1 /* $OpenBSD: ssl_srvr.c,v 1.73 2020/03/06 16:31:30 tb Exp $ */ 2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58 /* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 /* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 113 * 114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. 116 * 117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 118 * license provided above. 119 * 120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by 121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. 122 * 123 */ 124 /* ==================================================================== 125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 126 * 127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by 128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 129 * license. 130 * 131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of 132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites 133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. 134 * 135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in 136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received 137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. 138 * 139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not 140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third 141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights 142 * to make use of the Contribution. 143 * 144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN 145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA 146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY 147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 148 * OTHERWISE. 149 */ 150 151 #include <stdio.h> 152 153 #include "ssl_locl.h" 154 155 #include <openssl/bn.h> 156 #include <openssl/buffer.h> 157 #include <openssl/curve25519.h> 158 #include <openssl/evp.h> 159 #include <openssl/dh.h> 160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST 161 #include <openssl/gost.h> 162 #endif 163 #include <openssl/hmac.h> 164 #include <openssl/md5.h> 165 #include <openssl/objects.h> 166 #include <openssl/x509.h> 167 168 #include "bytestring.h" 169 #include "ssl_sigalgs.h" 170 #include "ssl_tlsext.h" 171 172 int 173 ssl3_accept(SSL *s) 174 { 175 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; 176 unsigned long alg_k; 177 int ret = -1; 178 int new_state, state, skip = 0; 179 int listen = 0; 180 181 ERR_clear_error(); 182 errno = 0; 183 184 if (s->internal->info_callback != NULL) 185 cb = s->internal->info_callback; 186 else if (s->ctx->internal->info_callback != NULL) 187 cb = s->ctx->internal->info_callback; 188 189 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 190 listen = D1I(s)->listen; 191 192 /* init things to blank */ 193 s->internal->in_handshake++; 194 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) 195 SSL_clear(s); 196 197 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 198 D1I(s)->listen = listen; 199 200 for (;;) { 201 state = S3I(s)->hs.state; 202 203 switch (S3I(s)->hs.state) { 204 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: 205 s->internal->renegotiate = 1; 206 /* S3I(s)->hs.state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ 207 208 case SSL_ST_BEFORE: 209 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 210 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 211 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 212 s->server = 1; 213 if (cb != NULL) 214 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); 215 216 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 217 if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00)) { 218 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 219 ret = -1; 220 goto end; 221 } 222 } else { 223 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) { 224 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 225 ret = -1; 226 goto end; 227 } 228 } 229 s->internal->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT; 230 231 if (!ssl3_setup_init_buffer(s)) { 232 ret = -1; 233 goto end; 234 } 235 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { 236 ret = -1; 237 goto end; 238 } 239 240 s->internal->init_num = 0; 241 242 if (S3I(s)->hs.state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) { 243 /* 244 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO 245 * so that the output is sent in a way that 246 * TCP likes :-) 247 */ 248 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) { 249 ret = -1; 250 goto end; 251 } 252 253 if (!tls1_transcript_init(s)) { 254 ret = -1; 255 goto end; 256 } 257 258 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; 259 s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept++; 260 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !S3I(s)->send_connection_binding) { 261 /* 262 * Server attempting to renegotiate with 263 * client that doesn't support secure 264 * renegotiation. 265 */ 266 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 267 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, 268 SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 269 ret = -1; 270 goto end; 271 } else { 272 /* 273 * S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, 274 * we will just send a HelloRequest. 275 */ 276 s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; 277 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; 278 } 279 break; 280 281 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: 282 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: 283 s->internal->shutdown = 0; 284 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 285 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s); 286 dtls1_start_timer(s); 287 } 288 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s); 289 if (ret <= 0) 290 goto end; 291 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 292 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; 293 else 294 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; 295 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 296 s->internal->init_num = 0; 297 298 if (!tls1_transcript_init(s)) { 299 ret = -1; 300 goto end; 301 } 302 break; 303 304 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: 305 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL_ST_OK; 306 break; 307 308 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: 309 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: 310 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: 311 s->internal->shutdown = 0; 312 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 313 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s); 314 if (ret <= 0) 315 goto end; 316 dtls1_stop_timer(s); 317 318 if (ret == 1 && 319 (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) 320 S3I(s)->hs.state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A; 321 else 322 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; 323 324 s->internal->init_num = 0; 325 326 /* 327 * Reflect ClientHello sequence to remain 328 * stateless while listening. 329 */ 330 if (listen) { 331 memcpy(S3I(s)->write_sequence, 332 S3I(s)->read_sequence, 333 sizeof(S3I(s)->write_sequence)); 334 } 335 336 /* If we're just listening, stop here */ 337 if (listen && S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { 338 ret = 2; 339 D1I(s)->listen = 0; 340 /* 341 * Set expected sequence numbers to 342 * continue the handshake. 343 */ 344 D1I(s)->handshake_read_seq = 2; 345 D1I(s)->handshake_write_seq = 1; 346 D1I(s)->next_handshake_write_seq = 1; 347 goto end; 348 } 349 } else { 350 if (s->internal->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) { 351 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s); 352 if (ret <= 0) 353 goto end; 354 } 355 356 s->internal->renegotiate = 2; 357 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; 358 s->internal->init_num = 0; 359 } 360 break; 361 362 case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: 363 case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B: 364 ret = dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(s); 365 if (ret <= 0) 366 goto end; 367 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 368 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; 369 370 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC. */ 371 tls1_transcript_reset(s); 372 break; 373 374 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: 375 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: 376 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 377 s->internal->renegotiate = 2; 378 dtls1_start_timer(s); 379 } 380 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s); 381 if (ret <= 0) 382 goto end; 383 if (s->internal->hit) { 384 if (s->internal->tlsext_ticket_expected) 385 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 386 else 387 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 388 } else { 389 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; 390 } 391 s->internal->init_num = 0; 392 break; 393 394 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: 395 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: 396 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH. */ 397 if (!(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & 398 SSL_aNULL)) { 399 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 400 dtls1_start_timer(s); 401 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); 402 if (ret <= 0) 403 goto end; 404 if (s->internal->tlsext_status_expected) 405 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; 406 else 407 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 408 } else { 409 skip = 1; 410 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 411 } 412 s->internal->init_num = 0; 413 break; 414 415 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: 416 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: 417 alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 418 419 /* 420 * Only send if using a DH key exchange. 421 * 422 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a ServerKeyExchange 423 * message only if the cipher suite is ECDHE. In other 424 * cases, the server certificate contains the server's 425 * public key for key exchange. 426 */ 427 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE)) { 428 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 429 dtls1_start_timer(s); 430 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); 431 if (ret <= 0) 432 goto end; 433 } else 434 skip = 1; 435 436 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; 437 s->internal->init_num = 0; 438 break; 439 440 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: 441 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: 442 /* 443 * Determine whether or not we need to request a 444 * certificate. 