1 /* 2 * Copyright (c) 1982, 1986, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993 3 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. 4 * (c) UNIX System Laboratories, Inc. 5 * All or some portions of this file are derived from material licensed 6 * to the University of California by American Telephone and Telegraph 7 * Co. or Unix System Laboratories, Inc. and are reproduced herein with 8 * the permission of UNIX System Laboratories, Inc. 9 * 10 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 11 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 12 * are met: 13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 15 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 16 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 17 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 18 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 19 * must display the following acknowledgement: 20 * This product includes software developed by the University of 21 * California, Berkeley and its contributors. 22 * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors 23 * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software 24 * without specific prior written permission. 25 * 26 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND 27 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 28 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 29 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 30 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 31 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 32 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 33 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 34 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 35 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 36 * SUCH DAMAGE. 37 * 38 * @(#)kern_prot.c 8.6 (Berkeley) 1/21/94 39 * $FreeBSD: src/sys/kern/kern_prot.c,v 1.53.2.9 2002/03/09 05:20:26 dd Exp $ 40 * $DragonFly: src/sys/kern/kern_prot.c,v 1.14 2003/12/20 05:58:30 dillon Exp $ 41 */ 42 43 /* 44 * System calls related to processes and protection 45 */ 46 47 #include "opt_compat.h" 48 49 #include <sys/param.h> 50 #include <sys/acct.h> 51 #include <sys/systm.h> 52 #include <sys/sysproto.h> 53 #include <sys/kernel.h> 54 #include <sys/proc.h> 55 #include <sys/malloc.h> 56 #include <sys/pioctl.h> 57 #include <sys/resourcevar.h> 58 #include <sys/thread2.h> 59 #include <sys/jail.h> 60 61 static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_CRED, "cred", "credentials"); 62 63 /* 64 * NOT MP SAFE due to p_pptr access 65 */ 66 /* ARGSUSED */ 67 int 68 getpid(struct getpid_args *uap) 69 { 70 struct proc *p = curproc; 71 72 uap->sysmsg_fds[0] = p->p_pid; 73 #if defined(COMPAT_43) || defined(COMPAT_SUNOS) 74 uap->sysmsg_fds[1] = p->p_pptr->p_pid; 75 #endif 76 return (0); 77 } 78 79 /* ARGSUSED */ 80 int 81 getppid(struct getppid_args *uap) 82 { 83 struct proc *p = curproc; 84 85 uap->sysmsg_result = p->p_pptr->p_pid; 86 return (0); 87 } 88 89 /* 90 * Get process group ID; note that POSIX getpgrp takes no parameter 91 * 92 * MP SAFE 93 */ 94 int 95 getpgrp(struct getpgrp_args *uap) 96 { 97 struct proc *p = curproc; 98 99 uap->sysmsg_result = p->p_pgrp->pg_id; 100 return (0); 101 } 102 103 /* 104 * Get an arbitary pid's process group id 105 */ 106 int 107 getpgid(struct getpgid_args *uap) 108 { 109 struct proc *p = curproc; 110 struct proc *pt; 111 112 pt = p; 113 if (uap->pid == 0) 114 goto found; 115 116 if ((pt = pfind(uap->pid)) == 0) 117 return ESRCH; 118 found: 119 uap->sysmsg_result = pt->p_pgrp->pg_id; 120 return 0; 121 } 122 123 /* 124 * Get an arbitary pid's session id. 125 */ 126 