1 /* 2 * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 3 * 4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use 5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy 6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at 7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html 8 */ 9 10 #include <stdio.h> 11 #include "internal/cryptlib.h" 12 #include <openssl/asn1.h> 13 #include <openssl/objects.h> 14 #include <openssl/x509.h> 15 #include <openssl/x509v3.h> 16 #include <openssl/core_names.h> 17 #include "crypto/x509.h" 18 19 int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) 20 { 21 int i; 22 const X509_CINF *ai, *bi; 23 24 if (b == NULL) 25 return a != NULL; 26 if (a == NULL) 27 return -1; 28 ai = &a->cert_info; 29 bi = &b->cert_info; 30 i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&ai->serialNumber, &bi->serialNumber); 31 if (i != 0) 32 return i < 0 ? -1 : 1; 33 return X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer); 34 } 35 36 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 37 unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a) 38 { 39 unsigned long ret = 0; 40 EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); 41 unsigned char md[16]; 42 char *f = NULL; 43 EVP_MD *digest = NULL; 44 45 if (ctx == NULL) 46 goto err; 47 f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0); 48 if (f == NULL) 49 goto err; 50 digest = EVP_MD_fetch(a->libctx, SN_md5, a->propq); 51 if (digest == NULL) 52 goto err; 53 54 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, digest, NULL)) 55 goto err; 56 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f))) 57 goto err; 58 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate 59 (ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber.data, 60 (unsigned long)a->cert_info.serialNumber.length)) 61 goto err; 62 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, &(md[0]), NULL)) 63 goto err; 64 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | 65 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) 66 ) & 0xffffffffL; 67 err: 68 OPENSSL_free(f); 69 EVP_MD_free(digest); 70 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); 71 return ret; 72 } 73 #endif 74 75 int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) 76 { 77 return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.issuer, b->cert_info.issuer); 78 } 79 80 int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) 81 { 82 return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.subject, b->cert_info.subject); 83 } 84 85 int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) 86 { 87 return X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl.issuer, b->crl.issuer); 88 } 89 90 int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) 91 { 92 int rv; 93 94 if ((a->flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0 95 && (b->flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0) 96 rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); 97 else 98 return -2; 99 100 return rv < 0 ? -1 : rv > 0; 101 } 102 103 X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a) 104 { 105 return a->cert_info.issuer; 106 } 107 108 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) 109 { 110 return X509_NAME_hash_ex(x->cert_info.issuer, NULL, NULL, NULL); 111 } 112 113 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 114 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) 115 { 116 return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.issuer); 117 } 118 #endif 119 120 X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a) 121 { 122 return a->cert_info.subject; 123 } 124 125 ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) 126 { 127 return &a->cert_info.serialNumber; 128 } 129 130 const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *a) 131 { 132 return &a->cert_info.serialNumber; 133 } 134 135 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) 136 { 137 return X509_NAME_hash_ex(x->cert_info.subject, NULL, NULL, NULL); 138 } 139 140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 141 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) 142 { 143 return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.subject); 144 } 145 #endif 146 147 /* 148 * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB: 149 * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const" 150 * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these 151 * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring 152 * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the 153 * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast. 154 */ 155 int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) 156 { 157 int rv = 0; 158 159 if (a == b) /* for efficiency */ 160 return 0; 161 162 /* attempt to compute cert hash */ 163 (void)X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0); 164 (void)X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0); 165 166 if ((a->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0 167 && (b->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0) 168 rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); 169 if (rv != 0) 170 return rv < 0 ? -1 : 1; 171 172 /* Check for match against stored encoding too */ 173 if (!a->cert_info.enc.modified && !b->cert_info.enc.modified) { 174 if (a->cert_info.enc.len < b->cert_info.enc.len) 175 return -1; 176 if (a->cert_info.enc.len > b->cert_info.enc.len) 177 return 1; 178 rv = memcmp(a->cert_info.enc.enc, 179 b->cert_info.enc.enc, a->cert_info.enc.len); 180 } 181 return rv < 0 ? -1 : rv > 0; 182 } 183 184 int ossl_x509_add_cert_new(STACK_OF(X509) **p_sk, X509 *cert, int flags) 185 { 186 if (*p_sk == NULL && (*p_sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { 187 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 188 return 0; 189 } 190 return X509_add_cert(*p_sk, cert, flags); 191 } 192 193 int X509_add_cert(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *cert, int flags) 194 { 195 if (sk == NULL) { 196 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); 197 return 0; 198 } 199 if ((flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP) != 0) { 200 /* 201 * not using sk_X509_set_cmp_func() and sk_X509_find() 202 * because this re-orders the certs on the stack 203 */ 204 int i; 205 206 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { 207 if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(sk, i), cert) == 0) 208 return 1; 209 } 210 } 211 if ((flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_SS) != 0) { 212 int ret = X509_self_signed(cert, 0); 213 214 if (ret != 0) 215 return ret > 0 ? 