1 /* 2 * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 3 * 4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use 5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy 6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at 7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html 8 */ 9 10 #include <stdio.h> 11 #include "internal/cryptlib.h" 12 #include <openssl/asn1.h> 13 #include <openssl/objects.h> 14 #include <openssl/x509.h> 15 #include <openssl/x509v3.h> 16 #include "crypto/x509.h" 17 18 int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) 19 { 20 int i; 21 const X509_CINF *ai, *bi; 22 23 ai = &a->cert_info; 24 bi = &b->cert_info; 25 i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&ai->serialNumber, &bi->serialNumber); 26 if (i) 27 return i; 28 return X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer); 29 } 30 31 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 32 unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a) 33 { 34 unsigned long ret = 0; 35 EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); 36 unsigned char md[16]; 37 char *f; 38 39 if (ctx == NULL) 40 goto err; 41 f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0); 42 if (f == NULL) 43 goto err; 44 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)) 45 goto err; 46 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f))) 47 goto err; 48 OPENSSL_free(f); 49 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate 50 (ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber.data, 51 (unsigned long)a->cert_info.serialNumber.length)) 52 goto err; 53 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, &(md[0]), NULL)) 54 goto err; 55 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | 56 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) 57 ) & 0xffffffffL; 58 err: 59 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); 60 return ret; 61 } 62 #endif 63 64 int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) 65 { 66 return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.issuer, b->cert_info.issuer); 67 } 68 69 int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) 70 { 71 return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.subject, b->cert_info.subject); 72 } 73 74 int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) 75 { 76 return X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl.issuer, b->crl.issuer); 77 } 78 79 int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) 80 { 81 return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20); 82 } 83 84 X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a) 85 { 86 return a->cert_info.issuer; 87 } 88 89 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) 90 { 91 return X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.issuer); 92 } 93 94 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 95 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) 96 { 97 return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.issuer); 98 } 99 #endif 100 101 X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a) 102 { 103 return a->cert_info.subject; 104 } 105 106 ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) 107 { 108 return &a->cert_info.serialNumber; 109 } 110 111 const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *a) 112 { 113 return &a->cert_info.serialNumber; 114 } 115 116 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) 117 { 118 return X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.subject); 119 } 120 121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 122 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) 123 { 124 return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.subject); 125 } 126 #endif 127 128 /* 129 * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB: 130 * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const" 131 * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these 132 * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring 133 * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the 134 * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast. 135 */ 136 int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) 137 { 138 int rv = 0; 139 140 if (a == b) /* for efficiency */ 141 return 0; 142 143 /* try to make sure hash is valid */ 144 (void)X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0); 145 (void)X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0); 146 147 if ((a->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0 148 && (b->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0) 149 rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); 150 if (rv != 0) 151 return rv; 152 153 /* Check for match against stored encoding too */ 154 if (!a->cert_info.enc.modified && !b->cert_info.enc.modified) { 155 if (a->cert_info.enc.len < b->cert_info.enc.len) 156 return -1; 157 if (a->cert_info.enc.len > b->cert_info.enc.len) 158 return 1; 159 return memcmp(a->cert_info.enc.enc, b->cert_info.enc.enc, 160 a->cert_info.enc.len); 161 } 162 return rv; 163 } 164 165 int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) 166 { 167 int ret; 168 169 /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */ 170 171 if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) { 172 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL); 173 if (ret < 0) 174 return -2; 175 } 176 177 if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) { 178 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL); 179 if (ret < 0) 180 return -2; 181 } 182 183 ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen; 184 185 if (ret != 0 || a->canon_enclen == 0) 186 return ret; 187 188 return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen); 189 190 } 191 192 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) 193 { 194 unsigned long ret = 0; 195 unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 196 197 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ 198 i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); 199 if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(), 200 NULL)) 201 return 0; 202 203 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | 204 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) 205 ) & 0xffffffffL; 206 return ret; 207 } 208 209 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 210 /* 211 * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding, 212 * this is reasonably efficient. 