1 /* 2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 3 * 4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use 5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy 6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at 7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html 8 */ 9 10 #include <stdio.h> 11 #include <limits.h> 12 #include <errno.h> 13 #include "../ssl_local.h" 14 #include <openssl/evp.h> 15 #include <openssl/buffer.h> 16 #include <openssl/rand.h> 17 #include "record_local.h" 18 #include "../packet_local.h" 19 #include "internal/cryptlib.h" 20 21 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \ 22 !( defined(AESNI_ASM) && ( \ 23 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ 24 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \ 25 ) 26 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 27 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0 28 #endif 29 30 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s) 31 { 32 rl->s = s; 33 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer); 34 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); 35 } 36 37 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 38 { 39 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; 40 41 /* 42 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not 43 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is 44 * that right? 45 */ 46 47 rl->packet = NULL; 48 rl->packet_length = 0; 49 rl->wnum = 0; 50 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment)); 51 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0; 52 rl->wpend_tot = 0; 53 rl->wpend_type = 0; 54 rl->wpend_ret = 0; 55 rl->wpend_buf = NULL; 56 57 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf); 58 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s); 59 rl->numrpipes = 0; 60 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); 61 62 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl); 63 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl); 64 65 if (rl->d) 66 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl); 67 } 68 69 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 70 { 71 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf)) 72 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s); 73 if (rl->numwpipes > 0) 74 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s); 75 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); 76 } 77 78 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */ 79 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) 80 { 81 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0; 82 } 83 84 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */ 85 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) 86 { 87 size_t curr_rec = 0, num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl); 88 const SSL3_RECORD *rr = rl->rrec; 89 90 while (curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec])) 91 curr_rec++; 92 93 return curr_rec < num_recs; 94 } 95 96 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) 97 { 98 return (rl->numwpipes > 0) 99 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0; 100 } 101 102 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 103 { 104 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence)); 105 } 106 107 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 108 { 109 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); 110 } 111 112 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s) 113 { 114 size_t i, num = 0; 115 116 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY) 117 return 0; 118 119 /* Take into account DTLS buffered app data */ 120 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 121 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; 122 pitem *item, *iter; 123 124 iter = pqueue_iterator(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data.q); 125 while ((item = pqueue_next(&iter)) != NULL) { 126 rdata = item->data; 127 num += rdata->rrec.length; 128 } 129 } 130 131 for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) { 132 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]) 133 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) 134 return num; 135 num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]); 136 } 137 138 return num; 139 } 140 141 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len) 142 { 143 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len; 144 } 145 146 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len) 147 { 148 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len); 149 } 150 151 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s) 152 { 153 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) { 154 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER: 155 return "read header"; 156 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY: 157 return "read body"; 158 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE: 159 return "read done"; 160 default: 161 return "unknown"; 162 } 163 } 164 165 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s) 166 { 167 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) { 168 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER: 169 return "RH"; 170 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY: 171 return "RB"; 172 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE: 173 return "RD"; 174 default: 175 return "unknown"; 176 } 177 } 178 179 /* 180 * Return values are as per SSL_read() 181 */ 182 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold, 183 size_t *readbytes) 184 { 185 /* 186 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase 187 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of 188 * s->rlayer.rbuf.buf specified by s->rlayer.packet and 189 * s->rlayer.packet_length. (If s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may 190 * be stored in rbuf [plus s->rlayer.packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) 191 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if 192 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were 193 */ 194 size_t len, left, align = 0; 195 unsigned char *pkt; 196 SSL3_BUFFER *rb; 197 198 if (n == 0) 199 return 0; 200 201 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf; 202 if (rb->buf == NULL) 203 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) { 204 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 205 return -1; 206 } 207 208 left = rb->left; 209 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 210 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 211 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); 212 #endif 213 214 if (!extend) { 215 /* start with empty packet ... */ 216 if (left == 0) 217 rb->offset = align; 218 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { 219 /* 220 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload 221 * alignment... 222 */ 223 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset; 224 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA 225 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) { 226 /* 227 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field 228 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about 229 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no 230 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer 231 * overrun can be triggered. 232 */ 233 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left); 234 rb->offset = align; 235 } 236 } 237 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset; 238 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0; 239 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ 240 } 241 242 len = s->rlayer.packet_length; 243 pkt = rb->buf + align; 244 /* 245 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already 246 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end 247 */ 248 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) { 249 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left); 250 s->rlayer.packet = pkt; 251 rb->offset = len + align; 252 } 253 254 /* 255 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read 256 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into 257 * the buffer). 