1 /* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
57
58 #include <string.h>
59
60 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
61 #include <openssl/digest.h>
62 #include <openssl/err.h>
63 #include <openssl/mem.h>
64 #include <openssl/obj.h>
65 #include <openssl/stack.h>
66 #include <openssl/x509.h>
67 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
68
69 #include "../internal.h"
70 #include "../x509v3/internal.h"
71 #include "internal.h"
72
73
X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 * a,const X509 * b)74 int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
75 {
76 int i;
77 X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
78
79 ai = a->cert_info;
80 bi = b->cert_info;
81 i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber);
82 if (i)
83 return (i);
84 return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer));
85 }
86
X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 * a,const X509 * b)87 int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
88 {
89 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer));
90 }
91
X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 * a,const X509 * b)92 int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
93 {
94 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject));
95 }
96
X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL * a,const X509_CRL * b)97 int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
98 {
99 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer));
100 }
101
X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL * a,const X509_CRL * b)102 int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
103 {
104 return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
105 }
106
X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 * a)107 X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a)
108 {
109 return (a->cert_info->issuer);
110 }
111
X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 * x)112 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
113 {
114 return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
115 }
116
X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 * x)117 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
118 {
119 return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer));
120 }
121
X509_get_subject_name(const X509 * a)122 X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a)
123 {
124 return (a->cert_info->subject);
125 }
126
X509_get_serialNumber(X509 * a)127 ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
128 {
129 return (a->cert_info->serialNumber);
130 }
131
X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 * x509)132 const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *x509)
133 {
134 return x509->cert_info->serialNumber;
135 }
136
X509_subject_name_hash(X509 * x)137 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
138 {
139 return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
140 }
141
X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 * x)142 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
143 {
144 return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject));
145 }
146
147 /*
148 * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
149 * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
150 * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
151 * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
152 * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
153 * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
154 */
X509_cmp(const X509 * a,const X509 * b)155 int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
156 {
157 /* Fill in the |sha1_hash| fields.
158 *
159 * TODO(davidben): This may fail, in which case the the hash will be all
160 * zeros. This produces a consistent comparison (failures are sticky), but
161 * not a good one. OpenSSL now returns -2, but this is not a consistent
162 * comparison and may cause misbehaving sorts by transitivity. For now, we
163 * retain the old OpenSSL behavior, which was to ignore the error. See
164 * https://crbug.com/boringssl/355. */
165 x509v3_cache_extensions((X509 *)a);
166 x509v3_cache_extensions((X509 *)b);
167
168 int rv = OPENSSL_memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
169 if (rv)
170 return rv;
171 /* Check for match against stored encoding too */
172 if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified) {
173 rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len);
174 if (rv)
175 return rv;
176 return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc,
177 a->cert_info->enc.len);
178 }
179 return rv;
180 }
181
X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME * a,const X509_NAME * b)182 int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
183 {
184 int ret;
185
186 /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
187
188 if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
189 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
190 if (ret < 0)
191 return -2;
192 }
193
194 if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
195 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
196 if (ret < 0)
197 return -2;
198 }
199
200 ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
201
202 if (ret)
203 return ret;
204
205 return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
206
207 }
208
X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME * x)209 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
210 {
211 unsigned long ret = 0;
212 unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
213
214 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
215 i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
216 if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
217 NULL))
218 return 0;
219
220 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
221 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
222 ) & 0xffffffffL;
223 return (ret);
224 }
225
226 /*
227 * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
228 * this is reasonably efficient.
229 */
230
X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME * x)231 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
232 {
233 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
234 unsigned long ret = 0;
235 unsigned char md[16];
236
237 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
238 i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
239 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
240 /* EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); */
241 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
242 && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
243 && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL))
244 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
245 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
246 ) & 0xffffffffL;
247 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
248
249 return (ret);
250 }
251
252 /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF (X509)* sk,X509_NAME * name,ASN1_INTEGER * serial)253 X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
254 ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
255 {
256 size_t i;
257 X509_CINF cinf;
258 X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
259
260 if (!sk)
261 return NULL;
262
263 x.cert_info = &cinf;
264 cinf.serialNumber = serial;
265 cinf.issuer = name;
266
267 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
268 x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
269 if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
270 return (x509);
271 }
272 return (NULL);
273 }
274
X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF (X509)* sk,X509_NAME * name)275 X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
276 {
277 X509 *x509;
278 size_t i;
279
280 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
281 x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
282 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
283 return (x509);
284 }
285 return (NULL);
286 }
287
X509_get_pubkey(X509 * x)288 EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
289 {
290 if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL))
291 return (NULL);
292 return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
293 }
294
X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 * x)295 ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
296 {
297 if (!x)
298 return NULL;
299 return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
300 }
301
X509_check_private_key(X509 * x,const EVP_PKEY * k)302 int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k)
303 {
304 EVP_PKEY *xk;
305 int ret;
306
307 xk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
308
309 if (xk)
310 ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
311 else
312 ret = -2;
313
314 switch (ret) {
315 case 1:
316 break;
317 case 0:
318 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
319 break;
320 case -1:
321 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
322 break;
323 case -2:
324 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
325 }
326 if (xk)
327 EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
328 if (ret > 0)
329 return 1;
330 return 0;
331 }
332
333 /*
334 * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID
335 * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a
336 * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags.
337 */
338
check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY * pkey,int sign_nid,unsigned long * pflags)339 static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
340 {
341 const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
342 int curve_nid;
343 if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
344 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec);
345 if (!grp)
346 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
347 curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
348 /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
349 if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */
350 /*
351 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve.
352 */
353 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
354 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
355 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
356 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
357 /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
358 *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
359 } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */
360 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
361 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
362 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
363 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
364 } else
365 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
366
367 return X509_V_OK;
368 }
369
X509_chain_check_suiteb(int * perror_depth,X509 * x,STACK_OF (X509)* chain,unsigned long flags)370 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
371 unsigned long flags)
372 {
373 int rv, sign_nid;
374 size_t i;
375 EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
376 unsigned long tflags;
377 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
378 return X509_V_OK;
379 tflags = flags;
380 /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
381 if (x == NULL) {
382 x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
383 i = 1;
384 } else
385 i = 0;
386
387 if (X509_get_version(x) != X509_VERSION_3) {
388 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
389 /* Correct error depth */
390 i = 0;
391 goto end;
392 }
393
394 pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
395 /* Check EE key only */
396 rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
397 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
398 /* Correct error depth */
399 i = 0;
400 goto end;
401 }
402 for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
403 sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
404 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
405 if (X509_get_version(x) != X509_VERSION_3) {
406 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
407 goto end;
408 }
409 EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
410 pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
411 rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
412 if (rv != X509_V_OK)
413 goto end;
414 }
415
416 /* Final check: root CA signature */
417 rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
418 end:
419 if (pk)
420 EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
421 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
422 /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
423 if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
424 || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
425 i--;
426 /*
427 * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
428 * with P-256. Use more meaninggul error.
429 */
430 if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
431 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
432 if (perror_depth)
433 *perror_depth = i;
434 }
435 return rv;
436 }
437
X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL * crl,EVP_PKEY * pk,unsigned long flags)438 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
439 {
440 int sign_nid;
441 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
442 return X509_V_OK;
443 sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm);
444 return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
445 }
446
447 /*
448 * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
449 * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
450 * each X509 structure.
451 */
STACK_OF(X509)452 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
453 {
454 STACK_OF(X509) *ret;
455 size_t i;
456 ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
457 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
458 X509_up_ref(sk_X509_value(ret, i));
459 }
460 return ret;
461 }
462