1 /* $OpenBSD: t1_enc.c,v 1.84 2016/03/06 14:52:15 beck Exp $ */ 2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58 /* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 /* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 113 * 114 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by 115 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 116 * license. 117 * 118 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of 119 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites 120 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. 121 * 122 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in 123 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received 124 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. 125 * 126 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not 127 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third 128 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights 129 * to make use of the Contribution. 130 * 131 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN 132 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA 133 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY 134 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 135 * OTHERWISE. 136 */ 137 138 #include <stdio.h> 139 140 #include "ssl_locl.h" 141 142 #include <openssl/evp.h> 143 #include <openssl/hmac.h> 144 #include <openssl/md5.h> 145 146 void 147 tls1_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s) 148 { 149 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block != NULL) { 150 explicit_bzero(s->s3->tmp.key_block, 151 s->s3->tmp.key_block_length); 152 free(s->s3->tmp.key_block); 153 s->s3->tmp.key_block = NULL; 154 } 155 s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = 0; 156 } 157 158 int 159 tls1_init_finished_mac(SSL *s) 160 { 161 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); 162 tls1_free_digest_list(s); 163 164 s->s3->handshake_buffer = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); 165 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer == NULL) 166 return (0); 167 168 (void)BIO_set_close(s->s3->handshake_buffer, BIO_CLOSE); 169 170 return (1); 171 } 172 173 void 174 tls1_free_digest_list(SSL *s) 175 { 176 int i; 177 178 if (s == NULL) 179 return; 180 181 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst == NULL) 182 return; 183 for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) { 184 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]) 185 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]); 186 } 187 free(s->s3->handshake_dgst); 188 s->s3->handshake_dgst = NULL; 189 } 190 191 void 192 tls1_finish_mac(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, int len) 193 { 194 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && 195 !(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE)) { 196 BIO_write(s->s3->handshake_buffer, (void *)buf, len); 197 } else { 198 int i; 199 for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) { 200 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]!= NULL) 201 EVP_DigestUpdate(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i], buf, len); 202 } 203 } 204 } 205 206 int 207 tls1_digest_cached_records(SSL *s) 208 { 209 int i; 210 long mask; 211 const EVP_MD *md; 212 long hdatalen; 213 void *hdata; 214 215 tls1_free_digest_list(s); 216 217 s->s3->handshake_dgst = calloc(SSL_MAX_DIGEST, sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX *)); 218 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst == NULL) { 219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 220 return 0; 221 } 222 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); 223 if (hdatalen <= 0) { 224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS, 225 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH); 226 return 0; 227 } 228 229 /* Loop through bits of the algorithm2 field and create MD contexts. */ 230 for (i = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(i, &mask, &md); i++) { 231 if ((mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) && md) { 232 s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); 233 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] == NULL) { 234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS, 235 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 236 return 0; 237 } 238 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i], 239 md, NULL)) { 240 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]); 241 return 0; 242 } 243 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i], hdata, 244 hdatalen)) 245 return 0; 246 } 247 } 248 249 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE)) { 250 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); 251 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; 252 } 253 254 return 1; 255 } 256 257 void 258 tls1_record_sequence_increment(unsigned char *seq) 259 { 260 int i; 261 262 for (i = SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE - 1; i >= 0; i--) { 263 if (++seq[i] != 0) 264 break; 265 } 266 } 267 268 /* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */ 269 static int 270 tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec, int sec_len, 271 const void *seed1, int seed1_len, const void *seed2, int seed2_len, 272 const void *seed3, int seed3_len, const void *seed4, int seed4_len, 273 const void *seed5, int seed5_len, unsigned char *out, int olen) 274 { 275 int chunk; 276 size_t j; 277 EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp; 278 EVP_PKEY *mac_key; 279 unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 280 size_t A1_len; 281 int ret = 0; 282 283 chunk = EVP_MD_size(md); 284 OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0); 285 286 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); 287 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp); 