xref: /freebsd/sys/netipsec/xform_ah.c (revision aa0a1e58)
1 /*	$FreeBSD$	*/
2 /*	$OpenBSD: ip_ah.c,v 1.63 2001/06/26 06:18:58 angelos Exp $ */
3 /*-
4  * The authors of this code are John Ioannidis (ji@tla.org),
5  * Angelos D. Keromytis (kermit@csd.uch.gr) and
6  * Niels Provos (provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de).
7  *
8  * The original version of this code was written by John Ioannidis
9  * for BSD/OS in Athens, Greece, in November 1995.
10  *
11  * Ported to OpenBSD and NetBSD, with additional transforms, in December 1996,
12  * by Angelos D. Keromytis.
13  *
14  * Additional transforms and features in 1997 and 1998 by Angelos D. Keromytis
15  * and Niels Provos.
16  *
17  * Additional features in 1999 by Angelos D. Keromytis and Niklas Hallqvist.
18  *
19  * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 by John Ioannidis,
20  * Angelos D. Keromytis and Niels Provos.
21  * Copyright (c) 1999 Niklas Hallqvist.
22  * Copyright (c) 2001 Angelos D. Keromytis.
23  *
24  * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software with or without fee
25  * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in
26  * all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or
27  * modification of this software.
28  * You may use this code under the GNU public license if you so wish. Please
29  * contribute changes back to the authors under this freer than GPL license
30  * so that we may further the use of strong encryption without limitations to
31  * all.
32  *
33  * THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
34  * IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY
35  * REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE
36  * MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR
37  * PURPOSE.
38  */
39 #include "opt_inet.h"
40 #include "opt_inet6.h"
41 
42 #include <sys/param.h>
43 #include <sys/systm.h>
44 #include <sys/mbuf.h>
45 #include <sys/socket.h>
46 #include <sys/syslog.h>
47 #include <sys/kernel.h>
48 #include <sys/sysctl.h>
49 
50 #include <net/if.h>
51 #include <net/vnet.h>
52 
53 #include <netinet/in.h>
54 #include <netinet/in_systm.h>
55 #include <netinet/ip.h>
56 #include <netinet/ip_ecn.h>
57 #include <netinet/ip6.h>
58 
59 #include <net/route.h>
60 #include <netipsec/ipsec.h>
61 #include <netipsec/ah.h>
62 #include <netipsec/ah_var.h>
63 #include <netipsec/xform.h>
64 
65 #ifdef INET6
66 #include <netinet6/ip6_var.h>
67 #include <netipsec/ipsec6.h>
68 #include <netinet6/ip6_ecn.h>
69 #endif
70 
71 #include <netipsec/key.h>
72 #include <netipsec/key_debug.h>
73 
74 #include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h>
75 
76 /*
77  * Return header size in bytes.  The old protocol did not support
78  * the replay counter; the new protocol always includes the counter.
79  */
80 #define HDRSIZE(sav) \
81 	(((sav)->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? \
82 		sizeof (struct ah) : sizeof (struct ah) + sizeof (u_int32_t))
83 /*
84  * Return authenticator size in bytes.  The old protocol is known
85  * to use a fixed 16-byte authenticator.  The new algorithm use 12-byte
86  * authenticator.
87  */
88 #define	AUTHSIZE(sav)	ah_authsize(sav)
89 
90 VNET_DEFINE(int, ah_enable) = 1;	/* control flow of packets with AH */
91 VNET_DEFINE(int, ah_cleartos) = 1;	/* clear ip_tos when doing AH calc */
92 VNET_DEFINE(struct ahstat, ahstat);
93 
94 SYSCTL_DECL(_net_inet_ah);
95 SYSCTL_VNET_INT(_net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO,
96 	ah_enable,	CTLFLAG_RW,	&VNET_NAME(ah_enable),	0, "");
97 SYSCTL_VNET_INT(_net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO,
98 	ah_cleartos,	CTLFLAG_RW,	&VNET_NAME(ah_cleartos), 0, "");
99 SYSCTL_VNET_STRUCT(_net_inet_ah, IPSECCTL_STATS,
100 	stats,		CTLFLAG_RD,	&VNET_NAME(ahstat), ahstat, "");
101 
102 static unsigned char ipseczeroes[256];	/* larger than an ip6 extension hdr */
103 
104 static int ah_input_cb(struct cryptop*);
105 static int ah_output_cb(struct cryptop*);
106 
107 static int
108 ah_authsize(struct secasvar *sav)
109 {
110 
111 	IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("%s: sav == NULL", __func__));
112 
113 	if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD)
114 		return 16;
115 
116 	switch (sav->alg_auth) {
117 	case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_256:
118 		return 16;
119 	case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_384:
120 		return 24;
121 	case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_512:
122 		return 32;
123 	default:
124 		return AH_HMAC_HASHLEN;
125 	}
126 	/* NOTREACHED */
127 }
128 /*
129  * NB: this is public for use by the PF_KEY support.