445 * 446 * Do not request a certificate if: 447 * 448 * - We did not ask for it (SSL_VERIFY_PEER is unset). 449 * 450 * - SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set and we are 451 * renegotiating. 452 * 453 * - We are using an anonymous ciphersuites 454 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts 455 * and in RFC 2246) ... except when the application 456 * insists on verification (against the specs, but 457 * s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3). 458 */ 459 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || 460 ((s->session->peer != NULL) && 461 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || 462 ((S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & 463 SSL_aNULL) && !(s->verify_mode & 464 SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))) { 465 /* No cert request. */ 466 skip = 1; 467 S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request = 0; 468 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 469 470 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 471 tls1_transcript_free(s); 472 } else { 473 S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request = 1; 474 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 475 dtls1_start_timer(s); 476 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); 477 if (ret <= 0) 478 goto end; 479 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 480 s->internal->init_num = 0; 481 } 482 break; 483 484 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: 485 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: 486 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 487 dtls1_start_timer(s); 488 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s); 489 if (ret <= 0) 490 goto end; 491 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 492 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 493 s->internal->init_num = 0; 494 break; 495 496 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: 497 /* 498 * This code originally checked to see if 499 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO 500 * and then flushed. This caused problems 501 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed 502 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue 503 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING 504 * still exist. So instead we just flush 505 * unconditionally. 506 */ 507 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; 508 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { 509 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 510 /* If the write error was fatal, stop trying. */ 511 if (!BIO_should_retry(s->wbio)) { 512 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 513 S3I(s)->hs.state = S3I(s)->hs.next_state; 514 } 515 } 516 ret = -1; 517 goto end; 518 } 519 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 520 S3I(s)->hs.state = S3I(s)->hs.next_state; 521 break; 522 523 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: 524 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: 525 if (S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request) { 526 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); 527 if (ret <= 0) 528 goto end; 529 } 530 s->internal->init_num = 0; 531 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; 532 break; 533 534 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: 535 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: 536 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); 537 if (ret <= 0) 538 goto end; 539 540 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 541 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 542 s->internal->init_num = 0; 543 } 544 545 alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 546 if (ret == 2) { 547 /* 548 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when 549 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in 550 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify 551 * message is not sent. 552 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when 553 * the client uses its key from the certificate 554 * for key exchange. 555 */ 556 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 557 s->internal->init_num = 0; 558 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)) { 559 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 560 s->internal->init_num = 0; 561 if (!s->session->peer) 562 break; 563 /* 564 * Freeze the transcript for use during client 565 * certificate verification. 566 */ 567 tls1_transcript_freeze(s); 568 } else { 569 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 570 s->internal->init_num = 0; 571 572 tls1_transcript_free(s); 573 574 /* 575 * We need to get hashes here so if there is 576 * a client cert, it can be verified. 577 */ 578 if (!tls1_transcript_hash_value(s, 579 S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md, 580 sizeof(S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md), 581 NULL)) { 582 ret = -1; 583 goto end; 584 } 585 } 586 break; 587 588 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: 589 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: 590 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 591 D1I(s)->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1; 592 else 593 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 594 595 /* we should decide if we expected this one */ 596 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); 597 if (ret <= 0) 598 goto end; 599 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 600 s->internal->init_num = 0; 601 break; 602 603 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: 604 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: 605 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 606 D1I(s)->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1; 607 else 608 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 609 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, 610 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); 611 if (ret <= 0) 612 goto end; 613 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 614 dtls1_stop_timer(s); 615 if (s->internal->hit) 616 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL_ST_OK; 617 else if (s->internal->tlsext_ticket_expected) 618 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 619 else 620 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 621 s->internal->init_num = 0; 622 break; 623 624 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: 625 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: 626 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); 627 if (ret <= 0) 628 goto end; 629 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 630 s->internal->init_num = 0; 631 break; 632 633 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: 634 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: 635 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s); 636 if (ret <= 0) 637 goto end; 638 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 639 s->internal->init_num = 0; 640 break; 641 642 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: 643 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: 644 s->session->cipher = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher; 645 if (!tls1_setup_key_block(s)) { 646 ret = -1; 647 goto end; 648 } 649 650 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, 651 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A, SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); 652 if (ret <= 0) 653 goto end; 654 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; 655 s->internal->init_num = 0; 656 657 if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(s, 658 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { 659 ret = -1; 660 goto end; 661 } 662 663 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 664 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); 665 break; 666 667 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: 668 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: 669 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s, 670 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, 671 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, 672 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE); 673 if (ret <= 0) 674 goto end; 675 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 676 if (s->internal->hit) { 677 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 678 tls1_transcript_free(s); 679 } else 680 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; 681 s->internal->init_num = 0; 682 break; 683 684 case SSL_ST_OK: 685 /* clean a few things up */ 686 tls1_cleanup_key_block(s); 687 688 if (S3I(s)->handshake_transcript != NULL) { 689 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 690 ret = -1; 691 goto end; 692 } 693 694 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 695 BUF_MEM_free(s->internal->init_buf); 696 s->internal->init_buf = NULL; 697 } 698 699 /* remove buffering on output */ 700 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); 701 702 s->internal->init_num = 0; 703 704 /* Skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest. */ 705 if (s->internal->renegotiate == 2) { 706 s->internal->renegotiate = 0; 707 s->internal->new_session = 0; 708 709 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); 710 711 s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept_good++; 712 /* s->server=1; */ 713 s->internal->handshake_func = ssl3_accept; 714 715 if (cb != NULL) 716 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); 717 } 718 719 ret = 1; 720 721 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 722 /* Done handshaking, next message is client hello. */ 723 D1I(s)->handshake_read_seq = 0; 724 /* Next message is server hello. */ 725 D1I(s)->handshake_write_seq = 0; 726 D1I(s)->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; 727 } 728 goto end; 729 /* break; */ 730 731 default: 732 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); 733 ret = -1; 734 goto end; 735 /* break; */ 736 } 737 738 if (!S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { 739 if (s->internal->debug) { 740 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) 741 goto end; 742 } 743 744 745 if ((cb != NULL) && (S3I(s)->hs.state != state)) { 746 new_state = S3I(s)->hs.state; 747 S3I(s)->hs.state = state; 748 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1); 749 S3I(s)->hs.state = new_state; 750 } 751 } 752 skip = 0; 753 } 754 end: 755 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ 756 s->internal->in_handshake--; 757 if (cb != NULL) 758 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret); 759 760 return (ret); 761 } 762 763 int 764 ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) 765 { 766 CBB cbb, hello; 767 768 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 769 770 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) { 771 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &hello, 772 SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)) 773 goto err; 774 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) 775 goto err; 776 777 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; 778 } 779 780 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ 781 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 782 783 err: 784 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 785 786 return (-1); 787 } 788 789 int 790 ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) 791 { 792 CBS cbs, client_random, session_id, cookie, cipher_suites; 793 CBS compression_methods; 794 uint16_t client_version; 795 uint8_t comp_method; 796 int comp_null; 797 int i, j, ok, al, ret = -1, cookie_valid = 0; 798 long n; 799 unsigned long id; 800 SSL_CIPHER *c; 801 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; 802 unsigned long alg_k; 803 const SSL_METHOD *method; 804 uint16_t max_version, shared_version; 805 806 /* 807 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. 