1 /* 2 * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 3 * 4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use 5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy 6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at 7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html 8 */ 9 10 #include <stdio.h> 11 #include <limits.h> 12 #include <errno.h> 13 #include "../ssl_locl.h" 14 #include <openssl/evp.h> 15 #include <openssl/buffer.h> 16 #include <openssl/rand.h> 17 #include "record_locl.h" 18 #include "../packet_locl.h" 19 20 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \ 21 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \ 22 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ 23 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \ 24 ) 25 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 26 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0 27 #endif 28 29 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s) 30 { 31 rl->s = s; 32 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer); 33 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); 34 } 35 36 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 37 { 38 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; 39 40 /* 41 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not 42 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is 43 * that right? 44 */ 45 46 rl->packet = NULL; 47 rl->packet_length = 0; 48 rl->wnum = 0; 49 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment)); 50 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0; 51 rl->wpend_tot = 0; 52 rl->wpend_type = 0; 53 rl->wpend_ret = 0; 54 rl->wpend_buf = NULL; 55 56 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf); 57 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s); 58 rl->numrpipes = 0; 59 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); 60 61 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl); 62 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl); 63 64 if (rl->d) 65 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl); 66 } 67 68 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 69 { 70 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf)) 71 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s); 72 if (rl->numwpipes > 0) 73 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s); 74 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); 75 } 76 77 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */ 78 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) 79 { 80 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0; 81 } 82 83 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */ 84 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) 85 { 86 size_t curr_rec = 0, num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl); 87 const SSL3_RECORD *rr = rl->rrec; 88 89 while (curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec])) 90 curr_rec++; 91 92 return curr_rec < num_recs; 93 } 94 95 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) 96 { 97 return (rl->numwpipes > 0) 98 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0; 99 } 100 101 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 102 { 103 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence)); 104 } 105 106 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 107 { 108 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); 109 } 110 111 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s) 112 { 113 size_t i, num = 0; 114 115 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY) 116 return 0; 117 118 for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) { 119 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]) 120 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) 121 return 0; 122 num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]); 123 } 124 125 return num; 126 } 127 128 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len) 129 { 130 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len; 131 } 132 133 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len) 134 { 135 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len); 136 } 137 138 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s) 139 { 140 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) { 141 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER: 142 return "read header"; 143 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY: 144 return "read body"; 145 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE: 146 return "read done"; 147 default: 148 return "unknown"; 149 } 150 } 151 152 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s) 153 { 154 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) { 155 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER: 156 return "RH"; 157 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY: 158 return "RB"; 159 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE: 160 return "RD"; 161 default: 162 return "unknown"; 163 } 164 } 165 166 /* 167 * Return values are as per SSL_read() 168 */ 169 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold, 170 size_t *readbytes) 171 { 172 /* 173 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase 174 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of 175 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If 176 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus 177 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) 178 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if 179 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were 180 */ 181 size_t len, left, align = 0; 182 unsigned char *pkt; 183 SSL3_BUFFER *rb; 184 185 if (n == 0) 186 return 0; 187 188 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf; 189 if (rb->buf == NULL) 190 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) { 191 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 192 return -1; 193 } 194 195 left = rb->left; 196 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 197 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 198 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); 199 #endif 200 201 if (!extend) { 202 /* start with empty packet ... */ 203 if (left == 0) 204 rb->offset = align; 205 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { 206 /* 207 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload 208 * alignment... 209 */ 210 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset; 211 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA 212 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) { 213 /* 214 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field 215 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about 216 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no 217 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer 218 * overrun can be triggered. 219 */ 220 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left); 221 rb->offset = align; 222 } 223 } 224 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset; 225 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0; 226 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ 227 } 228 229 len = s->rlayer.packet_length; 230 pkt = rb->buf + align; 231 /* 232 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already 233 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end 234 */ 235 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) { 236 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left); 237 s->rlayer.packet = pkt; 238 rb->offset = len + align; 239 } 240 241 /* 242 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read 243 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into 244 * the buffer). 