1 /* $OpenBSD: t1_enc.c,v 1.123 2020/08/30 15:40:20 jsing Exp $ */ 2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58 /* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 /* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 113 * 114 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by 115 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 116 * license. 117 * 118 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of 119 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites 120 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. 121 * 122 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in 123 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received 124 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. 125 * 126 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not 127 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third 128 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights 129 * to make use of the Contribution. 130 * 131 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN 132 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA 133 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY 134 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 135 * OTHERWISE. 136 */ 137 138 #include <limits.h> 139 #include <stdio.h> 140 141 #include "ssl_locl.h" 142 143 #include <openssl/evp.h> 144 #include <openssl/hmac.h> 145 #include <openssl/md5.h> 146 147 int tls1_PRF(SSL *s, const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, 148 const void *seed1, size_t seed1_len, const void *seed2, size_t seed2_len, 149 const void *seed3, size_t seed3_len, const void *seed4, size_t seed4_len, 150 const void *seed5, size_t seed5_len, unsigned char *out, size_t out_len); 151 152 void 153 tls1_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s) 154 { 155 freezero(S3I(s)->hs.key_block, S3I(s)->hs.key_block_len); 156 S3I(s)->hs.key_block = NULL; 157 S3I(s)->hs.key_block_len = 0; 158 } 159 160 void 161 tls1_record_sequence_increment(unsigned char *seq) 162 { 163 int i; 164 165 for (i = SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE - 1; i >= 0; i--) { 166 if (++seq[i] != 0) 167 break; 168 } 169 } 170 171 /* 172 * TLS P_hash() data expansion function - see RFC 5246, section 5. 173 */ 174 static int 175 tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, 176 const void *seed1, size_t seed1_len, const void *seed2, size_t seed2_len, 177 const void *seed3, size_t seed3_len, const void *seed4, size_t seed4_len, 178 const void *seed5, size_t seed5_len, unsigned char *out, size_t out_len) 179 { 180 unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 181 size_t A1_len, hmac_len; 182 EVP_MD_CTX ctx; 183 EVP_PKEY *mac_key; 184 int ret = 0; 185 int chunk; 186 size_t i; 187 188 chunk = EVP_MD_size(md); 189 OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0); 190 191 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); 192 193 mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, secret, secret_len); 194 if (!mac_key) 195 goto err; 196 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 197 goto err; 198 if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) 199 goto err; 200 if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) 201 goto err; 202 if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len)) 203 goto err; 204 if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len)) 205 goto err; 206 if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len)) 207 goto err; 208 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) 209 goto err; 210 211 for (;;) { 212 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 213 goto err; 214 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, A1, A1_len)) 215 goto err; 216 if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) 217 goto err; 218 if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) 219 goto err; 220 if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len)) 221 goto err; 222 if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len)) 223 goto err; 224 if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len)) 225 goto err; 226 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, hmac, &hmac_len)) 227 goto err; 228 229 if (hmac_len > out_len) 230 hmac_len = out_len; 231 232 for (i = 0; i < hmac_len; i++) 233 out[i] ^= hmac[i]; 234 235 out += hmac_len; 236 out_len -= hmac_len; 237 238 if (out_len == 0) 239 break; 240 241 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 242 goto err; 243 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, A1, A1_len)) 244 goto err; 245 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) 246 goto err; 247 } 248 ret = 1; 249 250 err: 251 EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); 252 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 253 254 explicit_bzero(A1, sizeof(A1)); 255 explicit_bzero(hmac, sizeof(hmac)); 256 257 return ret; 258 } 259 260 int 261 tls1_PRF(SSL *s, const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, 262 const void *seed1, size_t seed1_len, const void *seed2, size_t seed2_len, 263 const void *seed3, size_t seed3_len, const void *seed4, size_t seed4_len, 264 const void *seed5, size_t seed5_len, unsigned char *out, size_t out_len) 265 { 266 const EVP_MD *md; 267 size_t half_len; 268 269 memset(out, 0, out_len); 270 271 if (!ssl_get_handshake_evp_md(s, &md)) 272 return (0); 273 274 if (md->type == NID_md5_sha1) { 275 /* 276 * Partition secret between MD5 and SHA1, then XOR result. 