1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
5 *
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 */
11
12 #include <stdio.h>
13 #include <time.h>
14 #include <assert.h>
15 #include "../ssl_local.h"
16 #include "statem_local.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/md5.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25 #include <internal/cryptlib.h>
26
27 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
28 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
29
30 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
31 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
32 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
33 WPACKET *pkt);
34
35 /*
36 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
37 *
38 * Return values are:
39 * 1: Yes
40 * 0: No
41 */
cert_req_allowed(SSL * s)42 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
43 {
44 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
45 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
46 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
47 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
48 return 0;
49
50 return 1;
51 }
52
53 /*
54 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
55 *
56 * Return values are:
57 * 1: Yes
58 * 0: No
59 */
key_exchange_expected(SSL * s)60 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
61 {
62 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
63
64 /*
65 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
66 * ciphersuite or for SRP
67 */
68 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
69 | SSL_kSRP)) {
70 return 1;
71 }
72
73 return 0;
74 }
75
76 /*
77 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
78 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
79 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
80 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
81 *
82 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
83 * (transition not allowed)
84 */
ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL * s,int mt)85 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
86 {
87 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
88
89 /*
90 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
91 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
92 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
93 */
94
95 switch (st->hand_state) {
96 default:
97 break;
98
99 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
100 /*
101 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
102 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
103 */
104 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
105 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
106 return 1;
107 }
108 break;
109
110 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
111 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
112 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
113 return 1;
114 }
115 break;
116
117 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
118 if (s->hit) {
119 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
120 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
121 return 1;
122 }
123 } else {
124 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
125 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
126 return 1;
127 }
128 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
129 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
130 return 1;
131 }
132 }
133 break;
134
135 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
136 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
137 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
138 return 1;
139 }
140 break;
141
142 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
143 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
144 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
145 return 1;
146 }
147 break;
148
149 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
150 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
151 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
152 return 1;
153 }
154 break;
155
156 case TLS_ST_OK:
157 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
158 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
159 return 1;
160 }
161 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
163 return 1;
164 }
165 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
166 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
167 # error TODO(DTLS1.3): Restore digest for PHA before adding message.
168 #endif
169 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) {
170 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
171 /*
172 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
173 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
174 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
175 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
176 */
177 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
178 /* SSLfatal() already called */
179 return 0;
180 }
181 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
182 return 1;
183 }
184 }
185 break;
186 }
187
188 /* No valid transition found */
189 return 0;
190 }
191
192 /*
193 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
194 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
195 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
196 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
197 *
198 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
199 * (transition not allowed)
200 */
ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL * s,int mt)201 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
202 {
203 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
204 int ske_expected;
205
206 /*
207 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
208 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
209 */
210 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
211 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
212 goto err;
213 return 1;
214 }
215
216 switch (st->hand_state) {
217 default:
218 break;
219
220 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
221 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
222 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
223 return 1;
224 }
225
226 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
227 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
228 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
229 return 1;
230 }
231 }
232 break;
233
234 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
235 /*
236 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
237 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
238 * HelloRetryRequest.
239 */
240 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
241 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
242 return 1;
243 }
244 break;
245
246 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
247 if (s->hit) {
248 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
249 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
250 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
251 return 1;
252 }
253 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
254 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
255 return 1;
256 }
257 } else {
258 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
259 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
260 return 1;
261 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
262 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
263 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
264 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
265 /*
266 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
267 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
268 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
269 * the server is resuming.
270 */
271 s->hit = 1;
272 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
273 return 1;
274 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
275 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
276 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
277 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
278 return 1;
279 }
280 } else {
281 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
282 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
283 if (ske_expected
284 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
285 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
286 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
287 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
288 return 1;
289 }
290 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
291 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
292 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
293 return 1;
294 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
295 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
296 return 1;
297 }
298 }
299 }
300 break;
301
302 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
303 /*
304 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
305 * |ext.status_expected| is set
306 */
307 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
308 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
309 return 1;
310 }
311 /* Fall through */
312
313 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
314 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
315 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
316 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
317 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
318 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
319 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
320 return 1;
321 }
322 goto err;
323 }
324 /* Fall through */
325
326 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
327 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
328 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
329 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
330 return 1;
331 }
332 goto err;
333 }
334 /* Fall through */
335
336 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
337 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
338 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
339 return 1;
340 }
341 break;
342
343 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
344 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
345 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
346 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
347 return 1;
348 }
349 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
350 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
351 return 1;
352 }
353 break;
354
355 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
356 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
357 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
358 return 1;
359 }
360 break;
361
362 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
363 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
364 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
365 return 1;
366 }
367 break;
368
369 case TLS_ST_OK:
370 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
371 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
372 return 1;
373 }
374 break;
375 }
376
377 err:
378 /* No valid transition found */
379 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
380 BIO *rbio;
381
382 /*
383 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
384 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
385 */
386 s->init_num = 0;
387 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
388 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
389 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
390 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
391 return 0;
392 }
393 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
394 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION,
395 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
396 return 0;
397 }
398
399 /*
400 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
401 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
402 * server.
403 */
ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL * s)404 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
405 {
406 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
407
408 /*
409 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
410 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
411 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
412 */
413 switch (st->hand_state) {
414 default:
415 /* Shouldn't happen */
416 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
417 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
418 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
419 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
420
421 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
422 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
423 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
424 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
425 }
426 /*
427 * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
428 * we already sent close_notify
429 */
430 if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) {
431 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
432 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
433 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
434 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
435 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
436 }
437 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
438 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
439
440 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
441 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
442 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
443 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
444 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
445 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
446 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
447 else
448 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
449 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
450 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
451
452 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
453 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
454 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
455 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
456 }
457 /* Fall through */
458
459 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
460 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
461 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
462 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
463 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
464
465 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
466 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
467 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
468 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
469 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
470
471 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
472 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
473 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
474
475 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
476 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
477 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
478 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
479 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
480 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
481
482 case TLS_ST_OK:
483 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
484 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
485 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
486 }
487
488 /* Try to read from the server instead */
489 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
490 }
491 }
492
493 /*
494 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
495 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
496 */
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL * s)497 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
498 {
499 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
500
501 /*
502 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
503 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
504 * later
505 */
506 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
507 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
508
509 switch (st->hand_state) {
510 default:
511 /* Shouldn't happen */
512 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
513 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION,
514 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
515 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
516
517 case TLS_ST_OK:
518 if (!s->renegotiate) {
519 /*
520 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
521 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
522 */
523 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
524 }
525 /* Renegotiation */
526 /* fall thru */
527 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
528 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
529 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
530
531 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
532 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
533 /*
534 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
535 * actually selected a version yet.
