1 /* $OpenBSD: ssl_srvr.c,v 1.66 2019/03/25 17:21:18 jsing Exp $ */ 2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58 /* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 /* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 113 * 114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. 116 * 117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 118 * license provided above. 119 * 120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by 121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. 122 * 123 */ 124 /* ==================================================================== 125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 126 * 127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by 128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 129 * license. 130 * 131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of 132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites 133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. 134 * 135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in 136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received 137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. 138 * 139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not 140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third 141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights 142 * to make use of the Contribution. 143 * 144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN 145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA 146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY 147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 148 * OTHERWISE. 149 */ 150 151 #include <stdio.h> 152 153 #include "ssl_locl.h" 154 155 #include <openssl/bn.h> 156 #include <openssl/buffer.h> 157 #include <openssl/curve25519.h> 158 #include <openssl/evp.h> 159 #include <openssl/dh.h> 160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST 161 #include <openssl/gost.h> 162 #endif 163 #include <openssl/hmac.h> 164 #include <openssl/md5.h> 165 #include <openssl/objects.h> 166 #include <openssl/x509.h> 167 168 #include "bytestring.h" 169 #include "ssl_sigalgs.h" 170 #include "ssl_tlsext.h" 171 172 int 173 ssl3_accept(SSL *s) 174 { 175 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; 176 unsigned long alg_k; 177 int ret = -1; 178 int new_state, state, skip = 0; 179 int listen = 0; 180 181 ERR_clear_error(); 182 errno = 0; 183 184 if (s->internal->info_callback != NULL) 185 cb = s->internal->info_callback; 186 else if (s->ctx->internal->info_callback != NULL) 187 cb = s->ctx->internal->info_callback; 188 189 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 190 listen = D1I(s)->listen; 191 192 /* init things to blank */ 193 s->internal->in_handshake++; 194 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) 195 SSL_clear(s); 196 197 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 198 D1I(s)->listen = listen; 199 200 for (;;) { 201 state = S3I(s)->hs.state; 202 203 switch (S3I(s)->hs.state) { 204 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: 205 s->internal->renegotiate = 1; 206 /* S3I(s)->hs.state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ 207 208 case SSL_ST_BEFORE: 209 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 210 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 211 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 212 s->server = 1; 213 if (cb != NULL) 214 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); 215 216 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 217 if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00)) { 218 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 219 ret = -1; 220 goto end; 221 } 222 } else { 223 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) { 224 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 225 ret = -1; 226 goto end; 227 } 228 } 229 s->internal->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT; 230 231 if (!ssl3_setup_init_buffer(s)) { 232 ret = -1; 233 goto end; 234 } 235 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { 236 ret = -1; 237 goto end; 238 } 239 240 s->internal->init_num = 0; 241 242 if (S3I(s)->hs.state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) { 243 /* 244 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO 245 * so that the output is sent in a way that 246 * TCP likes :-) 247 */ 248 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) { 249 ret = -1; 250 goto end; 251 } 252 253 if (!tls1_transcript_init(s)) { 254 ret = -1; 255 goto end; 256 } 257 258 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; 259 s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept++; 260 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !S3I(s)->send_connection_binding) { 261 /* 262 * Server attempting to renegotiate with 263 * client that doesn't support secure 264 * renegotiation. 265 */ 266 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 267 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, 268 SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 269 ret = -1; 270 goto end; 271 } else { 272 /* 273 * S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, 274 * we will just send a HelloRequest. 275 */ 276 s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; 277 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; 278 } 279 break; 280 281 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: 282 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: 283 s->internal->shutdown = 0; 284 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 285 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s); 286 dtls1_start_timer(s); 287 } 288 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s); 289 if (ret <= 0) 290 goto end; 291 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 292 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; 293 else 294 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; 295 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 296 s->internal->init_num = 0; 297 298 if (!tls1_transcript_init(s)) { 299 ret = -1; 300 goto end; 301 } 302 break; 303 304 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: 305 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL_ST_OK; 306 break; 307 308 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: 309 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: 310 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: 311 s->internal->shutdown = 0; 312 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 313 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s); 314 if (ret <= 0) 315 goto end; 316 dtls1_stop_timer(s); 317 318 if (ret == 1 && 319 (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) 320 S3I(s)->hs.state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A; 321 else 322 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; 323 324 s->internal->init_num = 0; 325 326 /* 327 * Reflect ClientHello sequence to remain 328 * stateless while listening. 329 */ 330 if (listen) { 331 memcpy(S3I(s)->write_sequence, 332 S3I(s)->read_sequence, 333 sizeof(S3I(s)->write_sequence)); 334 } 335 336 /* If we're just listening, stop here */ 337 if (listen && S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { 338 ret = 2; 339 D1I(s)->listen = 0; 340 /* 341 * Set expected sequence numbers to 342 * continue the handshake. 343 */ 344 D1I(s)->handshake_read_seq = 2; 345 D1I(s)->handshake_write_seq = 1; 346 D1I(s)->next_handshake_write_seq = 1; 347 goto end; 348 } 349 } else { 350 if (s->internal->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) { 351 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s); 352 if (ret <= 0) 353 goto end; 354 } 355 356 s->internal->renegotiate = 2; 357 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; 358 s->internal->init_num = 0; 359 } 360 break; 361 362 case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: 363 case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B: 364 ret = dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(s); 365 if (ret <= 0) 366 goto end; 367 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 368 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; 369 370 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC. */ 371 tls1_transcript_reset(s); 372 break; 373 374 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: 375 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: 376 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 377 s->internal->renegotiate = 2; 378 dtls1_start_timer(s); 379 } 380 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s); 381 if (ret <= 0) 382 goto end; 383 if (s->internal->hit) { 384 if (s->internal->tlsext_ticket_expected) 385 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 386 else 387 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 388 } else { 389 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; 390 } 391 s->internal->init_num = 0; 392 break; 393 394 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: 395 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: 396 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH. */ 397 if (!(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & 398 SSL_aNULL)) { 399 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 400 dtls1_start_timer(s); 401 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); 402 if (ret <= 0) 403 goto end; 404 if (s->internal->tlsext_status_expected) 405 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; 406 else 407 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 408 } else { 409 skip = 1; 410 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 411 } 412 s->internal->init_num = 0; 413 break; 414 415 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: 416 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: 417 alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 418 419 /* 420 * Only send if using a DH key exchange. 421 * 422 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a ServerKeyExchange 423 * message only if the cipher suite is ECDHE. In other 424 * cases, the server certificate contains the server's 425 * public key for key exchange. 426 */ 427 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE)) { 428 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 429 dtls1_start_timer(s); 430 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); 431 if (ret <= 0) 432 goto end; 433 } else 434 skip = 1; 435 436 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; 437 s->internal->init_num = 0; 438 break; 439 440 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: 441 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: 442 /* 443 * Determine whether or not we need to request a 444 * certificate. 