245 */ 246 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 247 if (left == 0 && extend) 248 return 0; 249 if (left > 0 && n > left) 250 n = left; 251 } 252 253 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ 254 if (left >= n) { 255 s->rlayer.packet_length += n; 256 rb->left = left - n; 257 rb->offset += n; 258 *readbytes = n; 259 return 1; 260 } 261 262 /* else we need to read more data */ 263 264 if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) { 265 /* does not happen */ 266 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, 267 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 268 return -1; 269 } 270 271 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */ 272 if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 273 /* ignore max parameter */ 274 max = n; 275 else { 276 if (max < n) 277 max = n; 278 if (max > rb->len - rb->offset) 279 max = rb->len - rb->offset; 280 } 281 282 while (left < n) { 283 size_t bioread = 0; 284 int ret; 285 286 /* 287 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and 288 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if 289 * possible) 290 */ 291 292 clear_sys_error(); 293 if (s->rbio != NULL) { 294 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 295 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ 296 ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left); 297 if (ret >= 0) 298 bioread = ret; 299 } else { 300 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, 301 SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); 302 ret = -1; 303 } 304 305 if (ret <= 0) { 306 rb->left = left; 307 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 308 if (len + left == 0) 309 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); 310 return ret; 311 } 312 left += bioread; 313 /* 314 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the 315 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to 316 * byte oriented as in the TLS case. 317 */ 318 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 319 if (n > left) 320 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */ 321 } 322 } 323 324 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ 325 rb->offset += n; 326 rb->left = left - n; 327 s->rlayer.packet_length += n; 328 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 329 *readbytes = n; 330 return 1; 331 } 332 333 /* 334 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if 335 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. 336 */ 337 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len, 338 size_t *written) 339 { 340 const unsigned char *buf = buf_; 341 size_t tot; 342 size_t n, max_send_fragment, split_send_fragment, maxpipes; 343 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 344 size_t nw; 345 #endif 346 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; 347 int i; 348 size_t tmpwrit; 349 350 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 351 tot = s->rlayer.wnum; 352 /* 353 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out 354 * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for 355 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for 356 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be 357 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then 358 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and 359 * report the error in a way the user will notice 360 */ 361 if ((len < s->rlayer.wnum) 362 || ((wb->left != 0) && (len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) { 363 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, 364 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); 365 return -1; 366 } 367 368 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING 369 && !early_data_count_ok(s, len, 0, 1)) { 370 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 371 return -1; 372 } 373 374 s->rlayer.wnum = 0; 375 376 /* 377 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in 378 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those 379 * messages yet. 380 */ 381 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) 382 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING) { 383 i = s->handshake_func(s); 384 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 385 if (i < 0) 386 return i; 387 if (i == 0) { 388 return -1; 389 } 390 } 391 392 /* 393 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This 394 * will happen with non blocking IO 395 */ 396 if (wb->left != 0) { 397 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 398 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot, 399 &tmpwrit); 400 if (i <= 0) { 401 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */ 402 s->rlayer.wnum = tot; 403 return i; 404 } 405 tot += tmpwrit; /* this might be last fragment */ 406 } 407 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 408 /* 409 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times* 410 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate 411 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the 412 * compromise is considered worthy. 413 */ 414 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && 415 len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s)) && 416 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL && 417 !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && 418 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) & 419 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) { 420 unsigned char aad[13]; 421 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param; 422 size_t packlen; 423 int packleni; 424 425 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */ 426 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0) 427 max_send_fragment -= 512; 428 429 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */ 430 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 431 432 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, 433 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE, 434 (int)max_send_fragment, NULL); 435 436 if (len >= 8 * max_send_fragment) 437 packlen *= 8; 438 else 439 packlen *= 4; 440 441 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) { 442 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 443 return -1; 444 } 445 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */ 446 /* free jumbo buffer */ 447 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 448 *written = tot; 449 return 1; 450 } 451 452 n = (len - tot); 453 for (;;) { 454 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) { 455 /* free jumbo buffer */ 456 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 457 break; 458 } 459 460 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { 461 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); 462 if (i <= 0) { 463 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 464 s->rlayer.wnum = tot; 465 return i; 466 } 467 } 468 469 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment) 470 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8); 471 else 472 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4); 473 474 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8); 475 aad[8] = type; 476 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); 477 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); 478 aad[11] = 0; 479 aad[12] = 0; 480 mb_param.out = NULL; 481 mb_param.inp = aad; 482 mb_param.len = nw; 483 484 packleni = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, 485 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD, 486 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param); 487 packlen = (size_t)packleni; 488 if (packleni <= 0 || packlen > wb->len) { /* never happens */ 489 /* free jumbo buffer */ 490 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 491 break; 492 } 493 494 mb_param.out = wb->buf; 495 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot]; 496 mb_param.len = nw; 497 498 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, 499 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT, 500 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0) 501 return -1; 502 503 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave; 504 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) { 505 int j = 6; 506 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ; 507 } 508 509 wb->offset = 0; 510 wb->left = packlen; 511 512 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw; 513 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot]; 514 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type; 515 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw; 516 517 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, &tmpwrit); 518 if (i <= 0) { 519 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 520 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) { 521 /* free jumbo buffer */ 522 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 523 } 524 s->rlayer.wnum = tot; 525 return i; 526 } 527 if (tmpwrit == n) { 528 /* free jumbo buffer */ 529 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 530 *written = tot + tmpwrit; 531 return 1; 532 } 533 n -= tmpwrit; 534 tot += tmpwrit; 535 } 536 } else 537 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK */ 538 if (tot == len) { /* done? */ 539 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 540 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 541 542 *written = tot; 543 return 1; 544 } 545 546 n = (len - tot); 547 548 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s); 549 split_send_fragment = ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s); 550 /* 551 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to 552 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined 553 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using 554 * explicit IVs 555 */ 556 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines; 557 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) { 558 /* 559 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we 560 * shouldn't get here 561 */ 562 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, 563 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 564 return -1; 565 } 566 if (maxpipes == 0 567 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL 568 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) 569 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) 570 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) 571 maxpipes = 1; 572 if (max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment == 0 573 || split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) { 574 /* 575 * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send 576 * fragments so we shouldn't get here 577 */ 578 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, 579 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 580 return -1; 581 } 582 583 for (;;) { 584 size_t pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain; 585 size_t numpipes, j; 586 587 if (n == 0) 588 numpipes = 1; 589 else 590 numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1; 591 if (numpipes > maxpipes) 592 numpipes = maxpipes; 593 594 if (n / numpipes >= max_send_fragment) { 595 /* 596 * We have enough data to completely fill all available 597 * pipelines 598 */ 599 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { 600 pipelens[j] = max_send_fragment; 601 } 602 } else { 603 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */ 604 tmppipelen = n / numpipes; 605 remain = n % numpipes; 606 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { 607 pipelens[j] = tmppipelen; 608 if (j < remain) 609 pipelens[j]++; 610 } 611 } 612 613 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0, 614 &tmpwrit); 615 if (i <= 0) { 616 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 617 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */ 618 s->rlayer.wnum = tot; 619 return i; 620 } 621 622 if (tmpwrit == n || 623 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && 624 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) { 625 /* 626 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment 627 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: 628 */ 629 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0; 630 631 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && 632 !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 633 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 634 635 *written = tot + tmpwrit; 636 return 1; 637 } 638 639 n -= tmpwrit; 640 tot += tmpwrit; 641 } 642 } 643 644 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, 645 size_t *pipelens, size_t numpipes, 646 int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written) 647 { 648 WPACKET pkt[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; 649 SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; 650 WPACKET *thispkt; 651 SSL3_RECORD *thiswr; 652 unsigned char *recordstart; 653 int i, mac_size, clear = 0; 654 size_t prefix_len = 0; 655 int eivlen = 0; 656 size_t align = 0; 657 SSL3_BUFFER *wb; 658 SSL_SESSION *sess; 659 size_t totlen = 0, len, wpinited = 0; 660 size_t j; 661 662 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) 663 totlen += pipelens[j]; 664 /* 665 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This 666 * will happen with non blocking IO 667 */ 668 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer)) { 669 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ 670 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written); 671 } 672 673 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ 674 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { 675 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); 676 if (i <= 0) { 677 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 678 return i; 679 } 680 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ 681 } 682 683 if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes) { 684 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0)) { 685 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 686 return -1; 687 } 688 } 689 690 if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) 691 return 0; 692 693 sess = s->session; 694 695 if ((sess == NULL) || 696 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) { 697 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */ 698 mac_size = 0; 699 } else { 700 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */ 701 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); 702 if (mac_size < 0) { 703 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 704 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 705 goto err; 706 } 707 } 708 709 /* 710 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself 711 */ 712 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) { 713 /* 714 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see 715 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) 716 */ 717 718 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { 719 /* 720 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this 721 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these 722 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual 723 * payload) 724 */ 725 size_t tmppipelen = 0; 726 int ret; 727 728 ret = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1, &prefix_len); 729 if (ret <= 0) { 730 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 