1 /* $OpenBSD: t1_enc.c,v 1.117 2019/02/09 15:26:15 jsing Exp $ */ 2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58 /* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 /* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 113 * 114 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by 115 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 116 * license. 117 * 118 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of 119 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites 120 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. 121 * 122 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in 123 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received 124 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. 125 * 126 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not 127 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third 128 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights 129 * to make use of the Contribution. 130 * 131 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN 132 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA 133 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY 134 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 135 * OTHERWISE. 136 */ 137 138 #include <limits.h> 139 #include <stdio.h> 140 141 #include "ssl_locl.h" 142 143 #include <openssl/evp.h> 144 #include <openssl/hmac.h> 145 #include <openssl/md5.h> 146 147 int tls1_PRF(SSL *s, const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, 148 const void *seed1, size_t seed1_len, const void *seed2, size_t seed2_len, 149 const void *seed3, size_t seed3_len, const void *seed4, size_t seed4_len, 150 const void *seed5, size_t seed5_len, unsigned char *out, size_t out_len); 151 152 void 153 tls1_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s) 154 { 155 freezero(S3I(s)->hs.key_block, S3I(s)->hs.key_block_len); 156 S3I(s)->hs.key_block = NULL; 157 S3I(s)->hs.key_block_len = 0; 158 } 159 160 void 161 tls1_record_sequence_increment(unsigned char *seq) 162 { 163 int i; 164 165 for (i = SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE - 1; i >= 0; i--) { 166 if (++seq[i] != 0) 167 break; 168 } 169 } 170 171 /* 172 * TLS P_hash() data expansion function - see RFC 5246, section 5. 173 */ 174 static int 175 tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, 176 const void *seed1, size_t seed1_len, const void *seed2, size_t seed2_len, 177 const void *seed3, size_t seed3_len, const void *seed4, size_t seed4_len, 178 const void *seed5, size_t seed5_len, unsigned char *out, size_t out_len) 179 { 180 unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 181 size_t A1_len, hmac_len; 182 EVP_MD_CTX ctx; 183 EVP_PKEY *mac_key; 184 int ret = 0; 185 int chunk; 186 size_t i; 187 188 chunk = EVP_MD_size(md); 189 OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0); 190 191 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); 192 193 mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, secret, secret_len); 194 if (!mac_key) 195 goto err; 196 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 197 goto err; 198 if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) 199 goto err; 200 if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) 201 goto err; 202 if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len)) 203 goto err; 204 if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len)) 205 goto err; 206 if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len)) 207 goto err; 208 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) 209 goto err; 210 211 for (;;) { 212 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 213 goto err; 214 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, A1, A1_len)) 215 goto err; 216 if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) 217 goto err; 218 if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) 219 goto err; 220 if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len)) 221 goto err; 222 if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len)) 223 goto err; 224 if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len)) 225 goto err; 226 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, hmac, &hmac_len)) 227 goto err; 228 229 if (hmac_len > out_len) 230 hmac_len = out_len; 231 232 for (i = 0; i < hmac_len; i++) 233 out[i] ^= hmac[i]; 234 235 out += hmac_len; 236 out_len -= hmac_len; 237 238 if (out_len == 0) 239 break; 240 241 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 242 goto err; 243 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, A1, A1_len)) 244 goto err; 245 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) 246 goto err; 247 } 248 ret = 1; 249 250 err: 251 EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); 252 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 253 254 explicit_bzero(A1, sizeof(A1)); 255 explicit_bzero(hmac, sizeof(hmac)); 256 257 return ret; 258 } 259 260 int 261 tls1_PRF(SSL *s, const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, 262 const void *seed1, size_t seed1_len, const void *seed2, size_t seed2_len, 263 const void *seed3, size_t seed3_len, const void *seed4, size_t seed4_len, 264 const void *seed5, size_t seed5_len, unsigned char *out, size_t out_len) 265 { 266 const EVP_MD *md; 267 size_t half_len; 268 269 memset(out, 0, out_len); 270 271 if (!ssl_get_handshake_evp_md(s, &md)) 272 return (0); 273 274 if (md->type == NID_md5_sha1) { 275 /* 276 * Partition secret between MD5 and SHA1, then XOR result. 