1 /* 2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 3 * 4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use 5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy 6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at 7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html 8 */ 9 10 #include <stdio.h> 11 #include "internal/cryptlib.h" 12 #include <openssl/asn1.h> 13 #include <openssl/objects.h> 14 #include <openssl/x509.h> 15 #include <openssl/x509v3.h> 16 #include "crypto/x509.h" 17 18 int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) 19 { 20 int i; 21 const X509_CINF *ai, *bi; 22 23 ai = &a->cert_info; 24 bi = &b->cert_info; 25 i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&ai->serialNumber, &bi->serialNumber); 26 if (i) 27 return i; 28 return X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer); 29 } 30 31 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 32 unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a) 33 { 34 unsigned long ret = 0; 35 EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); 36 unsigned char md[16]; 37 char *f; 38 39 if (ctx == NULL) 40 goto err; 41 f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0); 42 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)) 43 goto err; 44 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f))) 45 goto err; 46 OPENSSL_free(f); 47 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate 48 (ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber.data, 49 (unsigned long)a->cert_info.serialNumber.length)) 50 goto err; 51 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, &(md[0]), NULL)) 52 goto err; 53 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | 54 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) 55 ) & 0xffffffffL; 56 err: 57 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); 58 return ret; 59 } 60 #endif 61 62 int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) 63 { 64 return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.issuer, b->cert_info.issuer); 65 } 66 67 int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) 68 { 69 return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.subject, b->cert_info.subject); 70 } 71 72 int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) 73 { 74 return X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl.issuer, b->crl.issuer); 75 } 76 77 int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) 78 { 79 return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20); 80 } 81 82 X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a) 83 { 84 return a->cert_info.issuer; 85 } 86 87 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) 88 { 89 return X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.issuer); 90 } 91 92 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 93 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) 94 { 95 return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.issuer); 96 } 97 #endif 98 99 X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a) 100 { 101 return a->cert_info.subject; 102 } 103 104 ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) 105 { 106 return &a->cert_info.serialNumber; 107 } 108 109 const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *a) 110 { 111 return &a->cert_info.serialNumber; 112 } 113 114 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) 115 { 116 return X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.subject); 117 } 118 119 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 120 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) 121 { 122 return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.subject); 123 } 124 #endif 125 126 /* 127 * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB: 128 * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const" 129 * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these 130 * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring 131 * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the 132 * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast. 133 */ 134 int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) 135 { 136 int rv; 137 138 /* ensure hash is valid */ 139 if (X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0) != 1) 140 return -2; 141 if (X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0) != 1) 142 return -2; 143 144 rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); 145 if (rv) 146 return rv; 147 /* Check for match against stored encoding too */ 148 if (!a->cert_info.enc.modified && !b->cert_info.enc.modified) { 149 if (a->cert_info.enc.len < b->cert_info.enc.len) 150 return -1; 151 if (a->cert_info.enc.len > b->cert_info.enc.len) 152 return 1; 153 return memcmp(a->cert_info.enc.enc, b->cert_info.enc.enc, 154 a->cert_info.enc.len); 155 } 156 return rv; 157 } 158 159 int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) 160 { 161 int ret; 162 163 /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */ 164 165 if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) { 166 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL); 167 if (ret < 0) 168 return -2; 169 } 170 171 if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) { 172 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL); 173 if (ret < 0) 174 return -2; 175 } 176 177 ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen; 178 179 if (ret != 0 || a->canon_enclen == 0) 180 return ret; 181 182 return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen); 183 184 } 185 186 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) 187 { 188 unsigned long ret = 0; 189 unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 190 191 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ 192 i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); 193 if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(), 194 NULL)) 195 return 0; 196 197 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | 198 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) 199 ) & 0xffffffffL; 200 return ret; 201 } 202 203 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 204 /* 205 * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding, 206 * this is reasonably efficient. 