xref: /dports/net/freeradius3/freeradius-server-3.0.25/src/main/util.c

/*
 * util.c	Various utility functions.
 *
 * Version:     $Id: b216cc9a5170f90a4ae0d02f0fb551d5bf928189 $
 *
 *   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
 *   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
 *   the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
 *   (at your option) any later version.
 *
 *   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
 *   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
 *   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
 *   GNU General Public License for more details.
 *
 *   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
 *   along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
 *   Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
 *
 * Copyright 2000,2006  The FreeRADIUS server project
 */

RCSID("$Id: b216cc9a5170f90a4ae0d02f0fb551d5bf928189 $")

#include <freeradius-devel/radiusd.h>
#include <freeradius-devel/rad_assert.h>

#include <ctype.h>

#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>

/*
 *	The signal() function in Solaris 2.5.1 sets SA_NODEFER in
 *	sa_flags, which causes grief if signal() is called in the
 *	handler before the cause of the signal has been cleared.
 *	(Infinite recursion).
 *
 *	The same problem appears on HPUX, so we avoid it, if we can.
 *
 *	Using sigaction() to reset the signal handler fixes the problem,
 *	so where available, we prefer that solution.
 */

void (*reset_signal(int signo, void (*func)(int)))(int)
{
#ifdef HAVE_SIGACTION
	struct sigaction act, oact;

	memset(&act, 0, sizeof(act));
	act.sa_handler = func;
	sigemptyset(&act.sa_mask);
	act.sa_flags = 0;
#ifdef  SA_INTERRUPT		/* SunOS */
	act.sa_flags |= SA_INTERRUPT;
#endif
	if (sigaction(signo, &act, &oact) < 0)
		return SIG_ERR;
	return oact.sa_handler;
#else

	/*
	 *	re-set by calling the 'signal' function, which
	 *	may cause infinite recursion and core dumps due to
	 *	stack growth.
	 *
	 *	However, the system is too dumb to implement sigaction(),
	 *	so we don't have a choice.
	 */
	signal(signo, func);

	return NULL;
#endif
}

/*
 *	Per-request data, added by modules...
 */
struct request_data_t {
	request_data_t	*next;

	void		*unique_ptr;
	int		unique_int;
	void		*opaque;
	bool		free_opaque;
};

/*
 *	Add opaque data (with a "free" function) to a REQUEST.
 *
 *	The unique ptr is meant to be a module configuration,
 *	and the unique integer allows the caller to have multiple
 *	opaque data associated with a REQUEST.
 */
int request_data_add(REQUEST *request, void *unique_ptr, int unique_int, void *opaque, bool free_opaque)
{
	request_data_t *this, **last, *next;

	/*
	 *	Some simple sanity checks.
	 */
	if (!request || !opaque) return -1;

	this = next = NULL;
	for (last = &(request->data);
	     *last != NULL;
	     last = &((*last)->next)) {
		if (((*last)->unique_ptr == unique_ptr) &&
		    ((*last)->unique_int == unique_int)) {
			this = *last;
			next = this->next;

			/*
			 *	If caller requires custom behaviour on free
			 *	they must set a destructor.
			 */
			if (this->opaque && this->free_opaque) talloc_free(this->opaque);

			break;	/* replace the existing entry */
		}
	}

	/*
	 *	Only alloc new memory if we're not replacing
	 *	an existing entry.
	 */
	if (!this) this = talloc_zero(request, request_data_t);
	if (!this) return -1;

	this->next = next;
	this->unique_ptr = unique_ptr;
	this->unique_int = unique_int;
	this->opaque = opaque;
	this->free_opaque = free_opaque;

	*last = this;

	return 0;
}

/*
 *	Get opaque data from a request.
 */
void *request_data_get(REQUEST *request, void *unique_ptr, int unique_int)
{
	request_data_t **last;

	if (!request) return NULL;

	for (last = &(request->data);
	     *last != NULL;
	     last = &((*last)->next)) {
		if (((*last)->unique_ptr == unique_ptr) &&
		    ((*last)->unique_int == unique_int)) {
			request_data_t *this;
			void *ptr;

			this = *last;
			ptr = this->opaque;

			/*
			 *	Remove the entry from the list, and free it.
			 */
			*last = this->next;
			talloc_free(this);

			return ptr; 		/* don't free it, the caller does that */
		}
	}

	return NULL;		/* wasn't found, too bad... */
}

/*
 *	Get opaque data from a request without removing it.
 */
void *request_data_reference(REQUEST *request, void *unique_ptr, int unique_int)
{
	request_data_t **last;

	for (last = &(request->data);
	     *last != NULL;
	     last = &((*last)->next)) {
		if (((*last)->unique_ptr == unique_ptr) &&
		    ((*last)->unique_int == unique_int)) {
			return (*last)->opaque;
		}
	}

	return NULL;		/* wasn't found, too bad... */
}

/** Create possibly many directories.
 *
 * @note that the input directory name is NOT treated as a constant. This is so that
 *	 if an error is returned, the 'directory' ptr points to the name of the file
 *	 which caused the error.
 *
 * @param dir path to directory to create.
 * @param mode for new directories.
 * @param uid to set on new directories, may be -1 to use effective uid.
 * @param gid to set on new directories, may be -1 to use effective gid.
 * @return 0 on success, -1 on error. Error available as errno.
 */
int rad_mkdir(char *dir, mode_t mode, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
{
	int rcode, fd;
	char *p;