808 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, 809 * This down switching should be handled by a different method. 810 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with 811 * TLSv1. 812 */ 813 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) { 814 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; 815 } 816 817 s->internal->first_packet = 1; 818 n = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, 819 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, 820 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); 821 if (!ok) 822 return ((int)n); 823 s->internal->first_packet = 0; 824 825 if (n < 0) 826 goto err; 827 828 CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n); 829 830 /* Parse client hello up until the extensions (if any). */ 831 if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &client_version)) 832 goto truncated; 833 if (!CBS_get_bytes(&cbs, &client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) 834 goto truncated; 835 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &session_id)) 836 goto truncated; 837 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 838 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &cookie)) 839 goto truncated; 840 } 841 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &cipher_suites)) 842 goto truncated; 843 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &compression_methods)) 844 goto truncated; 845 846 /* 847 * Use version from inside client hello, not from record header. 848 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) 849 */ 850 if (ssl_max_shared_version(s, client_version, &shared_version) != 1) { 851 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 852 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && 853 !s->internal->enc_write_ctx && !s->internal->write_hash) { 854 /* 855 * Similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote 856 * version number. 857 */ 858 s->version = s->client_version; 859 } 860 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 861 goto f_err; 862 } 863 s->client_version = client_version; 864 s->version = shared_version; 865 866 if ((method = tls1_get_server_method(shared_version)) == NULL) 867 method = dtls1_get_server_method(shared_version); 868 if (method == NULL) { 869 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 870 goto err; 871 } 872 s->method = method; 873 874 /* 875 * If we require cookies (DTLS) and this ClientHello does not contain 876 * one, just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. 877 * So check cookie length... 878 */ 879 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 880 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { 881 if (CBS_len(&cookie) == 0) 882 return (1); 883 } 884 } 885 886 if (!CBS_write_bytes(&client_random, s->s3->client_random, 887 sizeof(s->s3->client_random), NULL)) 888 goto err; 889 890 s->internal->hit = 0; 891 892 /* 893 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in 894 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally 895 * ignore resumption requests with flag 896 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag 897 * rather than a change to default behavior so that applications 898 * relying on this for security won't even compile against older 899 * library versions). 900 * 901 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() 902 * to request renegotiation but not a new session (s->internal->new_session 903 * remains unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the 904 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be 905 * ignored. 906 */ 907 if ((s->internal->new_session && (s->internal->options & 908 SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { 909 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) 910 goto err; 911 } else { 912 CBS ext_block; 913 914 CBS_dup(&cbs, &ext_block); 915 916 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &session_id, &ext_block); 917 if (i == 1) { /* previous session */ 918 s->internal->hit = 1; 919 } else if (i == -1) 920 goto err; 921 else { 922 /* i == 0 */ 923 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) 924 goto err; 925 } 926 } 927 928 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 929 /* 930 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the HelloVerify 931 * message has not been sent - make sure that it does not cause 932 * an overflow. 933 */ 934 if (CBS_len(&cookie) > sizeof(D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie)) { 935 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 936 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 937 goto f_err; 938 } 939 940 /* Verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ 941 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && 942 CBS_len(&cookie) > 0) { 943 size_t cookie_len; 944 945 /* XXX - rcvd_cookie seems to only be used here... */ 946 if (!CBS_write_bytes(&cookie, D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie, 947 sizeof(D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie), &cookie_len)) 948 goto err; 949 950 if (s->ctx->internal->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { 951 if (s->ctx->internal->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, 952 D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie, cookie_len) == 0) { 953 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 954 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 955 goto f_err; 956 } 957 /* else cookie verification succeeded */ 958 /* XXX - can d1->cookie_len > sizeof(rcvd_cookie) ? */ 959 } else if (timingsafe_memcmp(D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie, 960 D1I(s)->cookie, D1I(s)->cookie_len) != 0) { 961 /* default verification */ 962 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 963 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 964 goto f_err; 965 } 966 cookie_valid = 1; 967 } 968 } 969 970 /* XXX - This logic seems wrong... */ 971 if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) == 0 && CBS_len(&session_id) != 0) { 972 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */ 973 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 974 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); 975 goto f_err; 976 } 977 978 if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) { 979 if ((ciphers = ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, 980 &cipher_suites)) == NULL) 981 goto err; 982 } 983 984 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ 985 /* XXX - CBS_len(&cipher_suites) will always be zero here... */ 986 if (s->internal->hit && CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) { 987 j = 0; 988 id = s->session->cipher->id; 989 990 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { 991 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); 992 if (c->id == id) { 993 j = 1; 994 break; 995 } 996 } 997 if (j == 0) { 998 /* 999 * We need to have the cipher in the cipher 1000 * list if we are asked to reuse it 1001 */ 1002 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1003 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); 1004 goto f_err; 1005 } 1006 } 1007 1008 comp_null = 0; 1009 while (CBS_len(&compression_methods) > 0) { 1010 if (!CBS_get_u8(&compression_methods, &comp_method)) 1011 goto truncated; 1012 if (comp_method == 0) 1013 comp_null = 1; 1014 } 1015 if (comp_null == 0) { 1016 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1017 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); 1018 goto f_err; 1019 } 1020 1021 if (!tlsext_server_parse(s, &cbs, &al, SSL_TLSEXT_MSG_CH)) { 1022 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); 1023 goto f_err; 1024 } 1025 1026 if (!S3I(s)->renegotiate_seen && s->internal->renegotiate) { 1027 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1028 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 1029 goto f_err; 1030 } 1031 1032 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { 1033 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1034 goto err; 1035 } 1036 1037 /* 1038 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this 1039 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate 1040 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow 1041 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. 