1 /* 2 * Copyright 1995-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 3 * 4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use 5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy 6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at 7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html 8 */ 9 10 #include <stdio.h> 11 #include <limits.h> 12 #include <errno.h> 13 #include "../ssl_local.h" 14 #include <openssl/evp.h> 15 #include <openssl/buffer.h> 16 #include <openssl/rand.h> 17 #include "record_local.h" 18 #include "internal/packet.h" 19 #include "internal/cryptlib.h" 20 21 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \ 22 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \ 23 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ 24 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \ 25 ) 26 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 27 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0 28 #endif 29 30 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s) 31 { 32 rl->s = s; 33 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer); 34 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); 35 } 36 37 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 38 { 39 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; 40 41 /* 42 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not 43 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is 44 * that right? 45 */ 46 47 rl->packet = NULL; 48 rl->packet_length = 0; 49 rl->wnum = 0; 50 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment)); 51 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0; 52 rl->wpend_tot = 0; 53 rl->wpend_type = 0; 54 rl->wpend_ret = 0; 55 rl->wpend_buf = NULL; 56 57 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf); 58 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s); 59 rl->numrpipes = 0; 60 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); 61 62 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl); 63 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl); 64 65 if (rl->d) 66 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl); 67 } 68 69 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 70 { 71 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf)) 72 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s); 73 if (rl->numwpipes > 0) 74 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s); 75 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); 76 } 77 78 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */ 79 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) 80 { 81 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0; 82 } 83 84 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */ 85 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) 86 { 87 size_t curr_rec = 0, num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl); 88 const SSL3_RECORD *rr = rl->rrec; 89 90 while (curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec])) 91 curr_rec++; 92 93 return curr_rec < num_recs; 94 } 95 96 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) 97 { 98 return (rl->numwpipes > 0) 99 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0; 100 } 101 102 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 103 { 104 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence)); 105 } 106 107 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 108 { 109 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); 110 } 111 112 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s) 113 { 114 size_t i, num = 0; 115 116 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY) 117 return 0; 118 119 /* Take into account DTLS buffered app data */ 120 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 121 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; 122 pitem *item, *iter; 123 124 iter = pqueue_iterator(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data.q); 125 while ((item = pqueue_next(&iter)) != NULL) { 126 rdata = item->data; 127 num += rdata->rrec.length; 128 } 129 } 130 131 for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) { 132 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]) 133 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) 134 return num; 135 num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]); 136 } 137 138 return num; 139 } 140 141 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len) 142 { 143 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len; 144 } 145 146 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len) 147 { 148 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len); 149 } 150 151 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s) 152 { 153 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) { 154 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER: 155 return "read header"; 156 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY: 157 return "read body"; 158 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE: 159 return "read done"; 160 default: 161 return "unknown"; 162 } 163 } 164 165 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s) 166 { 167 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) { 168 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER: 169 return "RH"; 170 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY: 171 return "RB"; 172 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE: 173 return "RD"; 174 default: 175 return "unknown"; 176 } 177 } 178 179 /* 180 * Return values are as per SSL_read() 181 */ 182 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold, 183 size_t *readbytes) 184 { 185 /* 186 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase 187 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of 188 * s->rlayer.rbuf.buf specified by s->rlayer.packet and 189 * s->rlayer.packet_length. (If s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may 190 * be stored in rbuf [plus s->rlayer.packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) 191 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if 192 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were 193 */ 194 size_t len, left, align = 0; 195 unsigned char *pkt; 196 SSL3_BUFFER *rb; 197 198 if (n == 0) 199 return 0; 200 201 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf; 202 if (rb->buf == NULL) 203 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) { 204 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 205 return -1; 206 } 207 208 left = rb->left; 209 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 210 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 211 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); 212 #endif 213 214 if (!extend) { 215 /* start with empty packet ... */ 216 if (left == 0) 217 rb->offset = align; 218 219 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset; 220 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0; 221 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ 222 } 223 224 len = s->rlayer.packet_length; 225 pkt = rb->buf + align; 226 /* 227 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already 228 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end 229 */ 230 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) { 231 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left); 232 s->rlayer.packet = pkt; 233 rb->offset = len + align; 234 } 235 236 /* 237 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read 238 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into 239 * the buffer). 240 */ 241 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 242 if (left == 0 && extend) 243 return 0; 244 if (left > 0 && n > left) 245 n = left; 246 } 247 248 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ 249 if (left >= n) { 250 s->rlayer.packet_length += n; 251 rb->left = left - n; 252 rb->offset += n; 253 *readbytes = n; 254 return 1; 255 } 256 257 /* else we need to read more data */ 258 259 if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) { 260 /* does not happen */ 261 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 262 return -1; 263 } 264 265 /* 266 * Ktls always reads full records. 