	/*
	 *	Try to make the dir.  If it exists, chmod it.
	 *	If a path doesn't exist, that's OK.  Otherwise
	 *	return with an error.
	 *
	 *	Directories permissions are initially set so
	 *	that only we should have access. This prevents
	 *	an attacker removing them and swapping them
	 *	out for a link to somewhere else.
	 *	We change them to the correct permissions later.
	 */
	rcode = mkdir(dir, 0700);
	if (rcode < 0) {
		switch (errno) {
		case EEXIST:
			return 0; /* don't change permissions */

		case ENOENT:
			break;

		default:
			return rcode;
		}

		/*
		 *	A component in the dir path doesn't
		 *	exist.  Look for the LAST dir name.  Try
		 *	to create that.  If there's an error, we leave
		 *	the dir path as the one at which the
		 *	error occured.
		 */
		p = strrchr(dir, FR_DIR_SEP);
		if (!p || (p == dir)) return -1;

		*p = '\0';
		rcode = rad_mkdir(dir, mode, uid, gid);
		if (rcode < 0) return rcode;

		/*
		 *	Reset the dir path, and try again to
		 *	make the dir.
		 */
		*p = FR_DIR_SEP;
		rcode = mkdir(dir, 0700);
		if (rcode < 0) return rcode;
	} /* else we successfully created the dir */

	/*
	 *	Set the permissions on the directory we created
	 *	this should never fail unless there's a race.
	 */
	fd = open(dir, O_DIRECTORY);
	if (fd < 0) return -1;

	rcode = fchmod(fd, mode);
	if (rcode < 0) {
		close(fd);
		return rcode;
	}

	if ((uid != (uid_t)-1) || (gid != (gid_t)-1)) {
		rad_suid_up();
		rcode = fchown(fd, uid, gid);
		rad_suid_down();
	}
	close(fd);

	return rcode;
}

/** Ensures that a filename cannot walk up the directory structure
 *
 * Also sanitizes control chars.
 *
 * @param request Current request (may be NULL).
 * @param out Output buffer.
 * @param outlen Size of the output buffer.
 * @param in string to escape.
 * @param arg Context arguments (unused, should be NULL).
 */
size_t rad_filename_make_safe(UNUSED REQUEST *request, char *out, size_t outlen, char const *in, UNUSED void *arg)
{
	char const *q = in;
	char *p = out;
	size_t left = outlen;

	while (*q) {
		if (*q != '/') {
			if (left < 2) break;

			/*
			 *	Smash control characters and spaces to
			 *	something simpler.
			 */
			if (*q < ' ') {
				*(p++) = '_';
				q++;
				continue;
			}

			*(p++) = *(q++);
			left--;
			continue;
		}

		/*
		 *	For now, allow slashes in the expanded
		 *	filename.  This allows the admin to set
		 *	attributes which create sub-directories.
		 *	Unfortunately, it also allows users to send
		 *	attributes which *may* end up creating
		 *	sub-directories.
		 */
		if (left < 2) break;
		*(p++) = *(q++);

		/*
		 *	Get rid of ////../.././///.///..//
		 */
	redo:
		/*
		 *	Get rid of ////
		 */
		if (*q == '/') {
			q++;
			goto redo;
		}

		/*
		 *	Get rid of /./././
		 */
		if ((q[0] == '.') &&
		    (q[1] == '/')) {
			q += 2;
			goto redo;
		}

		/*
		 *	Get rid of /../../../
		 */
		if ((q[0] == '.') && (q[1] == '.') &&
		    (q[2] == '/')) {
			q += 3;
			goto redo;
		}
	}
	*p = '\0';

	return (p - out);
}

/** Escapes the raw string such that it should be safe to use as part of a file path
 *
 * This function is designed to produce a string that's still readable but portable
 * across the majority of file systems.
 *
 * For security reasons it cannot remove characters from the name, and must not allow
 * collisions to occur between different strings.
 *
 * With that in mind '-' has been chosen as the escape character, and will be double
 * escaped '-' -> '--' to avoid collisions.
 *
 * Escaping should be reversible if the original string needs to be extracted.
 *
 * @note function takes additional arguments so that it may be used as an xlat escape
 *	function but it's fine to call it directly.
 *
 * @note OSX/Unix/NTFS/VFAT have a max filename size of 255 bytes.
 *
 * @param request Current request (may be NULL).
 * @param out Output buffer.
 * @param outlen Size of the output buffer.
 * @param in string to escape.
 * @param arg Context arguments (unused, should be NULL).
 */
size_t rad_filename_escape(UNUSED REQUEST *request, char *out, size_t outlen, char const *in, UNUSED void *arg)
{
	size_t freespace = outlen;

	while (*in != '\0') {
		size_t utf8_len;

		/*
		 *	Encode multibyte UTF8 chars
		 */
		utf8_len = fr_utf8_char((uint8_t const *) in, -1);
		if (utf8_len > 1) {
			if (freespace <= (utf8_len * 3)) break;

			switch (utf8_len) {
			case 2:
				snprintf(out, freespace, "-%x-%x", in[0], in[1]);
				break;

			case 3:
				snprintf(out, freespace, "-%x-%x-%x", in[0], in[1], in[2]);
				break;

			case 4:
				snprintf(out, freespace, "-%x-%x-%x-%x", in[0], in[1], in[2], in[3]);
				break;
			}

			freespace -= (utf8_len * 3);
			out += (utf8_len * 3);
			in += utf8_len;

			continue;
		}

		/*
		 *	Safe chars
		 */
		if (((*in >= 'A') && (*in <= 'Z')) ||
		    ((*in >= 'a') && (*in <= 'z')) ||
		    ((*in >= '0') && (*in <= '9')) ||
		    (*in == '_')) {
		    	if (freespace <= 1) break;

		 	*out++ = *in++;
		 	freespace--;
		 	continue;
		}
		if (freespace <= 2) break;