277 * If the secret length is odd, a one byte overlap is used. 278 */ 279 half_len = secret_len - (secret_len / 2); 280 if (!tls1_P_hash(EVP_md5(), secret, half_len, seed1, seed1_len, 281 seed2, seed2_len, seed3, seed3_len, seed4, seed4_len, 282 seed5, seed5_len, out, out_len)) 283 return (0); 284 285 secret += secret_len - half_len; 286 if (!tls1_P_hash(EVP_sha1(), secret, half_len, seed1, seed1_len, 287 seed2, seed2_len, seed3, seed3_len, seed4, seed4_len, 288 seed5, seed5_len, out, out_len)) 289 return (0); 290 291 return (1); 292 } 293 294 if (!tls1_P_hash(md, secret, secret_len, seed1, seed1_len, 295 seed2, seed2_len, seed3, seed3_len, seed4, seed4_len, 296 seed5, seed5_len, out, out_len)) 297 return (0); 298 299 return (1); 300 } 301 302 static int 303 tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, int num) 304 { 305 if (num < 0) 306 return (0); 307 308 return tls1_PRF(s, 309 s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, 310 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, 311 s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 312 s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 313 NULL, 0, NULL, 0, km, num); 314 } 315 316 /* 317 * tls1_aead_ctx_init allocates aead_ctx, if needed. It returns 1 on success 318 * and 0 on failure. 319 */ 320 static int 321 tls1_aead_ctx_init(SSL_AEAD_CTX **aead_ctx) 322 { 323 if (*aead_ctx != NULL) { 324 EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&(*aead_ctx)->ctx); 325 return (1); 326 } 327 328 *aead_ctx = malloc(sizeof(SSL_AEAD_CTX)); 329 if (*aead_ctx == NULL) { 330 SSLerrorx(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 331 return (0); 332 } 333 334 return (1); 335 } 336 337 static int 338 tls1_change_cipher_state_aead(SSL *s, char is_read, const unsigned char *key, 339 unsigned int key_len, const unsigned char *iv, unsigned int iv_len) 340 { 341 const EVP_AEAD *aead = S3I(s)->tmp.new_aead; 342 SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead_ctx; 343 344 /* XXX - Need to avoid clearing write state for DTLS. */ 345 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 346 return 0; 347 348 if (is_read) { 349 ssl_clear_cipher_read_state(s); 350 if (!tls1_aead_ctx_init(&s->internal->aead_read_ctx)) 351 return 0; 352 aead_ctx = s->internal->aead_read_ctx; 353 354 if (!tls12_record_layer_set_read_aead(s->internal->rl, aead_ctx)) 355 return 0; 356 } else { 357 ssl_clear_cipher_write_state(s); 358 if (!tls1_aead_ctx_init(&s->internal->aead_write_ctx)) 359 return 0; 360 aead_ctx = s->internal->aead_write_ctx; 361 362 if (!tls12_record_layer_set_write_aead(s->internal->rl, aead_ctx)) 363 return 0; 364 } 365 366 if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(&aead_ctx->ctx, aead, key, key_len, 367 EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH, NULL)) 368 return (0); 369 if (iv_len > sizeof(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce)) { 370 SSLerrorx(ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 371 return (0); 372 } 373 memcpy(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce, iv, iv_len); 374 aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len = iv_len; 375 aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len = 8; /* always the case, currently. */ 376 aead_ctx->variable_nonce_in_record = 377 (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm2 & 378 SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_VARIABLE_NONCE_IN_RECORD) != 0; 379 aead_ctx->xor_fixed_nonce = 380 S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305; 381 aead_ctx->tag_len = EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(aead); 382 383 if (aead_ctx->xor_fixed_nonce) { 384 if (aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead) || 385 aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len > EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead)) { 386 SSLerrorx(ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 387 return (0); 388 } 389 } else { 390 if (aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len + aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len != 391 EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead)) { 392 SSLerrorx(ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 393 return (0); 394 } 395 } 396 397 return (1); 398 } 399 400 /* 401 * tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher performs the work needed to switch cipher 402 * states when using EVP_CIPHER. The argument is_read is true iff this function 403 * is being called due to reading, as opposed to writing, a ChangeCipherSpec 404 * message. 