267 * Also, we always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS. 268 */ 269 if (!BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) && !s->rlayer.read_ahead 270 && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 271 /* ignore max parameter */ 272 max = n; 273 } else { 274 if (max < n) 275 max = n; 276 if (max > rb->len - rb->offset) 277 max = rb->len - rb->offset; 278 } 279 280 while (left < n) { 281 size_t bioread = 0; 282 int ret; 283 284 /* 285 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3.rbuf.buf and 286 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if 287 * possible) 288 */ 289 290 clear_sys_error(); 291 if (s->rbio != NULL) { 292 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 293 ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left); 294 if (ret >= 0) 295 bioread = ret; 296 if (ret <= 0 297 && !BIO_should_retry(s->rbio) 298 && BIO_eof(s->rbio)) { 299 if (s->options & SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF) { 300 SSL_set_shutdown(s, SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN); 301 s->s3.warn_alert = SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY; 302 } else { 303 /* 304 * This reason code is part of the API and may be used by 305 * applications for control flow decisions. 306 */ 307 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 308 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EOF_WHILE_READING); 309 } 310 } 311 } else { 312 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); 313 ret = -1; 314 } 315 316 if (ret <= 0) { 317 rb->left = left; 318 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 319 if (len + left == 0) 320 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); 321 return ret; 322 } 323 left += bioread; 324 /* 325 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the 326 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to 327 * byte oriented as in the TLS case. 328 */ 329 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 330 if (n > left) 331 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */ 332 } 333 } 334 335 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ 336 rb->offset += n; 337 rb->left = left - n; 338 s->rlayer.packet_length += n; 339 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 340 *readbytes = n; 341 return 1; 342 } 343 344 /* 345 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if 346 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. 347 */ 348 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len, 349 size_t *written) 350 { 351 const unsigned char *buf = buf_; 352 size_t tot; 353 size_t n, max_send_fragment, split_send_fragment, maxpipes; 354 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 355 size_t nw; 356 #endif 357 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; 358 int i; 359 size_t tmpwrit; 360 361 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 362 tot = s->rlayer.wnum; 363 /* 364 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out 365 * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for 366 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for 367 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be 368 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then 369 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and 370 * report the error in a way the user will notice 371 */ 372 if ((len < s->rlayer.wnum) 373 || ((wb->left != 0) && (len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) { 374 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); 375 return -1; 376 } 377 378 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING 379 && !early_data_count_ok(s, len, 0, 1)) { 380 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 381 return -1; 382 } 383 384 s->rlayer.wnum = 0; 385 386 /* 387 * If we are supposed to be sending a KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket then go 388 * into init unless we have writes pending - in which case we should finish 389 * doing that first. 390 */ 391 if (wb->left == 0 && (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE 392 || s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0)) 393 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); 394 395 /* 396 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in 397 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those 398 * messages yet. 399 */ 400 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) 401 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING) { 402 i = s->handshake_func(s); 403 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 404 if (i < 0) 405 return i; 406 if (i == 0) { 407 return -1; 408 } 409 } 410 411 /* 412 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This 413 * will happen with non blocking IO 414 */ 415 if (wb->left != 0) { 416 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 417 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot, 418 &tmpwrit); 419 if (i <= 0) { 420 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */ 421 s->rlayer.wnum = tot; 422 return i; 423 } 424 tot += tmpwrit; /* this might be last fragment */ 425 } 426 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 427 /* 428 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times* 429 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate 430 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the 431 * compromise is considered worthy. 432 */ 433 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA 434 && len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s)) 435 && s->compress == NULL 436 && s->msg_callback == NULL 437 && !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) 438 && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) 439 && BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) == 0 440 && (EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) 441 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) != 0) { 442 unsigned char aad[13]; 443 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param; 444 size_t packlen; 445 int packleni; 446 447 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */ 448 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0) 449 max_send_fragment -= 512; 450 451 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */ 452 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 453 454 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, 455 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE, 456 (int)max_send_fragment, NULL); 457 458 if (len >= 8 * max_send_fragment) 459 packlen *= 8; 460 else 461 packlen *= 4; 462 463 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) { 464 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 465 return -1; 466 } 467 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */ 468 /* free jumbo buffer */ 469 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 470 *written = tot; 471 return 1; 472 } 473 474 n = (len - tot); 475 for (;;) { 476 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) { 477 /* free jumbo buffer */ 478 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 479 break; 480 } 481 482 if (s->s3.alert_dispatch) { 483 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); 484 if (i <= 0) { 485 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 486 s->rlayer.wnum = tot; 487 return i; 488 } 489 } 490 491 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment) 492 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8); 493 else 494 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4); 