1 /* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58
59 #include <stdio.h>
60 #include <ctype.h>
61 #include "cryptlib.h"
62 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
63 #include <openssl/objects.h>
64 #include <openssl/x509.h>
65 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
66
X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 * a,const X509 * b)67 int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
68 {
69 int i;
70 X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
71
72 ai = a->cert_info;
73 bi = b->cert_info;
74 i = M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber);
75 if (i)
76 return (i);
77 return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer));
78 }
79
80 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 * a)81 unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
82 {
83 unsigned long ret = 0;
84 EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
85 unsigned char md[16];
86 char *f;
87
88 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
89 f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer, NULL, 0);
90 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
91 goto err;
92 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
93 goto err;
94 OPENSSL_free(f);
95 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate
96 (&ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
97 (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length))
98 goto err;
99 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
100 goto err;
101 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
102 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
103 ) & 0xffffffffL;
104 err:
105 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
106 return (ret);
107 }
108 #endif
109
X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 * a,const X509 * b)110 int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
111 {
112 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer));
113 }
114
X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 * a,const X509 * b)115 int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
116 {
117 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject));
118 }
119
X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL * a,const X509_CRL * b)120 int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
121 {
122 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer));
123 }
124
125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL * a,const X509_CRL * b)126 int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
127 {
128 return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
129 }
130 #endif
131
X509_get_issuer_name(X509 * a)132 X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a)
133 {
134 return (a->cert_info->issuer);
135 }
136
X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 * x)137 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
138 {
139 return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
140 }
141
142 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 * x)143 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
144 {
145 return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer));
146 }
147 #endif
148
X509_get_subject_name(X509 * a)149 X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a)
150 {
151 return (a->cert_info->subject);
152 }
153
X509_get_serialNumber(X509 * a)154 ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
155 {
156 return (a->cert_info->serialNumber);
157 }
158
X509_subject_name_hash(X509 * x)159 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
160 {
161 return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
162 }
163
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 * x)165 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
166 {
167 return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject));
168 }
169 #endif
170
171 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
172 /*
173 * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
174 * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
175 * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
176 * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
177 * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
178 * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
179 */
X509_cmp(const X509 * a,const X509 * b)180 int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
181 {
182 int rv;
183 /* ensure hash is valid */
184 X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
185 X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
186
187 rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
188 if (rv)
189 return rv;
190 /* Check for match against stored encoding too */
191 if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified) {
192 rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len);
193 if (rv)
194 return rv;
195 return memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc,
196 a->cert_info->enc.len);
197 }
198 return rv;
199 }
200 #endif
201
X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME * a,const X509_NAME * b)202 int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
203 {
204 int ret;
205
206 /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
207
208 if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
209 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
210 if (ret < 0)
211 return -2;
212 }
213
214 if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
215 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
216 if (ret < 0)
217 return -2;
218 }
219
220 ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
221
222 if (ret != 0 || a->canon_enclen == 0)
223 return ret;
224
225 return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
226
227 }
228
X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME * x)229 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
230 {
231 unsigned long ret = 0;
232 unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
233
234 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
235 i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
236 if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
237 NULL))
238 return 0;
239
240 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
241 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
242 ) & 0xffffffffL;
243 return (ret);
244 }
245
246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
247 /*
248 * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
249 * this is reasonably efficient.
250 */
251
X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME * x)252 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
253 {
254 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
255 unsigned long ret = 0;
256 unsigned char md[16];
257
258 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
259 i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
260 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
261 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
262 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
263 && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
264 && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL))
265 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
266 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
267 ) & 0xffffffffL;
268 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
269
270 return (ret);
271 }
272 #endif
273
274 /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF (X509)* sk,X509_NAME * name,ASN1_INTEGER * serial)275 X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
276 ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
277 {
278 int i;
279 X509_CINF cinf;
280 X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
281
282 if (!sk)
283 return NULL;
284
285 x.cert_info = &cinf;
286 cinf.serialNumber = serial;
287 cinf.issuer = name;
288
289 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
290 x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
291 if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
292 return (x509);
293 }
294 return (NULL);
295 }
296
X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF (X509)* sk,X509_NAME * name)297 X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
298 {
299 X509 *x509;
300 int i;
301
302 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
303 x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
304 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
305 return (x509);
306 }
307 return (NULL);
308 }
309
X509_get_pubkey(X509 * x)310 EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
311 {
312 if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL))
313 return (NULL);
314 return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
315 }
316
X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 * x)317 ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
318 {
319 if (!x)
320 return NULL;
321 return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
322 }
323
X509_check_private_key(X509 * x,EVP_PKEY * k)324 int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
325 {
326 EVP_PKEY *xk;
327 int ret;
328
329 xk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
330
331 if (xk)
332 ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
333 else
334 ret = -2;
335
336 switch (ret) {
337 case 1:
338 break;
339 case 0:
340 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
341 break;
342 case -1:
343 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
344 break;
345 case -2:
346 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
347 }
348 if (xk)
349 EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
350 if (ret > 0)
351 return 1;
352 return 0;
353 }
354
355 /*
356 * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID
357 * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a
358 * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags.
359 */
360
361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
362
check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY * pkey,int sign_nid,unsigned long * pflags)363 static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
364 {
365 const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
366 int curve_nid;
367 if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
368 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec);
369 if (!grp)
370 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
371 curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
372 /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
373 if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */
374 /*
375 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve.
376 */
377 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
378 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
379 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
380 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
381 /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
382 *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
383 } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */
384 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
385 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
386 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
387 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
388 } else
389 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
390
391 return X509_V_OK;
392 }
393
X509_chain_check_suiteb(int * perror_depth,X509 * x,STACK_OF (X509)* chain,unsigned long flags)394 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
395 unsigned long flags)
396 {
397 int rv, i, sign_nid;
398 EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
399 unsigned long tflags;
400 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
401 return X509_V_OK;
402 tflags = flags;
403 /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
404 if (x == NULL) {
405 x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
406 i = 1;
407 } else
408 i = 0;
409
410 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
411 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
412 /* Correct error depth */
413 i = 0;
414 goto end;
415 }
416
417 pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
418 /* Check EE key only */
419 rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
420 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
421 /* Correct error depth */
422 i = 0;
423 goto end;
424 }
425 for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
426 sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
427 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
428 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
429 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
430 goto end;
431 }
432 EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
433 pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
434 rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
435 if (rv != X509_V_OK)
436 goto end;
437 }
438
439 /* Final check: root CA signature */
440 rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
441 end:
442 if (pk)
443 EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
444 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
445 /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
446 if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
447 || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
448 i--;
449 /*
450 * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
451 * with P-256. Use more meaninggul error.
452 */
453 if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
454 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
455 if (perror_depth)
456 *perror_depth = i;
457 }
458 return rv;
459 }
460
X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL * crl,EVP_PKEY * pk,unsigned long flags)461 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
462 {
463 int sign_nid;
464 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
465 return X509_V_OK;
466 sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm);
467 return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
468 }
469
470 #else
X509_chain_check_suiteb(int * perror_depth,X509 * x,STACK_OF (X509)* chain,unsigned long flags)471 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
472 unsigned long flags)
473 {
474 return 0;
475 }
476
X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL * crl,EVP_PKEY * pk,unsigned long flags)477 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
478 {
479 return 0;
480 }
481
482 #endif
483 /*
484 * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
485 * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
486 * each X509 structure.
487 */
STACK_OF(X509)488 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
489 {
490 STACK_OF(X509) *ret;
491 int i;
492 ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
493 if (ret == NULL)
494 return NULL;
495 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
496 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i);
497 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
498 }
499 return ret;
500 }
501