536 */
537 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
538 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
539 else
540 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
541 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
542 }
543 /*
544 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
545 * we will be sent
546 */
547 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
548
549 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
550 /*
551 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
552 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
553 * because we did early data.
554 */
555 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
556 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
557 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
558 else
559 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
560 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
561
562 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
563 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
564
565 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
566 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
567 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
568
569 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
570 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
571 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
572 else
573 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
574 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
575
576 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
577 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
578 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
579
580 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
581 /*
582 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
583 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
584 */
585 /*
586 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
587 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
588 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
589 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
590 */
591 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
592 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
593 } else {
594 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
595 }
596 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
597 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
598 }
599 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
600
601 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
602 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
603 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
604
605 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
606 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
607 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
608 } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
609 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
610 } else {
611 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
612 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
613 #else
614 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
615 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
616 else
617 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
618 #endif
619 }
620 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
621
622 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
623 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
624 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
625 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
626 #endif
627
628 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
629 if (s->hit) {
630 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
631 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
632 } else {
633 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
634 }
635
636 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
637 if (s->hit) {
638 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
639 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
640 } else {
641 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
642 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
643 }
644
645 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
646 /*
647 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
648 * convenient time.
649 */
650 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
651 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
652 /* SSLfatal() already called */
653 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
654 }
655 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
656 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
657 }
658 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
659 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
660 }
661 }
662
663 /*
664 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
665 * the client to the server.
666 */
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL * s,WORK_STATE wst)667 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
668 {
669 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
670
671 switch (st->hand_state) {
672 default:
673 /* No pre work to be done */
674 break;
675
676 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
677 s->shutdown = 0;
678 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
679 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
680 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
681 /* SSLfatal() already called */
682 return WORK_ERROR;
683 }
684 }
685 break;
686
687 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
688 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
689 if (s->hit) {
690 /*
691 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
692 * messages unless we need to.
693 */
694 st->use_timer = 0;
695 }
696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
697 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
698 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
699 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
700 }
701 #endif
702 }
703 break;
704
705 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
706 /*
707 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
708 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
709 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
710 */
711 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
712 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
713 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
714 /* Fall through */
715
716 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
717 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1);
718
719 case TLS_ST_OK:
720 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
721 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
722 }
723
724 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
725 }
726
727 /*
728 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
729 * client to the server.
730 */
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL * s,WORK_STATE wst)731 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
732 {
733 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
734
735 s->init_num = 0;
736
737 switch (st->hand_state) {
738 default:
739 /* No post work to be done */
740 break;
741
742 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
743 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
744 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
745 /*
746 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
747 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
748 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
749 */
750 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
751 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
752 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
753 /* SSLfatal() already called */
754 return WORK_ERROR;
755 }
756 }
757 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
758 } else if (!statem_flush(s)) {
759 return WORK_MORE_A;
760 }
761
762 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
763 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
764 s->first_packet = 1;
765 }
766 break;
767
768 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
769 /*
770 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
771 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
772 */
773 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
774 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
775 break;
776
777 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
778 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
779 /* SSLfatal() already called */
780 return WORK_ERROR;
781 }
782 break;
783
784 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
785 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
786 break;
787 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
788 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
789 /*
790 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
791 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
792 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
793 */
794 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
795 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
796 return WORK_ERROR;
797 break;
798 }
799 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
800 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
801 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
802 #else
803 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
804 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
805 else
806 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
807 #endif
808 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
809 /* SSLfatal() already called */
810 return WORK_ERROR;
811 }
812
813 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
814 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
815 /* SSLfatal() already called */
816 return WORK_ERROR;
817 }
818
819 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
820 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
821 if (s->hit) {
822 /*
823 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
824 * no SCTP used.
825 */
826 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
827 0, NULL);
828 }
829 #endif
830
831 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
832 }
833 break;
834
835 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
836 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
837 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
838 /*
839 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
840 * no SCTP used.
841 */
842 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
843 0, NULL);
844 }
845 #endif
846 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
847 return WORK_MORE_B;
848
849 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
850 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
851 /* SSLfatal() already called */
852 return WORK_ERROR;
853 }
854 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
855 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
856 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
857 /* SSLfatal() already called */
858 return WORK_ERROR;
859 }
860 }
861 }
862 break;
863
864 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
865 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
866 return WORK_MORE_A;
867 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
868 /* SSLfatal() already called */
869 return WORK_ERROR;
870 }
871 break;
872 }
873
874 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
875 }
876
877 /*
878 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
879 * client
880 *
881 * Valid return values are:
882 * 1: Success
883 * 0: Error
884 */
ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt,confunc_f * confunc,int * mt)885 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
886 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
887 {
888 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
889
890 switch (st->hand_state) {
891 default:
892 /* Shouldn't happen */
893 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
894 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
895 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
896 return 0;
897
898 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
899 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
900 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
901 else
902 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
903 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
904 break;
905
906 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
907 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
908 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
909 break;
910
911 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
912 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
913 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
914 break;
915
916 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
917 *confunc = NULL;
918 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
919 break;
920
921 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
922 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
923 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
924 break;
925
926 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
927 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
928 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
929 break;
930
931 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
932 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
933 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
934 break;
935
936 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
937 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
938 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
939 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
940 break;
941 #endif
942 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
943 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
944 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
945 break;
946
947 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
948 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
949 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
950 break;
951 }
952
953 return 1;
954 }
955
956 /*
957 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
958 * reading. Excludes the message header.