int 127 getsid(struct getsid_args *uap) 128 { 129 struct proc *p = curproc; 130 struct proc *pt; 131 132 pt = p; 133 if (uap->pid == 0) 134 goto found; 135 136 if ((pt = pfind(uap->pid)) == 0) 137 return ESRCH; 138 found: 139 uap->sysmsg_result = pt->p_session->s_sid; 140 return 0; 141 } 142 143 144 /* 145 * getuid() - MP SAFE 146 */ 147 /* ARGSUSED */ 148 int 149 getuid(struct getuid_args *uap) 150 { 151 struct proc *p = curproc; 152 153 uap->sysmsg_fds[0] = p->p_ucred->cr_ruid; 154 #if defined(COMPAT_43) || defined(COMPAT_SUNOS) 155 uap->sysmsg_fds[1] = p->p_ucred->cr_uid; 156 #endif 157 return (0); 158 } 159 160 /* 161 * geteuid() - MP SAFE 162 */ 163 /* ARGSUSED */ 164 int 165 geteuid(struct geteuid_args *uap) 166 { 167 struct proc *p = curproc; 168 169 uap->sysmsg_result = p->p_ucred->cr_uid; 170 return (0); 171 } 172 173 /* 174 * getgid() - MP SAFE 175 */ 176 /* ARGSUSED */ 177 int 178 getgid(struct getgid_args *uap) 179 { 180 struct proc *p = curproc; 181 182 uap->sysmsg_fds[0] = p->p_ucred->cr_rgid; 183 #if defined(COMPAT_43) || defined(COMPAT_SUNOS) 184 uap->sysmsg_fds[1] = p->p_ucred->cr_groups[0]; 185 #endif 186 return (0); 187 } 188 189 /* 190 * Get effective group ID. The "egid" is groups[0], and could be obtained 191 * via getgroups. This syscall exists because it is somewhat painful to do 192 * correctly in a library function. 193 */ 194 /* ARGSUSED */ 195 int 196 getegid(struct getegid_args *uap) 197 { 198 struct proc *p = curproc; 199 200 uap->sysmsg_result = p->p_ucred->cr_groups[0]; 201 return (0); 202 } 203 204 int 205 getgroups(struct getgroups_args *uap) 206 { 207 struct proc *p = curproc; 208 struct ucred *cr; 209 u_int ngrp; 210 int error; 211 212 if (p == NULL) /* API enforcement */ 213 return(EPERM); 214 cr = p->p_ucred; 215 216 if ((ngrp = uap->gidsetsize) == 0) { 217 uap->sysmsg_result = cr->cr_ngroups; 218 return (0); 219 } 220 if (ngrp < cr->cr_ngroups) 221 return (EINVAL); 222 ngrp = cr->cr_ngroups; 223 if ((error = copyout((caddr_t)cr->cr_groups, 224 (caddr_t)uap->gidset, ngrp * sizeof(gid_t)))) 225 return (error); 226 uap->sysmsg_result = ngrp; 227 return (0); 228 } 229 230 /* ARGSUSED */ 231 int 232 setsid(struct setsid_args *uap) 233 { 234 struct proc *p = curproc; 235 236 if (p->p_pgid == p->p_pid || pgfind(p->p_pid)) { 237 return (EPERM); 238 } else { 239 (void)enterpgrp(p, p->p_pid, 1); 240 uap->sysmsg_result = p->p_pid; 241 return (0); 242 } 243 } 244 245 /* 246 * set process group (setpgid/old setpgrp) 247 * 248 * caller does setpgid(targpid, targpgid) 249 * 250 * pid must be caller or child of caller (ESRCH) 251 * if a child 252 * pid must be in same session (EPERM) 253 * pid can't have done an exec (EACCES) 254 * if pgid != pid 255 * there must exist some pid in same session having pgid (EPERM) 256 * pid must not be session leader (EPERM) 257 */ 258 /* ARGSUSED */ 259 int 260 setpgid(struct setpgid_args *uap) 261 { 262 struct proc *curp = curproc; 263 struct proc *targp; /* target process */ 264 struct pgrp *pgrp; /* target pgrp */ 265 266 if (uap->pgid < 0) 267 return (EINVAL); 268 if (uap->pid != 0 && uap->pid != curp->p_pid) { 269 if ((targp = pfind(uap->pid)) == 0 || !inferior(targp)) 270 return (ESRCH); 271 if (targp->p_pgrp == NULL || targp->p_session != curp->p_session) 272 return (EPERM); 273 if (targp->p_flag & P_EXEC) 274 return (EACCES); 275 } else 276 targp = curp; 277 if (SESS_LEADER(targp)) 278 return (EPERM); 279 if (uap->pgid == 0) 280 uap->pgid = targp->p_pid; 281 else if (uap->pgid != targp->p_pid) 282 if ((pgrp = pgfind(uap->pgid)) == 0 || 283 pgrp->pg_session != curp->p_session) 284 return (EPERM); 285 return (enterpgrp(targp, uap->pgid, 