		/*
		 *	Double escape '-' (like \\)
		 */
		if (*in == '-') {
			*out++ = '-';
			*out++ = '-';

			freespace -= 2;
			in++;
			continue;
		}

		/*
		 *	Unsafe chars
		 */
		*out++ = '-';
		fr_bin2hex(out, (uint8_t const *)in++, 1);
		out += 2;
		freespace -= 3;
	}
	*out = '\0';

	return outlen - freespace;
}

/** Converts data stored in a file name back to its original form
 *
 * @param out Where to write the unescaped string (may be the same as in).
 * @param outlen Length of the output buffer.
 * @param in Input filename.
 * @param inlen Length of input.
 * @return number of bytes written to output buffer, or offset where parse error
 *	occurred on failure.
 */
ssize_t rad_filename_unescape(char *out, size_t outlen, char const *in, size_t inlen)
{
	char const *p, *end = in + inlen;
	size_t freespace = outlen;

	for (p = in; p < end; p++) {
		if (freespace <= 1) break;

		if (((*p >= 'A') && (*p <= 'Z')) ||
		    ((*p >= 'a') && (*p <= 'z')) ||
		    ((*p >= '0') && (*p <= '9')) ||
		    (*p == '_')) {
		 	*out++ = *p;
		 	freespace--;
		 	continue;
		}

		if (p[0] == '-') {
			/*
			 *	End of input, '-' needs at least one extra char after
			 *	it to be valid.
			 */
			if ((end - p) < 2) return in - p;
			if (p[1] == '-') {
				p++;
				*out++ = '-';
				freespace--;
				continue;
			}

			/*
			 *	End of input, '-' must be followed by <hex><hex>
			 *	but there aren't enough chars left
			 */
			if ((end - p) < 3) return in - p;

			/*
			 *	If hex2bin returns 0 the next two chars weren't hexits.
			 */
			if (fr_hex2bin((uint8_t *) out, 1, in, 1) == 0) return in - (p + 1);
			in += 2;
			out++;
			freespace--;
		}

		return in - p; /* offset we found the bad char at */
	}
	*out = '\0';

	return outlen - freespace;	/* how many bytes were written */
}

/*
 *	Allocate memory, or exit.
 *
 *	This call ALWAYS succeeds!
 */
void *rad_malloc(size_t size)
{
	void *ptr = malloc(size);

	if (ptr == NULL) {
		ERROR("no memory");
		fr_exit(1);
	}

	return ptr;
}


void rad_const_free(void const *ptr)
{
	void *tmp;
	if (!ptr) return;

	memcpy(&tmp, &ptr, sizeof(tmp));
	talloc_free(tmp);
}


/*
 *	Logs an error message and aborts the program
 *
 */

void NEVER_RETURNS rad_assert_fail(char const *file, unsigned int line, char const *expr)
{
	ERROR("ASSERT FAILED %s[%u]: %s", file, line, expr);
	fr_fault(SIGABRT);
	fr_exit_now(1);
}

/*
 *	Free a REQUEST struct.
 */
static int _request_free(REQUEST *request)
{
	rad_assert(!request->in_request_hash);
#ifdef WITH_PROXY
	rad_assert(!request->in_proxy_hash);
#endif
	rad_assert(!request->ev);

#ifdef WITH_COA
	rad_assert(request->coa == NULL);
#endif

#ifndef NDEBUG
	request->magic = 0x01020304;	/* set the request to be nonsense */
#endif
	request->client = NULL;
#ifdef WITH_PROXY
	request->home_server = NULL;
#endif

	/*
	 *	This is parented separately.
	 */
	if (request->state_ctx) {
		talloc_free(request->state_ctx);
	}

	return 0;
}

/*
 *	Create a new REQUEST data structure.
 */
REQUEST *request_alloc(TALLOC_CTX *ctx)
{
	REQUEST *request;

	request = talloc_zero(ctx, REQUEST);
	if (!request) return NULL;
	talloc_set_destructor(request, _request_free);
#ifndef NDEBUG
	request->magic = REQUEST_MAGIC;
#endif
#ifdef WITH_PROXY
	request->proxy = NULL;
#endif
	request->reply = NULL;
#ifdef WITH_PROXY
	request->proxy_reply = NULL;
#endif
	request->config = NULL;
	request->username = NULL;
	request->password = NULL;
	request->timestamp = time(NULL);
	request->log.lvl = rad_debug_lvl; /* Default to global debug level */

	request->module = "";
	request->component = "<core>";
	request->log.func = vradlog_request;

	request->state_ctx = talloc_init("session-state");

	return request;
}


/*
 *	Create a new REQUEST, based on an old one.
 *
 *	This function allows modules to inject fake requests
 *	into the server, for tunneled protocols like TTLS & PEAP.
 */
REQUEST *request_alloc_fake(REQUEST *request)
{
	REQUEST *fake;

	fake = request_alloc(request);
	if (!fake) return NULL;

	fake->number = request->number;
#ifdef HAVE_PTHREAD_H
	fake->child_pid = request->child_pid;
#endif
	fake->parent = request;
	fake->root = request->root;
	fake->client = request->client;

	/*
	 *	For new server support.
	 *
	 *	FIXME: Key instead off of a "virtual server" data structure.
	 *
	 *	FIXME: Permit different servers for inner && outer sessions?
	 */
	fake->server = request->server;

	fake->packet = rad_alloc(fake, true);
	if (!fake->packet) {
		talloc_free(fake);
		return NULL;
	}

	fake->reply = rad_alloc(fake, false);
	if (!fake->reply) {
		talloc_free(fake);
		return NULL;
	}

	fake->master_state = REQUEST_ACTIVE;
	fake->child_state = REQUEST_RUNNING;

	/*
	 *	Fill in the fake request.
	 */
	fake->packet->sockfd = -1;
	fake->packet->src_ipaddr = request->packet->src_ipaddr;
	fake->packet->src_port = request->packet->src_port;
	fake->packet->dst_ipaddr = request->packet->dst_ipaddr;
	fake->packet->dst_port = 0;