959 */
ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL * s)960 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
961 {
962 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
963
964 switch (st->hand_state) {
965 default:
966 /* Shouldn't happen */
967 return 0;
968
969 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
970 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
971
972 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
973 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
974
975 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
976 return s->max_cert_list;
977
978 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
979 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
980
981 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
982 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
983
984 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
985 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
986
987 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
988 /*
989 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
990 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
991 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
992 */
993 return s->max_cert_list;
994
995 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
996 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
997
998 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
999 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1000 return 3;
1001 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1002
1003 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1004 return (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) ? SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS13
1005 : SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS12;
1006
1007 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1008 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1009
1010 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1011 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
1012
1013 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1014 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1015 }
1016 }
1017
1018 /*
1019 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
1020 */
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)1021 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1022 {
1023 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1024
1025 switch (st->hand_state) {
1026 default:
1027 /* Shouldn't happen */
1028 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1029 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1030 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1031 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1032
1033 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
1034 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
1035
1036 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1037 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
1038
1039 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1040 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
1041
1042 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1043 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1044
1045 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
1046 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
1047
1048 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
1049 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1050
1051 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1052 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
1053
1054 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1055 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
1056
1057 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1058 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1059
1060 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1061 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
1062
1063 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1064 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1065
1066 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1067 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1068
1069 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1070 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1071
1072 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1073 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1074 }
1075 }
1076
1077 /*
1078 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1079 * from the server
1080 */
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL * s,WORK_STATE wst)1081 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1082 {
1083 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1084
1085 switch (st->hand_state) {
1086 default:
1087 /* Shouldn't happen */
1088 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1089 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1090 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1091 return WORK_ERROR;
1092
1093 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1094 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1095 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1096 }
1097 }
1098
tls_construct_client_hello(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)1099 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1100 {
1101 unsigned char *p;
1102 size_t sess_id_len;
1103 int i, protverr;
1104 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1105 SSL_COMP *comp;
1106 #endif
1107 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1108 unsigned char *session_id;
1109
1110 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1111 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1112 if (protverr != 0) {
1113 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1114 protverr);
1115 return 0;
1116 }
1117
1118 if (sess == NULL
1119 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL)
1120 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1121 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1122 && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1123 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1124 return 0;
1125 }
1126 }
1127 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1128
1129 p = s->s3->client_random;
1130
1131 /*
1132 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1133 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1134 */
1135 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1136 size_t idx;
1137 i = 1;
1138 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1139 if (p[idx]) {
1140 i = 0;
1141 break;
1142 }
1143 }
1144 } else {
1145 i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
1146 }
1147
1148 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random),
1149 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
1150 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1151 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1152 return 0;
1153 }
1154
1155 /*-
1156 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1157 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1158 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1159 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1160 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1161 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1162 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1163 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1164 * 1.0.
1165 *
1166 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1167 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1168 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1169 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1170 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1171 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1172 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1173 * know that is maximum server supports.
1174 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1175 * containing version 1.0.
1176 *
1177 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1178 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1179 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1180 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1181 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1182 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1183 * the negotiated version.
1184 *
1185 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1186 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1187 */
1188 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1189 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1190 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1191 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1192 return 0;
1193 }
1194
1195 /* Session ID */
1196 session_id = s->session->session_id;
1197 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1198 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1199 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
1200 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
1201 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1202 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
1203 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1204 && RAND_bytes(s->tmp_session_id, sess_id_len) <= 0) {
1205 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1206 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1207 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1208 return 0;
1209 }
1210 } else {
1211 sess_id_len = 0;
1212 }
1213 } else {
1214 assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id));
1215 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1216 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1217 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1218 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
1219 }
1220 }
1221 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1222 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
1223 sess_id_len))
1224 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1225 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1226 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1227 return 0;
1228 }
1229
1230 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1231 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1232 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1233 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1234 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1235 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1236 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1237 return 0;
1238 }
1239 }
1240
1241 /* Ciphers supported */
1242 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1243 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1244 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1245 return 0;
1246 }
1247
1248 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) {
1249 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1250 return 0;
1251 }
1252 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1253 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1254 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1255 return 0;
1256 }
1257
1258 /* COMPRESSION */
1259 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1260 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1261 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1262 return 0;
1263 }
1264 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1265 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1266 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1267 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1268 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1269 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1270 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1271 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1272 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1273 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1274 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1275 return 0;
1276 }
1277 }
1278 }
1279 #endif
1280 /* Add the NULL method */
1281 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1282 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1283 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1284 return 0;
1285 }
1286
1287 /* TLS extensions */
1288 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
1289 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1290 return 0;
1291 }
1292
1293 return 1;
1294 }
1295
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)1296 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1297 {
1298 size_t cookie_len;
1299 PACKET cookiepkt;
1300
1301 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1302 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1303 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1304 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1305 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1306 }
1307
1308 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1309 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1310 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1311 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1312 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1313 }
1314
1315 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1316 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1317 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1318 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1319 }
1320 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1321
1322 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1323 }
1324
set_client_ciphersuite(SSL * s,const unsigned char * cipherchars)1325 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1326 {
1327 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1328 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1329 int i;
1330
1331 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1332 if (c == NULL) {
1333 /* unknown cipher */
1334 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1335 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1336 return 0;
1337 }
1338 /*
1339 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1340 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1341 */
1342 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1343 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1344 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1345 return 0;
1346 }
1347
1348 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1349 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1350 if (i < 0) {
1351 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1352 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1353 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1354 return 0;
1355 }
1356
1357 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1358 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1359 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1360 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1361 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1362 return 0;
1363 }
1364
1365 /*
1366 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1367 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1368 * set and use it for comparison.
1369 */
1370 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1371 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1372 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1373 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1374 /*
1375 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1376 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1377 */
1378 if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2)
1379 != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1380 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1381 SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1382 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1383 return 0;
1384 }
1385 } else {
1386 /*
1387 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1388 * ciphersuite.
1389 */
1390 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1391 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1392 return 0;
1393 }
1394 }
1395 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1396
1397 return 1;
1398 }
1399
tls_process_server_hello(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)1400 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1401 {
1402 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1403 size_t session_id_len;
1404 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1405 int hrr = 0;
1406 unsigned int compression;
1407 unsigned int sversion;
1408 unsigned int context;
1409 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1411 SSL_COMP *comp;
1412 #endif
1413
1414 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1415 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1416 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1417 goto err;
1418 }
1419
1420 /* load the server random */
1421 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1422 && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
1423 && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1424 && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
1425 s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
1426 hrr = 1;
1427 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1428 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1429 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1430 goto err;
1431 }
1432 } else {
1433 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1434 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1435 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1436 goto err;
1437 }
1438 }
1439
1440 /* Get the session-id. */
1441 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1442 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1443 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1444 goto err;
1445 }
1446 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1447 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1448 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1449 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1450 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1451 goto err;
1452 }
1453
1454 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1455 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1456 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1457 goto err;
1458 }
1459
1460 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1461 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1462 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1463 goto err;
1464 }
1465
1466 /* TLS extensions */
1467 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
1468 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1469 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1470 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1471 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1472 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1473 goto err;
1474 }
1475
1476 if (!hrr) {
1477 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
1478 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1479 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1480 &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
1481 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1482 goto err;
1483 }
1484
1485 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
1486 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1487 goto err;
1488 }
1489 }
1490
1491 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
1492 if (compression != 0) {
1493 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1494 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1495 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1496 goto err;
1497 }
1498
1499 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
1500 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
1501 session_id_len) != 0) {
1502 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1503 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
1504 goto err;
1505 }
1506 }
1507
1508 if (hrr) {
1509 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1510 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1511 goto err;
1512 }
1513
1514 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
1515 }
1516
1517 /*
1518 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1519 * are appropriate for this version.