0)); 286 } 287 288 /* 289 * Use the clause in B.4.2.2 that allows setuid/setgid to be 4.2/4.3BSD 290 * compatible. It says that setting the uid/gid to euid/egid is a special 291 * case of "appropriate privilege". Once the rules are expanded out, this 292 * basically means that setuid(nnn) sets all three id's, in all permitted 293 * cases unless _POSIX_SAVED_IDS is enabled. In that case, setuid(getuid()) 294 * does not set the saved id - this is dangerous for traditional BSD 295 * programs. For this reason, we *really* do not want to set 296 * _POSIX_SAVED_IDS and do not want to clear POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2. 297 */ 298 #define POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2 299 300 /* ARGSUSED */ 301 int 302 setuid(struct setuid_args *uap) 303 { 304 struct proc *p = curproc; 305 struct ucred *cr; 306 uid_t uid; 307 int error; 308 309 if (p == NULL) /* API enforcement */ 310 return(EPERM); 311 cr = p->p_ucred; 312 313 /* 314 * See if we have "permission" by POSIX 1003.1 rules. 315 * 316 * Note that setuid(geteuid()) is a special case of 317 * "appropriate privileges" in appendix B.4.2.2. We need 318 * to use this clause to be compatible with traditional BSD 319 * semantics. Basically, it means that "setuid(xx)" sets all 320 * three id's (assuming you have privs). 321 * 322 * Notes on the logic. We do things in three steps. 323 * 1: We determine if the euid is going to change, and do EPERM 324 * right away. We unconditionally change the euid later if this 325 * test is satisfied, simplifying that part of the logic. 326 * 2: We determine if the real and/or saved uid's are going to 327 * change. Determined by compile options. 328 * 3: Change euid last. (after tests in #2 for "appropriate privs") 329 */ 330 uid = uap->uid; 331 if (uid != cr->cr_ruid && /* allow setuid(getuid()) */ 332 #ifdef _POSIX_SAVED_IDS 333 uid != crc->cr_svuid && /* allow setuid(saved gid) */ 334 #endif 335 #ifdef POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2 /* Use BSD-compat clause from B.4.2.2 */ 336 uid != cr->cr_uid && /* allow setuid(geteuid()) */ 337 #endif 338 (error = suser_cred(cr, PRISON_ROOT))) 339 return (error); 340 341 #ifdef _POSIX_SAVED_IDS 342 /* 343 * Do we have "appropriate privileges" (are we root or uid == euid) 344 * If so, we are changing the real uid and/or saved uid. 345 */ 346 if ( 347 #ifdef POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2 /* Use the clause from B.4.2.2 */ 348 uid == cr->cr_uid || 349 #endif 350 suser_cred(cr, PRISON_ROOT) == 0) /* we are using privs */ 351 #endif 352 { 353 /* 354 * Set the real uid and transfer proc count to new user. 355 */ 356 if (uid != cr->cr_ruid) { 357 change_ruid(uid); 358 setsugid(); 359 } 360 /* 361 * Set saved uid 362 * 363 * XXX always set saved uid even if not _POSIX_SAVED_IDS, as 364 * the security of seteuid() depends on it. B.4.2.2 says it 365 * is important that we should do this. 366 */ 367 if (cr->cr_svuid != uid) { 368 cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred); 369 cr->cr_svuid = uid; 370 setsugid(); 371 } 372 } 373 374 /* 375 * In all permitted cases, we are changing the euid. 376 * Copy credentials so other references do not see our changes. 377 */ 378 if (cr->cr_uid != uid) { 379 change_euid(uid); 380 setsugid(); 381 } 382 return (0); 383 } 384 385 /* ARGSUSED */ 386 int 387 seteuid(struct seteuid_args *uap) 388 { 389 struct proc *p = curproc; 390 struct ucred *cr; 391 uid_t euid; 392 int error; 393 394 if (p == NULL) /* API enforcement */ 395 return(EPERM); 396 397 cr = p->p_ucred; 398 euid = uap->euid; 399 if (euid != cr->cr_ruid && /* allow seteuid(getuid()) */ 400 euid != cr->cr_svuid && /* allow seteuid(saved uid) */ 401 (error = suser_cred(cr, PRISON_ROOT))) 402 return (error); 403 /* 404 * Everything's okay, do it. Copy credentials so other references do 405 * not see our changes. 