405 */ 406 static int 407 tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(SSL *s, char is_read, 408 const unsigned char *mac_secret, unsigned int mac_secret_size, 409 const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_len, const unsigned char *iv, 410 unsigned int iv_len) 411 { 412 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx; 413 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; 414 EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx; 415 EVP_PKEY *mac_key; 416 const EVP_MD *mac; 417 int stream_mac; 418 int mac_type; 419 420 cipher = S3I(s)->tmp.new_sym_enc; 421 mac = S3I(s)->tmp.new_hash; 422 mac_type = S3I(s)->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type; 423 stream_mac = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC; 424 425 if (is_read) { 426 if (stream_mac) 427 s->internal->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; 428 else 429 s->internal->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; 430 431 ssl_clear_cipher_read_state(s); 432 433 if ((cipher_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) 434 goto err; 435 s->enc_read_ctx = cipher_ctx; 436 if ((mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) 437 goto err; 438 s->read_hash = mac_ctx; 439 440 if (!tls12_record_layer_set_read_cipher_hash(s->internal->rl, 441 cipher_ctx, mac_ctx, stream_mac)) 442 goto err; 443 } else { 444 if (stream_mac) 445 s->internal->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; 446 else 447 s->internal->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; 448 449 /* 450 * DTLS fragments retain a pointer to the compression, cipher 451 * and hash contexts, so that it can restore state in order 452 * to perform retransmissions. As such, we cannot free write 453 * contexts that are used for DTLS - these are instead freed 454 * by DTLS when its frees a ChangeCipherSpec fragment. 455 */ 456 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 457 ssl_clear_cipher_write_state(s); 458 459 if ((cipher_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) 460 goto err; 461 s->internal->enc_write_ctx = cipher_ctx; 462 if ((mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) 463 goto err; 464 s->internal->write_hash = mac_ctx; 465 466 if (!tls12_record_layer_set_write_cipher_hash(s->internal->rl, 467 cipher_ctx, mac_ctx, stream_mac)) 468 goto err; 469 } 470 471 EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv, !is_read); 472 473 if ((mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, mac_secret, 474 mac_secret_size)) == NULL) 475 goto err; 476 EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, mac, NULL, mac_key); 477 EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); 478 479 if (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT) { 480 int nid; 481 if (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm2 & SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94) 482 nid = NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet; 483 else 484 nid = NID_id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z; 485 486 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipher_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GOST_SET_SBOX, nid, 0); 487 if (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_GOST89MAC) 488 EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mac_ctx, EVP_MD_CTRL_GOST_SET_SBOX, nid, 0); 489 } 490 491 return (1); 492 493 err: 494 SSLerrorx(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 495 return (0); 496 } 497 498 int 499 tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) 500 { 501 const unsigned char *client_write_mac_secret, *server_write_mac_secret; 502 const unsigned char *client_write_key, *server_write_key; 503 const unsigned char *client_write_iv, *server_write_iv; 504 const unsigned char *mac_secret, *key, *iv; 505 int mac_secret_size, key_len, iv_len; 506 unsigned char *key_block, *seq; 507 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; 508 const EVP_AEAD *aead; 509 char is_read, use_client_keys; 510 511 cipher = S3I(s)->tmp.new_sym_enc; 512 aead = S3I(s)->tmp.new_aead; 513 514 /* 515 * is_read is true if we have just read a ChangeCipherSpec message, 516 * that is we need to update the read cipherspec. Otherwise we have 517 * just written one. 518 */ 519 is_read = (which & SSL3_CC_READ) != 0; 520 521 /* 522 * use_client_keys is true if we wish to use the keys for the "client 523 * write" direction. This is the case if we're a client sending a 524 * ChangeCipherSpec, or a server reading a client's ChangeCipherSpec. 525 */ 526 use_client_keys = ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) || 527 (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)); 528 529 /* 530 * Reset sequence number to zero - for DTLS this is handled in 531 * dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(). 532 */ 533 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 534 seq = is_read ? S3I(s)->read_sequence : S3I(s)->write_sequence; 535 memset(seq, 0, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE); 536 } 537 538 if (aead != NULL) { 539 key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead); 540 iv_len = SSL_CIPHER_AEAD_FIXED_NONCE_LEN(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher); 541 } else { 542 key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher); 543 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); 544 } 545 546 mac_secret_size = S3I(s)->tmp.new_mac_secret_size; 547 548 key_block = S3I(s)->hs.key_block; 549 client_write_mac_secret = key_block; 550 key_block += mac_secret_size; 551 server_write_mac_secret = key_block; 552 key_block += mac_secret_size; 553 client_write_key = key_block; 554 key_block += key_len; 555 server_write_key = key_block; 556 key_block += key_len; 557 client_write_iv = key_block; 558 key_block += iv_len; 559 server_write_iv = key_block; 560 key_block += iv_len; 561 562 if (use_client_keys) { 563 mac_secret = client_write_mac_secret; 564 key = client_write_key; 565 iv = client_write_iv; 566 } else { 567 mac_secret = server_write_mac_secret; 568 key = server_write_key; 569 iv = server_write_iv; 570 } 571 572 if (key_block - S3I(s)->hs.key_block != S3I(s)->hs.key_block_len) { 573 