1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */ 2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58 59 #include <stdio.h> 60 #include <time.h> 61 #include <errno.h> 62 63 #include "cryptlib.h" 64 #include <openssl/crypto.h> 65 #include <openssl/lhash.h> 66 #include <openssl/buffer.h> 67 #include <openssl/evp.h> 68 #include <openssl/asn1.h> 69 #include <openssl/x509.h> 70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h> 71 #include <openssl/objects.h> 72 73 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e); 74 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); 75 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); 76 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 77 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 78 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 79 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 80 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 81 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 82 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; 83 84 85 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) 86 { 87 return ok; 88 } 89 90 #if 0 91 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b) 92 { 93 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b); 94 } 95 #endif 96 97 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 98 { 99 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL; 100 X509_NAME *xn; 101 int bad_chain = 0; 102 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param; 103 int depth,i,ok=0; 104 int num; 105 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 106 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL; 107 if (ctx->cert == NULL) 108 { 109 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); 110 return -1; 111 } 112 113 cb=ctx->verify_cb; 114 115 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is 116 * present and that the first entry is in place */ 117 if (ctx->chain == NULL) 118 { 119 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || 120 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert))) 121 { 122 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 123 goto end; 124 } 125 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 126 ctx->last_untrusted=1; 127 } 128 129 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */ 130 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL 131 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) 132 { 133 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 134 goto end; 135 } 136 137 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 138 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); 139 depth=param->depth; 140 141 142 for (;;) 143 { 144 /* If we have enough, we break */ 145 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take 146 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the 147 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error 148 * code later. 149 */ 150 151 /* If we are self signed, we break */ 152 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); 153 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break; 154 155 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ 156 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) 157 { 158 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x); 159 if (xtmp != NULL) 160 { 161 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp)) 162 { 163 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 164 goto end; 165 } 166 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 167 sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp); 168 ctx->last_untrusted++; 169 x=xtmp; 170 num++; 171 /* reparse the full chain for 172 * the next one */ 173 continue; 174 } 175 } 176 break; 177 } 178 179 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted 180 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one, 181 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */ 182 183 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it 184 * is self signed. 185 */ 186 187 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 188 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1); 189 xn = X509_get_subject_name(x); 190 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) 191 { 192 /* we have a self signed certificate */ 193 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) 194 { 195 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if 196 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact 197 * match to avoid possible impersonation. 198 */ 199 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); 200 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) 201 { 202 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; 203 ctx->current_cert=x; 204 ctx->error_depth=i-1; 205 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp); 206 bad_chain = 1; 207 ok=cb(0,ctx); 208 if (!ok) goto end; 209 } 210 else 211 { 212 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version 213 * so we get any trust settings. 214 */ 215 X509_free(x); 216 x = xtmp; 217 sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); 218 ctx->last_untrusted=0; 219 } 220 } 221 else 222 { 223 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */ 224 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); 225 ctx->last_untrusted--; 226 num--; 227 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); 228 } 229 } 230 231 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ 232 for (;;) 233 { 234 /* If we have enough, we break */ 235 if (depth < num) break; 236 237 /* If we are self signed, we break */ 238 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); 239 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break; 240 241 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); 242 243 if (ok < 0) return ok; 244 if (ok == 0) break; 245 246 x = xtmp; 247 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x)) 248 { 249 X509_free(xtmp); 250 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 251 return 0; 252 } 253 num++; 254 } 255 256 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ 257 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); 258 259 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */ 260 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) 261 { 262 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) 263 { 264 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) 265 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; 266 else 267 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; 268 ctx->current_cert=x; 269 } 270 else 271 { 272 273 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss); 274 num++; 275 ctx->last_untrusted=num; 276 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss; 277 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; 278 chain_ss=NULL; 279 } 280 281 ctx->error_depth=num-1; 282 bad_chain = 1; 283 ok=cb(0,ctx); 284 if (!ok) goto end; 285 } 286 287 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ 288 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx); 289 290 if (!ok) goto end; 291 292 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */ 293 294 if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx); 295 296 if (!ok) goto end; 297 298 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ 299 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); 300 301 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters 302 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification. 