288 mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len); 289 if (!mac_key) 290 goto err; 291 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 292 goto err; 293 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 294 goto err; 295 if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) 296 goto err; 297 if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) 298 goto err; 299 if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len)) 300 goto err; 301 if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len)) 302 goto err; 303 if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len)) 304 goto err; 305 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) 306 goto err; 307 308 for (;;) { 309 /* Reinit mac contexts */ 310 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 311 goto err; 312 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 313 goto err; 314 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, A1, A1_len)) 315 goto err; 316 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx_tmp, A1, A1_len)) 317 goto err; 318 if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) 319 goto err; 320 if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) 321 goto err; 322 if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len)) 323 goto err; 324 if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len)) 325 goto err; 326 if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len)) 327 goto err; 328 329 if (olen > chunk) { 330 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, out, &j)) 331 goto err; 332 out += j; 333 olen -= j; 334 /* calc the next A1 value */ 335 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len)) 336 goto err; 337 } else { 338 /* last one */ 339 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) 340 goto err; 341 memcpy(out, A1, olen); 342 break; 343 } 344 } 345 ret = 1; 346 347 err: 348 EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); 349 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 350 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp); 351 explicit_bzero(A1, sizeof(A1)); 352 return ret; 353 } 354 355 /* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */ 356 static int 357 tls1_PRF(long digest_mask, const void *seed1, int seed1_len, const void *seed2, 358 int seed2_len, const void *seed3, int seed3_len, const void *seed4, 359 int seed4_len, const void *seed5, int seed5_len, const unsigned char *sec, 360 int slen, unsigned char *out1, unsigned char *out2, int olen) 361 { 362 int len, i, idx, count; 363 const unsigned char *S1; 364 long m; 365 const EVP_MD *md; 366 int ret = 0; 367 368 /* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */ 369 count = 0; 370 for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) { 371 if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) 372 count++; 373 } 374 if (count == 0) { 375 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, 376 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 377 goto err; 378 } 379 len = slen / count; 380 if (count == 1) 381 slen = 0; 382 S1 = sec; 383 memset(out1, 0, olen); 384 for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) { 385 if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) { 386 if (!md) { 387 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, 388 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE); 389 goto err; 390 } 391 if (!tls1_P_hash(md , S1, len + (slen&1), seed1, 392 seed1_len, seed2, seed2_len, seed3, seed3_len, 393 seed4, seed4_len, seed5, seed5_len, out2, olen)) 394 goto err; 395 S1 += len; 396 for (i = 0; i < olen; i++) { 397 out1[i] ^= out2[i]; 398 } 399 } 400 } 401 ret = 1; 402 403 err: 404 return ret; 405 } 406 407 static int 408 tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, unsigned char *tmp, int num) 409 { 410 int ret; 411 412 ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), 413 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, 414 s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 415 s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 416 NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 417 s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, 418 km, tmp, num); 419 return ret; 420 } 421 422 /* 423 * tls1_aead_ctx_init allocates aead_ctx, if needed. It returns 1 on success 424 * and 0 on failure. 425 */ 426 static int 427 tls1_aead_ctx_init(SSL_AEAD_CTX **aead_ctx) 428 { 429 if (*aead_ctx != NULL) { 430 EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&(*aead_ctx)->ctx); 431 return (1); 432 } 433 434 *aead_ctx = malloc(sizeof(SSL_AEAD_CTX)); 435 if (*aead_ctx == NULL) { 436 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_AEAD_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 437 return (0); 438 } 439 440 return (1); 441 } 442 443 static int 444 tls1_change_cipher_state_aead(SSL *s, char is_read, const unsigned char *key, 445 unsigned key_len, const unsigned char *iv, unsigned iv_len) 446 { 447 const EVP_AEAD *aead = s->s3->tmp.new_aead; 448 SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead_ctx; 449 450 if (is_read) { 451 if (!tls1_aead_ctx_init(&s->aead_read_ctx)) 452 return 0; 453 aead_ctx = s->aead_read_ctx; 454 } else { 455 if (!tls1_aead_ctx_init(&s->aead_write_ctx)) 456 return 0; 457 aead_ctx = s->aead_write_ctx; 458 } 459 460 if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(&aead_ctx->ctx, aead, key, key_len, 461 EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH, NULL)) 462 return (0); 463 if (iv_len > sizeof(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce)) { 464 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE_AEAD, 465 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 466 return (0); 467 } 468 memcpy(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce, iv, iv_len); 469 aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len = iv_len; 470 aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len = 8; /* always the case, currently. */ 471 aead_ctx->variable_nonce_in_record = 472 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & 473 SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_VARIABLE_NONCE_IN_RECORD) != 0; 474 aead_ctx->xor_fixed_nonce = 475 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305; 476 aead_ctx->tag_len = EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(aead); 477 478 if (aead_ctx->xor_fixed_nonce) { 479 if (aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead) || 480 aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len > EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead)) { 481 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE_AEAD, 482 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 483 return (0); 484 } 485 } else { 486 if (aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len + aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len != 487 EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead)) { 488 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE_AEAD, 489 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 490 return (0); 491 } 492 } 493 494 return (1); 495 } 496 497 /* 498 * tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher performs the work needed to switch cipher 499 * states when using EVP_CIPHER. The argument is_read is true iff this function 500 * is being called due to reading, as opposed to writing, a ChangeCipherSpec 501 * message. In order to support export ciphersuites, use_client_keys indicates 502 * whether the key material provided is in the "client write" direction. 503 */ 504 static int 505 tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(SSL *s, char is_read, char use_client_keys, 506 const unsigned char *mac_secret, unsigned int mac_secret_size, 507 const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_len, const unsigned char *iv, 508 unsigned int iv_len) 509 { 510 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx; 511 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; 512 EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx; 513 const EVP_MD *mac; 514 int mac_type; 515 516 cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc; 517 mac = s->s3->tmp.new_hash; 518 mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type; 519 520 if (is_read) { 521 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) 522 s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; 523 else 524 s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; 525 526 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_read_ctx); 527 s->enc_read_ctx = NULL; 528 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(s->read_hash); 529 s->read_hash = NULL; 530 531 if ((cipher_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) 532 goto err; 533 s->enc_read_ctx = cipher_ctx; 534 if ((mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create()) == NULL) 535 goto err; 536 s->read_hash = mac_ctx; 537 } else { 538 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) 539 s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; 540 else 541 s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; 542 543 /* 544 * DTLS fragments retain a pointer to the compression, cipher 545 * and hash contexts, so that it can restore state in order 546 * to perform retransmissions. As such, we cannot free write 547 * contexts that are used for DTLS - these are instead freed 548 * by DTLS when its frees a ChangeCipherSpec fragment. 549 */ 550 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 551 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx); 552 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL; 553 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(s->write_hash); 554 s->write_hash = NULL; 555 } 556 if ((cipher_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) 557 goto err; 558 s->enc_write_ctx = cipher_ctx; 559 if ((mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create()) == NULL) 560 goto err; 561 s->write_hash = mac_ctx; 562 } 563 564 if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { 565 EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL, key, NULL, 566 !is_read); 567 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipher_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, 568 iv_len, (unsigned char *)iv); 569 } else 570 EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv, !is_read); 571 572 if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) { 573 EVP_PKEY *mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, 574 mac_secret, mac_secret_size); 575 if (mac_key == NULL) 576 goto err; 577 EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, mac, NULL, mac_key); 578 EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); 579 } else if (mac_secret_size > 0) { 580 /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */ 581 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipher_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY, 582 mac_secret_size, (unsigned char *)mac_secret); 583 } 584 585 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT) { 586 int nid; 587 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94) 588 nid = NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet; 589 else 590 nid = NID_id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z; 591 592 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipher_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GOST_SET_SBOX, nid, 0); 593 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_GOST89MAC) 594 EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mac_ctx, EVP_MD_CTRL_GOST_SET_SBOX, nid, 0); 595 } 596 597 return (1); 598 599 err: 600 