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 574 goto err2; 575 } 576 577 if (is_read) { 578 memcpy(S3I(s)->read_mac_secret, mac_secret, mac_secret_size); 579 S3I(s)->read_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; 580 } else { 581 memcpy(S3I(s)->write_mac_secret, mac_secret, mac_secret_size); 582 S3I(s)->write_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; 583 } 584 585 if (aead != NULL) { 586 return tls1_change_cipher_state_aead(s, is_read, key, key_len, 587 iv, iv_len); 588 } 589 590 return tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(s, is_read, 591 mac_secret, mac_secret_size, key, key_len, iv, iv_len); 592 593 err2: 594 return (0); 595 } 596 597 int 598 tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s) 599 { 600 unsigned char *key_block; 601 int mac_type = NID_undef, mac_secret_size = 0; 602 int key_block_len, key_len, iv_len; 603 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; 604 const EVP_AEAD *aead = NULL; 605 const EVP_MD *mac = NULL; 606 int ret = 0; 607 608 if (S3I(s)->hs.key_block_len != 0) 609 return (1); 610 611 if (s->session->cipher && 612 (s->session->cipher->algorithm_mac & SSL_AEAD)) { 613 if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(s->session, &aead)) { 614 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE); 615 return (0); 616 } 617 key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead); 618 iv_len = SSL_CIPHER_AEAD_FIXED_NONCE_LEN(s->session->cipher); 619 } else { 620 if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session, &cipher, &mac, &mac_type, 621 &mac_secret_size)) { 622 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE); 623 return (0); 624 } 625 key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher); 626 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); 627 } 628 629 S3I(s)->tmp.new_aead = aead; 630 S3I(s)->tmp.new_sym_enc = cipher; 631 S3I(s)->tmp.new_hash = mac; 632 S3I(s)->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type; 633 S3I(s)->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; 634 635 tls1_cleanup_key_block(s); 636 637 if ((key_block = reallocarray(NULL, mac_secret_size + key_len + iv_len, 638 2)) == NULL) { 639 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 640 goto err; 641 } 642 key_block_len = (mac_secret_size + key_len + iv_len) * 2; 643 644 S3I(s)->hs.key_block_len = key_block_len; 645 S3I(s)->hs.key_block = key_block; 646 647 if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, key_block, key_block_len)) 648 goto err; 649 650 if (!(s->internal->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS) && 651 s->method->internal->version <= TLS1_VERSION) { 652 /* 653 * Enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with 654 * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) 655 */ 656 S3I(s)->need_empty_fragments = 1; 657 658 if (s->session->cipher != NULL) { 659 if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL) 660 S3I(s)->need_empty_fragments = 0; 661 662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 663 if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4) 664 S3I(s)->need_empty_fragments = 0; 665 #endif 666 } 667 } 668 669 ret = 1; 670 671 err: 672 return (ret); 673 } 674 675 /* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively. 676 * 677 * Returns: 678 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too 679 * short etc). 680 * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. 681 * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending, 682 * an internal error occured. 683 */ 684 int 685 tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) 686 { 687 const SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead; 688 const EVP_CIPHER *enc; 689 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; 690 SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL *rec; 691 unsigned char *seq; 692 unsigned long l; 693 int bs, i, j, k, ret, mac_size = 0; 694 695 if (send) { 696 /* No longer supported. */ 697 return -1; 698 } else { 699 aead = s->internal->aead_read_ctx; 700 rec = &S3I(s)->rrec; 701 seq = S3I(s)->read_sequence; 702 } 703 704 if (aead) { 705 unsigned char ad[13], *in, *out, nonce[16]; 706 size_t out_len, pad_len = 0; 707 unsigned int nonce_used; 708 709 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 710 dtls1_build_sequence_number(ad, seq, 711 send ? D1I(s)->w_epoch : D1I(s)->r_epoch); 712 } else { 713 memcpy(ad, seq, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE); 714 tls1_record_sequence_increment(seq); 715 } 716 717 ad[8] = rec->type; 718 ad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); 719 ad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); 720 721 if (aead->variable_nonce_len > 8 || 722 aead->variable_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce)) 723 return -1; 724 725 if (aead->xor_fixed_nonce) { 726 if (aead->fixed_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce) || 727 aead->variable_nonce_len > aead->fixed_nonce_len) 728 return -1; /* Should never happen. */ 729 pad_len = aead->fixed_nonce_len - aead->variable_nonce_len; 730 } else { 731 if (aead->fixed_nonce_len + 732 aead->variable_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce)) 733 return -1; /* Should never happen. */ 734 } 735 736 if (send) { 737 size_t len = rec->length; 738 size_t eivlen = 0; 739 in = rec->input; 740 out = rec->data; 741 742 if (aead->xor_fixed_nonce) { 743 /* 744 * The sequence number is left zero 745 * padded, then xored with the fixed 746 * nonce. 