xref: /dragonfly/share/man/man4/stf.4 (revision c89a6c1b)
1.\"	$FreeBSD: src/share/man/man4/stf.4,v 1.3.2.5 2002/08/28 04:46:25 brooks Exp $
2.\"	$DragonFly: src/share/man/man4/stf.4,v 1.4 2007/11/23 23:16:37 swildner Exp $
3.\"     $KAME: stf.4,v 1.35 2001/05/02 06:24:49 itojun Exp $
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32.Dd April 27, 2001
33.Dt STF 4
34.Os
35.Sh NAME
36.Nm stf
37.Nd
38.Tn 6to4
39tunnel interface
40.Sh SYNOPSIS
41.Cd "pseudo-device stf"
42.Sh DESCRIPTION
43The
44.Nm
45interface supports
46.Dq 6to4
47IPv6 in IPv4 encapsulation.
48It can tunnel IPv6 traffic over IPv4, as specified in
49.Li RFC 3056 .
50.Pp
51For ordinary nodes in 6to4 site, you do not need
52.Nm
53interface.
54The
55.Nm
56interface is necessary for site border router
57(called
58.Dq 6to4 router
59in the specification).
60.Pp
61Each
62.Nm
63interface is created at runtime using interface cloning.
64This is
65most easily done with the
66.Xr ifconfig 8
67.Cm create
68command or using the
69.Va cloned_interfaces
70variable in
71.Xr rc.conf 5 .
72.Pp
73Due to the way 6to4 protocol is specified,
74.Nm
75interface requires certain configuration to work properly.
76Single
77(no more than 1)
78valid 6to4 address needs to be configured to the interface.
79.Dq A valid 6to4 address
80is an address which has the following properties.
81If any of the following properties are not satisfied,
82.Nm
83raises runtime error on packet transmission.
84Read the specification for more details.
85.Bl -bullet
86.It
87matches
88.Li 2002:xxyy:zzuu::/48
89where
90.Li xxyy:zzuu
91is a hexadecimal notation of an IPv4 address for the node.
92IPv4 address can be taken from any of interfaces your node has.
93Since the specification forbids the use of IPv4 private address,
94the address needs to be a global IPv4 address.
95.It
96Subnet identifier portion
97(48th to 63rd bit)
98and interface identifier portion
99(lower 64 bits)
100are properly filled to avoid address collisions.
101.El
102.Pp
103If you would like the node to behave as a relay router,
104the prefix length for the IPv6 interface address needs to be 16 so that
105the node would consider any 6to4 destination as
106.Dq on-link .
107If you would like to restrict 6to4 peers to be inside certain IPv4 prefix,
108you may want to configure IPv6 prefix length as
109.Dq 16 + IPv4 prefix length .
110.Nm
111interface will check the IPv4 source address on packets,
112if the IPv6 prefix length is larger than 16.
113.Pp
114.Nm
115can be configured to be ECN friendly.
116This can be configured by
117.Dv IFF_LINK1 .
118See
119.Xr gif 4
120for details.
121.Pp
122Please note that 6to4 specification is written as
123.Dq accept tunnelled packet from everyone
124tunnelling device.
125By enabling
126.Nm
127device, you are making it much easier for malicious parties to inject
128fabricated IPv6 packet to your node.
129Also, malicious party can inject an IPv6 packet with fabricated source address
130to make your node generate improper tunnelled packet.
131Administrators must take caution when enabling the interface.
132To prevent possible attacks,
133.Nm
134interface filters out the following packets.
135Note that the checks are no way complete:
136.Bl -bullet
137.It
138Packets with IPv4 unspecified address as outer IPv4 source/destination
139.Pq Li 0.0.0.0/8
140.It
141Packets with loopback address as outer IPv4 source/destination
142.Pq Li 127.0.0.0/8
143.It
144Packets with IPv4 multicast address as outer IPv4 source/destination
145.Pq Li 224.0.0.0/4
146.It
147Packets with limited broadcast address as outer IPv4 source/destination
148.Pq Li 255.0.0.0/8
149.It
150Packets with subnet broadcast address as outer IPv4 source/destination.