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE_CIPHER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 601 return (0); 602 } 603 604 int 605 tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) 606 { 607 const unsigned char *client_write_mac_secret, *server_write_mac_secret; 608 const unsigned char *client_write_key, *server_write_key; 609 const unsigned char *client_write_iv, *server_write_iv; 610 const unsigned char *mac_secret, *key, *iv; 611 int mac_secret_size, key_len, iv_len; 612 unsigned char *key_block, *seq; 613 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; 614 const EVP_AEAD *aead; 615 char is_read, use_client_keys; 616 617 618 cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc; 619 aead = s->s3->tmp.new_aead; 620 621 /* 622 * is_read is true if we have just read a ChangeCipherSpec message, 623 * that is we need to update the read cipherspec. Otherwise we have 624 * just written one. 625 */ 626 is_read = (which & SSL3_CC_READ) != 0; 627 628 /* 629 * use_client_keys is true if we wish to use the keys for the "client 630 * write" direction. This is the case if we're a client sending a 631 * ChangeCipherSpec, or a server reading a client's ChangeCipherSpec. 632 */ 633 use_client_keys = ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) || 634 (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)); 635 636 637 /* 638 * Reset sequence number to zero - for DTLS this is handled in 639 * dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(). 640 */ 641 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 642 seq = is_read ? s->s3->read_sequence : s->s3->write_sequence; 643 memset(seq, 0, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE); 644 } 645 646 if (aead != NULL) { 647 key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead); 648 iv_len = SSL_CIPHER_AEAD_FIXED_NONCE_LEN(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); 649 } else { 650 key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher); 651 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); 652 653 /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF. */ 654 if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) 655 iv_len = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN; 656 } 657 658 mac_secret_size = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size; 659 660 key_block = s->s3->tmp.key_block; 661 client_write_mac_secret = key_block; 662 key_block += mac_secret_size; 663 server_write_mac_secret = key_block; 664 key_block += mac_secret_size; 665 client_write_key = key_block; 666 key_block += key_len; 667 server_write_key = key_block; 668 key_block += key_len; 669 client_write_iv = key_block; 670 key_block += iv_len; 671 server_write_iv = key_block; 672 key_block += iv_len; 673 674 if (use_client_keys) { 675 mac_secret = client_write_mac_secret; 676 key = client_write_key; 677 iv = client_write_iv; 678 } else { 679 mac_secret = server_write_mac_secret; 680 key = server_write_key; 681 iv = server_write_iv; 682 } 683 684 if (key_block - s->s3->tmp.key_block != s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) { 685 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 686 goto err2; 687 } 688 689 if (is_read) { 690 memcpy(s->s3->read_mac_secret, mac_secret, mac_secret_size); 691 s->s3->read_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; 692 } else { 693 memcpy(s->s3->write_mac_secret, mac_secret, mac_secret_size); 694 s->s3->write_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; 695 } 696 697 if (aead != NULL) { 698 return tls1_change_cipher_state_aead(s, is_read, key, key_len, 699 iv, iv_len); 700 } 701 702 return tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(s, is_read, use_client_keys, 703 mac_secret, mac_secret_size, key, key_len, iv, iv_len); 704 705 err2: 706 return (0); 707 } 708 709 int 710 tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s) 711 { 712 unsigned char *key_block, *tmp_block = NULL; 713 int mac_type = NID_undef, mac_secret_size = 0; 714 int key_block_len, key_len, iv_len; 715 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; 716 const EVP_AEAD *aead = NULL; 717 const EVP_MD *mac = NULL; 718 int ret = 0; 719 720 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0) 721 return (1); 722 723 if (s->session->cipher && 724 (s->session->cipher->algorithm2 & SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_AEAD)) { 725 if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(s->session, &aead)) { 726 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, 727 SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE); 728 return (0); 729 } 730 key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead); 731 iv_len = SSL_CIPHER_AEAD_FIXED_NONCE_LEN(s->session->cipher); 732 } else { 733 if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session, &cipher, &mac, &mac_type, 734 &mac_secret_size)) { 735 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, 736 SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE); 737 return (0); 738 } 739 key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher); 740 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); 741 742 /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF. */ 743 if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) 744 iv_len = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN; 745 } 746 747 s->s3->tmp.new_aead = aead; 748 s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = cipher; 749 s->s3->tmp.new_hash = mac; 750 s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type; 751 s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; 752 753 tls1_cleanup_key_block(s); 754 755 if ((key_block = reallocarray(NULL, mac_secret_size + key_len + iv_len, 756 2)) == NULL) { 757 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 758 goto err; 759 } 760 key_block_len = (mac_secret_size + key_len + iv_len) * 2; 761 762 s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = key_block_len; 763 s->s3->tmp.key_block = key_block; 764 765 if ((tmp_block = malloc(key_block_len)) == NULL) { 766 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 767 goto err; 768 } 769 770 if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, key_block, tmp_block, key_block_len)) 771 goto err; 772 773 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS) && 774 s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION) { 775 /* 776 * Enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with 777 * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) 778 */ 779 s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1; 780 781 if (s->session->cipher != NULL) { 782 if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL) 783 s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0; 784 785 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 786 if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4) 787 s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0; 788 #endif 789 } 790 } 791 792 ret = 1; 793 794 err: 795 if (tmp_block) { 796 explicit_bzero(tmp_block, key_block_len); 797 free(tmp_block); 798 } 799 return (ret); 800 } 801 802 /* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively. 803 * 804 * Returns: 805 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too 806 * short etc). 807 * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. 808 * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending, 809 * an internal error occured. 810 */ 811 int 812 tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) 813 { 814 const SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead; 815 const EVP_CIPHER *enc; 816 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; 817 SSL3_RECORD *rec; 818 unsigned char *seq; 819 unsigned long l; 820 int bs, i, j, k, pad = 0, ret, mac_size = 0; 821 822 if (send) { 823 aead = s->aead_write_ctx; 824 rec = &s->s3->wrec; 825 seq = s->s3->write_sequence; 826 } else { 827 aead = s->aead_read_ctx; 828 rec = &s->s3->rrec; 829 seq = s->s3->read_sequence; 830 } 831 832 if (aead) { 833 unsigned char ad[13], *in, *out, nonce[16]; 834 size_t out_len, pad_len = 0; 835 unsigned int nonce_used; 836 837 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 838 dtls1_build_sequence_number(ad, seq, 839 send ? s->d1->w_epoch : s->d1->r_epoch); 840 } else { 841 memcpy(ad, seq, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE); 842 tls1_record_sequence_increment(seq); 843 } 844 845 ad[8] = rec->type; 846 ad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); 847 ad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); 848 849 if (aead->variable_nonce_len > 8 || 850 aead->variable_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce)) 851 return -1; 852 853 if (aead->xor_fixed_nonce) { 854 if (aead->fixed_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce) || 855 aead->variable_nonce_len > aead->fixed_nonce_len) 856 return -1; /* Should never happen. */ 857 pad_len = aead->fixed_nonce_len - aead->variable_nonce_len; 858 } else { 859 if (aead->fixed_nonce_len + 860 aead->variable_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce)) 861 return -1; /* Should never happen. */ 862 } 863 864 if (send) { 865 size_t len = rec->length; 866 size_t eivlen = 0; 867 in = rec->input; 868 out = rec->data; 869 870 if (aead->xor_fixed_nonce) { 871 /* 872 * The sequence number is left zero 873 * padded, then xored with the fixed 874 * nonce. 875 */ 876 memset(nonce, 0, pad_len); 877 memcpy(nonce + pad_len, ad, 878 aead->variable_nonce_len); 879 for (i = 0; i < aead->fixed_nonce_len; i++) 880 nonce[i] ^= aead->fixed_nonce[i]; 881 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 882 } else { 883 /* 884 * When sending we use the sequence number as 885 * the variable part of the nonce. 886 */ 887 memcpy(nonce, aead->fixed_nonce, 888 aead->fixed_nonce_len); 889 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 890 memcpy(nonce + nonce_used, ad, 891 aead->variable_nonce_len); 892 nonce_used += aead->variable_nonce_len; 893 } 894 895 /* 896 * In do_ssl3_write, rec->input is moved forward by 897 * variable_nonce_len in order to leave space for the 898 * variable nonce. Thus we can copy the sequence number 899 * bytes into place without overwriting any of the 900 * plaintext. 901 */ 902 if (aead->variable_nonce_in_record) { 903 memcpy(out, ad, aead->variable_nonce_len); 904 len -= aead->variable_nonce_len; 905 eivlen = aead->variable_nonce_len; 906 } 907 908 ad[11] = len >> 8; 909 ad[12] = len & 0xff; 910 911 if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(&aead->ctx, 912 out + eivlen, &out_len, len + aead->tag_len, nonce, 913 nonce_used, in + eivlen, len, ad, sizeof(ad))) 914 return -1; 915 if (aead->variable_nonce_in_record) 916 out_len += aead->variable_nonce_len; 917 } else { 918 /* receive */ 919 size_t len = rec->length; 920 921 if (rec->data != rec->input) 922 return -1; /* internal error - should never happen. */ 923 out = in = rec->input; 924 925 if (len < aead->variable_nonce_len) 926 return 0; 927 928 if (aead->xor_fixed_nonce) { 929 /* 930 * The sequence number is left zero 931 * padded, then xored with the fixed 932 * nonce. 