213 */ 214 215 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x) 216 { 217 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); 218 unsigned long ret = 0; 219 unsigned char md[16]; 220 221 if (md_ctx == NULL) 222 return ret; 223 224 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ 225 i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); 226 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); 227 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL) 228 && EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) 229 && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL)) 230 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | 231 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) 232 ) & 0xffffffffL; 233 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); 234 235 return ret; 236 } 237 #endif 238 239 /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */ 240 X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name, 241 ASN1_INTEGER *serial) 242 { 243 int i; 244 X509 x, *x509 = NULL; 245 246 if (!sk) 247 return NULL; 248 249 x.cert_info.serialNumber = *serial; 250 x.cert_info.issuer = name; 251 252 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { 253 x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); 254 if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0) 255 return x509; 256 } 257 return NULL; 258 } 259 260 X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name) 261 { 262 X509 *x509; 263 int i; 264 265 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { 266 x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); 267 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0) 268 return x509; 269 } 270 return NULL; 271 } 272 273 EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x) 274 { 275 if (x == NULL) 276 return NULL; 277 return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key); 278 } 279 280 EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x) 281 { 282 if (x == NULL) 283 return NULL; 284 return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key); 285 } 286 287 int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k) 288 { 289 const EVP_PKEY *xk; 290 int ret; 291 292 xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); 293 294 if (xk) 295 ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k); 296 else 297 ret = -2; 298 299 switch (ret) { 300 case 1: 301 break; 302 case 0: 303 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); 304 break; 305 case -1: 306 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); 307 break; 308 case -2: 309 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); 310 } 311 if (ret > 0) 312 return 1; 313 return 0; 314 } 315 316 /* 317 * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID 318 * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a 319 * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags. 320 */ 321 322 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 323 324 static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags) 325 { 326 const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL; 327 int curve_nid; 328 if (pkey && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) 329 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)); 330 if (!grp) 331 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM; 332 curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); 333 /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */ 334 if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */ 335 /* 336 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve. 337 */ 338 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384) 339 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; 340 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS)) 341 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; 342 /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */ 343 *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY; 344 } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */ 345 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256) 346 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; 347 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY)) 348 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; 349 } else 350 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE; 351 352 return X509_V_OK; 353 } 354 355 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, 356 unsigned long flags) 357 { 358 int rv, i, sign_nid; 359 EVP_PKEY *pk; 360 unsigned long tflags = flags; 361 362 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) 363 return X509_V_OK; 364 365 /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */ 366 if (x == NULL) { 367 x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); 368 i = 1; 369 } else 370 i = 0; 371 372 pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); 373 374 /* 375 * With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build 376 * a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report 377 * Suite-B errors if applicable. This is indicated via a NULL chain 378 * pointer. All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm. 379 */ 380 if (chain == NULL) 381 return check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); 382 383 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { 384 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; 385 /* Correct error depth */ 386 i = 0; 387 goto end; 388 } 389 390 /* Check EE key only */ 391 rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); 392 if (rv != X509_V_OK) { 393 /* Correct error depth */ 394 i = 0; 395 goto end; 396 } 397 for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { 398 sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); 399 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); 400 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { 401 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; 402 goto end; 403 } 404 pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); 405 rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags); 406 if (rv != X509_V_OK) 407 goto end; 408 } 409 410 /* Final check: root CA signature */ 411 rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags); 412 end: 413 if (rv != X509_V_OK) { 414 /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */ 415 if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM 416 || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i) 417 i--; 418 /* 419 * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384 420 * with P-256. Use more meaningful error. 421 */ 422 if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags) 423 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256; 424 if (perror_depth) 425 *perror_depth = i; 426 } 427 return rv; 428 } 429 430 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) 431 { 432 int sign_nid; 433 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) 434 return X509_V_OK; 435 sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl.sig_alg.algorithm); 436 return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags); 437 } 438 439 #else 440 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, 441 unsigned long flags) 442 { 443 return 0; 444 } 445 446 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) 447 { 448 return 0; 449 } 450 451 #endif 452 /* 453 * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference 454 * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of 455 * each X509 structure. 456 */ 457 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 458 { 459 STACK_OF(X509) *ret; 460 int i; 461 ret = sk_X509_dup(chain); 462 if (ret == NULL) 463 return NULL; 464 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) { 465 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i); 466 if (!X509_up_ref(x)) 467 goto err; 468 } 469 return ret; 470 err: 471 while (i-- > 0) 472 X509_free (sk_X509_value(ret, i)); 473 sk_X509_free(ret); 474 return NULL; 475 } 476