731 goto err; 732 } 733 734 if (prefix_len > 735 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) { 736 /* insufficient space */ 737 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 738 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 739 goto err; 740 } 741 } 742 743 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; 744 } 745 746 if (create_empty_fragment) { 747 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; 748 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 749 /* 750 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be 751 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real 752 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers. 753 */ 754 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 755 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); 756 #endif 757 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align); 758 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb), 759 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0) 760 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) { 761 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 762 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 763 goto err; 764 } 765 wpinited = 1; 766 } else if (prefix_len) { 767 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; 768 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], 769 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb), 770 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0) 771 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb) 772 + prefix_len, NULL)) { 773 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 774 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 775 goto err; 776 } 777 wpinited = 1; 778 } else { 779 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { 780 thispkt = &pkt[j]; 781 782 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j]; 783 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0 784 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 785 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); 786 #endif 787 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align); 788 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb), 789 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0) 790 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, align, NULL)) { 791 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 792 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 793 goto err; 794 } 795 wpinited++; 796 } 797 } 798 799 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */ 800 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && !SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)) { 801 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx); 802 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { 803 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */ 804 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx); 805 if (eivlen <= 1) 806 eivlen = 0; 807 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { 808 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ 809 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 810 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { 811 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 812 } 813 } 814 815 totlen = 0; 816 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */ 817 memset(wr, 0, sizeof(wr)); 818 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { 819 unsigned int version = (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) ? TLS1_2_VERSION 820 : s->version; 821 unsigned char *compressdata = NULL; 822 size_t maxcomplen; 823 unsigned int rectype; 824 825 thispkt = &pkt[j]; 826 thiswr = &wr[j]; 827 828 /* 829 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the 830 * record type 831 */ 832 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) 833 && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL 834 && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS 835 || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) 836 rectype = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA; 837 else 838 rectype = type; 839 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, rectype); 840 841 /* 842 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes 843 * and record version number > TLS 1.0 844 */ 845 if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO 846 && !s->renegotiate 847 && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION 848 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE) 849 version = TLS1_VERSION; 850 SSL3_RECORD_set_rec_version(thiswr, version); 851 852 maxcomplen = pipelens[j]; 853 if (s->compress != NULL) 854 maxcomplen += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD; 855 856 /* write the header */ 857 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, rectype) 858 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt, version) 859 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt) 860 || (eivlen > 0 861 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, eivlen, NULL)) 862 || (maxcomplen > 0 863 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, maxcomplen, 864 &compressdata))) { 865 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 866 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 867 goto err; 868 } 869 870 /* lets setup the record stuff. */ 871 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, compressdata); 872 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, pipelens[j]); 873 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr, (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]); 874 totlen += pipelens[j]; 875 876 /* 877 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into 878 * thiswr->data 879 */ 880 881 /* first we compress */ 882 if (s->compress != NULL) { 883 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, thiswr) 884 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, thiswr->length, NULL)) { 885 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 886 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); 887 goto err; 888 } 889 } else { 890 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt, thiswr->input, thiswr->length)) { 891 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 892 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 893 goto err; 894 } 895 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]); 896 } 897 898 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) 899 && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL 900 && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS 901 || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { 902 size_t rlen, max_send_fragment; 903 904 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, type)) { 905 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 906 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 907 goto err; 908 } 909 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, 1); 910 911 /* Add TLS1.3 padding */ 912 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s); 913 rlen = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr); 914 if (rlen < max_send_fragment) { 915 size_t padding = 0; 916 size_t max_padding = max_send_fragment - rlen; 917 if (s->record_padding_cb != NULL) { 918 padding = s->record_padding_cb(s, type, rlen, s->record_padding_arg); 919 } else if (s->block_padding > 0) { 920 size_t mask = s->block_padding - 1; 921 size_t remainder; 922 923 /* optimize for power of 2 */ 924 if ((s->block_padding & mask) == 0) 925 remainder = rlen & mask; 926 else 927 remainder = rlen % s->block_padding; 928 /* don't want to add a block of padding if we don't have to */ 929 if (remainder == 0) 930 padding = 0; 931 else 932 padding = s->block_padding - remainder; 933 } 934 if (padding > 0) { 935 /* do not allow the record to exceed max plaintext length */ 936 if (padding > max_padding) 937 padding = max_padding; 938 if (!WPACKET_memset(thispkt, 0, padding)) { 939 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 940 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 941 goto err; 942 } 943 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, padding); 944 } 945 } 946 } 947 948 /* 949 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from 950 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points 951 * in the wb->buf 952 */ 953 954 if (!SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) { 955 unsigned char *mac; 956 957 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac) 958 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) { 959 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 960 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 961 goto err; 962 } 963 } 964 965 /* 966 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption. 