130  */
131 struct auth_hash *
132 ah_algorithm_lookup(int alg)
133 {
134 	if (alg > SADB_AALG_MAX)
135 		return NULL;
136 	switch (alg) {
137 	case SADB_X_AALG_NULL:
138 		return &auth_hash_null;
139 	case SADB_AALG_MD5HMAC:
140 		return &auth_hash_hmac_md5;
141 	case SADB_AALG_SHA1HMAC:
142 		return &auth_hash_hmac_sha1;
143 	case SADB_X_AALG_RIPEMD160HMAC:
144 		return &auth_hash_hmac_ripemd_160;
145 	case SADB_X_AALG_MD5:
146 		return &auth_hash_key_md5;
147 	case SADB_X_AALG_SHA:
148 		return &auth_hash_key_sha1;
149 	case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_256:
150 		return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_256;
151 	case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_384:
152 		return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_384;
153 	case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_512:
154 		return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_512;
155 	}
156 	return NULL;
157 }
158 
159 size_t
160 ah_hdrsiz(struct secasvar *sav)
161 {
162 	size_t size;
163 
164 	if (sav != NULL) {
165 		int authsize;
166 		IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL, ("null xform"));
167 		/*XXX not right for null algorithm--does it matter??*/
168 		authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
169 		size = roundup(authsize, sizeof (u_int32_t)) + HDRSIZE(sav);
170 	} else {
171 		/* default guess */
172 		size = sizeof (struct ah) + sizeof (u_int32_t) + 16;
173 	}
174 	return size;
175 }
176 
177 /*
178  * NB: public for use by esp_init.
179  */
180 int
181 ah_init0(struct secasvar *sav, struct xformsw *xsp, struct cryptoini *cria)
182 {
183 	struct auth_hash *thash;
184 	int keylen;
185 
186 	thash = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth);
187 	if (thash == NULL) {
188 		DPRINTF(("%s: unsupported authentication algorithm %u\n",
189 			__func__, sav->alg_auth));
190 		return EINVAL;
191 	}
192 	/*
193 	 * Verify the replay state block allocation is consistent with
194 	 * the protocol type.  We check here so we can make assumptions
195 	 * later during protocol processing.
196 	 */
197 	/* NB: replay state is setup elsewhere (sigh) */
198 	if (((sav->flags&SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0) ^ (sav->replay != NULL)) {
199 		DPRINTF(("%s: replay state block inconsistency, "
200 			"%s algorithm %s replay state\n", __func__,
201 			(sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? "old" : "new",
202 			sav->replay == NULL ? "without" : "with"));
203 		return EINVAL;
204 	}
205 	if (sav->key_auth == NULL) {
206 		DPRINTF(("%s: no authentication key for %s algorithm\n",
207 			__func__, thash->name));
208 		return EINVAL;
209 	}
210 	keylen = _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth);
211 	if (keylen != thash->keysize && thash->keysize != 0) {
212 		DPRINTF(("%s: invalid keylength %d, algorithm %s requires "
213 			"keysize %d\n", __func__,
214 			 keylen, thash->name, thash->keysize));
215 		return EINVAL;
216 	}
217 
218 	sav->tdb_xform = xsp;
219 	sav->tdb_authalgxform = thash;
220 
221 	/* Initialize crypto session. */
222 	bzero(cria, sizeof (*cria));
223 	cria->cri_alg = sav->tdb_authalgxform->type;
224 	cria->cri_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth);
225 	cria->cri_key = sav->key_auth->key_data;
226 	cria->cri_mlen = AUTHSIZE(sav);
227 
228 	return 0;
229 }
230 
231 /*
232  * ah_init() is called when an SPI is being set up.
233  */
234 static int
235 ah_init(struct secasvar *sav, struct xformsw *xsp)
236 {
237 	struct cryptoini cria;
238 	int error;
239 
240 	error = ah_init0(sav, xsp, &cria);
241 	return error ? error :
242 		 crypto_newsession(&sav->tdb_cryptoid, &cria, V_crypto_support);
243 }
244 
245 /*
246  * Paranoia.
247  *
248  * NB: public for use by esp_zeroize (XXX).
249  */
250 int
251 ah_zeroize(struct secasvar *sav)
252 {
253 	int err;
254 
255 	if (sav->key_auth)
256 		bzero(sav->key_auth->key_data, _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth));
257 
258 	err = crypto_freesession(sav->tdb_cryptoid);
259 	sav->tdb_cryptoid = 0;
260 	sav->tdb_authalgxform = NULL;
261 	sav->tdb_xform = NULL;
262 	return err;
263 }
264 
265 /*
266  * Massage IPv4/IPv6 headers for AH processing.
267  */
268 static int
269 ah_massage_headers(struct mbuf **m0, int proto, int skip, int alg, int out)
270 {
271 	struct mbuf *m = *m0;
272 	unsigned char *ptr;
273 	int off, count;
274 
275 #ifdef INET
276 	struct ip *ip;
277 #endif /* INET */
278 
279 #ifdef INET6
280 	struct ip6_ext *ip6e;
281 	struct ip6_hdr ip6;
282 	int alloc, len, ad;
283 #endif /* INET6 */
284 
285 	switch (proto) {
286 #ifdef INET
287 	case AF_INET:
288 		/*
289 		 * This is the least painful way of dealing with IPv4 header
290 		 * and option processing -- just make sure they're in
291 		 * contiguous memory.
