xref: /dragonfly/sys/netproto/smb/smb_crypt.c (revision 479ab7f0)
1 /*
2  * Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Boris Popov
3  * All rights reserved.
4  *
5  * Copyright (c) 2003, 2004 Tim J. Robbins.
6  * All rights reserved.
7  *
8  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
9  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10  * are met:
11  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
12  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
13  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
14  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
15  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
16  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
17  *    must display the following acknowledgement:
18  *    This product includes software developed by Boris Popov.
19  * 4. Neither the name of the author nor the names of any co-contributors
20  *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
21  *    without specific prior written permission.
22  *
23  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
24  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
25  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
26  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
27  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
28  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
29  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
30  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
31  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
32  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
33  * SUCH DAMAGE.
34  *
35  * $FreeBSD: src/sys/netsmb/smb_crypt.c,v 1.1.2.3 2001/09/03 08:55:11 bp Exp $
36  * $DragonFly: src/sys/netproto/smb/smb_crypt.c,v 1.5 2008/01/05 14:02:40 swildner Exp $
37  */
38 #include <sys/param.h>
39 #include <sys/malloc.h>
40 #include <sys/kernel.h>
41 #include <sys/systm.h>
42 #include <sys/conf.h>
43 #include <sys/proc.h>
44 #include <sys/fcntl.h>
45 #include <sys/socket.h>
46 #include <sys/socketvar.h>
47 #include <sys/sysctl.h>
48 
49 #include <sys/endian.h>
50 #include <sys/mbuf.h>
51 #include <sys/mchain.h>
52 
53 #include <sys/md4.h>
54 #include <sys/md5.h>
55 #include <sys/iconv.h>
56 
57 #include "smb.h"
58 #include "smb_conn.h"
59 #include "smb_subr.h"
60 #include "smb_rq.h"
61 #include "smb_dev.h"
62 
63 #include "opt_netsmb.h"
64 
65 #include <crypto/des/des.h>
66 
67 static u_char N8[] = {0x4b, 0x47, 0x53, 0x21, 0x40, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25};
68 
69 
70 static void
71 smb_E(const u_char *key, u_char *data, u_char *dest)
72 {
73 	des_key_schedule *ksp;
74 	u_char kk[8];
75 
76 	kk[0] = key[0] & 0xfe;
77 	kk[1] = key[0] << 7 | (key[1] >> 1 & 0xfe);
78 	kk[2] = key[1] << 6 | (key[2] >> 2 & 0xfe);
79 	kk[3] = key[2] << 5 | (key[3] >> 3 & 0xfe);
80 	kk[4] = key[3] << 4 | (key[4] >> 4 & 0xfe);
81 	kk[5] = key[4] << 3 | (key[5] >> 5 & 0xfe);
82 	kk[6] = key[5] << 2 | (key[6] >> 6 & 0xfe);
83 	kk[7] = key[6] << 1;
84 	ksp = kmalloc(sizeof(des_key_schedule), M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK);
85 	des_set_key((des_cblock *)kk, *ksp);
86 	des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock *)data, (des_cblock *)dest, *ksp, 1);
87 	kfree(ksp, M_SMBTEMP);
88 }
89 
90 int
91 smb_encrypt(const u_char *apwd, u_char *C8, u_char *RN)
92 {
93 	u_char *p, *P14, *S21;
94 
95 	p = kmalloc(14 + 21, M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
96 	P14 = p;
97 	S21 = p + 14;
98 	bcopy(apwd, P14, min(14, strlen(apwd)));
99 	/*
100 	 * S21 = concat(Ex(P14, N8), zeros(5));
101 	 */
102 	smb_E(P14, N8, S21);
103 	smb_E(P14 + 7, N8, S21 + 8);
104 
105 	smb_E(S21, C8, RN);
106 	smb_E(S21 + 7, C8, RN + 8);
107 	smb_E(S21 + 14, C8, RN + 16);
108 	kfree(p, M_SMBTEMP);
109 	return 0;
110 }
111 
112 int
113 smb_ntencrypt(const u_char *apwd, u_char *C8, u_char *RN)
114 {
115 	u_char S21[21];
116 	u_int16_t *unipwd;
117 	MD4_CTX *ctxp;
118 	int len;
119 
120 	len = strlen(apwd);
121 	unipwd = kmalloc((len + 1) * sizeof(u_int16_t), M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK);
122 	/*
123 	 * S21 = concat(MD4(U(apwd)), zeros(5));
124 	 */
125 	smb_strtouni(unipwd, apwd);
126 	ctxp = kmalloc(sizeof(MD4_CTX), M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK);
127 	MD4Init(ctxp);
128 	MD4Update(ctxp, (u_char*)unipwd, len * sizeof(u_int16_t));
129 	kfree(unipwd, M_SMBTEMP);
130 	bzero(S21, 21);
131 	MD4Final(S21, ctxp);
132 	kfree(ctxp, M_SMBTEMP);
133 
134 	smb_E(S21, C8, RN);
135 	smb_E(S21 + 7, C8, RN + 8);
136 	smb_E(S21 + 14, C8, RN + 16);
137 	return 0;
138 }
139 
140 /*
141  * Calculate message authentication code (MAC) key for virtual circuit.
