1 /* 2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved 4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 5 * 6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use 7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy 8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at 9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html 10 */ 11 12 #include <stdio.h> 13 #include <time.h> 14 #include <assert.h> 15 #include "../ssl_local.h" 16 #include "statem_local.h" 17 #include <openssl/buffer.h> 18 #include <openssl/rand.h> 19 #include <openssl/objects.h> 20 #include <openssl/evp.h> 21 #include <openssl/md5.h> 22 #include <openssl/dh.h> 23 #include <openssl/rsa.h> 24 #include <openssl/bn.h> 25 #include <openssl/engine.h> 26 #include <openssl/trace.h> 27 #include <openssl/core_names.h> 28 #include <openssl/param_build.h> 29 #include "internal/cryptlib.h" 30 31 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); 32 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); 33 34 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s); 35 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s); 36 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, 37 WPACKET *pkt); 38 39 /* 40 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not? 41 * 42 * Return values are: 43 * 1: Yes 44 * 0: No 45 */ 46 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s) 47 { 48 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */ 49 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION 50 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) 51 || (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) 52 return 0; 53 54 return 1; 55 } 56 57 /* 58 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not? 59 * 60 * Return values are: 61 * 1: Yes 62 * 0: No 63 */ 64 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s) 65 { 66 long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 67 68 /* 69 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral 70 * ciphersuite or for SRP 71 */ 72 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK 73 | SSL_kSRP)) { 74 return 1; 75 } 76 77 return 0; 78 } 79 80 /* 81 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed 82 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the 83 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The 84 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. 85 * 86 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error 87 * (transition not allowed) 88 */ 89 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) 90 { 91 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 92 93 /* 94 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't 95 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by 96 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() 97 */ 98 99 switch (st->hand_state) { 100 default: 101 break; 102 103 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: 104 /* 105 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only 106 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello. 107 */ 108 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { 109 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; 110 return 1; 111 } 112 break; 113 114 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: 115 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) { 116 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; 117 return 1; 118 } 119 break; 120 121 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: 122 if (s->hit) { 123 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { 124 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED; 125 return 1; 126 } 127 } else { 128 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { 129 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; 130 return 1; 131 } 132 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { 133 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; 134 return 1; 135 } 136 } 137 break; 138 139 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: 140 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { 141 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; 142 return 1; 143 } 144 break; 145 146 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: 147 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { 148 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY; 149 return 1; 150 } 151 break; 152 153 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: 154 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { 155 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED; 156 return 1; 157 } 158 break; 159 160 case TLS_ST_OK: 161 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { 162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; 163 return 1; 164 } 165 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) { 166 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE; 167 return 1; 168 } 169 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { 170 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION 171 /* Restore digest for PHA before adding message.*/ 172 # error Internal DTLS version error 173 #endif 174 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) { 175 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED; 176 /* 177 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the 178 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding 179 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the 180 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished? 181 */ 182 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { 183 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 184 return 0; 185 } 186 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; 187 return 1; 188 } 189 } 190 break; 191 } 192 193 /* No valid transition found */ 194 return 0; 195 } 196 197 /* 198 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed 199 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the 200 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The 201 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. 202 * 203 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error 204 * (transition not allowed) 205 */ 206 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) 207 { 208 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 209 int ske_expected; 210 211 /* 212 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version 213 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later. 214 */ 215 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 216 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt)) 217 goto err; 218 return 1; 219 } 220 221 switch (st->hand_state) { 222 default: 223 break; 224 225 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: 226 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { 227 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; 228 return 1; 229 } 230 231 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 232 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { 233 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; 234 return 1; 235 } 236 } 237 break; 238 239 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: 240 /* 241 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early 242 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a 243 * HelloRetryRequest. 244 */ 245 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { 246 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; 247 return 1; 248 } 249 break; 250 251 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: 252 if (s->hit) { 253 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { 254 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { 255 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; 256 return 1; 257 } 258 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 259 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; 260 return 1; 261 } 262 } else { 263 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { 264 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; 265 return 1; 266 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION 267 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL 268 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL 269 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 270 /* 271 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session 272 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on 273 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if 274 * the server is resuming. 275 */ 276 s->hit = 1; 277 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; 278 return 1; 279 } else if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth 280 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { 281 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { 282 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; 283 return 1; 284 } 285 } else { 286 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s); 287 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */ 288 if (ske_expected 289 || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) 290 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { 291 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { 292 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH; 293 return 1; 294 } 295 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 296 && cert_req_allowed(s)) { 297 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; 298 return 1; 299 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { 300 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE; 301 return 1; 302 } 303 } 304 } 305 break; 306 307 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: 308 /* 309 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if 310 * |ext.status_expected| is set 311 */ 312 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) { 313 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS; 314 return 1; 315 } 316 /* Fall through */ 317 318 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: 319 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s); 320 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */ 321 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) 322 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { 323 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { 324 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH; 325 return 1; 326 } 327 goto err; 328 } 329 /* Fall through */ 330 331 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: 332 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { 333 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) { 334 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; 335 return 1; 336 } 337 goto err; 338 } 339 /* Fall through */ 340 341 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: 342 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { 343 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE; 344 return 1; 345 } 346 break; 347 348 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: 349 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { 350 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { 351 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; 352 return 1; 353 } 354 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 355 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; 356 return 1; 357 } 358 break; 359 360 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: 361 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 362 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; 363 return 1; 364 } 365 break; 366 367 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: 368 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { 369 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED; 370 return 1; 371 } 372 break; 373 374 case TLS_ST_OK: 375 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) { 376 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ; 377 return 1; 378 } 379 break; 380 } 381 382 err: 383 /* No valid transition found */ 384 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 385 BIO *rbio; 386 387 /* 388 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably 389 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it. 390 */ 391 s->init_num = 0; 392 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 393 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s); 394 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio); 395 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio); 396 return 0; 397 } 398 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 399 return 0; 400 } 401 402 /* 403 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to 404 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the 405 * server. 406 */ 407 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s) 408 { 409 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 410 411 /* 412 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated 413 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by 414 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition(). 415 */ 416 switch (st->hand_state) { 417 default: 418 /* Shouldn't happen */ 419 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 420 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; 421 422 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: 423 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { 424 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT; 425 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 426 } 427 /* 428 * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after 429 * we already sent close_notify 430 */ 431 if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) { 432 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */ 433 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 434 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; 435 } 436 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 437 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 438 439 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: 440 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY 441 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) 442 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END; 443 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 444 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE) 445 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; 446 else 447 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT 448 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; 449 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 450 451 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END: 452 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) { 453 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; 454 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 455 } 456 /* Fall through */ 457 458 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: 459 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: 460 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT 461 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; 462 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 463 464 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: 465 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */ 466 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY 467 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; 468 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 469 470 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: 471 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; 472 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 473 474 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE: 475 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE: 476 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: 477 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: 478 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 479 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 480 481 case TLS_ST_OK: 482 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { 483 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE; 484 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 485 } 486 487 /* Try to read from the server instead */ 488 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 489 } 490 } 491 492 /* 493 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to 494 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server. 