933 */ 934 memset(nonce, 0, pad_len); 935 memcpy(nonce + pad_len, ad, 936 aead->variable_nonce_len); 937 for (i = 0; i < aead->fixed_nonce_len; i++) 938 nonce[i] ^= aead->fixed_nonce[i]; 939 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 940 } else { 941 memcpy(nonce, aead->fixed_nonce, 942 aead->fixed_nonce_len); 943 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 944 945 memcpy(nonce + nonce_used, 946 aead->variable_nonce_in_record ? in : ad, 947 aead->variable_nonce_len); 948 nonce_used += aead->variable_nonce_len; 949 } 950 951 if (aead->variable_nonce_in_record) { 952 in += aead->variable_nonce_len; 953 len -= aead->variable_nonce_len; 954 out += aead->variable_nonce_len; 955 } 956 957 if (len < aead->tag_len) 958 return 0; 959 len -= aead->tag_len; 960 961 ad[11] = len >> 8; 962 ad[12] = len & 0xff; 963 964 if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(&aead->ctx, out, &out_len, len, 965 nonce, nonce_used, in, len + aead->tag_len, ad, 966 sizeof(ad))) 967 return -1; 968 969 rec->data = rec->input = out; 970 } 971 972 rec->length = out_len; 973 974 return 1; 975 } 976 977 if (send) { 978 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) { 979 int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); 980 OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); 981 } 982 ds = s->enc_write_ctx; 983 if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) 984 enc = NULL; 985 else { 986 int ivlen = 0; 987 enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx); 988 if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && 989 EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) 990 ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc); 991 if (ivlen > 1) { 992 if (rec->data != rec->input) { 993 #ifdef DEBUG 994 /* we can't write into the input stream: 995 * Can this ever happen?? (steve) 996 */ 997 fprintf(stderr, 998 "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n", 999 __FILE__, __LINE__); 1000 #endif 1001 } else 1002 arc4random_buf(rec->input, ivlen); 1003 } 1004 } 1005 } else { 1006 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) { 1007 int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); 1008 OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); 1009 } 1010 ds = s->enc_read_ctx; 1011 if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) 1012 enc = NULL; 1013 else 1014 enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); 1015 } 1016 1017 if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) { 1018 memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length); 1019 rec->input = rec->data; 1020 ret = 1; 1021 } else { 1022 l = rec->length; 1023 bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher); 1024 1025 if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { 1026 unsigned char buf[13]; 1027 1028 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1029 dtls1_build_sequence_number(buf, seq, 1030 send ? s->d1->w_epoch : s->d1->r_epoch); 1031 } else { 1032 memcpy(buf, seq, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE); 1033 tls1_record_sequence_increment(seq); 1034 } 1035 1036 buf[8] = rec->type; 1037 buf[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); 1038 buf[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); 1039 buf[11] = rec->length >> 8; 1040 buf[12] = rec->length & 0xff; 1041 pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, 13, buf); 1042 if (send) { 1043 l += pad; 1044 rec->length += pad; 1045 } 1046 } else if ((bs != 1) && send) { 1047 i = bs - ((int)l % bs); 1048 1049 /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */ 1050 1051 /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */ 1052 j = i - 1; 1053 for (k = (int)l; k < (int)(l + i); k++) 1054 rec->input[k] = j; 1055 l += i; 1056 rec->length += i; 1057 } 1058 1059 if (!send) { 1060 if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) 1061 return 0; 1062 } 1063 1064 i = EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l); 1065 if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & 1066 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) ? (i < 0) : (i == 0)) 1067 return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */ 1068 if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send) { 1069 rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 1070 rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 1071 rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 1072 } 1073 1074 ret = 1; 1075 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) 1076 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); 1077 if ((bs != 1) && !send) 1078 ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size); 1079 if (pad && !send) 1080 rec->length -= pad; 1081 } 1082 return ret; 1083 } 1084 1085 int 1086 tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out) 1087 { 1088 EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d = NULL; 1089 unsigned int ret; 1090 int i; 1091 1092 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 1093 if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) 1094 return 0; 1095 1096 for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) { 1097 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] && 1098 EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]) == md_nid) { 1099 d = s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]; 1100 break; 1101 } 1102 } 1103 if (d == NULL) { 1104 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC, SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST); 1105 return 0; 1106 } 1107 1108 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); 1109 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, d)) 1110 return 0; 1111 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &ret); 1112 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 1113 1114 return ((int)ret); 1115 } 1116 1117 int 1118 tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out) 1119 { 1120 unsigned int i; 1121 EVP_MD_CTX ctx; 1122 unsigned char buf[2*EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 1123 unsigned char *q, buf2[12]; 1124 int idx; 1125 long mask; 1126 int err = 0; 1127 const EVP_MD *md; 1128 1129 q = buf; 1130 1131 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 1132 if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) 1133 return 0; 1134 1135 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); 1136 1137 for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &mask, &md); idx++) { 1138 if (ssl_get_algorithm2(s) & mask) { 1139 int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md); 1140 EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx]; 1141 if (!hdgst || hashsize < 0 || 1142 hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q - buf))) { 1143 /* internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite! */ 1144 err = 1; 1145 } else { 1146 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) || 1147 !