445 * 446 * Do not request a certificate if: 447 * 448 * - We did not ask for it (SSL_VERIFY_PEER is unset). 449 * 450 * - SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set and we are 451 * renegotiating. 452 * 453 * - We are using an anonymous ciphersuites 454 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts 455 * and in RFC 2246) ... except when the application 456 * insists on verification (against the specs, but 457 * s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3). 458 */ 459 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || 460 ((s->session->peer != NULL) && 461 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || 462 ((S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & 463 SSL_aNULL) && !(s->verify_mode & 464 SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))) { 465 /* No cert request. */ 466 skip = 1; 467 S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request = 0; 468 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 469 470 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 471 tls1_transcript_free(s); 472 } else { 473 S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request = 1; 474 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 475 dtls1_start_timer(s); 476 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); 477 if (ret <= 0) 478 goto end; 479 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 480 s->internal->init_num = 0; 481 } 482 break; 483 484 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: 485 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: 486 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 487 dtls1_start_timer(s); 488 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s); 489 if (ret <= 0) 490 goto end; 491 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 492 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 493 s->internal->init_num = 0; 494 break; 495 496 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: 497 /* 498 * This code originally checked to see if 499 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO 500 * and then flushed. This caused problems 501 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed 502 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue 503 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING 504 * still exist. So instead we just flush 505 * unconditionally. 506 */ 507 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; 508 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { 509 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 510 /* If the write error was fatal, stop trying. */ 511 if (!BIO_should_retry(s->wbio)) { 512 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 513 S3I(s)->hs.state = S3I(s)->hs.next_state; 514 } 515 } 516 ret = -1; 517 goto end; 518 } 519 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 520 S3I(s)->hs.state = S3I(s)->hs.next_state; 521 break; 522 523 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: 524 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: 525 if (S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request) { 526 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); 527 if (ret <= 0) 528 goto end; 529 } 530 s->internal->init_num = 0; 531 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; 532 break; 533 534 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: 535 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: 536 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); 537 if (ret <= 0) 538 goto end; 539 540 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 541 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 542 s->internal->init_num = 0; 543 } 544 545 alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 546 if (ret == 2) { 547 /* 548 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when 549 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in 550 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify 551 * message is not sent. 552 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when 553 * the client uses its key from the certificate 554 * for key exchange. 555 */ 556 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 557 s->internal->init_num = 0; 558 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)) { 559 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 560 s->internal->init_num = 0; 561 if (!s->session->peer) 562 break; 563 /* 564 * Freeze the transcript for use during client 565 * certificate verification. 566 */ 567 tls1_transcript_freeze(s); 568 } else { 569 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 570 s->internal->init_num = 0; 571 572 tls1_transcript_free(s); 573 574 /* 575 * We need to get hashes here so if there is 576 * a client cert, it can be verified. 577 */ 578 if (!tls1_transcript_hash_value(s, 579 S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md, 580 sizeof(S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md), 581 NULL)) { 582 ret = -1; 583 goto end; 584 } 585 } 586 break; 587 588 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: 589 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: 590 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 591 D1I(s)->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1; 592 else 593 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 594 595 /* we should decide if we expected this one */ 596 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); 597 if (ret <= 0) 598 goto end; 599 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 600 s->internal->init_num = 0; 601 break; 602 603 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: 604 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: 605 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 606 D1I(s)->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1; 607 else 608 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 609 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, 610 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); 611 if (ret <= 0) 612 goto end; 613 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 614 dtls1_stop_timer(s); 615 if (s->internal->hit) 616 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL_ST_OK; 617 else if (s->internal->tlsext_ticket_expected) 618 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 619 else 620 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 621 s->internal->init_num = 0; 622 break; 623 624 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: 625 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: 626 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); 627 if (ret <= 0) 628 goto end; 629 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 630 s->internal->init_num = 0; 631 break; 632 633 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: 634 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: 635 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s); 636 if (ret <= 0) 637 goto end; 638 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 639 s->internal->init_num = 0; 640 break; 641 642 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: 643 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: 644 s->session->cipher = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher; 645 if (!tls1_setup_key_block(s)) { 646 ret = -1; 647 goto end; 648 } 649 650 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, 651 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A, SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); 652 if (ret <= 0) 653 goto end; 654 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; 655 s->internal->init_num = 0; 656 657 if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(s, 658 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { 659 ret = -1; 660 goto end; 661 } 662 663 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 664 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); 665 break; 666 667 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: 668 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: 669 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s, 670 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, 671 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, 672 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE); 673 if (ret <= 0) 674 goto end; 675 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 676 if (s->internal->hit) { 677 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 678 tls1_transcript_free(s); 679 } else 680 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; 681 s->internal->init_num = 0; 682 break; 683 684 case SSL_ST_OK: 685 /* clean a few things up */ 686 tls1_cleanup_key_block(s); 687 688 if (S3I(s)->handshake_transcript != NULL) { 689 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 690 ret = -1; 691 goto end; 692 } 693 694 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 695 BUF_MEM_free(s->internal->init_buf); 696 s->internal->init_buf = NULL; 697 } 698 699 /* remove buffering on output */ 700 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); 701 702 s->internal->init_num = 0; 703 704 /* Skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest. */ 705 if (s->internal->renegotiate == 2) { 706 s->internal->renegotiate = 0; 707 s->internal->new_session = 0; 708 709 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); 710 711 s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept_good++; 712 /* s->server=1; */ 713 s->internal->handshake_func = ssl3_accept; 714 715 if (cb != NULL) 716 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); 717 } 718 719 ret = 1; 720 721 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 722 /* Done handshaking, next message is client hello. */ 723 D1I(s)->handshake_read_seq = 0; 724 /* Next message is server hello. */ 725 D1I(s)->handshake_write_seq = 0; 726 D1I(s)->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; 727 } 728 goto end; 729 /* break; */ 730 731 default: 732 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); 733 ret = -1; 734 goto end; 735 /* break; */ 736 } 737 738 if (!S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { 739 if (s->internal->debug) { 740 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) 741 goto end; 742 } 743 744 745 if ((cb != NULL) && (S3I(s)->hs.state != state)) { 746 new_state = S3I(s)->hs.state; 747 S3I(s)->hs.state = state; 748 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1); 749 S3I(s)->hs.state = new_state; 750 } 751 } 752 skip = 0; 753 } 754 end: 755 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ 756 s->internal->in_handshake--; 757 if (cb != NULL) 758 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret); 759 760 return (ret); 761 } 762 763 int 764 ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) 765 { 766 CBB cbb, hello; 767 768 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 769 770 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) { 771 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &hello, 772 SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)) 773 goto err; 774 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) 775 goto err; 776 777 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; 778 } 779 780 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ 781 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 782 783 err: 784 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 785 786 return (-1); 787 } 788 789 int 790 ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) 791 { 792 CBS cbs, client_random, session_id, cookie, cipher_suites; 793 CBS compression_methods; 794 uint16_t client_version; 795 uint8_t comp_method; 796 int comp_null; 797 int i, j, ok, al, ret = -1, cookie_valid = 0; 798 long n; 799 unsigned long id; 800 SSL_CIPHER *c; 801 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; 802 unsigned long alg_k; 803 const SSL_METHOD *method; 804 uint16_t shared_version; 805 806 /* 807 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. 