103+ */ 12104+ if (rsa->d != NULL && (*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL) 12105+ { 12106+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 12107+ rollback = TRUE; 12108+ goto err; 12109+ } 12110+ else 12111+ *rsa_d_num = NULL; 12112+ } 12113+ 12114+ /* 12115+ * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well 12116+ * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache 12117+ * 'n'/'e' components as well. 12118+ */ 12119+ *rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n); 12120+ *rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e); 12121+ 12122+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ 12123+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err); 12124+ if (key_ptr != NULL) 12125+ *key_ptr = rsa; 12126+ 12127+err: 12128+ if (rollback) 12129+ { 12130+ /* 12131+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() 12132+ * since we are doing rollback. 12133+ */ 12134+ if (found == 0 && 12135+ (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) == 0) 12136+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); 12137+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 12138+ } 12139+ 12140+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 12141+ 12142+malloc_err: 12143+ /* 12144+ * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components. 12145+ * They need to be freed upon exit or error. 12146+ */ 12147+ for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++) 12148+ { 12149+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) 12150+ { 12151+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0, 12152+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen); 12153+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); 12154+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; 12155+ } 12156+ } 12157+ 12158+ return (h_key); 12159+ } 12160+ 12161+/* 12162+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle 12163+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. 12164+ */ 12165+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) 12166+ { 12167+ /* 12168+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the 12169+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA 12170+ * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values 12171+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. 12172+ * 12173+ * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public 12174+ * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we 12175+ * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public 12176+ * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for 12177+ * both data signing and verifying. 12178+ */ 12179+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) || 12180+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) || 12181+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0) || 12182+ (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) 12183+ { 12184+ /* 12185+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of 12186+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer 12187+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() 12188+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. 12189+ */ 12190+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE); 12191+ return (0); 12192+ } 12193+ return (1); 12194+ } 12195+ 12196+/* 12197+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle 12198+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. 12199+ */ 12200+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) 12201+ { 12202+ /* 12203+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making 12204+ * the check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent 12205+ * of RSA key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure 12206+ * should be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the 12207+ * public component since with the keys by reference 12208+ * mechanism, private components are not in the RSA 12209+ * structure. Also, see check_new_rsa_key_pub() about why we 12210+ * compare the handle as well. 12211+ */ 12212+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) || 12213+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, rsa->n) != 0) || 12214+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, rsa->e) != 0) || 12215+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num == NULL) || 12216+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num == NULL) || 12217+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) 12218+ { 12219+ /* 12220+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of 12221+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer 12222+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() 12223+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. 12224+ */ 12225+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE); 12226+ return (0); 12227+ } 12228+ return (1); 12229+ } 12230+ 12231+/* 12232+ * Local function to simplify key template population 12233+ * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error 12234+ */ 12235+static int 12236+init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value, 12237+ CK_ULONG *ul_value_len) 12238+ { 12239+ CK_ULONG len = 0; 12240+ 12241+ /* 12242+ * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is 12243+ * easier to check that here than individually in the callers. 12244+ */ 12245+ if (bn != NULL) 12246+ len = BN_num_bytes(bn); 12247+ 12248+ if (bn == NULL || len == 0) 12249+ return (1); 12250+ 12251+ *ul_value_len = len; 12252+ *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len); 12253+ if (*p_value == NULL) 12254+ return (0); 12255+ 12256+ BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value); 12257+ 12258+ return (1); 12259+ } 12260+ 12261+static void 12262+attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn) 12263+ { 12264+ if (attr->ulValueLen > 0) 12265+ *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL); 12266+ } 12267+ 12268+/* 12269+ * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the 12270+ * object or if we find more objects based on the template we got. 12271+ * Assume object store locked. 12272+ * 12273+ * Returns: 12274+ * 1 OK 12275+ * 0 no object or more than 1 object found 12276+ */ 12277+static int 12278+find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, 12279+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey) 12280+ { 12281+ CK_RV rv; 12282+ CK_ULONG objcnt; 12283+ 12284+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK) 12285+ { 12286+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, 12287+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); 12288+ return (0); 12289+ } 12290+ 12291+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt); 12292+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 12293+ { 12294+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); 12295+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, 12296+ rv); 12297+ return (0); 12298+ } 12299+ 12300+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); 12301+ 12302+ if (objcnt > 1) 12303+ { 12304+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, 12305+ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND); 12306+ return (0); 12307+ } 12308+ else if (objcnt == 0) 12309+ { 12310+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND); 12311+ return (0); 12312+ } 12313+ return (1); 12314+ } 12315+ 12316+/* from uri stuff */ 12317+ 12318+extern char *pk11_pin; 12319+ 12320+static int pk11_get_pin(void); 12321+ 12322+static int 12323+pk11_get_pin(void) 12324+{ 12325+ char *pin; 12326+ 12327+ /* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */ 12328+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 12329+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); 12330+#else 12331+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 12332+#endif 12333+ pin = getpassphrase("Enter PIN: "); 12334+ if (pin == NULL) 12335+ { 12336+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN); 12337+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 12338+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 12339+#else 12340+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 12341+#endif 12342+ return (0); 12343+ } 12344+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(pin); 12345+ if (pk11_pin == NULL) 12346+ { 12347+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 12348+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 12349+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 12350+#else 12351+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 12352+#endif 12353+ return (0); 12354+ } 12355+ memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin)); 12356+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 12357+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 12358+#else 12359+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 12360+#endif 12361+ return (1); 12362+ } 12363+ 12364+/* 12365+ * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of 12366+ * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from 12367+ * multiple threads. 12368+ * 12369+ * Returns: 12370+ * 1 on success 12371+ * 0 on failure 12372+ */ 12373+static int 12374+pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, 12375+ CK_BBOOL is_private) 12376+ { 12377+ CK_RV rv; 12378+ 12379+#if 0 12380+ /* doesn't work on the AEP Keyper??? */ 12381+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) 12382+ { 12383+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 12384+ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED); 12385+ return (0); 12386+ } 12387+#endif 12388+ 12389+ /* 12390+ * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been 12391+ * even initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we 12392+ * are supposed to always log in if we are going to access 12393+ * private keys. However, we may need to log in even for 12394+ * accessing public keys in case that the CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED 12395+ * flag is set. 12396+ */ 12397+ if (((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) || 12398+ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) && 12399+ (~pubkey_token_flags & CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED)) 12400+ { 12401+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET); 12402+ return (0); 12403+ } 12404+ 12405+ /* 12406+ * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread 12407+ * gets into pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We 12408+ * cannot avoid it since we cannot guard fork() in there with 12409+ * a lock because we could end up in a dead lock in the 12410+ * child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded environment 12411+ * so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to 12412+ * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call 12413+ * fork() held a lock, making future unlocking impossible. We 12414+ * lock right before C_Login(). 12415+ */ 12416+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) || 12417+ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) 12418+ { 12419+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) 12420+ { 12421+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0)) 12422+ { 12423+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 12424+ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED); 12425+ return (0); 12426+ } 12427+ } 12428+ 12429+ /* 12430+ * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from 12431+ * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here. 12432+ * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in 12433+ * the engine. 12434+ * 12435+ * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once. 12436+ * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy. 12437+ */ 12438+ 12439+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 12440+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); 12441+#else 12442+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 12443+#endif 12444+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) 12445+ { 12446+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, 12447+ CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin, 12448+ strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK) 12449+ { 12450+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 12451+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); 12452+ goto err_locked; 12453+ } 12454+ 12455+ *login_done = CK_TRUE; 12456+ 12457+ } 12458+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 12459+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 12460+#else 12461+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 12462+#endif 12463+ } 12464+ else 12465+ { 12466+ /* 12467+ * If token does not require login we take it as the 12468+ * login was done. 12469+ */ 12470+ *login_done = CK_TRUE; 12471+ } 12472+ 12473+ return (1); 12474+ 12475+err_locked: 12476+ if (pk11_pin) { 12477+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); 12478+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); 12479+ } 12480+ pk11_pin = NULL; 12481+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 12482+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 12483+#else 12484+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 12485+#endif 12486+ return (0); 12487+ } 12488+ 12489+/* 12490+ * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the 12491+ * parent. There are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login() 12492+ * but still it is quite different so we need a separate function for 12493+ * this. 12494+ * 12495+ * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is 12496+ * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once. 12497+ * 12498+ * Returns: 12499+ * 1 on success 12500+ * 0 on failure 12501+ */ 12502+int 12503+pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) 12504+ { 12505+ CK_RV rv; 12506+ 12507+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0)) 12508+ return (0); 12509+ 12510+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 12511+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); 12512+#else 12513+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 12514+#endif 12515+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER, 12516+ (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pk11_pin, strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK) 12517+ { 12518+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, 12519+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); 12520+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 12521+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 12522+#else 12523+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 12524+#endif 12525+ return (0); 12526+ } 12527+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 12528+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 12529+#else 12530+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 12531+#endif 12532+ 12533+ return (1); 12534+ } 12535+ 12536+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 12537+char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt) 12538+ { 12539+ static char buf[128]; 12540+ HANDLE h; 12541+ DWORD cc, mode; 12542+ int cnt; 12543+ 12544+ h = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE); 12545+ fputs(prompt, stderr); 12546+ fflush(stderr); 12547+ fflush(stdout); 12548+ FlushConsoleInputBuffer(h); 12549+ GetConsoleMode(h, &mode); 12550+ SetConsoleMode(h, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT); 12551+ 12552+ for (cnt = 0; cnt < sizeof(buf) - 1; cnt++) 12553+ { 12554+ ReadFile(h, buf + cnt, 1, &cc, NULL); 12555+ if (buf[cnt] == '\r') 12556+ break; 12557+ fputc('*', stdout); 12558+ fflush(stderr); 12559+ fflush(stdout); 12560+ } 12561+ 12562+ SetConsoleMode(h, mode); 12563+ buf[cnt] = '\0'; 12564+ fputs("\n", stderr); 12565+ return buf; 12566+ } 12567+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */ 12568+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO */ 12569+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ 12570+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ 12571Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h 12572diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h:1.1.1.1 12573--- /dev/null Fri Jan 2 14:59:08 2015 12574+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h Wed Oct 24 23:27:09 2007 12575@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@ 12576+/* pkcs11.h include file for PKCS #11. */ 12577+/* Revision: 1.1.1.1 */ 12578+ 12579+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is 12580+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface 12581+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software. 12582+ 12583+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that 12584+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 12585+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or 12586+ * referencing the derived work. 12587+ 12588+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the 12589+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for 12590+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied 12591+ * warranty of any kind. 12592+ */ 12593+ 12594+#ifndef _PKCS11_H_ 12595+#define _PKCS11_H_ 1 12596+ 12597+#ifdef __cplusplus 12598+extern "C" { 12599+#endif 12600+ 12601+/* Before including this file (pkcs11.h) (or pkcs11t.h by 12602+ * itself), 6 platform-specific macros must be defined. These 12603+ * macros are described below, and typical definitions for them 12604+ * are also given. Be advised that these definitions can depend 12605+ * on both the platform and the compiler used (and possibly also 12606+ * on whether a Cryptoki library is linked statically or 12607+ * dynamically). 12608+ * 12609+ * In addition to defining these 6 macros, the packing convention 12610+ * for Cryptoki structures should be set. The Cryptoki 12611+ * convention on packing is that structures should be 1-byte 12612+ * aligned. 12613+ * 12614+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to produce 12615+ * Win32 stuff, this might be done by using the following 12616+ * preprocessor directive before including pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h: 12617+ * 12618+ * #pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) 12619+ * 12620+ * and using the following preprocessor directive after including 12621+ * pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h: 12622+ * 12623+ * #pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) 12624+ * 12625+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer 12626+ * Studio to produce Win16 stuff, this might be done by using 12627+ * the following preprocessor directive before including 12628+ * pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h: 12629+ * 12630+ * #pragma pack(1) 12631+ * 12632+ * In a UNIX environment, you're on your own for this. You might 12633+ * not need to do (or be able to do!) anything. 12634+ * 12635+ * 12636+ * Now for the macros: 12637+ * 12638+ * 12639+ * 1. CK_PTR: The indirection string for making a pointer to an 12640+ * object. It can be used like this: 12641+ * 12642+ * typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR; 12643+ * 12644+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to produce 12645+ * Win32 stuff, it might be defined by: 12646+ * 12647+ * #define CK_PTR * 12648+ * 12649+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer 12650+ * Studio to produce Win16 stuff, it might be defined by: 12651+ * 12652+ * #define CK_PTR far * 12653+ * 12654+ * In a typical UNIX environment, it might be defined by: 12655+ * 12656+ * #define CK_PTR * 12657+ * 12658+ * 12659+ * 2. CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes 12660+ * an exportable Cryptoki library function definition out of a 12661+ * return type and a function name. It should be used in the 12662+ * following fashion to define the exposed Cryptoki functions in 12663+ * a Cryptoki library: 12664+ * 12665+ * CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)( 12666+ * CK_VOID_PTR pReserved 12667+ * ) 12668+ * { 12669+ * ... 12670+ * } 12671+ * 12672+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to define a 12673+ * function in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, it might be defined by: 12674+ * 12675+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 12676+ * returnType __declspec(dllexport) name 12677+ * 12678+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer 12679+ * Studio to define a function in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it 12680+ * might be defined by: 12681+ * 12682+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 12683+ * returnType __export _far _pascal name 12684+ * 12685+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by: 12686+ * 12687+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 12688+ * returnType name 12689+ * 12690+ * 12691+ * 3. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes 12692+ * an importable Cryptoki library function declaration out of a 12693+ * return type and a function name. It should be used in the 12694+ * following fashion: 12695+ * 12696+ * extern CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)( 12697+ * CK_VOID_PTR pReserved 12698+ * ); 12699+ * 12700+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to declare a 12701+ * function in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, it might be defined by: 12702+ * 12703+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 12704+ * returnType __declspec(dllimport) name 12705+ * 12706+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer 12707+ * Studio to declare a function in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it 12708+ * might be defined by: 12709+ * 12710+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 12711+ * returnType __export _far _pascal name 12712+ * 12713+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by: 12714+ * 12715+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 12716+ * returnType name 12717+ * 12718+ * 12719+ * 4. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name): A macro 12720+ * which makes a Cryptoki API function pointer declaration or 12721+ * function pointer type declaration out of a return type and a 12722+ * function name. It should be used in the following fashion: 12723+ * 12724+ * // Define funcPtr to be a pointer to a Cryptoki API function 12725+ * // taking arguments args and returning CK_RV. 12726+ * CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtr)(args); 12727+ * 12728+ * or 12729+ * 12730+ * // Define funcPtrType to be the type of a pointer to a 12731+ * // Cryptoki API function taking arguments args and returning 12732+ * // CK_RV, and then define funcPtr to be a variable of type 12733+ * // funcPtrType. 12734+ * typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtrType)(args); 12735+ * funcPtrType funcPtr; 12736+ * 12737+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to access 12738+ * functions in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, in might be defined by: 12739+ * 12740+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ 12741+ * returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) 12742+ * 12743+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer 12744+ * Studio to access functions in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it might 12745+ * be defined by: 12746+ * 12747+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ 12748+ * returnType __export _far _pascal (* name) 12749+ * 12750+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by: 12751+ * 12752+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ 12753+ * returnType (* name) 12754+ * 12755+ * 12756+ * 5. CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes 12757+ * a function pointer type for an application callback out of 12758+ * a return type for the callback and a name for the callback. 12759+ * It should be used in the following fashion: 12760+ * 12761+ * CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallback)(args); 12762+ * 12763+ * to declare a function pointer, myCallback, to a callback 12764+ * which takes arguments args and returns a CK_RV. It can also 12765+ * be used like this: 12766+ * 12767+ * typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallbackType)(args); 12768+ * myCallbackType myCallback; 12769+ * 12770+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to do Win32 12771+ * Cryptoki development, it might be defined by: 12772+ * 12773+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 12774+ * returnType (* name) 12775+ * 12776+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer 12777+ * Studio to do Win16 development, it might be defined by: 12778+ * 12779+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 12780+ * returnType _far _pascal (* name) 12781+ * 12782+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by: 12783+ * 12784+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 12785+ * returnType (* name) 12786+ * 12787+ * 12788+ * 6. NULL_PTR: This macro is the value of a NULL pointer. 12789+ * 12790+ * In any ANSI/ISO C environment (and in many others as well), 12791+ * this should best be defined by 12792+ * 12793+ * #ifndef NULL_PTR 12794+ * #define NULL_PTR 0 12795+ * #endif 12796+ */ 12797+ 12798+ 12799+/* All the various Cryptoki types and #define'd values are in the 12800+ * file pkcs11t.h. */ 12801+#include "pkcs11t.h" 12802+ 12803+#define __PASTE(x,y) x##y 12804+ 12805+ 12806+/* ============================================================== 12807+ * Define the "extern" form of all the entry points. 12808+ * ============================================================== 12809+ */ 12810+ 12811+#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1 12812+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \ 12813+ extern CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, name) 12814+ 12815+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki 12816+ * function prototypes. */ 12817+#include "pkcs11f.h" 12818+ 12819+#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 12820+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO 12821+ 12822+ 12823+/* ============================================================== 12824+ * Define the typedef form of all the entry points. That is, for 12825+ * each Cryptoki function C_XXX, define a type CK_C_XXX which is 12826+ * a pointer to that kind of function. 12827+ * ============================================================== 12828+ */ 12829+ 12830+#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1 12831+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \ 12832+ typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, __PASTE(CK_,name)) 12833+ 12834+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki 12835+ * function prototypes. */ 12836+#include "pkcs11f.h" 12837+ 12838+#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 12839+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO 12840+ 12841+ 12842+/* ============================================================== 12843+ * Define structed vector of entry points. A CK_FUNCTION_LIST 12844+ * contains a CK_VERSION indicating a library's Cryptoki version 12845+ * and then a whole slew of function pointers to the routines in 12846+ * the library. This type was declared, but not defined, in 12847+ * pkcs11t.h. 12848+ * ============================================================== 12849+ */ 12850+ 12851+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \ 12852+ __PASTE(CK_,name) name; 12853+ 12854+struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST { 12855+ 12856+ CK_VERSION version; /* Cryptoki version */ 12857+ 12858+/* Pile all the function pointers into the CK_FUNCTION_LIST. */ 12859+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki 12860+ * function prototypes. */ 12861+#include "pkcs11f.h" 12862+ 12863+}; 12864+ 12865+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO 12866+ 12867+ 12868+#undef __PASTE 12869+ 12870+#ifdef __cplusplus 12871+} 12872+#endif 12873+ 12874+#endif 12875Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h 12876diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h:1.1.1.1 12877--- /dev/null Fri Jan 2 14:59:08 2015 12878+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h Wed Oct 24 23:27:09 2007 12879@@ -0,0 +1,912 @@ 12880+/* pkcs11f.h include file for PKCS #11. */ 12881+/* Revision: 1.1.1.1 */ 12882+ 12883+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is 12884+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface 12885+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software. 12886+ 12887+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that 12888+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 12889+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or 12890+ * referencing the derived work. 12891+ 12892+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the 12893+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for 12894+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied 12895+ * warranty of any kind. 12896+ */ 12897+ 12898+/* This header file contains pretty much everything about all the */ 12899+/* Cryptoki function prototypes. Because this information is */ 12900+/* used for more than just declaring function prototypes, the */ 12901+/* order of the functions appearing herein is important, and */ 12902+/* should not be altered. */ 12903+ 12904+/* General-purpose */ 12905+ 12906+/* C_Initialize initializes the Cryptoki library. */ 12907+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Initialize) 12908+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 12909+( 12910+ CK_VOID_PTR pInitArgs /* if this is not NULL_PTR, it gets 12911+ * cast to CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR 12912+ * and dereferenced */ 12913+); 12914+#endif 12915+ 12916+ 12917+/* C_Finalize indicates that an application is done with the 12918+ * Cryptoki library. */ 12919+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Finalize) 12920+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 12921+( 12922+ CK_VOID_PTR pReserved /* reserved. Should be NULL_PTR */ 12923+); 12924+#endif 12925+ 12926+ 12927+/* C_GetInfo returns general information about Cryptoki. */ 12928+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetInfo) 12929+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 12930+( 12931+ CK_INFO_PTR pInfo /* location that receives information */ 12932+); 12933+#endif 12934+ 12935+ 12936+/* C_GetFunctionList returns the function list. */ 12937+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionList) 12938+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 12939+( 12940+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR ppFunctionList /* receives pointer to 12941+ * function list */ 12942+); 12943+#endif 12944+ 12945+ 12946+ 12947+/* Slot and token management */ 12948+ 12949+/* C_GetSlotList obtains a list of slots in the system. */ 12950+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotList) 12951+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 12952+( 12953+ CK_BBOOL tokenPresent, /* only slots with tokens? */ 12954+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList, /* receives array of slot IDs */ 12955+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount /* receives number of slots */ 12956+); 12957+#endif 12958+ 12959+ 12960+/* C_GetSlotInfo obtains information about a particular slot in 12961+ * the system. */ 12962+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotInfo) 12963+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 12964+( 12965+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* the ID of the slot */ 12966+ CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives the slot information */ 12967+); 12968+#endif 12969+ 12970+ 12971+/* C_GetTokenInfo obtains information about a particular token 12972+ * in the system. */ 12973+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetTokenInfo) 12974+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 12975+( 12976+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */ 12977+ CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives the token information */ 12978+); 12979+#endif 12980+ 12981+ 12982+/* C_GetMechanismList obtains a list of mechanism types 12983+ * supported by a token. */ 12984+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismList) 12985+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 12986+( 12987+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of token's slot */ 12988+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR pMechanismList, /* gets mech. array */ 12989+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount /* gets # of mechs. */ 12990+); 12991+#endif 12992+ 12993+ 12994+/* C_GetMechanismInfo obtains information about a particular 12995+ * mechanism possibly supported by a token. */ 12996+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismInfo) 12997+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 12998+( 12999+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */ 13000+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, /* type of mechanism */ 13001+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives mechanism info */ 13002+); 13003+#endif 13004+ 13005+ 13006+/* C_InitToken initializes a token. */ 13007+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitToken) 13008+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13009+/* pLabel changed from CK_CHAR_PTR to CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR for v2.10 */ 13010+( 13011+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */ 13012+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the SO's initial PIN */ 13013+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen, /* length in bytes of the PIN */ 13014+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pLabel /* 32-byte token label (blank padded) */ 13015+); 13016+#endif 13017+ 13018+ 13019+/* C_InitPIN initializes the normal user's PIN. */ 13020+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitPIN) 13021+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13022+( 13023+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13024+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the normal user's PIN */ 13025+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen /* length in bytes of the PIN */ 13026+); 13027+#endif 13028+ 13029+ 13030+/* C_SetPIN modifies the PIN of the user who is logged in. */ 13031+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetPIN) 13032+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13033+( 13034+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13035+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pOldPin, /* the old PIN */ 13036+ CK_ULONG ulOldLen, /* length of the old PIN */ 13037+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pNewPin, /* the new PIN */ 13038+ CK_ULONG ulNewLen /* length of the new PIN */ 13039+); 13040+#endif 13041+ 13042+ 13043+ 13044+/* Session management */ 13045+ 13046+/* C_OpenSession opens a session between an application and a 13047+ * token. */ 13048+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_OpenSession) 13049+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13050+( 13051+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* the slot's ID */ 13052+ CK_FLAGS flags, /* from CK_SESSION_INFO */ 13053+ CK_VOID_PTR pApplication, /* passed to callback */ 13054+ CK_NOTIFY Notify, /* callback function */ 13055+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR phSession /* gets session handle */ 13056+); 13057+#endif 13058+ 13059+ 13060+/* C_CloseSession closes a session between an application and a 13061+ * token. */ 13062+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseSession) 13063+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13064+( 13065+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ 13066+); 13067+#endif 13068+ 13069+ 13070+/* C_CloseAllSessions closes all sessions with a token. */ 13071+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseAllSessions) 13072+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13073+( 13074+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID /* the token's slot */ 13075+); 13076+#endif 13077+ 13078+ 13079+/* C_GetSessionInfo obtains information about the session. */ 13080+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSessionInfo) 13081+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13082+( 13083+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13084+ CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives session info */ 13085+); 13086+#endif 13087+ 13088+ 13089+/* C_GetOperationState obtains the state of the cryptographic operation 13090+ * in a session. */ 13091+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetOperationState) 13092+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13093+( 13094+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ 13095+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, /* gets state */ 13096+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOperationStateLen /* gets state length */ 13097+); 13098+#endif 13099+ 13100+ 13101+/* C_SetOperationState restores the state of the cryptographic 13102+ * operation in a session. */ 13103+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetOperationState) 13104+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13105+( 13106+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ 13107+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, /* holds state */ 13108+ CK_ULONG ulOperationStateLen, /* holds state length */ 13109+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey, /* en/decryption key */ 13110+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hAuthenticationKey /* sign/verify key */ 13111+); 13112+#endif 13113+ 13114+ 13115+/* C_Login logs a user into a token. */ 13116+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Login) 13117+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13118+( 13119+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13120+ CK_USER_TYPE userType, /* the user type */ 13121+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the user's PIN */ 13122+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen /* the length of the PIN */ 13123+); 13124+#endif 13125+ 13126+ 13127+/* C_Logout logs a user out from a token. */ 13128+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Logout) 13129+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13130+( 13131+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ 13132+); 13133+#endif 13134+ 13135+ 13136+ 13137+/* Object management */ 13138+ 13139+/* C_CreateObject creates a new object. */ 13140+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CreateObject) 13141+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13142+( 13143+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13144+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* the object's template */ 13145+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* attributes in template */ 13146+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject /* gets new object's handle. */ 13147+); 13148+#endif 13149+ 13150+ 13151+/* C_CopyObject copies an object, creating a new object for the 13152+ * copy. */ 13153+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CopyObject) 13154+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13155+( 13156+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13157+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ 13158+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* template for new object */ 13159+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* attributes in template */ 13160+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phNewObject /* receives handle of copy */ 13161+); 13162+#endif 13163+ 13164+ 13165+/* C_DestroyObject destroys an object. */ 13166+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DestroyObject) 13167+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13168+( 13169+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13170+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject /* the object's handle */ 13171+); 13172+#endif 13173+ 13174+ 13175+/* C_GetObjectSize gets the size of an object in bytes. */ 13176+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetObjectSize) 13177+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13178+( 13179+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13180+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ 13181+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSize /* receives size of object */ 13182+); 13183+#endif 13184+ 13185+ 13186+/* C_GetAttributeValue obtains the value of one or more object 13187+ * attributes. */ 13188+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetAttributeValue) 13189+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13190+( 13191+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13192+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ 13193+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* specifies attrs; gets vals */ 13194+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attributes in template */ 13195+); 13196+#endif 13197+ 13198+ 13199+/* C_SetAttributeValue modifies the value of one or more object 