495 496 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8); 497 aad[8] = type; 498 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); 499 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); 500 aad[11] = 0; 501 aad[12] = 0; 502 mb_param.out = NULL; 503 mb_param.inp = aad; 504 mb_param.len = nw; 505 506 packleni = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, 507 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD, 508 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param); 509 packlen = (size_t)packleni; 510 if (packleni <= 0 || packlen > wb->len) { /* never happens */ 511 /* free jumbo buffer */ 512 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 513 break; 514 } 515 516 mb_param.out = wb->buf; 517 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot]; 518 mb_param.len = nw; 519 520 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, 521 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT, 522 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0) 523 return -1; 524 525 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave; 526 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) { 527 int j = 6; 528 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ; 529 } 530 531 wb->offset = 0; 532 wb->left = packlen; 533 534 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw; 535 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot]; 536 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type; 537 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw; 538 539 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, &tmpwrit); 540 if (i <= 0) { 541 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 542 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) { 543 /* free jumbo buffer */ 544 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 545 } 546 s->rlayer.wnum = tot; 547 return i; 548 } 549 if (tmpwrit == n) { 550 /* free jumbo buffer */ 551 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 552 *written = tot + tmpwrit; 553 return 1; 554 } 555 n -= tmpwrit; 556 tot += tmpwrit; 557 } 558 } else 559 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK */ 560 if (tot == len) { /* done? */ 561 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 562 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 563 564 *written = tot; 565 return 1; 566 } 567 568 n = (len - tot); 569 570 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s); 571 split_send_fragment = ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s); 572 /* 573 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to 574 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined 575 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using 576 * explicit IVs 577 */ 578 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines; 579 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) { 580 /* 581 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we 582 * shouldn't get here 583 */ 584 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 585 return -1; 586 } 587 if (maxpipes == 0 588 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL 589 || (EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) 590 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) == 0 591 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) 592 maxpipes = 1; 593 if (max_send_fragment == 0 594 || split_send_fragment == 0 595 || split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) { 596 /* 597 * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send 598 * fragments so we shouldn't get here 599 */ 600 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 601 return -1; 602 } 603 604 for (;;) { 605 size_t pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain; 606 size_t numpipes, j; 607 608 if (n == 0) 609 numpipes = 1; 610 else 611 numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1; 612 if (numpipes > maxpipes) 613 numpipes = maxpipes; 614 615 if (n / numpipes >= split_send_fragment) { 616 /* 617 * We have enough data to completely fill all available 618 * pipelines 619 */ 620 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) 621 pipelens[j] = split_send_fragment; 622 } else { 623 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */ 624 tmppipelen = n / numpipes; 625 remain = n % numpipes; 626 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { 627 pipelens[j] = tmppipelen; 628 if (j < remain) 629 pipelens[j]++; 630 } 631 } 632 633 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0, 634 &tmpwrit); 635 if (i <= 0) { 636 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 637 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */ 638 s->rlayer.wnum = tot; 639 return i; 640 } 641 642 if (tmpwrit == n || 643 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && 644 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) { 645 /* 646 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment 647 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: 648 */ 649 s->s3.empty_fragment_done = 0; 650 651 if (tmpwrit == n 652 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) != 0 653 && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 654 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 655 656 *written = tot + tmpwrit; 657 return 1; 658 } 659 660 n -= tmpwrit; 661 tot += tmpwrit; 662 } 663 } 664 665 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, 666 size_t *pipelens, size_t numpipes, 667 int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written) 668 { 669 WPACKET pkt[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; 670 SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; 671 WPACKET *thispkt; 672 SSL3_RECORD *thiswr; 673 unsigned char *recordstart; 674 int i, mac_size, clear = 0; 675 size_t prefix_len = 0; 676 int eivlen = 0; 677 size_t align = 0; 678 SSL3_BUFFER *wb; 679 SSL_SESSION *sess; 680 size_t totlen = 0, len, wpinited = 0; 681 size_t j; 682 683 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) 684 totlen += pipelens[j]; 685 /* 686 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This 687 * will happen with non blocking IO 688 */ 689 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer)) { 690 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ 691 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written); 692 } 693 694 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ 695 if (s->s3.alert_dispatch) { 696 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); 697 if (i <= 0) { 698 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 699 return i; 700 } 701 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ 702 } 703 704 if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes) { 705 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0)) { 706 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 707 return -1; 708 } 709 } 710 711 if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) 712 return 0; 713 714 sess = s->session; 715 716 if ((sess == NULL) 717 || (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) 718 || (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) { 719 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */ 720 mac_size = 0; 721 } else { 722 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(s->write_hash); 723 if (mac_size < 0) { 724 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 725 goto err; 726 } 727 } 728 729 /* 730 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself 731 */ 732 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3.empty_fragment_done) { 733 /* 734 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see 735 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) 736 */ 737 738 if (s->s3.need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { 739 /* 740 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this 741 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these 742 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual 743 * payload) 744 */ 745 size_t tmppipelen = 0; 746 int ret; 747 748 ret = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1, &prefix_len); 749 if (ret <= 0) { 750 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 751 goto err; 752 } 753 754 if (prefix_len > 755 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) { 756 /* insufficient space */ 757 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 758 goto err; 759 } 760 } 761 762 s->s3.empty_fragment_done = 1; 763 } 764 765 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) { 766 /* 767 * ktls doesn't modify the buffer, but to avoid a warning we need to 768 * discard the const qualifier. 