258 */ 259 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 260 if (left == 0 && extend) 261 return 0; 262 if (left > 0 && n > left) 263 n = left; 264 } 265 266 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ 267 if (left >= n) { 268 s->rlayer.packet_length += n; 269 rb->left = left - n; 270 rb->offset += n; 271 *readbytes = n; 272 return 1; 273 } 274 275 /* else we need to read more data */ 276 277 if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) { 278 /* does not happen */ 279 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, 280 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 281 return -1; 282 } 283 284 /* 285 * Ktls always reads full records. 286 * Also, we always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS. 287 */ 288 if (!BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) && !s->rlayer.read_ahead 289 && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 290 /* ignore max parameter */ 291 max = n; 292 } else { 293 if (max < n) 294 max = n; 295 if (max > rb->len - rb->offset) 296 max = rb->len - rb->offset; 297 } 298 299 while (left < n) { 300 size_t bioread = 0; 301 int ret; 302 303 /* 304 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and 305 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if 306 * possible) 307 */ 308 309 clear_sys_error(); 310 if (s->rbio != NULL) { 311 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 312 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ 313 ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left); 314 if (ret >= 0) 315 bioread = ret; 316 } else { 317 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, 318 SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); 319 ret = -1; 320 } 321 322 if (ret <= 0) { 323 rb->left = left; 324 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 325 if (len + left == 0) 326 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); 327 return ret; 328 } 329 left += bioread; 330 /* 331 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the 332 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to 333 * byte oriented as in the TLS case. 334 */ 335 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 336 if (n > left) 337 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */ 338 } 339 } 340 341 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ 342 rb->offset += n; 343 rb->left = left - n; 344 s->rlayer.packet_length += n; 345 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 346 *readbytes = n; 347 return 1; 348 } 349 350 /* 351 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if 352 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. 353 */ 354 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len, 355 size_t *written) 356 { 357 const unsigned char *buf = buf_; 358 size_t tot; 359 size_t n, max_send_fragment, split_send_fragment, maxpipes; 360 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 361 size_t nw; 362 #endif 363 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; 364 int i; 365 size_t tmpwrit; 366 367 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 368 tot = s->rlayer.wnum; 369 /* 370 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out 371 * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for 372 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for 373 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be 374 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then 375 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and 376 * report the error in a way the user will notice 377 */ 378 if ((len < s->rlayer.wnum) 379 || ((wb->left != 0) && (len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) { 380 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, 381 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); 382 return -1; 383 } 384 385 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING 386 && !early_data_count_ok(s, len, 0, 1)) { 387 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 388 return -1; 389 } 390 391 s->rlayer.wnum = 0; 392 393 /* 394 * If we are supposed to be sending a KeyUpdate then go into init unless we 395 * have writes pending - in which case we should finish doing that first. 396 */ 397 if (wb->left == 0 && s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) 398 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); 399 400 /* 401 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in 402 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those 403 * messages yet. 404 */ 405 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) 406 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING) { 407 i = s->handshake_func(s); 408 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 409 if (i < 0) 410 return i; 411 if (i == 0) { 412 return -1; 413 } 414 } 415 416 /* 417 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This 418 * will happen with non blocking IO 419 */ 420 if (wb->left != 0) { 421 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 422 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot, 423 &tmpwrit); 424 if (i <= 0) { 425 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */ 426 s->rlayer.wnum = tot; 427 return i; 428 } 429 tot += tmpwrit; /* this might be last fragment */ 430 } 431 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 432 /* 433 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times* 434 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate 435 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the 436 * compromise is considered worthy. 437 */ 438 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && 439 len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s)) && 440 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL && 441 !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && 442 (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) == 0) && 443 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) & 444 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) { 445 unsigned char aad[13]; 446 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param; 447 size_t packlen; 448 int packleni; 449 450 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */ 451 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0) 452 max_send_fragment -= 512; 453 454 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */ 455 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 456 457 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, 458 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE, 459 (int)max_send_fragment, NULL); 460 461 if (len >= 8 * max_send_fragment) 462 packlen *= 8; 463 else 464 packlen *= 4; 465 466 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) { 467 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 468 return -1; 469 } 470 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */ 471 /* free jumbo buffer */ 472 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 473 *written = tot; 474 return 1; 475 } 476 477 n = (len - tot); 478 for (;;) { 479 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) { 480 /* free jumbo buffer */ 481 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 482 break; 483 } 484 485 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { 486 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); 487 if (i <= 0) { 488 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 489 s->rlayer.wnum = tot; 490 return i; 491 } 492 } 493 494 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment) 495 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8); 496 else 497 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4); 498 499 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8); 500 aad[8] = type; 501 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); 502 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); 503 aad[11] = 0; 504 aad[12] = 0; 505 mb_param.out = NULL; 506 mb_param.inp = aad; 507 mb_param.len = nw; 508 509 packleni = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, 510 