808 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, 809 * This down switching should be handled by a different method. 810 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with 811 * TLSv1. 812 */ 813 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) { 814 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; 815 } 816 817 s->internal->first_packet = 1; 818 n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, 819 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, 820 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); 821 if (!ok) 822 return ((int)n); 823 s->internal->first_packet = 0; 824 825 if (n < 0) 826 goto err; 827 828 CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n); 829 830 /* Parse client hello up until the extensions (if any). */ 831 if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &client_version)) 832 goto truncated; 833 if (!CBS_get_bytes(&cbs, &client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) 834 goto truncated; 835 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &session_id)) 836 goto truncated; 837 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 838 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &cookie)) 839 goto truncated; 840 } 841 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &cipher_suites)) 842 goto truncated; 843 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &compression_methods)) 844 goto truncated; 845 846 /* 847 * Use version from inside client hello, not from record header. 848 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) 849 */ 850 if (ssl_max_shared_version(s, client_version, &shared_version) != 1) { 851 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 852 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && 853 !s->internal->enc_write_ctx && !s->internal->write_hash) { 854 /* 855 * Similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote 856 * version number. 857 */ 858 s->version = s->client_version; 859 } 860 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 861 goto f_err; 862 } 863 s->client_version = client_version; 864 s->version = shared_version; 865 866 if ((method = tls1_get_server_method(shared_version)) == NULL) 867 method = dtls1_get_server_method(shared_version); 868 if (method == NULL) { 869 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 870 goto err; 871 } 872 s->method = method; 873 874 /* 875 * If we require cookies (DTLS) and this ClientHello does not contain 876 * one, just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. 877 * So check cookie length... 878 */ 879 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 880 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { 881 if (CBS_len(&cookie) == 0) 882 return (1); 883 } 884 } 885 886 if (!CBS_write_bytes(&client_random, s->s3->client_random, 887 sizeof(s->s3->client_random), NULL)) 888 goto err; 889 890 s->internal->hit = 0; 891 892 /* 893 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in 894 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally 895 * ignore resumption requests with flag 896 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag 897 * rather than a change to default behavior so that applications 898 * relying on this for security won't even compile against older 899 * library versions). 900 * 901 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() 902 * to request renegotiation but not a new session (s->internal->new_session 903 * remains unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the 904 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be 905 * ignored. 906 */ 907 if ((s->internal->new_session && (s->internal->options & 908 SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { 909 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) 910 goto err; 911 } else { 912 CBS ext_block; 913 914 CBS_dup(&cbs, &ext_block); 915 916 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, CBS_data(&session_id), 917 CBS_len(&session_id), &ext_block); 918 if (i == 1) { /* previous session */ 919 s->internal->hit = 1; 920 } else if (i == -1) 921 goto err; 922 else { 923 /* i == 0 */ 924 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) 925 goto err; 926 } 927 } 928 929 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 930 /* 931 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the HelloVerify 932 * message has not been sent - make sure that it does not cause 933 * an overflow. 934 */ 935 if (CBS_len(&cookie) > sizeof(D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie)) { 936 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 937 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 938 goto f_err; 939 } 940 941 /* Verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ 942 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && 943 CBS_len(&cookie) > 0) { 944 size_t cookie_len; 945 946 /* XXX - rcvd_cookie seems to only be used here... */ 947 if (!CBS_write_bytes(&cookie, D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie, 948 sizeof(D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie), &cookie_len)) 949 goto err; 950 951 if (s->ctx->internal->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { 952 if (s->ctx->internal->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, 953 D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie, cookie_len) == 0) { 954 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 955 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 956 goto f_err; 957 } 958 /* else cookie verification succeeded */ 959 /* XXX - can d1->cookie_len > sizeof(rcvd_cookie) ? */ 960 } else if (timingsafe_memcmp(D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie, 961 D1I(s)->cookie, D1I(s)->cookie_len) != 0) { 962 /* default verification */ 963 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 964 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 965 goto f_err; 966 } 967 cookie_valid = 1; 968 } 969 } 970 971 /* XXX - This logic seems wrong... */ 972 if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) == 0 && CBS_len(&session_id) != 0) { 973 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */ 974 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 975 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); 976 goto f_err; 977 } 978 979 if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) { 980 if ((ciphers = ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, 981 &cipher_suites)) == NULL) 982 goto err; 983 } 984 985 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ 986 /* XXX - CBS_len(&cipher_suites) will always be zero here... */ 987 if (s->internal->hit && CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) { 988 j = 0; 989 id = s->session->cipher->id; 990 991 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { 992 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); 993 if (c->id == id) { 994 j = 1; 995 break; 996 } 997 } 998 if (j == 0) { 999 /* 1000 * We need to have the cipher in the cipher 1001 * list if we are asked to reuse it 1002 */ 1003 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1004 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); 1005 goto f_err; 1006 } 1007 } 1008 1009 comp_null = 0; 1010 while (CBS_len(&compression_methods) > 0) { 1011 if (!CBS_get_u8(&compression_methods, &comp_method)) 1012 goto truncated; 1013 if (comp_method == 0) 1014 comp_null = 1; 1015 } 1016 if (comp_null == 0) { 1017 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1018 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); 1019 goto f_err; 1020 } 1021 1022 if (!tlsext_server_parse(s, &cbs, &al, SSL_TLSEXT_MSG_CH)) { 1023 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); 1024 goto f_err; 1025 } 1026 1027 if (!S3I(s)->renegotiate_seen && s->internal->renegotiate) { 1028 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1029 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 1030 goto f_err; 1031 } 1032 1033 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { 1034 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1035 goto err; 1036 } 1037 1038 /* 1039 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this 1040 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate 1041 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow 1042 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. 