13200+ * attributes */ 13201+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetAttributeValue) 13202+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13203+( 13204+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13205+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ 13206+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* specifies attrs and values */ 13207+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attributes in template */ 13208+); 13209+#endif 13210+ 13211+ 13212+/* C_FindObjectsInit initializes a search for token and session 13213+ * objects that match a template. */ 13214+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsInit) 13215+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13216+( 13217+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13218+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* attribute values to match */ 13219+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attrs in search template */ 13220+); 13221+#endif 13222+ 13223+ 13224+/* C_FindObjects continues a search for token and session 13225+ * objects that match a template, obtaining additional object 13226+ * handles. */ 13227+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjects) 13228+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13229+( 13230+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ 13231+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject, /* gets obj. handles */ 13232+ CK_ULONG ulMaxObjectCount, /* max handles to get */ 13233+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulObjectCount /* actual # returned */ 13234+); 13235+#endif 13236+ 13237+ 13238+/* C_FindObjectsFinal finishes a search for token and session 13239+ * objects. */ 13240+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsFinal) 13241+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13242+( 13243+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ 13244+); 13245+#endif 13246+ 13247+ 13248+ 13249+/* Encryption and decryption */ 13250+ 13251+/* C_EncryptInit initializes an encryption operation. */ 13252+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptInit) 13253+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13254+( 13255+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13256+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the encryption mechanism */ 13257+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of encryption key */ 13258+); 13259+#endif 13260+ 13261+ 13262+/* C_Encrypt encrypts single-part data. */ 13263+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Encrypt) 13264+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13265+( 13266+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ 13267+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the plaintext data */ 13268+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* bytes of plaintext */ 13269+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, /* gets ciphertext */ 13270+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen /* gets c-text size */ 13271+); 13272+#endif 13273+ 13274+ 13275+/* C_EncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part encryption 13276+ * operation. */ 13277+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptUpdate) 13278+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13279+( 13280+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ 13281+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */ 13282+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext data len */ 13283+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */ 13284+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text size */ 13285+); 13286+#endif 13287+ 13288+ 13289+/* C_EncryptFinal finishes a multiple-part encryption 13290+ * operation. */ 13291+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptFinal) 13292+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13293+( 13294+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session handle */ 13295+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLastEncryptedPart, /* last c-text */ 13296+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastEncryptedPartLen /* gets last size */ 13297+); 13298+#endif 13299+ 13300+ 13301+/* C_DecryptInit initializes a decryption operation. */ 13302+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptInit) 13303+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13304+( 13305+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13306+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the decryption mechanism */ 13307+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of decryption key */ 13308+); 13309+#endif 13310+ 13311+ 13312+/* C_Decrypt decrypts encrypted data in a single part. */ 13313+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Decrypt) 13314+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13315+( 13316+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ 13317+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, /* ciphertext */ 13318+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen, /* ciphertext length */ 13319+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* gets plaintext */ 13320+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen /* gets p-text size */ 13321+); 13322+#endif 13323+ 13324+ 13325+/* C_DecryptUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption 13326+ * operation. */ 13327+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptUpdate) 13328+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13329+( 13330+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ 13331+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* encrypted data */ 13332+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* input length */ 13333+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */ 13334+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* p-text size */ 13335+); 13336+#endif 13337+ 13338+ 13339+/* C_DecryptFinal finishes a multiple-part decryption 13340+ * operation. */ 13341+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptFinal) 13342+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13343+( 13344+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13345+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLastPart, /* gets plaintext */ 13346+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastPartLen /* p-text size */ 13347+); 13348+#endif 13349+ 13350+ 13351+ 13352+/* Message digesting */ 13353+ 13354+/* C_DigestInit initializes a message-digesting operation. */ 13355+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestInit) 13356+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13357+( 13358+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13359+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism /* the digesting mechanism */ 13360+); 13361+#endif 13362+ 13363+ 13364+/* C_Digest digests data in a single part. */ 13365+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Digest) 13366+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13367+( 13368+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13369+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* data to be digested */ 13370+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* bytes of data to digest */ 13371+ CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, /* gets the message digest */ 13372+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen /* gets digest length */ 13373+); 13374+#endif 13375+ 13376+ 13377+/* C_DigestUpdate continues a multiple-part message-digesting 13378+ * operation. */ 13379+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestUpdate) 13380+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13381+( 13382+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13383+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* data to be digested */ 13384+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* bytes of data to be digested */ 13385+); 13386+#endif 13387+ 13388+ 13389+/* C_DigestKey continues a multi-part message-digesting 13390+ * operation, by digesting the value of a secret key as part of 13391+ * the data already digested. */ 13392+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestKey) 13393+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13394+( 13395+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13396+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* secret key to digest */ 13397+); 13398+#endif 13399+ 13400+ 13401+/* C_DigestFinal finishes a multiple-part message-digesting 13402+ * operation. */ 13403+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestFinal) 13404+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13405+( 13406+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13407+ CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, /* gets the message digest */ 13408+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen /* gets byte count of digest */ 13409+); 13410+#endif 13411+ 13412+ 13413+ 13414+/* Signing and MACing */ 13415+ 13416+/* C_SignInit initializes a signature (private key encryption) 13417+ * operation, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to 13418+ * the data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the 13419+ *signature. */ 13420+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignInit) 13421+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13422+( 13423+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13424+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the signature mechanism */ 13425+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of signature key */ 13426+); 13427+#endif 13428+ 13429+ 13430+/* C_Sign signs (encrypts with private key) data in a single 13431+ * part, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the 13432+ * data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */ 13433+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Sign) 13434+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13435+( 13436+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13437+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the data to sign */ 13438+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* count of bytes to sign */ 13439+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */ 13440+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */ 13441+); 13442+#endif 13443+ 13444+ 13445+/* C_SignUpdate continues a multiple-part signature operation, 13446+ * where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data, 13447+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */ 13448+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignUpdate) 13449+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13450+( 13451+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13452+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the data to sign */ 13453+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* count of bytes to sign */ 13454+); 13455+#endif 13456+ 13457+ 13458+/* C_SignFinal finishes a multiple-part signature operation, 13459+ * returning the signature. */ 13460+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignFinal) 13461+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13462+( 13463+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13464+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */ 13465+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */ 13466+); 13467+#endif 13468+ 13469+ 13470+/* C_SignRecoverInit initializes a signature operation, where 13471+ * the data can be recovered from the signature. */ 13472+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecoverInit) 13473+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13474+( 13475+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13476+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the signature mechanism */ 13477+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of the signature key */ 13478+); 13479+#endif 13480+ 13481+ 13482+/* C_SignRecover signs data in a single operation, where the 13483+ * data can be recovered from the signature. */ 13484+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecover) 13485+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13486+( 13487+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13488+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the data to sign */ 13489+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* count of bytes to sign */ 13490+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */ 13491+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */ 13492+); 13493+#endif 13494+ 13495+ 13496+ 13497+/* Verifying signatures and MACs */ 13498+ 13499+/* C_VerifyInit initializes a verification operation, where the 13500+ * signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext cannot 13501+ * cannot be recovered from the signature (e.g. DSA). */ 13502+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyInit) 13503+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13504+( 13505+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13506+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the verification mechanism */ 13507+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* verification key */ 13508+); 13509+#endif 13510+ 13511+ 13512+/* C_Verify verifies a signature in a single-part operation, 13513+ * where the signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext 13514+ * cannot be recovered from the signature. */ 13515+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Verify) 13516+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13517+( 13518+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13519+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* signed data */ 13520+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* length of signed data */ 13521+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature */ 13522+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen /* signature length*/ 13523+); 13524+#endif 13525+ 13526+ 13527+/* C_VerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part verification 13528+ * operation, where the signature is an appendix to the data, 13529+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */ 13530+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyUpdate) 13531+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13532+( 13533+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13534+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* signed data */ 13535+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* length of signed data */ 13536+); 13537+#endif 13538+ 13539+ 13540+/* C_VerifyFinal finishes a multiple-part verification 13541+ * operation, checking the signature. */ 13542+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyFinal) 13543+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13544+( 13545+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13546+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature to verify */ 13547+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen /* signature length */ 13548+); 13549+#endif 13550+ 13551+ 13552+/* C_VerifyRecoverInit initializes a signature verification 13553+ * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */ 13554+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecoverInit) 13555+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13556+( 13557+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13558+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the verification mechanism */ 13559+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* verification key */ 13560+); 13561+#endif 13562+ 13563+ 13564+/* C_VerifyRecover verifies a signature in a single-part 13565+ * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */ 13566+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecover) 13567+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13568+( 13569+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13570+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature to verify */ 13571+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen, /* signature length */ 13572+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* gets signed data */ 13573+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen /* gets signed data len */ 13574+); 13575+#endif 13576+ 13577+ 13578+ 13579+/* Dual-function cryptographic operations */ 13580+ 13581+/* C_DigestEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part digesting 13582+ * and encryption operation. */ 13583+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestEncryptUpdate) 13584+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13585+( 13586+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ 13587+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */ 13588+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext length */ 13589+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */ 13590+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text length */ 13591+); 13592+#endif 13593+ 13594+ 13595+/* C_DecryptDigestUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and 13596+ * digesting operation. */ 13597+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptDigestUpdate) 13598+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13599+( 13600+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ 13601+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* ciphertext */ 13602+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* ciphertext length */ 13603+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */ 13604+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* gets plaintext len */ 13605+); 13606+#endif 13607+ 13608+ 13609+/* C_SignEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part signing and 13610+ * encryption operation. */ 13611+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignEncryptUpdate) 13612+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13613+( 13614+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ 13615+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */ 13616+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext length */ 13617+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */ 13618+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text length */ 13619+); 13620+#endif 13621+ 13622+ 13623+/* C_DecryptVerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and 13624+ * verify operation. */ 13625+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptVerifyUpdate) 13626+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13627+( 13628+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ 13629+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* ciphertext */ 13630+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* ciphertext length */ 13631+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */ 13632+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* gets p-text length */ 13633+); 13634+#endif 13635+ 13636+ 13637+ 13638+/* Key management */ 13639+ 13640+/* C_GenerateKey generates a secret key, creating a new key 13641+ * object. */ 13642+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKey) 13643+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13644+( 13645+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13646+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key generation mech. */ 13647+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* template for new key */ 13648+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* # of attrs in template */ 13649+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets handle of new key */ 13650+); 13651+#endif 13652+ 13653+ 13654+/* C_GenerateKeyPair generates a public-key/private-key pair, 13655+ * creating new key objects. */ 13656+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKeyPair) 13657+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13658+( 13659+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session 13660+ * handle */ 13661+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key-gen 13662+ * mech. */ 13663+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPublicKeyTemplate, /* template 13664+ * for pub. 13665+ * key */ 13666+ CK_ULONG ulPublicKeyAttributeCount, /* # pub. 13667+ * attrs. */ 13668+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPrivateKeyTemplate, /* template 13669+ * for priv. 13670+ * key */ 13671+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount, /* # priv. 13672+ * attrs. */ 13673+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey, /* gets pub. 13674+ * key 13675+ * handle */ 13676+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey /* gets 13677+ * priv. key 13678+ * handle */ 13679+); 