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD, 511 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param); 512 packlen = (size_t)packleni; 513 if (packleni <= 0 || packlen > wb->len) { /* never happens */ 514 /* free jumbo buffer */ 515 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 516 break; 517 } 518 519 mb_param.out = wb->buf; 520 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot]; 521 mb_param.len = nw; 522 523 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, 524 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT, 525 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0) 526 return -1; 527 528 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave; 529 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) { 530 int j = 6; 531 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ; 532 } 533 534 wb->offset = 0; 535 wb->left = packlen; 536 537 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw; 538 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot]; 539 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type; 540 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw; 541 542 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, &tmpwrit); 543 if (i <= 0) { 544 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 545 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) { 546 /* free jumbo buffer */ 547 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 548 } 549 s->rlayer.wnum = tot; 550 return i; 551 } 552 if (tmpwrit == n) { 553 /* free jumbo buffer */ 554 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 555 *written = tot + tmpwrit; 556 return 1; 557 } 558 n -= tmpwrit; 559 tot += tmpwrit; 560 } 561 } else 562 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK */ 563 if (tot == len) { /* done? */ 564 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 565 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 566 567 *written = tot; 568 return 1; 569 } 570 571 n = (len - tot); 572 573 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s); 574 split_send_fragment = ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s); 575 /* 576 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to 577 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined 578 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using 579 * explicit IVs 580 */ 581 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines; 582 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) { 583 /* 584 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we 585 * shouldn't get here 586 */ 587 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, 588 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 589 return -1; 590 } 591 if (maxpipes == 0 592 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL 593 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) 594 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) 595 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) 596 maxpipes = 1; 597 if (max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment == 0 598 || split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) { 599 /* 600 * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send 601 * fragments so we shouldn't get here 602 */ 603 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, 604 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 605 return -1; 606 } 607 608 for (;;) { 609 size_t pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain; 610 size_t numpipes, j; 611 612 if (n == 0) 613 numpipes = 1; 614 else 615 numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1; 616 if (numpipes > maxpipes) 617 numpipes = maxpipes; 618 619 if (n / numpipes >= max_send_fragment) { 620 /* 621 * We have enough data to completely fill all available 622 * pipelines 623 */ 624 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { 625 pipelens[j] = max_send_fragment; 626 } 627 } else { 628 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */ 629 tmppipelen = n / numpipes; 630 remain = n % numpipes; 631 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { 632 pipelens[j] = tmppipelen; 633 if (j < remain) 634 pipelens[j]++; 635 } 636 } 637 638 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0, 639 &tmpwrit); 640 if (i <= 0) { 641 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 642 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */ 643 s->rlayer.wnum = tot; 644 return i; 645 } 646 647 if (tmpwrit == n || 648 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && 649 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) { 650 /* 651 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment 652 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: 653 */ 654 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0; 655 656 if (tmpwrit == n 657 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) != 0 658 && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 659 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 660 661 *written = tot + tmpwrit; 662 return 1; 663 } 664 665 n -= tmpwrit; 666 tot += tmpwrit; 667 } 668 } 669 670 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, 671 size_t *pipelens, size_t numpipes, 672 int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written) 673 { 674 WPACKET pkt[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; 675 SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; 676 WPACKET *thispkt; 677 SSL3_RECORD *thiswr; 678 unsigned char *recordstart; 679 int i, mac_size, clear = 0; 680 size_t prefix_len = 0; 681 int eivlen = 0; 682 size_t align = 0; 683 SSL3_BUFFER *wb; 684 SSL_SESSION *sess; 685 size_t totlen = 0, len, wpinited = 0; 686 size_t j; 687 688 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) 689 totlen += pipelens[j]; 690 /* 691 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This 692 * will happen with non blocking IO 693 */ 694 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer)) { 695 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ 696 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written); 697 } 698 699 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ 700 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { 701 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); 702 if (i <= 0) { 703 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 704 return i; 705 } 706 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ 707 } 708 709 if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes) { 710 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0)) { 711 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 712 return -1; 713 } 714 } 715 716 if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) 717 return 0; 718 719 sess = s->session; 720 721 if ((sess == NULL) || 722 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) { 723 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */ 724 mac_size = 0; 725 } else { 726 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */ 727 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); 728 if (mac_size < 0) { 729 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 730 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 731 goto err; 732 } 733 } 734 735 /* 736 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself 737 */ 738 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) { 739 /* 740 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see 741 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) 742 */ 743 744 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { 745 /* 746 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this 747 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these 748 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual 749 * payload) 750 */ 751 size_t tmppipelen = 0; 752 int ret; 753 754 ret = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1, &prefix_len); 755 if (ret <= 0) { 756 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 757 goto err; 758 } 759 760 if (prefix_len > 761 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) { 762 /* insufficient space */ 763 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 764 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 765 goto err; 766 } 767 } 768 769 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; 770 } 771 772 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) { 773 /* 774 * ktls doesn't modify the buffer, but to avoid a warning we need to 775 * discard the const qualifier. 