1 : 0; 216 } 217 if (!sk_X509_insert(sk, cert, 218 (flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND) != 0 ? 0 : -1)) { 219 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 220 return 0; 221 } 222 if ((flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF) != 0) 223 (void)X509_up_ref(cert); 224 return 1; 225 } 226 227 int X509_add_certs(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, int flags) 228 /* compiler would allow 'const' for the certs, yet they may get up-ref'ed */ 229 { 230 if (sk == NULL) { 231 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); 232 return 0; 233 } 234 return ossl_x509_add_certs_new(&sk, certs, flags); 235 } 236 237 int ossl_x509_add_certs_new(STACK_OF(X509) **p_sk, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, 238 int flags) 239 /* compiler would allow 'const' for the certs, yet they may get up-ref'ed */ 240 { 241 int n = sk_X509_num(certs /* may be NULL */); 242 int i; 243 244 for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { 245 int j = (flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND) == 0 ? i : n - 1 - i; 246 /* if prepend, add certs in reverse order to keep original order */ 247 248 if (!ossl_x509_add_cert_new(p_sk, sk_X509_value(certs, j), flags)) 249 return 0; 250 } 251 return 1; 252 } 253 254 int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) 255 { 256 int ret; 257 258 if (b == NULL) 259 return a != NULL; 260 if (a == NULL) 261 return -1; 262 263 /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */ 264 if (a->canon_enc == NULL || a->modified) { 265 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL); 266 if (ret < 0) 267 return -2; 268 } 269 270 if (b->canon_enc == NULL || b->modified) { 271 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL); 272 if (ret < 0) 273 return -2; 274 } 275 276 ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen; 277 if (ret == 0 && a->canon_enclen == 0) 278 return 0; 279 280 if (ret == 0) { 281 if (a->canon_enc == NULL || b->canon_enc == NULL) 282 return -2; 283 ret = memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen); 284 } 285 286 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret > 0; 287 } 288 289 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_ex(const X509_NAME *x, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, 290 const char *propq, int *ok) 291 { 292 unsigned long ret = 0; 293 unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 294 EVP_MD *sha1 = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, "SHA1", propq); 295 296 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ 297 i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); 298 if (ok != NULL) 299 *ok = 0; 300 if (sha1 != NULL 301 && EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, sha1, NULL)) { 302 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | 303 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) 304 ) & 0xffffffffL; 305 if (ok != NULL) 306 *ok = 1; 307 } 308 EVP_MD_free(sha1); 309 return ret; 310 } 311 312 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 313 /* 314 * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding, 315 * this is reasonably efficient. 316 */ 317 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(const X509_NAME *x) 318 { 319 EVP_MD *md5 = EVP_MD_fetch(NULL, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5, "-fips"); 320 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); 321 unsigned long ret = 0; 322 unsigned char md[16]; 323 324 if (md5 == NULL || md_ctx == NULL) 325 goto end; 326 327 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ 328 i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); 329 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, md5, NULL) 330 && EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) 331 && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL)) 332 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | 333 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) 334 ) & 0xffffffffL; 335 336 end: 337 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); 338 EVP_MD_free(md5); 339 340 return ret; 341 } 342 #endif 343 344 /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */ 345 X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, const X509_NAME *name, 346 const ASN1_INTEGER *serial) 347 { 348 int i; 349 X509 x, *x509 = NULL; 350 351 if (!sk) 352 return NULL; 353 354 x.cert_info.serialNumber = *serial; 355 x.cert_info.issuer = (X509_NAME *)name; /* won't modify it */ 356 357 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { 358 x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); 359 if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0) 360 return x509; 361 } 362 return NULL; 363 } 364 365 X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, const X509_NAME *name) 366 { 367 X509 *x509; 368 int i; 369 370 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { 371 x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); 372 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0) 373 return x509; 374 } 375 return NULL; 376 } 377 378 EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x) 379 { 380 if (x == NULL) 381 return NULL; 382 return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key); 383 } 384 385 EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x) 386 { 387 if (x == NULL) 388 return