	/*
	 *	This isn't STRICTLY required, as the fake request MUST NEVER
	 *	be put into the request list.  However, it's still reasonable
	 *	practice.
	 */
	fake->packet->id = fake->number & 0xff;
	fake->packet->code = request->packet->code;
	fake->timestamp = request->timestamp;
	fake->packet->timestamp = request->packet->timestamp;

	/*
	 *	Required for new identity support
	 */
	fake->listener = request->listener;

	/*
	 *	Fill in the fake reply, based on the fake request.
	 */
	fake->reply->sockfd = fake->packet->sockfd;
	fake->reply->src_ipaddr = fake->packet->dst_ipaddr;
	fake->reply->src_port = fake->packet->dst_port;
	fake->reply->dst_ipaddr = fake->packet->src_ipaddr;
	fake->reply->dst_port = fake->packet->src_port;
	fake->reply->id = fake->packet->id;
	fake->reply->code = 0; /* UNKNOWN code */

	/*
	 *	Copy debug information.
	 */
	memcpy(&(fake->log), &(request->log), sizeof(fake->log));
	fake->log.indent = 0;	/* Apart from the indent which we reset */

	return fake;
}

#ifdef WITH_COA
static int null_handler(UNUSED REQUEST *request)
{
	return 0;
}

REQUEST *request_alloc_coa(REQUEST *request)
{
	if (!request || request->coa) return NULL;

	/*
	 *	Originate CoA requests only when necessary.
	 */
	if ((request->packet->code != PW_CODE_ACCESS_REQUEST) &&
	    (request->packet->code != PW_CODE_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST)) return NULL;

	request->coa = request_alloc_fake(request);
	if (!request->coa) return NULL;

	request->coa->handle = null_handler;
	request->coa->options = RAD_REQUEST_OPTION_COA;	/* is a CoA packet */
	request->coa->packet->code = 0; /* unknown, as of yet */
	request->coa->child_state = REQUEST_RUNNING;
	request->coa->proxy = rad_alloc(request->coa, false);
	if (!request->coa->proxy) {
		TALLOC_FREE(request->coa);
		return NULL;
	}

	return request->coa;
}
#endif

/*
 *	Copy a quoted string.
 */
int rad_copy_string(char *to, char const *from)
{
	int length = 0;
	char quote = *from;

	do {
		if (*from == '\\') {
			*(to++) = *(from++);
			length++;
		}
		*(to++) = *(from++);
		length++;
	} while (*from && (*from != quote));

	if (*from != quote) return -1; /* not properly quoted */

	*(to++) = quote;
	length++;
	*to = '\0';

	return length;
}

/*
 *	Copy a quoted string but without the quotes. The length
 *	returned is the number of chars written; the number of
 *	characters consumed is 2 more than this.
 */
int rad_copy_string_bare(char *to, char const *from)
{
	int length = 0;
	char quote = *from;

	from++;
	while (*from && (*from != quote)) {
		if (*from == '\\') {
			*(to++) = *(from++);
			length++;
		}
		*(to++) = *(from++);
		length++;
	}

	if (*from != quote) return -1; /* not properly quoted */

	*to = '\0';

	return length;
}


/*
 *	Copy a %{} string.
 */
int rad_copy_variable(char *to, char const *from)
{
	int length = 0;
	int sublen;

	*(to++) = *(from++);
	length++;

	while (*from) {
		switch (*from) {
		case '"':
		case '\'':
			sublen = rad_copy_string(to, from);
			if (sublen < 0) return sublen;
			from += sublen;
			to += sublen;
			length += sublen;
			break;

		case '}':	/* end of variable expansion */
			*(to++) = *(from++);
			*to = '\0';
			length++;
			return length; /* proper end of variable */

		case '\\':
			*(to++) = *(from++);
			*(to++) = *(from++);
			length += 2;
			break;

		case '%':	/* start of variable expansion */
			if (from[1] == '{') {
				*(to++) = *(from++);
				length++;

				sublen = rad_copy_variable(to, from);
				if (sublen < 0) return sublen;
				from += sublen;
				to += sublen;
				length += sublen;
				break;
			} /* else FIXME: catch %%{ ?*/

			/* FALL-THROUGH */
		default:
			*(to++) = *(from++);
			length++;
			break;
		}
	} /* loop over the input string */

	/*
	 *	We ended the string before a trailing '}'
	 */

	return -1;
}

#ifndef USEC
#define USEC 1000000
#endif

uint32_t rad_pps(uint32_t *past, uint32_t *present, time_t *then, struct timeval *now)
{
	uint32_t pps;

	if (*then != now->tv_sec) {
		*then = now->tv_sec;
		*past = *present;
		*present = 0;
	}

	/*
	 *	Bootstrap PPS by looking at a percentage of
	 *	the previous PPS.  This lets us take a moving
	 *	count, without doing a moving average.  If
	 *	we're a fraction "f" (0..1) into the current
	 *	second, we can get a good guess for PPS by
	 *	doing:
	 *
	 *	PPS = pps_now + pps_old * (1 - f)
	 *
	 *	It's an instantaneous measurement, rather than
	 *	a moving average.  This will hopefully let it
	 *	respond better to sudden spikes.
	 *
	 *	Doing the calculations by thousands allows us
	 *	to not overflow 2^32, AND to not underflow
	 *	when we divide by USEC.
	 */
	pps = USEC - now->tv_usec; /* useconds left in previous second */
	pps /= 1000;		   /* scale to milliseconds */
	pps *= *past;		   /* multiply by past count to get fraction */
	pps /= 1000;		   /* scale to usec again */
	pps += *present;	   /* add in current count */

	return pps;
}

/** Split string into words and expand each one
 *
 * @param request Current request.
 * @param cmd string to split.
 * @param max_argc the maximum number of arguments to split into.
 * @param argv Where to write the pointers into argv_buf.
 * @param can_fail If false, stop processing if any of the xlat expansions fail.
 * @param argv_buflen size of argv_buf.
 * @param argv_buf temporary buffer we used to mangle/expand cmd.
 *	Pointers to offsets of this buffer will be written to argv.
 * @return argc or -1 on failure.
 */

int rad_expand_xlat(REQUEST *request, char const *cmd,
		    int max_argc, char const *argv[], bool can_fail,
		    size_t argv_buflen, char *argv_buf)
{
	char const *from;
	char *to;
	int argc = -1;
	int i;
	int left;

	if (strlen(cmd) > (argv_buflen - 1)) {
		ERROR("rad_expand_xlat: Command line is too long");
		return -1;
	}