776 * This doesn't leak memory because the buffers have been released when 777 * switching to ktls. 778 */ 779 SSL3_BUFFER_set_buf(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], (unsigned char *)buf); 780 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], 0); 781 SSL3_BUFFER_set_app_buffer(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], 1); 782 goto wpacket_init_complete; 783 } 784 785 if (create_empty_fragment) { 786 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; 787 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 788 /* 789 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be 790 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real 791 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers. 792 */ 793 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 794 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); 795 #endif 796 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align); 797 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb), 798 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0) 799 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) { 800 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 801 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 802 goto err; 803 } 804 wpinited = 1; 805 } else if (prefix_len) { 806 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; 807 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], 808 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb), 809 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0) 810 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb) 811 + prefix_len, NULL)) { 812 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 813 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 814 goto err; 815 } 816 wpinited = 1; 817 } else { 818 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { 819 thispkt = &pkt[j]; 820 821 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j]; 822 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0 823 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 824 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); 825 #endif 826 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align); 827 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb), 828 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0) 829 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, align, NULL)) { 830 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 831 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 832 goto err; 833 } 834 wpinited++; 835 } 836 } 837 838 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */ 839 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && !SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)) { 840 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx); 841 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { 842 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */ 843 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx); 844 if (eivlen <= 1) 845 eivlen = 0; 846 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { 847 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ 848 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 849 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { 850 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 851 } 852 } 853 854 wpacket_init_complete: 855 856 totlen = 0; 857 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */ 858 memset(wr, 0, sizeof(wr)); 859 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { 860 unsigned int version = (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) ? TLS1_2_VERSION 861 : s->version; 862 unsigned char *compressdata = NULL; 863 size_t maxcomplen; 864 unsigned int rectype; 865 866 thispkt = &pkt[j]; 867 thiswr = &wr[j]; 868 869 /* 870 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the 871 * record type 872 */ 873 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) 874 && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL 875 && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS 876 || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) 877 rectype = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA; 878 else 879 rectype = type; 880 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, rectype); 881 882 /* 883 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes 884 * and record version number > TLS 1.0 885 */ 886 if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO 887 && !s->renegotiate 888 && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION 889 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE) 890 version = TLS1_VERSION; 891 SSL3_RECORD_set_rec_version(thiswr, version); 892 893 maxcomplen = pipelens[j]; 894 if (s->compress != NULL) 895 maxcomplen += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD; 896 897 /* 898 * When using offload kernel will write the header. 899 * Otherwise write the header now 900 */ 901 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) 902 && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, rectype) 903 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt, version) 904 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt) 905 || (eivlen > 0 906 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, eivlen, NULL)) 907 || (maxcomplen > 0 908 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, maxcomplen, 909 &compressdata)))) { 910 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 911 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 912 goto err; 913 } 914 915 /* lets setup the record stuff. */ 916 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, compressdata); 917 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, pipelens[j]); 918 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr, (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]); 919 totlen += pipelens[j]; 920 921 /* 922 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into 923 * thiswr->data 924 */ 925 926 /* first we compress */ 927 if (s->compress != NULL) { 928 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, thiswr) 929 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, thiswr->length, NULL)) { 930 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 931 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); 932 goto err; 933 } 934 } else { 935 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) { 936 SSL3_RECORD_reset_data(&wr[j]); 937 } else { 938 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt, thiswr->input, thiswr->length)) { 939 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 940 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 941 goto err; 942 } 943 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]); 944 } 945 } 946 947 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) 948 && !BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) 949 && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL 950 && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS 951 || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { 952 size_t rlen, max_send_fragment; 953 954 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, type)) { 955 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 956 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 957 goto err; 958 } 959 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, 1); 960 961 /* Add TLS1.3 padding */ 962 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s); 963 rlen = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr); 964 if (rlen < max_send_fragment) { 965 size_t padding = 0; 966 size_t max_padding = max_send_fragment - rlen; 967 if (s->record_padding_cb != NULL) { 968 padding = s->record_padding_cb(s, type, rlen, s->record_padding_arg); 969 } else if (s->block_padding > 0) { 970 size_t mask = s->block_padding - 1; 971 size_t remainder; 972 973 /* optimize for power of 2 */ 974 if ((s->block_padding & mask) == 0) 975 remainder = rlen & mask; 976 else 977 remainder = rlen % s->block_padding; 978 /* don't want to add a block of padding if we don't have to */ 979 if (remainder == 0) 980 padding = 0; 981 else 982 padding = s->block_padding - remainder; 983 } 984 if (padding > 0) { 985 /* do not allow the record to exceed max plaintext length */ 986 if (padding > max_padding) 987 padding = max_padding; 988 if (!WPACKET_memset(thispkt, 0, padding)) { 989 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 990 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 991 goto err; 992 } 993 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, padding); 994 } 995 } 996 } 997 998 /* 999 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from 1000 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points 1001 * in the wb->buf 1002 */ 1003 1004 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) && !