1 /* 2 * validator/val_utils.c - validator utility functions. 3 * 4 * Copyright (c) 2007, NLnet Labs. All rights reserved. 5 * 6 * This software is open source. 7 * 8 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 9 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 10 * are met: 11 * 12 * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, 13 * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 14 * 15 * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, 16 * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation 17 * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 18 * 19 * Neither the name of the NLNET LABS nor the names of its contributors may 20 * be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without 21 * specific prior written permission. 22 * 23 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS 24 * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT 25 * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR 26 * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT 27 * HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 28 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED 29 * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR 30 * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF 31 * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING 32 * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS 33 * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 34 */ 35 36 /** 37 * \file 38 * 39 * This file contains helper functions for the validator module. 40 */ 41 #include "config.h" 42 #include "validator/val_utils.h" 43 #include "validator/validator.h" 44 #include "validator/val_kentry.h" 45 #include "validator/val_sigcrypt.h" 46 #include "validator/val_anchor.h" 47 #include "validator/val_nsec.h" 48 #include "validator/val_neg.h" 49 #include "services/cache/rrset.h" 50 #include "services/cache/dns.h" 51 #include "util/data/msgreply.h" 52 #include "util/data/packed_rrset.h" 53 #include "util/data/dname.h" 54 #include "util/net_help.h" 55 #include "util/module.h" 56 #include "util/regional.h" 57 #include "util/config_file.h" 58 #include "sldns/wire2str.h" 59 #include "sldns/parseutil.h" 60 61 enum val_classification 62 val_classify_response(uint16_t query_flags, struct query_info* origqinf, 63 struct query_info* qinf, struct reply_info* rep, size_t skip) 64 { 65 int rcode = (int)FLAGS_GET_RCODE(rep->flags); 66 size_t i; 67 68 /* Normal Name Error's are easy to detect -- but don't mistake a CNAME 69 * chain ending in NXDOMAIN. */ 70 if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN && rep->an_numrrsets == 0) 71 return VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR; 72 73 /* check for referral: nonRD query and it looks like a nodata */ 74 if(!(query_flags&BIT_RD) && rep->an_numrrsets == 0 && 75 rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) { 76 /* SOA record in auth indicates it is NODATA instead. 77 * All validation requiring NODATA messages have SOA in 78 * authority section. */ 79 /* uses fact that answer section is empty */ 80 int saw_ns = 0; 81 for(i=0; i<rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) { 82 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA) 83 return VAL_CLASS_NODATA; 84 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS) 85 return VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL; 86 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS) 87 saw_ns = 1; 88 } 89 return saw_ns?VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL:VAL_CLASS_NODATA; 90 } 91 /* root referral where NS set is in the answer section */ 92 if(!(query_flags&BIT_RD) && rep->ns_numrrsets == 0 && 93 rep->an_numrrsets == 1 && rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && 94 ntohs(rep->rrsets[0]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS && 95 query_dname_compare(rep->rrsets[0]->rk.dname, 96 origqinf->qname) != 0) 97 return VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL; 98 99 /* dump bad messages */ 100 if(rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN) 101 return VAL_CLASS_UNKNOWN; 102 /* next check if the skip into the answer section shows no answer */ 103 if(skip>0 && rep->an_numrrsets <= skip) 104 return VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER; 105 106 /* Next is NODATA */ 107 if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && rep->an_numrrsets == 0) 108 return VAL_CLASS_NODATA; 109 110 /* We distinguish between CNAME response and other positive/negative 111 * responses because CNAME answers require extra processing. */ 112 113 /* We distinguish between ANY and CNAME or POSITIVE because 114 * ANY responses are validated differently. */ 115 if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && qinf->qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_ANY) 116 return VAL_CLASS_ANY; 117 118 /* Note that DNAMEs will be ignored here, unless qtype=DNAME. Unless 119 * qtype=CNAME, this will yield a CNAME response. */ 120 for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) { 121 if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && 122 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == qinf->qtype) 123 return VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE; 124 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME) 125 return VAL_CLASS_CNAME; 126 } 127 log_dns_msg("validator: error. failed to classify response message: ", 128 qinf, rep); 129 return VAL_CLASS_UNKNOWN; 130 } 131 132 /** Get signer name from RRSIG */ 133 static void 134 rrsig_get_signer(uint8_t* data, size_t len, uint8_t** sname, size_t* slen) 135 { 136 /* RRSIG rdata is not allowed to be compressed, it is stored 137 * uncompressed in memory as well, so return a ptr to the name */ 138 if(len < 21) { 139 /* too short RRSig: 140 * short, byte, byte, long, long, long, short, "." is 141 * 2 1 1 4 4 4 2 1 = 19 142 * and a skip of 18 bytes to the name. 143 * +2 for the rdatalen is 21 bytes len for root label */ 144 *sname = NULL; 145 *slen = 0; 146 return; 147 } 148 data += 20; /* skip the fixed size bits */ 149 len -= 20; 150 *slen = dname_valid(data, len); 151 if(!