	/*
	 *	Check for bad escapes.
	 */
	if (cmd[strlen(cmd) - 1] == '\\') {
		ERROR("rad_expand_xlat: Command line has final backslash, without a following character");
		return -1;
	}

	strlcpy(argv_buf, cmd, argv_buflen);

	/*
	 *	Split the string into argv's BEFORE doing radius_xlat...
	 */
	from = cmd;
	to = argv_buf;
	argc = 0;
	while (*from) {
		int length;

		/*
		 *	Skip spaces.
		 */
		if ((*from == ' ') || (*from == '\t')) {
			from++;
			continue;
		}

		argv[argc] = to;
		argc++;

		if (argc >= (max_argc - 1)) break;

		/*
		 *	Copy the argv over to our buffer.
		 */
		while (*from && (*from != ' ') && (*from != '\t')) {
			if (to >= argv_buf + argv_buflen - 1) {
				ERROR("rad_expand_xlat: Ran out of space in command line");
				return -1;
			}

			switch (*from) {
			case '"':
			case '\'':
				length = rad_copy_string_bare(to, from);
				if (length < 0) {
					ERROR("rad_expand_xlat: Invalid string passed as argument");
					return -1;
				}
				from += length+2;
				to += length;
				break;

			case '%':
				if (from[1] == '{') {
					*(to++) = *(from++);

					length = rad_copy_variable(to, from);
					if (length < 0) {
						ERROR("rad_expand_xlat: Invalid variable expansion passed as argument");
						return -1;
					}
					from += length;
					to += length;
				} else { /* FIXME: catch %%{ ? */
					*(to++) = *(from++);
				}
				break;

			case '\\':
				if (from[1] == ' ') from++;
				/* FALL-THROUGH */

			default:
				*(to++) = *(from++);
			}
		} /* end of string, or found a space */

		*(to++) = '\0';	/* terminate the string */
	}

	/*
	 *	We have to have SOMETHING, at least.
	 */
	if (argc <= 0) {
		ERROR("rad_expand_xlat: Empty command line");
		return -1;
	}

	/*
	 *	Expand each string, as appropriate.
	 */
	left = argv_buf + argv_buflen - to;
	for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
		int sublen;

		/*
		 *	Don't touch argv's which won't be translated.
		 */
		if (strchr(argv[i], '%') == NULL) continue;

		if (!request) continue;

		sublen = radius_xlat(to, left - 1, request, argv[i], NULL, NULL);
		if (sublen <= 0) {
			if (can_fail) {
				/*
				 *	Fail to be backwards compatible.
				 *
				 *	It's yucky, but it won't break anything,
				 *	and it won't cause security problems.
				 */
				sublen = 0;
			} else {
				ERROR("rad_expand_xlat: xlat failed");
				return -1;
			}
		}

		argv[i] = to;
		to += sublen;
		*(to++) = '\0';
		left -= sublen;
		left--;

		if (left <= 0) {
			ERROR("rad_expand_xlat: Ran out of space while expanding arguments");
			return -1;
		}
	}
	argv[argc] = NULL;

	return argc;
}

#ifndef NDEBUG
/*
 *	Verify a packet.
 */
static void verify_packet(char const *file, int line, REQUEST *request, RADIUS_PACKET *packet, char const *name)
{
	TALLOC_CTX *parent;

	if (!packet) {
		fprintf(stderr, "CONSISTENCY CHECK FAILED %s[%i]: RADIUS_PACKET %s pointer was NULL", file, line, name);
		fr_assert(0);
		fr_exit_now(0);
	}

	parent = talloc_parent(packet);
	if (parent != request) {
		ERROR("CONSISTENCY CHECK FAILED %s[%i]: Expected RADIUS_PACKET %s to be parented by %p (%s), "
		      "but parented by %p (%s)", file, line, name, request, talloc_get_name(request),
		      parent, parent ? talloc_get_name(parent) : "NULL");

		fr_log_talloc_report(packet);
		if (parent) fr_log_talloc_report(parent);

		rad_assert(0);
	}

	VERIFY_PACKET(packet);

	if (!packet->vps) return;

#ifdef WITH_VERIFY_PTR
	fr_pair_list_verify(file, line, packet, packet->vps, name);
#endif
}
/*
 *	Catch horrible talloc errors.
 */
void verify_request(char const *file, int line, REQUEST *request)
{
	if (!request) {
		fprintf(stderr, "CONSISTENCY CHECK FAILED %s[%i]: REQUEST pointer was NULL", file, line);
		fr_assert(0);
		fr_exit_now(0);
	}

	(void) talloc_get_type_abort(request, REQUEST);

#ifdef WITH_VERIFY_PTR
	fr_pair_list_verify(file, line, request, request->config, "config");
	fr_pair_list_verify(file, line, request->state_ctx, request->state, "state");
#endif

	if (request->packet) verify_packet(file, line, request, request->packet, "request");
	if (request->reply) verify_packet(file, line, request, request->reply, "reply");
#ifdef WITH_PROXY
	if (request->proxy) verify_packet(file, line, request, request->proxy, "proxy-request");
	if (request->proxy_reply) verify_packet(file, line, request, request->proxy_reply, "proxy-reply");
#endif