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) { 1005 unsigned char *mac; 1006 1007 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac) 1008 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) { 1009 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1010 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1011 goto err; 1012 } 1013 } 1014 1015 /* 1016 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption. If 1017 * we are adding the MAC independently of the cipher algorithm, then the 1018 * max encrypted overhead does not need to include an allocation for that 1019 * MAC 1020 */ 1021 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) { 1022 if (!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, 1023 SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD 1024 - mac_size, 1025 NULL) 1026 /* 1027 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this 1028 * sub-packet 1029 */ 1030 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)) { 1031 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1032 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1033 goto err; 1034 } 1035 1036 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */ 1037 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len; 1038 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, recordstart); 1039 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr); 1040 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, len); 1041 } 1042 } 1043 1044 if (s->statem.enc_write_state == ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS) { 1045 /* 1046 * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to 1047 * send early data - so we need to use the tls13enc function. 1048 */ 1049 if (tls13_enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1) { 1050 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { 1051 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1052 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1053 } 1054 goto err; 1055 } 1056 } else { 1057 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) { 1058 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1) { 1059 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { 1060 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1061 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1062 } 1063 goto err; 1064 } 1065 } 1066 } 1067 1068 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { 1069 size_t origlen; 1070 1071 thispkt = &pkt[j]; 1072 thiswr = &wr[j]; 1073 1074 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) 1075 goto mac_done; 1076 1077 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */ 1078 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &origlen) 1079 /* Check we allowed enough room for the encryption growth */ 1080 || !ossl_assert(origlen + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD 1081 - mac_size >= thiswr->length) 1082 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */ 1083 || origlen > thiswr->length 1084 || (thiswr->length > origlen 1085 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, 1086 thiswr->length - origlen, 1087 NULL))) { 1088 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1089 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1090 goto err; 1091 } 1092 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) { 1093 unsigned char *mac; 1094 1095 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac) 1096 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) { 1097 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1098 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1099 goto err; 1100 } 1101 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, mac_size); 1102 } 1103 1104 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len) 1105 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt)) { 1106 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1107 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1108 goto err; 1109 } 1110 1111 if (s->msg_callback) { 1112 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len 1113 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 1114 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, recordstart, 1115 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, 1116 s->msg_callback_arg); 1117 1118 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) { 1119 unsigned char ctype = type; 1120 1121 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE, 1122 &ctype, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1123 } 1124 } 1125 1126 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt)) { 1127 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1128 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1129 goto err; 1130 } 1131 1132 /* header is added by the kernel when using offload */ 1133 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); 1134 1135 if (create_empty_fragment) { 1136 /* 1137 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write 1138 * out anything here 1139 */ 1140 if (j > 0) { 1141 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */ 1142 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1143 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1144 goto err; 1145 } 1146 *written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr); 1147 return 1; 1148 } 1149 1150 mac_done: 1151 /* 1152 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which 1153 * is thiswr->length long 1154 */ 1155 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type); /* not needed but helps for 1156 * debugging */ 1157 1158 /* now let's set up wb */ 1159 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j], 1160 prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr)); 1161 } 1162 1163 /* 1164 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write 1165 * retries later 1166 */ 1167 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen; 1168 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf; 1169 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type; 1170 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen; 1171 1172 /* we now just need to write the buffer */ 1173 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written); 1174 err: 1175 for (j = 0; j < wpinited; j++) 1176 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt[j]); 1177 return -1; 1178 } 1179 1180 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this 1181 * 1182 * Return values are as per SSL_write() 1183 */ 1184 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, 1185 size_t *written) 1186 { 1187 int i; 1188 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf; 1189 size_t currbuf = 0; 1190 size_t tmpwrit = 0; 1191 1192 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len) 1193 || (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER) 1194 && (s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf)) 1195 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) { 1196 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, 1197 SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); 1198 return -1; 1199 } 1200 1201 for (;;) { 1202 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */ 1203 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0 1204 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) { 1205 currbuf++; 1206 continue; 1207 } 1208 clear_sys_error(); 1209 if (s->wbio != NULL) { 1210 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; 1211 1212 /* 1213 * To prevent coalescing of control and data messages, 1214 * such as in buffer_write, we flush the BIO 1215 */ 1216 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { 1217 i = BIO_flush(s->wbio); 1218 if (i <= 0) 1219 return i; 1220 BIO_set_ktls_ctrl_msg(s->wbio, type); 1221 } 1222 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ 1223 i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *) 1224 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf]) 1225 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]), 1226 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])); 1227 if (i >= 0) 1228 tmpwrit = i; 1229 } else { 1230 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, 1231 SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); 1232 i = -1; 1233 } 1234 1235 /* 1236 * When an empty fragment is sent on a connection using KTLS, 1237 * it is sent as a write of zero bytes. If this zero byte 1238 * write succeeds, i will be 0 rather than a non-zero value. 1239 * Treat i == 0 as success rather than an error for zero byte 1240 * writes to permit this case. 1241 */ 1242 if (i >= 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) { 1243 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0); 1244 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit); 1245 if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes) 1246 continue; 1247 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1248 *written = s->rlayer.wpend_ret; 1249 return 1; 1250 } else if (i <= 0) { 1251 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1252 /* 1253 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in 1254 * using a datagram service 1255 */ 1256 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0); 1257 } 1258 return i; 1259 } 1260 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit); 1261 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit); 1262 } 1263 } 1264 1265 /*- 1266 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. 1267 * 'type' is one of the following: 1268 * 1269 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) 1270 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) 1271 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) 1272 * 1273 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first 1274 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). 1275 * 1276 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as 1277 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec 1278 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type| 1279 * argument is non NULL. 1280 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store 1281 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol 1282 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): 1283 * Change cipher spec protocol 1284 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored 1285 * Alert protocol 1286 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) 1287 * Handshake protocol 1288 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have 1289 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages 1290 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers 1291 * Application data protocol 1292 * none of our business 1293 */ 1294 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, 1295 size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes) 1296 { 1297 int i, j, ret; 1298 size_t n, curr_rec, num_recs, totalbytes; 1299 SSL3_RECORD *rr; 1300 SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; 1301 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; 1302 int is_tls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s); 1303 1304 rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf; 1305 1306 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) { 1307 /* Not initialized yet */ 1308 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) { 1309 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1310 return -1; 1311 } 1312 } 1313 1314 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) 1315 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek 1316 && (type != 1317 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { 1318 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1319 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1320 return -1; 1321 } 1322 1323 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) 1324 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ 1325 { 1326 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment; 1327 unsigned char *dst = buf; 1328 unsigned int k; 1329 1330 /* peek == 0 */ 1331 n = 0; 1332 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { 1333 *dst++ = *src++; 1334 len--; 1335 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--; 1336 n++; 1337 } 1338 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ 1339 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++) 1340 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; 1341 1342 if (recvd_type != NULL) 1343 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; 1344 1345 *readbytes = n; 1346 return 1; 1347 } 1348 1349 /* 1350 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. 1351 */ 1352 1353 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) { 1354 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ 1355 i = s->handshake_func(s); 1356 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1357 if (i < 0) 1358 return i; 1359 if (i == 0) 1360 return -1; 1361 } 1362 start: 1363 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1364 1365 /*- 1366 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs] 1367 * rr[i].type - is the type of record 1368 * rr[i].data, - data 1369 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read 1370 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes. 1371 */ 1372 rr = s->rlayer.rrec; 1373 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); 1374 1375 do { 1376 /* get new records if necessary */ 1377 if (num_recs == 0) { 1378 ret = ssl3_get_record(s); 1379 if (ret <= 0) { 1380 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 1381 return ret; 1382 } 1383 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); 1384 if (num_recs == 0) { 1385 /* Shouldn't happen */ 1386 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1387 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1388 return -1; 1389 } 1390 } 1391 /* Skip over any records we have already read */ 1392 for (curr_rec = 0; 1393 curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]); 1394 curr_rec++) ; 1395 if (curr_rec == num_recs) { 1396 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0); 1397 num_recs = 0; 1398 curr_rec = 0; 1399 } 1400 } while (num_recs == 0); 1401 rr = &rr[curr_rec]; 1402 1403 if (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0 1404 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE 1405 && SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1406 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1407 SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA); 1408 return -1; 1409 } 1410 1411 /* 1412 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty 1413 * record that isn't an alert. 