1520 */
1521 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1522 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1523 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
1524 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1525 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1526 goto err;
1527 }
1528
1529 s->hit = 0;
1530
1531 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1532 /*
1533 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1534 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1535 */
1536 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1537 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1538 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1539 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1540 goto err;
1541 }
1542
1543 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1544 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1545 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1546 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
1547 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1548 goto err;
1549 }
1550 } else {
1551 /*
1552 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1553 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1554 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1555 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1556 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1557 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1558 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1559 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1560 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1561 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1562 */
1563 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1564 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1565 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1566 /*
1567 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1568 * backwards compat reasons
1569 */
1570 int master_key_length;
1571 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1572 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1573 &master_key_length,
1574 NULL, &pref_cipher,
1575 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1576 && master_key_length > 0) {
1577 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1578 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1579 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1580 } else {
1581 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1582 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1583 goto err;
1584 }
1585 }
1586
1587 if (session_id_len != 0
1588 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1589 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1590 session_id_len) == 0)
1591 s->hit = 1;
1592 }
1593
1594 if (s->hit) {
1595 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1596 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1597 /* actually a client application bug */
1598 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1599 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1600 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1601 goto err;
1602 }
1603 } else {
1604 /*
1605 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1606 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1607 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1608 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1609 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1610 */
1611 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1612 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss);
1613 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1614 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1615 goto err;
1616 }
1617 }
1618
1619 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1620 /*
1621 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1622 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1623 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1624 * used for resumption.
1625 */
1626 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1627 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1628 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1629 if (session_id_len > 0)
1630 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1631 session_id_len);
1632 }
1633 }
1634
1635 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1636 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1637 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1638 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1639 goto err;
1640 }
1641 /*
1642 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1643 * version.
1644 */
1645 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1646 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1647
1648 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1649 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1650 goto err;
1651 }
1652
1653 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1654 if (compression != 0) {
1655 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1656 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1657 goto err;
1658 }
1659 /*
1660 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1661 * using compression.
1662 */
1663 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1664 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1665 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1666 goto err;
1667 }
1668 #else
1669 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1670 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1671 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1672 goto err;
1673 }
1674 if (compression == 0)
1675 comp = NULL;
1676 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1677 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1678 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1679 goto err;
1680 } else {
1681 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1682 }
1683
1684 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1685 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1686 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1687 goto err;
1688 } else {
1689 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1690 }
1691 #endif
1692
1693 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1694 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1695 goto err;
1696 }
1697
1698 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1699 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1700 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1701 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1702 size_t labellen;
1703
1704 /*
1705 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1706 * no SCTP used.
1707 */
1708 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1709 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1710
1711 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
1712 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
1713 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
1714 labellen += 1;
1715
1716 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1717 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1718 labelbuffer,
1719 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1720 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1721 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1722 goto err;
1723 }
1724
1725 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1726 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1727 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1728 }
1729 #endif
1730
1731 /*
1732 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1733 * we're done with this message
1734 */
1735 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1736 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1737 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1738 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1739 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1740 goto err;
1741 }
1742
1743 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1744 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1745 err:
1746 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1747 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1748 }
1749
tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL * s,PACKET * extpkt)1750 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s,
1751 PACKET *extpkt)
1752 {
1753 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1754
1755 /*
1756 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1757 * should not be used.
1758 */
1759 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
1760 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
1761
1762 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1763 &extensions, NULL, 1)
1764 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1765 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1766 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1767 goto err;
1768 }
1769
1770 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1771 extensions = NULL;
1772
1773 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0
1774 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1775 && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL
1776 #endif
1777 ) {
1778 /*
1779 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1780 * ClientHello will not change
1781 */
1782 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1783 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1784 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1785 goto err;
1786 }
1787
1788 /*
1789 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1790 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1791 */
1792 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
1793 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1794 goto err;
1795 }
1796
1797 /*
1798 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1799 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1800 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1801 * for HRR messages.
1802 */
1803 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1804 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1805 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1806 goto err;
1807 }
1808
1809 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1810 err:
1811 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1812 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1813 }
1814
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)1815 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1816 {
1817 int i;
1818 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1819 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1820 X509 *x = NULL;
1821 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1822 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1823 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1824 size_t chainidx, certidx;
1825 unsigned int context = 0;
1826 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1827
1828 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1829 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1830 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1831 goto err;
1832 }
1833
1834 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1835 || context != 0
1836 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1837 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1838 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1839 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1840 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1841 goto err;
1842 }
1843 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1844 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1845 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1846 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1847 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1848 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1849 goto err;
1850 }
1851
1852 certstart = certbytes;
1853 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1854 if (x == NULL) {
1855 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE,
1856 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1857 goto err;
1858 }
1859 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1860 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1861 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1862 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1863 goto err;
1864 }
1865
1866 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1867 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1868 PACKET extensions;
1869
1870 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1871 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1872 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1873 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1874 goto err;
1875 }
1876 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1877 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1878 NULL, chainidx == 0)
1879 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1880 rawexts, x, chainidx,
1881 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1882 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1883 /* SSLfatal already called */
1884 goto err;
1885 }
1886 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1887 }
1888
1889 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1890 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1891 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1892 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1893 goto err;
1894 }
1895 x = NULL;
1896 }
1897
1898 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1899 /*
1900 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1901 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1902 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1903 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1904 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1905 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1906 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1907 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1908 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1909 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1910 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1911 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1912 */
1913 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1914 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
1915 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1916 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1917 goto err;
1918 }
1919 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1920 if (i > 1) {
1921 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1922 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1923 goto err;
1924 }
1925
1926 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1927 /*
1928 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1929 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1930 */
1931 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1932 sk = NULL;
1933
1934 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1935
1936 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1937 x = NULL;
1938 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1939 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1940 goto err;
1941 }
1942
1943 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
1944 x = NULL;
1945 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1946 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1947 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1948 goto err;
1949 }
1950 /*
1951 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1952 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1953 * type.