495 */ 496 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s) 497 { 498 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 499 500 /* 501 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what 502 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until 503 * later 504 */ 505 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) 506 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s); 507 508 switch (st->hand_state) { 509 default: 510 /* Shouldn't happen */ 511 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 512 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; 513 514 case TLS_ST_OK: 515 if (!s->renegotiate) { 516 /* 517 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have 518 * received a message from the server. Better read it. 519 */ 520 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 521 } 522 /* Renegotiation */ 523 /* fall thru */ 524 case TLS_ST_BEFORE: 525 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; 526 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 527 528 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: 529 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) { 530 /* 531 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't 532 * actually selected a version yet. 533 */ 534 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) 535 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; 536 else 537 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; 538 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 539 } 540 /* 541 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what 542 * we will be sent 543 */ 544 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 545 546 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: 547 /* 548 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a 549 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one 550 * because we did early data. 551 */ 552 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 553 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) 554 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; 555 else 556 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; 557 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 558 559 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: 560 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 561 562 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: 563 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; 564 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 565 566 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: 567 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req) 568 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT; 569 else 570 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH; 571 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 572 573 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: 574 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH; 575 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 576 577 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: 578 /* 579 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is 580 * sent, but no verify packet is sent 581 */ 582 /* 583 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH 584 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We 585 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's 586 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate. 587 */ 588 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) { 589 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY; 590 } else { 591 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; 592 } 593 if (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) { 594 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; 595 } 596 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 597 598 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: 599 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; 600 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 601 602 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: 603 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { 604 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; 605 } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) { 606 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; 607 } else { 608 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 609 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; 610 #else 611 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.npn_seen) 612 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO; 613 else 614 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; 615 #endif 616 } 617 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 618 619 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 620 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO: 621 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; 622 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 623 #endif 624 625 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: 626 if (s->hit) { 627 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 628 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 629 } else { 630 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 631 } 632 633 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: 634 if (s->hit) { 635 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; 636 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 637 } else { 638 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 639 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 640 } 641 642 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ: 643 /* 644 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more 645 * convenient time. 646 */ 647 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) { 648 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) { 649 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 650 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; 651 } 652 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; 653 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 654 } 655 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 656 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 657 } 658 } 659 660 /* 661 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from 662 * the client to the server. 663 */ 664 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) 665 { 666 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 667 668 switch (st->hand_state) { 669 default: 670 /* No pre work to be done */ 671 break; 672 673 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: 674 s->shutdown = 0; 675 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 676 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */ 677 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { 678 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 679 return WORK_ERROR; 680 } 681 } 682 break; 683 684 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: 685 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 686 if (s->hit) { 687 /* 688 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these 689 * messages unless we need to. 690 */ 691 st->use_timer = 0; 692 } 693 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 694 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { 695 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ 696 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s); 697 } 698 #endif 699 } 700 break; 701 702 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END: 703 /* 704 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not 705 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press 706 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here. 707 */ 708 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING 709 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE) 710 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 711 /* Fall through */ 712 713 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: 714 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1); 715 716 case TLS_ST_OK: 717 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ 718 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1); 719 } 720 721 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 722 } 723 724 /* 725 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the 726 * client to the server. 727 */ 728 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) 729 { 730 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 731 732 s->init_num = 0; 733 734 switch (st->hand_state) { 735 default: 736 /* No post work to be done */ 737 break; 738 739 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: 740 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING 741 && s->max_early_data > 0) { 742 /* 743 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change 744 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead 745 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly. 746 */ 747 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) { 748 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s, 749 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { 750 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 751 return WORK_ERROR; 752 } 753 } 754 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */ 755 } else if (!statem_flush(s)) { 756 return WORK_MORE_A; 757 } 758 759 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 760 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */ 761 s->first_packet = 1; 762 } 763 break; 764 765 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: 766 /* 767 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing 768 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server. 769 */ 770 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx); 771 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL; 772 break; 773 774 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: 775 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) { 776 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 777 return WORK_ERROR; 778 } 779 break; 780 781 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: 782 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) 783 break; 784 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING 785 && s->max_early_data > 0) { 786 /* 787 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change 788 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead 789 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly. 790 */ 791 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s, 792 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) 793 return WORK_ERROR; 794 break; 795 } 796 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher; 797 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 798 s->session->compress_meth = 0; 799 #else 800 if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL) 801 s->session->compress_meth = 0; 802 else 803 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id; 804 #endif 805 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { 806 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 807 return WORK_ERROR; 808 } 809 810 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 811 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { 812 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 813 return WORK_ERROR; 814 } 815 816 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 818 if (s->hit) { 819 /* 820 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if 821 * no SCTP used. 822 */ 823 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 824 0, NULL); 825 } 826 #endif 827 828 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); 829 } 830 break; 831 832 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: 833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 834 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) { 835 /* 836 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if 837 * no SCTP used. 838 */ 839 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 840 0, NULL); 841 } 842 #endif 843 if (statem_flush(s) != 1) 844 return WORK_MORE_B; 845 846 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 847 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { 848 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 849 return WORK_ERROR; 850 } 851 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { 852 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 853 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { 854 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 855 return WORK_ERROR; 856 } 857 } 858 } 859 break; 860 861 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE: 862 if (statem_flush(s) != 1) 863 return WORK_MORE_A; 864 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) { 865 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 866 return WORK_ERROR; 867 } 868 break; 869 } 870 871 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 872 } 873 874 /* 875 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the 876 * client 877 * 878 * Valid return values are: 879 * 1: Success 880 * 0: Error 881 */ 882 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, 883 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt) 884 { 885 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 886 887 switch (st->hand_state) { 888 default: 889 /* Shouldn't happen */ 890 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE); 891 return 0; 892 893 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: 894 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 895 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec; 896 else 897 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec; 898 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; 899 break; 900 901 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: 902 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello; 903 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO; 904 break; 905 906 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: 907 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data; 908 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; 909 break; 910 911 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END: 912 *confunc = NULL; 913 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY; 914 break; 915 916 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: 917 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate; 918 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE; 919 break; 920 921 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: 922 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange; 923 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; 924 break; 925 926 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: 927 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify; 928 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; 929 break; 930 931 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 932 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO: 933 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto; 934 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO; 935 break; 936 #endif 937 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: 938 *confunc = tls_construct_finished; 939 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED; 940 break; 941 942 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE: 943 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update; 944 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE; 945 break; 946 } 947 948 return 1; 949 } 950 951 /* 952 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are 953 * reading. Excludes the message header. 