303 */ 304 305 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); 306 if(!ok) goto end; 307 308 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */ 309 if (ctx->verify != NULL) 310 ok=ctx->verify(ctx); 311 else 312 ok=internal_verify(ctx); 313 if(!ok) goto end; 314 315 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 316 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ 317 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx); 318 if (!ok) goto end; 319 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx); 320 if (!ok) goto end; 321 #endif 322 323 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ 324 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)) 325 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); 326 if(!ok) goto end; 327 if (0) 328 { 329 end: 330 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); 331 } 332 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp); 333 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss); 334 return ok; 335 } 336 337 338 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) 339 */ 340 341 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) 342 { 343 int i; 344 X509 *issuer; 345 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) 346 { 347 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); 348 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) 349 return issuer; 350 } 351 return NULL; 352 } 353 354 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ 355 356 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) 357 { 358 int ret; 359 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); 360 if (ret == X509_V_OK) 361 return 1; 362 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */ 363 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) 364 return 0; 365 366 ctx->error = ret; 367 ctx->current_cert = x; 368 ctx->current_issuer = issuer; 369 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 370 return 0; 371 } 372 373 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ 374 375 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 376 { 377 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); 378 if (*issuer) 379 { 380 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 381 return 1; 382 } 383 else 384 return 0; 385 } 386 387 388 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency 389 * with the supplied purpose 390 */ 391 392 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 393 { 394 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY 395 return 1; 396 #else 397 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca; 398 X509 *x; 399 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 400 int proxy_path_length = 0; 401 int allow_proxy_certs = 402 !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); 403 cb=ctx->verify_cb; 404 405 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: 406 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct 407 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). 408 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not 409 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. 410 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for 411 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. 412 */ 413 must_be_ca = -1; 414 415 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software 416 happy */ 417 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS")) 418 allow_proxy_certs = 1; 419 420 /* Check all untrusted certificates */ 421 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) 422 { 423 int ret; 424 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 425 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) 426 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) 427 { 428 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION; 429 ctx->error_depth = i; 430 ctx->current_cert = x; 431 ok=cb(0,ctx); 432 if (!ok) goto end; 433 } 434 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) 435 { 436 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED; 437 ctx->error_depth = i; 438 ctx->current_cert = x; 439 ok=cb(0,ctx); 440 if (!ok) goto end; 441 } 442 ret = X509_check_ca(x); 443 switch(must_be_ca) 444 { 445 case -1: 446 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 447 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) 448 { 449 ret = 0; 450 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; 451 } 452 else 453 ret = 1; 454 break; 455 case 0: 456 if (ret != 0) 457 { 458 ret = 0; 459 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; 460 } 461 else 462 ret = 1; 463 break; 464 default: 465 if ((ret == 0) 466 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 467 && (ret != 1))) 468 { 469 ret = 0; 470 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; 471 } 472 else 473 ret = 1; 474 break; 475 } 476 if (ret == 0) 477 { 478 ctx->error_depth = i; 479 ctx->current_cert = x; 480 ok=cb(0,ctx); 481 if (!ok) goto end; 482 } 483 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) 484 { 485 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->param->purpose, 486 must_be_ca > 0); 487 if ((ret == 0) 488 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 489 && (ret != 1))) 490 { 491 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; 492 ctx->error_depth = i; 493 ctx->current_cert = x; 494 ok=cb(0,ctx); 495 if (!ok) goto end; 496 } 497 } 498 /* Check pathlen */ 499 if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) 500 && (i > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) 501 { 502 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; 503 ctx->error_depth = i; 504 ctx->current_cert = x; 505 ok=cb(0,ctx); 506 if (!ok) goto end; 507 } 508 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next 509 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE 510 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a 511 CA certificate. */ 512 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) 513 { 514 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) 515 { 516 ctx->error = 517 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; 518 ctx->error_depth = i; 519 ctx->current_cert = x; 520 ok=cb(0,ctx); 521 if (!ok) goto end; 522 } 523 proxy_path_length++; 524 must_be_ca = 0; 525 } 526 else 527 must_be_ca = 1; 528 } 529 ok = 1; 530 end: 531 return ok; 532 #endif 533 } 534 535 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 536 { 537 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY 538 return 1; 539 #else 540 int i, ok; 541 X509 *x; 542 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 543 cb=ctx->verify_cb; 544 