1954 */
1955 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1956 if ((clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1957 x = NULL;
1958 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1959 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1960 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1961 goto err;
1962 }
1963 }
1964
1965 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1966 X509_up_ref(x);
1967 s->session->peer = x;
1968 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1969 x = NULL;
1970
1971 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1972 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1973 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1974 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1975 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1976 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1977 goto err;
1978 }
1979
1980 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1981
1982 err:
1983 X509_free(x);
1984 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1985 return ret;
1986 }
1987
tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)1988 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1989 {
1990 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1991 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1992
1993 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1994
1995 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1996 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1997 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1998 return 0;
1999 }
2000
2001 /*
2002 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
2003 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
2004 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
2005 * identity.
2006 */
2007 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2008 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2009 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2010 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2011 return 0;
2012 }
2013
2014 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
2015 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2016 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
2017 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
2018 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
2019 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2020 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2021 return 0;
2022 }
2023
2024 return 1;
2025 #else
2026 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2027 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2028 return 0;
2029 #endif
2030 }
2031
tls_process_ske_srp(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt,EVP_PKEY ** pkey)2032 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2033 {
2034 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2035 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
2036
2037 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2038 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2039 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
2040 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
2041 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2042 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2043 return 0;
2044 }
2045
2046 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
2047 if ((s->srp_ctx.N =
2048 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
2049 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
2050 || (s->srp_ctx.g =
2051 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
2052 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
2053 || (s->srp_ctx.s =
2054 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
2055 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
2056 || (s->srp_ctx.B =
2057 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
2058 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
2059 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2060 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2061 return 0;
2062 }
2063
2064 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
2065 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2066 return 0;
2067 }
2068
2069 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2070 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2071 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2072
2073 return 1;
2074 #else
2075 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2076 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2077 return 0;
2078 #endif
2079 }
2080
tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt,EVP_PKEY ** pkey)2081 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2082 {
2083 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2084 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
2085 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
2086
2087 DH *dh = NULL;
2088 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
2089
2090 int check_bits = 0;
2091
2092 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2093 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2094 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
2095 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2096 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2097 return 0;
2098 }
2099
2100 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
2101 dh = DH_new();
2102
2103 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
2104 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2105 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2106 goto err;
2107 }
2108
2109 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
2110 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
2111 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
2112 NULL);
2113 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
2114 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
2115 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
2116 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2117 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2118 goto err;
2119 }
2120
2121 /* test non-zero pubkey */
2122 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
2123 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2124 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2125 goto err;
2126 }
2127
2128 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
2129 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2130 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2131 goto err;
2132 }
2133 p = g = NULL;
2134
2135 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
2136 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2137 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2138 goto err;
2139 }
2140
2141 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
2142 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2143 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2144 goto err;
2145 }
2146 bnpub_key = NULL;
2147
2148 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
2149 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2150 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2151 goto err;
2152 }
2153 dh = NULL;
2154
2155 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, EVP_PKEY_security_bits(peer_tmp),
2156 0, peer_tmp)) {
2157 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2158 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2159 goto err;
2160 }
2161
2162 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2163
2164 /*
2165 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2166 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2167 */
2168 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2169 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2170 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2171
2172 return 1;
2173
2174 err:
2175 BN_free(p);
2176 BN_free(g);
2177 BN_free(bnpub_key);
2178 DH_free(dh);
2179 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2180
2181 return 0;
2182 #else
2183 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2184 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2185 return 0;
2186 #endif
2187 }
2188
tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt,EVP_PKEY ** pkey)2189 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2190 {
2191 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2192 PACKET encoded_pt;
2193 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2194
2195 /*
2196 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2197 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2198 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2199 */
2200 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2201 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2202 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2203 return 0;
2204 }
2205 /*
2206 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2207 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2208 */
2209 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
2210 || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) {
2211 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2212 SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2213 return 0;
2214 }
2215
2216 if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id)) == NULL) {
2217 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2218 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2219 return 0;
2220 }
2221
2222 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2223 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2224 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2225 return 0;
2226 }
2227
2228 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2229 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2230 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2231 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2232 SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2233 return 0;
2234 }
2235
2236 /*
2237 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2238 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2239 * and ECDSA.
2240 */
2241 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2242 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2243 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2244 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2245 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2246
2247 return 1;
2248 #else
2249 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2250 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2251 return 0;
2252 #endif
2253 }
2254
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)2255 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2256 {
2257 long alg_k;
2258 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2259 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2260 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2261 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2262
2263 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2264
2265 save_param_start = *pkt;
2266
2267 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2268 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2269 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2270 #endif
2271
2272 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2273 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
2274 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2275 goto err;
2276 }
2277 }
2278
2279 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2280 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2281 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2282 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2283 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2284 goto err;
2285 }
2286 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2287 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2288 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2289 goto err;
2290 }
2291 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2292 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2293 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2294 goto err;
2295 }
2296 } else if (alg_k) {
2297 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2298 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2299 goto err;
2300 }
2301
2302 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2303 if (pkey != NULL) {
2304 PACKET params;
2305 int maxsig;
2306 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2307 unsigned char *tbs;
2308 size_t tbslen;
2309 int rv;
2310
2311 /*
2312 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2313 * equals the length of the parameters.