292 		 */
293 		*m0 = m = m_pullup(m, skip);
294 		if (m == NULL) {
295 			DPRINTF(("%s: m_pullup failed\n", __func__));
296 			return ENOBUFS;
297 		}
298 
299 		/* Fix the IP header */
300 		ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
301 		if (V_ah_cleartos)
302 			ip->ip_tos = 0;
303 		ip->ip_ttl = 0;
304 		ip->ip_sum = 0;
305 
306 		/*
307 		 * On input, fix ip_len which has been byte-swapped
308 		 * at ip_input().
309 		 */
310 		if (!out) {
311 			ip->ip_len = htons(ip->ip_len + skip);
312 
313 			if (alg == CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK || alg == CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK)
314 				ip->ip_off = htons(ip->ip_off & IP_DF);
315 			else
316 				ip->ip_off = 0;
317 		} else {
318 			if (alg == CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK || alg == CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK)
319 				ip->ip_off = htons(ntohs(ip->ip_off) & IP_DF);
320 			else
321 				ip->ip_off = 0;
322 		}
323 
324 		ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *) + sizeof(struct ip);
325 
326 		/* IPv4 option processing */
327 		for (off = sizeof(struct ip); off < skip;) {
328 			if (ptr[off] == IPOPT_EOL || ptr[off] == IPOPT_NOP ||
329 			    off + 1 < skip)
330 				;
331 			else {
332 				DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option length for "
333 					"option %d\n", __func__, ptr[off]));
334 
335 				m_freem(m);
336 				return EINVAL;
337 			}
338 
339 			switch (ptr[off]) {
340 			case IPOPT_EOL:
341 				off = skip;  /* End the loop. */
342 				break;
343 
344 			case IPOPT_NOP:
345 				off++;
346 				break;
347 
348 			case IPOPT_SECURITY:	/* 0x82 */
349 			case 0x85:	/* Extended security. */
350 			case 0x86:	/* Commercial security. */
351 			case 0x94:	/* Router alert */
352 			case 0x95:	/* RFC1770 */
353 				/* Sanity check for option length. */
354 				if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) {
355 					DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option "
356 						"length for option %d\n",
357 						__func__, ptr[off]));
358 
359 					m_freem(m);
360 					return EINVAL;
361 				}
362 
363 				off += ptr[off + 1];
364 				break;
365 
366 			case IPOPT_LSRR:
367 			case IPOPT_SSRR:
368 				/* Sanity check for option length. */
369 				if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) {
370 					DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option "
371 						"length for option %d\n",
372 						__func__, ptr[off]));
373 
374 					m_freem(m);
375 					return EINVAL;
376 				}
377 
378 				/*
379 				 * On output, if we have either of the
380 				 * source routing options, we should
381 				 * swap the destination address of the
382 				 * IP header with the last address
383 				 * specified in the option, as that is
384 				 * what the destination's IP header
385 				 * will look like.
386 				 */
387 				if (out)
388 					bcopy(ptr + off + ptr[off + 1] -
389 					    sizeof(struct in_addr),
390 					    &(ip->ip_dst), sizeof(struct in_addr));
391 
392 				/* Fall through */
393 			default:
394 				/* Sanity check for option length. */
395 				if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) {
396 					DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option "
397 						"length for option %d\n",
398 						__func__, ptr[off]));
399 					m_freem(m);
400 					return EINVAL;
401 				}
402 
403 				/* Zeroize all other options. */
404 				count = ptr[off + 1];
405 				bcopy(ipseczeroes, ptr, count);
406 				off += count;
407 				break;
408 			}
409 
410 			/* Sanity check. */
411 			if (off > skip)	{
412 				DPRINTF(("%s: malformed IPv4 options header\n",
413 					__func__));
414 
415 				m_freem(m);
416 				return EINVAL;
417 			}
418 		}
419 
420 		break;
421 #endif /* INET */
422 
423 #ifdef INET6
424 	case AF_INET6:  /* Ugly... */
425 		/* Copy and "cook" the IPv6 header. */
426 		m_copydata(m, 0, sizeof(ip6), (caddr_t) &ip6);
427 
428 		/* We don't do IPv6 Jumbograms. */
429 		if (ip6.ip6_plen == 0) {
430 			DPRINTF(("%s: unsupported IPv6 jumbogram\n", __func__));
431 			m_freem(m);
432 			return EMSGSIZE;
433 		}
434 
435 		ip6.ip6_flow = 0;
436 		ip6.ip6_hlim = 0;
437 		ip6.ip6_vfc &= ~IPV6_VERSION_MASK;
438 		ip6.ip6_vfc |= IPV6_VERSION;
439 
440 		/* Scoped address handling. */
441 		if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_src))
442 			ip6.ip6_src.s6_addr16[1] = 0;
443 		if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_dst))
444 			ip6.ip6_dst.s6_addr16[1] = 0;
445 
446 		/* Done with IPv6 header. */
447 		m_copyback(m, 0, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), (caddr_t) &ip6);
448 
449 		/* Let's deal with the remaining headers (if any). */
450 		if (skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) > 0) {
451 			if (m->m_len <= skip) {
452 				ptr = (unsigned char *) malloc(
453 				    skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr),
454 				    M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT);
455 				if (ptr == NULL) {
456 					DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate memory"
457 						"for IPv6 headers\n",__func__));
458 					m_freem(m);
459 					return ENOBUFS;
460 				}
461 
462 				/*
463 				 * Copy all the protocol headers after
464 				 * the IPv6 header.