406 */ 407 if (cr->cr_uid != euid) { 408 change_euid(euid); 409 setsugid(); 410 } 411 return (0); 412 } 413 414 /* ARGSUSED */ 415 int 416 setgid(struct setgid_args *uap) 417 { 418 struct proc *p = curproc; 419 struct ucred *cr; 420 gid_t gid; 421 int error; 422 423 if (p == NULL) /* API enforcement */ 424 return(EPERM); 425 cr = p->p_ucred; 426 427 /* 428 * See if we have "permission" by POSIX 1003.1 rules. 429 * 430 * Note that setgid(getegid()) is a special case of 431 * "appropriate privileges" in appendix B.4.2.2. We need 432 * to use this clause to be compatible with traditional BSD 433 * semantics. Basically, it means that "setgid(xx)" sets all 434 * three id's (assuming you have privs). 435 * 436 * For notes on the logic here, see setuid() above. 437 */ 438 gid = uap->gid; 439 if (gid != cr->cr_rgid && /* allow setgid(getgid()) */ 440 #ifdef _POSIX_SAVED_IDS 441 gid != cr->cr_svgid && /* allow setgid(saved gid) */ 442 #endif 443 #ifdef POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2 /* Use BSD-compat clause from B.4.2.2 */ 444 gid != cr->cr_groups[0] && /* allow setgid(getegid()) */ 445 #endif 446 (error = suser_cred(cr, PRISON_ROOT))) 447 return (error); 448 449 #ifdef _POSIX_SAVED_IDS 450 /* 451 * Do we have "appropriate privileges" (are we root or gid == egid) 452 * If so, we are changing the real uid and saved gid. 453 */ 454 if ( 455 #ifdef POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2 /* use the clause from B.4.2.2 */ 456 gid == cr->cr_groups[0] || 457 #endif 458 suser_cred(cr, PRISON_ROOT) == 0) /* we are using privs */ 459 #endif 460 { 461 /* 462 * Set real gid 463 */ 464 if (cr->cr_rgid != gid) { 465 cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred); 466 cr->cr_rgid = gid; 467 setsugid(); 468 } 469 /* 470 * Set saved gid 471 * 472 * XXX always set saved gid even if not _POSIX_SAVED_IDS, as 473 * the security of setegid() depends on it. B.4.2.2 says it 474 * is important that we should do this. 475 */ 476 if (cr->cr_svgid != gid) { 477 cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred); 478 cr->cr_svgid = gid; 479 setsugid(); 480 } 481 } 482 /* 483 * In all cases permitted cases, we are changing the egid. 484 * Copy credentials so other references do not see our changes. 485 */ 486 if (cr->cr_groups[0] != gid) { 487 cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred); 488 cr->cr_groups[0] = gid; 489 setsugid(); 490 } 491 return (0); 492 } 493 494 /* ARGSUSED */ 495 int 496 setegid(struct setegid_args *uap) 497 { 498 struct proc *p = curproc; 499 struct ucred *cr; 500 gid_t egid; 501 int error; 502 503 if (p == NULL) /* API enforcement */ 504 return(EPERM); 505 cr = p->p_ucred; 506 507 egid = uap->egid; 508 if (egid != cr->cr_rgid && /* allow setegid(getgid()) */ 509 egid != cr->cr_svgid && /* allow setegid(saved gid) */ 510 (error = suser_cred(cr, PRISON_ROOT))) 511 return (error); 512 if (cr->cr_groups[0] != egid) { 513 cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred); 514 cr->cr_groups[0] = egid; 515 setsugid(); 516 } 517 return (0); 518 } 519 520 /* ARGSUSED */ 521 int 522 setgroups(struct setgroups_args *uap) 523 { 524 struct proc *p = curproc; 525 struct ucred *cr; 526 u_int ngrp; 527 int error; 528 529 if (p == NULL) /* API enforcement */ 530 return(EPERM); 531 cr = p->p_ucred; 532 533 if ((error = suser_cred(cr, PRISON_ROOT))) 534 return (error); 535 ngrp = uap->gidsetsize; 536 if (ngrp > NGROUPS) 537 return (EINVAL); 538 /* 539 * XXX A little bit lazy here. We could test if anything has 540 * changed before cratom() and setting P_SUGID. 