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, q, &i) || 1148 (i != (unsigned int)hashsize)) 1149 err = 1; 1150 q += hashsize; 1151 } 1152 } 1153 } 1154 1155 if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), str, slen, buf, (int)(q - buf), 1156 NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 1157 s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, 1158 out, buf2, sizeof buf2)) 1159 err = 1; 1160 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 1161 1162 if (err) 1163 return 0; 1164 else 1165 return sizeof buf2; 1166 } 1167 1168 int 1169 tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) 1170 { 1171 SSL3_RECORD *rec; 1172 unsigned char *seq; 1173 EVP_MD_CTX *hash; 1174 size_t md_size, orig_len; 1175 EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx; 1176 unsigned char header[13]; 1177 int stream_mac = (send ? 1178 (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) : 1179 (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM)); 1180 int t; 1181 1182 if (send) { 1183 rec = &(ssl->s3->wrec); 1184 seq = &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]); 1185 hash = ssl->write_hash; 1186 } else { 1187 rec = &(ssl->s3->rrec); 1188 seq = &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]); 1189 hash = ssl->read_hash; 1190 } 1191 1192 t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); 1193 OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0); 1194 md_size = t; 1195 1196 /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */ 1197 if (stream_mac) { 1198 mac_ctx = hash; 1199 } else { 1200 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac, hash)) 1201 return -1; 1202 mac_ctx = &hmac; 1203 } 1204 1205 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) 1206 dtls1_build_sequence_number(header, seq, 1207 send ? ssl->d1->w_epoch : ssl->d1->r_epoch); 1208 else 1209 memcpy(header, seq, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE); 1210 1211 /* kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */ 1212 orig_len = rec->length + md_size + ((unsigned int)rec->type >> 8); 1213 rec->type &= 0xff; 1214 1215 header[8] = rec->type; 1216 header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8); 1217 header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version); 1218 header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8; 1219 header[12] = (rec->length) & 0xff; 1220 1221 if (!send && 1222 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && 1223 ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) { 1224 /* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any 1225 * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of 1226 * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a 1227 * timing-oracle. */ 1228 if (!ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx, 1229 md, &md_size, header, rec->input, 1230 rec->length + md_size, orig_len, 1231 ssl->s3->read_mac_secret, 1232 ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 1233 0 /* not SSLv3 */)) 1234 return -1; 1235 } else { 1236 EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)); 1237 EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length); 1238 t = EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size); 1239 OPENSSL_assert(t > 0); 1240 } 1241 1242 if (!stream_mac) 1243 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); 1244 1245 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) 1246 tls1_record_sequence_increment(seq); 1247 1248 return (md_size); 1249 } 1250 1251 int 1252 tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, 1253 int len) 1254 { 1255 unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; 1256 1257 tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), 1258 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE, 1259 s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, NULL, 0, 1260 s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, NULL, 0, 1261 p, len, s->session->master_key, buff, sizeof buff); 1262 1263 return (SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE); 1264 } 1265 1266 int 1267 tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, 1268 const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context, 1269 size_t contextlen, int use_context) 1270 { 1271 unsigned char *buff; 1272 unsigned char *val = NULL; 1273 size_t vallen, currentvalpos; 1274 int rv; 1275 1276 buff = malloc(olen); 1277 if (buff == NULL) 1278 goto err2; 1279 1280 /* construct PRF arguments 1281 * we construct the PRF argument ourself rather than passing separate 1282 * values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the concatenation of values 1283 * does not create a prohibited label. 