#ifdef WITH_COA
	if (request->coa) {
		void *parent;

		(void) talloc_get_type_abort(request->coa, REQUEST);
		parent = talloc_parent(request->coa);

		rad_assert(parent == request);

		verify_request(file, line, request->coa);
	}
#endif
}
#endif

/** Convert mode_t into humanly readable permissions flags
 *
 * @author Jonathan Leffler.
 *
 * @param mode to convert.
 * @param out Where to write the string to, must be exactly 10 bytes long.
 */
void rad_mode_to_str(char out[10], mode_t mode)
{
    static char const *rwx[] = {"---", "--x", "-w-", "-wx", "r--", "r-x", "rw-", "rwx"};

    strcpy(&out[0], rwx[(mode >> 6) & 0x07]);
    strcpy(&out[3], rwx[(mode >> 3) & 0x07]);
    strcpy(&out[6], rwx[(mode & 7)]);
    if (mode & S_ISUID) out[2] = (mode & 0100) ? 's' : 'S';
    if (mode & S_ISGID) out[5] = (mode & 0010) ? 's' : 'l';
    if (mode & S_ISVTX) out[8] = (mode & 0100) ? 't' : 'T';
    out[9] = '\0';
}

void rad_mode_to_oct(char out[5], mode_t mode)
{
	out[0] = '0' + ((mode >> 9) & 0x07);
	out[1] = '0' + ((mode >> 6) & 0x07);
	out[2] = '0' + ((mode >> 3) & 0x07);
	out[3] = '0' + (mode & 0x07);
	out[4] = '\0';
}

/** Resolve a uid to a passwd entry
 *
 * Resolves a uid to a passwd entry. The memory to hold the
 * passwd entry is talloced under ctx, and must be freed when no
 * longer required.
 *
 * @param ctx to allocate passwd entry in.
 * @param out Where to write pointer to entry.
 * @param uid to resolve.
 * @return 0 on success, -1 on error.
 */
int rad_getpwuid(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, struct passwd **out, uid_t uid)
{
	static size_t len;
	uint8_t *buff;
	int ret;

	*out = NULL;

	/*
	 *	We assume this won't change between calls,
	 *	and that the value is the same, so races don't
	 *	matter.
	 */
	if (len == 0) {
#ifdef _SC_GETPW_R_SIZE_MAX
		long int sc_len;

		sc_len = sysconf(_SC_GETPW_R_SIZE_MAX);
		if (sc_len <= 0) sc_len = 1024;
		len = (size_t)sc_len;
#else
		len = 1024;
#endif
	}

	buff = talloc_array(ctx, uint8_t, sizeof(struct passwd) + len);
	if (!buff) return -1;

	/*
	 *	In some cases we may need to dynamically
	 *	grow the string buffer.
	 */
	while ((ret = getpwuid_r(uid, (struct passwd *)buff, (char *)(buff + sizeof(struct passwd)),
				 talloc_array_length(buff) - sizeof(struct passwd), out)) == ERANGE) {
		buff = talloc_realloc_size(ctx, buff, talloc_array_length(buff) * 2);
		if (!buff) {
			talloc_free(buff);
			return -1;
		}
	}

	if ((ret != 0) || !*out) {
		fr_strerror_printf("Failed resolving UID: %s", fr_syserror(ret));
		talloc_free(buff);
		errno = ret;
		return -1;
	}

	talloc_set_type(buff, struct passwd);
	*out = (struct passwd *)buff;

	return 0;
}

/** Resolve a username to a passwd entry
 *
 * Resolves a username to a passwd entry. The memory to hold the
 * passwd entry is talloced under ctx, and must be freed when no
 * longer required.
 *
 * @param ctx to allocate passwd entry in.
 * @param out Where to write pointer to entry.
 * @param name to resolve.
 * @return 0 on success, -1 on error.
 */
int rad_getpwnam(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, struct passwd **out, char const *name)
{
	static size_t len;
	uint8_t *buff;
	int ret;

	*out = NULL;

	/*
	 *	We assume this won't change between calls,
	 *	and that the value is the same, so races don't
	 *	matter.
	 */
	if (len == 0) {
#ifdef _SC_GETPW_R_SIZE_MAX
		long int sc_len;

		sc_len = sysconf(_SC_GETPW_R_SIZE_MAX);
		if (sc_len <= 0) sc_len = 1024;
		len = (size_t)sc_len;
#else
		sc_len = 1024;
#endif
	}

	buff = talloc_array(ctx, uint8_t, sizeof(struct passwd) + len);
	if (!buff) return -1;

	/*
	 *	In some cases we may need to dynamically
	 *	grow the string buffer.
	 */
	while ((ret = getpwnam_r(name, (struct passwd *)buff, (char *)(buff + sizeof(struct passwd)),
				 talloc_array_length(buff) - sizeof(struct passwd), out)) == ERANGE) {
		buff = talloc_realloc_size(ctx, buff, talloc_array_length(buff) * 2);
		if (!buff) {
			talloc_free(buff);
			return -1;
		}
	}

	if ((ret != 0) || !*out) {
		fr_strerror_printf("Failed resolving UID: %s", fr_syserror(ret));
		talloc_free(buff);
		errno = ret;
		return -1;
	}

	talloc_set_type(buff, struct passwd);
	*out = (struct passwd *)buff;

	return 0;
}

/** Resolve a gid to a group database entry
 *
 * Resolves a gid to a group database entry. The memory to hold the
 * group entry is talloced under ctx, and must be freed when no
 * longer required.
 *
 * @param ctx to allocate passwd entry in.
 * @param out Where to write pointer to entry.
 * @param gid to resolve.
 * @return 0 on success, -1 on error.
 */
int rad_getgrgid(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, struct group **out, gid_t gid)
{
	static size_t len;
	uint8_t *buff;
	int ret;