1414 */ 1415 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT 1416 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0) 1417 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0; 1418 1419 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ 1420 1421 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, 1422 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ 1423 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { 1424 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1425 SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); 1426 return -1; 1427 } 1428 1429 /* 1430 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in 1431 * 'peek' mode) 1432 */ 1433 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { 1434 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); 1435 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1436 return 0; 1437 } 1438 1439 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) 1440 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 1441 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL 1442 && !is_tls13)) { 1443 /* 1444 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or 1445 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or 1446 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 1447 */ 1448 /* 1449 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are 1450 * doing a handshake for the first time 1451 */ 1452 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && 1453 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) { 1454 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1455 SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); 1456 return -1; 1457 } 1458 1459 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE 1460 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 1461 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) { 1462 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1463 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 1464 return -1; 1465 } 1466 1467 if (recvd_type != NULL) 1468 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr); 1469 1470 if (len == 0) { 1471 /* 1472 * Mark a zero length record as read. This ensures multiple calls to 1473 * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause 1474 * SSL_pending() to report data as being available. 1475 */ 1476 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) 1477 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1478 return 0; 1479 } 1480 1481 totalbytes = 0; 1482 do { 1483 if (len - totalbytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) 1484 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); 1485 else 1486 n = len - totalbytes; 1487 1488 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); 1489 buf += n; 1490 if (peek) { 1491 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */ 1492 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) 1493 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1494 } else { 1495 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n); 1496 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n); 1497 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) { 1498 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; 1499 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0); 1500 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1501 } 1502 } 1503 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0 1504 || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) { 1505 curr_rec++; 1506 rr++; 1507 } 1508 totalbytes += n; 1509 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs 1510 && totalbytes < len); 1511 if (totalbytes == 0) { 1512 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */ 1513 goto start; 1514 } 1515 if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs 1516 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) 1517 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) 1518 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); 1519 *readbytes = totalbytes; 1520 return 1; 1521 } 1522 1523 /* 1524 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message, 1525 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we 1526 * were actually expecting a CCS). 1527 */ 1528 1529 /* 1530 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record 1531 */ 1532 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { 1533 /* 1534 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2 1535 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an 1536 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to 1537 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong 1538 */ 1539 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1540 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1541 return -1; 1542 } 1543 1544 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION 1545 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { 1546 /* 1547 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version 1548 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with 1549 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything 1550 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server. 1551 */ 1552 s->version = rr->rec_version; 1553 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1554 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 1555 return -1; 1556 } 1557 1558 /*- 1559 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; 1560 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) 1561 */ 1562 1563 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { 1564 unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr; 1565 unsigned char *alert_bytes = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr) 1566 + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr); 1567 PACKET alert; 1568 1569 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) 1570 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level) 1571 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr) 1572 || PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) { 1573 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1574 SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT); 1575 return -1; 1576 } 1577 1578 if (s->msg_callback) 1579 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, s, 1580 s->msg_callback_arg); 1581 1582 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 1583 cb = s->info_callback; 1584 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 1585 cb = s->ctx->info_callback; 1586 1587 if (cb != NULL) { 1588 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; 1589 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); 1590 } 1591 1592 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING 1593 || (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED)) { 1594 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; 1595 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1596 1597 s->rlayer.alert_count++; 1598 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) { 1599 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1600 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS); 1601 return -1; 1602 } 1603 } 1604 1605 /* 1606 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3 1607 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore. 1608 */ 1609 if (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED) { 1610 goto start; 1611 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY 1612 && (is_tls13 || alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING)) { 1613 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; 1614 return 0; 1615 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL || is_tls13) { 1616 char tmp[16]; 1617 1618 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1619 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; 1620 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1621 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); 1622 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr); 1623 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp); 1624 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; 1625 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1626 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); 1627 return 0; 1628 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { 1629 /* 1630 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested 1631 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal 1632 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it 1633 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In 1634 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if 1635 * the peer refused it where we carry on. 1636 */ 1637 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1638 SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1639 return -1; 1640 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { 1641 /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */ 1642 goto start; 1643 } 1644 1645 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1646 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); 1647 return -1; 1648 } 1649 1650 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) { 1651 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { 1652 BIO *rbio; 1653 1654 /* 1655 * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are 1656 * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other 1657 * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them 1658 * because we are unable to write any response due to having already 1659 * sent close_notify. 