954 */ 955 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s) 956 { 957 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 958 959 switch (st->hand_state) { 960 default: 961 /* Shouldn't happen */ 962 return 0; 963 964 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: 965 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; 966 967 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: 968 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH; 969 970 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: 971 return s->max_cert_list; 972 973 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: 974 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; 975 976 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: 977 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; 978 979 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: 980 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH; 981 982 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: 983 /* 984 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In 985 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured 986 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs 987 */ 988 return s->max_cert_list; 989 990 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: 991 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH; 992 993 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: 994 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 995 return 3; 996 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH; 997 998 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: 999 return (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) ? SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS13 1000 : SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS12; 1001 1002 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: 1003 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; 1004 1005 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: 1006 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH; 1007 1008 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE: 1009 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH; 1010 } 1011 } 1012 1013 /* 1014 * Process a message that the client has received from the server. 1015 */ 1016 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 1017 { 1018 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 1019 1020 switch (st->hand_state) { 1021 default: 1022 /* Shouldn't happen */ 1023 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1024 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 1025 1026 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: 1027 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt); 1028 1029 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: 1030 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt); 1031 1032 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: 1033 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt); 1034 1035 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: 1036 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt); 1037 1038 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: 1039 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt); 1040 1041 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: 1042 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt); 1043 1044 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: 1045 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt); 1046 1047 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: 1048 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt); 1049 1050 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: 1051 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt); 1052 1053 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: 1054 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt); 1055 1056 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: 1057 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); 1058 1059 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ: 1060 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt); 1061 1062 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: 1063 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt); 1064 1065 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE: 1066 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt); 1067 } 1068 } 1069 1070 /* 1071 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message 1072 * from the server 1073 */ 1074 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) 1075 { 1076 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 1077 1078 switch (st->hand_state) { 1079 default: 1080 /* Shouldn't happen */ 1081 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1082 return WORK_ERROR; 1083 1084 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: 1085 return tls_post_process_server_certificate(s, wst); 1086 1087 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: 1088 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: 1089 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst); 1090 } 1091 } 1092 1093 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 1094 { 1095 unsigned char *p; 1096 size_t sess_id_len; 1097 int i, protverr; 1098 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1099 SSL_COMP *comp; 1100 #endif 1101 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; 1102 unsigned char *session_id; 1103 1104 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */ 1105 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s); 1106 if (protverr != 0) { 1107 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, protverr); 1108 return 0; 1109 } 1110 1111 if (sess == NULL 1112 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL) 1113 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) { 1114 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE 1115 && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { 1116 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1117 return 0; 1118 } 1119 } 1120 /* else use the pre-loaded session */ 1121 1122 p = s->s3.client_random; 1123 1124 /* 1125 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are 1126 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify 1127 */ 1128 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1129 size_t idx; 1130 i = 1; 1131 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3.client_random); idx++) { 1132 if (p[idx]) { 1133 i = 0; 1134 break; 1135 } 1136 } 1137 } else { 1138 i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE); 1139 } 1140 1141 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3.client_random), 1142 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) { 1143 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1144 return 0; 1145 } 1146 1147 /*- 1148 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from 1149 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version 1150 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also 1151 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can 1152 * choke if we initially report a higher version then 1153 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This 1154 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it 1155 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports 1156 * 1.0. 1157 * 1158 * Possible scenario with previous logic: 1159 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2 1160 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0 1161 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2. 1162 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0. 1163 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate. 1164 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now 1165 * know that is maximum server supports. 1166 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret 1167 * containing version 1.0. 1168 * 1169 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the 1170 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely 1171 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't 1172 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with 1173 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using 1174 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to 1175 * the negotiated version. 1176 * 1177 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the 1178 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions. 1179 */ 1180 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version) 1181 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { 1182 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1183 return 0; 1184 } 1185 1186 /* Session ID */ 1187 session_id = s->session->session_id; 1188 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) { 1189 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION 1190 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) { 1191 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id); 1192 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len; 1193 session_id = s->tmp_session_id; 1194 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE 1195 && RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->tmp_session_id, 1196 sess_id_len, 0) <= 0) { 1197 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1198 return 0; 1199 } 1200 } else { 1201 sess_id_len = 0; 1202 } 1203 } else { 1204 assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id)); 1205 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length; 1206 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) { 1207 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len; 1208 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len); 1209 } 1210 } 1211 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) 1212 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id, 1213 sess_id_len)) 1214 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1215 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1216 return 0; 1217 } 1218 1219 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */ 1220 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1221 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie) 1222 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie, 1223 s->d1->cookie_len)) { 1224 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1225 return 0; 1226 } 1227 } 1228 1229 /* Ciphers supported */ 1230 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { 1231 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1232 return 0; 1233 } 1234 1235 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) { 1236 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1237 return 0; 1238 } 1239 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1240 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1241 return 0; 1242 } 1243 1244 /* COMPRESSION */ 1245 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) { 1246 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1247 return 0; 1248 } 1249 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1250 if (ssl_allow_compression(s) 1251 && s->ctx->comp_methods 1252 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3.tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) { 1253 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); 1254 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) { 1255 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i); 1256 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) { 1257 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1258 return 0; 1259 } 1260 } 1261 } 1262 #endif 1263 /* Add the NULL method */ 1264 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1265 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1266 return 0; 1267 } 1268 1269 /* TLS extensions */ 1270 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) { 1271 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1272 return 0; 1273 } 1274 1275 return 1; 1276 } 1277 1278 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 1279 { 1280 size_t cookie_len; 1281 PACKET cookiepkt; 1282 1283 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2) 1284 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) { 1285 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1286 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 1287 } 1288 1289 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt); 1290 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) { 1291 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 1292 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 1293 } 1294 1295 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) { 1296 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1297 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 1298 } 1299 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len; 1300 1301 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; 1302 } 1303 1304 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars) 1305 { 1306 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; 1307 const SSL_CIPHER *c; 1308 int i; 1309 1310 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0); 1311 if (c == NULL) { 1312 /* unknown cipher */ 1313 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); 1314 return 0; 1315 } 1316 /* 1317 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello, 1318 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error. 1319 */ 1320 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) { 1321 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); 1322 return 0; 1323 } 1324 1325 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s); 1326 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c); 1327 if (i < 0) { 1328 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ 1329 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); 1330 return 0; 1331 } 1332 1333 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL 1334 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) { 1335 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */ 1336 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); 1337 return 0; 1338 } 1339 1340 /* 1341 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher 1342 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is 1343 * set and use it for comparison. 1344 */ 1345 if (s->session->cipher != NULL) 1346 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id; 1347 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) { 1348 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1349 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(s->ctx, c->algorithm2); 1350 1351 /* 1352 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different 1353 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same. 1354 */ 1355 if (md == NULL 1356 || md != ssl_md(s->ctx, s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) { 1357 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1358 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED); 1359 return 0; 1360 } 1361 } else { 1362 /* 1363 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same 1364 * ciphersuite. 1365 */ 1366 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1367 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); 1368 return 0; 1369 } 1370 } 1371 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = c; 1372 1373 return 1; 1374 } 1375 1376 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 1377 { 1378 PACKET session_id, extpkt; 1379 size_t session_id_len; 1380 const unsigned char *cipherchars; 1381 int hrr = 0; 1382 unsigned int compression; 1383 unsigned int sversion; 1384 unsigned int context; 1385 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL; 1386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1387 SSL_COMP *comp; 1388 #endif 1389 1390 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) { 1391 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1392 goto err; 1393 } 1394 1395 /* load the server random */ 1396 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION 1397 && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION 1398 && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE 1399 && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) { 1400 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { 1401 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 1402 goto err; 1403 } 1404 s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING; 1405 hrr = 1; 1406 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { 1407 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1408 goto err; 1409 } 1410 } else { 1411 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { 1412 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1413 goto err; 1414 } 1415 } 1416 1417 /* Get the session-id. */ 1418 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) { 1419 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1420 goto err; 1421 } 1422 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id); 1423 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id) 1424 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) { 1425 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); 1426 goto err; 1427 } 1428 1429 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) { 1430 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1431 goto err; 1432 } 1433 1434 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) { 1435 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1436 goto err; 1437 } 1438 1439 /* TLS extensions */ 1440 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) { 1441 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt); 1442 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt) 1443 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 1444 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); 1445 goto err; 1446 } 1447 1448 if (!hrr) { 1449 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, 1450 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO 1451 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, 1452 &extensions, NULL, 1)) { 1453 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1454 goto err; 1455 } 1456 1457 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) { 1458 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1459 goto err; 1460 } 1461 } 1462 1463 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) { 1464 if (compression != 0) { 1465 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1466 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 1467 goto err; 1468 } 1469 1470 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len 1471 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id, 1472 session_id_len) != 0) { 1473 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID); 1474 goto err; 1475 } 1476 } 1477 1478 if (hrr) { 1479 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) { 1480 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1481 goto err; 1482 } 1483 1484 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt); 1485 } 1486 1487 /* 1488 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions 1489 * are appropriate for this version. 