*slen) { 152 /* bad dname in this rrsig. */ 153 *sname = NULL; 154 return; 155 } 156 *sname = data; 157 } 158 159 void 160 val_find_rrset_signer(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, uint8_t** sname, 161 size_t* slen) 162 { 163 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*) 164 rrset->entry.data; 165 /* return signer for first signature, or NULL */ 166 if(d->rrsig_count == 0) { 167 *sname = NULL; 168 *slen = 0; 169 return; 170 } 171 /* get rrsig signer name out of the signature */ 172 rrsig_get_signer(d->rr_data[d->count], d->rr_len[d->count], 173 sname, slen); 174 } 175 176 /** 177 * Find best signer name in this set of rrsigs. 178 * @param rrset: which rrsigs to look through. 179 * @param qinf: the query name that needs validation. 180 * @param signer_name: the best signer_name. Updated if a better one is found. 181 * @param signer_len: length of signer name. 182 * @param matchcount: count of current best name (starts at 0 for no match). 183 * Updated if match is improved. 184 */ 185 static void 186 val_find_best_signer(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, 187 struct query_info* qinf, uint8_t** signer_name, size_t* signer_len, 188 int* matchcount) 189 { 190 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*) 191 rrset->entry.data; 192 uint8_t* sign; 193 size_t i; 194 int m; 195 for(i=d->count; i<d->count+d->rrsig_count; i++) { 196 sign = d->rr_data[i]+2+18; 197 /* look at signatures that are valid (long enough), 198 * and have a signer name that is a superdomain of qname, 199 * and then check the number of labels in the shared topdomain 200 * improve the match if possible */ 201 if(d->rr_len[i] > 2+19 && /* rdata, sig + root label*/ 202 dname_subdomain_c(qinf->qname, sign)) { 203 (void)dname_lab_cmp(qinf->qname, 204 dname_count_labels(qinf->qname), 205 sign, dname_count_labels(sign), &m); 206 if(m > *matchcount) { 207 *matchcount = m; 208 *signer_name = sign; 209 (void)dname_count_size_labels(*signer_name, 210 signer_len); 211 } 212 } 213 } 214 } 215 216 void 217 val_find_signer(enum val_classification subtype, struct query_info* qinf, 218 struct reply_info* rep, size_t skip, uint8_t** signer_name, 219 size_t* signer_len) 220 { 221 size_t i; 222 223 if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE) { 224 /* check for the answer rrset */ 225 for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) { 226 if(query_dname_compare(qinf->qname, 227 rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0) { 228 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i], 229 signer_name, signer_len); 230 return; 231 } 232 } 233 *signer_name = NULL; 234 *signer_len = 0; 235 } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME) { 236 /* check for the first signed cname/dname rrset */ 237 for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) { 238 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i], 239 signer_name, signer_len); 240 if(*signer_name) 241 return; 242 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) 243 break; /* only check CNAME after a DNAME */ 244 } 245 *signer_name = NULL; 246 *signer_len = 0; 247 } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR 248 || subtype == VAL_CLASS_NODATA) { 249 /*Check to see if the AUTH section NSEC record(s) have rrsigs*/ 250 for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i< 251 rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) { 252 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC 253 || ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == 254 LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) { 255 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i], 256 signer_name, signer_len); 257 return; 258 } 259 } 260 } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER) { 261 /* find closest superdomain signer name in authority section 262 * NSEC and NSEC3s */ 263 int matchcount = 0; 264 *signer_name = NULL; 265 *signer_len = 0; 266 for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<rep->an_numrrsets+rep-> 267 ns_numrrsets; i++) { 268 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC 269 || ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == 270 LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) { 271 val_find_best_signer(rep->rrsets[i], qinf, 272 signer_name, signer_len, &matchcount); 273 } 274 } 275 } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_ANY) { 276 /* check for one of the answer rrset that has signatures, 277 * or potentially a DNAME is in use with a different qname */ 278 for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) { 279 if(query_dname_compare(qinf->qname, 280 rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0) { 281 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i], 282 signer_name, signer_len); 283 if(*signer_name) 284 return; 285 } 286 } 287 /* no answer RRSIGs with qname, try a DNAME */ 288 if(skip < rep->an_numrrsets && 289 ntohs(rep->rrsets[skip]->rk.type) == 290 LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) { 291 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[skip], 292 signer_name, signer_len); 293 if(*signer_name) 294 return; 295 } 296 *signer_name = NULL; 297 *signer_len = 0; 298 } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL) { 299 /* find keys for the item at skip */ 300 if(skip < rep->rrset_count) { 301 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[skip], 302 signer_name, signer_len); 303 return; 304 } 305 *signer_name = NULL; 306 *signer_len = 0; 307 } else { 308 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "find_signer: could not find signer name" 309 " for unknown type response"); 310 *signer_name = NULL; 311 *signer_len = 0; 312 } 313 } 314 315 /** return number of rrs in an rrset */ 316 static size_t 317 rrset_get_count(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset) 318 { 319 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*) 320 rrset->entry.data; 321 if(!d) return 0; 322 return d->count; 323 } 324 325 /** return TTL of rrset */ 326 static uint32_t 327 rrset_get_ttl(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset) 328 { 329 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*) 330 rrset->entry.data; 331 if(!d) return 0; 332 return d->ttl; 333 } 334 335 enum sec_status 336 val_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, 337 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* keys, 338 uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason, sldns_pkt_section section, 339 struct module_qstate* qstate) 340 { 341 enum sec_status sec; 342 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset-> 343 entry.data; 344 if(d->security == sec_status_secure) { 345 /* re-verify all other statuses, because keyset may change*/ 346 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "verify rrset cached", 347 rrset->rk.dname, ntohs(rrset->rk.type), 348 ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class)); 349 return d->security; 350 } 351 /* check in the cache if verification has already been done */ 352 rrset_check_sec_status(env->rrset_cache, rrset, *env->now); 353 if(d->security == sec_status_secure) { 354 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "verify rrset from cache", 355 rrset->rk.dname, ntohs(rrset->rk.type), 356 ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class)); 357 return d->security; 358 } 359 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "verify rrset", rrset->rk.dname, 360 ntohs(rrset->rk.type), ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class)); 361 sec = dnskeyset_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, keys, sigalg, reason, 362 section, qstate); 363 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "verify result: %s", sec_status_to_string(sec)); 364 regional_free_all(env->scratch); 365 366 /* update rrset security status 367 * only improves security status 368 * and bogus is set only once, even if we rechecked the status */ 369 if(sec > d->security) { 370 d->security = sec; 371 if(sec == sec_status_secure) 372 d->trust = rrset_trust_validated; 373 else if(sec == sec_status_bogus) { 374 size_t i; 375 /* update ttl for rrset to fixed value. */ 376 d->ttl = ve->bogus_ttl; 377 for(i=0; i<d->count+d->rrsig_count; i++) 378 d->rr_ttl[i] = ve->bogus_ttl; 379 /* leave RR specific TTL: not used for determine 380 * if RRset timed out and clients see proper value. */ 381 lock_basic_lock(&ve->bogus_lock); 382 ve->num_rrset_bogus++; 383 lock_basic_unlock(&ve->bogus_lock); 384 } 385 /* if status updated - store in cache for reuse */ 386 rrset_update_sec_status(env->rrset_cache, rrset, *env->now); 387 } 388 389 return sec; 390 } 391 392 enum sec_status 393 val_verify_rrset_entry(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, 394 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct key_entry_key* kkey, 395 char** reason, sldns_pkt_section section, struct module_qstate* qstate) 396 { 397 /* temporary dnskey rrset-key */ 398 struct ub_packed_rrset_key dnskey; 399 struct key_entry_data* kd = (struct key_entry_data*)kkey->entry.data; 400 enum sec_status sec; 401 dnskey.rk.type = htons(kd->rrset_type); 402 dnskey.rk.rrset_class = htons(kkey->key_class); 403 dnskey.rk.flags = 0; 404 dnskey.rk.dname = kkey->name; 405 dnskey.rk.dname_len = kkey->namelen; 406 dnskey.entry.key = &dnskey; 407 dnskey.entry.data = kd->rrset_data; 408 sec = val_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, &dnskey, kd->algo, reason, 409 section, qstate); 410 return sec; 411 } 412 413 /** verify that a DS RR hashes to a key and that key signs the set */ 414 static enum sec_status 415 verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, 416 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, 417 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, size_t ds_idx, char** reason, 418 struct module_qstate* qstate) 419 { 420 enum sec_status sec = sec_status_bogus; 421 size_t i, num, numchecked = 0, numhashok = 0, numsizesupp = 0; 422 num = rrset_get_count(dnskey_rrset); 423 for(i=0; i<num; i++) { 424 /* Skip DNSKEYs that don't match the basic criteria. */ 425 if(ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, ds_idx) 426 != dnskey_get_algo(dnskey_rrset, i) 427 || dnskey_calc_keytag(dnskey_rrset, i) 428 != ds_get_keytag(ds_rrset, ds_idx)) { 429 continue; 430 } 431 numchecked++; 432 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "attempt DS match algo %d keytag %d", 433 ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, ds_idx), 434 ds_get_keytag(ds_rrset, ds_idx)); 435 436 /* Convert the candidate DNSKEY into a hash using the 437 * same DS hash algorithm. */ 438 if(!ds_digest_match_dnskey(env, dnskey_rrset, i, ds_rrset, 439 ds_idx)) { 440 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS match attempt failed"); 441 continue; 442 } 443 numhashok++; 444 if(!dnskey_size_is_supported(dnskey_rrset, i)) { 445 