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */ 545 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 546 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 547 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); 548 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) 549 return 1; 550 ctx->error_depth = i; 551 ctx->current_cert = x; 552 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) 553 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; 554 else 555 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED; 556 ok = cb(0, ctx); 557 return ok; 558 #endif 559 } 560 561 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 562 { 563 int i, last, ok; 564 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) 565 return 1; 566 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) 567 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 568 else 569 last = 0; 570 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++) 571 { 572 ctx->error_depth = i; 573 ok = check_cert(ctx); 574 if (!ok) return ok; 575 } 576 return 1; 577 } 578 579 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 580 { 581 X509_CRL *crl = NULL; 582 X509 *x; 583 int ok, cnum; 584 cnum = ctx->error_depth; 585 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); 586 ctx->current_cert = x; 587 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ 588 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); 589 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except 590 * notify callback 591 */ 592 if(!ok) 593 { 594 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; 595 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 596 goto err; 597 } 598 ctx->current_crl = crl; 599 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); 600 if (!ok) goto err; 601 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); 602 err: 603 ctx->current_crl = NULL; 604 X509_CRL_free(crl); 605 return ok; 606 607 } 608 609 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ 610 611 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) 612 { 613 time_t *ptime; 614 int i; 615 ctx->current_crl = crl; 616 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) 617 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; 618 else 619 ptime = NULL; 620 621 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); 622 if (i == 0) 623 { 624 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD; 625 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 626 return 0; 627 } 628 629 if (i > 0) 630 { 631 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID; 632 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 633 return 0; 634 } 635 636 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) 637 { 638 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); 639 640 if (i == 0) 641 { 642 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD; 643 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 644 return 0; 645 } 646 647 if (i < 0) 648 { 649 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED; 650 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 651 return 0; 652 } 653 } 654 655 ctx->current_crl = NULL; 656 657 return 1; 658 } 659 660 /* Lookup CRLs from the supplied list. Look for matching isser name 661 * and validity. If we can't find a valid CRL return the last one 662 * with matching name. This gives more meaningful error codes. Otherwise 663 * we'd get a CRL not found error if a CRL existed with matching name but 664 * was invalid. 665 */ 666 667 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, 668 X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) 669 { 670 int i; 671 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; 672 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) 673 { 674 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); 675 if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) 676 continue; 677 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) 678 { 679 *pcrl = crl; 680 CRYPTO_add(&crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 681 return 1; 682 } 683 best_crl = crl; 684 } 685 if (best_crl) 686 { 687 *pcrl = best_crl; 688 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 689 } 690 691 return 0; 692 } 693 694 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to certificate: currently just a 695 * subject lookup: maybe use AKID later... 696 */ 697 static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 *x) 698 { 699 int ok; 700 X509_CRL *crl = NULL; 701 X509_OBJECT xobj; 702 X509_NAME *nm; 703 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); 704 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, nm, ctx->crls); 705 if (ok) 706 { 707 *pcrl = crl; 708 return 1; 709 } 710 711 ok = X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_CRL, nm, &xobj); 712 713 if (!ok) 714 { 715 /* If we got a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ 716 if (crl) 717 { 718 *pcrl = crl; 719 return 1; 720 } 721 return 0; 722 } 723 724 *pcrl = xobj.data.crl; 725 if (crl) 726 X509_CRL_free(crl); 727 return 1; 728 } 729 730 /* Check CRL validity */ 731 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) 732 { 733 X509 *issuer = NULL; 734 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; 735 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum; 736 cnum = ctx->error_depth; 737 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 738 /* Find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer 739 * is next certificate in chain. 740 */ 741 if(cnum < chnum) 742 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); 743 else 744 { 745 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); 746 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ 747 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) 748 { 749 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER; 750 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 751 if(!ok) goto err; 752 } 753 } 754 755 if(issuer) 756 { 757 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ 758 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && 759 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) 760 { 761 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN; 762 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 763 if(!ok) goto err; 764 } 765 766 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ 767 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer); 768 769 if(!ikey) 770 { 771 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; 772 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 773 if (!ok) goto err; 774 } 775 else 776 { 777 /* Verify CRL signature */ 778 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) 779 { 780 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; 781 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 782 if (!ok) goto err; 783 } 784 } 785 } 786 787 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1); 788 if (!ok) 789 goto err; 790 791 ok = 1; 792 793 err: 794 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey); 795 return ok; 796 } 797 798 /* Check certificate against CRL */ 799 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) 800 { 801 int idx, ok; 802 X509_REVOKED rtmp; 803 STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts; 804 X509_EXTENSION *ext; 805 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL */ 806 rtmp.serialNumber = X509_get_serialNumber(x); 807 /* Sort revoked into serial number order if not already sorted. 