1490 */ 1491 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO 1492 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO; 1493 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) { 1494 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 1495 goto err; 1496 } 1497 1498 s->hit = 0; 1499 1500 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1501 /* 1502 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of 1503 * the message must be on a record boundary. 1504 */ 1505 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { 1506 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, 1507 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); 1508 goto err; 1509 } 1510 1511 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */ 1512 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk, 1513 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, 1514 extensions, NULL, 0)) { 1515 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1516 goto err; 1517 } 1518 } else { 1519 /* 1520 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared 1521 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption. 1522 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs. 1523 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs) 1524 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application 1525 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether 1526 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session 1527 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we 1528 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake 1529 * message to see if the server wants to resume. 1530 */ 1531 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION 1532 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) { 1533 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; 1534 /* 1535 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for 1536 * backwards compat reasons 1537 */ 1538 int master_key_length; 1539 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); 1540 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, 1541 &master_key_length, 1542 NULL, &pref_cipher, 1543 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg) 1544 && master_key_length > 0) { 1545 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length; 1546 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? 1547 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0); 1548 } else { 1549 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1550 goto err; 1551 } 1552 } 1553 1554 if (session_id_len != 0 1555 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length 1556 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id, 1557 session_id_len) == 0) 1558 s->hit = 1; 1559 } 1560 1561 if (s->hit) { 1562 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length 1563 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) { 1564 /* actually a client application bug */ 1565 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1566 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); 1567 goto err; 1568 } 1569 } else { 1570 /* 1571 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server 1572 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION. 1573 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID, 1574 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be 1575 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption. 1576 */ 1577 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { 1578 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss); 1579 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { 1580 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1581 goto err; 1582 } 1583 } 1584 1585 s->session->ssl_version = s->version; 1586 /* 1587 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can 1588 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an 1589 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be 1590 * used for resumption. 1591 */ 1592 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1593 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len; 1594 /* session_id_len could be 0 */ 1595 if (session_id_len > 0) 1596 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id), 1597 session_id_len); 1598 } 1599 } 1600 1601 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */ 1602 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) { 1603 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, 1604 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH); 1605 goto err; 1606 } 1607 /* 1608 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed 1609 * version. 1610 */ 1611 s->s3.tmp.min_ver = s->version; 1612 s->s3.tmp.max_ver = s->version; 1613 1614 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) { 1615 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1616 goto err; 1617 } 1618 1619 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1620 if (compression != 0) { 1621 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1622 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 1623 goto err; 1624 } 1625 /* 1626 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session 1627 * using compression. 1628 */ 1629 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { 1630 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1631 goto err; 1632 } 1633 #else 1634 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) { 1635 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1636 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED); 1637 goto err; 1638 } 1639 if (compression == 0) 1640 comp = NULL; 1641 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) { 1642 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED); 1643 goto err; 1644 } else { 1645 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression); 1646 } 1647 1648 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) { 1649 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1650 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 1651 goto err; 1652 } else { 1653 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp; 1654 } 1655 #endif 1656 1657 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) { 1658 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1659 goto err; 1660 } 1661 1662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 1663 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { 1664 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; 1665 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; 1666 size_t labellen; 1667 1668 /* 1669 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if 1670 * no SCTP used. 1671 */ 1672 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, 1673 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); 1674 1675 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */ 1676 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1; 1677 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG) 1678 labellen += 1; 1679 1680 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, 1681 sizeof(sctpauthkey), 1682 labelbuffer, 1683 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { 1684 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1685 goto err; 1686 } 1687 1688 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), 1689 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, 1690 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); 1691 } 1692 #endif 1693 1694 /* 1695 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise 1696 * we're done with this message 1697 */ 1698 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) 1699 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s) 1700 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 1701 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) { 1702 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1703 goto err; 1704 } 1705 1706 OPENSSL_free(extensions); 1707 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; 1708 err: 1709 OPENSSL_free(extensions); 1710 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 1711 } 1712 1713 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, 1714 PACKET *extpkt) 1715 { 1716 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL; 1717 1718 /* 1719 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and 1720 * should not be used. 1721 */ 1722 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx); 1723 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL; 1724 1725 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, 1726 &extensions, NULL, 1) 1727 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, 1728 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) { 1729 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1730 goto err; 1731 } 1732 1733 OPENSSL_free(extensions); 1734 extensions = NULL; 1735 1736 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0 && s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) { 1737 /* 1738 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next 1739 * ClientHello will not change 1740 */ 1741 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR); 1742 goto err; 1743 } 1744 1745 /* 1746 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with 1747 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1. 1748 */ 1749 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) { 1750 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1751 goto err; 1752 } 1753 1754 /* 1755 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done 1756 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the 1757 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now 1758 * for HRR messages. 1759 */ 1760 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, 1761 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { 1762 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1763 goto err; 1764 } 1765 1766 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; 1767 err: 1768 OPENSSL_free(extensions); 1769 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 1770 } 1771 1772 /* prepare server cert verification by setting s->session->peer_chain from pkt */ 1773 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 1774 { 1775 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len; 1776 X509 *x = NULL; 1777 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; 1778 size_t chainidx; 1779 unsigned int context = 0; 1780 1781 if ((s->session->peer_chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { 1782 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1783 goto err; 1784 } 1785 1786 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context)) 1787 || context != 0 1788 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len) 1789 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len 1790 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) { 1791 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1792 goto err; 1793 } 1794 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) { 1795 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len) 1796 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) { 1797 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1798 goto err; 1799 } 1800 1801 certstart = certbytes; 1802 x = X509_new_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq); 1803 if (x == NULL) { 1804 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1805 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1806 goto err; 1807 } 1808 if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, 1809 cert_len) == NULL) { 1810 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); 1811 goto err; 1812 } 1813 1814 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) { 1815 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1816 goto err; 1817 } 1818 1819 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1820 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; 1821 PACKET extensions; 1822 1823 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) { 1824 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); 1825 goto err; 1826 } 1827 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, 1828 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts, 1829 NULL, chainidx == 0) 1830 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, 1831 rawexts, x, chainidx, 1832 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { 1833 OPENSSL_free(rawexts); 1834 /* SSLfatal already called */ 1835 goto err; 1836 } 1837 OPENSSL_free(rawexts); 1838 } 1839 1840 if (!sk_X509_push(s->session->peer_chain, x)) { 1841 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1842 goto err; 1843 } 1844 x = NULL; 1845 } 1846 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; 1847 1848 err: 1849 X509_free(x); 1850 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free); 1851 s->session->peer_chain = NULL; 1852 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 1853 } 1854 1855 /* 1856 * Verify the s->session->peer_chain and check server cert type. 1857 * On success set s->session->peer and s->session->verify_result. 1858 * Else the peer certificate verification callback may request retry. 1859 */ 1860 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) 1861 { 1862 X509 *x; 1863 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 1864 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu; 1865 size_t certidx; 1866 int i; 1867 1868 if (s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY) 1869 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1870 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, s->session->peer_chain); 1871 if (i > 0 && s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY) { 1872 return WORK_MORE_A; 1873 } 1874 /* 1875 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order 1876 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place. 