NULL; 389 return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key); 390 } 391 392 int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k) 393 { 394 const EVP_PKEY *xk; 395 int ret; 396 397 xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); 398 if (xk == NULL) { 399 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); 400 return 0; 401 } 402 403 switch (ret = EVP_PKEY_eq(xk, k)) { 404 case 0: 405 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); 406 break; 407 case -1: 408 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); 409 break; 410 case -2: 411 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); 412 break; 413 } 414 415 return ret > 0; 416 } 417 418 /* 419 * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID 420 * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a 421 * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags. 422 */ 423 424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 425 426 static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags) 427 { 428 char curve_name[80]; 429 size_t curve_name_len; 430 int curve_nid; 431 432 if (pkey == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC")) 433 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM; 434 435 if (!EVP_PKEY_get_group_name(pkey, curve_name, sizeof(curve_name), 436 &curve_name_len)) 437 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE; 438 439 curve_nid = OBJ_txt2nid(curve_name); 440 /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */ 441 if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */ 442 /* 443 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve. 444 */ 445 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384) 446 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; 447 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS)) 448 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; 449 /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */ 450 *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY; 451 } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */ 452 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256) 453 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; 454 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY)) 455 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; 456 } else { 457 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE; 458 } 459 return X509_V_OK; 460 } 461 462 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, 463 unsigned long flags) 464 { 465 int rv, i, sign_nid; 466 EVP_PKEY *pk; 467 unsigned long tflags = flags; 468 469 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) 470 return X509_V_OK; 471 472 /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */ 473 if (x == NULL) { 474 x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); 475 i = 1; 476 } else { 477 i = 0; 478 } 479 pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); 480 481 /* 482 * With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build 483 * a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report 484 * Suite-B errors if applicable. This is indicated via a NULL chain 485 * pointer. All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm. 486 */ 487 if (chain == NULL) 488 return check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); 489 490 if (X509_get_version(x) != X509_VERSION_3) { 491 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; 492 /* Correct error depth */ 493 i = 0; 494 goto end; 495 } 496 497 /* Check EE key only */ 498 rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); 499 if (rv != X509_V_OK) { 500 /* Correct error depth */ 501 i = 0; 502 goto end; 503 } 504 for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { 505 sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); 506 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); 507 if (X509_get_version(x) != X509_VERSION_3) { 508 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; 509 goto end; 510 } 511 pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); 512 rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags); 513 if (rv != X509_V_OK) 514 goto end; 515 } 516 517 /* Final check: root CA signature */ 518 rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags); 519 end: 520 if (rv != X509_V_OK) { 521 /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */ 522 if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM 523 || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i) 524 i--; 525 /* 526 * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384 527 * with P-256. Use more meaningful error. 528 */ 529 if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags) 530 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256; 531 if (perror_depth) 532 *perror_depth = i; 533 } 534 return rv; 535 } 536 537 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) 538 { 539 int sign_nid; 540 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) 541 return X509_V_OK; 542 sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl.sig_alg.algorithm); 543 return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags); 544 } 545 546 #else 547 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, 548 unsigned long flags) 549 { 550 return 0; 551 } 552 553 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) 554 { 555 return 0; 556 } 557 558 #endif 559 560 /* 561 * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference 562 * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of 563 * each X509 structure. 564 */ 565 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 566 { 567 STACK_OF(X509) *ret = sk_X509_dup(chain); 568 int i; 569 570 if (ret == NULL) 571 return NULL; 572 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) { 573 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i); 574 575 if (!X509_up_ref(x)) 576 goto err; 577 } 578 return ret; 579 580 err: 581 while (i-- > 0) 582 X509_free(sk_X509_value(ret, i)); 583 sk_X509_free(ret); 584 return NULL; 585 } 586