769 * This doesn't leak memory because the buffers have been released when 770 * switching to ktls. 771 */ 772 SSL3_BUFFER_set_buf(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], (unsigned char *)buf); 773 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], 0); 774 SSL3_BUFFER_set_app_buffer(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], 1); 775 goto wpacket_init_complete; 776 } 777 778 if (create_empty_fragment) { 779 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; 780 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 781 /* 782 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be 783 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real 784 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers. 785 */ 786 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 787 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); 788 #endif 789 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align); 790 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb), 791 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0) 792 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) { 793 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 794 goto err; 795 } 796 wpinited = 1; 797 } else if (prefix_len) { 798 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; 799 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], 800 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb), 801 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0) 802 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb) 803 + prefix_len, NULL)) { 804 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 805 goto err; 806 } 807 wpinited = 1; 808 } else { 809 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { 810 thispkt = &pkt[j]; 811 812 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j]; 813 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0 814 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 815 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); 816 #endif 817 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align); 818 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb), 819 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0) 820 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, align, NULL)) { 821 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 822 goto err; 823 } 824 wpinited++; 825 } 826 } 827 828 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */ 829 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && !SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)) { 830 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(s->enc_write_ctx); 831 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { 832 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx); 833 if (eivlen < 0) { 834 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); 835 goto err; 836 } 837 if (eivlen <= 1) 838 eivlen = 0; 839 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { 840 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ 841 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 842 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { 843 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 844 } 845 } 846 847 wpacket_init_complete: 848 849 totlen = 0; 850 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */ 851 memset(wr, 0, sizeof(wr)); 852 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { 853 unsigned int version = (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) ? TLS1_2_VERSION 854 : s->version; 855 unsigned char *compressdata = NULL; 856 size_t maxcomplen; 857 unsigned int rectype; 858 859 thispkt = &pkt[j]; 860 thiswr = &wr[j]; 861 862 /* 863 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the 864 * record type 865 */ 866 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) 867 && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL 868 && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS 869 || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) 870 rectype = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA; 871 else 872 rectype = type; 873 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, rectype); 874 875 /* 876 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes 877 * and record version number > TLS 1.0 878 */ 879 if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO 880 && !s->renegotiate 881 && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION 882 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE) 883 version = TLS1_VERSION; 884 SSL3_RECORD_set_rec_version(thiswr, version); 885 886 maxcomplen = pipelens[j]; 887 if (s->compress != NULL) 888 maxcomplen += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD; 889 890 /* 891 * When using offload kernel will write the header. 892 * Otherwise write the header now 893 */ 894 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) 895 && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, rectype) 896 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt, version) 897 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt) 898 || (eivlen > 0 899 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, eivlen, NULL)) 900 || (maxcomplen > 0 901 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, maxcomplen, 902 &compressdata)))) { 903 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 904 goto err; 905 } 906 907 /* lets setup the record stuff. */ 908 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, compressdata); 909 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, pipelens[j]); 910 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr, (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]); 911 totlen += pipelens[j]; 912 913 /* 914 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into 915 * thiswr->data 916 */ 917 918 /* first we compress */ 919 if (s->compress != NULL) { 920 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, thiswr) 921 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, thiswr->length, NULL)) { 922 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); 923 goto err; 924 } 925 } else { 926 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) { 927 SSL3_RECORD_reset_data(&wr[j]); 928 } else { 929 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt, thiswr->input, thiswr->length)) { 930 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 931 goto err; 932 } 933 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]); 934 } 935 } 936 937 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) 938 && !BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) 939 && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL 940 && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS 941 || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { 942 size_t rlen, max_send_fragment; 943 944 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, type)) { 945 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 946 goto err; 947 } 948 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, 1); 949 950 /* Add TLS1.3 padding */ 