1877 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set 1878 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes 1879 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was 1880 * reverted because at least one application *only* set 1881 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused 1882 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did 1883 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags 1884 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the 1885 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is 1886 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same. 1887 */ 1888 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) { 1889 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result), 1890 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); 1891 return WORK_ERROR; 1892 } 1893 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */ 1894 1895 /* 1896 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate, 1897 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c 1898 */ 1899 x = sk_X509_value(s->session->peer_chain, 0); 1900 1901 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x); 1902 1903 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) { 1904 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1905 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS); 1906 return WORK_ERROR; 1907 } 1908 1909 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) { 1910 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); 1911 return WORK_ERROR; 1912 } 1913 /* 1914 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3 1915 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate 1916 * type. 1917 */ 1918 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1919 if ((clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) { 1920 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); 1921 return WORK_ERROR; 1922 } 1923 } 1924 1925 X509_free(s->session->peer); 1926 X509_up_ref(x); 1927 s->session->peer = x; 1928 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; 1929 1930 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */ 1931 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) 1932 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash, 1933 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash), 1934 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) { 1935 /* SSLfatal() already called */; 1936 return WORK_ERROR; 1937 } 1938 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 1939 } 1940 1941 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 1942 { 1943 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1944 PACKET psk_identity_hint; 1945 1946 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */ 1947 1948 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) { 1949 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1950 return 0; 1951 } 1952 1953 /* 1954 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in 1955 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of 1956 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK 1957 * identity. 1958 */ 1959 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { 1960 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 1961 return 0; 1962 } 1963 1964 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) { 1965 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); 1966 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL; 1967 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint, 1968 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) { 1969 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1970 return 0; 1971 } 1972 1973 return 1; 1974 #else 1975 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1976 return 0; 1977 #endif 1978 } 1979 1980 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey) 1981 { 1982 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1983 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub; 1984 1985 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime) 1986 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator) 1987 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt) 1988 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) { 1989 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1990 return 0; 1991 } 1992 1993 if ((s->srp_ctx.N = 1994 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), 1995 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL 1996 || (s->srp_ctx.g = 1997 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), 1998 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL 1999 || (s->srp_ctx.s = 2000 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt), 2001 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL 2002 || (s->srp_ctx.B = 2003 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub), 2004 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) { 2005 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB); 2006 return 0; 2007 } 2008 2009 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) { 2010 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2011 return 0; 2012 } 2013 2014 /* We must check if there is a certificate */ 2015 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS)) 2016 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); 2017 2018 return 1; 2019 #else 2020 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2021 return 0; 2022 #endif 2023 } 2024 2025 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey) 2026 { 2027 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key; 2028 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL; 2029 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL; 2030 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; 2031 OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL; 2032 OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = NULL; 2033 int ret = 0; 2034 2035 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime) 2036 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator) 2037 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) { 2038 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2039 return 0; 2040 } 2041 2042 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL); 2043 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), 2044 NULL); 2045 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key), 2046 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL); 2047 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) { 2048 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB); 2049 goto err; 2050 } 2051 2052 tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new(); 2053 if (tmpl == NULL 2054 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p) 2055 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g) 2056 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, 2057 bnpub_key) 2058 || (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl)) == NULL) { 2059 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2060 goto err; 2061 } 2062 2063 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(s->ctx->libctx, "DH", s->ctx->propq); 2064 if (pctx == NULL) { 2065 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2066 goto err; 2067 } 2068 if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx) <= 0 2069 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &peer_tmp, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) <= 0) { 2070 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE); 2071 goto err; 2072 } 2073 2074 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 2075 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, peer_tmp, s->ctx->propq); 2076 if (pctx == NULL 2077 /* 2078 * EVP_PKEY_param_check() will verify that the DH params are using 2079 * a safe prime. In this context, because we're using ephemeral DH, 2080 * we're ok with it not being a safe prime. 2081 * EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick() skips the safe prime check. 2082 */ 2083 || EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick(pctx) != 1 2084 || EVP_PKEY_public_check(pctx) != 1) { 2085 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE); 2086 goto err; 2087 } 2088 2089 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, 2090 EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(peer_tmp), 2091 0, peer_tmp)) { 2092 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); 2093 goto err; 2094 } 2095 2096 s->s3.peer_tmp = peer_tmp; 2097 peer_tmp = NULL; 2098 2099 /* 2100 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with 2101 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this 2102 */ 2103 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS)) 2104 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); 2105 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */ 2106 2107 ret = 1; 2108 2109 err: 2110 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl); 2111 OSSL_PARAM_free(params); 2112 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp); 2113 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 2114 BN_free(p); 2115 BN_free(g); 2116 BN_free(bnpub_key); 2117 2118 return ret; 2119 } 2120 2121 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey) 2122 { 2123 PACKET encoded_pt; 2124 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id; 2125 2126 /* 2127 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH 2128 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and 2129 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. 2130 */ 2131 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) { 2132 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 2133 return 0; 2134 } 2135 /* 2136 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not 2137 * server has sent an invalid curve. 2138 */ 2139 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE 2140 || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) { 2141 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); 2142 return 0; 2143 } 2144 2145 if ((s->s3.peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(s, curve_id)) == NULL) { 2146 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2147 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); 2148 return 0; 2149 } 2150 2151 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) { 2152 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2153 return 0; 2154 } 2155 2156 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(s->s3.peer_tmp, 2157 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), 2158 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt)) <= 0) { 2159 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); 2160 return 0; 2161 } 2162 2163 /* 2164 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign 2165 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA 2166 * and ECDSA. 2167 */ 2168 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA) 2169 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); 2170 else if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA) 2171 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); 2172 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */ 2173 2174 /* Cache the agreed upon group in the SSL_SESSION */ 2175 s->session->kex_group = curve_id; 2176 return 1; 2177 } 2178 2179 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 2180 { 2181 long alg_k; 2182 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 2183 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL; 2184 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; 2185 PACKET save_param_start, signature; 2186 2187 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 2188 2189 save_param_start = *pkt; 2190 2191 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.peer_tmp); 2192 s->s3.peer_tmp = NULL; 2193 2194 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) { 2195 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) { 2196 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2197 goto err; 2198 } 2199 } 2200 2201 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */ 2202 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { 2203 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { 2204 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) { 2205 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2206 goto err; 2207 } 2208 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { 2209 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) { 2210 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2211 goto err; 2212 } 2213 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { 2214 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) { 2215 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2216 goto err; 2217 } 2218 } else if (alg_k) { 2219 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 2220 goto err; 2221 } 2222 2223 /* if it was signed, check the signature */ 2224 if (pkey != NULL) { 2225 PACKET params; 2226 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 2227 unsigned char *tbs; 2228 size_t tbslen; 2229 int rv; 2230 2231 /* 2232 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference 2233 * equals the length of the parameters. 2234 */ 2235 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms, 2236 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) - 2237 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) { 2238 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2239 goto err; 2240 } 2241 2242 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 2243 unsigned int sigalg; 2244 2245 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { 2246 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 2247 goto err; 2248 } 2249 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) { 2250 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2251 goto err; 2252 } 2253 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { 2254 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2255 SSL_R_LEGACY_SIGALG_DISALLOWED_OR_UNSUPPORTED); 2256 goto err; 2257 } 2258 2259 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { 2260 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2261 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM); 2262 goto err; 2263 } 2264 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) 2265 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", 2266 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md)); 2267 2268 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature) 2269 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 2270 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2271 goto err; 2272 } 2273 2274 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); 2275 if (md_ctx == NULL) { 2276 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2277 goto err; 2278 } 2279 2280 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx, 2281 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md), 2282 s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq, pkey, 2283 NULL) <= 0) { 2284 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2285 goto err; 2286 } 2287 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { 2288 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 2289 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, 2290 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { 2291 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2292 goto err; 2293 } 2294 } 2295 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms), 2296 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)); 2297 if (tbslen == 0) { 2298 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2299 goto err; 2300 } 2301 2302 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature), 2303 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen); 2304 OPENSSL_free(tbs); 2305 if (rv <= 0) { 2306 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); 2307 goto err; 2308 } 2309 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); 2310 md_ctx = NULL; 2311 } else { 2312 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */ 2313 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) 2314 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) { 2315 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */ 2316 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { 2317 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DATA); 2318 } 2319 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */ 2320 goto err; 2321 } 2322 /* still data left over */ 2323 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 2324 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); 2325 goto err; 2326 } 2327 } 2328 2329 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; 2330 err: 2331 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); 2332 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2333 } 2334 2335 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 2336 { 2337 size_t i; 2338 2339 /* Clear certificate validity flags */ 2340 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) 2341 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0; 2342 2343 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 2344 PACKET reqctx, extensions; 2345 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; 2346 2347 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) { 2348 /* 2349 * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3 2350 * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so 2351 * we just ignore it 2352 */ 2353 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; 2354 } 2355 2356 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */ 2357 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.ctype); 2358 s->s3.tmp.ctype = NULL; 2359 s->s3.tmp.ctype_len = 0; 2360 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context); 2361 s->pha_context = NULL; 2362 s->pha_context_len = 0; 2363 2364 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) || 2365 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) { 2366 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2367 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2368 } 2369 2370 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) { 2371 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); 2372 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2373 } 2374 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, 2375 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, 2376 &rawexts, NULL, 1) 2377 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, 2378 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) { 2379 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2380 OPENSSL_free(rawexts); 2381 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2382 } 2383 OPENSSL_free(rawexts); 2384 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { 2385 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); 2386 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2387 } 2388 } else { 2389 PACKET ctypes; 2390 2391 /* get the certificate types */ 2392 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) { 2393 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2394 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2395 } 2396 2397 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3.tmp.ctype, &s->s3.tmp.ctype_len)) { 2398 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2399 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2400 } 2401 2402 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 2403 PACKET sigalgs; 2404 2405 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) { 2406 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2407 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2408 } 2409 2410 /* 2411 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility 2412 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field. 2413 */ 2414 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) { 2415 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2416 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR); 2417 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2418 } 2419 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { 2420 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2421 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2422 } 2423 } 2424 2425 /* get the CA RDNs */ 2426 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) { 2427 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2428 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2429 } 2430 } 2431 2432 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 2433 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2434 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2435 } 2436 2437 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */ 2438 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 1; 2439 2440 /* 2441 * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until 2442 * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because 2443 * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message 2444 * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that 2445 * SSL_get1_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in 2446 * client_cert_cb. 2447 */ 2448 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) 2449 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; 2450 2451 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; 2452 } 2453 2454 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 2455 { 2456 unsigned int ticklen; 2457 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0; 2458 unsigned int sess_len; 2459 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL; 2460 PACKET nonce; 2461 EVP_MD *sha256 = NULL; 2462 2463 PACKET_null_init(&nonce); 2464 2465 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint) 2466 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) 2467 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add) 2468 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce))) 2469 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen) 2470 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen) 2471 : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) { 2472 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2473 goto err; 2474 } 2475 2476 /* 2477 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty 2478 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never 2479 * be 0 here in that instance 2480 */ 2481 if (ticklen == 0) 2482 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; 2483 2484 /* 2485 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise 2486 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions, 2487 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every 2488 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive 2489 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session 2490 * cache. 2491 */ 2492 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) { 2493 SSL_SESSION *new_sess; 2494 2495 /* 2496 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new 2497 * one 2498 */ 2499 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) { 2500 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2501 goto err; 2502 } 2503 2504 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0 2505 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 2506 /* 2507 * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that 2508 * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the 2509 * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails 2510 */ 2511 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); 2512 } 2513 2514 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); 2515 s->session = new_sess; 2516 } 2517 2518 s->session->time = time(NULL); 2519 ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s->session); 2520 2521 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick); 2522 s->session->ext.tick = NULL; 2523 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0; 2524 2525 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); 2526 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) { 2527 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2528 goto err; 2529 } 2530 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) { 2531 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2532 goto err; 2533 } 2534 2535 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint; 2536 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add; 2537 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen; 2538 2539 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 2540 PACKET extpkt; 2541 2542 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt) 2543 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 2544 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2545 goto err; 2546 } 2547 2548 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, 2549 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts, 2550 NULL, 1) 2551 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, 2552 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, 2553 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) { 2554 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2555 goto err; 2556 } 2557 } 2558 2559 /* 2560 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set 2561 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in 2562 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work 2563 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The 2564 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is 2565 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption. 2566 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions 2567 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 hash of the 2568 * ticket. 2569 */ 2570 sha256 = EVP_MD_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "SHA2-256", s->ctx->propq); 2571 if (sha256 == NULL) { 2572 /* Error is already recorded */ 2573 SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2574 goto err; 2575 } 2576 /* 2577 * We use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int 2578 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t 2579 */ 2580 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen, 2581 s->session->session_id, &sess_len, 2582 sha256, NULL)) { 2583 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2584 goto err; 2585 } 2586 EVP_MD_free(sha256); 2587 sha256 = NULL; 2588 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len; 2589 s->session->not_resumable = 0; 2590 2591 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */ 2592 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 2593 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s); 2594 int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md); 2595 size_t hashlen; 2596 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption"; 2597 2598 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */ 2599 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) { 2600 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2601 goto err; 2602 } 2603 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni; 2604 2605 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret, 2606 nonce_label, 2607 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1, 2608 PACKET_data(&nonce), 2609 PACKET_remaining(&nonce), 2610 s->session->master_key, 2611 hashlen, 1)) { 2612 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2613 goto err; 2614 } 2615 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen; 2616 2617 OPENSSL_free(exts); 2618 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); 2619 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; 2620 } 2621 2622 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; 2623 err: 2624 EVP_MD_free(sha256); 2625 OPENSSL_free(exts); 2626 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2627 } 2628 2629 /* 2630 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to 2631 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure 2632 */ 2633 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 2634 { 2635 size_t resplen; 2636 unsigned int type; 2637 2638 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type) 2639 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { 2640 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE); 2641 return 0; 2642 } 2643 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen) 2644 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) { 2645 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2646 return 0; 2647 } 2648 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen); 2649 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) { 2650 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0; 2651 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2652 return 0; 2653 } 2654 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen; 2655 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) { 2656 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2657 return 0; 2658 } 2659 2660 return 1; 2661 } 2662 2663 2664 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 2665 { 2666 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) { 2667 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2668 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2669 } 2670 2671 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; 2672 } 2673 2674 /* 2675 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the 2676 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message. 2677 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0 2678 * on failure. 2679 */ 2680 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s) 2681 { 2682 /* 2683 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from 2684 * the server 2685 */ 2686 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { 2687 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2688 return 0; 2689 } 2690 2691 /* 2692 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and 2693 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status 2694 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise 2695 */ 2696 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing 2697 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) { 2698 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg); 2699 2700 if (ret == 0) { 2701 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE, 2702 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE); 2703 return 0; 2704 } 2705 if (ret < 0) { 2706 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2707 SSL_R_OCSP_CALLBACK_FAILURE); 2708 return 0; 2709 } 2710 } 2711 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT 2712 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) { 2713 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */ 2714 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { 2715 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2716 return 0; 2717 } 2718 } 2719 #endif 2720 2721 return 1; 2722 } 2723 2724 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 2725 { 2726 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { 2727 /* should contain no data */ 2728 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2729 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2730 } 2731 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2732 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { 2733 if (ssl_srp_calc_a_param_intern(s) <= 0) { 2734 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC); 2735 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2736 } 2737 } 2738 #endif 2739 2740 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) { 2741 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2742 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2743 } 2744 2745 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; 2746 } 2747 2748 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 2749 { 2750 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2751 int ret = 0; 2752 /* 2753 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a 2754 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating 2755 * strnlen. 2756 */ 2757 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; 2758 size_t identitylen = 0; 2759 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; 2760 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL; 2761 char *tmpidentity = NULL; 2762 size_t psklen = 0; 2763 2764 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) { 2765 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB); 2766 goto err; 2767 } 2768 2769 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity)); 2770 2771 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint, 2772 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1, 2773 psk, sizeof(psk)); 2774 2775 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { 2776 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2777 psklen = PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN; /* Avoid overrunning the array on cleanse */ 2778 goto err; 2779 } else if (psklen == 0) { 2780 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); 2781 goto err; 2782 } 2783 2784 identitylen = strlen(identity); 2785 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { 2786 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2787 goto err; 2788 } 2789 2790 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen); 2791 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity); 2792 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) { 2793 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2794 goto err; 2795 } 2796 2797 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk); 2798 s->s3.tmp.psk = tmppsk; 2799 s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen; 2800 tmppsk = NULL; 2801 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); 2802 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity; 2803 tmpidentity = NULL; 2804 2805 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) { 2806 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2807 goto err; 2808 } 2809 2810 ret = 1; 2811 2812 err: 2813 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); 2814 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity)); 2815 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen); 2816 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen); 2817 2818 return ret; 2819 #else 2820 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2821 return 0; 2822 #endif 2823 } 2824 2825 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 2826 { 2827 unsigned char *encdata = NULL; 2828 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 2829 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; 2830 size_t enclen; 2831 unsigned char *pms = NULL; 2832 size_t pmslen = 0; 2833 2834 if (s->session->peer == NULL) { 2835 /* 2836 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. 