1660 */ 1661 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1662 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); 1663 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1664 1665 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY) != 0) 1666 goto start; 1667 1668 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 1669 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s); 1670 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio); 1671 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio); 1672 return -1; 1673 } 1674 } else { 1675 /* 1676 * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have 1677 * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have 1678 * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled 1679 * above. 1680 * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify 1681 */ 1682 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); 1683 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1684 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1685 SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY); 1686 return -1; 1687 } 1688 } 1689 1690 /* 1691 * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we 1692 * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the 1693 * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data 1694 * that we're just going to discard. 1695 */ 1696 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { 1697 size_t dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment); 1698 unsigned char *dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment; 1699 size_t *dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; 1700 1701 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */ 1702 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n) 1703 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */ 1704 1705 /* now move 'n' bytes: */ 1706 memcpy(dest + *dest_len, 1707 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr) + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr), n); 1708 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n); 1709 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n); 1710 *dest_len += n; 1711 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) 1712 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1713 1714 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) 1715 goto start; /* fragment was too small */ 1716 } 1717 1718 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 1719 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1720 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 1721 return -1; 1722 } 1723 1724 /* 1725 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or 1726 * protocol violation) 1727 */ 1728 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) 1729 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) { 1730 int ined = (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING); 1731 1732 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */ 1733 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); 1734 1735 i = s->handshake_func(s); 1736 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 1737 if (i < 0) 1738 return i; 1739 if (i == 0) { 1740 return -1; 1741 } 1742 1743 /* 1744 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a 1745 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read 1746 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now. 1747 */ 1748 if (ined) 1749 return -1; 1750 1751 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { 1752 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) { 1753 /* no read-ahead left? */ 1754 BIO *bio; 1755 /* 1756 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we 1757 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry 1758 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty 1759 * problems in the blocking world 1760 */ 1761 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 1762 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); 1763 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); 1764 BIO_set_retry_read(bio); 1765 return -1; 1766 } 1767 } 1768 goto start; 1769 } 1770 1771 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) { 1772 default: 1773 /* 1774 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but 1775 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the 1776 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where 1777 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised 1778 * record types, using up resources processing them. 1779 */ 1780 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1781 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); 1782 return -1; 1783 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: 1784 case SSL3_RT_ALERT: 1785 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: 1786 /* 1787 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of 1788 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but 1789 * that should not happen when type != rr->type 1790 */ 1791 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1792 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1793 return -1; 1794 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: 1795 /* 1796 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have 1797 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() 1798 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read 1799 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet 1800 * started), we will indulge it. 1801 */ 1802 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) { 1803 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; 1804 return -1; 1805 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) { 1806 /* 1807 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data, 1808 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server 1809 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a 1810 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be 1811 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null 1812 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next 1813 * record. 1814 */ 1815 if (!early_data_count_ok(s, rr->length, 1816 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) { 1817 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1818 return -1; 1819 } 1820 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1821 goto start; 1822 } else { 1823 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1824 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); 1825 return -1; 1826 } 1827 } 1828 } 1829 1830 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq) 1831 { 1832 int i; 1833 1834 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { 1835 ++seq[i]; 1836 if (seq[i] != 0) 1837 break; 1838 } 1839 } 1840 1841 /* 1842 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible 1843 * format and false otherwise. 1844 */ 1845 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 1846 { 1847 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]); 1848 } 1849 1850 /* 1851 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec 1852 */ 1853 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 1854 { 1855 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]); 1856 } 1857