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS okay but that DNSKEY size is not supported"); 446 numsizesupp++; 447 continue; 448 } 449 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS match digest ok, trying signature"); 450 451 /* Otherwise, we have a match! Make sure that the DNSKEY 452 * verifies *with this key* */ 453 sec = dnskey_verify_rrset(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, 454 dnskey_rrset, i, reason, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate); 455 if(sec == sec_status_secure) { 456 return sec; 457 } 458 /* If it didn't validate with the DNSKEY, try the next one! */ 459 } 460 if(numsizesupp != 0) { 461 /* there is a working DS, but that DNSKEY is not supported */ 462 return sec_status_insecure; 463 } 464 if(numchecked == 0) 465 algo_needs_reason(env, ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, ds_idx), 466 reason, "no keys have a DS"); 467 else if(numhashok == 0) 468 *reason = "DS hash mismatches key"; 469 else if(!*reason) 470 *reason = "keyset not secured by DNSKEY that matches DS"; 471 return sec_status_bogus; 472 } 473 474 int val_favorite_ds_algo(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset) 475 { 476 size_t i, num = rrset_get_count(ds_rrset); 477 int d, digest_algo = 0; /* DS digest algo 0 is not used. */ 478 /* find favorite algo, for now, highest number supported */ 479 for(i=0; i<num; i++) { 480 if(!ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) || 481 !ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i)) { 482 continue; 483 } 484 d = ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i); 485 if(d > digest_algo) 486 digest_algo = d; 487 } 488 return digest_algo; 489 } 490 491 enum sec_status 492 val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, 493 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, 494 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason, 495 struct module_qstate* qstate) 496 { 497 /* as long as this is false, we can consider this DS rrset to be 498 * equivalent to no DS rrset. */ 499 int has_useful_ds = 0, digest_algo, alg; 500 struct algo_needs needs; 501 size_t i, num; 502 enum sec_status sec; 503 504 if(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len != ds_rrset->rk.dname_len || 505 query_dname_compare(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, ds_rrset->rk.dname) 506 != 0) { 507 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset " 508 "by name"); 509 *reason = "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset by name"; 510 return sec_status_bogus; 511 } 512 513 if(sigalg) { 514 /* harden against algo downgrade is enabled */ 515 digest_algo = val_favorite_ds_algo(ds_rrset); 516 algo_needs_init_ds(&needs, ds_rrset, digest_algo, sigalg); 517 } else { 518 /* accept any key algo, any digest algo */ 519 digest_algo = -1; 520 } 521 num = rrset_get_count(ds_rrset); 522 for(i=0; i<num; i++) { 523 /* Check to see if we can understand this DS. 524 * And check it is the strongest digest */ 525 if(!ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) || 526 !ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) || 527 (sigalg && (ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i) != digest_algo))) { 528 continue; 529 } 530 531 sec = verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, 532 ds_rrset, i, reason, qstate); 533 if(sec == sec_status_insecure) 534 continue; 535 536 /* Once we see a single DS with a known digestID and 537 * algorithm, we cannot return INSECURE (with a 538 * "null" KeyEntry). */ 539 has_useful_ds = 1; 540 541 if(sec == sec_status_secure) { 542 if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs, 543 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i))) { 544 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS matched DNSKEY."); 545 if(!dnskeyset_size_is_supported(dnskey_rrset)) { 546 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS works, but dnskeyset contain keys that are unsupported, treat as insecure"); 547 return sec_status_insecure; 548 } 549 return sec_status_secure; 550 } 551 } else if(sigalg && sec == sec_status_bogus) { 552 algo_needs_set_bogus(&needs, 553 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i)); 554 } 555 } 556 557 /* None of the DS's worked out. */ 558 559 /* If no DSs were understandable, then this is OK. */ 560 if(!has_useful_ds) { 561 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "No usable DS records were found -- " 562 "treating as insecure."); 563 return sec_status_insecure; 564 } 565 /* If any were understandable, then it is bad. */ 566 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "Failed to match any usable DS to a DNSKEY."); 567 if(sigalg && (alg=algo_needs_missing(&needs)) != 0) { 568 algo_needs_reason(env, alg, reason, "missing verification of " 569 "DNSKEY signature"); 570 } 571 return sec_status_bogus; 572 } 573 574 struct key_entry_key* 575 val_verify_new_DNSKEYs(struct regional* region, struct module_env* env, 576 struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, 577 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, int downprot, char** reason, 578 struct module_qstate* qstate) 579 { 580 uint8_t sigalg[ALGO_NEEDS_MAX+1]; 581 enum sec_status sec = val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(env, ve, 582 dnskey_rrset, ds_rrset, downprot?sigalg:NULL, reason, qstate); 583 584 if(sec == sec_status_secure) { 585 return key_entry_create_rrset(region, 586 ds_rrset->rk.dname, ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, 587 ntohs(ds_rrset->rk.rrset_class), dnskey_rrset, 588 downprot?sigalg:NULL, *env->now); 589 } else if(sec == sec_status_insecure) { 590 return