2837 */ 2838 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2839 return 0; 2840 } 2841 2842 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); 2843 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "RSA")) { 2844 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2845 return 0; 2846 } 2847 2848 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; 2849 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); 2850 if (pms == NULL) { 2851 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2852 return 0; 2853 } 2854 2855 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8; 2856 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; 2857 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms + 2, pmslen - 2, 0) <= 0) { 2858 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2859 goto err; 2860 } 2861 2862 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ 2863 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { 2864 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2865 goto err; 2866 } 2867 2868 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, pkey, s->ctx->propq); 2869 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0 2870 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { 2871 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2872 goto err; 2873 } 2874 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata) 2875 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { 2876 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); 2877 goto err; 2878 } 2879 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 2880 pctx = NULL; 2881 2882 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ 2883 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 2884 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2885 goto err; 2886 } 2887 2888 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */ 2889 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) { 2890 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2891 goto err; 2892 } 2893 2894 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms; 2895 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen; 2896 2897 return 1; 2898 err: 2899 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); 2900 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 2901 2902 return 0; 2903 } 2904 2905 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 2906 { 2907 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL; 2908 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL; 2909 int prime_len; 2910 unsigned char *encoded_pub = NULL; 2911 size_t encoded_pub_len, pad_len; 2912 int ret = 0; 2913 2914 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp; 2915 if (skey == NULL) { 2916 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2917 goto err; 2918 } 2919 2920 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey); 2921 if (ckey == NULL) { 2922 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2923 goto err; 2924 } 2925 2926 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) { 2927 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2928 goto err; 2929 } 2930 2931 /* send off the data */ 2932 2933 /* Generate encoding of server key */ 2934 encoded_pub_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encoded_pub); 2935 if (encoded_pub_len == 0) { 2936 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2937 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); 2938 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 2939 } 2940 2941 /* 2942 * For interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS 2943 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length 2944 * as the prime. 2945 */ 2946 prime_len = EVP_PKEY_get_size(ckey); 2947 pad_len = prime_len - encoded_pub_len; 2948 if (pad_len > 0) { 2949 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, pad_len, &keybytes)) { 2950 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2951 goto err; 2952 } 2953 memset(keybytes, 0, pad_len); 2954 } 2955 2956 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_pub, encoded_pub_len)) { 2957 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2958 goto err; 2959 } 2960 2961 ret = 1; 2962 err: 2963 OPENSSL_free(encoded_pub); 2964 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); 2965 return ret; 2966 } 2967 2968 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 2969 { 2970 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; 2971 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0; 2972 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL; 2973 int ret = 0; 2974 2975 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp; 2976 if (skey == NULL) { 2977 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2978 return 0; 2979 } 2980 2981 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey); 2982 if (ckey == NULL) { 2983 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2984 goto err; 2985 } 2986 2987 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) { 2988 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2989 goto err; 2990 } 2991 2992 /* Generate encoding of client key */ 2993 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encodedPoint); 2994 2995 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) { 2996 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2997 goto err; 2998 } 2999 3000 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) { 3001 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3002 goto err; 3003 } 3004 3005 ret = 1; 3006 err: 3007 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 3008 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); 3009 return ret; 3010 } 3011 3012 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 3013 { 3014 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST 3015 /* GOST key exchange message creation */ 3016 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL; 3017 X509 *peer_cert; 3018 size_t msglen; 3019 unsigned int md_len; 3020 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256]; 3021 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL; 3022 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94; 3023 unsigned char *pms = NULL; 3024 size_t pmslen = 0; 3025 3026 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0) 3027 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256; 3028 3029 /* 3030 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it 3031 */ 3032 peer_cert = s->session->peer; 3033 if (peer_cert == NULL) { 3034 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 3035 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER); 3036 return 0; 3037 } 3038 3039 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, 3040 X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), 3041 s->ctx->propq); 3042 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { 3043 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3044 return 0; 3045 } 3046 /* 3047 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key 3048 * parameters match those of server certificate, use 3049 * certificate key for key exchange 3050 */ 3051 3052 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */ 3053 pmslen = 32; 3054 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); 3055 if (pms == NULL) { 3056 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3057 goto err; 3058 } 3059 3060 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0 3061 /* Generate session key 3062 */ 3063 || RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms, pmslen, 0) <= 0) { 3064 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3065 goto err; 3066 }; 3067 /* 3068 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context 3069 * data 3070 */ 3071 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); 3072 if (ukm_hash == NULL 3073 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0 3074 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.client_random, 3075 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 3076 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.server_random, 3077 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 3078 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) { 3079 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3080 goto err; 3081 } 3082 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash); 3083 ukm_hash = NULL; 3084 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, 3085 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) <= 0) { 3086 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); 3087 goto err; 3088 } 3089 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */ 3090 /* 3091 * Encapsulate it into sequence 3092 */ 3093 msglen = 255; 3094 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { 3095 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); 3096 goto err; 3097 } 3098 3099 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) 3100 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81)) 3101 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) { 3102 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3103 goto err; 3104 } 3105 3106 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); 3107 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms; 3108 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen; 3109 3110 return 1; 3111 err: 3112 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); 3113 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); 3114 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash); 3115 return 0; 3116 #else 3117 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3118 return 0; 3119 #endif 3120 } 3121 3122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST 3123 int ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(const SSL *s) 3124 { 3125 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_MAGMA) != 0) 3126 return NID_magma_ctr; 3127 else if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_KUZNYECHIK) != 0) 3128 return NID_kuznyechik_ctr; 3129 3130 return NID_undef; 3131 } 3132 3133 int ossl_gost_ukm(const SSL *s, unsigned char *dgst_buf) 3134 { 3135 EVP_MD_CTX * hash = NULL; 3136 unsigned int md_len; 3137 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_evp_md_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, s->ctx->propq); 3138 3139 if (md == NULL) 3140 return 0; 3141 3142 if ((hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL 3143 || EVP_DigestInit(hash, md) <= 0 3144 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 3145 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 3146 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(hash, dgst_buf, &md_len) <= 0) { 3147 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash); 3148 ssl_evp_md_free(md); 3149 return 0; 3150 } 3151 3152 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash); 3153 ssl_evp_md_free(md); 3154 return 1; 3155 } 3156 #endif 3157 3158 static int tls_construct_cke_gost18(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 3159 { 3160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST 3161 /* GOST 2018 key exchange message creation */ 3162 unsigned char rnd_dgst[32]; 3163 unsigned char *encdata = NULL; 3164 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL; 3165 X509 *peer_cert; 3166 unsigned char *pms = NULL; 3167 size_t pmslen = 0; 3168 size_t msglen; 3169 int cipher_nid = ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s); 3170 3171 if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) { 3172 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3173 return 0; 3174 } 3175 3176 if (ossl_gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) { 3177 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3178 goto err; 3179 } 3180 3181 /* Pre-master secret - random bytes */ 3182 pmslen = 32; 3183 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); 3184 if (pms == NULL) { 3185 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3186 goto err; 3187 } 3188 3189 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms, pmslen, 0) <= 0) { 3190 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3191 goto err; 3192 } 3193 3194 /* Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it */ 3195 peer_cert = s->session->peer; 3196 if (peer_cert == NULL) { 3197 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 3198 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER); 3199 goto err; 3200 } 3201 3202 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, 3203 X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), 3204 s->ctx->propq); 3205 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { 3206 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3207 goto err; 3208 } 3209 3210 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0 ) { 3211 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3212 goto err; 3213 }; 3214 3215 /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code */ 3216 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, 3217 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) <= 0) { 3218 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); 3219 goto err; 3220 } 3221 3222 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, 3223 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) <= 0) { 3224 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); 3225 goto err; 3226 } 3227 3228 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, NULL, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { 3229 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 3230 goto err; 3231 } 3232 3233 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, msglen, &encdata) 3234 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, encdata, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { 3235 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 3236 goto err; 3237 } 3238 3239 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); 3240 pkey_ctx = NULL; 3241 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms; 3242 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen; 3243 3244 return 1; 3245 err: 3246 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); 3247 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); 3248 return 0; 3249 #else 3250 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3251 return 0; 3252 #endif 3253 } 3254 3255 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 3256 { 3257 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 3258 unsigned char *abytes = NULL; 3259 3260 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL 3261 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A), 3262 &abytes)) { 3263 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3264 return 0; 3265 } 3266 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes); 3267 3268 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); 3269 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); 3270 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { 3271 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3272 return 0; 3273 } 3274 3275 return 1; 3276 #else 3277 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3278 return 0; 3279 #endif 3280 } 3281 3282 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 3283 { 3284 unsigned long alg_k; 3285 3286 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 3287 3288 /* 3289 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so 3290 * no