1042 */ 1043 arc4random_buf(s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1044 1045 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !ssl_enabled_version_range(s, NULL, &max_version)) 1046 goto err; 1047 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && max_version >= TLS1_2_VERSION && 1048 s->version < max_version) { 1049 /* 1050 * RFC 8446 section 4.1.3. If we are downgrading from TLS 1.3 1051 * we must set the last 8 bytes of the server random to magical 1052 * values to indicate we meant to downgrade. For TLS 1.2 it is 1053 * recommended that we do the same. 1054 */ 1055 size_t index = SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - sizeof(tls13_downgrade_12); 1056 uint8_t *magic = &s->s3->server_random[index]; 1057 if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION) { 1058 /* Indicate we chose to downgrade to 1.2. */ 1059 memcpy(magic, tls13_downgrade_12, 1060 sizeof(tls13_downgrade_12)); 1061 } else { 1062 /* Indicate we chose to downgrade to 1.1 or lower */ 1063 memcpy(magic, tls13_downgrade_11, 1064 sizeof(tls13_downgrade_11)); 1065 } 1066 } 1067 1068 if (!s->internal->hit && s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb) { 1069 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; 1070 1071 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); 1072 if (s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, 1073 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers, &pref_cipher, 1074 s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { 1075 s->internal->hit = 1; 1076 s->session->ciphers = ciphers; 1077 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; 1078 1079 ciphers = NULL; 1080 1081 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ 1082 pref_cipher = pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : 1083 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, 1084 SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1085 if (pref_cipher == NULL) { 1086 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1087 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1088 goto f_err; 1089 } 1090 1091 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; 1092 1093 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); 1094 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->internal->cipher_list_by_id); 1095 1096 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1097 s->internal->cipher_list_by_id = 1098 sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1099 } 1100 } 1101 1102 /* 1103 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must 1104 * pick a cipher 1105 */ 1106 1107 if (!s->internal->hit) { 1108 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); 1109 s->session->ciphers = ciphers; 1110 if (ciphers == NULL) { 1111 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1112 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED); 1113 goto f_err; 1114 } 1115 ciphers = NULL; 1116 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, 1117 SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1118 1119 if (c == NULL) { 1120 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1121 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1122 goto f_err; 1123 } 1124 S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher = c; 1125 } else { 1126 S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; 1127 } 1128 1129 if (!tls1_transcript_hash_init(s)) 1130 goto err; 1131 1132 alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1133 if (!(SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)) || 1134 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) 1135 tls1_transcript_free(s); 1136 1137 /* 1138 * We now have the following setup. 1139 * client_random 1140 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers 1141 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers 1142 * compression - basically ignored right now 1143 * ssl version is set - sslv3 1144 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. 1145 * s->internal->hit - session reuse flag 1146 * s->hs.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. 1147 */ 1148 1149 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ 1150 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) { 1151 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1152 goto err; 1153 } 1154 1155 ret = cookie_valid ? 2 : 1; 1156 1157 if (0) { 1158 truncated: 1159 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1160 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); 1161 f_err: 1162 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1163 } 1164 err: 1165 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); 1166 1167 return (ret); 1168 } 1169 1170 int 1171 ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) 1172 { 1173 CBB cbb, server_hello, session_id; 1174 size_t sl; 1175 1176 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 1177 1178 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { 1179 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &server_hello, 1180 SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)) 1181 goto err; 1182 1183 if (!CBB_add_u16(&server_hello, s->version)) 1184 goto err; 1185 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&server_hello, s->s3->server_random, 1186 sizeof(s->s3->server_random))) 1187 goto err; 1188 1189 /* 1190 * There are several cases for the session ID to send 1191 * back in the server hello: 1192 * 1193 * - For session reuse from the session cache, 1194 * we send back the old session ID. 1195 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) 1196 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" 1197 * (which doesn't actually identify the session). 1198 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new 1199 * session ID. 1200 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, 1201 * we send back a 0-length session ID. 1202 * 1203 * s->internal->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, 1204 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed 1205 * to send back. 1206 */ 1207 if (!(s->ctx->internal->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) 1208 && !s->internal->hit) 1209 s->session->session_id_length = 0; 1210 1211 sl = s->session->session_id_length; 1212 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { 1213 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1214 goto err; 1215 } 1216 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&server_hello, &session_id)) 1217 goto err; 1218 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&session_id, s->session->session_id, sl)) 1219 goto err; 1220 1221 /* Cipher suite. */ 1222 if (!CBB_add_u16(&server_hello, 1223 ssl3_cipher_get_value(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher))) 1224 goto err; 1225 1226 /* Compression method (null). */ 1227 if (!CBB_add_u8(&server_hello, 0)) 1228 goto err; 1229 1230 /* TLS extensions */ 1231 if (!tlsext_server_build(s, &server_hello, SSL_TLSEXT_MSG_SH)) { 1232 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1233 goto err; 1234 } 1235 1236 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) 1237 goto err; 1238 } 1239 1240 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ 1241 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 1242 1243 err: 1244 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 1245 1246 return (-1); 1247 } 1248 1249 int 1250 ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) 1251 { 1252 CBB cbb, done; 1253 1254 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 1255 1256 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) { 1257 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &done, 1258 SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE)) 1259 goto err; 1260 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) 1261 goto err; 1262 1263 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; 1264 } 1265 1266 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ 1267 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 1268 1269 err: 1270 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 1271 1272 return (-1); 1273 } 1274 1275 static int 1276 ssl3_send_server_kex_dhe(SSL *s, CBB *cbb) 1277 { 1278 CBB dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys; 1279 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp; 1280 unsigned char *data; 1281 int al; 1282 1283 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 0) { 1284 if ((dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s)) == NULL) { 1285 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1286 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1287 goto f_err; 1288 } 1289 } else 1290 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp; 1291 1292 if (dhp == NULL && s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL) 1293 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1294 SSL_C_PKEYLENGTH(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher)); 1295 1296 if (dhp == NULL) { 1297 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1298 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1299 goto f_err; 1300 } 1301 1302 if (S3I(s)->tmp.dh != NULL) { 1303 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1304 goto err; 1305 } 1306 1307 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 0) { 1308 dh = dhp; 1309 } else if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) { 1310 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1311 goto err; 1312 } 1313 S3I(s)->tmp.dh = dh; 1314 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) { 1315 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1316 goto err; 1317 } 1318 1319 /* 1320 * Serialize the DH parameters and public key. 1321 */ 1322 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_p)) 1323 goto err; 1324 if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_p, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh->p))) 1325 goto err; 1326 BN_bn2bin(dh->p, data); 1327 1328 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_g)) 1329 goto err; 1330 if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_g, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh->g))) 1331 goto err; 1332 BN_bn2bin(dh->g, data); 1333 1334 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_Ys)) 1335 goto err; 1336 if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_Ys, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh->pub_key))) 1337 goto err; 1338 BN_bn2bin(dh->pub_key, data); 1339 1340 if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) 1341 goto err; 1342 1343 return (1); 1344 1345 f_err: 1346 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1347 err: 1348 return (-1); 1349 } 1350 1351 static int 1352 ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecp(SSL *s, int nid, CBB *cbb) 1353 { 1354 int curve_id = 0; 1355 EC_KEY *ecdh; 1356 CBB ecpoint; 1357 int al; 1358 1359 /* 1360 * Only named curves are supported in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. 1361 * For supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero. 1362 */ 1363 if ((curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid)) == 0) { 1364 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 1365 goto err; 1366 } 1367 1368 if (S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { 1369 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1370 goto err; 1371 } 1372 1373 if ((S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { 1374 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1375 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 1376 goto f_err; 1377 } 1378 S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh_nid = nid; 1379 ecdh = S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh; 1380 1381 if (!ssl_kex_generate_ecdhe_ecp(ecdh, nid)) 1382 goto err; 1383 1384 /* 1385 * Encode the public key. 1386 * 1387 * Only named curves are supported in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. 