1284 */ 1285 vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2; 1286 if (use_context) { 1287 vallen += 2 + contextlen; 1288 } 1289 1290 val = malloc(vallen); 1291 if (val == NULL) 1292 goto err2; 1293 currentvalpos = 0; 1294 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *) label, llen); 1295 currentvalpos += llen; 1296 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1297 currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1298 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1299 currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1300 1301 if (use_context) { 1302 val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff; 1303 currentvalpos++; 1304 val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff; 1305 currentvalpos++; 1306 if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL)) { 1307 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen); 1308 } 1309 } 1310 1311 /* disallow prohibited labels 1312 * note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited label len) = 1313 * 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and the 1314 * comparisons won't have buffer overflow 1315 */ 1316 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, 1317 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1318 goto err1; 1319 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, 1320 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1321 goto err1; 1322 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, 1323 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1324 goto err1; 1325 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, 1326 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1327 goto err1; 1328 1329 rv = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), 1330 val, vallen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 1331 s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, 1332 out, buff, olen); 1333 1334 goto ret; 1335 err1: 1336 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, 1337 SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL); 1338 rv = 0; 1339 goto ret; 1340 err2: 1341 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1342 rv = 0; 1343 ret: 1344 free(buff); 1345 free(val); 1346 1347 return (rv); 1348 } 1349 1350 int 1351 tls1_alert_code(int code) 1352 { 1353 switch (code) { 1354 case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: 1355 return (SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY); 1356 case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: 1357 return (SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 1358 case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: 1359 return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC); 1360 case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: 1361 return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 1362 case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: 1363 return (TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW); 1364 case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE: 1365 return (SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE); 1366 case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: 1367 return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1368 case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE: 1369 return (-1); 1370 case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: 1371 return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE); 1372 case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE: 1373 return (SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE); 1374 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED: 1375 return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED); 1376 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED: 1377 return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED); 1378 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN: 1379 return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN); 1380 case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: 1381 return (SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); 1382 case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: 1383 return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA); 1384 case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: 1385 return (TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED); 1386 case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR: 1387 return (TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 1388 case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: 1389 return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR); 1390 case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: 1391 return (TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION); 1392 case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: 1393 return (TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); 1394 case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY: 1395 return (TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY); 1396 case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: 1397 return (TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1398 case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK: 1399 return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); 1400 case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED: 1401 return (TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED); 1402 case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: 1403 return (TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1404 case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: 1405 return (TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION); 1406 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: 1407 return (TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE); 1408 case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: 1409 return (TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME); 1410 case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: 1411 return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE); 1412 case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: 1413 return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE); 1414 case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY: 1415 return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY); 1416 default: 1417 return (-1); 1418 } 1419 } 1420