465 				 */
466 				m_copydata(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr),
467 				    skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr);
468 				alloc = 1;
469 			} else {
470 				/* No need to allocate memory. */
471 				ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *) +
472 				    sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);
473 				alloc = 0;
474 			}
475 		} else
476 			break;
477 
478 		off = ip6.ip6_nxt & 0xff; /* Next header type. */
479 
480 		for (len = 0; len < skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);)
481 			switch (off) {
482 			case IPPROTO_HOPOPTS:
483 			case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS:
484 				ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *) (ptr + len);
485 
486 				/*
487 				 * Process the mutable/immutable
488 				 * options -- borrows heavily from the
489 				 * KAME code.
490 				 */
491 				for (count = len + sizeof(struct ip6_ext);
492 				     count < len + ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3);) {
493 					if (ptr[count] == IP6OPT_PAD1) {
494 						count++;
495 						continue; /* Skip padding. */
496 					}
497 
498 					/* Sanity check. */
499 					if (count > len +
500 					    ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3)) {
501 						m_freem(m);
502 
503 						/* Free, if we allocated. */
504 						if (alloc)
505 							free(ptr, M_XDATA);
506 						return EINVAL;
507 					}
508 
509 					ad = ptr[count + 1];
510 
511 					/* If mutable option, zeroize. */
512 					if (ptr[count] & IP6OPT_MUTABLE)
513 						bcopy(ipseczeroes, ptr + count,
514 						    ptr[count + 1]);
515 
516 					count += ad;
517 
518 					/* Sanity check. */
519 					if (count >
520 					    skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) {
521 						m_freem(m);
522 
523 						/* Free, if we allocated. */
524 						if (alloc)
525 							free(ptr, M_XDATA);
526 						return EINVAL;
527 					}
528 				}
529 
530 				/* Advance. */
531 				len += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3);
532 				off = ip6e->ip6e_nxt;
533 				break;
534 
535 			case IPPROTO_ROUTING:
536 				/*
537 				 * Always include routing headers in
538 				 * computation.
539 				 */
540 				ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *) (ptr + len);
541 				len += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3);
542 				off = ip6e->ip6e_nxt;
543 				break;
544 
545 			default:
546 				DPRINTF(("%s: unexpected IPv6 header type %d",
547 					__func__, off));
548 				if (alloc)
549 					free(ptr, M_XDATA);
550 				m_freem(m);
551 				return EINVAL;
552 			}
553 
554 		/* Copyback and free, if we allocated. */
555 		if (alloc) {
556 			m_copyback(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr),
557 			    skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr);
558 			free(ptr, M_XDATA);
559 		}
560 
561 		break;
562 #endif /* INET6 */
563 	}
564 
565 	return 0;
566 }
567 
568 /*
569  * ah_input() gets called to verify that an input packet
570  * passes authentication.
571  */
572 static int
573 ah_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff)
574 {
575 	struct auth_hash *ahx;
576 	struct tdb_ident *tdbi;
577 	struct tdb_crypto *tc;
578 	struct m_tag *mtag;
579 	struct newah *ah;
580 	int hl, rplen, authsize;
581 
582 	struct cryptodesc *crda;
583 	struct cryptop *crp;
584 
585 	IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("null SA"));
586 	IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->key_auth != NULL, ("null authentication key"));
587 	IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL,
588 		("null authentication xform"));
589 
590 	/* Figure out header size. */
591 	rplen = HDRSIZE(sav);
592 
593 	/* XXX don't pullup, just copy header */
594 	IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct newah *, m, skip, rplen);
595 	if (ah == NULL) {
596 		DPRINTF(("ah_input: cannot pullup header\n"));
597 		V_ahstat.ahs_hdrops++;		/*XXX*/
598 		m_freem(m);
599 		return ENOBUFS;
600 	}
601 
602 	/* Check replay window, if applicable. */
603 	if (sav->replay && !ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(ah->ah_seq), sav)) {
604 		V_ahstat.ahs_replay++;
605 		DPRINTF(("%s: packet replay failure: %s\n", __func__,
606 			  ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
607 		m_freem(m);
608 		return ENOBUFS;
609 	}
610 
611 	/* Verify AH header length. */
612 	hl = ah->ah_len * sizeof (u_int32_t);
613 	ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
614 	authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
615 	if (hl != authsize + rplen - sizeof (struct ah)) {
616 		DPRINTF(("%s: bad authenticator length %u (expecting %lu)"
617 			" for packet in SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
618 			hl, (u_long) (authsize + rplen - sizeof (struct ah)),
619 			ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
620 			(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
621 		V_ahstat.ahs_badauthl++;
622 		m_freem(m);
623 		return EACCES;
624 	}
625 	V_ahstat.ahs_ibytes += m->m_pkthdr.len - skip - hl;
626 
627 	/* Get crypto descriptors. */
628 	crp = crypto_getreq(1);
629 	if (crp == NULL) {
630 		DPRINTF(("%s: failed to acquire crypto descriptor\n",__func__));
631 		V_ahstat.ahs_crypto++;
632 		m_freem(m);
633 		return ENOBUFS;
634 	}
635 
636 	crda = crp->crp_desc;
637 	IPSEC_ASSERT(crda != NULL, ("null crypto descriptor"));
638 
639 	crda->crd_skip = 0;
640 	crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len;
641 	crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen;
642 
643 	/* Authentication operation. */
644 	crda->crd_alg = ahx->type;
645 	crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth);
646 	crda->crd_key = sav->key_auth->key_data;
647 
648 	/* Find out if we've already done crypto. */
649 	for (mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_CRYPTO_DONE, NULL);