207 */ 208 209 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x) 210 { 211 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); 212 unsigned long ret = 0; 213 unsigned char md[16]; 214 215 if (md_ctx == NULL) 216 return ret; 217 218 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ 219 i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); 220 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); 221 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL) 222 && EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) 223 && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL)) 224 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | 225 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) 226 ) & 0xffffffffL; 227 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); 228 229 return ret; 230 } 231 #endif 232 233 /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */ 234 X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name, 235 ASN1_INTEGER *serial) 236 { 237 int i; 238 X509 x, *x509 = NULL; 239 240 if (!sk) 241 return NULL; 242 243 x.cert_info.serialNumber = *serial; 244 x.cert_info.issuer = name; 245 246 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { 247 x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); 248 if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0) 249 return x509; 250 } 251 return NULL; 252 } 253 254 X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name) 255 { 256 X509 *x509; 257 int i; 258 259 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { 260 x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); 261 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0) 262 return x509; 263 } 264 return NULL; 265 } 266 267 EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x) 268 { 269 if (x == NULL) 270 return NULL; 271 return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key); 272 } 273 274 EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x) 275 { 276 if (x == NULL) 277 return NULL; 278 return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key); 279 } 280 281 int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k) 282 { 283 const EVP_PKEY *xk; 284 int ret; 285 286 xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); 287 288 if (xk) 289 ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k); 290 else 291 ret = -2; 292 293 switch (ret) { 294 case 1: 295 break; 296 case 0: 297 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); 298 break; 299 case -1: 300 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); 301 break; 302 case -2: 303 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); 304 } 305 if (ret > 0) 306 return 1; 307 return 0; 308 } 309 310 /* 311 * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID 312 * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a 313 * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags. 314 */ 315 316 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 317 318 static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags) 319 { 320 const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL; 321 int curve_nid; 322 if (pkey && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) 323 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)); 324 if (!grp) 325 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM; 326 curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); 327 /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */ 328 if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */ 329 /* 330 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve. 331 */ 332 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384) 333 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; 334 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS)) 335 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; 336 /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */ 337 *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY; 338 } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */ 339 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256) 340 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; 341 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY)) 342 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; 343 } else 344 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE; 345 346 return X509_V_OK; 347 } 348 349 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, 350 unsigned long flags) 351 { 352 int rv, i, sign_nid; 353 EVP_PKEY *pk; 354 unsigned long tflags = flags; 355 356 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) 357 return X509_V_OK; 358 359 /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */ 360 if (x == NULL) { 361 x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); 362 i = 1; 363 } else 364 i = 0; 365 366 pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); 367 368 /* 369 * With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build 370 * a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report 371 * Suite-B errors if applicable. This is indicated via a NULL chain 372 * pointer. All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm. 373 */ 374 if (chain == NULL) 375 return check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); 376 377 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { 378 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; 379 /* Correct error depth */ 380 i = 0; 381 goto end; 382 } 383 384 /* Check EE key only */ 385 rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); 386 if (rv != X509_V_OK) { 387 /* Correct error depth */ 388 i = 0; 389 goto end; 390 } 391 for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { 392 sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); 393 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); 394 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { 395 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; 396 goto end; 397 } 398 pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); 399 rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags); 400 if (rv != X509_V_OK) 401 goto end; 402 } 403 404 /* Final check: root CA signature */ 405 rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags); 406 end: 407 if (rv != X509_V_OK) { 408 /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */ 409 if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM 410 || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i) 411 i--; 412 /* 413 * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384 414 * with P-256. Use more meaningful error. 415 */ 416 if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags) 417 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256; 418 if (perror_depth) 419 *perror_depth = i; 420 } 421 return rv; 422 } 423 424 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) 425 { 426 int sign_nid; 427 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) 428 return X509_V_OK; 429 sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl.sig_alg.algorithm); 430 return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags); 431 } 432 433 #else 434 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, 435 unsigned long flags) 436 { 437 return 0; 438 } 439 440 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) 441 { 442 return 0; 443 } 444 445 #endif 446 /* 447 * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference 448 * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of 449 * each X509 structure. 450 */ 451 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 452 { 453 STACK_OF(X509) *ret; 454 int i; 455 ret = sk_X509_dup(chain); 456 if (ret == NULL) 457 return NULL; 458 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) { 459 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i); 460 if (!X509_up_ref(x)) 461 goto err; 462 } 463 return ret; 464 err: 465 while (i-- > 0) 466 X509_free (sk_X509_value(ret, i)); 467 sk_X509_free(ret); 468 return NULL; 469 } 470