951 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s); 952 rlen = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr); 953 if (rlen < max_send_fragment) { 954 size_t padding = 0; 955 size_t max_padding = max_send_fragment - rlen; 956 if (s->record_padding_cb != NULL) { 957 padding = s->record_padding_cb(s, type, rlen, s->record_padding_arg); 958 } else if (s->block_padding > 0) { 959 size_t mask = s->block_padding - 1; 960 size_t remainder; 961 962 /* optimize for power of 2 */ 963 if ((s->block_padding & mask) == 0) 964 remainder = rlen & mask; 965 else 966 remainder = rlen % s->block_padding; 967 /* don't want to add a block of padding if we don't have to */ 968 if (remainder == 0) 969 padding = 0; 970 else 971 padding = s->block_padding - remainder; 972 } 973 if (padding > 0) { 974 /* do not allow the record to exceed max plaintext length */ 975 if (padding > max_padding) 976 padding = max_padding; 977 if (!WPACKET_memset(thispkt, 0, padding)) { 978 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 979 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 980 goto err; 981 } 982 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, padding); 983 } 984 } 985 } 986 987 /* 988 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from 989 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points 990 * in the wb->buf 991 */ 992 993 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) && !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) { 994 unsigned char *mac; 995 996 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac) 997 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) { 998 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 999 goto err; 1000 } 1001 } 1002 1003 /* 1004 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption. If 1005 * we are adding the MAC independently of the cipher algorithm, then the 1006 * max encrypted overhead does not need to include an allocation for that 1007 * MAC 1008 */ 1009 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) { 1010 if (!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, 1011 SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD 1012 - mac_size, NULL) 1013 /* 1014 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this 1015 * sub-packet 1016 */ 1017 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)) { 1018 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1019 goto err; 1020 } 1021 1022 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */ 1023 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len; 1024 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, recordstart); 1025 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr); 1026 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, len); 1027 } 1028 } 1029 1030 if (s->statem.enc_write_state == ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS) { 1031 /* 1032 * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to 1033 * send early data - so we need to use the tls13enc function. 1034 */ 1035 if (tls13_enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1, NULL, mac_size) < 1) { 1036 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { 1037 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1038 } 1039 goto err; 1040 } 1041 } else { 1042 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) { 1043 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1, NULL, 1044 mac_size) < 1) { 1045 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { 1046 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1047 } 1048 goto err; 1049 } 1050 } 1051 } 1052 1053 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { 1054 size_t origlen; 1055 1056 thispkt = &pkt[j]; 1057 thiswr = &wr[j]; 1058 1059 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) 1060 goto mac_done; 1061 1062 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */ 1063 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &origlen) 1064 /* Check we allowed enough room for the encryption growth */ 1065 || !ossl_assert(origlen + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD 1066 - mac_size >= thiswr->length) 1067 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */ 1068 || origlen > thiswr->length 1069 || (thiswr->length > origlen 1070 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, 1071 thiswr->length - origlen, 1072 NULL))) { 1073 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1074 goto err; 1075 } 1076 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) { 1077 unsigned char *mac; 1078 1079 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac) 1080 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) { 1081 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1082 goto err; 1083 } 1084 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, mac_size); 1085 } 1086 1087 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len) 1088 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt)) { 1089 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1090 goto err; 1091 } 1092 1093 if (s->msg_callback) { 1094 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len 1095 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 1096 s->msg_callback(1, thiswr->rec_version, SSL3_RT_HEADER, recordstart, 1097 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, 1098 s->msg_callback_arg); 1099 1100 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) { 1101 unsigned char ctype = type; 1102 1103 s->msg_callback(1, thiswr->rec_version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE, 1104 &ctype, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1105 } 1106 } 1107 1108 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt)) { 1109 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1110 goto err; 1111 } 1112 1113 /* header is added by the kernel when using offload */ 1114 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); 1115 1116 if (create_empty_fragment) { 1117 /* 1118 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write 1119 * out anything here 1120 */ 1121 if (j > 0) { 1122 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */ 1123 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1124 goto err; 1125 } 1126 *written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr); 1127 return 1; 1128 } 1129 1130 mac_done: 1131 /* 1132 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which 1133 * is thiswr->length long 1134 */ 1135 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type); /* not needed but helps for 1136 * debugging */ 1137 1138 /* now let's set up wb */ 1139 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j], 1140 prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr)); 1141 } 1142 1143 /* 1144 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write 1145 * retries later 1146 */ 1147 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen; 1148 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf; 1149 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type; 1150 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen; 1151 1152 /* we now just need to write the buffer */ 1153 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written); 1154 err: 1155 for (j = 0; j < wpinited; j++) 1156 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt[j]); 1157 return -1; 1158 } 1159 1160 /* if s->s3.wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this 1161 * 1162 * Return values are as per SSL_write() 1163 */ 1164 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, 1165 size_t *written) 1166 { 1167 int i; 1168 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf; 1169 size_t currbuf = 0; 1170 size_t tmpwrit = 0; 1171 1172 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len) 1173 || (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER) 1174 && (s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf)) 