142  */
143 int
144 smb_calcmackey(struct smb_vc *vcp)
145 {
146 	const char *pwd;
147 	u_int16_t *unipwd;
148 	int len;
149 	MD4_CTX md4;
150 	u_char S16[16], S21[21];
151 
152 	KASSERT(vcp->vc_hflags2 & SMB_FLAGS2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE,
153 	    ("signatures not enabled"));
154 
155 	if (vcp->vc_mackey != NULL) {
156 		kfree(vcp->vc_mackey, M_SMBTEMP);
157 		vcp->vc_mackey = NULL;
158 		vcp->vc_mackeylen = 0;
159 		vcp->vc_seqno = 0;
160 	}
161 
162 	/*
163 	 * The partial MAC key is the concatenation of the 16 byte session
164 	 * key and the 24 byte challenge response.
165 	 */
166 	vcp->vc_mackeylen = 16 + 24;
167 	vcp->vc_mackey = kmalloc(vcp->vc_mackeylen, M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK);
168 
169 	/*
170 	 * Calculate session key:
171 	 *	MD4(MD4(U(PN)))
172 	 */
173 	pwd = smb_vc_getpass(vcp);
174 	len = strlen(pwd);
175 	unipwd = kmalloc((len + 1) * sizeof(u_int16_t), M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK);
176 	smb_strtouni(unipwd, pwd);
177 	MD4Init(&md4);
178 	MD4Update(&md4, (u_char *)unipwd, len * sizeof(u_int16_t));
179 	MD4Final(S16, &md4);
180 	MD4Init(&md4);
181 	MD4Update(&md4, S16, 16);
182 	MD4Final(vcp->vc_mackey, &md4);
183 	kfree(unipwd, M_SMBTEMP);
184 
185 	/*
186 	 * Calculate response to challenge:
187 	 *	Ex(concat(MD4(U(pass)), zeros(5)), C8)
188 	 */
189 	bzero(S21, 21);
190 	bcopy(S16, S21, 16);
191 	smb_E(S21, vcp->vc_ch, vcp->vc_mackey + 16);
192 	smb_E(S21 + 7, vcp->vc_ch, vcp->vc_mackey + 24);
193 	smb_E(S21 + 14, vcp->vc_ch, vcp->vc_mackey + 32);
194 
195 	return (0);
196 }
197 
198 /*
199  * Sign request with MAC.
200  */
201 int
202 smb_rq_sign(struct smb_rq *rqp)
203 {
204 	struct smb_vc *vcp = rqp->sr_vc;
205 	struct mbchain *mbp;
206 	struct mbuf *mb;
207 	MD5_CTX md5;
208 	u_char digest[16];
209 
210 	KASSERT(vcp->vc_hflags2 & SMB_FLAGS2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE,
211 	    ("signatures not enabled"));
212 
213 	if (vcp->vc_mackey == NULL)
214 		/* XXX Should assert that cmd == SMB_COM_NEGOTIATE. */
215 		return (0);
216 
217 	/*
218 	 * This is a bit of a kludge. If the request is non-TRANSACTION,
219 	 * or it is the first request of a transaction, give it the next
220 	 * sequence number, and expect the reply to have the sequence number
221 	 * following that one. Otherwise, it is a secondary request in
222 	 * a transaction, and it gets the same sequence numbers as the
223 	 * primary request.