808 * Do this under a lock to avoid race condition. 809 */ 810 if (!sk_X509_REVOKED_is_sorted(crl->crl->revoked)) 811 { 812 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); 813 sk_X509_REVOKED_sort(crl->crl->revoked); 814 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); 815 } 816 idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &rtmp); 817 /* If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than 818 * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs. 819 */ 820 if(idx >= 0) 821 { 822 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; 823 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 824 if (!ok) return 0; 825 } 826 827 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) 828 return 1; 829 830 /* See if we have any critical CRL extensions: since we 831 * currently don't handle any CRL extensions the CRL must be 832 * rejected. 833 * This code accesses the X509_CRL structure directly: applications 834 * shouldn't do this. 835 */ 836 837 exts = crl->crl->extensions; 838 839 for (idx = 0; idx < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); idx++) 840 { 841 ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, idx); 842 if (ext->critical > 0) 843 { 844 ctx->error = 845 X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION; 846 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 847 if(!ok) return 0; 848 break; 849 } 850 } 851 return 1; 852 } 853 854 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 855 { 856 int ret; 857 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, 858 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); 859 if (ret == 0) 860 { 861 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 862 return 0; 863 } 864 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ 865 if (ret == -1) 866 { 867 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify 868 * callback. 869 */ 870 X509 *x; 871 int i; 872 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) 873 { 874 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 875 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) 876 continue; 877 ctx->current_cert = x; 878 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; 879 ret = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 880 } 881 return 1; 882 } 883 if (ret == -2) 884 { 885 ctx->current_cert = NULL; 886 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; 887 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 888 } 889 890 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) 891 { 892 ctx->current_cert = NULL; 893 ctx->error = X509_V_OK; 894 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) 895 return 0; 896 } 897 898 return 1; 899 } 900 901 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 902 { 903 time_t *ptime; 904 int i; 905 906 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) 907 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; 908 else 909 ptime = NULL; 910 911 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime); 912 if (i == 0) 913 { 914 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; 915 ctx->current_cert=x; 916 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 917 return 0; 918 } 919 920 if (i > 0) 921 { 922 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; 923 ctx->current_cert=x; 924 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 925 return 0; 926 } 927 928 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime); 929 if (i == 0) 930 { 931 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; 932 ctx->current_cert=x; 933 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 934 return 0; 935 } 936 937 if (i < 0) 938 { 939 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; 940 ctx->current_cert=x; 941 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 942 return 0; 943 } 944 945 return 1; 946 } 947 948 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 949 { 950 int ok=0,n; 951 X509 *xs,*xi; 952 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; 953 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 954 955 cb=ctx->verify_cb; 956 957 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 958 ctx->error_depth=n-1; 959 n--; 960 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); 961 962 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) 963 xs=xi; 964 else 965 { 966 if (n <= 0) 967 { 968 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; 969 ctx->current_cert=xi; 970 ok=cb(0,ctx); 971 goto end; 972 } 973 else 974 { 975 n--; 976 ctx->error_depth=n; 977 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); 978 } 979 } 980 981 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */ 982 while (n >= 0) 983 { 984 ctx->error_depth=n; 985 if (!xs->valid) 986 { 987 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) 988 { 989 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; 990 ctx->current_cert=xi; 991 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); 992 if (!ok) goto end; 993 } 994 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0) 995 /* XXX For the final trusted self-signed cert, 996 * this is a waste of time. That check should 997 * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be 998 * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but 999 * we don't verify again and again in SSL 1000 * handshakes and the like once the cert has 1001 * been declared trusted. */ 1002 { 1003 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; 1004 ctx->current_cert=xs; 1005 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); 1006 if (!ok) 1007 { 1008 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 1009 goto end; 1010 } 1011 } 1012 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 1013 pkey=NULL; 1014 } 1015 1016 xs->valid = 1; 1017 1018 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs); 1019 if (!ok) 1020 goto end; 1021 1022 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ 1023 ctx->current_issuer=xi; 1024 ctx->current_cert=xs; 1025 ok=(*cb)(1,ctx); 1026 if (!ok) goto end; 1027 1028 n--; 1029 if (n >= 0) 1030 { 1031 xi=xs; 1032 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); 1033 } 1034 } 1035 ok=1; 1036 end: 1037 return ok; 1038 } 1039 1040 int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm) 1041 { 1042 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); 1043 } 1044 1045 int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) 1046 { 1047 char *str; 1048 ASN1_TIME atm; 1049 long offset; 1050 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p; 1051 int i,j; 1052 1053 p=buff1; 1054 i=ctm->length; 1055 str=(char *)ctm->data; 1056 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) 1057 { 1058 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0; 1059 memcpy(p,str,10); 1060 p+=10; 1061 str+=10; 1062 } 1063 else 1064 { 1065 if (i < 13) return 0; 1066 memcpy(p,str,12); 1067 p+=12; 1068 str+=12; 1069 } 1070 1071 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) 1072 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; } 1073 else 1074 { 1075 *(p++)= *(str++); 1076 *(p++)= *(str++); 1077 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */ 1078 if (*str == '.') 