	*out = NULL;

	/*
	 *	We assume this won't change between calls,
	 *	and that the value is the same, so races don't
	 *	matter.
	 */
	if (len == 0) {
#ifdef _SC_GETGR_R_SIZE_MAX
		long int sc_len;

		sc_len = sysconf(_SC_GETGR_R_SIZE_MAX);
		if (sc_len <= 0) sc_len = 1024;
		len = (size_t)sc_len;
#else
		sc_len = 1024;
#endif
	}

	buff = talloc_array(ctx, uint8_t, sizeof(struct group) + len);
	if (!buff) return -1;

	/*
	 *	In some cases we may need to dynamically
	 *	grow the string buffer.
	 */
	while ((ret = getgrgid_r(gid, (struct group *)buff, (char *)(buff + sizeof(struct group)),
				 talloc_array_length(buff) - sizeof(struct group), out)) == ERANGE) {
		buff = talloc_realloc_size(ctx, buff, talloc_array_length(buff) * 2);
		if (!buff) {
			talloc_free(buff);
			return -1;
		}
	}

	if ((ret != 0) || !*out) {
		fr_strerror_printf("Failed resolving GID: %s", fr_syserror(ret));
		talloc_free(buff);
		errno = ret;
		return -1;
	}

	talloc_set_type(buff, struct group);
	*out = (struct group *)buff;

	return 0;
}

/** Resolve a group name to a group database entry
 *
 * Resolves a group name to a group database entry.
 * The memory to hold the group entry is talloced under ctx,
 * and must be freed when no longer required.
 *
 * @param ctx to allocate passwd entry in.
 * @param out Where to write pointer to entry.
 * @param name to resolve.
 * @return 0 on success, -1 on error.
 */
int rad_getgrnam(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, struct group **out, char const *name)
{
	static size_t len;
	uint8_t *buff;
	int ret;

	*out = NULL;

	/*
	 *	We assume this won't change between calls,
	 *	and that the value is the same, so races don't
	 *	matter.
	 */
	if (len == 0) {
#ifdef _SC_GETGR_R_SIZE_MAX
		long int sc_len;

		sc_len = sysconf(_SC_GETGR_R_SIZE_MAX);
		if (sc_len <= 0) sc_len = 1024;
		len = (size_t)sc_len;
#else
		len = 1024;
#endif
	}

	buff = talloc_array(ctx, uint8_t, sizeof(struct group) + len);
	if (!buff) return -1;

	/*
	 *	In some cases we may need to dynamically
	 *	grow the string buffer.
	 */
	while ((ret = getgrnam_r(name, (struct group *)buff, (char *)(buff + sizeof(struct group)),
				 talloc_array_length(buff) - sizeof(struct group), out)) == ERANGE) {
		buff = talloc_realloc_size(ctx, buff, talloc_array_length(buff) * 2);
		if (!buff) {
			talloc_free(buff);
			return -1;
		}
	}

	if ((ret != 0) || !*out) {
		fr_strerror_printf("Failed resolving GID: %s", fr_syserror(ret));
		talloc_free(buff);
		errno = ret;
		return -1;
	}

	talloc_set_type(buff, struct group);
	*out = (struct group *)buff;

	return 0;
}

/** Resolve a group name to a GID
 *
 * @param ctx TALLOC_CTX for temporary allocations.
 * @param name of group.
 * @param out where to write gid.
 * @return 0 on success, -1 on error;
 */
int rad_getgid(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, gid_t *out, char const *name)
{
	int ret;
	struct group *result;

	ret = rad_getgrnam(ctx, &result, name);
	if (ret < 0) return -1;

	*out = result->gr_gid;
	talloc_free(result);
	return 0;
}

/** Print uid to a string
 *
 * @note The reason for taking a fixed buffer is pure laziness.
 *	 It means the caller doesn't have to free the string.
 *
 * @note Will always \0 terminate the buffer, even on error.
 *
 * @param ctx TALLOC_CTX for temporary allocations.
 * @param out Where to write the uid string.
 * @param outlen length of output buffer.
 * @param uid to resolve.
 * @return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
 */
int rad_prints_uid(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, char *out, size_t outlen, uid_t uid)
{
	struct passwd *result;

	rad_assert(outlen > 0);

	*out = '\0';

	if (rad_getpwuid(ctx, &result, uid) < 0) return -1;
	strlcpy(out, result->pw_name, outlen);
	talloc_free(result);

	return 0;
}

/** Print gid to a string
 *
 * @note The reason for taking a fixed buffer is pure laziness.
 *	 It means the caller doesn't have to free the string.
 *
 * @note Will always \0 terminate the buffer, even on error.
 *
 * @param ctx TALLOC_CTX for temporary allocations.
 * @param out Where to write the uid string.
 * @param outlen length of output buffer.
 * @param gid to resolve.
 * @return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
 */
int rad_prints_gid(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, char *out, size_t outlen, gid_t gid)
{
	struct group *result;

	rad_assert(outlen > 0);

	*out = '\0';

	if (rad_getgrgid(ctx, &result, gid) < 0) return -1;
	strlcpy(out, result->gr_name, outlen);
	talloc_free(result);

	return 0;
}

#ifdef HAVE_SETUID
static bool doing_setuid = false;
static uid_t suid_down_uid = (uid_t)-1;

/** Set the uid and gid used when dropping privileges
 *
 * @note if this function hasn't been called, rad_suid_down will have no effect.
 *
 * @param uid to drop down to.
 */
void rad_suid_set_down_uid(uid_t uid)
{
	suid_down_uid = uid;
	doing_setuid = true;
}