13680+#endif 13681+ 13682+ 13683+/* C_WrapKey wraps (i.e., encrypts) a key. */ 13684+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WrapKey) 13685+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13686+( 13687+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13688+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the wrapping mechanism */ 13689+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey, /* wrapping key */ 13690+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, /* key to be wrapped */ 13691+ CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, /* gets wrapped key */ 13692+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulWrappedKeyLen /* gets wrapped key size */ 13693+); 13694+#endif 13695+ 13696+ 13697+/* C_UnwrapKey unwraps (decrypts) a wrapped key, creating a new 13698+ * key object. */ 13699+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_UnwrapKey) 13700+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13701+( 13702+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ 13703+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* unwrapping mech. */ 13704+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey, /* unwrapping key */ 13705+ CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, /* the wrapped key */ 13706+ CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen, /* wrapped key len */ 13707+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* new key template */ 13708+ CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, /* template length */ 13709+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets new handle */ 13710+); 13711+#endif 13712+ 13713+ 13714+/* C_DeriveKey derives a key from a base key, creating a new key 13715+ * object. */ 13716+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DeriveKey) 13717+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13718+( 13719+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ 13720+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key deriv. mech. */ 13721+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey, /* base key */ 13722+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* new key template */ 13723+ CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, /* template length */ 13724+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets new handle */ 13725+); 13726+#endif 13727+ 13728+ 13729+ 13730+/* Random number generation */ 13731+ 13732+/* C_SeedRandom mixes additional seed material into the token's 13733+ * random number generator. */ 13734+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SeedRandom) 13735+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13736+( 13737+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13738+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed, /* the seed material */ 13739+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen /* length of seed material */ 13740+); 13741+#endif 13742+ 13743+ 13744+/* C_GenerateRandom generates random data. */ 13745+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateRandom) 13746+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13747+( 13748+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13749+ CK_BYTE_PTR RandomData, /* receives the random data */ 13750+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen /* # of bytes to generate */ 13751+); 13752+#endif 13753+ 13754+ 13755+ 13756+/* Parallel function management */ 13757+ 13758+/* C_GetFunctionStatus is a legacy function; it obtains an 13759+ * updated status of a function running in parallel with an 13760+ * application. */ 13761+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionStatus) 13762+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13763+( 13764+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ 13765+); 13766+#endif 13767+ 13768+ 13769+/* C_CancelFunction is a legacy function; it cancels a function 13770+ * running in parallel. */ 13771+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CancelFunction) 13772+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13773+( 13774+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ 13775+); 13776+#endif 13777+ 13778+ 13779+ 13780+/* Functions added in for Cryptoki Version 2.01 or later */ 13781+ 13782+/* C_WaitForSlotEvent waits for a slot event (token insertion, 13783+ * removal, etc.) to occur. */ 13784+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WaitForSlotEvent) 13785+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13786+( 13787+ CK_FLAGS flags, /* blocking/nonblocking flag */ 13788+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlot, /* location that receives the slot ID */ 13789+ CK_VOID_PTR pRserved /* reserved. Should be NULL_PTR */ 13790+); 13791+#endif 13792Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h 13793diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h:1.2 13794--- /dev/null Fri Jan 2 14:59:08 2015 13795+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h Sat Aug 30 11:58:07 2008 13796@@ -0,0 +1,1885 @@ 13797+/* pkcs11t.h include file for PKCS #11. */ 13798+/* Revision: 1.2 */ 13799+ 13800+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is 13801+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface 13802+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software. 13803+ 13804+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that 13805+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 13806+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or 13807+ * referencing the derived work. 13808+ 13809+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the 13810+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for 13811+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied 13812+ * warranty of any kind. 13813+ */ 13814+ 13815+/* See top of pkcs11.h for information about the macros that 13816+ * must be defined and the structure-packing conventions that 13817+ * must be set before including this file. */ 13818+ 13819+#ifndef _PKCS11T_H_ 13820+#define _PKCS11T_H_ 1 13821+ 13822+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MAJOR 2 13823+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MINOR 20 13824+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_AMENDMENT 3 13825+ 13826+#define CK_TRUE 1 13827+#define CK_FALSE 0 13828+ 13829+#ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE 13830+#ifndef FALSE 13831+#define FALSE CK_FALSE 13832+#endif 13833+ 13834+#ifndef TRUE 13835+#define TRUE CK_TRUE 13836+#endif 13837+#endif 13838+ 13839+/* an unsigned 8-bit value */ 13840+typedef unsigned char CK_BYTE; 13841+ 13842+/* an unsigned 8-bit character */ 13843+typedef CK_BYTE CK_CHAR; 13844+ 13845+/* an 8-bit UTF-8 character */ 13846+typedef CK_BYTE CK_UTF8CHAR; 13847+ 13848+/* a BYTE-sized Boolean flag */ 13849+typedef CK_BYTE CK_BBOOL; 13850+ 13851+/* an unsigned value, at least 32 bits long */ 13852+typedef unsigned long int CK_ULONG; 13853+ 13854+/* a signed value, the same size as a CK_ULONG */ 13855+/* CK_LONG is new for v2.0 */ 13856+typedef long int CK_LONG; 13857+ 13858+/* at least 32 bits; each bit is a Boolean flag */ 13859+typedef CK_ULONG CK_FLAGS; 13860+ 13861+ 13862+/* some special values for certain CK_ULONG variables */ 13863+#define CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION (~0UL) 13864+#define CK_EFFECTIVELY_INFINITE 0 13865+ 13866+ 13867+typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR; 13868+typedef CK_CHAR CK_PTR CK_CHAR_PTR; 13869+typedef CK_UTF8CHAR CK_PTR CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR; 13870+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PTR CK_ULONG_PTR; 13871+typedef void CK_PTR CK_VOID_PTR; 13872+ 13873+/* Pointer to a CK_VOID_PTR-- i.e., pointer to pointer to void */ 13874+typedef CK_VOID_PTR CK_PTR CK_VOID_PTR_PTR; 13875+ 13876+ 13877+/* The following value is always invalid if used as a session */ 13878+/* handle or object handle */ 13879+#define CK_INVALID_HANDLE 0 13880+ 13881+ 13882+typedef struct CK_VERSION { 13883+ CK_BYTE major; /* integer portion of version number */ 13884+ CK_BYTE minor; /* 1/100ths portion of version number */ 13885+} CK_VERSION; 13886+ 13887+typedef CK_VERSION CK_PTR CK_VERSION_PTR; 13888+ 13889+ 13890+typedef struct CK_INFO { 13891+ /* manufacturerID and libraryDecription have been changed from 13892+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */ 13893+ CK_VERSION cryptokiVersion; /* Cryptoki interface ver */ 13894+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */ 13895+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* must be zero */ 13896+ 13897+ /* libraryDescription and libraryVersion are new for v2.0 */ 13898+ CK_UTF8CHAR libraryDescription[32]; /* blank padded */ 13899+ CK_VERSION libraryVersion; /* version of library */ 13900+} CK_INFO; 13901+ 13902+typedef CK_INFO CK_PTR CK_INFO_PTR; 13903+ 13904+ 13905+/* CK_NOTIFICATION enumerates the types of notifications that 13906+ * Cryptoki provides to an application */ 13907+/* CK_NOTIFICATION has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG 13908+ * for v2.0 */ 13909+typedef CK_ULONG CK_NOTIFICATION; 13910+#define CKN_SURRENDER 0 13911+ 13912+/* The following notification is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ 13913+#define CKN_OTP_CHANGED 1 13914+ 13915+ 13916+typedef CK_ULONG CK_SLOT_ID; 13917+ 13918+typedef CK_SLOT_ID CK_PTR CK_SLOT_ID_PTR; 13919+ 13920+ 13921+/* CK_SLOT_INFO provides information about a slot */ 13922+typedef struct CK_SLOT_INFO { 13923+ /* slotDescription and manufacturerID have been changed from 13924+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */ 13925+ CK_UTF8CHAR slotDescription[64]; /* blank padded */ 13926+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */ 13927+ CK_FLAGS flags; 13928+ 13929+ /* hardwareVersion and firmwareVersion are new for v2.0 */ 13930+ CK_VERSION hardwareVersion; /* version of hardware */ 13931+ CK_VERSION firmwareVersion; /* version of firmware */ 13932+} CK_SLOT_INFO; 13933+ 13934+/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot 13935+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning 13936+ */ 13937+#define CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT 0x00000001 /* a token is there */ 13938+#define CKF_REMOVABLE_DEVICE 0x00000002 /* removable devices*/ 13939+#define CKF_HW_SLOT 0x00000004 /* hardware slot */ 13940+ 13941+typedef CK_SLOT_INFO CK_PTR CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR; 13942+ 13943+ 13944+/* CK_TOKEN_INFO provides information about a token */ 13945+typedef struct CK_TOKEN_INFO { 13946+ /* label, manufacturerID, and model have been changed from 13947+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */ 13948+ CK_UTF8CHAR label[32]; /* blank padded */ 13949+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */ 13950+ CK_UTF8CHAR model[16]; /* blank padded */ 13951+ CK_CHAR serialNumber[16]; /* blank padded */ 13952+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* see below */ 13953+ 13954+ /* ulMaxSessionCount, ulSessionCount, ulMaxRwSessionCount, 13955+ * ulRwSessionCount, ulMaxPinLen, and ulMinPinLen have all been 13956+ * changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ 13957+ CK_ULONG ulMaxSessionCount; /* max open sessions */ 13958+ CK_ULONG ulSessionCount; /* sess. now open */ 13959+ CK_ULONG ulMaxRwSessionCount; /* max R/W sessions */ 13960+ CK_ULONG ulRwSessionCount; /* R/W sess. now open */ 13961+ CK_ULONG ulMaxPinLen; /* in bytes */ 13962+ CK_ULONG ulMinPinLen; /* in bytes */ 13963+ CK_ULONG ulTotalPublicMemory; /* in bytes */ 13964+ CK_ULONG ulFreePublicMemory; /* in bytes */ 13965+ CK_ULONG ulTotalPrivateMemory; /* in bytes */ 13966+ CK_ULONG ulFreePrivateMemory; /* in bytes */ 13967+ 13968+ /* hardwareVersion, firmwareVersion, and time are new for 13969+ * v2.0 */ 13970+ CK_VERSION hardwareVersion; /* version of hardware */ 13971+ CK_VERSION firmwareVersion; /* version of firmware */ 13972+ CK_CHAR utcTime[16]; /* time */ 13973+} CK_TOKEN_INFO; 13974+ 13975+/* The flags parameter is defined as follows: 13976+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning 13977+ */ 13978+#define CKF_RNG 0x00000001 /* has random # 13979+ * generator */ 13980+#define CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED 0x00000002 /* token is 13981+ * write- 13982+ * protected */ 13983+#define CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED 0x00000004 /* user must 13984+ * login */ 13985+#define CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED 0x00000008 /* normal user's 13986+ * PIN is set */ 13987+ 13988+/* CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED is new for v2.0. If it is set, 13989+ * that means that *every* time the state of cryptographic 13990+ * operations of a session is successfully saved, all keys 13991+ * needed to continue those operations are stored in the state */ 13992+#define CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED 0x00000020 13993+ 13994+/* CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN is new for v2.0. If it is set, that means 13995+ * that the token has some sort of clock. The time on that 13996+ * clock is returned in the token info structure */ 13997+#define CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN 0x00000040 13998+ 13999+/* CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH is new for v2.0. If it is 14000+ * set, that means that there is some way for the user to login 14001+ * without sending a PIN through the Cryptoki library itself */ 14002+#define CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH 0x00000100 14003+ 14004+/* CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS is new for v2.0. If it is true, 14005+ * that means that a single session with the token can perform 14006+ * dual simultaneous cryptographic operations (digest and 14007+ * encrypt; decrypt and digest; sign and encrypt; and decrypt 14008+ * and sign) */ 14009+#define CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS 0x00000200 14010+ 14011+/* CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the 14012+ * token has been initialized using C_InitializeToken or an 14013+ * equivalent mechanism outside the scope of PKCS #11. 14014+ * Calling C_InitializeToken when this flag is set will cause 14015+ * the token to be reinitialized. */ 14016+#define CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED 0x00000400 14017+ 14018+/* CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION if new for v2.10. If it is 14019+ * true, the token supports secondary authentication for 14020+ * private key objects. This flag is deprecated in v2.11 and 14021+ onwards. */ 14022+#define CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION 0x00000800 14023+ 14024+/* CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an 14025+ * incorrect user login PIN has been entered at least once 14026+ * since the last successful authentication. */ 14027+#define CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW 0x00010000 14028+ 14029+/* CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true, 14030+ * supplying an incorrect user PIN will it to become locked. */ 14031+#define CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY 0x00020000 14032+ 14033+/* CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the 14034+ * user PIN has been locked. User login to the token is not 14035+ * possible. */ 14036+#define CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED 0x00040000 14037+ 14038+/* CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true, 14039+ * the user PIN value is the default value set by token 14040+ * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been 14041+ * expired by the card. */ 14042+#define CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED 0x00080000 14043+ 14044+/* CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an 14045+ * incorrect SO login PIN has been entered at least once since 14046+ * the last successful authentication. */ 14047+#define CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW 0x00100000 14048+ 14049+/* CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true, 14050+ * supplying an incorrect SO PIN will it to become locked. */ 14051+#define CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY 0x00200000 14052+ 14053+/* CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the SO 14054+ * PIN has been locked. SO login to the token is not possible. 14055+ */ 14056+#define CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED 0x00400000 14057+ 14058+/* CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true, 14059+ * the SO PIN value is the default value set by token 14060+ * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been 14061+ * expired by the card. */ 14062+#define CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED 0x00800000 14063+ 14064+typedef CK_TOKEN_INFO CK_PTR CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR; 14065+ 14066+ 14067+/* CK_SESSION_HANDLE is a Cryptoki-assigned value that 14068+ * identifies a session */ 14069+typedef CK_ULONG CK_SESSION_HANDLE; 14070+ 14071+typedef CK_SESSION_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR; 14072+ 14073+ 14074+/* CK_USER_TYPE enumerates the types of Cryptoki users */ 14075+/* CK_USER_TYPE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for 14076+ * v2.0 */ 14077+typedef CK_ULONG CK_USER_TYPE; 14078+/* Security Officer */ 14079+#define CKU_SO 0 14080+/* Normal user */ 14081+#define CKU_USER 1 14082+/* Context specific (added in v2.20) */ 14083+#define CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC 2 14084+ 14085+/* CK_STATE enumerates the session states */ 14086+/* CK_STATE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for 14087+ * v2.0 */ 14088+typedef CK_ULONG CK_STATE; 14089+#define CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION 0 14090+#define CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS 1 14091+#define CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION 2 14092+#define CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS 3 14093+#define CKS_RW_SO_FUNCTIONS 4 14094+ 14095+ 14096+/* CK_SESSION_INFO provides information about a session */ 14097+typedef struct CK_SESSION_INFO { 14098+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID; 14099+ CK_STATE state; 14100+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* see below */ 14101+ 14102+ /* ulDeviceError was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for 14103+ * v2.0 */ 14104+ CK_ULONG ulDeviceError; /* device-dependent error code */ 14105+} CK_SESSION_INFO; 14106+ 14107+/* The flags are defined in the following table: 14108+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning 14109+ */ 14110+#define CKF_RW_SESSION 0x00000002 /* session is r/w */ 14111+#define CKF_SERIAL_SESSION 0x00000004 /* no parallel */ 14112+ 14113+typedef CK_SESSION_INFO CK_PTR CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR; 14114+ 14115+ 14116+/* CK_OBJECT_HANDLE is a token-specific identifier for an 14117+ * object */ 14118+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OBJECT_HANDLE; 14119+ 14120+typedef CK_OBJECT_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR; 14121+ 14122+ 14123+/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS is a value that identifies the classes (or 14124+ * types) of objects that Cryptoki recognizes. It is defined 14125+ * as follows: */ 14126+/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for 14127+ * v2.0 */ 14128+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OBJECT_CLASS; 14129+ 14130+/* The following classes of objects are defined: */ 14131+/* CKO_HW_FEATURE is new for v2.10 */ 14132+/* CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS is new for v2.11 */ 14133+/* CKO_MECHANISM is new for v2.20 */ 14134+#define CKO_DATA 0x00000000 14135+#define CKO_CERTIFICATE 0x00000001 14136+#define CKO_PUBLIC_KEY 0x00000002 14137+#define CKO_PRIVATE_KEY 0x00000003 14138+#define CKO_SECRET_KEY 0x00000004 14139+#define CKO_HW_FEATURE 0x00000005 14140+#define CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS 0x00000006 14141+#define CKO_MECHANISM 0x00000007 14142+ 14143+/* CKO_OTP_KEY is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ 14144+#define CKO_OTP_KEY 0x00000008 14145+ 14146+#define CKO_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 14147+ 14148+typedef CK_OBJECT_CLASS CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_CLASS_PTR; 14149+ 14150+/* CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is new for v2.10. CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is a 14151+ * value that identifies the hardware feature type of an object 14152+ * with CK_OBJECT_CLASS equal to