1079 { 1080 str++; 1081 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++; 1082 } 1083 1084 } 1085 *(p++)='Z'; 1086 *(p++)='\0'; 1087 1088 if (*str == 'Z') 1089 offset=0; 1090 else 1091 { 1092 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-')) 1093 return 0; 1094 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60; 1095 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0'); 1096 if (*str == '-') 1097 offset= -offset; 1098 } 1099 atm.type=ctm->type; 1100 atm.length=sizeof(buff2); 1101 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2; 1102 1103 if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL) 1104 return 0; 1105 1106 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) 1107 { 1108 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0'); 1109 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ 1110 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0'); 1111 if (j < 50) j+=100; 1112 1113 if (i < j) return -1; 1114 if (i > j) return 1; 1115 } 1116 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2); 1117 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ 1118 return -1; 1119 else 1120 return i; 1121 } 1122 1123 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) 1124 { 1125 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); 1126 } 1127 1128 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm) 1129 { 1130 time_t t; 1131 int type = -1; 1132 1133 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm; 1134 else time(&t); 1135 1136 t+=adj; 1137 if (s) type = s->type; 1138 if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t); 1139 if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t); 1140 return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t); 1141 } 1142 1143 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 1144 { 1145 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2; 1146 int i,j; 1147 1148 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1; 1149 1150 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++) 1151 { 1152 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i)); 1153 if (ktmp == NULL) 1154 { 1155 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); 1156 return 0; 1157 } 1158 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) 1159 break; 1160 else 1161 { 1162 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); 1163 ktmp=NULL; 1164 } 1165 } 1166 if (ktmp == NULL) 1167 { 1168 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); 1169 return 0; 1170 } 1171 1172 /* first, populate the other certs */ 1173 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--) 1174 { 1175 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j)); 1176 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp); 1177 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2); 1178 } 1179 1180 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp); 1181 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); 1182 return 1; 1183 } 1184 1185 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, 1186 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) 1187 { 1188 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by 1189 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */ 1190 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp, 1191 new_func, dup_func, free_func); 1192 } 1193 1194 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) 1195 { 1196 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data); 1197 } 1198 1199 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) 1200 { 1201 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx); 1202 } 1203 1204 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1205 { 1206 return ctx->error; 1207 } 1208 1209 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) 1210 { 1211 ctx->error=err; 1212 } 1213 1214 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1215 { 1216 return ctx->error_depth; 1217 } 1218 1219 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1220 { 1221 return ctx->current_cert; 1222 } 1223 1224 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1225 { 1226 return ctx->chain; 1227 } 1228 1229 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1230 { 1231 int i; 1232 X509 *x; 1233 STACK_OF(X509) *chain; 1234 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL; 1235 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) 1236 { 1237 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); 1238 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 1239 } 1240 return chain; 1241 } 1242 1243 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 1244 { 1245 ctx->cert=x; 1246 } 1247 1248 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) 1249 { 1250 ctx->untrusted=sk; 1251 } 1252 1253 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) 1254 { 1255 ctx->crls=sk; 1256 } 1257 1258 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) 1259 { 1260 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); 1261 } 1262 1263 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) 1264 { 1265 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); 1266 } 1267 1268 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust 1269 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its 1270 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by 1271 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default 1272 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value. 1273 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own 1274 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they 1275 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server. 