1388 * In this case the ServerKeyExchange message has: 1389 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] 1390 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by 1391 * the actual encoded point itself. 1392 */ 1393 if (!CBB_add_u8(cbb, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)) 1394 goto err; 1395 if (!CBB_add_u16(cbb, curve_id)) 1396 goto err; 1397 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &ecpoint)) 1398 goto err; 1399 if (!ssl_kex_public_ecdhe_ecp(ecdh, &ecpoint)) 1400 goto err; 1401 if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) 1402 goto err; 1403 1404 return (1); 1405 1406 f_err: 1407 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1408 err: 1409 return (-1); 1410 } 1411 1412 static int 1413 ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecx(SSL *s, int nid, CBB *cbb) 1414 { 1415 uint8_t *public_key = NULL, *private_key = NULL; 1416 int curve_id; 1417 CBB ecpoint; 1418 int ret = -1; 1419 1420 /* Generate an X25519 key pair. */ 1421 if (S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 != NULL) { 1422 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1423 goto err; 1424 } 1425 if ((private_key = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL) 1426 goto err; 1427 if ((public_key = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL) 1428 goto err; 1429 X25519_keypair(public_key, private_key); 1430 1431 /* Serialize public key. */ 1432 if ((curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid)) == 0) { 1433 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 1434 goto err; 1435 } 1436 1437 if (!CBB_add_u8(cbb, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)) 1438 goto err; 1439 if (!CBB_add_u16(cbb, curve_id)) 1440 goto err; 1441 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &ecpoint)) 1442 goto err; 1443 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ecpoint, public_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) 1444 goto err; 1445 if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) 1446 goto err; 1447 1448 S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 = private_key; 1449 private_key = NULL; 1450 ret = 1; 1451 1452 err: 1453 free(public_key); 1454 freezero(private_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH); 1455 1456 return (ret); 1457 } 1458 1459 static int 1460 ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, CBB *cbb) 1461 { 1462 int nid; 1463 1464 nid = tls1_get_shared_curve(s); 1465 1466 if (nid == NID_X25519) 1467 return ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecx(s, nid, cbb); 1468 1469 return ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecp(s, nid, cbb); 1470 } 1471 1472 int 1473 ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) 1474 { 1475 CBB cbb, cbb_params, cbb_signature, server_kex; 1476 const struct ssl_sigalg *sigalg = NULL; 1477 unsigned char *signature = NULL; 1478 size_t signature_len = 0; 1479 unsigned char *params = NULL; 1480 size_t params_len; 1481 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 1482 unsigned long type; 1483 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; 1484 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; 1485 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 1486 int al; 1487 1488 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 1489 memset(&cbb_params, 0, sizeof(cbb_params)); 1490 1491 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); 1492 1493 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) { 1494 1495 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &server_kex, 1496 SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) 1497 goto err; 1498 1499 if (!CBB_init(&cbb_params, 0)) 1500 goto err; 1501 1502 type = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1503 if (type & SSL_kDHE) { 1504 if (ssl3_send_server_kex_dhe(s, &cbb_params) != 1) 1505 goto err; 1506 } else if (type & SSL_kECDHE) { 1507 if (ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe(s, &cbb_params) != 1) 1508 goto err; 1509 } else { 1510 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1511 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); 1512 goto f_err; 1513 } 1514 1515 if (!CBB_finish(&cbb_params, ¶ms, ¶ms_len)) 1516 goto err; 1517 1518 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&server_kex, params, params_len)) 1519 goto err; 1520 1521 /* Add signature unless anonymous. */ 1522 if (!(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) { 1523 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher, 1524 &md, &sigalg)) == NULL) { 1525 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1526 goto f_err; 1527 } 1528 1529 /* Send signature algorithm. */ 1530 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 1531 if (!CBB_add_u16(&server_kex, sigalg->value)) { 1532 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1533 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1534 goto f_err; 1535 } 1536 } 1537 1538 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey)) { 1539 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 1540 goto err; 1541 } 1542 if ((sigalg->flags & SIGALG_FLAG_RSA_PSS) && 1543 (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, 1544 RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) || 1545 !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1))) { 1546 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 1547 goto err; 1548 } 1549 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->client_random, 1550 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { 1551 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 1552 goto err; 1553 } 1554 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->server_random, 1555 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { 1556 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 1557 goto err; 1558 } 1559 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&md_ctx, params, params_len)) { 1560 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 1561 goto err; 1562 } 1563 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, NULL, &signature_len) || 1564 !signature_len) { 1565 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 1566 goto err; 1567 } 1568 if ((signature = calloc(1, signature_len)) == NULL) { 1569 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1570 goto err; 1571 } 1572 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, signature, &signature_len)) { 1573 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 1574 goto err; 1575 } 1576 1577 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&server_kex, 1578 &cbb_signature)) 1579 goto err; 1580 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb_signature, signature, 1581 signature_len)) 1582 goto err; 1583 } 1584 1585 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) 1586 goto err; 1587 1588 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; 1589 } 1590 1591 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 1592 free(params); 1593 free(signature); 1594 1595 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 1596 1597 f_err: 1598 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1599 err: 1600 CBB_cleanup(&cbb_params); 1601 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 1602 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 1603 free(params); 1604 free(signature); 1605 1606 return (-1); 1607 } 1608 1609 int 1610 ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) 1611 { 1612 CBB cbb, cert_request, cert_types, sigalgs, cert_auth, dn; 1613 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL; 1614 X509_NAME *name; 1615 int i; 1616 1617 /* 1618 * Certificate Request - RFC 5246 section 7.4.4. 1619 */ 1620 1621 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 1622 1623 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) { 1624 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &cert_request, 1625 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)) 1626 goto err; 1627 1628 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &cert_types)) 1629 goto err; 1630 if (!ssl3_get_req_cert_types(s, &cert_types)) 1631 goto err; 1632 1633 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 1634 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &sigalgs)) 1635 goto err; 1636 if (!ssl_sigalgs_build(&sigalgs, tls12_sigalgs, tls12_sigalgs_len)) 1637 goto err; 1638 } 1639 1640 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &cert_auth)) 1641 goto err; 1642 1643 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); 1644 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { 1645 unsigned char *name_data; 1646 size_t name_len; 1647 1648 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); 1649 name_len = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); 1650 1651 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_auth, &dn)) 1652 goto err; 1653 if (!CBB_add_space(&dn, &name_data, name_len)) 1654 goto err; 1655 if (i2d_X509_NAME(name, &name_data) != name_len) 1656 goto err; 1657 } 1658 1659 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) 1660 goto err; 1661 1662 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; 1663 } 1664 1665 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ 1666 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 1667 1668 err: 1669 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 1670 1671 return (-1); 1672 } 1673 1674 static int 1675 ssl3_get_client_kex_rsa(SSL *s, CBS *cbs) 1676 { 1677 unsigned char fakekey[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; 1678 unsigned char *pms = NULL; 1679 unsigned char *p; 1680 size_t pms_len = 0; 1681 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 1682 RSA *rsa = NULL; 1683 CBS enc_pms; 1684 int decrypt_len; 1685 int al = -1; 1686 1687 arc4random_buf(fakekey, sizeof(fakekey)); 1688 fakekey[0] = s->client_version >> 8; 1689 fakekey[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; 1690 1691 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; 1692 if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || 1693 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) { 1694 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1695 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); 1696 goto f_err; 1697 } 1698 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa; 1699 1700 pms_len = RSA_size(rsa); 1701 if (pms_len < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 1702 goto err; 1703 if ((pms = malloc(pms_len)) == NULL) 1704 goto err; 1705 p = pms; 1706 1707 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &enc_pms)) 1708 goto truncated; 1709 if (CBS_len(cbs) != 0 || CBS_len(&enc_pms) != RSA_size(rsa)) { 1710 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 1711 goto err; 1712 } 1713 1714 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(CBS_len(&enc_pms), CBS_data(&enc_pms), 1715 pms, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); 1716 1717 ERR_clear_error(); 1718 1719 if (decrypt_len != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 1720 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1721 /* SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */ 1722 } 1723 1724 if ((al == -1) && !((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8)) && 1725 (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) { 1726 /* 1727 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number 1728 * as the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks 1729 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for 1730 * DH ciphersuites). 1731 * 1732 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack 1733 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version 1734 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would 1735 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext 1736 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except that 1737 * the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks, we should 1738 * treat this just like any other decryption error. 1739 */ 1740 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1741 /* SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */ 1742 } 1743 1744 if (al != -1) { 1745 /* 1746 * Some decryption failure -- use random value instead 1747 * as countermeasure against Bleichenbacher's attack 1748 * on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, 1749 * section 7.4.7.1). 1750 */ 1751 p = fakekey; 1752 } 1753 1754 s->session->master_key_length = 1755 tls1_generate_master_secret(s, 1756 s->session->master_key, p, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); 1757 1758 freezero(pms, pms_len); 1759 1760 return (1); 1761 1762 truncated: 1763 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1764 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); 1765 f_err: 1766 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1767 err: 1768 freezero(pms, pms_len); 1769 1770 return (-1); 1771 } 1772 1773 static int 1774 ssl3_get_client_kex_dhe(SSL *s, CBS *cbs) 1775 { 1776 int key_size = 0, key_len, al; 1777 unsigned char *key = NULL; 1778 BIGNUM *bn = NULL; 1779 CBS dh_Yc; 1780 DH *dh; 1781 1782 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &dh_Yc)) 1783 goto truncated; 1784 if (CBS_len(cbs) != 0) 1785 goto truncated; 1786 1787 if (S3I(s)->tmp.dh == NULL) { 1788 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1789 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1790 goto f_err; 1791 } 1792 dh = S3I(s)->tmp.dh; 1793 1794 if ((bn = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_Yc), CBS_len(&dh_Yc), NULL)) == NULL) { 1795 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BN_LIB); 1796 goto err; 1797 } 1798 1799 if ((key_size = DH_size(dh)) <= 0) { 1800 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1801 goto err; 1802 } 1803 if ((key = malloc(key_size)) == NULL) { 1804 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1805 goto err; 1806 } 1807 if ((key_len = DH_compute_key(key, bn, dh)) <= 0) { 1808 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1809 goto err; 1810 } 1811 1812 s->session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret(s, 1813 s->session->master_key, key, key_len); 1814 1815 DH_free(S3I(s)->tmp.dh); 1816 S3I(s)->tmp.dh = NULL; 1817 1818 freezero(key, key_size); 1819 BN_clear_free(bn); 1820 1821 return (1); 1822 1823 truncated: 1824 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1825 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); 1826 f_err: 1827 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1828 err: 1829 freezero(key, key_size); 1830 BN_clear_free(bn); 1831 1832 return (-1); 1833 } 1834 1835 static int 1836 ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecp(SSL *s, CBS *cbs) 1837 { 1838 uint8_t *key = NULL; 1839 size_t key_len = 0; 1840 EC_KEY *ecdh_peer = NULL; 1841 EC_KEY *ecdh; 1842 CBS public; 1843 int ret = -1; 1844 1845 /* 1846 * Use the ephemeral values we saved when generating the 1847 * ServerKeyExchange message. 1848 */ 1849 if ((ecdh = S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh) == NULL) { 1850 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1851 goto err; 1852 } 1853 1854 /* 1855 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the ClientKeyExchange 1856 * message. 1857 */ 1858 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(cbs, &public)) 1859 goto err; 1860 if (CBS_len(cbs) != 0) 1861 goto err; 1862 1863 if ((ecdh_peer = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) 1864 goto err; 1865 1866 if (!ssl_kex_peer_public_ecdhe_ecp(ecdh_peer, S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh_nid, 1867 &public)) 1868 goto err; 1869 1870 /* Derive the shared secret and compute master secret. */ 1871 if (!ssl_kex_derive_ecdhe_ecp(ecdh, ecdh_peer, &key, &key_len)) 1872 goto err; 1873 s->session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret(s, 1874 s->session->master_key, key, key_len); 1875 1876 EC_KEY_free(S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh); 1877 S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 1878 S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh_nid = NID_undef; 1879 1880 ret = 1; 1881 1882 err: 1883 freezero(key, key_len); 1884 EC_KEY_free(ecdh_peer); 1885 1886 return (ret); 1887 } 1888 1889 static int 1890 ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecx(SSL *s, CBS *cbs) 1891 { 1892 uint8_t *shared_key = NULL; 1893 CBS ecpoint; 1894 int ret = -1; 1895 1896 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(cbs, &ecpoint)) 1897 goto err; 1898 if (CBS_len(cbs) != 0) 1899 goto err; 1900 if (CBS_len(&ecpoint) != X25519_KEY_LENGTH) 1901 goto err; 1902 1903 if ((shared_key = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL) 1904 goto err; 1905 if (!X25519(shared_key, S3I(s)->tmp.x25519, CBS_data(&ecpoint))) 1906 goto err; 1907 1908 freezero(S3I(s)->tmp.x25519, X25519_KEY_LENGTH); 1909 S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 = NULL; 1910 1911 s->session->master_key_length = 1912 tls1_generate_master_secret( 1913 s, s->session->master_key, shared_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH); 1914 1915 ret = 1; 1916 1917 err: 1918 freezero(shared_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH); 1919 1920 return (ret); 1921 } 1922 1923 static int 1924 ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, CBS *cbs) 1925 { 1926 if (S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 != NULL) 1927 return ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecx(s, cbs); 1928 1929 return ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecp(s, cbs); 1930 } 1931 1932 static int 1933 ssl3_get_client_kex_gost(SSL *s, CBS *cbs) 1934 { 1935 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; 1936 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; 1937 unsigned char premaster_secret[32]; 1938 unsigned long alg_a; 1939 size_t outlen = 32; 1940 CBS gostblob; 1941 int al; 1942 int ret = 0; 1943 1944 /* Get our certificate private key*/ 1945 alg_a = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 1946 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) 1947 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; 1948 1949 if ((pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL)) == NULL) 1950 goto err; 1951 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) 1952 goto gerr; 1953 1954 /* 1955 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, 1956 * maybe use it for key exchange. 1957 * Don't mind errors from EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because 1958 * it is completely valid to use a client certificate for 1959 * authorization only. 1960 */ 1961 if ((client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) != NULL) { 1962 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, 1963 client_pub_pkey) <= 0) 1964 ERR_clear_error(); 1965 } 1966 1967 /* Decrypt session key */ 1968 if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &gostblob, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) 1969 goto truncated; 1970 if (CBS_len(cbs) != 0) 1971 goto truncated; 1972 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, 1973 CBS_data(&gostblob), CBS_len(&gostblob)) <= 0) { 1974 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 1975 goto gerr; 1976 } 1977 1978 /* Generate master secret */ 1979 s->session->master_key_length = 1980 tls1_generate_master_secret( 1981 s, s->session->master_key, premaster_secret, 32); 1982 1983 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ 1984 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, 1985 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) 1986 ret = 2; 1987 else 1988 ret = 1; 1989 gerr: 1990 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey); 1991 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); 1992 if (ret) 1993 return (ret); 1994 else 1995 goto err; 1996 1997 truncated: 1998 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1999 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); 2000 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2001 err: 2002 return (-1); 2003 } 2004 2005 int 2006 ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) 2007 { 2008 unsigned long alg_k; 2009 int al, ok; 2010 CBS cbs; 2011 long n; 2012 2013 /* 2048 maxlen is a guess. How long a key does that permit? */ 2014 n = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, 2015 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok); 2016 if (!ok) 2017 return ((int)n); 2018 2019 if (n < 0) 2020 goto err; 2021 2022 CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n); 2023 2024 alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 2025 2026 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { 2027 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_rsa(s, &cbs) != 1) 2028 goto err; 2029 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { 2030 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_dhe(s, &cbs) != 