CKO_HW_FEATURE. */ 14153+typedef CK_ULONG CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE; 14154+ 14155+/* The following hardware feature types are defined */ 14156+/* CKH_USER_INTERFACE is new for v2.20 */ 14157+#define CKH_MONOTONIC_COUNTER 0x00000001 14158+#define CKH_CLOCK 0x00000002 14159+#define CKH_USER_INTERFACE 0x00000003 14160+#define CKH_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 14161+ 14162+/* CK_KEY_TYPE is a value that identifies a key type */ 14163+/* CK_KEY_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ 14164+typedef CK_ULONG CK_KEY_TYPE; 14165+ 14166+/* the following key types are defined: */ 14167+#define CKK_RSA 0x00000000 14168+#define CKK_DSA 0x00000001 14169+#define CKK_DH 0x00000002 14170+ 14171+/* CKK_ECDSA and CKK_KEA are new for v2.0 */ 14172+/* CKK_ECDSA is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_EC is preferred. */ 14173+#define CKK_ECDSA 0x00000003 14174+#define CKK_EC 0x00000003 14175+#define CKK_X9_42_DH 0x00000004 14176+#define CKK_KEA 0x00000005 14177+ 14178+#define CKK_GENERIC_SECRET 0x00000010 14179+#define CKK_RC2 0x00000011 14180+#define CKK_RC4 0x00000012 14181+#define CKK_DES 0x00000013 14182+#define CKK_DES2 0x00000014 14183+#define CKK_DES3 0x00000015 14184+ 14185+/* all these key types are new for v2.0 */ 14186+#define CKK_CAST 0x00000016 14187+#define CKK_CAST3 0x00000017 14188+/* CKK_CAST5 is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_CAST128 is preferred. */ 14189+#define CKK_CAST5 0x00000018 14190+#define CKK_CAST128 0x00000018 14191+#define CKK_RC5 0x00000019 14192+#define CKK_IDEA 0x0000001A 14193+#define CKK_SKIPJACK 0x0000001B 14194+#define CKK_BATON 0x0000001C 14195+#define CKK_JUNIPER 0x0000001D 14196+#define CKK_CDMF 0x0000001E 14197+#define CKK_AES 0x0000001F 14198+ 14199+/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */ 14200+#define CKK_BLOWFISH 0x00000020 14201+#define CKK_TWOFISH 0x00000021 14202+ 14203+/* SecurID, HOTP, and ACTI are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ 14204+#define CKK_SECURID 0x00000022 14205+#define CKK_HOTP 0x00000023 14206+#define CKK_ACTI 0x00000024 14207+ 14208+/* Camellia is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ 14209+#define CKK_CAMELLIA 0x00000025 14210+/* ARIA is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ 14211+#define CKK_ARIA 0x00000026 14212+ 14213+ 14214+#define CKK_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 14215+ 14216+ 14217+/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE is a value that identifies a certificate 14218+ * type */ 14219+/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG 14220+ * for v2.0 */ 14221+typedef CK_ULONG CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE; 14222+ 14223+/* The following certificate types are defined: */ 14224+/* CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT is new for v2.10 */ 14225+/* CKC_WTLS is new for v2.20 */ 14226+#define CKC_X_509 0x00000000 14227+#define CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT 0x00000001 14228+#define CKC_WTLS 0x00000002 14229+#define CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 14230+ 14231+ 14232+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE is a value that identifies an attribute 14233+ * type */ 14234+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for 14235+ * v2.0 */ 14236+typedef CK_ULONG CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE; 14237+ 14238+/* The CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE flag identifies an attribute which 14239+ consists of an array of values. */ 14240+#define CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE 0x40000000 14241+ 14242+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 14243+ and relates to the CKA_OTP_FORMAT attribute */ 14244+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_DECIMAL 0 14245+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_HEXADECIMAL 1 14246+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_ALPHANUMERIC 2 14247+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_BINARY 3 14248+ 14249+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 14250+ and relates to the CKA_OTP_..._REQUIREMENT attributes */ 14251+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_IGNORED 0 14252+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_OPTIONAL 1 14253+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_MANDATORY 2 14254+ 14255+/* The following attribute types are defined: */ 14256+#define CKA_CLASS 0x00000000 14257+#define CKA_TOKEN 0x00000001 14258+#define CKA_PRIVATE 0x00000002 14259+#define CKA_LABEL 0x00000003 14260+#define CKA_APPLICATION 0x00000010 14261+#define CKA_VALUE 0x00000011 14262+ 14263+/* CKA_OBJECT_ID is new for v2.10 */ 14264+#define CKA_OBJECT_ID 0x00000012 14265+ 14266+#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 0x00000080 14267+#define CKA_ISSUER 0x00000081 14268+#define CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER 0x00000082 14269+ 14270+/* CKA_AC_ISSUER, CKA_OWNER, and CKA_ATTR_TYPES are new 14271+ * for v2.10 */ 14272+#define CKA_AC_ISSUER 0x00000083 14273+#define CKA_OWNER 0x00000084 14274+#define CKA_ATTR_TYPES 0x00000085 14275+ 14276+/* CKA_TRUSTED is new for v2.11 */ 14277+#define CKA_TRUSTED 0x00000086 14278+ 14279+/* CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY ... 14280+ * CKA_CHECK_VALUE are new for v2.20 */ 14281+#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY 0x00000087 14282+#define CKA_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN 0x00000088 14283+#define CKA_URL 0x00000089 14284+#define CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY 0x0000008A 14285+#define CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY 0x0000008B 14286+#define CKA_CHECK_VALUE 0x00000090 14287+ 14288+#define CKA_KEY_TYPE 0x00000100 14289+#define CKA_SUBJECT 0x00000101 14290+#define CKA_ID 0x00000102 14291+#define CKA_SENSITIVE 0x00000103 14292+#define CKA_ENCRYPT 0x00000104 14293+#define CKA_DECRYPT 0x00000105 14294+#define CKA_WRAP 0x00000106 14295+#define CKA_UNWRAP 0x00000107 14296+#define CKA_SIGN 0x00000108 14297+#define CKA_SIGN_RECOVER 0x00000109 14298+#define CKA_VERIFY 0x0000010A 14299+#define CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER 0x0000010B 14300+#define CKA_DERIVE 0x0000010C 14301+#define CKA_START_DATE 0x00000110 14302+#define CKA_END_DATE 0x00000111 14303+#define CKA_MODULUS 0x00000120 14304+#define CKA_MODULUS_BITS 0x00000121 14305+#define CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT 0x00000122 14306+#define CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT 0x00000123 14307+#define CKA_PRIME_1 0x00000124 14308+#define CKA_PRIME_2 0x00000125 14309+#define CKA_EXPONENT_1 0x00000126 14310+#define CKA_EXPONENT_2 0x00000127 14311+#define CKA_COEFFICIENT 0x00000128 14312+#define CKA_PRIME 0x00000130 14313+#define CKA_SUBPRIME 0x00000131 14314+#define CKA_BASE 0x00000132 14315+ 14316+/* CKA_PRIME_BITS and CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS are new for v2.11 */ 14317+#define CKA_PRIME_BITS 0x00000133 14318+#define CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS 0x00000134 14319+#define CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS 14320+/* (To retain backwards-compatibility) */ 14321+ 14322+#define CKA_VALUE_BITS 0x00000160 14323+#define CKA_VALUE_LEN 0x00000161 14324+ 14325+/* CKA_EXTRACTABLE, CKA_LOCAL, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, 14326+ * CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, CKA_MODIFIABLE, CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS, 14327+ * and CKA_EC_POINT are new for v2.0 */ 14328+#define CKA_EXTRACTABLE 0x00000162 14329+#define CKA_LOCAL 0x00000163 14330+#define CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE 0x00000164 14331+#define CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE 0x00000165 14332+ 14333+/* CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM is new for v2.11 */ 14334+#define CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM 0x00000166 14335+ 14336+#define CKA_MODIFIABLE 0x00000170 14337+ 14338+/* CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS is deprecated in v2.11, 14339+ * CKA_EC_PARAMS is preferred. */ 14340+#define CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS 0x00000180 14341+#define CKA_EC_PARAMS 0x00000180 14342+ 14343+#define CKA_EC_POINT 0x00000181 14344+ 14345+/* CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH, CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS, 14346+ * are new for v2.10. Deprecated in v2.11 and onwards. */ 14347+#define CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH 0x00000200 14348+#define CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS 0x00000201 14349+ 14350+/* CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE ... 14351+ * CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE are new for v2.20 */ 14352+#define CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE 0x00000202 14353+ 14354+#define CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED 0x00000210 14355+#define CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000211) 14356+#define CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000212) 14357+ 14358+/* CKA_OTP... atttributes are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3. */ 14359+#define CKA_OTP_FORMAT 0x00000220 14360+#define CKA_OTP_LENGTH 0x00000221 14361+#define CKA_OTP_TIME_INTERVAL 0x00000222 14362+#define CKA_OTP_USER_FRIENDLY_MODE 0x00000223 14363+#define CKA_OTP_CHALLENGE_REQUIREMENT 0x00000224 14364+#define CKA_OTP_TIME_REQUIREMENT 0x00000225 14365+#define CKA_OTP_COUNTER_REQUIREMENT 0x00000226 14366+#define CKA_OTP_PIN_REQUIREMENT 0x00000227 14367+#define CKA_OTP_COUNTER 0x0000022E 14368+#define CKA_OTP_TIME 0x0000022F 14369+#define CKA_OTP_USER_IDENTIFIER 0x0000022A 14370+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_IDENTIFIER 0x0000022B 14371+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO 0x0000022C 14372+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO_TYPE 0x0000022D 14373+ 14374+ 14375+/* CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE, CKA_RESET_ON_INIT, and CKA_HAS_RESET 14376+ * are new for v2.10 */ 14377+#define CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE 0x00000300 14378+#define CKA_RESET_ON_INIT 0x00000301 14379+#define CKA_HAS_RESET 0x00000302 14380+ 14381+/* The following attributes are new for v2.20 */ 14382+#define CKA_PIXEL_X 0x00000400 14383+#define CKA_PIXEL_Y 0x00000401 14384+#define CKA_RESOLUTION 0x00000402 14385+#define CKA_CHAR_ROWS 0x00000403 14386+#define CKA_CHAR_COLUMNS 0x00000404 14387+#define CKA_COLOR 0x00000405 14388+#define CKA_BITS_PER_PIXEL 0x00000406 14389+#define CKA_CHAR_SETS 0x00000480 14390+#define CKA_ENCODING_METHODS 0x00000481 14391+#define CKA_MIME_TYPES 0x00000482 14392+#define CKA_MECHANISM_TYPE 0x00000500 14393+#define CKA_REQUIRED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000501 14394+#define CKA_DEFAULT_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000502 14395+#define CKA_SUPPORTED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000503 14396+#define CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000600) 14397+ 14398+#define CKA_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 14399+ 14400+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE is a structure that includes the type, length 14401+ * and value of an attribute */ 14402+typedef struct CK_ATTRIBUTE { 14403+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type; 14404+ CK_VOID_PTR pValue; 14405+ 14406+ /* ulValueLen went from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ 14407+ CK_ULONG ulValueLen; /* in bytes */ 14408+} CK_ATTRIBUTE; 14409+ 14410+typedef CK_ATTRIBUTE CK_PTR CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR; 14411+ 14412+ 14413+/* CK_DATE is a structure that defines a date */ 14414+typedef struct CK_DATE{ 14415+ CK_CHAR year[4]; /* the year ("1900" - "9999") */ 14416+ CK_CHAR month[2]; /* the month ("01" - "12") */ 14417+ CK_CHAR day[2]; /* the day ("01" - "31") */ 14418+} CK_DATE; 14419+ 14420+ 14421+/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE is a value that identifies a mechanism 14422+ * type */ 14423+/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for 14424+ * v2.0 */ 14425+typedef CK_ULONG CK_MECHANISM_TYPE; 14426+ 14427+/* the following mechanism types are defined: */ 14428+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000000 14429+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS 0x00000001 14430+#define CKM_RSA_9796 0x00000002 14431+#define CKM_RSA_X_509 0x00000003 14432+ 14433+/* CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS, CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS 14434+ * are new for v2.0. They are mechanisms which hash and sign */ 14435+#define CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS 0x00000004 14436+#define CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS 0x00000005 14437+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS 0x00000006 14438+ 14439+/* CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS, CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS, and 14440+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP are new for v2.10 */ 14441+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS 0x00000007 14442+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS 0x00000008 14443+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP 0x00000009 14444+ 14445+/* CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_RSA_X9_31, CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31, 14446+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS are new for v2.11 */ 14447+#define CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x0000000A 14448+#define CKM_RSA_X9_31 0x0000000B 14449+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31 0x0000000C 14450+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x0000000D 14451+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x0000000E 14452+ 14453+#define CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000010 14454+#define CKM_DSA 0x00000011 14455+#define CKM_DSA_SHA1 0x00000012 14456+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000020 14457+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE 0x00000021 14458+ 14459+/* CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE, 14460+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE, and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE are new for 14461+ * v2.11 */ 14462+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000030 14463+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE 0x00000031 14464+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE 0x00000032 14465+#define CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE 0x00000033 14466+ 14467+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */ 14468+#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS 0x00000040 14469+#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS 0x00000041 14470+#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS 0x00000042 14471+#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000043 14472+#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000044 14473+#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000045 14474+ 14475+/* SHA-224 RSA mechanisms are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ 14476+#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS 0x00000046 14477+#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000047 14478+ 14479+#define CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN 0x00000100 14480+#define CKM_RC2_ECB 0x00000101 14481+#define CKM_RC2_CBC 0x00000102 14482+#define CKM_RC2_MAC 0x00000103 14483+ 14484+/* CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */ 14485+#define CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000104 14486+#define CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD 0x00000105 14487+ 14488+#define CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN 0x00000110 14489+#define CKM_RC4 0x00000111 14490+#define CKM_DES_KEY_GEN 0x00000120 14491+#define CKM_DES_ECB 0x00000121 14492+#define CKM_DES_CBC 0x00000122 14493+#define CKM_DES_MAC 0x00000123 14494+ 14495+/* CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_DES_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */ 14496+#define CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000124 14497+#define CKM_DES_CBC_PAD 0x00000125 14498+ 14499+#define CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN 0x00000130 14500+#define CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN 0x00000131 14501+#define CKM_DES3_ECB 0x00000132 14502+#define CKM_DES3_CBC 0x00000133 14503+#define CKM_DES3_MAC 0x00000134 14504+ 14505+/* CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD, CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN, 14506+ * CKM_CDMF_ECB, CKM_CDMF_CBC, CKM_CDMF_MAC, 14507+ * CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL, and CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */ 14508+#define CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000135 14509+#define CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD 0x00000136 14510+#define CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN 0x00000140 14511+#define CKM_CDMF_ECB 0x00000141 14512+#define CKM_CDMF_CBC 0x00000142 14513+#define CKM_CDMF_MAC 0x00000143 14514+#define CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000144 14515+#define CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD 0x00000145 14516+ 14517+/* the following four DES mechanisms are new for v2.20 */ 14518+#define CKM_DES_OFB64 0x00000150 14519+#define CKM_DES_OFB8 0x00000151 14520+#define CKM_DES_CFB64 0x00000152 14521+#define CKM_DES_CFB8 0x00000153 14522+ 14523+#define CKM_MD2 0x00000200 14524+ 14525+/* CKM_MD2_HMAC and CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */ 14526+#define CKM_MD2_HMAC 0x00000201 14527+#define CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000202 14528+ 14529+#define CKM_MD5 0x00000210 14530+ 14531+/* CKM_MD5_HMAC and CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */ 14532+#define CKM_MD5_HMAC 0x00000211 14533+#define CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000212 14534+ 14535+#define CKM_SHA_1 0x00000220 14536+ 14537+/* CKM_SHA_1_HMAC and CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */ 14538+#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC 0x00000221 14539+#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000222 14540+ 14541+/* CKM_RIPEMD128, CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC, 14542+ * CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL, CKM_RIPEMD160, CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC, 14543+ * and CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.10 */ 14544+#define CKM_RIPEMD128 0x00000230 14545+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC 0x00000231 14546+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000232 14547+#define CKM_RIPEMD160 0x00000240 14548+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC 0x00000241 14549+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000242 14550+ 14551+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */ 14552+#define CKM_SHA256 0x00000250 14553+#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC 0x00000251 14554+#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000252 14555+ 14556+/* SHA-224 is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ 14557+#define CKM_SHA224 0x00000255 14558+#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC 0x00000256 14559+#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000257 14560+ 14561+#define CKM_SHA384 0x00000260 14562+#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC 0x00000261 14563+#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000262 14564+#define CKM_SHA512 0x00000270 14565+#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC 0x00000271 14566+#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000272 14567+ 14568+/* SecurID is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ 14569+#define CKM_SECURID_KEY_GEN 0x00000280 14570+#define CKM_SECURID 0x00000282 14571+ 14572+/* HOTP is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ 14573+#define CKM_HOTP_KEY_GEN 0x00000290 14574+#define CKM_HOTP 0x00000291 14575+ 14576+/* ACTI is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ 14577+#define CKM_ACTI 0x000002A0 14578+#define CKM_ACTI_KEY_GEN 0x000002A1 14579+ 14580+/* All of the following mechanisms are new for v2.0 */ 14581+/* Note that CAST128 