277 * If the secret length is odd, a one byte overlap is used. 278 */ 279 half_len = secret_len - (secret_len / 2); 280 if (!tls1_P_hash(EVP_md5(), secret, half_len, seed1, seed1_len, 281 seed2, seed2_len, seed3, seed3_len, seed4, seed4_len, 282 seed5, seed5_len, out, out_len)) 283 return (0); 284 285 secret += secret_len - half_len; 286 if (!tls1_P_hash(EVP_sha1(), secret, half_len, seed1, seed1_len, 287 seed2, seed2_len, seed3, seed3_len, seed4, seed4_len, 288 seed5, seed5_len, out, out_len)) 289 return (0); 290 291 return (1); 292 } 293 294 if (!tls1_P_hash(md, secret, secret_len, seed1, seed1_len, 295 seed2, seed2_len, seed3, seed3_len, seed4, seed4_len, 296 seed5, seed5_len, out, out_len)) 297 return (0); 298 299 return (1); 300 } 301 302 static int 303 tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, int num) 304 { 305 if (num < 0) 306 return (0); 307 308 return tls1_PRF(s, 309 s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, 310 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, 311 s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 312 s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 313 NULL, 0, NULL, 0, km, num); 314 } 315 316 /* 317 * tls1_aead_ctx_init allocates aead_ctx, if needed. It returns 1 on success 318 * and 0 on failure. 319 */ 320 static int 321 tls1_aead_ctx_init(SSL_AEAD_CTX **aead_ctx) 322 { 323 if (*aead_ctx != NULL) { 324 EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&(*aead_ctx)->ctx); 325 return (1); 326 } 327 328 *aead_ctx = malloc(sizeof(SSL_AEAD_CTX)); 329 if (*aead_ctx == NULL) { 330 SSLerrorx(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 331 return (0); 332 } 333 334 return (1); 335 } 336 337 static int 338 tls1_change_cipher_state_aead(SSL *s, char is_read, const unsigned char *key, 339 unsigned key_len, const unsigned char *iv, unsigned iv_len) 340 { 341 const EVP_AEAD *aead = S3I(s)->tmp.new_aead; 342 SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead_ctx; 343 344 if (is_read) { 345 ssl_clear_cipher_read_state(s); 346 if (!tls1_aead_ctx_init(&s->internal->aead_read_ctx)) 347 return 0; 348 aead_ctx = s->internal->aead_read_ctx; 349 } else { 350 /* XXX - Need to correctly handle DTLS. */ 351 ssl_clear_cipher_write_state(s); 352 if (!tls1_aead_ctx_init(&s->internal->aead_write_ctx)) 353 return 0; 354 aead_ctx = s->internal->aead_write_ctx; 355 } 356 357 if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(&aead_ctx->ctx, aead, key, key_len, 358 EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH, NULL)) 359 return (0); 360 if (iv_len > sizeof(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce)) { 361 SSLerrorx(ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 362 return (0); 363 } 364 memcpy(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce, iv, iv_len); 365 aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len = iv_len; 366 aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len = 8; /* always the case, currently. */ 367 aead_ctx->variable_nonce_in_record = 368 (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm2 & 369 SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_VARIABLE_NONCE_IN_RECORD) != 0; 370 aead_ctx->xor_fixed_nonce = 371 S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305; 372 aead_ctx->tag_len = EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(aead); 373 374 if (aead_ctx->xor_fixed_nonce) { 375 if (aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead) || 376 aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len > EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead)) { 377 SSLerrorx(ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 378 return (0); 379 } 380 } else { 381 if (aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len + aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len != 382 EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead)) { 383 SSLerrorx(ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 384 return (0); 385 } 386 } 387 388 return (1); 389 } 390 391 /* 392 * tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher performs the work needed to switch cipher 393 * states when using EVP_CIPHER. The argument is_read is true iff this function 394 * is being called due to reading, as opposed to writing, a ChangeCipherSpec 395 * message. 396 */ 397 static int 398 tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(SSL *s, char is_read, 399 const unsigned char *mac_secret, unsigned int mac_secret_size, 400 const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_len, const unsigned char *iv, 401 unsigned int iv_len) 402 { 403 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx; 404 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; 405 EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx; 406 EVP_PKEY *mac_key; 407 const EVP_MD *mac; 408 int mac_type; 409 410 cipher = S3I(s)->tmp.new_sym_enc; 411 mac = S3I(s)->tmp.new_hash; 412 mac_type = S3I(s)->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type; 413 414 if (is_read) { 415 if (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) 416 s->internal->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; 417 else 418 s->internal->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; 419 420 ssl_clear_cipher_read_state(s); 421 422 if ((cipher_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) 423 goto err; 424 s->enc_read_ctx = cipher_ctx; 425 if ((mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) 426 goto err; 427 s->read_hash = mac_ctx; 428 } else { 429 if (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) 430 s->internal->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; 431 else 432 s->internal->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; 433 434 /* 435 * DTLS fragments retain a pointer to the compression, cipher 436 * and hash contexts, so that it can restore state in order 437 * to perform retransmissions. As such, we cannot free write 438 * contexts that are used for DTLS - these are instead freed 439 * by DTLS when its frees a ChangeCipherSpec fragment. 