1043 */ 1044 arc4random_buf(s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1045 1046 if (!s->internal->hit && s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb) { 1047 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; 1048 1049 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); 1050 if (s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, 1051 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers, &pref_cipher, 1052 s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { 1053 s->internal->hit = 1; 1054 s->session->ciphers = ciphers; 1055 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; 1056 1057 ciphers = NULL; 1058 1059 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ 1060 pref_cipher = pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : 1061 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, 1062 SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1063 if (pref_cipher == NULL) { 1064 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1065 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1066 goto f_err; 1067 } 1068 1069 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; 1070 1071 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); 1072 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->internal->cipher_list_by_id); 1073 1074 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1075 s->internal->cipher_list_by_id = 1076 sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1077 } 1078 } 1079 1080 /* 1081 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must 1082 * pick a cipher 1083 */ 1084 1085 if (!s->internal->hit) { 1086 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); 1087 s->session->ciphers = ciphers; 1088 if (ciphers == NULL) { 1089 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1090 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED); 1091 goto f_err; 1092 } 1093 ciphers = NULL; 1094 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, 1095 SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1096 1097 if (c == NULL) { 1098 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1099 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1100 goto f_err; 1101 } 1102 S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher = c; 1103 } else { 1104 S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; 1105 } 1106 1107 if (!tls1_transcript_hash_init(s)) 1108 goto err; 1109 1110 alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1111 if (!(SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)) || 1112 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) 1113 tls1_transcript_free(s); 1114 1115 /* 1116 * We now have the following setup. 1117 * client_random 1118 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers 1119 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers 1120 * compression - basically ignored right now 1121 * ssl version is set - sslv3 1122 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. 1123 * s->internal->hit - session reuse flag 1124 * s->hs.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. 1125 */ 1126 1127 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ 1128 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) { 1129 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1130 goto err; 1131 } 1132 1133 ret = cookie_valid ? 2 : 1; 1134 1135 if (0) { 1136 truncated: 1137 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1138 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); 1139 f_err: 1140 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1141 } 1142 err: 1143 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); 1144 1145 return (ret); 1146 } 1147 1148 int 1149 ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) 1150 { 1151 CBB cbb, server_hello, session_id; 1152 size_t sl; 1153 1154 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 1155 1156 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { 1157 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &server_hello, 1158 SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)) 1159 goto err; 1160 1161 if (!CBB_add_u16(&server_hello, s->version)) 1162 goto err; 1163 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&server_hello, s->s3->server_random, 1164 sizeof(s->s3->server_random))) 1165 goto err; 1166 1167 /* 1168 * There are several cases for the session ID to send 1169 * back in the server hello: 1170 * 1171 * - For session reuse from the session cache, 1172 * we send back the old session ID. 1173 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) 1174 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" 1175 * (which doesn't actually identify the session). 1176 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new 1177 * session ID. 1178 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, 1179 * we send back a 0-length session ID. 1180 * 1181 * s->internal->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, 1182 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed 1183 * to send back. 1184 */ 1185 if (!(s->ctx->internal->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) 1186 && !s->internal->hit) 1187 s->session->session_id_length = 0; 1188 1189 sl = s->session->session_id_length; 1190 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { 1191 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1192 goto err; 1193 } 1194 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&server_hello, &session_id)) 1195 goto err; 1196 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&session_id, s->session->session_id, sl)) 1197 goto err; 1198 1199 /* Cipher suite. */ 1200 if (!CBB_add_u16(&server_hello, 1201 ssl3_cipher_get_value(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher))) 1202 goto err; 1203 1204 /* Compression method (null). */ 1205 if (!CBB_add_u8(&server_hello, 0)) 1206 goto err; 1207 1208 /* TLS extensions */ 1209 if (!tlsext_server_build(s, &server_hello, SSL_TLSEXT_MSG_SH)) { 1210 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1211 goto err; 1212 } 1213 1214 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) 1215 goto err; 1216 } 1217 1218 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ 1219 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 1220 1221 err: 1222 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 1223 1224 return (-1); 1225 } 1226 1227 int 1228 ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) 1229 { 1230 CBB cbb, done; 1231 1232 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 1233 1234 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) { 1235 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &done, 1236 SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE)) 1237 goto err; 1238 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) 1239 goto err; 1240 1241 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; 1242 } 1243 1244 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ 1245 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 1246 1247 err: 1248 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 1249 1250 return (-1); 1251 } 1252 1253 static int 1254 ssl3_send_server_kex_dhe(SSL *s, CBB *cbb) 1255 { 1256 CBB dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys; 1257 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp; 1258 unsigned char *data; 1259 int al; 1260 1261 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 0) { 1262 if ((dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s)) == NULL) { 1263 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1264 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1265 goto f_err; 1266 } 1267 } else 1268 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp; 1269 1270 if (dhp == NULL && s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL) 1271 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1272 SSL_C_PKEYLENGTH(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher)); 1273 1274 if (dhp == NULL) { 1275 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1276 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1277 goto f_err; 1278 } 1279 1280 if (S3I(s)->tmp.dh != NULL) { 1281 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1282 goto err; 1283 } 1284 1285 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 0) { 1286 dh = dhp; 1287 } else if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) { 1288 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1289 goto err; 1290 } 1291 S3I(s)->tmp.dh = dh; 1292 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) { 1293 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1294 goto err; 1295 } 1296 1297 /* 1298 * Serialize the DH parameters and public key. 1299 */ 1300 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_p)) 1301 goto err; 1302 if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_p, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh->p))) 1303 goto err; 1304 BN_bn2bin(dh->p, data); 1305 1306 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_g)) 1307 goto err; 1308 if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_g, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh->g))) 1309 goto err; 1310 BN_bn2bin(dh->g, data); 1311 1312 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_Ys)) 1313 goto err; 1314 if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_Ys, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh->pub_key))) 1315 goto err; 1316 BN_bn2bin(dh->pub_key, data); 1317 1318 if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) 1319 goto err; 1320 1321 return (1); 1322 1323 f_err: 1324 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1325 err: 1326 return (-1); 1327 } 1328 1329 static int 1330 ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecp(SSL *s, int nid, CBB *cbb) 1331 { 1332 const EC_GROUP *group; 1333 const EC_POINT *pubkey; 1334 unsigned char *data; 1335 int encoded_len = 0; 1336 int curve_id = 0; 1337 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1338 EC_KEY *ecdh; 1339 CBB ecpoint; 1340 int al; 1341 1342 /* 1343 * Only named curves are supported in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. 1344 * For supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero. 1345 */ 1346 if ((curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid)) == 0) { 1347 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 1348 goto err; 1349 } 1350 1351 if (S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { 1352 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1353 goto err; 1354 } 1355 1356 if ((S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid)) == NULL) { 1357 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1358 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 1359 goto f_err; 1360 } 1361 ecdh = S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh; 1362 1363 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) { 1364 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1365 goto err; 1366 } 1367 if ((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL || 1368 (pubkey = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh)) == NULL || 1369 EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) { 1370 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1371 goto err; 1372 } 1373 1374 /* 1375 * Encode the public key. 1376 */ 1377 encoded_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, pubkey, 1378 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL); 1379 if (encoded_len == 0) { 1380 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1381 goto err; 1382 } 1383 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { 1384 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1385 goto err; 1386 } 1387 1388 /* 1389 * Only named curves are supported in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. 1390 * In this case the ServerKeyExchange message has: 1391 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] 1392 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by 1393 * the actual encoded point itself. 