747 */ 748 memset(nonce, 0, pad_len); 749 memcpy(nonce + pad_len, ad, 750 aead->variable_nonce_len); 751 for (i = 0; i < aead->fixed_nonce_len; i++) 752 nonce[i] ^= aead->fixed_nonce[i]; 753 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 754 } else { 755 /* 756 * When sending we use the sequence number as 757 * the variable part of the nonce. 758 */ 759 memcpy(nonce, aead->fixed_nonce, 760 aead->fixed_nonce_len); 761 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 762 memcpy(nonce + nonce_used, ad, 763 aead->variable_nonce_len); 764 nonce_used += aead->variable_nonce_len; 765 } 766 767 /* 768 * In do_ssl3_write, rec->input is moved forward by 769 * variable_nonce_len in order to leave space for the 770 * variable nonce. Thus we can copy the sequence number 771 * bytes into place without overwriting any of the 772 * plaintext. 773 */ 774 if (aead->variable_nonce_in_record) { 775 memcpy(out, ad, aead->variable_nonce_len); 776 len -= aead->variable_nonce_len; 777 eivlen = aead->variable_nonce_len; 778 } 779 780 ad[11] = len >> 8; 781 ad[12] = len & 0xff; 782 783 if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(&aead->ctx, 784 out + eivlen, &out_len, len + aead->tag_len, nonce, 785 nonce_used, in + eivlen, len, ad, sizeof(ad))) 786 return -1; 787 if (aead->variable_nonce_in_record) 788 out_len += aead->variable_nonce_len; 789 } else { 790 /* receive */ 791 size_t len = rec->length; 792 793 if (rec->data != rec->input) 794 return -1; /* internal error - should never happen. */ 795 out = in = rec->input; 796 797 if (len < aead->variable_nonce_len) 798 return 0; 799 800 if (aead->xor_fixed_nonce) { 801 /* 802 * The sequence number is left zero 803 * padded, then xored with the fixed 804 * nonce. 805 */ 806 memset(nonce, 0, pad_len); 807 memcpy(nonce + pad_len, ad, 808 aead->variable_nonce_len); 809 for (i = 0; i < aead->fixed_nonce_len; i++) 810 nonce[i] ^= aead->fixed_nonce[i]; 811 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 812 } else { 813 memcpy(nonce, aead->fixed_nonce, 814 aead->fixed_nonce_len); 815 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 816 817 memcpy(nonce + nonce_used, 818 aead->variable_nonce_in_record ? in : ad, 819 aead->variable_nonce_len); 820 nonce_used += aead->variable_nonce_len; 821 } 822 823 if (aead->variable_nonce_in_record) { 824 in += aead->variable_nonce_len; 825 len -= aead->variable_nonce_len; 826 out += aead->variable_nonce_len; 827 } 828 829 if (len < aead->tag_len) 830 return 0; 831 len -= aead->tag_len; 832 833 ad[11] = len >> 8; 834 ad[12] = len & 0xff; 835 836 if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(&aead->ctx, out, &out_len, len, 837 nonce, nonce_used, in, len + aead->tag_len, ad, 838 sizeof(ad))) 839 return -1; 840 841 rec->data = rec->input = out; 842 } 843 844 rec->length = out_len; 845 846 return 1; 847 } 848 849 if (send) { 850 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->internal->write_hash)) { 851 int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->internal->write_hash); 852 OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); 853 } 854 ds = s->internal->enc_write_ctx; 855 if (s->internal->enc_write_ctx == NULL) 856 enc = NULL; 857 else { 858 int ivlen = 0; 859 enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->internal->enc_write_ctx); 860 if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && 861 EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) 862 ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc); 863 if (ivlen > 1) { 864 if (rec->data != rec->input) { 865 #ifdef DEBUG 866 /* we can't write into the input stream: 867 * Can this ever happen?? (steve) 868 */ 869 fprintf(stderr, 870 "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n", 871 __FILE__, __LINE__); 872 #endif 873 } else 874 arc4random_buf(rec->input, ivlen); 875 } 876 } 877 } else { 878 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) { 879 int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); 880 OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); 881 } 882 ds = s->enc_read_ctx; 883 if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) 884 enc = NULL; 885 else 886 enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); 887 } 888 889 if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) { 890 memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length); 891 rec->input = rec->data; 892 ret = 1; 893 } else { 894 l = rec->length; 895 bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher); 896 897 if (bs != 1 && send) { 898 i = bs - ((int)l % bs); 899 900 /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */ 901 902 /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */ 903 j = i - 1; 904 for (k = (int)l; k < (int)(l + i); k++) 905 rec->input[k] = j; 906 l += i; 907 rec->length += i; 908 } 909 910 if (!send) { 911 if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) 912 return 0; 913 } 914 915 i = EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l); 916 if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & 917 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) ? (i < 0) : (i == 0)) 918 return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */ 919 920 ret = 1; 921 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) 922 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); 923 if ((bs != 