1) 2031 goto err; 2032 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) { 2033 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe(s, &cbs) != 1) 2034 goto err; 2035 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { 2036 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_gost(s, &cbs) != 1) 2037 goto err; 2038 } else { 2039 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2040 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); 2041 goto f_err; 2042 } 2043 2044 if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { 2045 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2046 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); 2047 goto f_err; 2048 } 2049 2050 return (1); 2051 2052 f_err: 2053 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2054 err: 2055 return (-1); 2056 } 2057 2058 int 2059 ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) 2060 { 2061 CBS cbs, signature; 2062 const struct ssl_sigalg *sigalg = NULL; 2063 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 2064 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 2065 X509 *peer = NULL; 2066 EVP_MD_CTX mctx; 2067 int al, ok, verify; 2068 const unsigned char *hdata; 2069 size_t hdatalen; 2070 int type = 0; 2071 int ret = 0; 2072 long n; 2073 2074 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); 2075 2076 n = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, 2077 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); 2078 if (!ok) 2079 return ((int)n); 2080 2081 if (n < 0) 2082 goto err; 2083 2084 CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n); 2085 2086 if (s->session->peer != NULL) { 2087 peer = s->session->peer; 2088 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer); 2089 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey); 2090 } 2091 2092 if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { 2093 S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 2094 if (peer != NULL) { 2095 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2096 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE); 2097 goto f_err; 2098 } 2099 ret = 1; 2100 goto end; 2101 } 2102 2103 if (peer == NULL) { 2104 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED); 2105 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2106 goto f_err; 2107 } 2108 2109 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { 2110 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); 2111 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2112 goto f_err; 2113 } 2114 2115 if (S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec) { 2116 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 2117 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2118 goto f_err; 2119 } 2120 2121 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 2122 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &signature)) 2123 goto err; 2124 if (CBS_len(&signature) > EVP_PKEY_size(pkey)) { 2125 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); 2126 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2127 goto f_err; 2128 } 2129 if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { 2130 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2131 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); 2132 goto f_err; 2133 } 2134 } 2135 2136 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 2137 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; 2138 uint16_t sigalg_value; 2139 2140 if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &sigalg_value)) 2141 goto truncated; 2142 if ((sigalg = ssl_sigalg(sigalg_value, tls12_sigalgs, 2143 tls12_sigalgs_len)) == NULL || 2144 (md = sigalg->md()) == NULL) { 2145 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); 2146 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2147 goto f_err; 2148 } 2149 if (!ssl_sigalg_pkey_ok(sigalg, pkey, 0)) { 2150 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); 2151 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2152 goto f_err; 2153 } 2154 2155 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &signature)) 2156 goto err; 2157 if (CBS_len(&signature) > EVP_PKEY_size(pkey)) { 2158 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); 2159 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2160 goto f_err; 2161 } 2162 if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { 2163 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2164 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); 2165 goto f_err; 2166 } 2167 2168 if (!tls1_transcript_data(s, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { 2169 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2170 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2171 goto f_err; 2172 } 2173 if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey)) { 2174 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2175 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2176 goto f_err; 2177 } 2178 if ((sigalg->flags & SIGALG_FLAG_RSA_PSS) && 2179 (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding 2180 (pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) || 2181 !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1))) { 2182 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2183 goto f_err; 2184 } 2185 if (!EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) { 2186 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2187 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2188 goto f_err; 2189 } 2190 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&mctx, CBS_data(&signature), 2191 CBS_len(&signature)) <= 0) { 2192 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2193 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); 2194 goto f_err; 2195 } 2196 } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { 2197 verify = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md, 2198 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, CBS_data(&signature), 2199 CBS_len(&signature), pkey->pkey.rsa); 2200 if (verify < 0) { 2201 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2202 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); 2203 goto f_err; 2204 } 2205 if (verify == 0) { 2206 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2207 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); 2208 goto f_err; 2209 } 2210 } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { 2211 verify = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 2212 &(S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 2213 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, CBS_data(&signature), 2214 CBS_len(&signature), pkey->pkey.ec); 2215 if (verify <= 0) { 2216 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2217 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 2218 goto f_err; 2219 } 2220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST 2221 } else if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || 2222 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { 2223 unsigned char sigbuf[128]; 2224 unsigned int siglen = sizeof(sigbuf); 2225 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; 2226 int nid; 2227 2228 if (!tls1_transcript_data(s, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { 2229 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2230 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2231 goto f_err; 2232 } 2233 if (!EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &nid) || 2234 !(md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid))) { 2235 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2236 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2237 goto f_err; 2238 } 2239 if ((pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL)) == NULL) { 2240 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2241 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2242 goto f_err; 2243 } 2244 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) || 2245 !EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen) || 2246 !EVP_DigestFinal(&mctx, sigbuf, &siglen) || 2247 (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) || 2248 (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, md) <= 0) || 2249 (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY, 2250 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GOST_SIG_FORMAT, 2251 GOST_SIG_FORMAT_RS_LE, NULL) <= 0)) { 2252 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2253 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2254 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 2255 goto f_err; 2256 } 2257 if (EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, CBS_data(&signature), 2258 CBS_len(&signature), sigbuf, siglen) <= 0) { 2259 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2260 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); 2261 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 2262 goto f_err; 2263 } 2264 2265 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 2266 #endif 2267 } else { 2268 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2269 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; 2270 goto f_err; 2271 } 2272 2273 ret = 1; 2274 if (0) { 2275 truncated: 2276 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2277 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); 2278 f_err: 2279 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2280 } 2281 end: 2282 tls1_transcript_free(s); 2283 err: 2284 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); 2285 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 2286 return (ret); 2287 } 2288 2289 int 2290 ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) 2291 { 2292 CBS cbs, client_certs; 2293 int i, ok, al, ret = -1; 2294 X509 *x = NULL; 2295 long n; 2296 const unsigned char *q; 2297 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; 2298 2299 n = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 2300 -1, s->internal->max_cert_list, &ok); 2301 if (!ok) 2302 return ((int)n); 2303 2304 if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { 2305 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 2306 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 2307 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 2308 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2309 goto f_err; 2310 } 2311 /* 2312 * If tls asked for a client cert, 2313 * the client must return a 0 list. 2314 */ 2315 if (S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request) { 2316 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST 2317 ); 2318 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2319 