1175 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) { 1176 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); 1177 return -1; 1178 } 1179 1180 for (;;) { 1181 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */ 1182 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0 1183 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) { 1184 currbuf++; 1185 continue; 1186 } 1187 clear_sys_error(); 1188 if (s->wbio != NULL) { 1189 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; 1190 1191 /* 1192 * To prevent coalescing of control and data messages, 1193 * such as in buffer_write, we flush the BIO 1194 */ 1195 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { 1196 i = BIO_flush(s->wbio); 1197 if (i <= 0) 1198 return i; 1199 BIO_set_ktls_ctrl_msg(s->wbio, type); 1200 } 1201 i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *) 1202 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf]) 1203 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]), 1204 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])); 1205 if (i >= 0) 1206 tmpwrit = i; 1207 } else { 1208 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); 1209 i = -1; 1210 } 1211 1212 /* 1213 * When an empty fragment is sent on a connection using KTLS, 1214 * it is sent as a write of zero bytes. If this zero byte 1215 * write succeeds, i will be 0 rather than a non-zero value. 1216 * Treat i == 0 as success rather than an error for zero byte 1217 * writes to permit this case. 1218 */ 1219 if (i >= 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) { 1220 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0); 1221 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit); 1222 if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes) 1223 continue; 1224 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1225 *written = s->rlayer.wpend_ret; 1226 return 1; 1227 } else if (i <= 0) { 1228 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1229 /* 1230 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in 1231 * using a datagram service 1232 */ 1233 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0); 1234 } 1235 return i; 1236 } 1237 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit); 1238 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit); 1239 } 1240 } 1241 1242 /*- 1243 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. 1244 * 'type' is one of the following: 1245 * 1246 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) 1247 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) 1248 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) 1249 * 1250 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first 1251 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). 1252 * 1253 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as 1254 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec 1255 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recvd_type| 1256 * argument is non NULL. 1257 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store 1258 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol 1259 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): 1260 * Change cipher spec protocol 1261 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored 1262 * Alert protocol 1263 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) 1264 * Handshake protocol 1265 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have 1266 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages 1267 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers 1268 * Application data protocol 1269 * none of our business 1270 */ 1271 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, 1272 size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes) 1273 { 1274 int i, j, ret; 1275 size_t n, curr_rec, num_recs, totalbytes; 1276 SSL3_RECORD *rr; 1277 SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; 1278 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; 1279 int is_tls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s); 1280 1281 rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf; 1282 1283 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) { 1284 /* Not initialized yet */ 1285 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) { 1286 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1287 return -1; 1288 } 1289 } 1290 1291 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) 1292 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek 1293 && (type != 1294 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { 1295 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1296 return -1; 1297 } 1298 1299 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) 1300 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ 1301 { 1302 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment; 1303 unsigned char *dst = buf; 1304 unsigned int k; 1305 1306 /* peek == 0 */ 1307 n = 0; 1308 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { 1309 *dst++ = *src++; 1310 len--; 1311 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--; 1312 n++; 1313 } 1314 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ 1315 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++) 1316 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; 1317 1318 if (recvd_type != NULL) 1319 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; 1320 1321 *readbytes = n; 1322 return 1; 1323 } 1324 1325 /* 1326 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. 1327 */ 1328 1329 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) { 1330 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ 1331 i = s->handshake_func(s); 1332 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1333 if (i < 0) 1334 return i; 1335 if (i == 0) 1336 return -1; 1337 } 1338 start: 1339 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1340 1341 /*- 1342 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs] 1343 * rr[i].type - is the type of record 1344 * rr[i].data, - data 1345 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read 1346 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes. 1347 */ 1348 rr = s->rlayer.rrec; 1349 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); 1350 1351 do { 1352 /* get new records if necessary */ 1353 if (num_recs == 0) { 1354 ret = ssl3_get_record(s); 1355 if (ret <= 0) { 1356 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 1357 return ret; 1358 } 1359 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); 1360 if (num_recs == 0) { 1361 /* Shouldn't happen */ 1362 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1363 return -1; 1364 } 1365 } 1366 /* Skip over any records we have already read */ 1367 for (curr_rec = 0; 1368 curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]); 1369 curr_rec++) ; 1370 if (curr_rec == num_recs) { 1371 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0); 1372 num_recs = 0; 1373 curr_rec = 0; 1374 } 1375 } while (num_recs == 0); 1376 rr = &rr[curr_rec]; 1377 1378 if (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0 1379 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE 1380 && SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1381 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, 1382 SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA); 1383 return -1; 1384 } 1385 1386 /* 1387 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty 1388 * record that isn't an alert. 