2314 */
2315 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2316 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2317 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2318 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2319 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2320 goto err;
2321 }
2322
2323 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2324 unsigned int sigalg;
2325
2326 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2327 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2328 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2329 goto err;
2330 }
2331 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
2332 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2333 goto err;
2334 }
2335 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2336 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2337 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2338 goto err;
2339 }
2340
2341 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2342 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2343 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2344 goto err;
2345 }
2346 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
2347 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2348 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
2349 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md));
2350 #endif
2351
2352 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2353 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2354 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2355 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2356 goto err;
2357 }
2358 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2359 if (maxsig < 0) {
2360 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2361 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2362 goto err;
2363 }
2364
2365 /*
2366 * Check signature length
2367 */
2368 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2369 /* wrong packet length */
2370 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2371 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2372 goto err;
2373 }
2374
2375 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2376 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2377 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2378 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2379 goto err;
2380 }
2381
2382 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2383 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2384 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2385 goto err;
2386 }
2387 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2388 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2389 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2390 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2391 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2392 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2393 goto err;
2394 }
2395 }
2396 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2397 PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
2398 if (tbslen == 0) {
2399 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2400 goto err;
2401 }
2402
2403 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2404 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2405 OPENSSL_free(tbs);
2406 if (rv <= 0) {
2407 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2408 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2409 goto err;
2410 }
2411 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2412 md_ctx = NULL;
2413 } else {
2414 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2415 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2416 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2417 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2418 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2419 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2420 SSL_R_BAD_DATA);
2421 }
2422 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2423 goto err;
2424 }
2425 /* still data left over */
2426 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2427 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2428 SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2429 goto err;
2430 }
2431 }
2432
2433 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2434 err:
2435 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2436 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2437 }
2438
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)2439 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2440 {
2441 size_t i;
2442
2443 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2444 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2445 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2446
2447 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2448 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2449 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2450
2451 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
2452 /*
2453 * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
2454 * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
2455 * we just ignore it
2456 */
2457 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2458 }
2459
2460 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2461 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
2462 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
2463 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2464 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2465 s->pha_context = NULL;
2466 s->pha_context_len = 0;
2467
2468 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) ||
2469 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) {
2470 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2471 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2472 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2473 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2474 }
2475
2476 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2477 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2478 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2479 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2480 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2481 }
2482 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2483 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2484 &rawexts, NULL, 1)
2485 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2486 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2487 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2488 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2489 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2490 }
2491 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2492 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2493 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2494 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2495 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2496 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2497 }
2498 } else {
2499 PACKET ctypes;
2500
2501 /* get the certificate types */
2502 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2503 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2504 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2505 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2506 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2507 }
2508
2509 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2510 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2511 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2512 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2513 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2514 }
2515
2516 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2517 PACKET sigalgs;
2518
2519 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2520 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2521 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2522 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2523 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2524 }
2525
2526 /*
2527 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2528 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2529 */
2530 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) {
2531 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2532 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2533 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2534 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2535 }
2536 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2537 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2538 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2539 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2540 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2541 }
2542 }
2543
2544 /* get the CA RDNs */
2545 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2546 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2547 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2548 }
2549 }
2550
2551 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2552 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2553 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2554 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2555 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2556 }
2557
2558 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2559 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2560
2561 /*
2562 * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
2563 * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
2564 * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
2565 * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
2566 * SSL_get_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
2567 * client_cert_cb.
2568 */
2569 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
2570 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2571
2572 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2573 }
2574
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)2575 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2576 {
2577 unsigned int ticklen;
2578 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2579 unsigned int sess_len;
2580 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2581 PACKET nonce;
2582
2583 PACKET_null_init(&nonce);
2584
2585 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2586 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2587 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2588 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)))
2589 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2590 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen)
2591 : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) {
2592 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2593 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2594 goto err;
2595 }
2596
2597 /*
2598 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2599 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2600 * be 0 here in that instance
2601 */
2602 if (ticklen == 0)
2603 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2604
2605 /*
2606 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2607 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2608 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2609 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2610 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2611 * cache.
2612 */
2613 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2614 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2615
2616 /*
2617 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2618 * one
2619 */
2620 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2621 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2622 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2623 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2624 goto err;
2625 }
2626
2627 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0
2628 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2629 /*
2630 * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
2631 * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
2632 * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2633 */
2634 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2635 }
2636
2637 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2638 s->session = new_sess;
2639 }
2640
2641 /*
2642 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2643 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2644 */
2645 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2646
2647 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2648 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2649 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2650
2651 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2652 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2653 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2654 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2655 goto err;
2656 }
2657 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2658 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2659 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2660 goto err;
2661 }
2662
2663 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2664 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2665 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2666
2667 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2668 PACKET extpkt;
2669
2670 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2671 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2672 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2673 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2674 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2675 goto err;
2676 }
2677
2678 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2679 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts,
2680 NULL, 1)
2681 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2682 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2683 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2684 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2685 goto err;
2686 }
2687 }
2688
2689 /*
2690 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2691 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2692 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2693 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2694 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2695 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2696 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2697 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2698 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2699 */
2700 /*
2701 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2702 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2703 */
2704 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2705 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2706 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2707 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2708 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2709 goto err;
2710 }
2711 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2712 s->session->not_resumable = 0;
2713
2714 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2715 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2716 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
2717 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
2718 size_t hashlen;
2719 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
2720
2721 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
2722 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
2723 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2724 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2725 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2726 goto err;
2727 }
2728 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
2729
2730 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
2731 nonce_label,
2732 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
2733 PACKET_data(&nonce),
2734 PACKET_remaining(&nonce),
2735 s->session->master_key,
2736 hashlen, 1)) {
2737 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2738 goto err;
2739 }
2740 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
2741
2742 OPENSSL_free(exts);
2743 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2744 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2745 }
2746
2747 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2748 err:
2749 OPENSSL_free(exts);
2750 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2751 }
2752
2753 /*
2754 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2755 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2756 */
tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)2757 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2758 {
2759 size_t resplen;
2760 unsigned int type;
2761
2762 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2763 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2764 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2765 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2766 return 0;
2767 }
2768 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2769 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2770 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2771 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2772 return 0;
2773 }
2774 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2775 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2776 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0;
2777 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2778 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2779 return 0;
2780 }
2781 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2782 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2783 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2784 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2785 return 0;
2786 }
2787
2788 return 1;
2789 }
2790
2791
tls_process_cert_status(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)2792 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2793 {
2794 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
2795 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2796 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2797 }
2798
2799 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2800 }
2801
2802 /*
2803 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2804 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2805 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2806 * on failure.
2807 */
tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL * s)2808 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s)
2809 {
2810 /*
2811 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2812 * the server
2813 */
2814 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2815 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2816 return 0;
2817 }
2818
2819 /*
2820 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2821 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2822 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2823 */
2824 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2825 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2826 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2827
2828 if (ret == 0) {
2829 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
2830 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2831 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2832 return 0;
2833 }
2834 if (ret < 0) {
2835 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2836 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2837 SSL_R_OCSP_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
2838 return 0;
2839 }
2840 }
2841 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2842 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2843 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2844 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2845 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2846 return 0;
2847 }
2848 }
2849 #endif
2850
2851 return 1;
2852 }
2853
tls_process_server_done(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)2854 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2855 {
2856 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2857 /* should contain no data */
2858 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2859 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2860 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2861 }
2862 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2863 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2864 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2865 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2866 SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2867 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2868 }
2869 }
2870 #endif
2871
2872 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
2873 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2874 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2875 }
2876
2877 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2878 }
2879
tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)2880 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2881 {
2882 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2883 int ret = 0;
2884 /*
2885 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2886 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2887 * strnlen.
