1 /* 2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 3 * 4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use 5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy 6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at 7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html 8 */ 9 10 #include <stdio.h> 11 #include "internal/cryptlib.h" 12 #include <openssl/asn1.h> 13 #include <openssl/objects.h> 14 #include <openssl/x509.h> 15 #include <openssl/x509v3.h> 16 #include "internal/x509_int.h" 17 18 int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) 19 { 20 int i; 21 const X509_CINF *ai, *bi; 22 23 ai = &a->cert_info; 24 bi = &b->cert_info; 25 i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&ai->serialNumber, &bi->serialNumber); 26 if (i) 27 return i; 28 return X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer); 29 } 30 31 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 32 unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a) 33 { 34 unsigned long ret = 0; 35 EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); 36 unsigned char md[16]; 37 char *f; 38 39 if (ctx == NULL) 40 goto err; 41 f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0); 42 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)) 43 goto err; 44 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f))) 45 goto err; 46 OPENSSL_free(f); 47 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate 48 (ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber.data, 49 (unsigned long)a->cert_info.serialNumber.length)) 50 goto err; 51 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, &(md[0]), NULL)) 52 goto err; 53 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | 54 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) 55 ) & 0xffffffffL; 56 err: 57 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); 58 return ret; 59 } 60 #endif 61 62 int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) 63 { 64 return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.issuer, b->cert_info.issuer); 65 } 66 67 int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) 68 { 69 return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.subject, b->cert_info.subject); 70 } 71 72 int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) 73 { 74 return X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl.issuer, b->crl.issuer); 75 } 76 77 int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) 78 { 79 return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20); 80 } 81 82 X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a) 83 { 84 return a->cert_info.issuer; 85 } 86 87 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) 88 { 89 return X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.issuer); 90 } 91 92 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 93 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) 94 { 95 return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.issuer); 96 } 97 #endif 98 99 X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a) 100 { 101 return a->cert_info.subject; 102 } 103 104 ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) 105 { 106 return &a->cert_info.serialNumber; 107 } 108 109 const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *a) 110 { 111 return &a->cert_info.serialNumber; 112 } 113 114 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) 115 { 116 return X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.subject); 117 } 118 119 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 120 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) 121 { 122 return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.subject); 123 } 124 #endif 125 126 /* 127 * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB: 128 * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const" 129 * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these 130 * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring 131 * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the 132 * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast. 133 */ 134 int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) 135 { 136 int rv; 137 /* ensure hash is valid */ 138 X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0); 139 X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0); 140 141 rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); 142 if (rv) 143 return rv; 144 /* Check for match against stored encoding too */ 145 if (!a->cert_info.enc.modified && !b->cert_info.enc.modified) { 146 if (a->cert_info.enc.len < b->cert_info.enc.len) 147 return -1; 148 if (a->cert_info.enc.len > b->cert_info.enc.len) 149 return 1; 150 return memcmp(a->cert_info.enc.enc, b->cert_info.enc.enc, 151 a->cert_info.enc.len); 152 } 153 return rv; 154 } 155 156 int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) 157 { 158 int ret; 159 160 /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */ 161 162 if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) { 163 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL); 164 if (ret < 0) 165 return -2; 166 } 167 168 if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) { 169 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL); 170 if (ret < 0) 171 return -2; 172 } 173 174 ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen; 175 176 if (ret != 0 || a->canon_enclen == 0) 177 return ret; 178 179 return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen); 180 181 } 182 183 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) 184 { 185 unsigned long ret = 0; 186 unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 187 188 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ 189 i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); 190 if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(), 191 NULL)) 192 return 0; 193 194 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | 195 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) 196 ) & 0xffffffffL; 197 return ret; 198 } 199 200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 201 /* 202 * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding, 203 * this is reasonably efficient. 