541 */ 542 cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred); 543 if (ngrp < 1) { 544 /* 545 * setgroups(0, NULL) is a legitimate way of clearing the 546 * groups vector on non-BSD systems (which generally do not 547 * have the egid in the groups[0]). We risk security holes 548 * when running non-BSD software if we do not do the same. 549 */ 550 cr->cr_ngroups = 1; 551 } else { 552 if ((error = copyin((caddr_t)uap->gidset, 553 (caddr_t)cr->cr_groups, ngrp * sizeof(gid_t)))) 554 return (error); 555 cr->cr_ngroups = ngrp; 556 } 557 setsugid(); 558 return (0); 559 } 560 561 /* ARGSUSED */ 562 int 563 setreuid(struct setreuid_args *uap) 564 { 565 struct proc *p = curproc; 566 struct ucred *cr; 567 uid_t ruid, euid; 568 int error; 569 570 if (p == NULL) /* API enforcement */ 571 return(EPERM); 572 cr = p->p_ucred; 573 574 ruid = uap->ruid; 575 euid = uap->euid; 576 if (((ruid != (uid_t)-1 && ruid != cr->cr_ruid && ruid != cr->cr_svuid) || 577 (euid != (uid_t)-1 && euid != cr->cr_uid && 578 euid != cr->cr_ruid && euid != cr->cr_svuid)) && 579 (error = suser_cred(cr, PRISON_ROOT)) != 0) 580 return (error); 581 582 if (euid != (uid_t)-1 && cr->cr_uid != euid) { 583 change_euid(euid); 584 setsugid(); 585 } 586 if (ruid != (uid_t)-1 && cr->cr_ruid != ruid) { 587 change_ruid(ruid); 588 setsugid(); 589 } 590 if ((ruid != (uid_t)-1 || cr->cr_uid != cr->cr_ruid) && 591 cr->cr_svuid != cr->cr_uid) { 592 cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred); 593 cr->cr_svuid = cr->cr_uid; 594 setsugid(); 595 } 596 return (0); 597 } 598 599 /* ARGSUSED */ 600 int 601 setregid(struct setregid_args *uap) 602 { 603 struct proc *p = curproc; 604 struct ucred *cr; 605 gid_t rgid, egid; 606 int error; 607 608 if (p == NULL) /* API enforcement */ 609 return(EPERM); 610 cr = p->p_ucred; 611 612 rgid = uap->rgid; 613 egid = uap->egid; 614 if (((rgid != (gid_t)-1 && rgid != cr->cr_rgid && rgid != cr->cr_svgid) || 615 (egid != (gid_t)-1 && egid != cr->cr_groups[0] && 616 egid != cr->cr_rgid && egid != cr->cr_svgid)) && 617 (error = suser_cred(cr, PRISON_ROOT)) != 0) 618 return (error); 619 620 if (egid != (gid_t)-1 && cr->cr_groups[0] != egid) { 621 cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred); 622 cr->cr_groups[0] = egid; 623 setsugid(); 624 } 625 if (rgid != (gid_t)-1 && cr->cr_rgid != rgid) { 626 cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred); 627 cr->cr_rgid = rgid; 628 setsugid(); 629 } 630 if ((rgid != (gid_t)-1 || cr->cr_groups[0] != cr->cr_rgid) && 631 cr->cr_svgid != cr->cr_groups[0]) { 632 cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred); 633 cr->cr_svgid = cr->cr_groups[0]; 634 setsugid(); 635 } 636 return (0); 637 } 638 639 /* 640 * setresuid(ruid, euid, suid) is like setreuid except control over the 641 * saved uid is explicit. 642 */ 643 644 /* ARGSUSED */ 645 int 646 setresuid(struct setresuid_args *uap) 647 { 648 struct proc *p = curproc; 649 struct ucred *cr; 650 uid_t ruid, euid, suid; 651 int error; 652 653 cr = p->p_ucred; 654 ruid = uap->ruid; 655 euid = uap->euid; 656 suid = uap->suid; 657 if (((ruid != (uid_t)-1 && ruid != cr->cr_ruid && ruid != cr->cr_svuid && 658 ruid != cr->cr_uid) || 659 (euid != (uid_t)-1 && euid != cr->cr_ruid && euid != cr->cr_svuid && 660 euid != cr->cr_uid) || 661 (suid != (uid_t)-1 && suid != cr->cr_ruid && suid != cr->cr_svuid && 662 suid != cr->cr_uid)) && 663 (error = suser_cred(cr, PRISON_ROOT)) != 0) 664 return (error); 665 if (euid != (uid_t)-1 && cr->cr_uid != euid) { 666 change_euid(euid); 667 setsugid(); 668 } 669 if (ruid != (uid_t)-1 && cr->cr_ruid != ruid) { 670 change_ruid(ruid); 671 setsugid(); 672 } 673 if (suid != (uid_t)-1 && cr->cr_svuid != suid) { 674 cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred); 675 cr->cr_svuid = suid; 676 setsugid(); 677 } 678 return (0); 679 } 680 681 /* 682 * setresgid(rgid, egid, sgid) is like setregid except control over the 683 * saved gid is explicit. 