goto f_err; 2320 } 2321 S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 2322 return (1); 2323 } 2324 2325 if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { 2326 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2327 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); 2328 goto f_err; 2329 } 2330 2331 if (n < 0) 2332 goto truncated; 2333 2334 CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n); 2335 2336 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { 2337 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2338 goto err; 2339 } 2340 2341 if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cbs, &client_certs) || 2342 CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) 2343 goto truncated; 2344 2345 while (CBS_len(&client_certs) > 0) { 2346 CBS cert; 2347 2348 if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&client_certs, &cert)) { 2349 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2350 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2351 goto f_err; 2352 } 2353 2354 q = CBS_data(&cert); 2355 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, CBS_len(&cert)); 2356 if (x == NULL) { 2357 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); 2358 goto err; 2359 } 2360 if (q != CBS_data(&cert) + CBS_len(&cert)) { 2361 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2362 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2363 goto f_err; 2364 } 2365 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { 2366 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2367 goto err; 2368 } 2369 x = NULL; 2370 } 2371 2372 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { 2373 /* 2374 * TLS does not mind 0 certs returned. 2375 * Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate. 2376 */ 2377 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 2378 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 2379 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 2380 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2381 goto f_err; 2382 } 2383 /* No client certificate so free transcript. */ 2384 tls1_transcript_free(s); 2385 } else { 2386 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); 2387 if (i <= 0) { 2388 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); 2389 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED); 2390 goto f_err; 2391 } 2392 } 2393 2394 X509_free(s->session->peer); 2395 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); 2396 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; 2397 2398 /* 2399 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL 2400 * when we arrive here 2401 */ 2402 if (SSI(s)->sess_cert == NULL) { 2403 SSI(s)->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); 2404 if (SSI(s)->sess_cert == NULL) { 2405 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2406 goto err; 2407 } 2408 } 2409 sk_X509_pop_free(SSI(s)->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); 2410 SSI(s)->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk; 2411 2412 /* 2413 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the 2414 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c 2415 */ 2416 2417 sk = NULL; 2418 2419 ret = 1; 2420 if (0) { 2421 truncated: 2422 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2423 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); 2424 f_err: 2425 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2426 } 2427 err: 2428 X509_free(x); 2429 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); 2430 2431 return (ret); 2432 } 2433 2434 int 2435 ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) 2436 { 2437 CBB cbb, server_cert; 2438 CERT_PKEY *cpk; 2439 2440 /* 2441 * Server Certificate - RFC 5246, section 7.4.2. 2442 */ 2443 2444 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 2445 2446 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) { 2447 if ((cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s)) == NULL) { 2448 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2449 return (0); 2450 } 2451 2452 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &server_cert, 2453 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)) 2454 goto err; 2455 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, &server_cert, cpk)) 2456 goto err; 2457 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) 2458 goto err; 2459 2460 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; 2461 } 2462 2463 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ 2464 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 2465 2466 err: 2467 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 2468 2469 return (0); 2470 } 2471 2472 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */ 2473 int 2474 ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) 2475 { 2476 CBB cbb, session_ticket, ticket; 2477 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 2478 size_t enc_session_len, enc_session_max_len, hmac_len; 2479 size_t session_len = 0; 2480 unsigned char *enc_session = NULL, *session = NULL; 2481 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 2482 unsigned char key_name[16]; 2483 unsigned char *hmac; 2484 unsigned int hlen; 2485 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 2486 HMAC_CTX hctx; 2487 int len; 2488 2489 /* 2490 * New Session Ticket - RFC 5077, section 3.3. 2491 */ 2492 2493 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 2494 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 2495 2496 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 2497 2498 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) { 2499 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &session_ticket, 2500 SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET)) 2501 goto err; 2502 2503 if (!SSL_SESSION_ticket(s->session, &session, &session_len)) 2504 goto err; 2505 if (session_len > 0xffff) 2506 goto err; 2507 2508 /* 2509 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback is present 2510 * it does all the work, otherwise use generated values from 2511 * parent context. 2512 */ 2513 if (tctx->internal->tlsext_ticket_key_cb != NULL) { 2514 if (tctx->internal->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, 2515 key_name, iv, &ctx, &hctx, 1) < 0) { 2516 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2517 goto err; 2518 } 2519 } else { 2520 arc4random_buf(iv, 16); 2521 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 2522 tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); 2523 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 2524 16, EVP_sha256(), NULL); 2525 memcpy(key_name, tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); 2526 } 2527 2528 /* Encrypt the session state. */ 2529 enc_session_max_len = session_len + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH; 2530 if ((enc_session = calloc(1, enc_session_max_len)) == NULL) 2531 goto err; 2532 enc_session_len = 0; 2533 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, enc_session, &len, session, 2534 session_len)) 2535 goto err; 2536 enc_session_len += len; 2537 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, enc_session + enc_session_len, 2538 &len)) 2539 goto err; 2540 enc_session_len += len; 2541 2542 if (enc_session_len > enc_session_max_len) 2543 goto err; 2544 2545 /* Generate the HMAC. */ 2546 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, key_name, sizeof(key_name))) 2547 goto err; 2548 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx))) 2549 goto err; 2550 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, enc_session, enc_session_len)) 2551 goto err; 2552 2553 if ((hmac_len = HMAC_size(&hctx)) <= 0) 2554 goto err; 2555 2556 /* 2557 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): 2558 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session 2559 * (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for new 2560 * sessions will live as long as their sessions. 2561 */ 2562 if (!CBB_add_u32(&session_ticket, 2563 s->internal->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout)) 2564 goto err; 2565 2566 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&session_ticket, &ticket)) 2567 goto err; 2568 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ticket, key_name, sizeof(key_name))) 2569 goto err; 2570 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ticket, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx))) 2571 goto err; 2572 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ticket, enc_session, enc_session_len)) 2573 goto err; 2574 if (!CBB_add_space(&ticket, &hmac, hmac_len)) 2575 goto err; 2576 2577 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, hmac, &hlen)) 2578 goto err; 2579 if (hlen != hmac_len) 2580 goto err; 2581 2582 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) 2583 goto err; 2584 2585 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; 2586 } 2587 2588 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2589 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 2590 freezero(session, session_len); 2591 free(enc_session); 2592 2593 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ 2594 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 2595 2596 err: 2597 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 2598 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2599 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 2600 freezero(session, session_len); 2601 free(enc_session); 2602 2603 return (-1); 2604 } 2605 2606 int 2607 ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) 2608 { 2609 CBB cbb, certstatus, ocspresp; 2610 2611 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 2612 2613 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) { 2614 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &certstatus, 2615 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS)) 2616 goto err; 2617 if (!CBB_add_u8(&certstatus, s->tlsext_status_type)) 2618 goto err; 2619 if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&certstatus, &ocspresp)) 2620 goto err; 2621 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ocspresp, s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resp, 2622 s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) 2623 goto err; 2624 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) 2625 goto err; 2626 2627 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; 2628 } 2629 2630 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ 2631 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 2632 2633 err: 2634 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 2635 2636 return (-1); 2637 } 2638