1276 */ 1277 1278 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, 1279 int purpose, int trust) 1280 { 1281 int idx; 1282 /* If purpose not set use default */ 1283 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose; 1284 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ 1285 if (purpose) 1286 { 1287 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; 1288 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); 1289 if (idx == -1) 1290 { 1291 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, 1292 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); 1293 return 0; 1294 } 1295 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); 1296 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) 1297 { 1298 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); 1299 if (idx == -1) 1300 { 1301 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, 1302 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); 1303 return 0; 1304 } 1305 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); 1306 } 1307 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ 1308 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust; 1309 } 1310 if (trust) 1311 { 1312 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); 1313 if (idx == -1) 1314 { 1315 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, 1316 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); 1317 return 0; 1318 } 1319 } 1320 1321 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose; 1322 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust; 1323 return 1; 1324 } 1325 1326 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) 1327 { 1328 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; 1329 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); 1330 if (!ctx) 1331 { 1332 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1333 return NULL; 1334 } 1335 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); 1336 return ctx; 1337 } 1338 1339 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1340 { 1341 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); 1342 OPENSSL_free(ctx); 1343 } 1344 1345 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, 1346 STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 1347 { 1348 int ret = 1; 1349 ctx->ctx=store; 1350 ctx->current_method=0; 1351 ctx->cert=x509; 1352 ctx->untrusted=chain; 1353 ctx->crls = NULL; 1354 ctx->last_untrusted=0; 1355 ctx->other_ctx=NULL; 1356 ctx->valid=0; 1357 ctx->chain=NULL; 1358 ctx->error=0; 1359 ctx->explicit_policy=0; 1360 ctx->error_depth=0; 1361 ctx->current_cert=NULL; 1362 ctx->current_issuer=NULL; 1363 ctx->tree = NULL; 1364 1365 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); 1366 1367 if (!ctx->param) 1368 { 1369 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1370 return 0; 1371 } 1372 1373 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set 1374 * use defaults. 1375 */ 1376 1377 1378 if (store) 1379 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); 1380 else 1381 ctx->param->flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; 1382 1383 if (store) 1384 { 1385 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; 1386 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; 1387 } 1388 else 1389 ctx->cleanup = 0; 1390 1391 if (ret) 1392 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, 1393 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); 1394 1395 if (ret == 0) 1396 { 1397 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1398 return 0; 1399 } 1400 1401 if (store && store->check_issued) 1402 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; 1403 else 1404 ctx->check_issued = check_issued; 1405 1406 if (store && store->get_issuer) 1407 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; 1408 else 1409 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; 1410 1411 if (store && store->verify_cb) 1412 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; 1413 else 1414 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; 1415 1416 if (store && store->verify) 1417 ctx->verify = store->verify; 1418 else 1419 ctx->verify = internal_verify; 1420 1421 if (store && store->check_revocation) 1422 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; 1423 else 1424 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; 1425 1426 if (store && store->get_crl) 1427 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; 1428 else 1429 ctx->get_crl = get_crl; 1430 1431 if (store && store->check_crl) 1432 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; 1433 else 1434 ctx->check_crl = check_crl; 1435 1436 if (store && store->cert_crl) 1437 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; 1438 else 1439 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; 1440 1441 ctx->check_policy = check_policy; 1442 1443 1444 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As 1445 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a 1446 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */ 1447 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */ 1448 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, 1449 &(ctx->ex_data))) 1450 { 1451 OPENSSL_free(ctx); 1452 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1453 return 0; 1454 } 1455 return 1; 1456 } 1457 1458 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. 1459 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. 1460 */ 1461 1462 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) 1463 { 1464 ctx->other_ctx = sk; 1465 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; 1466 } 1467 1468 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1469 { 1470 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx); 1471 if (ctx->param != NULL) 1472 { 1473 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); 1474 ctx->param=NULL; 1475 } 1476 if (ctx->tree != NULL) 1477 { 1478 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); 1479 ctx->tree=NULL; 1480 } 1481 if (ctx->chain != NULL) 1482 { 1483 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free); 1484 ctx->chain=NULL; 1485 } 1486 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); 1487 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); 1488 } 1489 1490 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) 1491 { 1492 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); 1493 } 1494 1495 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) 1496 { 1497 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); 1498 } 1499 1500 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t) 1501 { 1502 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); 1503 } 1504 1505 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 1506 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) 1507 { 1508 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb; 1509 } 1510 1511 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1512 { 1513 return ctx->tree; 1514 } 1515 1516 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1517 { 1518 return ctx->explicit_policy; 1519 } 1520 1521 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) 1522 { 1523 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; 1524 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); 1525 if (!param) 1526 return 0; 1527 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); 1528 } 1529 1530 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1531 { 1532 return ctx->param; 1533 } 1534 1535 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) 1536 { 1537 if (ctx->param) 1538 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); 1539 ctx->param = param; 1540 } 1541 1542 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509) 1543 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509) 1544 1545 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME) 1546 1547 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) 1548 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) 1549