2888 */
2889 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2890 size_t identitylen = 0;
2891 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2892 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2893 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2894 size_t psklen = 0;
2895
2896 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2897 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2898 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2899 goto err;
2900 }
2901
2902 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2903
2904 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2905 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2906 psk, sizeof(psk));
2907
2908 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2909 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2910 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2911 psklen = PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN; /* Avoid overrunning the array on cleanse */
2912 goto err;
2913 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2914 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2915 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2916 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2917 goto err;
2918 }
2919
2920 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2921 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2922 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2923 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2924 goto err;
2925 }
2926
2927 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2928 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2929 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2930 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2931 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2932 goto err;
2933 }
2934
2935 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2936 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2937 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2938 tmppsk = NULL;
2939 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2940 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2941 tmpidentity = NULL;
2942
2943 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2944 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2945 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2946 goto err;
2947 }
2948
2949 ret = 1;
2950
2951 err:
2952 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2953 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2954 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2955 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2956
2957 return ret;
2958 #else
2959 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2960 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2961 return 0;
2962 #endif
2963 }
2964
tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)2965 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2966 {
2967 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2968 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2969 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2970 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2971 size_t enclen;
2972 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2973 size_t pmslen = 0;
2974
2975 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2976 /*
2977 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2978 */
2979 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2980 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2981 return 0;
2982 }
2983
2984 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2985 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2986 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2987 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2988 return 0;
2989 }
2990
2991 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2992 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2993 if (pms == NULL) {
2994 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2995 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2996 return 0;
2997 }
2998
2999 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
3000 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
3001 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3002 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
3003 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3004 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3005 goto err;
3006 }
3007
3008 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3009 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3010 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3011 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3012 goto err;
3013 }
3014 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3015 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
3016 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3017 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3018 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3019 goto err;
3020 }
3021 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
3022 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3023 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3024 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
3025 goto err;
3026 }
3027 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3028 pctx = NULL;
3029
3030 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3031 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3032 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3033 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3034 goto err;
3035 }
3036
3037 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
3038 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
3039 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3040 goto err;
3041 }
3042
3043 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3044 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3045
3046 return 1;
3047 err:
3048 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3049 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3050
3051 return 0;
3052 #else
3053 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3054 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3055 return 0;
3056 #endif
3057 }
3058
tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)3059 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3060 {
3061 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3062 DH *dh_clnt = NULL;
3063 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
3064 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3065 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
3066
3067 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
3068 if (skey == NULL) {
3069 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3070 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3071 goto err;
3072 }
3073
3074 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
3075 if (ckey == NULL) {
3076 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3077 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3078 goto err;
3079 }
3080
3081 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3082
3083 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
3084 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3085 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3086 goto err;
3087 }
3088
3089 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3090 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3091 goto err;
3092 }
3093
3094 /* send off the data */
3095 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
3096 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key),
3097 &keybytes)) {
3098 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3099 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3100 goto err;
3101 }
3102
3103 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
3104 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3105
3106 return 1;
3107 err:
3108 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3109 return 0;
3110 #else
3111 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3112 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3113 return 0;
3114 #endif
3115 }
3116
tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)3117 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3118 {
3119 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3120 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
3121 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
3122 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3123 int ret = 0;
3124
3125 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
3126 if (skey == NULL) {
3127 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3128 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3129 return 0;
3130 }
3131
3132 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
3133 if (ckey == NULL) {
3134 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3135 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3136 goto err;
3137 }
3138
3139 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3140 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3141 goto err;
3142 }
3143
3144 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3145 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
3146
3147 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
3148 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3149 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
3150 goto err;
3151 }
3152
3153 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
3154 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3155 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3156 goto err;
3157 }
3158
3159 ret = 1;
3160 err:
3161 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3162 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3163 return ret;
3164 #else
3165 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3166 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3167 return 0;
3168 #endif
3169 }
3170
tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)3171 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3172 {
3173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3174 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3175 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3176 X509 *peer_cert;
3177 size_t msglen;
3178 unsigned int md_len;
3179 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3180 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3181 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3182 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3183 size_t pmslen = 0;
3184
3185 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3186 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3187
3188 /*
3189 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3190 */
3191 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3192 if (!peer_cert) {
3193 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3194 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3195 return 0;
3196 }
3197
3198 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
3199 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3200 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3201 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3202 return 0;
3203 }
3204 /*
3205 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3206 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3207 * certificate key for key exchange
3208 */
3209
3210 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3211 pmslen = 32;
3212 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3213 if (pms == NULL) {
3214 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3215 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3216 goto err;
3217 }
3218
3219 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3220 /* Generate session key
3221 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3222 */
3223 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3224 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3225 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3226 goto err;
3227 };
3228 /*
3229 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3230 * data
3231 */
3232 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3233 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3234 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3235 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
3236 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3237 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
3238 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3239 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3240 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3241 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3242 goto err;
3243 }
3244 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3245 ukm_hash = NULL;
3246 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3247 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
3248 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3249 SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3250 goto err;
3251 }
3252 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3253 /*
3254 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3255 */
3256 msglen = 255;
3257 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3258 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3259 SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3260 goto err;
3261 }
3262
3263 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3264 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3265 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3266 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3267 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3268 goto err;
3269 }
3270
3271 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3272 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3273 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3274
3275 return 1;
3276 err:
3277 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3278 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3279 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3280 return 0;
3281 #else
3282 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3283 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3284 return 0;
3285 #endif
3286 }
3287
tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)3288 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3289 {
3290 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3291 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3292
3293 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3294 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3295 &abytes)) {
3296 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3297 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3298 return 0;
3299 }
3300 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3301
3302 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3303 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3304 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3305 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3306 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3307 return 0;
3308 }
3309
3310 return 1;
3311 #else
3312 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3313 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3314 return 0;
3315 #endif
3316 }
3317
tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)3318 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3319 {
3320 unsigned long alg_k;
3321
3322 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3323
3324 /*
3325 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3326 * no need to do so here.
3327 */
3328 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3329 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
3330 goto err;
3331
3332 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3333 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
3334 goto err;
3335 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3336 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
3337 goto err;
3338 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3339 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
3340 goto err;
3341 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3342 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
3343 goto err;
3344 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3345 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
3346 goto err;
3347 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3348 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3349 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3350 goto err;
3351 }
3352
3353 return 1;
3354 err:
3355 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3356 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3357 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = 0;
3358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3359 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3360 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3361 s->s3->tmp.psklen = 0;
3362 #endif
3363 return 0;
3364 }
3365
tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL * s)3366 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3367 {
3368 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3369 size_t pmslen = 0;
3370
3371 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3372 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3373
3374 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3375 /* Check for SRP */
3376 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3377 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3378 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3379 goto err;
3380 }
3381 return 1;
3382 }
3383 #endif
3384
3385 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3386 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3387 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3388 goto err;
3389 }
3390 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3391 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3392 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3393 pms = NULL;
3394 pmslen = 0;
3395 goto err;
3396 }
3397 pms = NULL;
3398 pmslen = 0;
3399
3400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3401 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3402 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3403 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3404 size_t labellen;
3405
3406 /*
3407 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3408 * used.