151The check is made against subnet broadcast addresses for
152all of the directly connected subnets.
153.It
154Packets that does not pass ingress filtering.
155Outer IPv4 source address must meet the IPv4 topology on the routing table.
156Ingress filter can be turned off by
157.Dv IFF_LINK2
158bit.
159.It
160The same set of rules are applied against the IPv4 address embedded into
161inner IPv6 address, if the IPv6 address matches 6to4 prefix.
162.El
163.Pp
164It is recommended to filter/audit
165incoming IPv4 packet with IP protocol number 41, as necessary.
166It is also recommended to filter/audit encapsulated IPv6 packets as well.
167You may also want to run normal ingress filter against inner IPv6 address
168to avoid spoofing.
169.Pp
170By setting the
171.Dv IFF_LINK0
172flag on the
173.Nm
174interface, it is possible to disable the input path,
175making the direct attacks from the outside impossible.
176Note, however, there are other security risks exist.
177If you wish to use the configuration,
178you must not advertise your 6to4 address to others.
179.\"
180.Sh EXAMPLES
181Note that
182.Li 8504:0506
183is equal to
184.Li 133.4.5.6 ,
185written in hexadecimals.
186.Bd -literal
187# ifconfig ne0 inet 133.4.5.6 netmask 0xffffff00
188# ifconfig stf0 inet6 2002:8504:0506:0000:a00:5aff:fe38:6f86 \\
189	prefixlen 16 alias
190.Ed
191.Pp
192The following configuration accepts packets from IPv4 source
193.Li 9.1.0.0/16
194only.
195It emits 6to4 packet only for IPv6 destination 2002:0901::/32
196(IPv4 destination will match
197.Li 9.1.0.0/16 ) .
198.Bd -literal
199# ifconfig ne0 inet 9.1.2.3 netmask 0xffff0000
200# ifconfig stf0 inet6 2002:0901:0203:0000:a00:5aff:fe38:6f86 \\
201	prefixlen 32 alias
202.Ed
203.Pp
204The following configuration uses the
205.Nm
206interface as an output-only device.
207You need to have alternative IPv6 connectivity
208(other than 6to4)
209to use this configuration.
210For outbound traffic, you can reach other 6to4 networks efficiently via
211.Nm .
212For inbound traffic, you will not receive any 6to4-tunneled packets
213(less security drawbacks).
214Be careful not to advertise your 6to4 prefix to others
215.Pq Li 2002:8504:0506::/48 ,
216and not to use your 6to4 prefix as a source.
217.Bd -literal
218# ifconfig ne0 inet 133.4.5.6 netmask 0xffffff00
219# ifconfig stf0 inet6 2002:8504:0506:0000:a00:5aff:fe38:6f86 \\
220	prefixlen 16 alias deprecated link0
221# route add -inet6 2002:: -prefixlen 16 ::1
222# route change -inet6 2002:: -prefixlen 16 ::1 -ifp stf0
223.Ed
224.\"
225.Sh SEE ALSO
226.Xr gif 4 ,
227.Xr inet 4 ,
228.Xr inet6 4
229.Pp
230.Pa http://www.6bone.net/6bone_6to4.html
231.Rs
232.%A Brian Carpenter
233.%A Keith Moore
234.%T "Connection of IPv6 Domains via IPv4 Clouds"
235.%D February 2001
236.%R RFC
237.%N 3056
238.Re
239.Rs
240.%A Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino
241.%T "Possible abuse against IPv6 transition technologies"
242.%D July 2000
243.%N draft-itojun-ipv6-transition-abuse-01.txt
244.%O work in progress
245.Re
246.\"
247.Sh HISTORY
248The
249.Nm
250device first appeared in WIDE/KAME IPv6 stack.
251.\"
252.Sh BUGS
253No more than one
254.Nm
255interface is allowed for a node,
256and no more than one IPv6 interface address is allowed for an
257.Nm
258interface.
259It is to avoid source address selection conflicts
260between IPv6 layer and IPv4 layer,
261and to cope with ingress filtering rule on the other side.
262This is a feature to make
263.Nm
264work right for all occasions.
265