1394 */ 1395 if (!CBB_add_u8(cbb, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)) 1396 goto err; 1397 if (!CBB_add_u16(cbb, curve_id)) 1398 goto err; 1399 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &ecpoint)) 1400 goto err; 1401 if (!CBB_add_space(&ecpoint, &data, encoded_len)) 1402 goto err; 1403 if (EC_POINT_point2oct(group, pubkey, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1404 data, encoded_len, bn_ctx) == 0) { 1405 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1406 goto err; 1407 } 1408 if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) 1409 goto err; 1410 1411 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 1412 1413 return (1); 1414 1415 f_err: 1416 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1417 err: 1418 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 1419 1420 return (-1); 1421 } 1422 1423 static int 1424 ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecx(SSL *s, int nid, CBB *cbb) 1425 { 1426 uint8_t *public_key = NULL; 1427 int curve_id; 1428 CBB ecpoint; 1429 int ret = -1; 1430 1431 /* Generate an X25519 key pair. */ 1432 if (S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 != NULL) { 1433 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1434 goto err; 1435 } 1436 if ((S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL) 1437 goto err; 1438 if ((public_key = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL) 1439 goto err; 1440 X25519_keypair(public_key, S3I(s)->tmp.x25519); 1441 1442 /* Serialize public key. */ 1443 if ((curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid)) == 0) { 1444 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 1445 goto err; 1446 } 1447 1448 if (!CBB_add_u8(cbb, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)) 1449 goto err; 1450 if (!CBB_add_u16(cbb, curve_id)) 1451 goto err; 1452 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &ecpoint)) 1453 goto err; 1454 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ecpoint, public_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) 1455 goto err; 1456 if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) 1457 goto err; 1458 1459 ret = 1; 1460 1461 err: 1462 free(public_key); 1463 1464 return (ret); 1465 } 1466 1467 static int 1468 ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, CBB *cbb) 1469 { 1470 int nid; 1471 1472 nid = tls1_get_shared_curve(s); 1473 1474 if (nid == NID_X25519) 1475 return ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecx(s, nid, cbb); 1476 1477 return ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecp(s, nid, cbb); 1478 } 1479 1480 int 1481 ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) 1482 { 1483 CBB cbb, cbb_params, cbb_signature, server_kex; 1484 const struct ssl_sigalg *sigalg = NULL; 1485 unsigned char *signature = NULL; 1486 size_t signature_len = 0; 1487 unsigned char *params = NULL; 1488 size_t params_len; 1489 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 1490 unsigned long type; 1491 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; 1492 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; 1493 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 1494 int al; 1495 1496 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 1497 memset(&cbb_params, 0, sizeof(cbb_params)); 1498 1499 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); 1500 1501 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) { 1502 1503 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &server_kex, 1504 SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) 1505 goto err; 1506 1507 if (!CBB_init(&cbb_params, 0)) 1508 goto err; 1509 1510 type = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1511 if (type & SSL_kDHE) { 1512 if (ssl3_send_server_kex_dhe(s, &cbb_params) != 1) 1513 goto err; 1514 } else if (type & SSL_kECDHE) { 1515 if (ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe(s, &cbb_params) != 1) 1516 goto err; 1517 } else { 1518 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1519 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); 1520 goto f_err; 1521 } 1522 1523 if (!CBB_finish(&cbb_params, ¶ms, ¶ms_len)) 1524 goto err; 1525 1526 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&server_kex, params, params_len)) 1527 goto err; 1528 1529 /* Add signature unless anonymous. */ 1530 if (!(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) { 1531 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher, 1532 &md, &sigalg)) == NULL) { 1533 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1534 goto f_err; 1535 } 1536 1537 /* Send signature algorithm. */ 1538 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 1539 if (!CBB_add_u16(&server_kex, sigalg->value)) { 1540 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1541 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1542 goto f_err; 1543 } 1544 } 1545 1546 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey)) { 1547 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 1548 goto err; 1549 } 1550 if ((sigalg->flags & SIGALG_FLAG_RSA_PSS) && 1551 (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, 1552 RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) || 1553 !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1))) { 1554 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 1555 goto err; 1556 } 1557 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->client_random, 1558 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { 1559 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 1560 goto err; 1561 } 1562 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->server_random, 1563 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { 1564 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 1565 goto err; 1566 } 1567 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&md_ctx, params, params_len)) { 1568 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 1569 goto err; 1570 } 1571 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, NULL, &signature_len) || 1572 !signature_len) { 1573 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 1574 goto err; 1575 } 1576 if ((signature = calloc(1, signature_len)) == NULL) { 1577 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1578 goto err; 1579 } 1580 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, signature, &signature_len)) { 1581 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 1582 goto err; 1583 } 1584 1585 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&server_kex, 1586 &cbb_signature)) 1587 goto err; 1588 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb_signature, signature, 1589 signature_len)) 1590 goto err; 1591 } 1592 1593 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) 1594 goto err; 1595 1596 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; 1597 } 1598 1599 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 1600 free(params); 1601 free(signature); 1602 1603 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 1604 1605 f_err: 1606 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1607 err: 1608 CBB_cleanup(&cbb_params); 1609 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 1610 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 1611 free(params); 1612 free(signature); 1613 1614 return (-1); 1615 } 1616 1617 int 1618 ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) 1619 { 1620 CBB cbb, cert_request, cert_types, sigalgs, cert_auth, dn; 1621 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL; 1622 X509_NAME *name; 1623 int i; 1624 1625 /* 1626 * Certificate Request - RFC 5246 section 7.4.4. 1627 */ 1628 1629 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 1630 1631 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) { 1632 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &cert_request, 1633 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)) 1634 goto err; 1635 1636 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &cert_types)) 1637 goto err; 1638 if (!ssl3_get_req_cert_types(s, &cert_types)) 1639 goto err; 1640 1641 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 1642 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &sigalgs)) 1643 goto err; 1644 if (!ssl_sigalgs_build(&sigalgs, tls12_sigalgs, tls12_sigalgs_len)) 1645 goto err; 1646 } 1647 1648 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &cert_auth)) 1649 goto err; 1650 1651 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); 1652 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { 1653 unsigned char *name_data; 1654 size_t name_len; 1655 1656 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); 1657 name_len = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); 1658 1659 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_auth, &dn)) 1660 goto err; 1661 if (!CBB_add_space(&dn, &name_data, name_len)) 1662 goto err; 1663 if (i2d_X509_NAME(name, &name_data) != name_len) 1664 goto err; 1665 } 1666 1667 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) 1668 goto err; 1669 1670 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; 1671 } 1672 1673 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ 1674 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 1675 1676 err: 1677 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 1678 1679 return (-1); 1680 } 1681 1682 static int 1683 ssl3_get_client_kex_rsa(SSL *s, CBS *cbs) 1684 { 1685 unsigned char fakekey[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; 1686 unsigned char *pms = NULL; 1687 unsigned char *p; 1688 size_t pms_len = 0; 1689 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 1690 RSA *rsa = NULL; 1691 CBS enc_pms; 1692 int decrypt_len; 1693 int al = -1; 1694 1695 arc4random_buf(fakekey, sizeof(fakekey)); 1696 fakekey[0] = s->client_version >> 8; 1697 fakekey[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; 1698 1699 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; 1700 if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || 1701 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) { 1702 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1703 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); 1704 goto f_err; 1705 } 1706 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa; 1707 1708 pms_len = RSA_size(rsa); 1709 if (pms_len < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 1710 goto err; 1711 if ((pms = malloc(pms_len)) == NULL) 1712 goto err; 1713 p = pms; 1714 1715 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &enc_pms)) 1716 goto truncated; 1717 if (CBS_len(cbs) != 0 || CBS_len(&enc_pms) != RSA_size(rsa)) { 1718 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 1719 goto err; 1720 } 1721 1722 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(CBS_len(&enc_pms), CBS_data(&enc_pms), 1723 pms, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); 1724 1725 ERR_clear_error(); 1726 1727 if (decrypt_len != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 1728 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1729 /* SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */ 1730 } 1731 1732 if ((al == -1) && !((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8)) && 1733 (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) { 1734 /* 1735 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number 1736 * as the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks 1737 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for 1738 * DH ciphersuites). 1739 * 1740 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack 1741 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version 1742 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would 1743 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext 1744 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except that 1745 * the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks, we should 1746 * treat this just like any other decryption error. 1747 */ 1748 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1749 /* SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */ 1750 } 1751 1752 if (al != -1) { 1753 /* 1754 * Some decryption failure -- use random value instead 1755 * as countermeasure against Bleichenbacher's attack 1756 * on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, 1757 * section 7.4.7.1). 1758 */ 1759 p = fakekey; 1760 } 1761 1762 s->session->master_key_length = 1763 tls1_generate_master_secret(s, 1764 s->session->master_key, p, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); 1765 1766 freezero(pms, pms_len); 1767 1768 return (1); 1769 1770 truncated: 1771 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1772 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); 1773 f_err: 1774 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1775 err: 1776 freezero(pms, pms_len); 1777 1778 return (-1); 1779 } 1780 1781 static int 1782 ssl3_get_client_kex_dhe(SSL *s, CBS *cbs) 1783 { 1784 int key_size = 0, key_len, al; 1785 unsigned char *key = NULL; 1786 BIGNUM *bn = NULL; 1787 CBS dh_Yc; 1788 DH *dh; 1789 1790 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &dh_Yc)) 1791 goto truncated; 1792 if (CBS_len(cbs) != 0) 1793 goto truncated; 1794 1795 if (S3I(s)->tmp.dh == NULL) { 1796 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1797 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1798 goto f_err; 1799 } 1800 dh = S3I(s)->tmp.dh; 1801 1802 if ((bn = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_Yc), CBS_len(&dh_Yc), NULL)) == NULL) { 1803 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BN_LIB); 1804 goto err; 1805 } 1806 1807 if ((key_size = DH_size(dh)) <= 0) { 1808 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1809 goto err; 1810 } 1811 if ((key = malloc(key_size)) == NULL) { 1812 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1813 goto err; 1814 } 1815 if ((key_len = DH_compute_key(key, bn, dh)) <= 0) { 1816 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1817 goto err; 1818 } 1819 1820 s->session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret(s, 1821 s->session->master_key, key, key_len); 1822 1823 DH_free(S3I(s)->tmp.dh); 1824 S3I(s)->tmp.dh = NULL; 1825 1826 freezero(key, key_size); 1827 BN_clear_free(bn); 1828 1829 return (1); 1830 1831 truncated: 1832 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1833 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); 1834 f_err: 1835 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1836 err: 1837 freezero(key, key_size); 1838 BN_clear_free(bn); 1839 1840 return (-1); 1841 } 1842 1843 static int 1844 ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecp(SSL *s, CBS *cbs) 1845 { 1846 unsigned char *key = NULL; 1847 int key_size = 0, key_len; 1848 EC_POINT *point = NULL; 1849 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1850 const EC_GROUP *group; 1851 EC_KEY *ecdh; 1852 CBS public; 1853 int ret = -1; 1854 1855 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(cbs, &public)) 1856 goto err; 1857 if (CBS_len(cbs) != 0) 1858 goto err; 1859 1860 /* 1861 * Use the ephemeral values we saved when generating the 1862 * ServerKeyExchange message. 1863 */ 1864 if ((ecdh = S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh) == NULL) { 1865 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1866 goto err; 1867 } 1868 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh); 1869 1870 /* 1871 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the ClientKeyExchange 1872 * message. 1873 */ 1874 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { 1875 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1876 goto err; 1877 } 1878 if ((point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { 1879 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1880 goto err; 1881 } 1882 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, point, CBS_data(&public), 1883 CBS_len(&public), bn_ctx) == 0) { 1884 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 1885 goto err; 1886 } 1887 1888 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ 1889 if ((key_size = ECDH_size(ecdh)) <= 0) { 1890 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1891 goto err; 1892 } 1893 if ((key = malloc(key_size)) == NULL) { 1894 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1895 goto err; 1896 } 1897 if ((key_len = ECDH_compute_key(key, key_size, point, ecdh, 1898 NULL)) <= 0) { 1899 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1900 goto err; 1901 } 1902 1903 /* Compute the master secret */ 1904 s->session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret(s, 1905 s->session->master_key, key, key_len); 1906 1907 EC_KEY_free(S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh); 1908 S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 1909 1910 ret = 1; 1911 1912 err: 1913 freezero(key, key_size); 1914 EC_POINT_free(point); 1915 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 1916 1917 return (ret); 1918 } 1919 1920 static int 1921 ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecx(SSL *s, CBS *cbs) 1922 { 1923 uint8_t *shared_key = NULL; 1924 CBS ecpoint; 1925 int ret = -1; 1926 1927 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(cbs, &ecpoint)) 1928 goto err; 1929 if (CBS_len(cbs) != 0) 1930 goto err; 1931 if (CBS_len(&ecpoint) != X25519_KEY_LENGTH) 1932 goto err; 1933 1934 if ((shared_key = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL) 1935 goto err; 1936 if (!X25519(shared_key, S3I(s)->tmp.x25519, CBS_data(&ecpoint))) 1937 goto err; 1938 1939 freezero(S3I(s)->tmp.x25519, X25519_KEY_LENGTH); 1940 S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 = NULL; 1941 1942 s->session->master_key_length = 1943 tls1_generate_master_secret( 1944 s, s->session->master_key, shared_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH); 1945 1946 ret = 1; 1947 1948 err: 1949 freezero(shared_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH); 1950 1951 return (ret); 1952 } 1953 1954 static int 1955 ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, CBS *cbs) 1956 { 1957 if (S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 != NULL) 1958 return ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecx(s, cbs); 1959 1960 return ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecp(s, cbs); 1961 } 1962 1963 static int 1964 ssl3_get_client_kex_gost(SSL *s, CBS *cbs) 1965 { 1966 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; 1967 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; 1968 unsigned char premaster_secret[32]; 1969 unsigned long alg_a; 1970 size_t outlen = 32; 1971 CBS gostblob; 1972 int al; 1973 int ret = 0; 1974 1975 /* Get our certificate private key*/ 1976 alg_a = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 1977 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) 1978 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; 1979 1980 if ((pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL)) == NULL) 1981 goto err; 1982 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) 1983 goto gerr; 1984 1985 /* 1986 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, 1987 * maybe use it for key exchange. 1988 * Don't mind errors from EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because 1989 * it is completely valid to use a client certificate for 1990 * authorization only. 1991 */ 1992 if ((client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) != NULL) { 1993 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, 1994 client_pub_pkey) <= 0) 1995 ERR_clear_error(); 1996 } 1997 1998 /* Decrypt session key */ 1999 if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &gostblob, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) 2000 goto truncated; 2001 if (CBS_len(cbs) != 0) 2002 goto truncated; 2003 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, 2004 CBS_data(&gostblob), CBS_len(&gostblob)) <= 0) { 2005 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2006 goto gerr; 2007 } 2008 2009 /* Generate master secret */ 2010 s->session->master_key_length = 2011 tls1_generate_master_secret( 2012 s, s->session->master_key, premaster_secret, 32); 2013 2014 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ 2015 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, 2016 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) 2017 ret = 2; 2018 else 2019 ret = 1; 2020 gerr: 2021 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey); 2022 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); 2023 if (ret) 2024 return (ret); 2025 else 2026 goto err; 2027 2028 truncated: 2029 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2030 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); 2031 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2032 err: 2033 return (-1); 2034 } 2035 2036 int 2037 ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) 2038 { 2039 unsigned long alg_k; 2040 int al, ok; 2041 CBS cbs; 2042 long n; 2043 2044 /* 2048 maxlen is a guess. How long a key does that permit? */ 2045 n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, 2046 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok); 2047 if (!ok) 2048 return ((int)n); 2049 2050 if (n < 0) 2051 goto err; 2052 2053 CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n); 2054 2055 alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 2056 2057 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { 2058 