440 */ 441 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 442 ssl_clear_cipher_write_state(s); 443 444 if ((cipher_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) 445 goto err; 446 s->internal->enc_write_ctx = cipher_ctx; 447 if ((mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) 448 goto err; 449 s->internal->write_hash = mac_ctx; 450 } 451 452 EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv, !is_read); 453 454 if ((mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, mac_secret, 455 mac_secret_size)) == NULL) 456 goto err; 457 EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, mac, NULL, mac_key); 458 EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); 459 460 if (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT) { 461 int nid; 462 if (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm2 & SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94) 463 nid = NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet; 464 else 465 nid = NID_id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z; 466 467 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipher_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GOST_SET_SBOX, nid, 0); 468 if (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_GOST89MAC) 469 EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mac_ctx, EVP_MD_CTRL_GOST_SET_SBOX, nid, 0); 470 } 471 472 return (1); 473 474 err: 475 SSLerrorx(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 476 return (0); 477 } 478 479 int 480 tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) 481 { 482 const unsigned char *client_write_mac_secret, *server_write_mac_secret; 483 const unsigned char *client_write_key, *server_write_key; 484 const unsigned char *client_write_iv, *server_write_iv; 485 const unsigned char *mac_secret, *key, *iv; 486 int mac_secret_size, key_len, iv_len; 487 unsigned char *key_block, *seq; 488 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; 489 const EVP_AEAD *aead; 490 char is_read, use_client_keys; 491 492 cipher = S3I(s)->tmp.new_sym_enc; 493 aead = S3I(s)->tmp.new_aead; 494 495 /* 496 * is_read is true if we have just read a ChangeCipherSpec message, 497 * that is we need to update the read cipherspec. Otherwise we have 498 * just written one. 499 */ 500 is_read = (which & SSL3_CC_READ) != 0; 501 502 /* 503 * use_client_keys is true if we wish to use the keys for the "client 504 * write" direction. This is the case if we're a client sending a 505 * ChangeCipherSpec, or a server reading a client's ChangeCipherSpec. 506 */ 507 use_client_keys = ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) || 508 (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)); 509 510 /* 511 * Reset sequence number to zero - for DTLS this is handled in 512 * dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(). 513 */ 514 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 515 seq = is_read ? S3I(s)->read_sequence : S3I(s)->write_sequence; 516 memset(seq, 0, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE); 517 } 518 519 if (aead != NULL) { 520 key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead); 521 iv_len = SSL_CIPHER_AEAD_FIXED_NONCE_LEN(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher); 522 } else { 523 key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher); 524 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); 525 } 526 527 mac_secret_size = S3I(s)->tmp.new_mac_secret_size; 528 529 key_block = S3I(s)->hs.key_block; 530 client_write_mac_secret = key_block; 531 key_block += mac_secret_size; 532 server_write_mac_secret = key_block; 533 key_block += mac_secret_size; 534 client_write_key = key_block; 535 key_block += key_len; 536 server_write_key = key_block; 537 key_block += key_len; 538 client_write_iv = key_block; 539 key_block += iv_len; 540 server_write_iv = key_block; 541 key_block += iv_len; 542 543 if (use_client_keys) { 544 mac_secret = client_write_mac_secret; 545 key = client_write_key; 546 iv = client_write_iv; 547 } else { 548 mac_secret = server_write_mac_secret; 549 key = server_write_key; 550 iv = server_write_iv; 551 } 552 553 if (key_block - S3I(s)->hs.key_block != S3I(s)->hs.key_block_len) { 554 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 555 goto err2; 556 } 557 558 if (is_read) { 559 memcpy(S3I(s)->read_mac_secret, mac_secret, mac_secret_size); 560 S3I(s)->read_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; 561 } else { 562 memcpy(S3I(s)->write_mac_secret, mac_secret, mac_secret_size); 563 S3I(s)->write_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; 