684 */ 685 686 /* ARGSUSED */ 687 int 688 setresgid(struct setresgid_args *uap) 689 { 690 struct proc *p = curproc; 691 struct ucred *cr; 692 gid_t rgid, egid, sgid; 693 int error; 694 695 cr = p->p_ucred; 696 rgid = uap->rgid; 697 egid = uap->egid; 698 sgid = uap->sgid; 699 if (((rgid != (gid_t)-1 && rgid != cr->cr_rgid && rgid != cr->cr_svgid && 700 rgid != cr->cr_groups[0]) || 701 (egid != (gid_t)-1 && egid != cr->cr_rgid && egid != cr->cr_svgid && 702 egid != cr->cr_groups[0]) || 703 (sgid != (gid_t)-1 && sgid != cr->cr_rgid && sgid != cr->cr_svgid && 704 sgid != cr->cr_groups[0])) && 705 (error = suser_cred(cr, PRISON_ROOT)) != 0) 706 return (error); 707 708 if (egid != (gid_t)-1 && cr->cr_groups[0] != egid) { 709 cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred); 710 cr->cr_groups[0] = egid; 711 setsugid(); 712 } 713 if (rgid != (gid_t)-1 && cr->cr_rgid != rgid) { 714 cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred); 715 cr->cr_rgid = rgid; 716 setsugid(); 717 } 718 if (sgid != (gid_t)-1 && cr->cr_svgid != sgid) { 719 cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred); 720 cr->cr_svgid = sgid; 721 setsugid(); 722 } 723 return (0); 724 } 725 726 /* ARGSUSED */ 727 int 728 getresuid(struct getresuid_args *uap) 729 { 730 struct proc *p = curproc; 731 struct ucred *cr = p->p_ucred; 732 int error1 = 0, error2 = 0, error3 = 0; 733 734 if (uap->ruid) 735 error1 = copyout((caddr_t)&cr->cr_ruid, 736 (caddr_t)uap->ruid, sizeof(cr->cr_ruid)); 737 if (uap->euid) 738 error2 = copyout((caddr_t)&cr->cr_uid, 739 (caddr_t)uap->euid, sizeof(cr->cr_uid)); 740 if (uap->suid) 741 error3 = copyout((caddr_t)&cr->cr_svuid, 742 (caddr_t)uap->suid, sizeof(cr->cr_svuid)); 743 return error1 ? error1 : (error2 ? error2 : error3); 744 } 745 746 /* ARGSUSED */ 747 int 748 getresgid(struct getresgid_args *uap) 749 { 750 struct proc *p = curproc; 751 struct ucred *cr = p->p_ucred; 752 int error1 = 0, error2 = 0, error3 = 0; 753 754 if (uap->rgid) 755 error1 = copyout((caddr_t)&cr->cr_rgid, 756 (caddr_t)uap->rgid, sizeof(cr->cr_rgid)); 757 if (uap->egid) 758 error2 = copyout((caddr_t)&cr->cr_groups[0], 759 (caddr_t)uap->egid, sizeof(cr->cr_groups[0])); 760 if (uap->sgid) 761 error3 = copyout((caddr_t)&cr->cr_svgid, 762 (caddr_t)uap->sgid, sizeof(cr->cr_svgid)); 763 return error1 ? error1 : (error2 ? error2 : error3); 764 } 765 766 767 /* ARGSUSED */ 768 int 769 issetugid(struct issetugid_args *uap) 770 { 771 struct proc *p = curproc; 772 /* 773 * Note: OpenBSD sets a P_SUGIDEXEC flag set at execve() time, 774 * we use P_SUGID because we consider changing the owners as 775 * "tainting" as well. 776 * This is significant for procs that start as root and "become" 777 * a user without an exec - programs cannot know *everything* 778 * that libc *might* have put in their data segment. 779 */ 780 uap->sysmsg_result = (p->p_flag & P_SUGID) ? 