1 /* $OpenBSD: x509_cmp.c,v 1.35 2019/03/13 20:34:00 tb Exp $ */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3  * All rights reserved.
4  *
5  * This package is an SSL implementation written
6  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8  *
9  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
11  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
13  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15  *
16  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17  * the code are not to be removed.
18  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22  *
23  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25  * are met:
26  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32  *    must display the following acknowledgement:
33  *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37  * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40  *
41  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51  * SUCH DAMAGE.
52  *
53  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
55  * copied and put under another distribution licence
56  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57  */
58 
59 #include <ctype.h>
60 #include <stdio.h>
61 #include <string.h>
62 
63 #include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
64 
65 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
66 #include <openssl/err.h>
67 #include <openssl/objects.h>
68 #include <openssl/x509.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
70 
71 int
72 X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
73 {
74 	int i;
75 	X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
76 
77 	ai = a->cert_info;
78 	bi = b->cert_info;
79 	i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber);
80 	if (i)
81 		return (i);
82 	return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer));
83 }
84 
85 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
86 unsigned long
87 X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
88 {
89 	unsigned long ret = 0;
90 	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
91 	unsigned char md[16];
92 	char *f;
93 
94 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
95 	f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer, NULL, 0);
96 	if (f == NULL)
97 		goto err;
98 	if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
99 		goto err;
100 	if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
101 		goto err;
102 	free(f);
103 	f = NULL;
104 	if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,
105 	    (unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
106 	    (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length))
107 		goto err;
108 	if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
109 		goto err;
110 	ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
111 	    ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)) &
112 	    0xffffffffL;
113 
114 err:
115 	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
116 	free(f);
117 	return (ret);
118 }
119 #endif
120 
121 int
122 X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
123 {
124 	return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer));
125 }
126 
127 int
128 X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
129 {
130 	return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject));
131 }
132 
133 int
134 X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
135 {
136 	return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer));
137 }
138 
139 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
140 int
141 X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
142 {
143 	return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
144 }
145 #endif
146 
147 X509_NAME *
148 X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a)
149 {
150 	return (a->cert_info->issuer);
151 }
152 
153 unsigned long
154 X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
155 {
156 	return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
157 }
158 
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
160 unsigned long
161 X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
162 {
163 	return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer));
164 }
165 #endif
166 
167 X509_NAME *
168 X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a)
169 {
170 	return (a->cert_info->subject);
171 }
172 
173 ASN1_INTEGER *
174 X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
175 {
176 	return (a->cert_info->serialNumber);
177 }
178 
179 const ASN1_INTEGER *
180 X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *a)
181 {
182 	return (a->cert_info->serialNumber);
183 }
184 
185 unsigned long
186 X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
187 {
188 	return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
189 }
190 
191 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
192 unsigned long
193 X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
194 {
195 	return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject));
196 }
197 #endif
198 
199 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
200 /* Compare two certificates: they must be identical for
201  * this to work. NB: Although "cmp" operations are generally
202  * prototyped to take "const" arguments (eg. for use in
203  * STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these operations may
204  * involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
205  * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point
206  * where the "depth-first" constification tree has to halt
207  * with an evil cast.
208  */
209 int
210 X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
211 {
212 	/* ensure hash is valid */
213 	X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
214 	X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
215 
216 	return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
217 }
218 #endif
219 
220 int
221 X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
222 {
223 	int ret;
224 
225 	/* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
226 	if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
227 		ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
228 		if (ret < 0)
229 			return -2;
230 	}
231 	if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
232 		ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
233 		if (ret < 0)
234 			return -2;
235 	}
236 	ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
237 	if (ret)
238 		return ret;
239 	return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
240 }
241 
242 unsigned long
243 X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
244 {
245 	unsigned long ret = 0;
246 	unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
247 
248 	/* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
249 	i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
250 	if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
251 	    NULL))
252 		return 0;
253 
254 	ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
255 	    ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)) &
256 	    0xffffffffL;
257 	return (ret);
258 }
259 
260 
261 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
262 /* I now DER encode the name and hash it.  Since I cache the DER encoding,
263  * this is reasonably efficient. */
264 
265 unsigned long
266 X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
267 {
268 	EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
269 	unsigned long ret = 0;
270 	unsigned char md[16];
271 
272 	/* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
273 	i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
274 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
275 	if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL) &&
276 	    EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) &&
277 	    EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL))
278 		ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) |
279 		    ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
280 		    ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) |
281 		    ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)) &
282 		    0xffffffffL;
283 	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
284 
285 	return (ret);
286 }
287 #endif
288 
289 /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
290 X509 *
291 X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
292     ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
293 {
294 	int i;
295 	X509_CINF cinf;
296 	X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
297 
298 	if (!sk)
299 		return NULL;
300 
301 	x.cert_info = &cinf;
302 	cinf.serialNumber = serial;
303 	cinf.issuer = name;
304 
305 	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
306 		x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
307 		if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
308 			return (x509);
309 	}
310 	return (NULL);
311 }
312 
313 X509 *
314 X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
315 {
316 	X509 *x509;
317 	int i;
318 
319 	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
320 		x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
321 		if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
322 			return (x509);
323 	}
324 	return (NULL);
325 }
326 
327 EVP_PKEY *
328 X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
329 {
330 	if (x == NULL || x->cert_info == NULL)
331 		return (NULL);
332 	return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
333 }
334 
335 EVP_PKEY *
336 X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x)
337 {
338 	if (x == NULL || x->cert_info == NULL)
339 		return (NULL);
340 	return (X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info->key));
341 }
342 
343 ASN1_BIT_STRING *
344 X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
345 {
346 	if (!x)
347 		return NULL;
348 	return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
349 }
350 
351 int
352 X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k)
353 {
354 	const EVP_PKEY *xk;
355 	int ret;
356 
357 	xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
358 
359 	if (xk)
360 		ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
361 	else
362 		ret = -2;
363 
364 	switch (ret) {
365 	case 1:
366 		break;
367 	case 0:
368 		X509error(X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
369 		break;
370 	case -1:
371 		X509error(X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
372 		break;
373 	case -2:
374 		X509error(X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
375 	}
376 	if (ret > 0)
377 		return 1;
378 	return 0;
379 }
380 
381 /*
382  * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
383  * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
384  * each X509 structure.
385  */
386 STACK_OF(X509) *
387 X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
388 {
389 	STACK_OF(X509) *ret;
390 	size_t i;
391 
392 	ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
393 	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++)
394 		X509_up_ref(sk_X509_value(ret, i));
395 
396 	return ret;
397 }
398