1) && !send) 924 ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size); 925 } 926 return ret; 927 } 928 929 int 930 tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, int str_len, unsigned char *out) 931 { 932 unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 933 size_t hash_len; 934 935 if (str_len < 0) 936 return 0; 937 938 if (!tls1_transcript_hash_value(s, buf, sizeof(buf), &hash_len)) 939 return 0; 940 941 if (!tls1_PRF(s, s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, 942 str, str_len, buf, hash_len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 943 out, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH)) 944 return 0; 945 946 return TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH; 947 } 948 949 int 950 tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) 951 { 952 SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL *rec; 953 unsigned char *seq; 954 EVP_MD_CTX *hash; 955 size_t md_size, orig_len; 956 EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx; 957 unsigned char header[13]; 958 int stream_mac = (send ? 959 (ssl->internal->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) : 960 (ssl->internal->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM)); 961 int t; 962 963 if (send) { 964 /* No longer supported. */ 965 return -1; 966 } else { 967 rec = &(ssl->s3->internal->rrec); 968 seq = &(ssl->s3->internal->read_sequence[0]); 969 hash = ssl->read_hash; 970 } 971 972 t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); 973 OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0); 974 md_size = t; 975 976 /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */ 977 if (stream_mac) { 978 mac_ctx = hash; 979 } else { 980 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac, hash)) 981 return -1; 982 mac_ctx = &hmac; 983 } 984 985 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) 986 dtls1_build_sequence_number(header, seq, 987 send ? D1I(ssl)->w_epoch : D1I(ssl)->r_epoch); 988 else 989 memcpy(header, seq, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE); 990 991 orig_len = rec->length + md_size + rec->padding_length; 992 993 header[8] = rec->type; 994 header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8); 995 header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version); 996 header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8; 997 header[12] = (rec->length) & 0xff; 998 999 if (!send && 1000 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && 1001 ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) { 1002 /* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any 1003 * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of 1004 * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a 1005 * timing-oracle. */ 1006 if (!ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx, 1007 md, &md_size, header, rec->input, 1008 rec->length + md_size, orig_len, 1009 ssl->s3->internal->read_mac_secret, 1010 ssl->s3->internal->read_mac_secret_size)) 1011 return -1; 1012 } else { 1013 EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)); 1014 EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length); 1015 t = EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size); 1016 OPENSSL_assert(t > 0); 1017 } 1018 1019 if (!stream_mac) 1020 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); 1021 1022 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) 1023 tls1_record_sequence_increment(seq); 1024 1025 return (md_size); 1026 } 1027 1028 int 1029 tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, 1030 int len) 1031 { 1032 if (len < 0) 1033 return 0; 1034 1035 if (!tls1_PRF(s, p, len, 1036 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE, 1037 s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, NULL, 0, 1038 s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, NULL, 0, 1039 s->session->master_key, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)) 1040 return 0; 1041 1042 return (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); 1043 } 1044 1045 int 1046 tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, 1047 const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context, 1048 size_t contextlen, int use_context) 1049 { 1050 unsigned char *val = NULL; 1051 size_t vallen, currentvalpos; 1052 int rv; 1053 1054 /* construct PRF arguments 1055 * we construct the PRF argument ourself rather than passing separate 1056 * values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the concatenation of values 1057 * does not create a prohibited label. 1058 */ 1059 vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2; 1060 if (use_context) { 1061 vallen += 2 + contextlen; 1062 } 1063 1064 val = malloc(vallen); 1065 if (val == NULL) 1066 goto err2; 1067 currentvalpos = 0; 1068 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *) label, llen); 1069 currentvalpos += llen; 1070 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1071 currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1072 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1073 currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1074 1075 if (use_context) { 1076 val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff; 1077 currentvalpos++; 1078 val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff; 1079 currentvalpos++; 1080 if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL)) { 1081 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen); 