1 : 0; 781 return (0); 782 } 783 784 /* 785 * Check if gid is a member of the group set. 786 */ 787 int 788 groupmember(gid_t gid, struct ucred *cred) 789 { 790 gid_t *gp; 791 gid_t *egp; 792 793 egp = &(cred->cr_groups[cred->cr_ngroups]); 794 for (gp = cred->cr_groups; gp < egp; gp++) { 795 if (*gp == gid) 796 return (1); 797 } 798 return (0); 799 } 800 801 /* 802 * Test whether the specified credentials imply "super-user" 803 * privilege; if so, and we have accounting info, set the flag 804 * indicating use of super-powers. A kernel thread without a process 805 * context is assumed to have super user capabilities. In situations 806 * where the caller always expect a cred to exist, the cred should be 807 * passed separately and suser_cred()should be used instead of suser(). 808 * 809 * Returns 0 or error. 810 */ 811 int 812 suser(struct thread *td) 813 { 814 struct proc *p = td->td_proc; 815 816 if (p != NULL) { 817 return suser_cred(p->p_ucred, 0); 818 } else { 819 return (0); 820 } 821 } 822 823 int 824 suser_cred(struct ucred *cred, int flag) 825 { 826 KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("suser_cred: NULL cred!")); 827 828 if (cred->cr_uid != 0) 829 return (EPERM); 830 if (cred->cr_prison && !(flag & PRISON_ROOT)) 831 return (EPERM); 832 /* NOTE: accounting for suser access (p_acflag/ASU) removed */ 833 return (0); 834 } 835 836 /* 837 * Return zero if p1 can fondle p2, return errno (EPERM/ESRCH) otherwise. 838 */ 839 int 840 p_trespass(struct ucred *cr1, struct ucred *cr2) 841 { 842 if (cr1 == cr2) 843 return (0); 844 if (!PRISON_CHECK(cr1, cr2)) 845 return (ESRCH); 846 if (cr1->cr_ruid == cr2->cr_ruid) 847 return (0); 848 if (cr1->cr_uid == cr2->cr_ruid) 849 return (0); 850 if (cr1->cr_ruid == cr2->cr_uid) 851 return (0); 852 if (cr1->cr_uid == cr2->cr_uid) 853 return (0); 854 if (suser_cred(cr1, PRISON_ROOT) == 0) 855 return (0); 856 return (EPERM); 857 } 858 859 /* 860 * Allocate a zeroed cred structure. 861 */ 862 struct ucred * 863 crget() 864 { 865 struct ucred *cr; 866 867 MALLOC(cr, struct ucred *, sizeof(*cr), M_CRED, M_WAITOK); 868 bzero((caddr_t)cr, sizeof(*cr)); 869 cr->cr_ref = 1; 870 return (cr); 871 } 872 873 /* 874 * Claim another reference to a ucred structure. Can be used with special 875 * creds. 876 */ 877 struct ucred * 878 crhold(struct ucred *cr) 879 { 880 if (cr != NOCRED && cr != FSCRED) 881 cr->cr_ref++; 882 return(cr); 883 } 884 885 /* 886 * Free a cred structure. 887 * Throws away space when ref count gets to 0. 888 * MPSAFE 889 */ 890 void 891 crfree(struct ucred *cr) 892 { 893 /* Protect crfree() as a critical section as there 894 * appears to be a crfree race which can occur on 895 * SMP systems. 896 */ 897 crit_enter(); 898 if (cr->cr_ref == 0) 899 panic("Freeing already free credential! %p", cr); 900 901 if (--cr->cr_ref == 0) { 902 /* 903 * Some callers of crget(), such as nfs_statfs(), 904 * allocate a temporary credential, but don't 905 * allocate a uidinfo structure. 906 */ 907 if (cr->cr_uidinfo != NULL) { 908 uidrop(cr->cr_uidinfo); 909 cr->cr_uidinfo = NULL; 910 } 911 if (cr->cr_ruidinfo != NULL) { 912 uidrop(cr->cr_ruidinfo); 913 cr->cr_ruidinfo = NULL; 914 } 915 916 /* 917 * Destroy empty prisons 918 */ 919 if (cr->cr_prison && !--cr->cr_prison->pr_ref) { 920 if (cr->cr_prison->pr_linux != NULL) 921 FREE(cr->cr_prison->pr_linux, M_PRISON); 922 FREE(cr->cr_prison, M_PRISON); 923 } 924 cr->cr_prison = NULL; /* safety */ 925 926 FREE((caddr_t)cr, M_CRED); 927 } 928 crit_exit(); 929 } 930 931 /* 932 * Atomize a cred structure so it can be modified without polluting 933 * other references to it. 934 */ 935 struct ucred * 936 cratom(struct ucred **pcr) 937 { 938 struct ucred *oldcr; 939 struct ucred *newcr; 940 941 oldcr = *pcr; 942 if (oldcr->cr_ref == 1) 943 return (oldcr); 944 newcr = crget(); 945 *newcr = *oldcr; 946 if (newcr->cr_uidinfo) 947 uihold(newcr->cr_uidinfo); 948 if (newcr->cr_ruidinfo) 949 uihold(newcr->cr_ruidinfo); 