564 } 565 566 if (aead != NULL) { 567 return tls1_change_cipher_state_aead(s, is_read, key, key_len, 568 iv, iv_len); 569 } 570 571 return tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(s, is_read, 572 mac_secret, mac_secret_size, key, key_len, iv, iv_len); 573 574 err2: 575 return (0); 576 } 577 578 int 579 tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s) 580 { 581 unsigned char *key_block; 582 int mac_type = NID_undef, mac_secret_size = 0; 583 int key_block_len, key_len, iv_len; 584 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; 585 const EVP_AEAD *aead = NULL; 586 const EVP_MD *mac = NULL; 587 int ret = 0; 588 589 if (S3I(s)->hs.key_block_len != 0) 590 return (1); 591 592 if (s->session->cipher && 593 (s->session->cipher->algorithm_mac & SSL_AEAD)) { 594 if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(s->session, &aead)) { 595 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE); 596 return (0); 597 } 598 key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead); 599 iv_len = SSL_CIPHER_AEAD_FIXED_NONCE_LEN(s->session->cipher); 600 } else { 601 if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session, &cipher, &mac, &mac_type, 602 &mac_secret_size)) { 603 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE); 604 return (0); 605 } 606 key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher); 607 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); 608 } 609 610 S3I(s)->tmp.new_aead = aead; 611 S3I(s)->tmp.new_sym_enc = cipher; 612 S3I(s)->tmp.new_hash = mac; 613 S3I(s)->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type; 614 S3I(s)->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; 615 616 tls1_cleanup_key_block(s); 617 618 if ((key_block = reallocarray(NULL, mac_secret_size + key_len + iv_len, 619 2)) == NULL) { 620 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 621 goto err; 622 } 623 key_block_len = (mac_secret_size + key_len + iv_len) * 2; 624 625 S3I(s)->hs.key_block_len = key_block_len; 626 S3I(s)->hs.key_block = key_block; 627 628 if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, key_block, key_block_len)) 629 goto err; 630 631 if (!(s->internal->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS) && 632 s->method->internal->version <= TLS1_VERSION) { 633 /* 634 * Enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with 635 * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) 636 */ 637 S3I(s)->need_empty_fragments = 1; 638 639 if (s->session->cipher != NULL) { 640 if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL) 641 S3I(s)->need_empty_fragments = 0; 642 643 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 644 if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4) 645 S3I(s)->need_empty_fragments = 0; 646 #endif 647 } 648 } 649 650 ret = 1; 651 652 err: 653 return (ret); 654 } 655 656 /* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively. 657 * 658 * Returns: 659 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too 660 * short etc). 661 * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. 662 * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending, 663 * an internal error occured. 664 */ 665 int 666 tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) 667 { 668 const SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead; 669 const EVP_CIPHER *enc; 670 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; 671 SSL3_RECORD *rec; 672 unsigned char *seq; 673 unsigned long l; 674 int bs, i, j, k, pad = 0, ret, mac_size = 0; 675 676 if (send) { 677 aead = s->internal->aead_write_ctx; 678 rec = &S3I(s)->wrec; 679 seq = S3I(s)->write_sequence; 680 } else { 681 aead = s->internal->aead_read_ctx; 682 rec = &S3I(s)->rrec; 683 seq = S3I(s)->read_sequence; 684 } 685 686 if (aead) { 687 unsigned char ad[13], *in, *out, nonce[16]; 688 size_t out_len, pad_len = 0; 689 unsigned int nonce_used; 690 691 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 692 dtls1_build_sequence_number(ad, seq, 693 send ? D1I(s)->w_epoch : D1I(s)->r_epoch); 694 } else { 695 memcpy(ad, seq, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE); 696 tls1_record_sequence_increment(seq); 697 } 698 699 ad[8] = rec->type; 700 ad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); 701 ad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); 702 703 if (aead->variable_nonce_len > 8 || 704 aead->variable_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce)) 705 return -1; 706 707 if (aead->xor_fixed_nonce) { 708 if (aead->fixed_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce) || 709 aead->variable_nonce_len > aead->fixed_nonce_len) 710 return -1; /* Should never happen. */ 711 pad_len = aead->fixed_nonce_len - aead->variable_nonce_len; 712 } else { 713 if (aead->fixed_nonce_len + 714 aead->variable_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce)) 715 return -1; /* Should never happen. */ 716 } 717 718 if (send) { 719 size_t len = rec->length; 720 size_t eivlen = 0; 721 in = rec->input; 722 out = rec->data; 723 724 if (aead->xor_fixed_nonce) { 725 /* 726 * The sequence number is left zero 727 * padded, then xored with the fixed 728 * nonce. 729 */ 730 memset(nonce, 0, pad_len); 731 memcpy(nonce + pad_len, ad, 732 aead->variable_nonce_len); 733 for (i = 0; i < aead->fixed_nonce_len; i++) 734 nonce[i] ^= aead->fixed_nonce[i]; 735 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 736 } else { 737 /* 738 * When sending we use the sequence number as 739 * the variable part of the nonce. 