key_entry_create_null(region, ds_rrset->rk.dname, 591 ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, 592 ntohs(ds_rrset->rk.rrset_class), 593 rrset_get_ttl(ds_rrset), *env->now); 594 } 595 return key_entry_create_bad(region, ds_rrset->rk.dname, 596 ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, ntohs(ds_rrset->rk.rrset_class), 597 BOGUS_KEY_TTL, *env->now); 598 } 599 600 enum sec_status 601 val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, 602 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, 603 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_ds, 604 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_dnskey, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason, 605 struct module_qstate* qstate) 606 { 607 /* as long as this is false, we can consider this anchor to be 608 * equivalent to no anchor. */ 609 int has_useful_ta = 0, digest_algo = 0, alg; 610 struct algo_needs needs; 611 size_t i, num; 612 enum sec_status sec; 613 614 if(ta_ds && (dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len != ta_ds->rk.dname_len || 615 query_dname_compare(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, ta_ds->rk.dname) 616 != 0)) { 617 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset " 618 "by name"); 619 *reason = "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset by name"; 620 return sec_status_bogus; 621 } 622 if(ta_dnskey && (dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len != ta_dnskey->rk.dname_len 623 || query_dname_compare(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, ta_dnskey->rk.dname) 624 != 0)) { 625 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "DNSKEY RRset did not match anchor RRset " 626 "by name"); 627 *reason = "DNSKEY RRset did not match anchor RRset by name"; 628 return sec_status_bogus; 629 } 630 631 if(ta_ds) 632 digest_algo = val_favorite_ds_algo(ta_ds); 633 if(sigalg) { 634 if(ta_ds) 635 algo_needs_init_ds(&needs, ta_ds, digest_algo, sigalg); 636 else memset(&needs, 0, sizeof(needs)); 637 if(ta_dnskey) 638 algo_needs_init_dnskey_add(&needs, ta_dnskey, sigalg); 639 } 640 if(ta_ds) { 641 num = rrset_get_count(ta_ds); 642 for(i=0; i<num; i++) { 643 /* Check to see if we can understand this DS. 644 * And check it is the strongest digest */ 645 if(!ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ta_ds, i) || 646 !ds_key_algo_is_supported(ta_ds, i) || 647 ds_get_digest_algo(ta_ds, i) != digest_algo) 648 continue; 649 650 sec = verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, 651 ta_ds, i, reason, qstate); 652 if(sec == sec_status_insecure) 653 continue; 654 655 /* Once we see a single DS with a known digestID and 656 * algorithm, we cannot return INSECURE (with a 657 * "null" KeyEntry). */ 658 has_useful_ta = 1; 659 660 if(sec == sec_status_secure) { 661 if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs, 662 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ta_ds, i))) { 663 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS matched DNSKEY."); 664 if(!dnskeyset_size_is_supported(dnskey_rrset)) { 665 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "trustanchor works, but dnskeyset contain keys that are unsupported, treat as insecure"); 666 return sec_status_insecure; 667 } 668 return sec_status_secure; 669 } 670 } else if(sigalg && sec == sec_status_bogus) { 671 algo_needs_set_bogus(&needs, 672 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ta_ds, i)); 673 } 674 } 675 } 676 677 /* None of the DS's worked out: check the DNSKEYs. */ 678 if(ta_dnskey) { 679 num = rrset_get_count(ta_dnskey); 680 for(i=0; i<num; i++) { 681 /* Check to see if we can understand this DNSKEY */ 682 if(!dnskey_algo_is_supported(ta_dnskey, i)) 683 continue; 684 if(!dnskey_size_is_supported(ta_dnskey, i)) 685 continue; 686 687 /* we saw a useful TA */ 688 has_useful_ta = 1; 689 690 sec = dnskey_verify_rrset(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, 691 ta_dnskey, i, reason, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate); 692 if(sec == sec_status_secure) { 693 if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs, 694 (uint8_t)dnskey_get_algo(ta_dnskey, i))) { 695 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "anchor matched DNSKEY."); 696 if(!dnskeyset_size_is_supported(dnskey_rrset)) { 697 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "trustanchor works, but dnskeyset contain keys that are unsupported, treat as insecure"); 698 return sec_status_insecure; 699 } 700 return sec_status_secure; 701 } 702 } else if(sigalg && sec == sec_status_bogus) { 703 algo_needs_set_bogus(&needs, 704 (uint8_t)dnskey_get_algo(ta_dnskey, i)); 705 } 706 } 707 } 708 709 /* If no DSs were understandable, then this is OK. */ 710 if(!has_useful_ta) { 711 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "No usable trust anchors were found -- " 712 "treating as insecure."); 713 return sec_status_insecure; 714 } 715 /* If any were understandable, then it is bad. */ 716 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "Failed to match any usable anchor to a DNSKEY."); 717 if(sigalg && (alg=algo_needs_missing(&needs)) != 0) { 718 algo_needs_reason(env, alg, reason, "missing verification of " 719 "DNSKEY signature"); 720 } 721 return sec_status_bogus; 722 } 723 724 struct key_entry_key* 725 val_verify_new_DNSKEYs_with_ta(struct regional* region, struct module_env* env, 726 struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, 727 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_ds_rrset, 728 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_dnskey_rrset, int downprot, 729 char** reason, struct module_qstate* qstate) 730 { 731 uint8_t sigalg[ALGO_NEEDS_MAX+1]; 