950 if (newcr->cr_prison) 951 ++newcr->cr_prison->pr_ref; 952 newcr->cr_ref = 1; 953 crfree(oldcr); 954 *pcr = newcr; 955 return (newcr); 956 } 957 958 #if 0 /* no longer used but keep around for a little while */ 959 /* 960 * Copy cred structure to a new one and free the old one. 961 */ 962 struct ucred * 963 crcopy(struct ucred *cr) 964 { 965 struct ucred *newcr; 966 967 if (cr->cr_ref == 1) 968 return (cr); 969 newcr = crget(); 970 *newcr = *cr; 971 if (newcr->cr_uidinfo) 972 uihold(newcr->cr_uidinfo); 973 if (newcr->cr_ruidinfo) 974 uihold(newcr->cr_ruidinfo); 975 if (newcr->cr_prison) 976 ++newcr->cr_prison->pr_ref; 977 newcr->cr_ref = 1; 978 crfree(cr); 979 return (newcr); 980 } 981 #endif 982 983 /* 984 * Dup cred struct to a new held one. 985 */ 986 struct ucred * 987 crdup(cr) 988 struct ucred *cr; 989 { 990 struct ucred *newcr; 991 992 newcr = crget(); 993 *newcr = *cr; 994 if (newcr->cr_uidinfo) 995 uihold(newcr->cr_uidinfo); 996 if (newcr->cr_ruidinfo) 997 uihold(newcr->cr_ruidinfo); 998 if (newcr->cr_prison) 999 ++newcr->cr_prison->pr_ref; 1000 newcr->cr_ref = 1; 1001 return (newcr); 1002 } 1003 1004 /* 1005 * Fill in a struct xucred based on a struct ucred. 1006 */ 1007 void 1008 cru2x(cr, xcr) 1009 struct ucred *cr; 1010 struct xucred *xcr; 1011 { 1012 1013 bzero(xcr, sizeof(*xcr)); 1014 xcr->cr_version = XUCRED_VERSION; 1015 xcr->cr_uid = cr->cr_uid; 1016 xcr->cr_ngroups = cr->cr_ngroups; 1017 bcopy(cr->cr_groups, xcr->cr_groups, sizeof(cr->cr_groups)); 1018 } 1019 1020 /* 1021 * Get login name, if available. 1022 */ 1023 /* ARGSUSED */ 1024 int 1025 getlogin(struct getlogin_args *uap) 1026 { 1027 struct proc *p = curproc; 1028 1029 if (uap->namelen > MAXLOGNAME) 1030 uap->namelen = MAXLOGNAME; 1031 return (copyout((caddr_t) p->p_pgrp->pg_session->s_login, 1032 (caddr_t) uap->namebuf, uap->namelen)); 1033 } 1034 1035 /* 1036 * Set login name. 1037 */ 1038 /* ARGSUSED */ 1039 int 1040 setlogin(struct setlogin_args *uap) 1041 { 1042 struct proc *p = curproc; 1043 int error; 1044 char logintmp[MAXLOGNAME]; 1045 1046 KKASSERT(p != NULL); 1047 if ((error = suser_cred(p->p_ucred, PRISON_ROOT))) 1048 return (error); 1049 error = copyinstr((caddr_t) uap->namebuf, (caddr_t) logintmp, 1050 sizeof(logintmp), (size_t *)0); 1051 if (error == ENAMETOOLONG) 1052 error = EINVAL; 1053 else if (!error) 1054 (void) memcpy(p->p_pgrp->pg_session->s_login, logintmp, 1055 sizeof(logintmp)); 1056 return (error); 1057 } 1058 1059 void 1060 setsugid() 1061 { 1062 struct proc *p = curproc; 1063 1064 KKASSERT(p != NULL); 1065 p->p_flag |= P_SUGID; 1066 if (!(p->p_pfsflags & PF_ISUGID)) 1067 p->p_stops = 0; 1068 } 1069 1070 /* 1071 * Helper function to change the effective uid of a process 1072 */ 1073 void 1074 change_euid(uid_t euid) 1075 { 1076 struct proc *p = curproc; 1077 struct ucred *cr; 1078 1079 KKASSERT(p != NULL); 1080 cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred); 1081 cr->cr_uid = euid; 1082 uireplace(&cr->cr_uidinfo, uifind(euid)); 1083 } 1084 1085 /* 1086 * Helper function to change the real uid of a process 1087 * 1088 * The per-uid process count for this process is transfered from 1089 * the old uid to the new uid. 1090 */ 1091 void 1092 change_ruid(uid_t ruid) 1093 { 1094 struct proc *p = curproc; 1095 struct ucred *cr; 1096 1097 KKASSERT(p != NULL); 1098 1099 cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred); 1100 (void)chgproccnt(cr->cr_ruidinfo, -1, 0); 1101 /* It is assumed that pcred is not shared between processes */ 1102 cr->cr_ruid = ruid; 1103 uireplace(&cr->cr_ruidinfo, uifind(ruid)); 1104 (void)chgproccnt(cr->cr_ruidinfo, 1, 0); 1105 } 1106