#  if defined(HAVE_SETRESUID) && defined (HAVE_GETRESUID)
void rad_suid_up(void)
{
	uid_t ruid, euid, suid;

	if (getresuid(&ruid, &euid, &suid) < 0) {
		ERROR("Failed getting saved UID's");
		fr_exit_now(1);
	}

	if (setresuid(-1, suid, -1) < 0) {
		ERROR("Failed switching to privileged user");
		fr_exit_now(1);
	}

	if (geteuid() != suid) {
		ERROR("Switched to unknown UID");
		fr_exit_now(1);
	}
}

void rad_suid_down(void)
{
	if (!doing_setuid) return;

	if (setresuid(-1, suid_down_uid, geteuid()) < 0) {
		struct passwd *passwd;
		char const *name;

		name = (rad_getpwuid(NULL, &passwd, suid_down_uid) < 0) ? "unknown" : passwd->pw_name;
		ERROR("Failed switching to uid %s: %s", name, fr_syserror(errno));
		talloc_free(passwd);
		fr_exit_now(1);
	}

	if (geteuid() != suid_down_uid) {
		ERROR("Failed switching uid: UID is incorrect");
		fr_exit_now(1);
	}

	fr_reset_dumpable();
}

void rad_suid_down_permanent(void)
{
	if (!doing_setuid) return;

	if (setresuid(suid_down_uid, suid_down_uid, suid_down_uid) < 0) {
		struct passwd *passwd;
		char const *name;

		name = (rad_getpwuid(NULL, &passwd, suid_down_uid) < 0) ? "unknown" : passwd->pw_name;
		ERROR("Failed in permanent switch to uid %s: %s", name, fr_syserror(errno));
		talloc_free(passwd);
		fr_exit_now(1);
	}

	if (geteuid() != suid_down_uid) {
		ERROR("Switched to unknown uid");
		fr_exit_now(1);
	}

	fr_reset_dumpable();
}
#  else
/*
 *	Much less secure...
 */
void rad_suid_up(void)
{
	if (!doing_setuid) return;

	if (seteuid(0) < 0) {
		ERROR("Failed switching up to euid 0: %s", fr_syserror(errno));
		fr_exit_now(1);
	}

}

void rad_suid_down(void)
{
	if (!doing_setuid) return;

	if (geteuid() == suid_down_uid) return;

	if (seteuid(suid_down_uid) < 0) {
		struct passwd *passwd;
		char const *name;

		name = (rad_getpwuid(NULL, &passwd, suid_down_uid) < 0) ? "unknown": passwd->pw_name;
		ERROR("Failed switching to euid %s: %s", name, fr_syserror(errno));
		talloc_free(passwd);
		fr_exit_now(1);
	}

	fr_reset_dumpable();
}

void rad_suid_down_permanent(void)
{
	if (!doing_setuid) return;

	/*
	 *	Already done.  Don't do anything else.
	 */
	if (getuid() == suid_down_uid) return;

	/*
	 *	We're root, but running as a normal user.  Fix that,
	 *	so we can call setuid().
	 */
	if (geteuid() == suid_down_uid) {
		rad_suid_up();
	}

	if (setuid(suid_down_uid) < 0) {
		struct passwd *passwd;
		char const *name;

		name = (rad_getpwuid(NULL, &passwd, suid_down_uid) < 0) ? "unknown": passwd->pw_name;
		ERROR("Failed switching permanently to uid %s: %s", name, fr_syserror(errno));
		talloc_free(passwd);
		fr_exit_now(1);
	}

	fr_reset_dumpable();
}
#  endif /* HAVE_SETRESUID && HAVE_GETRESUID */
#else  /* HAVE_SETUID */
void rad_suid_set_down_uid(uid_t uid)
{
}
void rad_suid_up(void)
{
}
void rad_suid_down(void)
{
	fr_reset_dumpable();
}
void rad_suid_down_permanent(void)
{
	fr_reset_dumpable();
}
#endif /* HAVE_SETUID */

/** Alter the effective user id
 *
 * @param uid to set
 * @return 0 on success -1 on failure.
 */
int rad_seuid(uid_t uid)
{
	if (seteuid(uid) < 0) {
		struct passwd *passwd;

		if (rad_getpwuid(NULL, &passwd, uid) < 0) return -1;
		fr_strerror_printf("Failed setting euid to %s", passwd->pw_name);
		talloc_free(passwd);

		return -1;
	}
	return 0;
}

/** Alter the effective user id
 *
 * @param gid to set
 * @return 0 on success -1 on failure.
 */
int rad_segid(gid_t gid)
{
	if (setegid(gid) < 0) {
		struct group *group;

		if (rad_getgrgid(NULL, &group, gid) < 0) return -1;
		fr_strerror_printf("Failed setting egid to %s", group->gr_name);
		talloc_free(group);

		return -1;
	}
	return 0;
}

/** Determine the elapsed time between two timevals
  *
  * @param end timeval nearest to the present
  * @param start timeval furthest from the present
  * @param elapsed Where to write the elapsed time
  */
void rad_tv_sub(struct timeval const *end, struct timeval const *start, struct timeval *elapsed)
{
	elapsed->tv_sec = end->tv_sec - start->tv_sec;
	if (elapsed->tv_sec > 0) {
		elapsed->tv_sec--;
		elapsed->tv_usec = USEC;
	} else {
		elapsed->tv_usec = 0;
	}
	elapsed->tv_usec += end->tv_usec;
	elapsed->tv_usec -= start->tv_usec;

	if (elapsed->tv_usec >= USEC) {
		elapsed->tv_usec -= USEC;
		elapsed->tv_sec++;
	}
}