732 enum sec_status sec = val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(env, ve, 733 dnskey_rrset, ta_ds_rrset, ta_dnskey_rrset, 734 downprot?sigalg:NULL, reason, qstate); 735 736 if(sec == sec_status_secure) { 737 return key_entry_create_rrset(region, 738 dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len, 739 ntohs(dnskey_rrset->rk.rrset_class), dnskey_rrset, 740 downprot?sigalg:NULL, *env->now); 741 } else if(sec == sec_status_insecure) { 742 return key_entry_create_null(region, dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, 743 dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len, 744 ntohs(dnskey_rrset->rk.rrset_class), 745 rrset_get_ttl(dnskey_rrset), *env->now); 746 } 747 return key_entry_create_bad(region, dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, 748 dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len, ntohs(dnskey_rrset->rk.rrset_class), 749 BOGUS_KEY_TTL, *env->now); 750 } 751 752 int 753 val_dsset_isusable(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset) 754 { 755 size_t i; 756 for(i=0; i<rrset_get_count(ds_rrset); i++) { 757 if(ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) && 758 ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i)) 759 return 1; 760 } 761 if(verbosity < VERB_ALGO) 762 return 0; 763 if(rrset_get_count(ds_rrset) == 0) 764 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS is not usable"); 765 else { 766 /* report usability for the first DS RR */ 767 sldns_lookup_table *lt; 768 char herr[64], aerr[64]; 769 lt = sldns_lookup_by_id(sldns_hashes, 770 (int)ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, 0)); 771 if(lt) snprintf(herr, sizeof(herr), "%s", lt->name); 772 else snprintf(herr, sizeof(herr), "%d", 773 (int)ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, 0)); 774 lt = sldns_lookup_by_id(sldns_algorithms, 775 (int)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, 0)); 776 if(lt) snprintf(aerr, sizeof(aerr), "%s", lt->name); 777 else snprintf(aerr, sizeof(aerr), "%d", 778 (int)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, 0)); 779 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS unsupported, hash %s %s, " 780 "key algorithm %s %s", herr, 781 (ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, 0)? 782 "(supported)":"(unsupported)"), aerr, 783 (ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, 0)? 784 "(supported)":"(unsupported)")); 785 } 786 return 0; 787 } 788 789 /** get label count for a signature */ 790 static uint8_t 791 rrsig_get_labcount(struct packed_rrset_data* d, size_t sig) 792 { 793 if(d->rr_len[sig] < 2+4) 794 return 0; /* bad sig length */ 795 return d->rr_data[sig][2+3]; 796 } 797 798 int 799 val_rrset_wildcard(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, uint8_t** wc, 800 size_t* wc_len) 801 { 802 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset-> 803 entry.data; 804 uint8_t labcount; 805 int labdiff; 806 uint8_t* wn; 807 size_t i, wl; 808 if(d->rrsig_count == 0) { 809 return 1; 810 } 811 labcount = rrsig_get_labcount(d, d->count + 0); 812 /* check rest of signatures identical */ 813 for(i=1; i<d->rrsig_count; i++) { 814 if(labcount != rrsig_get_labcount(d, d->count + i)) { 815 return 0; 816 } 817 } 818 /* OK the rrsigs check out */ 819 /* if the RRSIG label count is shorter than the number of actual 820 * labels, then this rrset was synthesized from a wildcard. 821 * Note that the RRSIG label count doesn't count the root label. */ 822 wn = rrset->rk.dname; 823 wl = rrset->rk.dname_len; 824 /* skip a leading wildcard label in the dname (RFC4035 2.2) */ 825 if(dname_is_wild(wn)) { 826 wn += 2; 827 wl -= 2; 828 } 829 labdiff = (dname_count_labels(wn) - 1) - (int)labcount; 830 if(labdiff > 0) { 831 *wc = wn; 832 dname_remove_labels(wc, &wl, labdiff); 833 *wc_len = wl; 834 return 1; 835 } 836 return 1; 837 } 838 839 int 840 val_chase_cname(struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* rep, 841 size_t* cname_skip) { 842 size_t i; 843 /* skip any DNAMEs, go to the CNAME for next part */ 844 for(i = *cname_skip; i < rep->an_numrrsets; i++) { 845 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME && 846 query_dname_compare(qchase->qname, rep->rrsets[i]-> 847 rk.dname) == 0) { 848 qchase->qname = NULL; 849 get_cname_target(rep->rrsets[i], &qchase->qname, 850 &qchase->qname_len); 851 if(!qchase->qname) 852 return 0; /* bad CNAME rdata */ 853 (*cname_skip) = i+1; 854 return 1; 855 } 856 } 857 return 0; /* CNAME classified but no matching CNAME ?! */ 858 } 859 860 /** see if rrset has signer name as one of the rrsig signers */ 861 static int 862 rrset_has_signer(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, uint8_t* name, size_t len) 863 { 864 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset-> 865 entry.data; 866 size_t i; 867 for(i = d->count; i< d->count+d->rrsig_count; i++) { 868 if(d->rr_len[i] > 2+18+len) { 869 /* at least rdatalen + signature + signame (+1 sig)*/ 870 if(!dname_valid(d->rr_data[i]+2+18, d->rr_len[i]-2-18)) 871 continue; 872 if(query_dname_compare(name, d->rr_data[i]+2+18) == 0) 873 { 874 return 1; 875 } 876 } 877 } 878 return 0; 879 } 880 881 void 882 val_fill_reply(struct reply_info* chase, struct reply_info* orig, 883 size_t skip, uint8_t* name, size_t len, uint8_t* signer) 884 { 885 size_t i; 886 int seen_dname = 0; 887 chase->rrset_count = 0; 888 chase->an_numrrsets = 0; 889 chase->ns_numrrsets = 0; 890 chase->ar_numrrsets = 0; 891 /* ANSWER section */ 892 for(i=skip; i<orig->an_numrrsets; i++) { 893 if(!signer) { 894 if(query_dname_compare(name, 895 orig->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0) 896 