and CAST5 are the same algorithm */ 14582+#define CKM_CAST_KEY_GEN 0x00000300 14583+#define CKM_CAST_ECB 0x00000301 14584+#define CKM_CAST_CBC 0x00000302 14585+#define CKM_CAST_MAC 0x00000303 14586+#define CKM_CAST_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000304 14587+#define CKM_CAST_CBC_PAD 0x00000305 14588+#define CKM_CAST3_KEY_GEN 0x00000310 14589+#define CKM_CAST3_ECB 0x00000311 14590+#define CKM_CAST3_CBC 0x00000312 14591+#define CKM_CAST3_MAC 0x00000313 14592+#define CKM_CAST3_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000314 14593+#define CKM_CAST3_CBC_PAD 0x00000315 14594+#define CKM_CAST5_KEY_GEN 0x00000320 14595+#define CKM_CAST128_KEY_GEN 0x00000320 14596+#define CKM_CAST5_ECB 0x00000321 14597+#define CKM_CAST128_ECB 0x00000321 14598+#define CKM_CAST5_CBC 0x00000322 14599+#define CKM_CAST128_CBC 0x00000322 14600+#define CKM_CAST5_MAC 0x00000323 14601+#define CKM_CAST128_MAC 0x00000323 14602+#define CKM_CAST5_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000324 14603+#define CKM_CAST128_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000324 14604+#define CKM_CAST5_CBC_PAD 0x00000325 14605+#define CKM_CAST128_CBC_PAD 0x00000325 14606+#define CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN 0x00000330 14607+#define CKM_RC5_ECB 0x00000331 14608+#define CKM_RC5_CBC 0x00000332 14609+#define CKM_RC5_MAC 0x00000333 14610+#define CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000334 14611+#define CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD 0x00000335 14612+#define CKM_IDEA_KEY_GEN 0x00000340 14613+#define CKM_IDEA_ECB 0x00000341 14614+#define CKM_IDEA_CBC 0x00000342 14615+#define CKM_IDEA_MAC 0x00000343 14616+#define CKM_IDEA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000344 14617+#define CKM_IDEA_CBC_PAD 0x00000345 14618+#define CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN 0x00000350 14619+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY 0x00000360 14620+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA 0x00000362 14621+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE 0x00000363 14622+#define CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA 0x00000364 14623+#define CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY 0x00000365 14624+#define CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x00000370 14625+#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x00000371 14626+#define CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x00000372 14627+ 14628+/* CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, 14629+ * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, and 14630+ * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH are new for v2.11 */ 14631+#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x00000373 14632+#define CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x00000374 14633+#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x00000375 14634+#define CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x00000376 14635+#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x00000377 14636+ 14637+/* CKM_TLS_PRF is new for v2.20 */ 14638+#define CKM_TLS_PRF 0x00000378 14639+ 14640+#define CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC 0x00000380 14641+#define CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC 0x00000381 14642+#define CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000390 14643+#define CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000391 14644+#define CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000392 14645+ 14646+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */ 14647+#define CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000393 14648+#define CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000394 14649+#define CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000395 14650+ 14651+/* SHA-224 key derivation is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ 14652+#define CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000396 14653+ 14654+#define CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC 0x000003A0 14655+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC 0x000003A1 14656+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST_CBC 0x000003A2 14657+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST3_CBC 0x000003A3 14658+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST5_CBC 0x000003A4 14659+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST128_CBC 0x000003A4 14660+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST5_CBC 0x000003A5 14661+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST128_CBC 0x000003A5 14662+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 0x000003A6 14663+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 0x000003A7 14664+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC 0x000003A8 14665+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC 0x000003A9 14666+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC 0x000003AA 14667+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC 0x000003AB 14668+ 14669+/* CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 is new for v2.10 */ 14670+#define CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 0x000003B0 14671+ 14672+#define CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC 0x000003C0 14673+ 14674+/* WTLS mechanisms are new for v2.20 */ 14675+#define CKM_WTLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x000003D0 14676+#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x000003D1 14677+#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_ECC 0x000003D2 14678+#define CKM_WTLS_PRF 0x000003D3 14679+#define CKM_WTLS_SERVER_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003D4 14680+#define CKM_WTLS_CLIENT_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003D5 14681+ 14682+#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS 0x00000400 14683+#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP 0x00000401 14684+ 14685+/* CKM_CMS_SIG is new for v2.20 */ 14686+#define CKM_CMS_SIG 0x00000500 14687+ 14688+/* CKM_KIP mechanisms are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 2 */ 14689+#define CKM_KIP_DERIVE 0x00000510 14690+#define CKM_KIP_WRAP 0x00000511 14691+#define CKM_KIP_MAC 0x00000512 14692+ 14693+/* Camellia is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ 14694+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN 0x00000550 14695+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB 0x00000551 14696+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC 0x00000552 14697+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC 0x00000553 14698+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000554 14699+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD 0x00000555 14700+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000556 14701+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000557 14702+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CTR 0x00000558 14703+ 14704+/* ARIA is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ 14705+#define CKM_ARIA_KEY_GEN 0x00000560 14706+#define CKM_ARIA_ECB 0x00000561 14707+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC 0x00000562 14708+#define CKM_ARIA_MAC 0x00000563 14709+#define CKM_ARIA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000564 14710+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC_PAD 0x00000565 14711+#define CKM_ARIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000566 14712+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000567 14713+ 14714+/* Fortezza mechanisms */ 14715+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_KEY_GEN 0x00001000 14716+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_ECB64 0x00001001 14717+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64 0x00001002 14718+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_OFB64 0x00001003 14719+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB64 0x00001004 14720+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB32 0x00001005 14721+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB16 0x00001006 14722+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8 0x00001007 14723+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP 0x00001008 14724+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP 0x00001009 14725+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX 0x0000100a 14726+#define CKM_KEA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001010 14727+#define CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE 0x00001011 14728+#define CKM_FORTEZZA_TIMESTAMP 0x00001020 14729+#define CKM_BATON_KEY_GEN 0x00001030 14730+#define CKM_BATON_ECB128 0x00001031 14731+#define CKM_BATON_ECB96 0x00001032 14732+#define CKM_BATON_CBC128 0x00001033 14733+#define CKM_BATON_COUNTER 0x00001034 14734+#define CKM_BATON_SHUFFLE 0x00001035 14735+#define CKM_BATON_WRAP 0x00001036 14736+ 14737+/* CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN is deprecated in v2.11, 14738+ * CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN is preferred */ 14739+#define CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001040 14740+#define CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001040 14741+ 14742+#define CKM_ECDSA 0x00001041 14743+#define CKM_ECDSA_SHA1 0x00001042 14744+ 14745+/* CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE, and CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE 14746+ * are new for v2.11 */ 14747+#define CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE 0x00001050 14748+#define CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE 0x00001051 14749+#define CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE 0x00001052 14750+ 14751+#define CKM_JUNIPER_KEY_GEN 0x00001060 14752+#define CKM_JUNIPER_ECB128 0x00001061 14753+#define CKM_JUNIPER_CBC128 0x00001062 14754+#define CKM_JUNIPER_COUNTER 0x00001063 14755+#define CKM_JUNIPER_SHUFFLE 0x00001064 14756+#define CKM_JUNIPER_WRAP 0x00001065 14757+#define CKM_FASTHASH 0x00001070 14758+ 14759+/* CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, CKM_AES_ECB, CKM_AES_CBC, CKM_AES_MAC, 14760+ * CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN, 14761+ * CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN, and CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN are 14762+ * new for v2.11 */ 14763+#define CKM_AES_KEY_GEN 0x00001080 14764+#define CKM_AES_ECB 0x00001081 14765+#define CKM_AES_CBC 0x00001082 14766+#define CKM_AES_MAC 0x00001083 14767+#define CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL 0x00001084 14768+#define CKM_AES_CBC_PAD 0x00001085 14769+ 14770+/* AES counter mode is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ 14771+#define CKM_AES_CTR 0x00001086 14772+ 14773+/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */ 14774+#define CKM_BLOWFISH_KEY_GEN 0x00001090 14775+#define CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC 0x00001091 14776+#define CKM_TWOFISH_KEY_GEN 0x00001092 14777+#define CKM_TWOFISH_CBC 0x00001093 14778+ 14779+ 14780+/* CKM_xxx_ENCRYPT_DATA mechanisms are new for v2.20 */ 14781+#define CKM_DES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001100 14782+#define CKM_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001101 14783+#define CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001102 14784+#define CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001103 14785+#define CKM_AES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001104 14786+#define CKM_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001105 14787+ 14788+#define CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002000 14789+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002001 14790+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002002 14791+ 14792+#define CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 14793+ 14794+typedef CK_MECHANISM_TYPE CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR; 14795+ 14796+ 14797+/* CK_MECHANISM is a structure that specifies a particular 14798+ * mechanism */ 14799+typedef struct CK_MECHANISM { 14800+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism; 14801+ CK_VOID_PTR pParameter; 14802+ 14803+ /* ulParameterLen was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for 14804+ * v2.0 */ 14805+ CK_ULONG ulParameterLen; /* in bytes */ 14806+} CK_MECHANISM; 14807+ 14808+typedef CK_MECHANISM CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_PTR; 14809+ 14810+ 14811+/* CK_MECHANISM_INFO provides information about a particular 14812+ * mechanism */ 14813+typedef struct CK_MECHANISM_INFO { 14814+ CK_ULONG ulMinKeySize; 14815+ CK_ULONG ulMaxKeySize; 14816+ CK_FLAGS flags; 14817+} CK_MECHANISM_INFO; 14818+ 14819+/* The flags are defined as follows: 14820+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning */ 14821+#define CKF_HW 0x00000001 /* performed by HW */ 14822+ 14823+/* The flags CKF_ENCRYPT, CKF_DECRYPT, CKF_DIGEST, CKF_SIGN, 14824+ * CKG_SIGN_RECOVER, CKF_VERIFY, CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER, 14825+ * CKF_GENERATE, CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, CKF_WRAP, CKF_UNWRAP, 14826+ * and CKF_DERIVE are new for v2.0. They specify whether or not 14827+ * a mechanism can be used for a particular task */ 14828+#define CKF_ENCRYPT 0x00000100 14829+#define CKF_DECRYPT 0x00000200 14830+#define CKF_DIGEST 0x00000400 14831+#define CKF_SIGN 0x00000800 14832+#define CKF_SIGN_RECOVER 0x00001000 14833+#define CKF_VERIFY 0x00002000 14834+#define CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER 0x00004000 14835+#define CKF_GENERATE 0x00008000 14836+#define CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR 0x00010000 14837+#define CKF_WRAP 0x00020000 14838+#define CKF_UNWRAP 0x00040000 14839+#define CKF_DERIVE 0x00080000 14840+ 14841+/* CKF_EC_F_P, CKF_EC_F_2M, CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS, CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE, 14842+ * CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS, and CKF_EC_COMPRESS are new for v2.11. They 14843+ * describe a token's EC capabilities not available in mechanism 14844+ * information. */ 14845+#define CKF_EC_F_P 0x00100000 14846+#define CKF_EC_F_2M 0x00200000 14847+#define CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS 0x00400000 14848+#define CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE 0x00800000 14849+#define CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS 0x01000000 14850+#define CKF_EC_COMPRESS 0x02000000 14851+ 14852+#define CKF_EXTENSION 0x80000000 /* FALSE for this version */ 14853+ 14854+typedef CK_MECHANISM_INFO CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR; 14855+ 14856+ 14857+/* CK_RV is a value that identifies the return value of a 14858+ * Cryptoki function */ 14859+/* CK_RV was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ 14860+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RV; 14861+ 14862+#define CKR_OK 0x00000000 14863+#define CKR_CANCEL 0x00000001 14864+#define CKR_HOST_MEMORY 0x00000002 14865+#define CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID 0x00000003 14866+ 14867+/* CKR_FLAGS_INVALID was removed for v2.0 */ 14868+ 14869+/* CKR_GENERAL_ERROR and CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED are new for v2.0 */ 14870+#define CKR_GENERAL_ERROR 0x00000005 14871+#define CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED 0x00000006 14872+ 14873+/* CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_NO_EVENT, CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS, 14874+ * and CKR_CANT_LOCK are new for v2.01 */ 14875+#define CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD 0x00000007 14876+#define CKR_NO_EVENT 0x00000008 14877+#define CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS 0x00000009 14878+#define CKR_CANT_LOCK 0x0000000A 14879+ 14880+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY 0x00000010 14881+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE 0x00000011 14882+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID 0x00000012 14883+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID 0x00000013 14884+#define CKR_DATA_INVALID 0x00000020 14885+#define CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE 0x00000021 14886+#define CKR_DEVICE_ERROR 0x00000030 14887+#define CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY 0x00000031 14888+#define CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED 0x00000032 14889+#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID 0x00000040 14890+#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE 0x00000041 14891+#define CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED 0x00000050 14892+#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL 0x00000051 14893+ 14894+/* CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED is new for v2.0 */ 14895+#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000054 14896+ 14897+#define CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000060 14898+ 14899+/* CKR_KEY_SENSITIVE was removed for v2.0 */ 14900+ 14901+#define CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x00000062 14902+#define CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x00000063 14903+ 14904+/* CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED, CKR_KEY_CHANGED, CKR_KEY_NEEDED, 14905+ * CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED, 14906+ * CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE, and CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE are new for 14907+ * v2.0 */ 14908+#define CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED 0x00000064 14909+#define CKR_KEY_CHANGED 0x00000065 14910+#define CKR_KEY_NEEDED 0x00000066 14911+#define CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE 0x00000067 14912+#define CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED 0x00000068 14913+#define CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE 0x00000069 14914+#define CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE 0x0000006A 14915+ 14916+#define CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID 0x00000070 14917+#define CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID 0x00000071 14918+ 14919+/* CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INCONSISTENT and CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INVALID 14920+ * were removed for v2.0 */ 14921+#define CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000082 14922+#define CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE 0x00000090 14923+#define CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000091 14924+#define CKR_PIN_INCORRECT 0x000000A0 14925+#define CKR_PIN_INVALID 0x000000A1 14926+#define CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE 0x000000A2 14927+ 14928+/* CKR_PIN_EXPIRED and CKR_PIN_LOCKED are new for v2.0 */ 14929+#define CKR_PIN_EXPIRED 0x000000A3 14930+#define CKR_PIN_LOCKED 0x000000A4 14931+ 14932+#define CKR_SESSION_CLOSED 0x000000B0 14933+#define CKR_SESSION_COUNT 0x000000B1 14934+#define CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID 0x000000B3 14935+#define CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x000000B4 14936+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY 0x000000B5 14937+#define CKR_SESSION_EXISTS 0x000000B6 14938+ 14939+/* CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS and 14940+ * CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS are new for v2.0 */ 14941+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS 0x000000B7 14942+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS 0x000000B8 14943+ 14944+#define CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID 0x000000C0 14945+#define CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE 0x000000C1 14946+#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE 0x000000D0 14947+#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT 0x000000D1 14948+#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT 0x000000E0 14949+#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED 0x000000E1 14950+#define CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED 0x000000E2 14951+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x000000F0 14952+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x000000F1 14953+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x000000F2 14954+#define CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN 0x00000100 14955+#define CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN 0x00000101 14956+#define CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000102 14957+#define CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID 0x00000103 14958+ 14959+/* CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN and CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES 14960+ * are new to v2.01 */ 14961+#define CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN 0x00000104 14962+#define CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES 0x00000105 14963+ 14964+#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID 0x00000110 14965+#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE 0x00000112 14966+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000113 14967+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x00000114 14968+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x00000115 14969+#define CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000120 14970+ 14971+/* These are new to v2.0 */ 14972+#define CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG 0x00000121 14973+ 14974+/* These are new to v2.11 */ 14975+#define CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID 0x00000130 14976+ 14977+/* These are new to v2.0 */ 14978+#define CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL 0x00000150 14979+#define CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID 0x00000160 14980+#define CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE 0x00000170 14981+#define CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE 0x00000180 14982+ 14983+/* These are new to v2.01 */ 14984+#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000190 14985+#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED 0x00000191 14986+#define CKR_MUTEX_BAD 0x000001A0 14987+#define CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED 0x000001A1 14988+ 14989+/* The following return values are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ 14990+#define CKR_NEW_PIN_MODE 0x000001B0 14991+#define CKR_NEXT_OTP 0x000001B1 14992+ 14993+/* This is new to v2.20 */ 14994+#define CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED 0x00000200 14995+ 14996+#define CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 14997+ 14998+ 14999+/* CK_NOTIFY is an application callback that processes events */ 15000+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_NOTIFY)( 15001+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 15002+ CK_NOTIFICATION event, 15003+ CK_VOID_PTR pApplication /* passed to C_OpenSession */ 15004+); 15005+ 15006+ 15007+/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is a structure holding a Cryptoki spec 15008+ * version and pointers of appropriate types to all the 15009+ * Cryptoki functions */ 15010+/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is new for v2.0 */ 15011+typedef struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_FUNCTION_LIST; 15012+ 15013+typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR; 15014+ 15015+typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR; 15016+ 15017+ 15018+/* CK_CREATEMUTEX is an application callback for creating a 15019+ * mutex object */ 15020+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_CREATEMUTEX)( 15021+ CK_VOID_PTR_PTR ppMutex /* location to receive ptr to mutex */ 15022+); 15023+ 15024+ 15025+/* CK_DESTROYMUTEX is an application callback for destroying a 15026+ * mutex object */ 15027+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_DESTROYMUTEX)( 15028+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */ 15029+); 15030+ 15031+ 15032+/* CK_LOCKMUTEX is an application callback for locking a mutex */ 15033+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_LOCKMUTEX)( 15034+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */ 15035+); 15036+ 15037+ 15038+/* CK_UNLOCKMUTEX is an application callback for unlocking a 15039+ * mutex */ 15040+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_UNLOCKMUTEX)( 15041+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */ 15042+); 15043+ 15044+ 15045+/* CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS provides the optional arguments to 15046+ * C_Initialize */ 15047+typedef struct CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS { 15048+ CK_CREATEMUTEX CreateMutex; 15049+ CK_DESTROYMUTEX DestroyMutex; 15050+ CK_LOCKMUTEX LockMutex; 15051+ CK_UNLOCKMUTEX UnlockMutex; 15052+ CK_FLAGS flags; 15053+ CK_VOID_PTR pReserved; 15054+} CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS; 15055+ 15056+/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot 15057+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning 15058+ */ 15059+#define CKF_LIBRARY_CANT_CREATE_OS_THREADS 0x00000001 15060+#define CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK 0x00000002 15061+ 15062+typedef CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS CK_PTR CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR; 15063+ 15064+ 15065+/* additional flags for parameters to functions */ 15066+ 15067+/* CKF_DONT_BLOCK is for the function C_WaitForSlotEvent */ 15068+#define CKF_DONT_BLOCK 1 15069+ 15070+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE is new for v2.10. 15071+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE is used to indicate the Message 15072+ * Generation Function (MGF) applied to a message block when 15073+ * formatting a message block for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption 15074+ * scheme. */ 15075+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE; 15076+ 15077+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE_PTR; 15078+ 15079+/* The following MGFs are defined */ 15080+/* CKG_MGF1_SHA256, CKG_MGF1_SHA384, and CKG_MGF1_SHA512 15081+ * are new for v2.20 */ 15082+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA1 0x00000001 15083+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA256 0x00000002 15084+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA384 0x00000003 15085+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA512 0x00000004 15086+/* SHA-224 is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ 15087+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA224 0x00000005 15088+ 15089+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10. 15090+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the source 15091+ * of the encoding parameter when formatting a message block 15092+ * for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption scheme. */ 15093+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE; 15094+ 15095+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR; 15096+ 15097+/* The following encoding parameter sources are defined */ 15098+#define CKZ_DATA_SPECIFIED 0x00000001 15099+ 15100+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.10. 15101+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the 15102+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP mechanism. */ 15103+typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS { 15104+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg; 15105+ CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf; 15106+ CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE source; 15107+ CK_VOID_PTR pSourceData; 15108+ CK_ULONG ulSourceDataLen; 15109+} CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS; 15110+ 15111+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR; 15112+ 15113+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS is new for v2.11. 15114+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS provides the parameters to the 15115+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS mechanism(s). */ 15116+typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS { 15117+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg; 15118+ CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf; 15119+ CK_ULONG sLen; 15120+} CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS; 15121+ 15122+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS_PTR; 15123+ 15124+/* CK_EC_KDF_TYPE is new for v2.11. */ 15125+typedef CK_ULONG CK_EC_KDF_TYPE; 15126+ 15127+/* The following EC Key Derivation Functions are defined */ 15128+#define CKD_NULL 0x00000001 15129+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF 0x00000002 15130+ 15131+/* CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. 15132+ * CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the 15133+ * CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE and CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE mechanisms, 15134+ * where each party contributes one key pair. 15135+ */ 15136+typedef struct CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS { 15137+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf; 15138+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen; 15139+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData; 15140+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; 15141+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; 15142+} CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS; 15143+ 15144+typedef CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; 15145+ 15146+ 15147+/* CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. 15148+ * CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the 15149+ * CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE mechanism, where each party contributes two key pairs. */ 15150+typedef struct CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS { 15151+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf; 15152+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen; 15153+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData; 15154+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; 15155+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; 15156+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; 15157+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; 15158+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; 15159+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; 15160+} CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS; 15161+ 15162+typedef CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; 15163+ 15164+typedef struct CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS { 15165+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf; 15166+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen; 15167+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData; 15168+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; 15169+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; 15170+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; 15171+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; 15172+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; 15173+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; 15174+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey; 15175+} CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS; 15176+ 15177+typedef CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; 15178+ 15179+/* Typedefs and defines for the CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN and the 15180+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN mechanisms (new for PKCS #11 v2.11) */ 15181+typedef CK_ULONG CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE; 15182+typedef CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE_PTR; 15183+ 15184+/* The following X9.42 DH key derivation functions are defined 15185+ (besides CKD_NULL already defined : */ 15186+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_ASN1 0x00000003 15187+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_CONCATENATE 0x00000004 15188+ 15189+/* CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. 15190+ * CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the 15191+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE key derivation mechanism, where each party 15192+ * contributes one key pair */ 15193+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS { 15194+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf; 15195+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen; 15196+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo; 15197+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; 15198+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; 15199+} CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS; 15200+ 15201+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; 15202+ 15203+/* CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. 15204+ * CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the 15205+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE key derivation 15206+ * mechanisms, where each party contributes two key pairs */ 15207+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS { 15208+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf; 15209+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen; 15210+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo; 15211+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; 15212+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; 15213+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; 15214+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; 15215+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; 15216+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; 15217+} CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS; 15218+ 15219+typedef CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; 15220+ 15221+typedef struct CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS { 15222+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf; 15223+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen; 15224+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo; 15225+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; 15226+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; 15227+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; 15228+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; 15229+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; 15230+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; 15231+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey; 15232+} CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS; 15233+ 15234+typedef CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; 15235+ 15236+/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the 15237+ * CKM_KEA_DERIVE mechanism */ 15238+/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ 15239+typedef struct CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS { 15240+ CK_BBOOL isSender; 15241+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen; 15242+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomA; 15243+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomB; 15244+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; 15245+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; 15246+} CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS; 15247+ 15248+typedef CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; 15249+ 15250+ 15251+/* CK_RC2_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_ECB and 15252+ * CKM_RC2_MAC mechanisms. An instance of CK_RC2_PARAMS just 15253+ * holds the effective keysize */ 15254+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RC2_PARAMS; 15255+ 15256+typedef CK_RC2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_PARAMS_PTR; 15257+ 15258+ 15259+/* CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_CBC 15260+ * mechanism */ 15261+typedef struct CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS { 15262+ /* ulEffectiveBits was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for 15263+ * v2.0 */ 15264+ CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits; /* effective bits (1-1024) */ 15265+ 15266+ CK_BYTE iv[8]; /* IV for CBC mode */ 15267+} CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS; 15268+ 15269+typedef CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS_PTR; 15270+ 15271+ 15272+/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the 15273+ * CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */ 15274+/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ 15275+typedef struct CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS { 15276+ CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits; /* effective bits (1-1024) */ 15277+ CK_ULONG ulMacLength; /* Length of MAC in bytes */ 15278+} CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; 15279+ 15280+typedef CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR \ 15281+ CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR; 15282+ 15283+ 15284+/* CK_RC5_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_ECB and 15285+ * CKM_RC5_MAC mechanisms */ 15286+/* CK_RC5_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ 15287+typedef struct CK_RC5_PARAMS { 15288+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */ 15289+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */ 15290+} CK_RC5_PARAMS; 15291+ 15292+typedef CK_RC5_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_PARAMS_PTR; 15293+ 15294+ 15295+/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_CBC 15296+ * mechanism */ 15297+/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ 15298+typedef struct CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS { 15299+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */ 15300+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */ 15301+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIv; /* pointer to IV */ 15302+ CK_ULONG ulIvLen; /* length of IV in bytes */ 15303+} CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS; 15304+ 15305+typedef CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS_PTR; 15306+ 15307+ 15308+/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the 15309+ * CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */ 15310+/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ 15311+typedef struct CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS { 15312+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */ 15313+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */ 15314+ CK_ULONG ulMacLength; /* Length of MAC in bytes */ 15315+} CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; 15316+ 15317+typedef CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR \ 15318+ CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR; 15319+ 15320+ 15321+/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters to most block 15322+ * ciphers' MAC_GENERAL mechanisms. Its value is the length of 15323+ * the MAC */ 15324+/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ 15325+typedef CK_ULONG CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; 15326+ 15327+typedef CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR; 15328+ 15329+/* CK_DES/AES_ECB/CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS are new for v2.20 */ 15330+typedef struct CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { 15331+ CK_BYTE iv[8]; 15332+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; 15333+ CK_ULONG length; 15334+} CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; 15335+ 15336+typedef CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; 15337+ 15338+typedef struct CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { 15339+ CK_BYTE iv[16]; 15340+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; 15341+ CK_ULONG length; 15342+} CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; 15343+ 15344+typedef CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; 15345+ 15346+/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the 15347+ * CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP mechanism */ 15348+/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ 15349+typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS { 15350+ CK_ULONG ulPasswordLen; 15351+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPassword; 15352+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; 15353+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; 15354+ CK_ULONG ulPAndGLen; 15355+ CK_ULONG ulQLen; 15356+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen; 15357+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomA; 15358+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPrimeP; 15359+ CK_BYTE_PTR pBaseG; 15360+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSubprimeQ; 15361+} CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS; 15362+ 15363+typedef CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS CK_PTR \ 15364+ CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PTR; 15365+ 15366+ 15367+/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS provides the parameters to the 15368+ * CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX mechanism */ 15369+/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ 15370+typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS { 15371+ CK_ULONG ulOldWrappedXLen; 15372+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldWrappedX; 15373+ CK_ULONG ulOldPasswordLen; 15374+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldPassword; 15375+ CK_ULONG ulOldPublicDataLen; 15376+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldPublicData; 15377+ CK_ULONG ulOldRandomLen; 15378+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldRandomA; 15379+ CK_ULONG ulNewPasswordLen; 15380+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewPassword; 15381+ CK_ULONG ulNewPublicDataLen; 15382+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewPublicData; 15383+ CK_ULONG ulNewRandomLen; 15384+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewRandomA; 15385+} CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS; 15386+ 15387+typedef CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS CK_PTR \ 15388+ CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS_PTR; 15389+ 15390+ 15391+typedef struct CK_PBE_PARAMS { 15392+ CK_BYTE_PTR pInitVector; 15393+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPassword; 15394+ CK_ULONG ulPasswordLen; 15395+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSalt; 15396+ CK_ULONG ulSaltLen; 15397+ CK_ULONG ulIteration; 15398+} CK_PBE_PARAMS; 15399+ 15400+typedef CK_PBE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PBE_PARAMS_PTR; 15401+ 15402+ 15403+/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the 15404+ * CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP mechanism */ 15405+/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ 15406+typedef struct CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS { 15407+ CK_BYTE bBC; /* block contents byte */ 15408+ CK_BYTE_PTR pX; /* extra data */ 15409+ CK_ULONG ulXLen; /* length of extra data in bytes */ 15410+} CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS; 15411+ 15412+typedef CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR \ 15413+ CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR; 15414+ 15415+ 15416+typedef struct CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA { 15417+ CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom; 15418+ CK_ULONG ulClientRandomLen; 15419+ CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom; 15420+ CK_ULONG ulServerRandomLen; 15421+} CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA; 15422+ 15423+ 15424+typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS { 15425+ CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; 15426+ CK_VERSION_PTR pVersion; 15427+} CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS; 15428+ 15429+typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR \ 15430+ CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; 15431+ 15432+ 15433+typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT { 15434+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientMacSecret; 15435+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerMacSecret; 15436+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientKey; 15437+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerKey; 15438+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIVClient; 15439+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIVServer; 15440+} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT; 15441+ 15442+typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR; 15443+ 15444+ 15445+typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS { 15446+ CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits; 15447+ CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits; 15448+ CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits; 15449+ CK_BBOOL bIsExport; 15450+ CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; 15451+ CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial; 15452+} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS; 15453+ 15454+typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR; 15455+ 15456+/* CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS is new for version 2.20 */ 15457+typedef struct CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS { 15458+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed; 15459+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen; 15460+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLabel; 15461+ CK_ULONG ulLabelLen; 15462+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOutput; 15463+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOutputLen; 15464+} CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS; 15465+ 15466+typedef CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR; 15467+ 15468+/* WTLS is new for version 2.20 */ 15469+typedef struct CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA { 15470+ CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom; 15471+ CK_ULONG ulClientRandomLen; 15472+ CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom; 15473+ CK_ULONG ulServerRandomLen; 15474+} CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA; 15475+ 15476+typedef CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA CK_PTR CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA_PTR; 15477+ 15478+typedef struct CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS { 15479+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism; 15480+ CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; 15481+ CK_BYTE_PTR pVersion; 15482+} CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS; 15483+ 15484+typedef CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR \ 15485+ CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; 15486+ 15487+typedef struct CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS { 15488+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism; 15489+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed; 15490+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen; 15491+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLabel; 15492+ CK_ULONG ulLabelLen; 15493+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOutput; 15494+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOutputLen; 15495+} CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS; 15496+ 15497+typedef CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR; 15498+ 15499+typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT { 15500+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hMacSecret; 15501+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey; 15502+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIV; 15503+} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT; 15504+ 15505+typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR; 15506+ 15507+typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS { 15508+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism; 15509+ CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits; 15510+ CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits; 15511+ CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits; 15512+ CK_ULONG ulSequenceNumber; 15513+ CK_BBOOL bIsExport; 15514+ CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; 15515+ CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial; 15516+} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS; 15517+ 15518+typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR; 15519+ 15520+/* CMS is new for version 2.20 */ 15521+typedef struct CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS { 15522+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE certificateHandle; 15523+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pSigningMechanism; 15524+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pDigestMechanism; 15525+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pContentType; 15526+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRequestedAttributes; 15527+ CK_ULONG ulRequestedAttributesLen; 15528+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRequiredAttributes; 15529+ CK_ULONG ulRequiredAttributesLen; 15530+} CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS; 15531+ 15532+typedef CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS_PTR; 15533+ 15534+typedef struct CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA { 15535+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; 15536+ CK_ULONG ulLen; 15537+} CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA; 15538+ 15539+typedef CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA CK_PTR \ 15540+ CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA_PTR; 15541+ 15542+ 15543+/* The CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is used for the 15544+ * CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY mechanism. It specifies which bit 15545+ * of the base key should be used as the first bit of the 15546+ * derived key */ 15547+/* CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ 15548+typedef CK_ULONG CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS; 15549+ 15550+typedef CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS_PTR; 15551+ 15552+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is new for v2.10. 15553+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is used to 15554+ * indicate the Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) used to generate 15555+ * key bits using PKCS #5 PBKDF2. */ 15556+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE; 15557+ 15558+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE_PTR; 15559+ 15560+/* The following PRFs are defined in PKCS #5 v2.0. */ 15561+#define CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA1 0x00000001 15562+ 15563+ 15564+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10. 15565+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the 15566+ * source of the salt value when deriving a key using PKCS #5 15567+ * PBKDF2. */ 15568+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE; 15569+ 15570+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR; 15571+ 15572+/* The following salt value sources are defined in PKCS #5 v2.0. */ 15573+#define CKZ_SALT_SPECIFIED 0x00000001 15574+ 15575+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is new for v2.10. 15576+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is a structure that provides the 15577+ * parameters to the CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 mechanism. */ 15578+typedef struct CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS { 15579+ CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE saltSource; 15580+ CK_VOID_PTR pSaltSourceData; 15581+ CK_ULONG ulSaltSourceDataLen; 15582+ CK_ULONG iterations; 15583+ CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE prf; 15584+ CK_VOID_PTR pPrfData; 15585+ CK_ULONG ulPrfDataLen; 15586+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPassword; 15587+ CK_ULONG_PTR ulPasswordLen; 15588+} CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS; 15589+ 15590+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS_PTR; 15591+ 15592+/* All CK_OTP structs are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ 15593+ 15594+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE; 15595+typedef CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE CK_PARAM_TYPE; /* B/w compatibility */ 15596+ 15597+typedef struct CK_OTP_PARAM { 15598+ CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE type; 15599+ CK_VOID_PTR pValue; 15600+ CK_ULONG ulValueLen; 15601+} CK_OTP_PARAM; 15602+ 15603+typedef CK_OTP_PARAM CK_PTR CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR; 15604+ 15605+typedef struct CK_OTP_PARAMS { 15606+ CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR pParams; 15607+ CK_ULONG ulCount; 15608+} CK_OTP_PARAMS; 15609+ 15610+typedef CK_OTP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_OTP_PARAMS_PTR; 15611+ 15612+typedef struct CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO { 15613+ CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR pParams; 15614+ CK_ULONG ulCount; 15615+} CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO; 15616+ 15617+typedef CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO CK_PTR CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO_PTR; 15618+ 15619+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ 15620+#define CK_OTP_VALUE 0 15621+#define CK_OTP_PIN 1 15622+#define CK_OTP_CHALLENGE 2 15623+#define CK_OTP_TIME 3 15624+#define CK_OTP_COUNTER 4 15625+#define CK_OTP_FLAGS 5 15626+#define CK_OTP_OUTPUT_LENGTH 6 15627+#define CK_OTP_OUTPUT_FORMAT 7 15628+ 15629+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ 15630+#define CKF_NEXT_OTP 0x00000001 15631+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_TIME 0x00000002 15632+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_COUNTER 0x00000004 15633+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_CHALLENGE 0x00000008 15634+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_PIN 0x00000010 15635+#define CKF_USER_FRIENDLY_OTP 0x00000020 15636+ 15637+/* CK_KIP_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 2 */ 15638+typedef struct CK_KIP_PARAMS { 15639+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism; 15640+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey; 15641+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed; 15642+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen; 15643+} CK_KIP_PARAMS; 15644+ 15645+typedef CK_KIP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_KIP_PARAMS_PTR; 15646+ 15647+/* CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ 15648+typedef struct CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS { 15649+ CK_ULONG ulCounterBits; 15650+ CK_BYTE cb[16]; 15651+} CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS; 15652+ 15653+typedef CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS_PTR; 15654+ 15655+/* CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ 15656+typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS { 15657+ CK_ULONG ulCounterBits; 15658+ CK_BYTE cb[16]; 15659+} CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS; 15660+ 15661+typedef CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS_PTR; 15662+ 15663+/* CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ 15664+typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { 15665+ CK_BYTE iv[16]; 15666+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; 15667+ CK_ULONG length; 15668+} CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; 15669+ 15670+typedef CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; 15671+ 15672+/* CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ 15673+typedef struct CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { 15674+ CK_BYTE iv[16]; 15675+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; 15676+ CK_ULONG length; 15677+} CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; 15678+ 15679+typedef CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; 15680+ 15681+#endif 15682Index: openssl/util/libeay.num 15683diff -u openssl/util/libeay.num:1.8.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1 openssl/util/libeay.num:1.12 15684--- openssl/util/libeay.num:1.8.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1 Mon Apr 14 12:42:50 2014 15685+++ openssl/util/libeay.num Mon Apr 14 12:44:22 2014 15686@@ -4312,3 +4312,5 @@ 15687 BIO_s_datagram_sctp 4680 EXIST::FUNCTION:DGRAM,SCTP 15688 BIO_dgram_is_sctp 4681 EXIST::FUNCTION:SCTP 15689 BIO_dgram_sctp_notification_cb 4682 EXIST::FUNCTION:SCTP 15690+ENGINE_load_pk11ca 4683 EXIST::FUNCTION:HW_PKCS11CA,ENGINE 15691+ENGINE_load_pk11so 4683 EXIST::FUNCTION:HW_PKCS11SO,ENGINE 15692Index: openssl/util/mk1mf.pl 15693diff -u openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.9.2.1.4.1.10.1 openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.11 15694--- openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.9.2.1.4.1.10.1 Fri Jan 2 14:55:51 2015 15695+++ openssl/util/mk1mf.pl Fri Jan 2 14:56:55 2015 15696@@ -114,6 +114,8 @@ 15697 no-ecdh - No ECDH 15698 no-engine - No engine 15699 no-hw - No hw 15700+ no-hw-pkcs11ca - No hw PKCS#11 CA flavor 15701+ no-hw-pkcs11so - No hw PKCS#11 SO flavor 15702 nasm - Use NASM for x86 asm 15703 nw-nasm - Use NASM x86 asm for NetWare 15704 nw-mwasm - Use Metrowerks x86 asm for NetWare 15705@@ -278,6 +280,8 @@ 15706 $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_GOST" if $no_gost; 15707 $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ENGINE" if $no_engine; 15708 $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW" if $no_hw; 15709+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA" if $no_hw_pkcs11ca; 15710+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO" if $no_hw_pkcs11so; 15711 $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_FIPS" if $fips; 15712 $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE" if $no_jpake; 15713 $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_EC2M" if $no_ec2m; 15714@@ -345,6 +349,9 @@ 15715 $dir=$val; 15716 } 15717 15718+ if ($key eq "PK11_LIB_LOCATION") 15719+ { $cflags .= " -D$key=\\\"$val\\\"" if $val ne "";} 15720+ 15721 if ($key eq "KRB5_INCLUDES") 15722 { $cflags .= " $val";} 15723 15724@@ -1131,6 +1138,8 @@ 15725 "no-gost" => \$no_gost, 15726 "no-engine" => \$no_engine, 15727 "no-hw" => \$no_hw, 15728+ "no-hw-pkcs11ca" => \$no_hw_pkcs11ca, 15729+ "no-hw-pkcs11so" => \$no_hw_pkcs11so, 15730 "no-rsax" => 0, 15731 "just-ssl" => 15732 [\$no_rc2, \$no_idea, \$no_des, \$no_bf, \$no_cast, 15733Index: openssl/util/mkdef.pl 15734diff -u openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.7.2.1.4.1.10.1 openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.10 15735--- openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.7.2.1.4.1.10.1 Fri Jan 2 14:55:51 2015 15736+++ openssl/util/mkdef.pl Fri Jan 2 14:56:55 2015 15737@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ 15738 # External "algorithms" 15739 "FP_API", "STDIO", "SOCK", "KRB5", "DGRAM", 15740 # Engines 15741- "STATIC_ENGINE", "ENGINE", "HW", "GMP", 15742+ "STATIC_ENGINE", "ENGINE", "HW", "GMP", "HW_PKCS11CA", "HW_PKCS11SO", 15743 # RFC3779 15744 "RFC3779", 15745 # TLS 15746@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ 15747 my $no_md2; my $no_md4; my $no_md5; my $no_sha; my $no_ripemd; my $no_mdc2; 15748 my $no_rsa; my $no_dsa; my $no_dh; my $no_hmac=0; my $no_aes; my $no_krb5; 15749 my $no_ec; my $no_ecdsa; my $no_ecdh; my $no_engine; my $no_hw; 15750+my $no_pkcs11ca; my $no_pkcs11so; 15751 my $no_fp_api; my $no_static_engine=1; my $no_gmp; my $no_deprecated; 15752 my $no_rfc3779; my $no_psk; my $no_tlsext; my $no_cms; my $no_capieng; 15753 my $no_jpake; my $no_srp; my $no_ssl2; my $no_ec2m; my $no_nistp_gcc; 15754@@ -242,6 +243,8 @@ 15755 elsif (/^no-sctp$/) { $no_sctp=1; } 15756 elsif (/^no-srtp$/) { $no_srtp=1; } 15757 elsif (/^no-unit-test$/){ $no_unit_test=1; } 15758+ elsif (/^no-hw-pkcs11ca$/) { $no_pkcs11ca=1; } 15759+ elsif (/^no-hw-pkcs11so$/) { $no_pkcs11so=1; } 15760 } 15761 15762 15763@@ -1196,6 +1199,8 @@ 15764 if ($keyword eq "KRB5" && $no_krb5) { return 0; } 15765 if ($keyword eq "ENGINE" && $no_engine) { return 0; } 15766 if ($keyword eq "HW" && $no_hw) { return 0; } 15767+ if ($keyword eq "HW_PKCS11CA" && $no_pkcs11ca) { return 0; } 15768+ if ($keyword eq "HW_PKCS11SO" && $no_pkcs11so) { return 0; } 15769 if ($keyword eq "FP_API" && $no_fp_api) { return 0; } 15770 if ($keyword eq "STATIC_ENGINE" && $no_static_engine) { return 0; } 15771 if ($keyword eq "GMP" && $no_gmp) { return 0; } 15772Index: openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl 15773diff -u openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.7.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1 openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.10 15774--- openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.7.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1 Mon Apr 14 12:42:50 2014 15775+++ openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl Mon Apr 14 12:44:22 2014 15776@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ 15777 my $f = $shlib || $fips ?' /MD':' /MT'; 15778 $lib_cflag='/Zl' if (!$shlib); # remove /DEFAULTLIBs from static lib 15779 $opt_cflags=$f.' /Ox'; 15780- $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG'; 15781+ $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od /Zi -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG'; 15782 $lflags="/nologo /subsystem:console /opt:ref"; 15783 15784 *::perlasm_compile_target = sub { 15785