1389 */ 1390 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT 1391 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0) 1392 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0; 1393 1394 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ 1395 1396 if (s->s3.change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, 1397 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ 1398 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { 1399 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, 1400 SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); 1401 return -1; 1402 } 1403 1404 /* 1405 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in 1406 * 'peek' mode) 1407 */ 1408 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { 1409 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); 1410 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1411 return 0; 1412 } 1413 1414 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) 1415 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 1416 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL 1417 && !is_tls13)) { 1418 /* 1419 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or 1420 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or 1421 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 1422 */ 1423 /* 1424 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are 1425 * doing a handshake for the first time 1426 */ 1427 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && 1428 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) { 1429 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); 1430 return -1; 1431 } 1432 1433 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE 1434 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 1435 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) { 1436 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 1437 return -1; 1438 } 1439 1440 if (recvd_type != NULL) 1441 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr); 1442 1443 if (len == 0) { 1444 /* 1445 * Mark a zero length record as read. This ensures multiple calls to 1446 * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause 1447 * SSL_pending() to report data as being available. 1448 */ 1449 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) 1450 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1451 return 0; 1452 } 1453 1454 totalbytes = 0; 1455 do { 1456 if (len - totalbytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) 1457 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); 1458 else 1459 n = len - totalbytes; 1460 1461 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); 1462 buf += n; 1463 if (peek) { 1464 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */ 1465 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) 1466 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1467 } else { 1468 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CLEANSE_PLAINTEXT) 1469 OPENSSL_cleanse(&(rr->data[rr->off]), n); 1470 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n); 1471 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n); 1472 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) { 1473 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; 1474 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0); 1475 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1476 } 1477 } 1478 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0 1479 || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) { 1480 curr_rec++; 1481 rr++; 1482 } 1483 totalbytes += n; 1484 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs 1485 && totalbytes < len); 1486 if (totalbytes == 0) { 1487 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */ 1488 goto start; 1489 } 1490 if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs 1491 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) 1492 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) 1493 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); 1494 *readbytes = totalbytes; 1495 return 1; 1496 } 1497 1498 /* 1499 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message, 1500 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we 1501 * were actually expecting a CCS). 1502 */ 1503 1504 /* 1505 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record 1506 */ 1507 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { 1508 /* 1509 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2 1510 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an 1511 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to 1512 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong 1513 */ 1514 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1515 return -1; 1516 } 1517 1518 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION 1519 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { 1520 /* 1521 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version 1522 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing 1523 * with. We shouldn't be receiving anything other than a ClientHello 1524 * if we are a server. 1525 */ 1526 s->version = rr->rec_version; 1527 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 1528 return -1; 1529 } 1530 1531 /*- 1532 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; 1533 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) 1534 */ 1535 1536 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { 1537 unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr; 1538 unsigned char *alert_bytes = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr) 1539 + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr); 1540 PACKET alert; 1541 1542 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) 1543 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level) 1544 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr) 1545 || PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) { 1546 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT); 1547 return -1; 1548 } 1549 1550 if (s->msg_callback) 1551 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, s, 1552 s->msg_callback_arg); 1553 1554 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 1555 cb = s->info_callback; 1556 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 1557 cb = s->ctx->info_callback; 1558 1559 if (cb != NULL) { 1560 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; 1561 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); 1562 } 1563 1564 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING 1565 || (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED)) { 1566 s->s3.warn_alert = alert_descr; 1567 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1568 1569 s->rlayer.alert_count++; 1570 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) { 1571 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, 1572 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS); 1573 return -1; 1574 } 1575 } 1576 1577 /* 1578 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3 1579 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore. 1580 */ 1581 if (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED) { 1582 goto start; 1583 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY 1584 && (is_tls13 || alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING)) { 1585 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; 1586 return 0; 1587 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL || is_tls13) { 1588 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1589 s->s3.fatal_alert = alert_descr; 1590 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, 1591 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr, 1592 "SSL alert number %d", alert_descr); 1593 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; 1594 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1595 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); 1596 return 0; 1597 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { 1598 /* 1599 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested 1600 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal 1601 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it 1602 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In 1603 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if 1604 * the peer refused it where we carry on. 1605 */ 1606 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1607 return -1; 1608 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { 1609 /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */ 1610 goto start; 1611 } 1612 1613 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); 1614 return -1; 1615 } 1616 1617 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) { 1618 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { 1619 BIO *rbio; 1620 1621 /* 1622 * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are 1623 * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other 1624 * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them 1625 * because we are unable to write any response due to having already 1626 * sent close_notify. 