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets++] = 897 orig->rrsets[i]; 898 } else if(seen_dname && ntohs(orig->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == 899 LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME) { 900 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i]; 901 seen_dname = 0; 902 } else if(rrset_has_signer(orig->rrsets[i], name, len)) { 903 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i]; 904 if(ntohs(orig->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == 905 LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) { 906 seen_dname = 1; 907 } 908 } 909 } 910 /* AUTHORITY section */ 911 for(i = (skip > orig->an_numrrsets)?skip:orig->an_numrrsets; 912 i<orig->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets; 913 i++) { 914 if(!signer) { 915 if(query_dname_compare(name, 916 orig->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0) 917 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets+ 918 chase->ns_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i]; 919 } else if(rrset_has_signer(orig->rrsets[i], name, len)) { 920 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets+ 921 chase->ns_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i]; 922 } 923 } 924 /* ADDITIONAL section */ 925 for(i= (skip>orig->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets)? 926 skip:orig->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets; 927 i<orig->rrset_count; i++) { 928 if(!signer) { 929 if(query_dname_compare(name, 930 orig->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0) 931 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets 932 +orig->ns_numrrsets+chase->ar_numrrsets++] 933 = orig->rrsets[i]; 934 } else if(rrset_has_signer(orig->rrsets[i], name, len)) { 935 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets+ 936 chase->ar_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i]; 937 } 938 } 939 chase->rrset_count = chase->an_numrrsets + chase->ns_numrrsets + 940 chase->ar_numrrsets; 941 } 942 943 void val_reply_remove_auth(struct reply_info* rep, size_t index) 944 { 945 log_assert(index < rep->rrset_count); 946 log_assert(index >= rep->an_numrrsets); 947 log_assert(index < rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets); 948 memmove(rep->rrsets+index, rep->rrsets+index+1, 949 sizeof(struct ub_packed_rrset_key*)* 950 (rep->rrset_count - index - 1)); 951 rep->ns_numrrsets--; 952 rep->rrset_count--; 953 } 954 955 void 956 val_check_nonsecure(struct module_env* env, struct reply_info* rep) 957 { 958 size_t i; 959 /* authority */ 960 for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) { 961 if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data) 962 ->security != sec_status_secure) { 963 /* because we want to return the authentic original 964 * message when presented with CD-flagged queries, 965 * we need to preserve AUTHORITY section data. 966 * However, this rrset is not signed or signed 967 * with the wrong keys. Validation has tried to 968 * verify this rrset with the keysets of import. 969 * But this rrset did not verify. 970 * Therefore the message is bogus. 971 */ 972 973 /* check if authority has an NS record 974 * which is bad, and there is an answer section with 975 * data. In that case, delete NS and additional to 976 * be lenient and make a minimal response */ 977 if(rep->an_numrrsets != 0 && 978 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) 979 == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS) { 980 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "truncate to minimal"); 981 rep->ar_numrrsets = 0; 982 rep->rrset_count = rep->an_numrrsets + 983 rep->ns_numrrsets; 984 /* remove this unneeded authority rrset */ 985 memmove(rep->rrsets+i, rep->rrsets+i+1, 986 sizeof(struct ub_packed_rrset_key*)* 987 (rep->rrset_count - i - 1)); 988 rep->ns_numrrsets--; 989 rep->rrset_count--; 990 i--; 991 return; 992 } 993 994 log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "message is bogus, " 995 "non secure rrset", 996 rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname, 997 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type), 998 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.rrset_class)); 999 rep->security = sec_status_bogus; 1000 return; 1001 } 1002 } 1003 /* additional */ 1004 if(!env->cfg->val_clean_additional) 1005 return; 1006 for(i=rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) { 1007 if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data) 1008 ->security != sec_status_secure) { 1009 /* This does not cause message invalidation. It was 1010 * simply unsigned data in the additional. The 1011 * RRSIG must have been truncated off the message. 1012 * 1013 * However, we do not want to return possible bogus 1014 * data to clients that rely on this service for 1015 * their authentication. 