650 	     mtag != NULL;
651 	     mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_CRYPTO_DONE, mtag)) {
652 		tdbi = (struct tdb_ident *) (mtag + 1);
653 		if (tdbi->proto == sav->sah->saidx.proto &&
654 		    tdbi->spi == sav->spi &&
655 		    !bcmp(&tdbi->dst, &sav->sah->saidx.dst,
656 			  sizeof (union sockaddr_union)))
657 			break;
658 	}
659 
660 	/* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */
661 	if (mtag == NULL) {
662 		tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof (struct tdb_crypto) +
663 			skip + rplen + authsize, M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO);
664 	} else {
665 		/* Hash verification has already been done successfully. */
666 		tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof (struct tdb_crypto),
667 						    M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO);
668 	}
669 	if (tc == NULL) {
670 		DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n", __func__));
671 		V_ahstat.ahs_crypto++;
672 		crypto_freereq(crp);
673 		m_freem(m);
674 		return ENOBUFS;
675 	}
676 
677 	/* Only save information if crypto processing is needed. */
678 	if (mtag == NULL) {
679 		int error;
680 
681 		/*
682 		 * Save the authenticator, the skipped portion of the packet,
683 		 * and the AH header.
684 		 */
685 		m_copydata(m, 0, skip + rplen + authsize, (caddr_t)(tc+1));
686 
687 		/* Zeroize the authenticator on the packet. */
688 		m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes);
689 
690 		/* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */
691 		error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family,
692 		    skip, ahx->type, 0);
693 		if (error != 0) {
694 			/* NB: mbuf is free'd by ah_massage_headers */
695 			V_ahstat.ahs_hdrops++;
696 			free(tc, M_XDATA);
697 			crypto_freereq(crp);
698 			return error;
699 		}
700 	}
701 
702 	/* Crypto operation descriptor. */
703 	crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */
704 	crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF | CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC;
705 	crp->crp_buf = (caddr_t) m;
706 	crp->crp_callback = ah_input_cb;
707 	crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid;
708 	crp->crp_opaque = (caddr_t) tc;
709 
710 	/* These are passed as-is to the callback. */
711 	tc->tc_spi = sav->spi;
712 	tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst;
713 	tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto;
714 	tc->tc_nxt = ah->ah_nxt;
715 	tc->tc_protoff = protoff;
716 	tc->tc_skip = skip;
717 	tc->tc_ptr = (caddr_t) mtag; /* Save the mtag we've identified. */
718 
719 	if (mtag == NULL)
720 		return crypto_dispatch(crp);
721 	else
722 		return ah_input_cb(crp);
723 }
724 
725 #ifdef INET6
726 #define	IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag) do {		     \
727 	if (saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) {			     \
728 		error = ipsec6_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag); \
729 	} else {							     \
730 		error = ipsec4_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag); \
731 	}								     \
732 } while (0)
733 #else
734 #define	IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag)		     \
735 	(error = ipsec4_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag))
736 #endif
737 
738 /*
739  * AH input callback from the crypto driver.
740  */
741 static int
742 ah_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
743 {
744 	int rplen, error, skip, protoff;
745 	unsigned char calc[AH_ALEN_MAX];
746 	struct mbuf *m;
747 	struct cryptodesc *crd;
748 	struct auth_hash *ahx;
749 	struct tdb_crypto *tc;
750 	struct m_tag *mtag;
751 	struct secasvar *sav;
752 	struct secasindex *saidx;
753 	u_int8_t nxt;
754 	caddr_t ptr;
755 	int authsize;
756 
757 	crd = crp->crp_desc;
758 
759 	tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque;
760 	IPSEC_ASSERT(tc != NULL, ("null opaque crypto data area!"));
761 	skip = tc->tc_skip;
762 	nxt = tc->tc_nxt;
763 	protoff = tc->tc_protoff;
764 	mtag = (struct m_tag *) tc->tc_ptr;
765 	m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf;
766 
767 	sav = KEY_ALLOCSA(&tc->tc_dst, tc->tc_proto, tc->tc_spi);
768 	if (sav == NULL) {
769 		V_ahstat.ahs_notdb++;
770 		DPRINTF(("%s: SA expired while in crypto\n", __func__));
771 		error = ENOBUFS;		/*XXX*/
772 		goto bad;
773 	}
774 
775 	saidx = &sav->sah->saidx;
776 	IPSEC_ASSERT(saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET ||
777 		saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6,
778 		("unexpected protocol family %u", saidx->dst.sa.sa_family));
779 
780 	ahx = (struct auth_hash *) sav->tdb_authalgxform;
781 
782 	/* Check for crypto errors. */
783 	if (crp->crp_etype) {
784 		if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0)
785 			sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid;
786 
787 		if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) {
788 			error = crypto_dispatch(crp);
789 			return error;
790 		}
791 
792 		V_ahstat.ahs_noxform++;
793 		DPRINTF(("%s: crypto error %d\n", __func__, crp->crp_etype));
794 		error = crp->crp_etype;
795 		goto bad;
796 	} else {
797 		V_ahstat.ahs_hist[sav->alg_auth]++;
798 		crypto_freereq(crp);		/* No longer needed. */
799 		crp = NULL;
800 	}
801 
802 	/* Shouldn't happen... */
803 	if (m == NULL) {
804 		V_ahstat.ahs_crypto++;
805 		DPRINTF(("%s: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n", __func__));
806 		error = EINVAL;
807 		goto bad;
808 	}
809 
810 	/* Figure out header size. */
811 	rplen = HDRSIZE(sav);
812 	authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
813 
814 	/* Copy authenticator off the packet. */
815 	m_copydata(m, skip + rplen, authsize, calc);
816 
817 	/*
818 	 * If we have an mtag, we don't need to verify the authenticator --
819 	 * it has been verified by an IPsec-aware NIC.