967 * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using 968 * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case. 969 */ 970 if (!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE, 971 NULL) 972 /* 973 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this 974 * sub-packet 975 */ 976 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)) { 977 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 978 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 979 goto err; 980 } 981 982 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */ 983 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len; 984 985 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, recordstart); 986 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr); 987 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, len); 988 } 989 990 if (s->statem.enc_write_state == ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS) { 991 /* 992 * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to 993 * send early data - so we need to use the tls13enc function. 994 */ 995 if (tls13_enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1) { 996 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { 997 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 998 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 999 } 1000 goto err; 1001 } 1002 } else { 1003 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1) { 1004 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { 1005 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1006 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1007 } 1008 goto err; 1009 } 1010 } 1011 1012 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { 1013 size_t origlen; 1014 1015 thispkt = &pkt[j]; 1016 thiswr = &wr[j]; 1017 1018 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */ 1019 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &origlen) 1020 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */ 1021 || origlen > thiswr->length 1022 || (thiswr->length > origlen 1023 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, 1024 thiswr->length - origlen, NULL))) { 1025 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1026 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1027 goto err; 1028 } 1029 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) { 1030 unsigned char *mac; 1031 1032 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac) 1033 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) { 1034 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1035 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1036 goto err; 1037 } 1038 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, mac_size); 1039 } 1040 1041 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len) 1042 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt)) { 1043 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1044 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1045 goto err; 1046 } 1047 1048 if (s->msg_callback) { 1049 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len 1050 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 1051 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, recordstart, 1052 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, 1053 s->msg_callback_arg); 1054 1055 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) { 1056 unsigned char ctype = type; 1057 1058 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE, 1059 &ctype, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1060 } 1061 } 1062 1063 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt)) { 1064 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1065 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1066 goto err; 1067 } 1068 1069 /* 1070 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which 1071 * is thiswr->length long 1072 */ 1073 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type); /* not needed but helps for 1074 * debugging */ 1075 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); 1076 1077 if (create_empty_fragment) { 1078 /* 1079 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write 1080 * out anything here 1081 */ 1082 if (j > 0) { 1083 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */ 1084 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1085 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1086 goto err; 1087 } 1088 *written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr); 1089 return 1; 1090 } 1091 1092 /* now let's set up wb */ 1093 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j], 1094 prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr)); 1095 } 1096 1097 /* 1098 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write 1099 * retries later 1100 */ 1101 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen; 1102 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf; 1103 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type; 1104 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen; 1105 1106 /* we now just need to write the buffer */ 1107 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written); 1108 err: 1109 for (j = 0; j < wpinited; j++) 1110 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt[j]); 1111 return -1; 1112 } 1113 1114 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this 1115 * 1116 * Return values are as per SSL_write() 1117 */ 1118 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, 1119 size_t *written) 1120 { 1121 int i; 1122 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf; 1123 size_t currbuf = 0; 1124 size_t tmpwrit = 0; 1125 1126 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len) 1127 || (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER) 1128 && (s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf)) 1129 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) { 1130 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, 1131 SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); 1132 return -1; 1133 } 1134 1135 for (;;) { 1136 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */ 1137 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0 1138 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) { 1139 currbuf++; 1140 continue; 1141 } 1142 clear_sys_error(); 1143 if (s->wbio != NULL) { 1144 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; 1145 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ 1146 i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *) 1147 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf]) 1148 