1016 */ 1017 /* remove this unneeded additional rrset */ 1018 memmove(rep->rrsets+i, rep->rrsets+i+1, 1019 sizeof(struct ub_packed_rrset_key*)* 1020 (rep->rrset_count - i - 1)); 1021 rep->ar_numrrsets--; 1022 rep->rrset_count--; 1023 i--; 1024 } 1025 } 1026 } 1027 1028 /** check no anchor and unlock */ 1029 static int 1030 check_no_anchor(struct val_anchors* anchors, uint8_t* nm, size_t l, uint16_t c) 1031 { 1032 struct trust_anchor* ta; 1033 if((ta=anchors_lookup(anchors, nm, l, c))) { 1034 lock_basic_unlock(&ta->lock); 1035 } 1036 return !ta; 1037 } 1038 1039 void 1040 val_mark_indeterminate(struct reply_info* rep, struct val_anchors* anchors, 1041 struct rrset_cache* r, struct module_env* env) 1042 { 1043 size_t i; 1044 struct packed_rrset_data* d; 1045 for(i=0; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) { 1046 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data; 1047 if(d->security == sec_status_unchecked && 1048 check_no_anchor(anchors, rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname, 1049 rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname_len, 1050 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.rrset_class))) 1051 { 1052 /* mark as indeterminate */ 1053 d->security = sec_status_indeterminate; 1054 rrset_update_sec_status(r, rep->rrsets[i], *env->now); 1055 } 1056 } 1057 } 1058 1059 void 1060 val_mark_insecure(struct reply_info* rep, uint8_t* kname, 1061 struct rrset_cache* r, struct module_env* env) 1062 { 1063 size_t i; 1064 struct packed_rrset_data* d; 1065 for(i=0; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) { 1066 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data; 1067 if(d->security == sec_status_unchecked && 1068 dname_subdomain_c(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname, kname)) { 1069 /* mark as insecure */ 1070 d->security = sec_status_insecure; 1071 rrset_update_sec_status(r, rep->rrsets[i], *env->now); 1072 } 1073 } 1074 } 1075 1076 size_t 1077 val_next_unchecked(struct reply_info* rep, size_t skip) 1078 { 1079 size_t i; 1080 struct packed_rrset_data* d; 1081 for(i=skip+1; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) { 1082 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data; 1083 if(d->security == sec_status_unchecked) { 1084 return i; 1085 } 1086 } 1087 return rep->rrset_count; 1088 } 1089 1090 const char* 1091 val_classification_to_string(enum val_classification subtype) 1092 { 1093 switch(subtype) { 1094 case VAL_CLASS_UNTYPED: return "untyped"; 1095 case VAL_CLASS_UNKNOWN: return "unknown"; 1096 case VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE: return "positive"; 1097 case VAL_CLASS_CNAME: return "cname"; 1098 case VAL_CLASS_NODATA: return "nodata"; 1099 case VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR: return "nameerror"; 1100 case VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER: return "cnamenoanswer"; 1101 case VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL: return "referral"; 1102 case VAL_CLASS_ANY: return "qtype_any"; 1103 default: 1104 return "bad_val_classification"; 1105 } 1106 } 1107 1108 /** log a sock_list entry */ 1109 static void 1110 sock_list_logentry(enum verbosity_value v, const char* s, struct sock_list* p) 1111 { 1112 if(p->len) 1113 log_addr(v, s, &p->addr, p->len); 1114 else verbose(v, "%s cache", s); 1115 } 1116 1117 void val_blacklist(struct sock_list** blacklist, struct regional* region, 1118 struct sock_list* origin, int cross) 1119 { 1120 /* debug printout */ 1121 if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO) { 1122 struct sock_list* p; 1123 for(p=*blacklist; p; p=p->next) 1124 sock_list_logentry(VERB_ALGO, "blacklist", p); 1125 if(!origin) 1126 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "blacklist add: cache"); 1127 for(p=origin; p; p=p->next) 1128 sock_list_logentry(VERB_ALGO, "blacklist add", p); 1129 } 1130 /* blacklist the IPs or the cache */ 1131 if(!origin) { 1132 /* only add if nothing there. anything else also stops cache*/ 1133 if(!*blacklist) 1134 sock_list_insert(blacklist, NULL, 0, region); 1135 } else if(!cross) 1136 sock_list_prepend(blacklist, origin); 1137 else sock_list_merge(blacklist, region, origin); 1138 } 1139 1140 int val_has_signed_nsecs(struct reply_info* rep, char** reason) 1141 { 1142 size_t i, num_nsec = 0, num_nsec3 = 0; 1143 struct packed_rrset_data* d; 1144 for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) { 1145 if(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type == htons(LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC)) 1146 num_nsec++; 1147 else if(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type == htons(LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3)) 1148 num_nsec3++; 1149 else continue; 1150 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data; 1151 if(d && d->rrsig_count != 0) { 1152 return 1; 1153 } 1154 } 1155 if(num_nsec == 0 && num_nsec3 == 0) 1156 *reason = "no DNSSEC records"; 1157 else if(num_nsec != 0) 1158 *reason = "no signatures over NSECs"; 1159 else *reason = "no signatures over NSEC3s"; 1160 return 0; 1161 } 1162 1163 struct dns_msg* 1164 val_find_DS(struct module_env* env, uint8_t* nm, size_t nmlen, uint16_t c, 1165 struct regional* region, uint8_t* topname) 1166 { 1167 struct dns_msg* msg; 1168 struct query_info qinfo; 1169 struct ub_packed_rrset_key *rrset = rrset_cache_lookup( 1170 env->rrset_cache, nm, nmlen, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, c, 0, 1171 *env->now, 0); 1172 if(rrset) { 1173 /* DS rrset exists. Return it to the validator immediately*/ 1174 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* copy = packed_rrset_copy_region( 1175 rrset, region, *env->now); 1176 lock_rw_unlock(&rrset->entry.lock); 1177 if(!copy) 1178 return NULL; 1179 msg = dns_msg_create(nm, nmlen, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, c, region, 1); 1180 if(!msg) 1181 return NULL; 1182 msg->rep->rrsets[0] = copy; 1183 msg->rep->rrset_count++; 1184 msg->rep->an_numrrsets++; 1185 return msg; 1186 } 1187 /* lookup in rrset and negative cache for NSEC/NSEC3 */ 1188 qinfo.qname = nm; 1189 qinfo.qname_len = nmlen; 1190 qinfo.qtype = LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS; 1191 qinfo.qclass = c; 1192 qinfo.local_alias = NULL; 1193 /* do not add SOA to reply message, it is going to be used internal */ 1194 msg = val_neg_getmsg(env->neg_cache, &qinfo, region, env->rrset_cache, 1195 env->scratch_buffer, *env->now, 0, topname, env->cfg); 1196 return msg; 1197 } 1198