820 	 */
821 	if (mtag == NULL) {
822 		ptr = (caddr_t) (tc + 1);
823 
824 		/* Verify authenticator. */
825 		if (bcmp(ptr + skip + rplen, calc, authsize)) {
826 			DPRINTF(("%s: authentication hash mismatch for packet "
827 			    "in SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
828 			    ipsec_address(&saidx->dst),
829 			    (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
830 			V_ahstat.ahs_badauth++;
831 			error = EACCES;
832 			goto bad;
833 		}
834 
835 		/* Fix the Next Protocol field. */
836 		((u_int8_t *) ptr)[protoff] = nxt;
837 
838 		/* Copyback the saved (uncooked) network headers. */
839 		m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr);
840 	} else {
841 		/* Fix the Next Protocol field. */
842 		m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), &nxt);
843 	}
844 
845 	free(tc, M_XDATA), tc = NULL;			/* No longer needed */
846 
847 	/*
848 	 * Header is now authenticated.
849 	 */
850 	m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR|M_AUTHIPDGM;
851 
852 	/*
853 	 * Update replay sequence number, if appropriate.
854 	 */
855 	if (sav->replay) {
856 		u_int32_t seq;
857 
858 		m_copydata(m, skip + offsetof(struct newah, ah_seq),
859 			   sizeof (seq), (caddr_t) &seq);
860 		if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(seq), sav)) {
861 			V_ahstat.ahs_replay++;
862 			error = ENOBUFS;			/*XXX as above*/
863 			goto bad;
864 		}
865 	}
866 
867 	/*
868 	 * Remove the AH header and authenticator from the mbuf.
869 	 */
870 	error = m_striphdr(m, skip, rplen + authsize);
871 	if (error) {
872 		DPRINTF(("%s: mangled mbuf chain for SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
873 		    ipsec_address(&saidx->dst), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
874 
875 		V_ahstat.ahs_hdrops++;
876 		goto bad;
877 	}
878 
879 	IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag);
880 
881 	KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
882 	return error;
883 bad:
884 	if (sav)
885 		KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
886 	if (m != NULL)
887 		m_freem(m);
888 	if (tc != NULL)
889 		free(tc, M_XDATA);
890 	if (crp != NULL)
891 		crypto_freereq(crp);
892 	return error;
893 }
894 
895 /*
896  * AH output routine, called by ipsec[46]_process_packet().
897  */
898 static int
899 ah_output(
900 	struct mbuf *m,
901 	struct ipsecrequest *isr,
902 	struct mbuf **mp,
903 	int skip,
904 	int protoff)
905 {
906 	struct secasvar *sav;
907 	struct auth_hash *ahx;
908 	struct cryptodesc *crda;
909 	struct tdb_crypto *tc;
910 	struct mbuf *mi;
911 	struct cryptop *crp;
912 	u_int16_t iplen;
913 	int error, rplen, authsize, maxpacketsize, roff;
914 	u_int8_t prot;
915 	struct newah *ah;
916 
917 	sav = isr->sav;
918 	IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("null SA"));
919 	ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
920 	IPSEC_ASSERT(ahx != NULL, ("null authentication xform"));
921 
922 	V_ahstat.ahs_output++;
923 
924 	/* Figure out header size. */
925 	rplen = HDRSIZE(sav);
926 
927 	/* Check for maximum packet size violations. */
928 	switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) {
929 #ifdef INET
930 	case AF_INET:
931 		maxpacketsize = IP_MAXPACKET;
932 		break;
933 #endif /* INET */
934 #ifdef INET6
935 	case AF_INET6:
936 		maxpacketsize = IPV6_MAXPACKET;
937 		break;
938 #endif /* INET6 */
939 	default:
940 		DPRINTF(("%s: unknown/unsupported protocol family %u, "
941 		    "SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
942 		    sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family,
943 		    ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
944 		    (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
945 		V_ahstat.ahs_nopf++;
946 		error = EPFNOSUPPORT;
947 		goto bad;
948 	}
949 	authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
950 	if (rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len > maxpacketsize) {
951 		DPRINTF(("%s: packet in SA %s/%08lx got too big "
952 		    "(len %u, max len %u)\n", __func__,
953 		    ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
954 		    (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi),
955 		    rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len, maxpacketsize));
956 		V_ahstat.ahs_toobig++;
957 		error = EMSGSIZE;
958 		goto bad;
959 	}
960 
961 	/* Update the counters. */
962 	V_ahstat.ahs_obytes += m->m_pkthdr.len - skip;
963 
964 	m = m_unshare(m, M_NOWAIT);
965 	if (m == NULL) {
966 		DPRINTF(("%s: cannot clone mbuf chain, SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
967 		    ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
968 		    (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
969 		V_ahstat.ahs_hdrops++;
970 		error = ENOBUFS;
971 		goto bad;
972 	}
973 
974 	/* Inject AH header. */
975 	mi = m_makespace(m, skip, rplen + authsize, &roff);
976 	if (mi == NULL) {
977 		DPRINTF(("%s: failed to inject %u byte AH header for SA "
978 		    "%s/%08lx\n", __func__,
979 		    rplen + authsize,
980 		    ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
981 		    (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
982 		V_ahstat.ahs_hdrops++;		/*XXX differs from openbsd */
983 		error = ENOBUFS;
984 		goto bad;
985 	}
986 
987 	/*
988 	 * The AH header is guaranteed by m_makespace() to be in
989 	 * contiguous memory, at roff bytes offset into the returned mbuf.