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_rsa(s, &cbs) != 1) 2059 goto err; 2060 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { 2061 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_dhe(s, &cbs) != 1) 2062 goto err; 2063 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) { 2064 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe(s, &cbs) != 1) 2065 goto err; 2066 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { 2067 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_gost(s, &cbs) != 1) 2068 goto err; 2069 } else { 2070 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2071 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); 2072 goto f_err; 2073 } 2074 2075 if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { 2076 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2077 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); 2078 goto f_err; 2079 } 2080 2081 return (1); 2082 2083 f_err: 2084 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2085 err: 2086 return (-1); 2087 } 2088 2089 int 2090 ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) 2091 { 2092 CBS cbs, signature; 2093 const struct ssl_sigalg *sigalg = NULL; 2094 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 2095 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 2096 X509 *peer = NULL; 2097 EVP_MD_CTX mctx; 2098 int al, ok, verify; 2099 const unsigned char *hdata; 2100 size_t hdatalen; 2101 int type = 0; 2102 int ret = 0; 2103 long n; 2104 2105 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); 2106 2107 n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, 2108 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); 2109 if (!ok) 2110 return ((int)n); 2111 2112 if (n < 0) 2113 goto err; 2114 2115 CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n); 2116 2117 if (s->session->peer != NULL) { 2118 peer = s->session->peer; 2119 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer); 2120 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey); 2121 } 2122 2123 if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { 2124 S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 2125 if (peer != NULL) { 2126 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2127 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE); 2128 goto f_err; 2129 } 2130 ret = 1; 2131 goto end; 2132 } 2133 2134 if (peer == NULL) { 2135 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED); 2136 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2137 goto f_err; 2138 } 2139 2140 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { 2141 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); 2142 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2143 goto f_err; 2144 } 2145 2146 if (S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec) { 2147 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 2148 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2149 goto f_err; 2150 } 2151 2152 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 2153 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &signature)) 2154 goto err; 2155 if (CBS_len(&signature) > EVP_PKEY_size(pkey)) { 2156 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); 2157 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2158 goto f_err; 2159 } 2160 if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { 2161 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2162 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); 2163 goto f_err; 2164 } 2165 } 2166 2167 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 2168 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; 2169 uint16_t sigalg_value; 2170 2171 if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &sigalg_value)) 2172 goto truncated; 2173 if ((sigalg = ssl_sigalg(sigalg_value, tls12_sigalgs, 2174 tls12_sigalgs_len)) == NULL || 2175 (md = sigalg->md()) == NULL) { 2176 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); 2177 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2178 goto f_err; 2179 } 2180 if (!ssl_sigalg_pkey_ok(sigalg, pkey, 0)) { 2181 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); 2182 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2183 goto f_err; 2184 } 2185 2186 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &signature)) 2187 goto err; 2188 if (CBS_len(&signature) > EVP_PKEY_size(pkey)) { 2189 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); 2190 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2191 goto f_err; 2192 } 2193 if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { 2194 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2195 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); 2196 goto f_err; 2197 } 2198 2199 if (!tls1_transcript_data(s, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { 2200 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2201 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2202 goto f_err; 2203 } 2204 if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey)) { 2205 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2206 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2207 goto f_err; 2208 } 2209 if ((sigalg->flags & SIGALG_FLAG_RSA_PSS) && 2210 (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding 2211 (pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) || 2212 !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1))) { 2213 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2214 goto f_err; 2215 } 2216 if (!EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) { 2217 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2218 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2219 goto f_err; 2220 } 2221 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&mctx, CBS_data(&signature), 2222 CBS_len(&signature)) <= 0) { 2223 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2224 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); 2225 goto f_err; 2226 } 2227 } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { 2228 verify = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md, 2229 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, CBS_data(&signature), 2230 CBS_len(&signature), pkey->pkey.rsa); 2231 if (verify < 0) { 2232 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2233 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); 2234 goto f_err; 2235 } 2236 if (verify == 0) { 2237 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2238 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); 2239 goto f_err; 2240 } 2241 } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { 2242 verify = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 2243 &(S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 2244 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, CBS_data(&signature), 2245 CBS_len(&signature), pkey->pkey.ec); 2246 if (verify <= 0) { 2247 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2248 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 2249 goto f_err; 2250 } 2251 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST 2252 } else if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || 2253 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { 2254 unsigned char sigbuf[128]; 2255 unsigned int siglen = sizeof(sigbuf); 2256 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; 2257 int nid; 2258 2259 if (!tls1_transcript_data(s, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { 2260 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2261 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2262 goto f_err; 2263 } 2264 if (!EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &nid) || 2265 !(md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid))) { 2266 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2267 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2268 goto f_err; 2269 } 2270 if ((pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL)) == NULL) { 2271 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2272 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2273 goto f_err; 2274 } 2275 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) || 2276 !EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen) || 2277 !EVP_DigestFinal(&mctx, sigbuf, &siglen) || 2278 (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) || 2279 (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, md) <= 0) || 2280 (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY, 2281 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GOST_SIG_FORMAT, 2282 GOST_SIG_FORMAT_RS_LE, NULL) <= 0)) { 2283 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2284 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2285 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 2286 goto f_err; 2287 } 2288 if (EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, CBS_data(&signature), 2289 CBS_len(&signature), sigbuf, siglen) <= 0) { 2290 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2291 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); 2292 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 2293 goto f_err; 2294 } 2295 2296 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 2297 #endif 2298 } else { 2299 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2300 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; 2301 goto f_err; 2302 } 2303 2304 ret = 1; 2305 if (0) { 2306 truncated: 2307 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2308 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); 2309 f_err: 2310 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2311 } 2312 end: 2313 tls1_transcript_free(s); 2314 err: 2315 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); 2316 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 2317 return (ret); 2318 } 2319 2320 int 2321 ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) 2322 { 2323 CBS cbs, client_certs; 2324 int i, ok, al, ret = -1; 2325 X509 *x = NULL; 2326 long n; 2327 const unsigned char *q; 2328 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; 2329 2330 n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 2331 -1, s->internal->max_cert_list, &ok); 2332 2333 if (!ok) 2334 return ((int)n); 2335 2336 if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { 2337 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 2338 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 2339 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 2340 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2341 goto f_err; 2342 } 2343 /* 2344 * If tls asked for a client cert, 2345 * the client must return a 0 list. 2346 */ 2347 if (S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request) { 2348 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST 2349 ); 2350 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2351 goto f_err; 2352 } 2353 S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 2354 return (1); 2355 } 2356 2357 if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { 2358 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2359 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); 2360 goto f_err; 2361 } 2362 2363 if (n < 0) 2364 goto truncated; 2365 2366 CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n); 2367 2368 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { 2369 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2370 goto err; 2371 } 2372 2373 if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cbs, &client_certs) || 2374 CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) 2375 goto truncated; 2376 2377 while (CBS_len(&client_certs) > 0) { 2378 CBS cert; 2379 2380 if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&client_certs, &cert)) { 2381 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2382 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2383 goto f_err; 2384 } 2385 2386 q = CBS_data(&cert); 2387 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, CBS_len(&cert)); 2388 if (x == NULL) { 2389 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); 2390 goto err; 2391 } 2392 if (q != CBS_data(&cert) + CBS_len(&cert)) { 2393 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2394 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2395 goto f_err; 2396 } 2397 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { 2398 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2399 goto err; 2400 } 2401 x = NULL; 2402 } 2403 2404 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { 2405 /* 2406 * TLS does not mind 0 certs returned. 2407 * Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate. 2408 */ 2409 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 2410 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 2411 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 2412 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2413 goto f_err; 2414 } 2415 /* No client certificate so free transcript. */ 2416 tls1_transcript_free(s); 2417 } else { 2418 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); 2419 if (i <= 0) { 2420 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); 2421 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED); 2422 goto f_err; 2423 } 2424 } 2425 2426 X509_free(s->session->peer); 2427 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); 2428 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; 2429 2430 /* 2431 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL 2432 * when we arrive here 2433 */ 2434 if (SSI(s)->sess_cert == NULL) { 2435 SSI(s)->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); 2436 if (SSI(s)->sess_cert == NULL) { 2437 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2438 goto err; 2439 } 2440 } 2441 sk_X509_pop_free(SSI(s)->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); 2442 SSI(s)->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk; 2443 2444 /* 2445 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the 2446 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c 2447 */ 2448 2449 sk = NULL; 2450 2451 ret = 1; 2452 if (0) { 2453 truncated: 2454 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2455 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); 2456 f_err: 2457 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2458 } 2459 err: 2460 X509_free(x); 2461 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); 2462 2463 return (ret); 2464 } 2465 2466 int 2467 ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) 2468 { 2469 CBB cbb, server_cert; 2470 CERT_PKEY *cpk; 2471 2472 /* 2473 * Server Certificate - RFC 5246, section 7.4.2. 2474 */ 2475 2476 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 2477 2478 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) { 2479 if ((cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s)) == NULL) { 2480 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2481 return (0); 2482 } 2483 2484 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &server_cert, 2485 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)) 2486 goto err; 2487 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, &server_cert, cpk)) 2488 goto err; 2489 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) 2490 goto err; 2491 2492 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; 2493 } 2494 2495 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ 2496 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 2497 2498 err: 2499 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 2500 2501 return (0); 2502 } 2503 2504 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */ 2505 int 2506 ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) 2507 { 2508 CBB cbb, session_ticket, ticket; 2509 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 2510 size_t enc_session_len, enc_session_max_len, hmac_len; 2511 size_t session_len = 0; 2512 unsigned char *enc_session = NULL, *session = NULL; 2513 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 2514 unsigned char key_name[16]; 2515 unsigned char *hmac; 2516 unsigned int hlen; 2517 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 2518 HMAC_CTX hctx; 2519 int len; 2520 2521 /* 2522 * New Session Ticket - RFC 5077, section 3.3. 2523 */ 2524 2525 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 2526 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 2527 2528 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 2529 2530 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) { 2531 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &session_ticket, 2532 SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET)) 2533 goto err; 2534 2535 if (!SSL_SESSION_ticket(s->session, &session, &session_len)) 2536 goto err; 2537 if (session_len > 0xffff) 2538 goto err; 2539 2540 /* 2541 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback is present 2542 * it does all the work, otherwise use generated values from 2543 * parent context. 2544 */ 2545 if (tctx->internal->tlsext_ticket_key_cb != NULL) { 2546 if (tctx->internal->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, 2547 key_name, iv, &ctx, &hctx, 1) < 0) { 2548 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2549 goto err; 2550 } 2551 } else { 2552 arc4random_buf(iv, 16); 2553 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 2554 tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); 2555 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 2556 16, tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); 2557 memcpy(key_name, tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); 2558 } 2559 2560 /* Encrypt the session state. */ 2561 enc_session_max_len = session_len + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH; 2562 if ((enc_session = calloc(1, enc_session_max_len)) == NULL) 2563 goto err; 2564 enc_session_len = 0; 2565 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, enc_session, &len, session, 2566 session_len)) 2567 goto err; 2568 enc_session_len += len; 2569 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, enc_session + enc_session_len, 2570 &len)) 2571 goto err; 2572 enc_session_len += len; 2573 2574 if (enc_session_len > enc_session_max_len) 2575 goto err; 2576 2577 /* Generate the HMAC. */ 2578 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, key_name, sizeof(key_name))) 2579 goto err; 2580 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx))) 2581 goto err; 2582 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, enc_session, enc_session_len)) 2583 goto err; 2584 2585 if ((hmac_len = HMAC_size(&hctx)) <= 0) 2586 goto err; 2587 2588 /* 2589 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): 2590 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session 2591 * (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for new 2592 * sessions will live as long as their sessions. 2593 */ 2594 if (!CBB_add_u32(&session_ticket, 2595 s->internal->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout)) 2596 goto err; 2597 2598 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&session_ticket, &ticket)) 2599 goto err; 2600 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ticket, key_name, sizeof(key_name))) 2601 goto err; 2602 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ticket, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx))) 2603 goto err; 2604 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ticket, enc_session, enc_session_len)) 2605 goto err; 2606 if (!CBB_add_space(&ticket, &hmac, hmac_len)) 2607 goto err; 2608 2609 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, hmac, &hlen)) 2610 goto err; 2611 if (hlen != hmac_len) 2612 goto err; 2613 2614 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) 2615 goto err; 2616 2617 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; 2618 } 2619 2620 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2621 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 2622 freezero(session, session_len); 2623 free(enc_session); 2624 2625 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ 2626 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 2627 2628 err: 2629 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 2630 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2631 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 2632 freezero(session, session_len); 2633 free(enc_session); 2634 2635 return (-1); 2636 } 2637 2638 int 2639 ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) 2640 { 2641 CBB cbb, certstatus, ocspresp; 2642 2643 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 2644 2645 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) { 2646 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &certstatus, 2647 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS)) 2648 goto err; 2649 if (!CBB_add_u8(&certstatus, s->tlsext_status_type)) 2650 goto err; 2651 if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&certstatus, &ocspresp)) 2652 goto err; 2653 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ocspresp, s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resp, 2654 s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) 2655 goto err; 2656 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) 2657 goto err; 2658 2659 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; 2660 } 2661 2662 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ 2663 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 2664 2665 err: 2666 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 2667 2668 return (-1); 2669 } 2670