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]), 1149 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])); 1150 if (i >= 0) 1151 tmpwrit = i; 1152 } else { 1153 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, 1154 SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); 1155 i = -1; 1156 } 1157 if (i > 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) { 1158 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0); 1159 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit); 1160 if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes) 1161 continue; 1162 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1163 *written = s->rlayer.wpend_ret; 1164 return 1; 1165 } else if (i <= 0) { 1166 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1167 /* 1168 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in 1169 * using a datagram service 1170 */ 1171 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0); 1172 } 1173 return i; 1174 } 1175 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit); 1176 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit); 1177 } 1178 } 1179 1180 /*- 1181 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. 1182 * 'type' is one of the following: 1183 * 1184 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) 1185 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) 1186 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) 1187 * 1188 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first 1189 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). 1190 * 1191 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as 1192 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec 1193 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type| 1194 * argument is non NULL. 1195 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store 1196 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol 1197 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): 1198 * Change cipher spec protocol 1199 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored 1200 * Alert protocol 1201 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) 1202 * Handshake protocol 1203 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have 1204 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages 1205 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers 1206 * Application data protocol 1207 * none of our business 1208 */ 1209 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, 1210 size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes) 1211 { 1212 int i, j, ret; 1213 size_t n, curr_rec, num_recs, totalbytes; 1214 SSL3_RECORD *rr; 1215 SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; 1216 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; 1217 int is_tls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s); 1218 1219 rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf; 1220 1221 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) { 1222 /* Not initialized yet */ 1223 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) { 1224 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1225 return -1; 1226 } 1227 } 1228 1229 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) 1230 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek 1231 && (type != 1232 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { 1233 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1234 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1235 return -1; 1236 } 1237 1238 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) 1239 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ 1240 { 1241 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment; 1242 unsigned char *dst = buf; 1243 unsigned int k; 1244 1245 /* peek == 0 */ 1246 n = 0; 1247 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { 1248 *dst++ = *src++; 1249 len--; 1250 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--; 1251 n++; 1252 } 1253 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ 1254 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++) 1255 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; 1256 1257 if (recvd_type != NULL) 1258 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; 1259 1260 *readbytes = n; 1261 return 1; 1262 } 1263 1264 /* 1265 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. 1266 */ 1267 1268 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) { 1269 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ 1270 i = s->handshake_func(s); 1271 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1272 if (i < 0) 1273 return i; 1274 if (i == 0) 1275 return -1; 1276 } 1277 start: 1278 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1279 1280 /*- 1281 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs] 1282 * rr[i].type - is the type of record 1283 * rr[i].data, - data 1284 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read 1285 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes. 1286 */ 1287 rr = s->rlayer.rrec; 1288 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); 1289 1290 do { 1291 /* get new records if necessary */ 1292 if (num_recs == 0) { 1293 ret = ssl3_get_record(s); 1294 if (ret <= 0) { 1295 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 1296 return ret; 1297 } 1298 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); 1299 if (num_recs == 0) { 1300 /* Shouldn't happen */ 1301 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1302 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1303 return -1; 1304 } 1305 } 1306 /* Skip over any records we have already read */ 1307 for (curr_rec = 0; 1308 curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]); 1309 curr_rec++) ; 1310 if (curr_rec == num_recs) { 1311 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0); 1312 num_recs = 0; 1313 curr_rec = 0; 1314 } 1315 } while (num_recs == 0); 1316 rr = &rr[curr_rec]; 1317 1318 if (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0 1319 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE 1320 && SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1321 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1322 SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA); 1323 return -1; 1324 } 1325 1326 /* 1327 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty 1328 * record that isn't an alert. 1329 */ 1330 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT 1331 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0) 1332 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0; 1333 1334 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ 1335 1336 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, 1337 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ 1338 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { 1339 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1340 SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); 1341 return -1; 1342 } 1343 1344 /* 1345 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in 1346 * 'peek' mode) 1347 */ 1348 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { 1349 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); 1350 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1351 return 0; 1352 } 1353 1354 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) 1355 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 1356 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL 1357 && !is_tls13)) { 1358 /* 1359 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or 1360 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or 1361 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 1362 */ 1363 /* 1364 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are 1365 * doing a handshake for the first time 1366 */ 1367 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && 1368 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) { 1369 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1370 SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); 1371 return -1; 1372 } 1373 1374 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE 1375 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 1376 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) { 1377 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1378 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 1379 return -1; 1380 } 1381 1382 if (recvd_type != NULL) 1383 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr); 1384 1385 if (len == 0) { 1386 /* 1387 * Mark a zero length record as read. This ensures multiple calls to 1388 * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause 1389 * SSL_pending() to report data as being available. 