990 	 */
991 	ah = (struct newah *)(mtod(mi, caddr_t) + roff);
992 
993 	/* Initialize the AH header. */
994 	m_copydata(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), (caddr_t) &ah->ah_nxt);
995 	ah->ah_len = (rplen + authsize - sizeof(struct ah)) / sizeof(u_int32_t);
996 	ah->ah_reserve = 0;
997 	ah->ah_spi = sav->spi;
998 
999 	/* Zeroize authenticator. */
1000 	m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes);
1001 
1002 	/* Insert packet replay counter, as requested.  */
1003 	if (sav->replay) {
1004 		if (sav->replay->count == ~0 &&
1005 		    (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_CYCSEQ) == 0) {
1006 			DPRINTF(("%s: replay counter wrapped for SA %s/%08lx\n",
1007 				__func__,
1008 				ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
1009 				(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
1010 			V_ahstat.ahs_wrap++;
1011 			error = EINVAL;
1012 			goto bad;
1013 		}
1014 #ifdef REGRESSION
1015 		/* Emulate replay attack when ipsec_replay is TRUE. */
1016 		if (!V_ipsec_replay)
1017 #endif
1018 			sav->replay->count++;
1019 		ah->ah_seq = htonl(sav->replay->count);
1020 	}
1021 
1022 	/* Get crypto descriptors. */
1023 	crp = crypto_getreq(1);
1024 	if (crp == NULL) {
1025 		DPRINTF(("%s: failed to acquire crypto descriptors\n",
1026 			__func__));
1027 		V_ahstat.ahs_crypto++;
1028 		error = ENOBUFS;
1029 		goto bad;
1030 	}
1031 
1032 	crda = crp->crp_desc;
1033 
1034 	crda->crd_skip = 0;
1035 	crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen;
1036 	crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len;
1037 
1038 	/* Authentication operation. */
1039 	crda->crd_alg = ahx->type;
1040 	crda->crd_key = sav->key_auth->key_data;
1041 	crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth);
1042 
1043 	/* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */
1044 	tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(
1045 		sizeof(struct tdb_crypto) + skip, M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO);
1046 	if (tc == NULL) {
1047 		crypto_freereq(crp);
1048 		DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n", __func__));
1049 		V_ahstat.ahs_crypto++;
1050 		error = ENOBUFS;
1051 		goto bad;
1052 	}
1053 
1054 	/* Save the skipped portion of the packet. */
1055 	m_copydata(m, 0, skip, (caddr_t) (tc + 1));
1056 
1057 	/*
1058 	 * Fix IP header length on the header used for
1059 	 * authentication. We don't need to fix the original
1060 	 * header length as it will be fixed by our caller.