need to do so here. 3291 */ 3292 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) 3293 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) 3294 goto err; 3295 3296 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { 3297 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) 3298 goto err; 3299 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { 3300 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) 3301 goto err; 3302 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { 3303 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) 3304 goto err; 3305 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { 3306 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt)) 3307 goto err; 3308 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) { 3309 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost18(s, pkt)) 3310 goto err; 3311 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { 3312 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt)) 3313 goto err; 3314 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) { 3315 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3316 goto err; 3317 } 3318 3319 return 1; 3320 err: 3321 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.pms, s->s3.tmp.pmslen); 3322 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL; 3323 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = 0; 3324 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 3325 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen); 3326 s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL; 3327 s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0; 3328 #endif 3329 return 0; 3330 } 3331 3332 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s) 3333 { 3334 unsigned char *pms = NULL; 3335 size_t pmslen = 0; 3336 3337 pms = s->s3.tmp.pms; 3338 pmslen = s->s3.tmp.pmslen; 3339 3340 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 3341 /* Check for SRP */ 3342 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { 3343 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) { 3344 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3345 goto err; 3346 } 3347 return 1; 3348 } 3349 #endif 3350 3351 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { 3352 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3353 goto err; 3354 } 3355 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) { 3356 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3357 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */ 3358 pms = NULL; 3359 pmslen = 0; 3360 goto err; 3361 } 3362 pms = NULL; 3363 pmslen = 0; 3364 3365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 3366 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 3367 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; 3368 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; 3369 size_t labellen; 3370 3371 /* 3372 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP 3373 * used. 3374 */ 3375 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, 3376 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); 3377 3378 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */ 3379 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1; 3380 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG) 3381 labellen += 1; 3382 3383 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, 3384 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, 3385 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { 3386 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3387 goto err; 3388 } 3389 3390 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, 3391 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); 3392 } 3393 #endif 3394 3395 return 1; 3396 err: 3397 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); 3398 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL; 3399 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = 0; 3400 return 0; 3401 } 3402 3403 /* 3404 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check 3405 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client 3406 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B. 3407 */ 3408 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s) 3409 { 3410 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */ 3411 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL) 3412 return 0; 3413 /* 3414 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also 3415 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary. 3416 */ 3417 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT && 3418 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2)) 3419 return 0; 3420 return 1; 3421 } 3422 3423 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) 3424 { 3425 X509 *x509 = NULL; 3426 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 3427 int i; 3428 3429 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { 3430 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */ 3431 if (s->cert->cert_cb) { 3432 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); 3433 if (i < 0) { 3434 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 3435 return WORK_MORE_A; 3436 } 3437 if (i == 0) { 3438 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); 3439 return WORK_ERROR; 3440 } 3441 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 3442 } 3443 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) { 3444 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { 3445 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; 3446 } 3447 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 3448 } 3449 3450 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */ 3451 wst = WORK_MORE_B; 3452 } 3453 3454 /* We need to get a client cert */ 3455 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) { 3456 /* 3457 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 3458 * return(-1); We then get retied later 3459 */ 3460 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey); 3461 if (i < 0) { 3462 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 3463 return WORK_MORE_B; 3464 } 3465 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 3466 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) { 3467 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey)) 3468 i = 0; 3469 } else if (i == 1) { 3470 i = 0; 3471 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK); 3472 } 3473 3474 X509_free(x509); 3475 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 3476 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) 3477 i = 0; 3478 if (i == 0) { 3479 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { 3480 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0; 3481 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE); 3482 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 3483 } else { 3484 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 2; 3485 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { 3486 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3487 return WORK_ERROR; 3488 } 3489 } 3490 } 3491 3492 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) 3493 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; 3494 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 3495 } 3496 3497 /* Shouldn't ever get here */ 3498 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3499 return WORK_ERROR; 3500 } 3501 3502 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 3503 { 3504 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 3505 if (s->pha_context == NULL) { 3506 /* no context available, add 0-length context */ 3507 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { 3508 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3509 return 0; 3510 } 3511 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) { 3512 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3513 return 0; 3514 } 3515 } 3516 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, 3517 (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL 3518 : s->cert->key)) { 3519 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3520 return 0; 3521 } 3522 3523 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) 3524 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) 3525 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 3526 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) { 3527 /* 3528 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent 3529 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash. 3530 */ 3531 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); 3532 return 0; 3533 } 3534 3535 return 1; 3536 } 3537 3538 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) 3539 { 3540 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu; 3541 size_t idx; 3542 long alg_k, alg_a; 3543 3544 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 3545 alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 3546 3547 /* we don't have a certificate */ 3548 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT)) 3549 return 1; 3550 3551 /* This is the passed certificate */ 3552 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx); 3553 3554 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */ 3555 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) { 3556 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT); 3557 return 0; 3558 } 3559 3560 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) { 3561 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s)) 3562 return 1; 3563 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); 3564 return 0; 3565 } 3566 3567 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) { 3568 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 3569 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); 3570 return 0; 3571 } 3572 3573 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3.peer_tmp == NULL)) { 3574 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3575 return 0; 3576 } 3577 3578 return 1; 3579 } 3580 3581 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 3582 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 3583 { 3584 size_t len, padding_len; 3585 unsigned char *padding = NULL; 3586 3587 len = s->ext.npn_len; 3588 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32); 3589 3590 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len) 3591 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) { 3592 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3593 return 0; 3594 } 3595 3596 memset(padding, 0, padding_len); 3597 3598 return 1; 3599 } 3600 #endif 3601 3602 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 3603 { 3604 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { 3605 /* should contain no data */ 3606 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3607 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 3608 } 3609 3610 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) { 3611 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 3612 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; 3613 } 3614 3615 /* 3616 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for 3617 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will 3618 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a 3619 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable 3620 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd. 3621 */ 3622 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 3623 SSL_renegotiate(s); 3624 else 3625 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s); 3626 3627 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; 3628 } 3629 3630 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 3631 { 3632 PACKET extensions; 3633 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; 3634 3635 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions) 3636 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 3637 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3638 goto err; 3639 } 3640 3641 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, 3642 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts, 3643 NULL, 1) 3644 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, 3645 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) { 3646 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3647 goto err; 3648 } 3649 3650 OPENSSL_free(rawexts); 3651 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; 3652 3653 err: 3654 OPENSSL_free(rawexts); 3655 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 3656 } 3657 3658 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) 3659 { 3660 int i = 0; 3661 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE 3662 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) { 3663 i = tls_engine_load_ssl_client_cert(s, px509, ppkey); 3664 if (i != 0) 3665 return i; 3666 } 3667 #endif 3668 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb) 3669 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey); 3670 return i; 3671 } 3672 3673 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt) 3674 { 3675 int i; 3676 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0; 3677 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate; 3678 3679 /* Set disabled masks for this session */ 3680 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) { 3681 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); 3682 return 0; 3683 } 3684 3685 if (sk == NULL) { 3686 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3687 return 0; 3688 } 3689 3690 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH 3691 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6 3692 # error Max cipher length too short 3693 # endif 3694 /* 3695 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround 3696 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we 3697 * use TLS v1.2 3698 */ 3699 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 3700 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1; 3701 else 3702 #endif 3703 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */ 3704 maxlen = 0xfffe; 3705 3706 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) 3707 maxlen -= 2; 3708 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) 3709 maxlen -= 2; 3710 3711 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) { 3712 const SSL_CIPHER *c; 3713 3714 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); 3715 /* Skip disabled ciphers */ 3716 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0)) 3717 continue; 3718 3719 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) { 3720 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3721 return 0; 3722 } 3723 3724 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */ 3725 if (!maxverok) { 3726 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 3727 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver) 3728 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)) 3729 maxverok = 1; 3730 } else { 3731 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3.tmp.max_ver 3732 && c->min_tls <= s->s3.tmp.max_ver) 3733 maxverok = 1; 3734 } 3735 } 3736 3737 totlen += len; 3738 } 3739 3740 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) { 3741 const char *maxvertext = 3742 !maxverok 3743 ? "No ciphers enabled for max supported SSL/TLS version" 3744 : NULL; 3745 3746 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE, 3747 maxvertext); 3748 return 0; 3749 } 3750 3751 if (totlen != 0) { 3752 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) { 3753 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { 3754 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 3755 }; 3756 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) { 3757 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3758 return 0; 3759 } 3760 } 3761 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) { 3762 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { 3763 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 3764 }; 3765 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) { 3766 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3767 return 0; 3768 } 3769 } 3770 } 3771 3772 return 1; 3773 } 3774 3775 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 3776 { 3777 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY 3778 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) { 3779 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); 3780 return 0; 3781 } 3782 3783 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING; 3784 return 1; 3785 } 3786