1082 } 1083 } 1084 1085 /* disallow prohibited labels 1086 * note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited label len) = 1087 * 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and the 1088 * comparisons won't have buffer overflow 1089 */ 1090 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, 1091 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1092 goto err1; 1093 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, 1094 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1095 goto err1; 1096 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, 1097 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1098 goto err1; 1099 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, 1100 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1101 goto err1; 1102 1103 rv = tls1_PRF(s, s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, 1104 val, vallen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, out, olen); 1105 1106 goto ret; 1107 err1: 1108 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL); 1109 rv = 0; 1110 goto ret; 1111 err2: 1112 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1113 rv = 0; 1114 ret: 1115 free(val); 1116 1117 return (rv); 1118 } 1119 1120 int 1121 tls1_alert_code(int code) 1122 { 1123 switch (code) { 1124 case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: 1125 return (SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY); 1126 case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: 1127 return (SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 1128 case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: 1129 return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC); 1130 case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: 1131 return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 1132 case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: 1133 return (TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW); 1134 case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE: 1135 return (SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE); 1136 case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: 1137 return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1138 case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE: 1139 return (-1); 1140 case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: 1141 return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE); 1142 case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE: 1143 return (SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE); 1144 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED: 1145 return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED); 1146 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED: 1147 return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED); 1148 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN: 1149 return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN); 1150 case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: 1151 return (SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); 1152 case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: 1153 return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA); 1154 case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: 1155 return (TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED); 1156 case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR: 1157 return (TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 1158 case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: 1159 return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR); 1160 case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: 1161 return (TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION); 1162 case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: 1163 return (TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); 1164 case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY: 1165 return (TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY); 1166 case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: 1167 return (TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1168 case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK: 1169 return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); 1170 case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED: 1171 return (TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED); 1172 case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: 1173 return (TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1174 case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: 1175 return (TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION); 1176 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: 1177 return (TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE); 1178 case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: 1179 return (TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME); 1180 case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: 1181 return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE); 1182 case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: 1183 return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE); 1184 case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY: 1185 return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY); 1186 default: 1187 return (-1); 1188 } 1189 } 1190