1061 	 */
1062 	switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) {
1063 #ifdef INET
1064 	case AF_INET:
1065 		bcopy(((caddr_t)(tc + 1)) +
1066 		    offsetof(struct ip, ip_len),
1067 		    (caddr_t) &iplen, sizeof(u_int16_t));
1068 		iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize);
1069 		m_copyback(m, offsetof(struct ip, ip_len),
1070 		    sizeof(u_int16_t), (caddr_t) &iplen);
1071 		break;
1072 #endif /* INET */
1073 
1074 #ifdef INET6
1075 	case AF_INET6:
1076 		bcopy(((caddr_t)(tc + 1)) +
1077 		    offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen),
1078 		    (caddr_t) &iplen, sizeof(u_int16_t));
1079 		iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize);
1080 		m_copyback(m, offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen),
1081 		    sizeof(u_int16_t), (caddr_t) &iplen);
1082 		break;
1083 #endif /* INET6 */
1084 	}
1085 
1086 	/* Fix the Next Header field in saved header. */
1087 	((u_int8_t *) (tc + 1))[protoff] = IPPROTO_AH;
1088 
1089 	/* Update the Next Protocol field in the IP header. */
1090 	prot = IPPROTO_AH;
1091 	m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), (caddr_t) &prot);
1092 
1093 	/* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */
1094 	error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family,
1095 			skip, ahx->type, 1);
1096 	if (error != 0) {
1097 		m = NULL;	/* mbuf was free'd by ah_massage_headers. */
1098 		free(tc, M_XDATA);
1099 		crypto_freereq(crp);
1100 		goto bad;
1101 	}
1102 
1103 	/* Crypto operation descriptor. */
1104 	crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */
1105 	crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF | CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC;
1106 	crp->crp_buf = (caddr_t) m;
1107 	crp->crp_callback = ah_output_cb;
1108 	crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid;
1109 	crp->crp_opaque = (caddr_t) tc;
1110 
1111 	/* These are passed as-is to the callback. */
1112 	tc->tc_isr = isr;
1113 	tc->tc_spi = sav->spi;
1114 	tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst;
1115 	tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto;
1116 	tc->tc_skip = skip;
1117 	tc->tc_protoff = protoff;
1118 
1119 	return crypto_dispatch(crp);
1120 bad:
1121 	if (m)
1122 		m_freem(m);
1123 	return (error);
1124 }
1125 
1126 /*
1127  * AH output callback from the crypto driver.
1128  */
1129 static int
1130 ah_output_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
1131 {
1132 	int skip, protoff, error;
1133 	struct tdb_crypto *tc;
1134 	struct ipsecrequest *isr;
1135 	struct secasvar *sav;
1136 	struct mbuf *m;
1137 	caddr_t ptr;
1138 	int err;
1139 
1140 	tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque;
1141 	IPSEC_ASSERT(tc != NULL, ("null opaque data area!"));
1142 	skip = tc->tc_skip;
1143 	protoff = tc->tc_protoff;
1144 	ptr = (caddr_t) (tc + 1);
1145 	m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf;
1146 
1147 	isr = tc->tc_isr;
1148 	IPSECREQUEST_LOCK(isr);
1149 	sav = KEY_ALLOCSA(&tc->tc_dst, tc->tc_proto, tc->tc_spi);
1150 	if (sav == NULL) {
1151 		V_ahstat.ahs_notdb++;
1152 		DPRINTF(("%s: SA expired while in crypto\n", __func__));
1153 		error = ENOBUFS;		/*XXX*/
1154 		goto bad;
1155 	}
1156 	IPSEC_ASSERT(isr->sav == sav, ("SA changed\n"));
1157 
1158 	/* Check for crypto errors. */
1159 	if (crp->crp_etype) {
1160 		if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0)
1161 			sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid;
1162 
1163 		if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) {
1164 			KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
1165 			IPSECREQUEST_UNLOCK(isr);
1166 			error = crypto_dispatch(crp);
1167 			return error;
1168 		}
1169 
1170 		V_ahstat.ahs_noxform++;
1171 		DPRINTF(("%s: crypto error %d\n", __func__, crp->crp_etype));
1172 		error = crp->crp_etype;
1173 		goto bad;
1174 	}
1175 
1176 	/* Shouldn't happen... */
1177 	if (m == NULL) {
1178 		V_ahstat.ahs_crypto++;
1179 		DPRINTF(("%s: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n", __func__));
1180 		error = EINVAL;
1181 		goto bad;
1182 	}
1183 	V_ahstat.ahs_hist[sav->alg_auth]++;
1184 
1185 	/*
1186 	 * Copy original headers (with the new protocol number) back
1187 	 * in place.
1188 	 */
1189 	m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr);
1190 
1191 	/* No longer needed. */
1192 	free(tc, M_XDATA);
1193 	crypto_freereq(crp);
1194 
1195 #ifdef REGRESSION
1196 	/* Emulate man-in-the-middle attack when ipsec_integrity is TRUE. */
1197 	if (V_ipsec_integrity) {
1198 		int alen;
1199 
1200 		/*
1201 		 * Corrupt HMAC if we want to test integrity verification of
1202 		 * the other side.
1203 		 */
1204 		alen = AUTHSIZE(sav);
1205 		m_copyback(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - alen, alen, ipseczeroes);
1206 	}
1207 #endif
1208 
1209 	/* NB: m is reclaimed by ipsec_process_done. */
1210 	err = ipsec_process_done(m, isr);
1211 	KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
1212 	IPSECREQUEST_UNLOCK(isr);
1213 	return err;
1214 bad:
1215 	if (sav)
1216 		KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
1217 	IPSECREQUEST_UNLOCK(isr);
1218 	if (m)
1219 		m_freem(m);
1220 	free(tc, M_XDATA);
1221 	crypto_freereq(crp);
1222 	return error;
1223 }
1224 
1225 static struct xformsw ah_xformsw = {
1226 	XF_AH,		XFT_AUTH,	"IPsec AH",
1227 	ah_init,	ah_zeroize,	ah_input,	ah_output,
1228 };
1229 
1230 static void
1231 ah_attach(void)
1232 {
1233 
1234 	xform_register(&ah_xformsw);
1235 }
1236 
1237 SYSINIT(ah_xform_init, SI_SUB_PROTO_DOMAIN, SI_ORDER_MIDDLE, ah_attach, NULL);
1238