1390 */ 1391 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) 1392 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1393 return 0; 1394 } 1395 1396 totalbytes = 0; 1397 do { 1398 if (len - totalbytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) 1399 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); 1400 else 1401 n = len - totalbytes; 1402 1403 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); 1404 buf += n; 1405 if (peek) { 1406 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */ 1407 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) 1408 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1409 } else { 1410 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n); 1411 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n); 1412 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) { 1413 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; 1414 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0); 1415 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1416 } 1417 } 1418 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0 1419 || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) { 1420 curr_rec++; 1421 rr++; 1422 } 1423 totalbytes += n; 1424 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs 1425 && totalbytes < len); 1426 if (totalbytes == 0) { 1427 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */ 1428 goto start; 1429 } 1430 if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs 1431 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) 1432 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) 1433 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); 1434 *readbytes = totalbytes; 1435 return 1; 1436 } 1437 1438 /* 1439 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message, 1440 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we 1441 * were actually expecting a CCS). 1442 */ 1443 1444 /* 1445 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record 1446 */ 1447 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { 1448 /* 1449 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2 1450 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an 1451 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to 1452 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong 1453 */ 1454 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1455 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1456 return -1; 1457 } 1458 1459 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION 1460 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { 1461 /* 1462 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version 1463 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with 1464 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything 1465 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server. 1466 */ 1467 s->version = rr->rec_version; 1468 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1469 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 1470 return -1; 1471 } 1472 1473 /*- 1474 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; 1475 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) 1476 */ 1477 1478 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { 1479 unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr; 1480 unsigned char *alert_bytes = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr) 1481 + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr); 1482 PACKET alert; 1483 1484 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) 1485 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level) 1486 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr) 1487 || PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) { 1488 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1489 SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT); 1490 return -1; 1491 } 1492 1493 if (s->msg_callback) 1494 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, s, 1495 s->msg_callback_arg); 1496 1497 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 1498 cb = s->info_callback; 1499 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 1500 cb = s->ctx->info_callback; 1501 1502 if (cb != NULL) { 1503 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; 1504 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); 1505 } 1506 1507 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING 1508 || (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED)) { 1509 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; 1510 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1511 1512 s->rlayer.alert_count++; 1513 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) { 1514 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1515 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS); 1516 return -1; 1517 } 1518 } 1519 1520 /* 1521 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3 1522 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore. 1523 */ 1524 if (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED) { 1525 goto start; 1526 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY 1527 && (is_tls13 || alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING)) { 1528 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; 1529 return 0; 1530 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL || is_tls13) { 1531 char tmp[16]; 1532 1533 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1534 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; 1535 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1536 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); 1537 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr); 1538 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp); 1539 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; 1540 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1541 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); 1542 return 0; 1543 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { 1544 /* 1545 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested 1546 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal 1547 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it 1548 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In 1549 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if 1550 * the peer refused it where we carry on. 1551 */ 1552 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1553 SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1554 return -1; 1555 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { 1556 /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */ 1557 goto start; 1558 } 1559 1560 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1561 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); 1562 return -1; 1563 } 1564 1565 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) { 1566 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { 1567 BIO *rbio; 1568 1569 /* 1570 * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are 1571 * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other 1572 * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them 1573 * because we are unable to write any response due to having already 1574 * sent close_notify. 