740 */ 741 memcpy(nonce, aead->fixed_nonce, 742 aead->fixed_nonce_len); 743 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 744 memcpy(nonce + nonce_used, ad, 745 aead->variable_nonce_len); 746 nonce_used += aead->variable_nonce_len; 747 } 748 749 /* 750 * In do_ssl3_write, rec->input is moved forward by 751 * variable_nonce_len in order to leave space for the 752 * variable nonce. Thus we can copy the sequence number 753 * bytes into place without overwriting any of the 754 * plaintext. 755 */ 756 if (aead->variable_nonce_in_record) { 757 memcpy(out, ad, aead->variable_nonce_len); 758 len -= aead->variable_nonce_len; 759 eivlen = aead->variable_nonce_len; 760 } 761 762 ad[11] = len >> 8; 763 ad[12] = len & 0xff; 764 765 if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(&aead->ctx, 766 out + eivlen, &out_len, len + aead->tag_len, nonce, 767 nonce_used, in + eivlen, len, ad, sizeof(ad))) 768 return -1; 769 if (aead->variable_nonce_in_record) 770 out_len += aead->variable_nonce_len; 771 } else { 772 /* receive */ 773 size_t len = rec->length; 774 775 if (rec->data != rec->input) 776 return -1; /* internal error - should never happen. */ 777 out = in = rec->input; 778 779 if (len < aead->variable_nonce_len) 780 return 0; 781 782 if (aead->xor_fixed_nonce) { 783 /* 784 * The sequence number is left zero 785 * padded, then xored with the fixed 786 * nonce. 787 */ 788 memset(nonce, 0, pad_len); 789 memcpy(nonce + pad_len, ad, 790 aead->variable_nonce_len); 791 for (i = 0; i < aead->fixed_nonce_len; i++) 792 nonce[i] ^= aead->fixed_nonce[i]; 793 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 794 } else { 795 memcpy(nonce, aead->fixed_nonce, 796 aead->fixed_nonce_len); 797 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 798 799 memcpy(nonce + nonce_used, 800 aead->variable_nonce_in_record ? in : ad, 801 aead->variable_nonce_len); 802 nonce_used += aead->variable_nonce_len; 803 } 804 805 if (aead->variable_nonce_in_record) { 806 in += aead->variable_nonce_len; 807 len -= aead->variable_nonce_len; 808 out += aead->variable_nonce_len; 809 } 810 811 if (len < aead->tag_len) 812 return 0; 813 len -= aead->tag_len; 814 815 ad[11] = len >> 8; 816 ad[12] = len & 0xff; 817 818 if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(&aead->ctx, out, &out_len, len, 819 nonce, nonce_used, in, len + aead->tag_len, ad, 820 sizeof(ad))) 821 return -1; 822 823 rec->data = rec->input = out; 824 } 825 826 rec->length = out_len; 827 828 return 1; 829 } 830 831 if (send) { 832 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->internal->write_hash)) { 833 int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->internal->write_hash); 834 OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); 835 } 836 ds = s->internal->enc_write_ctx; 837 if (s->internal->enc_write_ctx == NULL) 838 enc = NULL; 839 else { 840 int ivlen = 0; 841 enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->internal->enc_write_ctx); 842 if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && 843 EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) 844 ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc); 845 if (ivlen > 1) { 846 if (rec->data != rec->input) { 847 #ifdef DEBUG 848 /* we can't write into the input stream: 849 * Can this ever happen?? (steve) 850 */ 851 fprintf(stderr, 852 "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n", 853 __FILE__, __LINE__); 854 #endif 855 } else 856 arc4random_buf(rec->input, ivlen); 857 } 858 } 859 } else { 860 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) { 861 int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); 862 OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); 863 } 864 ds = s->enc_read_ctx; 865 if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) 866 enc = NULL; 867 else 868 enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); 869 } 870 871 if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) { 872 memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length); 873 rec->input = rec->data; 874 ret = 1; 875 } else { 876 l = rec->length; 877 bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher); 878 879 if (bs != 1 && send) { 880 i = bs - ((int)l % bs); 881 882 /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */ 883 884 /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */ 885 j = i - 1; 886 for (k = (int)l; k < (int)(l + i); k++) 887 rec->input[k] = j; 888 l += i; 889 rec->length += i; 890 } 891 892 if (!send) { 893 if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) 894 return 0; 895 } 896 897 i = EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l); 898 if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & 899 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) ? (i < 0) : (i == 0)) 900 return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */ 901 902 ret = 1; 903 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) 904 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); 905 if ((bs != 1) && !send) 906 ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size); 907 if (pad && !send) 908 rec->length -= pad; 909 } 910 return ret; 911 } 912 913 int 914 tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, int str_len, unsigned char *out) 915 { 916 unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 917 size_t hash_len; 918 919 if (str_len < 0) 920 return 0; 921 922 if (!tls1_transcript_hash_value(s, buf, sizeof(buf), &hash_len)) 923 return 0; 924 925 if (!tls1_PRF(s, s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, 926 str, str_len, buf, hash_len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 927 out, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH)) 928 return 0; 929 930 return TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH; 931 } 932 933 int 934 tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) 935 { 936 SSL3_RECORD *rec; 937 unsigned char *seq; 938 EVP_MD_CTX *hash; 939 size_t md_size, orig_len; 940 EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx; 941 unsigned char header[13]; 942 int stream_mac = (send ? 943 (ssl->internal->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) : 944 (ssl->internal->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM)); 945 int t; 946 947 if (send) { 948 rec = &(ssl->s3->internal->wrec); 949 seq = &(ssl->s3->internal->write_sequence[0]); 950 hash = ssl->internal->write_hash; 951 } else { 952 rec = &(ssl->s3->internal->rrec); 953 seq = &(ssl->s3->internal->read_sequence[0]); 954 hash = ssl->read_hash; 955 } 956 957 t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); 958 OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0); 959 md_size = t; 960 961 /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */ 962 if (stream_mac) { 963 mac_ctx = hash; 964 } else { 965 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac, hash)) 966 return -1; 967 mac_ctx = &hmac; 968 } 969 970 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) 971 dtls1_build_sequence_number(header, seq, 972 send ? D1I(ssl)->w_epoch : D1I(ssl)->r_epoch); 973 else 974 memcpy(header, seq, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE); 975 976 /* kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */ 977 orig_len = rec->length + md_size + ((unsigned int)rec->type >> 8); 978 rec->type &= 0xff; 979 980 header[8] = rec->type; 981 header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8); 982 header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version); 983 header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8; 984 header[12] = (rec->length) & 0xff; 985 986 if (!send && 987 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && 988 ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) { 989 /* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any 990 * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of 991 * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a 992 * timing-oracle. */ 993 if (!ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx, 994 md, &md_size, header, rec->input, 995 rec->length + md_size, orig_len, 996 ssl->s3->internal->read_mac_secret, 997 ssl->s3->internal->read_mac_secret_size)) 998 return -1; 999 } else { 1000 EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)); 1001 EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length); 1002 t = EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size); 1003 OPENSSL_assert(t > 0); 1004 } 1005 1006 if (!stream_mac) 1007 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); 1008 1009 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) 1010 tls1_record_sequence_increment(seq); 1011 1012 return (md_size); 1013 } 1014 1015 int 1016 tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, 1017 int len) 1018 { 1019 if (len < 0) 1020 return 0; 1021 1022 if (!tls1_PRF(s, p, len, 1023 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE, 1024 s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, NULL, 0, 1025 s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, NULL, 0, 1026 s->session->master_key, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)) 1027 return 0; 1028 1029 return (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); 1030 } 1031 1032 int 1033 tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, 1034 const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context, 1035 size_t contextlen, int use_context) 1036 { 1037 unsigned char *val = NULL; 1038 size_t vallen, currentvalpos; 1039 int rv; 1040 1041 /* construct PRF arguments 1042 * we construct the PRF argument ourself rather than passing separate 1043 * values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the concatenation of values 1044 * does not create a prohibited label. 1045 */ 1046 vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2; 1047 if (use_context) { 1048 vallen += 2 + contextlen; 1049 } 1050 1051 val = malloc(vallen); 1052 if (val == NULL) 1053 goto err2; 1054 currentvalpos = 0; 1055 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *) label, llen); 1056 currentvalpos += llen; 1057 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1058 currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1059 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1060 currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1061 1062 if (use_context) { 1063 val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff; 1064 currentvalpos++; 1065 val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff; 1066 currentvalpos++; 1067 if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL)) { 1068 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen); 1069 } 1070 } 1071 1072 /* disallow prohibited labels 1073 * note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited label len) = 1074 * 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and the 1075 * comparisons won't have buffer overflow 1076 */ 1077 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, 1078 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1079 goto err1; 1080 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, 1081 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1082 goto err1; 1083 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, 1084 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1085 goto err1; 1086 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, 1087 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1088 goto err1; 1089 1090 rv = tls1_PRF(s, s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, 1091 val, vallen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, out, olen); 1092 1093 goto ret; 1094 err1: 1095 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL); 1096 rv = 0; 1097 goto ret; 1098 err2: 1099 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1100 rv = 0; 1101 ret: 1102 free(val); 1103 1104 return (rv); 1105 } 1106 1107 int 1108 tls1_alert_code(int code) 1109 { 1110 switch (code) { 1111 case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: 1112 return (SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY); 1113 case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: 1114 return (SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 1115 case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: 1116 return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC); 1117 case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: 1118 return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 1119 case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: 1120 return (TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW); 1121 case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE: 1122 return (SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE); 1123 case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: 1124 return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1125 case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE: 1126 return (-1); 1127 case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: 1128 return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE); 1129 case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE: 1130 return (SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE); 1131 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED: 1132 return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED); 1133 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED: 1134 return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED); 1135 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN: 1136 return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN); 1137 case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: 1138 return (SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); 1139 case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: 1140 return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA); 1141 case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: 1142 return (TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED); 1143 case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR: 1144 return (TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 1145 case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: 1146 return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR); 1147 case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: 1148 return (TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION); 1149 case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: 1150 return (TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); 1151 case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY: 1152 return (TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY); 1153 case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: 1154 return (TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1155 case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK: 1156 return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); 1157 case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED: 1158 return (TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED); 1159 case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: 1160 return (TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1161 case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: 1162 return (TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION); 1163 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: 1164 return (TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE); 1165 case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: 1166 return (TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME); 1167 case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: 1168 return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE); 1169 case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: 1170 return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE); 1171 case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY: 1172 return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY); 1173 default: 1174 return (-1); 1175 } 1176 } 1177