204 */ 205 206 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x) 207 { 208 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); 209 unsigned long ret = 0; 210 unsigned char md[16]; 211 212 if (md_ctx == NULL) 213 return ret; 214 215 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ 216 i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); 217 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); 218 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL) 219 && EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) 220 && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL)) 221 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | 222 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) 223 ) & 0xffffffffL; 224 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); 225 226 return ret; 227 } 228 #endif 229 230 /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */ 231 X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name, 232 ASN1_INTEGER *serial) 233 { 234 int i; 235 X509 x, *x509 = NULL; 236 237 if (!sk) 238 return NULL; 239 240 x.cert_info.serialNumber = *serial; 241 x.cert_info.issuer = name; 242 243 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { 244 x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); 245 if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0) 246 return x509; 247 } 248 return NULL; 249 } 250 251 X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name) 252 { 253 X509 *x509; 254 int i; 255 256 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { 257 x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); 258 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0) 259 return x509; 260 } 261 return NULL; 262 } 263 264 EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x) 265 { 266 if (x == NULL) 267 return NULL; 268 return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key); 269 } 270 271 EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x) 272 { 273 if (x == NULL) 274 return NULL; 275 return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key); 276 } 277 278 int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k) 279 { 280 const EVP_PKEY *xk; 281 int ret; 282 283 xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); 284 285 if (xk) 286 ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k); 287 else 288 ret = -2; 289 290 switch (ret) { 291 case 1: 292 break; 293 case 0: 294 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); 295 break; 296 case -1: 297 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); 298 break; 299 case -2: 300 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); 301 } 302 if (ret > 0) 303 return 1; 304 return 0; 305 } 306 307 /* 308 * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID 309 * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a 310 * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags. 311 */ 312 313 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 314 315 static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags) 316 { 317 const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL; 318 int curve_nid; 319 if (pkey && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) 320 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)); 321 if (!grp) 322 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM; 323 curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); 324 /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */ 325 if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */ 326 /* 327 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve. 328 */ 329 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384) 330 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; 331 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS)) 332 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; 333 /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */ 334 *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY; 335 } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */ 336 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256) 337 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; 338 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY)) 339 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; 340 } else 341 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE; 342 343 return X509_V_OK; 344 } 345 346 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, 347 unsigned long flags) 348 { 349 int rv, i, sign_nid; 350 EVP_PKEY *pk; 351 unsigned long tflags = flags; 352 353 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) 354 return X509_V_OK; 355 356 /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */ 357 if (x == NULL) { 358 x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); 359 i = 1; 360 } else 361 i = 0; 362 363 pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); 364 365 /* 366 * With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build 367 * a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report 368 * Suite-B errors if applicable. This is indicated via a NULL chain 369 * pointer. All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm. 370 */ 371 if (chain == NULL) 372 return check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); 373 374 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { 375 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; 376 /* Correct error depth */ 377 i = 0; 378 goto end; 379 } 380 381 /* Check EE key only */ 382 rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); 383 if (rv != X509_V_OK) { 384 /* Correct error depth */ 385 i = 0; 386 goto end; 387 } 388 for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { 389 sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); 390 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); 391 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { 392 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; 393 goto end; 394 } 395 pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); 396 rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags); 397 if (rv != X509_V_OK) 398 goto end; 399 } 400 401 /* Final check: root CA signature */ 402 rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags); 403 end: 404 if (rv != X509_V_OK) { 405 /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */ 406 if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM 407 || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i) 408 i--; 409 /* 410 * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384 411 * with P-256. Use more meaningful error. 412 */ 413 if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags) 414 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256; 415 if (perror_depth) 416 *perror_depth = i; 417 } 418 return rv; 419 } 420 421 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) 422 { 423 int sign_nid; 424 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) 425 return X509_V_OK; 426 sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl.sig_alg.algorithm); 427 return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags); 428 } 429 430 #else 431 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, 432 unsigned long flags) 433 { 434 return 0; 435 } 436 437 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) 438 { 439 return 0; 440 } 441 442 #endif 443 /* 444 * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference 445 * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of 446 * each X509 structure. 447 */ 448 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 449 { 450 STACK_OF(X509) *ret; 451 int i; 452 ret = sk_X509_dup(chain); 453 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) { 454 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i); 455 X509_up_ref(x); 456 } 457 return ret; 458 } 459