1575 */ 1576 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1577 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); 1578 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1579 1580 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY) != 0) 1581 goto start; 1582 1583 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 1584 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s); 1585 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio); 1586 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio); 1587 return -1; 1588 } 1589 } else { 1590 /* 1591 * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have 1592 * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have 1593 * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled 1594 * above. 1595 * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify 1596 */ 1597 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); 1598 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1599 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1600 SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY); 1601 return -1; 1602 } 1603 } 1604 1605 /* 1606 * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we 1607 * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the 1608 * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data 1609 * that we're just going to discard. 1610 */ 1611 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { 1612 size_t dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment); 1613 unsigned char *dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment; 1614 size_t *dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; 1615 1616 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */ 1617 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n) 1618 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */ 1619 1620 /* now move 'n' bytes: */ 1621 memcpy(dest + *dest_len, 1622 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr) + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr), n); 1623 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n); 1624 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n); 1625 *dest_len += n; 1626 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) 1627 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1628 1629 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) 1630 goto start; /* fragment was too small */ 1631 } 1632 1633 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 1634 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1635 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 1636 return -1; 1637 } 1638 1639 /* 1640 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or 1641 * protocol violation) 1642 */ 1643 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) 1644 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) { 1645 int ined = (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING); 1646 1647 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */ 1648 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); 1649 1650 i = s->handshake_func(s); 1651 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 1652 if (i < 0) 1653 return i; 1654 if (i == 0) { 1655 return -1; 1656 } 1657 1658 /* 1659 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a 1660 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read 1661 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now. 1662 */ 1663 if (ined) 1664 return -1; 1665 1666 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { 1667 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) { 1668 /* no read-ahead left? */ 1669 BIO *bio; 1670 /* 1671 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we 1672 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry 1673 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty 1674 * problems in the blocking world 1675 */ 1676 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 1677 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); 1678 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); 1679 BIO_set_retry_read(bio); 1680 return -1; 1681 } 1682 } 1683 goto start; 1684 } 1685 1686 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) { 1687 default: 1688 /* 1689 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but 1690 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the 1691 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where 1692 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised 1693 * record types, using up resources processing them. 1694 */ 1695 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1696 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); 1697 return -1; 1698 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: 1699 case SSL3_RT_ALERT: 1700 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: 1701 /* 1702 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of 1703 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but 1704 * that should not happen when type != rr->type 1705 */ 1706 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1707 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1708 return -1; 1709 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: 1710 /* 1711 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have 1712 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() 1713 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read 1714 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet 1715 * started), we will indulge it. 1716 */ 1717 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) { 1718 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; 1719 return -1; 1720 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) { 1721 /* 1722 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data, 1723 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server 1724 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a 1725 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be 1726 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null 1727 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next 1728 * record. 1729 */ 1730 if (!early_data_count_ok(s, rr->length, 1731 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) { 1732 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1733 return -1; 1734 } 1735 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1736 goto start; 1737 } else { 1738 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1739 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); 1740 return -1; 1741 } 1742 } 1743 } 1744 1745 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq) 1746 { 1747 int i; 1748 1749 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { 1750 ++seq[i]; 1751 if (seq[i] != 0) 1752 break; 1753 } 1754 } 1755 1756 /* 1757 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible 1758 * format and false otherwise. 1759 */ 1760 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 1761 { 1762 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]); 1763 } 1764 1765 /* 1766 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec 1767 */ 1768 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 1769 { 1770 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]); 1771 } 1772