1627 */ 1628 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1629 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); 1630 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1631 1632 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY) != 0) 1633 goto start; 1634 1635 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 1636 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s); 1637 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio); 1638 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio); 1639 return -1; 1640 } 1641 } else { 1642 /* 1643 * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have 1644 * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have 1645 * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled 1646 * above. 1647 * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify 1648 */ 1649 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); 1650 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1651 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, 1652 SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY); 1653 return -1; 1654 } 1655 } 1656 1657 /* 1658 * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we 1659 * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the 1660 * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data 1661 * that we're just going to discard. 1662 */ 1663 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { 1664 size_t dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment); 1665 unsigned char *dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment; 1666 size_t *dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; 1667 1668 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */ 1669 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n) 1670 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */ 1671 1672 /* now move 'n' bytes: */ 1673 memcpy(dest + *dest_len, 1674 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr) + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr), n); 1675 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n); 1676 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n); 1677 *dest_len += n; 1678 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) 1679 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1680 1681 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) 1682 goto start; /* fragment was too small */ 1683 } 1684 1685 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 1686 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 1687 return -1; 1688 } 1689 1690 /* 1691 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or 1692 * protocol violation) 1693 */ 1694 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) 1695 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) { 1696 int ined = (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING); 1697 1698 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */ 1699 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); 1700 1701 i = s->handshake_func(s); 1702 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 1703 if (i < 0) 1704 return i; 1705 if (i == 0) { 1706 return -1; 1707 } 1708 1709 /* 1710 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a 1711 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read 1712 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now. 1713 */ 1714 if (ined) 1715 return -1; 1716 1717 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { 1718 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) { 1719 /* no read-ahead left? */ 1720 BIO *bio; 1721 /* 1722 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we 1723 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry 1724 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty 1725 * problems in the blocking world 1726 */ 1727 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 1728 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); 1729 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); 1730 BIO_set_retry_read(bio); 1731 return -1; 1732 } 1733 } 1734 goto start; 1735 } 1736 1737 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) { 1738 default: 1739 /* 1740 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but 1741 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the 1742 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where 1743 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised 1744 * record types, using up resources processing them. 1745 */ 1746 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); 1747 return -1; 1748 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: 1749 case SSL3_RT_ALERT: 1750 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: 1751 /* 1752 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of 1753 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but 1754 * that should not happen when type != rr->type 1755 */ 1756 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1757 return -1; 1758 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: 1759 /* 1760 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have 1761 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() 1762 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read 1763 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet 1764 * started), we will indulge it. 1765 */ 1766 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) { 1767 s->s3.in_read_app_data = 2; 1768 return -1; 1769 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) { 1770 /* 1771 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data, 1772 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server 1773 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a 1774 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be 1775 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null 1776 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next 1777 * record. 1778 */ 1779 if (!early_data_count_ok(s, rr->length, 1780 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) { 1781 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1782 return -1; 1783 } 1784 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1785 goto start; 1786 } else { 1787 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); 1788 return -1; 1789 } 1790 } 1791 } 1792 1793 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq) 1794 { 1795 int i; 1796 1797 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { 1798 ++seq[i]; 1799 if (seq[i] != 0) 1800 break; 1801 } 1802 } 1803 1804 /* 1805 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible 1806 * format and false otherwise. 1807 */ 1808 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 1809 { 1810 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]); 1811 } 1812 1813 /* 1814 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec 1815 */ 1816 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 1817 { 1818 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]); 1819 } 1820