224 	 */
225 	if (rqp->sr_t2 == NULL ||
226 	    (rqp->sr_t2->t2_flags & SMBT2_SECONDARY) == 0) {
227 		rqp->sr_seqno = vcp->vc_seqno++;
228 		rqp->sr_rseqno = vcp->vc_seqno++;
229 	} else {
230 		/*
231 		 * Sequence numbers are already in the struct because
232 		 * smb_t2_request_int() uses the same one for all the
233 		 * requests in the transaction.
234 		 * (At least we hope so.)
235 		 */
236 		KASSERT(rqp->sr_t2 == NULL ||
237 		    (rqp->sr_t2->t2_flags & SMBT2_SECONDARY) == 0 ||
238 		    rqp->sr_t2->t2_rq == rqp,
239 		    ("sec t2 rq not using same smb_rq"));
240 	}
241 
242 	/* Initialize sec. signature field to sequence number + zeros. */
243 	*(u_int32_t *)rqp->sr_rqsig = htole32(rqp->sr_seqno);
244 	*(u_int32_t *)(rqp->sr_rqsig + 4) = 0;
245 
246 	/*
247 	 * Compute HMAC-MD5 of packet data, keyed by MAC key.
248 	 * Store the first 8 bytes in the sec. signature field.
249 	 */
250 	smb_rq_getrequest(rqp, &mbp);
251 	MD5Init(&md5);
252 	MD5Update(&md5, vcp->vc_mackey, vcp->vc_mackeylen);
253 	for (mb = mbp->mb_top; mb != NULL; mb = mb->m_next)
254 		MD5Update(&md5, mtod(mb, void *), mb->m_len);
255 	MD5Final(digest, &md5);
256 	bcopy(digest, rqp->sr_rqsig, 8);
257 
258 	return (0);
259 }
260 
261 /*
262  * Verify reply signature.
263  */
264 int
265 smb_rq_verify(struct smb_rq *rqp)
266 {
267 	struct smb_vc *vcp = rqp->sr_vc;
268 	struct mdchain *mdp;
269 	u_char sigbuf[8];
270 	MD5_CTX md5;
271 	u_char digest[16];
272 	struct mbuf *mb;
273 
274 	KASSERT(vcp->vc_hflags2 & SMB_FLAGS2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE,
275 	    ("signatures not enabled"));
276 
277 	if (vcp->vc_mackey == NULL)
278 		/* XXX Should check that this is a SMB_COM_NEGOTIATE reply. */
279 		return (0);
280 
281 	/*
282 	 * Compute HMAC-MD5 of packet data, keyed by MAC key.
283 	 * We play games to pretend the security signature field
284 	 * contains their sequence number, to avoid modifying
285 	 * the packet itself.
286 	 */
287 	smb_rq_getreply(rqp, &mdp);
288 	mb = mdp->md_top;
289 	KASSERT(mb->m_len >= SMB_HDRLEN, ("forgot to m_pullup"));
290 	MD5Init(&md5);
291 	MD5Update(&md5, vcp->vc_mackey, vcp->vc_mackeylen);
292 	MD5Update(&md5, mtod(mb, void *), 14);
293 	*(u_int32_t *)sigbuf = htole32(rqp->sr_rseqno);
294 	*(u_int32_t *)(sigbuf + 4) = 0;
295 	MD5Update(&md5, sigbuf, 8);
296 	MD5Update(&md5, mtod(mb, u_char *) + 22, mb->m_len - 22);
297 	for (mb = mb->m_next; mb != NULL; mb = mb->m_next)
298 		MD5Update(&md5, mtod(mb, void *), mb->m_len);
299 	MD5Final(digest, &md5);
300 
301 	/*
302 	 * Now verify the signature.
303 	 */
304 	if (bcmp(mtod(mdp->md_top, u_char *) + 14, digest, 8) != 0)
305 		return (EAUTH);
306 
307 	return (0);
308 }
309