3409 */
3410 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3411 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3412
3413 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3414 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3415 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3416 labellen += 1;
3417
3418 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3419 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3420 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3421 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3422 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3423 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3424 goto err;
3425 }
3426
3427 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3428 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3429 }
3430 #endif
3431
3432 return 1;
3433 err:
3434 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3435 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3436 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = 0;
3437 return 0;
3438 }
3439
3440 /*
3441 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3442 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3443 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3444 */
ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL * s)3445 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3446 {
3447 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3448 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3449 return 0;
3450 /*
3451 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3452 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3453 */
3454 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3455 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3456 return 0;
3457 return 1;
3458 }
3459
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL * s,WORK_STATE wst)3460 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3461 {
3462 X509 *x509 = NULL;
3463 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3464 int i;
3465
3466 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3467 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3468 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3469 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3470 if (i < 0) {
3471 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3472 return WORK_MORE_A;
3473 }
3474 if (i == 0) {
3475 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3476 SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3477 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3478 return WORK_ERROR;
3479 }
3480 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3481 }
3482 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) {
3483 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3484 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3485 }
3486 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3487 }
3488
3489 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3490 wst = WORK_MORE_B;
3491 }
3492
3493 /* We need to get a client cert */
3494 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3495 /*
3496 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3497 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3498 */
3499 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3500 if (i < 0) {
3501 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3502 return WORK_MORE_B;
3503 }
3504 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3505 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3506 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3507 i = 0;
3508 } else if (i == 1) {
3509 i = 0;
3510 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3511 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3512 }
3513
3514 X509_free(x509);
3515 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3516 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3517 i = 0;
3518 if (i == 0) {
3519 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3520 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3521 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3522 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3523 } else {
3524 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3525 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3526 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3527 return WORK_ERROR;
3528 }
3529 }
3530 }
3531
3532 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
3533 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3534 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3535 }
3536
3537 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3538 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3539 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3540 return WORK_ERROR;
3541 }
3542
tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)3543 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3544 {
3545 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3546 if (s->pha_context == NULL) {
3547 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3548 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3549 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3550 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3551 return 0;
3552 }
3553 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
3554 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3555 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3556 return 0;
3557 }
3558 }
3559 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3560 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3561 : s->cert->key)) {
3562 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3563 return 0;
3564 }
3565
3566 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
3567 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3568 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3569 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3570 /*
3571 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3572 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3573 */
3574 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3575 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3576 return 0;
3577 }
3578
3579 return 1;
3580 }
3581
ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL * s)3582 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3583 {
3584 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3585 size_t idx;
3586 long alg_k, alg_a;
3587
3588 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3589 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3590
3591 /* we don't have a certificate */
3592 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3593 return 1;
3594
3595 /* This is the passed certificate */
3596 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
3597
3598 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3599 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3600 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3601 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3602 SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3603 return 0;
3604 }
3605
3606 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3607 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3608 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3609 return 1;
3610 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3611 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3612 return 0;
3613 }
3614 #endif
3615 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3616 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3617 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3618 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3619 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3620 return 0;
3621 }
3622 #endif
3623 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3624 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3625 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3626 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3627 return 0;
3628 }
3629 #endif
3630
3631 return 1;
3632 }
3633
3634 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
tls_construct_next_proto(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)3635 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3636 {
3637 size_t len, padding_len;
3638 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3639
3640 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3641 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3642
3643 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3644 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3645 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO,
3646 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3647 return 0;
3648 }
3649
3650 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3651
3652 return 1;
3653 }
3654 #endif
3655
tls_process_hello_req(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)3656 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3657 {
3658 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3659 /* should contain no data */
3660 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ,
3661 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3662 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3663 }
3664
3665 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3666 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3667 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3668 }
3669
3670 /*
3671 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3672 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3673 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3674 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3675 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3676 */
3677 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
3678 SSL_renegotiate(s);
3679 else
3680 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3681
3682 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3683 }
3684
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)3685 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3686 {
3687 PACKET extensions;
3688 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3689
3690 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3691 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3692 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3693 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3694 goto err;
3695 }
3696
3697 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3698 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3699 NULL, 1)
3700 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3701 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
3702 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3703 goto err;
3704 }
3705
3706 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3707 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3708
3709 err:
3710 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3711 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3712 }
3713
ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL * s,X509 ** px509,EVP_PKEY ** ppkey)3714 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3715 {
3716 int i = 0;
3717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3718 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3719 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3720 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3721 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3722 if (i != 0)
3723 return i;
3724 }
3725 #endif
3726 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3727 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3728 return i;
3729 }
3730
ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL * s,STACK_OF (SSL_CIPHER)* sk,WPACKET * pkt)3731 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3732 {
3733 int i;
3734 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3735 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3736
3737 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3738 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) {
3739 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3740 SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
3741 return 0;
3742 }
3743
3744 if (sk == NULL) {
3745 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3746 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3747 return 0;
3748 }
3749
3750 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3751 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3752 # error Max cipher length too short
3753 # endif
3754 /*
3755 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3756 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3757 * use TLS v1.2
3758 */
3759 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3760 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3761 else
3762 #endif
3763 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3764 maxlen = 0xfffe;
3765
3766 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3767 maxlen -= 2;
3768 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3769 maxlen -= 2;
3770
3771 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3772 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3773
3774 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3775 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3776 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3777 continue;
3778
3779 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3780 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3781 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3782 return 0;
3783 }
3784
3785 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3786 if (!maxverok) {
3787 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3788 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3789 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver))
3790 maxverok = 1;
3791 } else {
3792 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver
3793 && c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3794 maxverok = 1;
3795 }
3796 }
3797
3798 totlen += len;
3799 }
3800
3801 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3802 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3803 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3804
3805 if (!maxverok)
3806 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3807 "SSL/TLS version");
3808
3809 return 0;
3810 }
3811
3812 if (totlen != 0) {
3813 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3814 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3815 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3816 };
3817 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3818 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3819 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3820 return 0;
3821 }
3822 }
3823 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3824 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3825 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3826 };
3827 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3828 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3829 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3830 return 0;
3831 }
3832 }
3833 }
3834
3835 return 1;
3836 }
3837
tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)3838 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3839 {
3840 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3841 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3842 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3843 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3844 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3845 return 0;
3846 }
3847
3848 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;
3849 return 1;
3850 }
3851