1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ 2 3 /* 4 * Copyright 2018-2019 IBM Corporation. 5 */ 6 7 #define __SANE_USERSPACE_TYPES__ 8 9 #include <sys/types.h> 10 #include <stdint.h> 11 #include <malloc.h> 12 #include <unistd.h> 13 #include <stdlib.h> 14 #include <string.h> 15 #include <stdio.h> 16 #include <sys/prctl.h> 17 #include "utils.h" 18 19 #include "../pmu/event.h" 20 21 22 extern void pattern_cache_loop(void); 23 extern void indirect_branch_loop(void); 24 25 static int do_count_loop(struct event *events, bool is_p9, s64 *miss_percent) 26 { 27 u64 pred, mpred; 28 29 prctl(PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE); 30 31 if (is_p9) 32 pattern_cache_loop(); 33 else 34 indirect_branch_loop(); 35 36 prctl(PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE); 37 38 event_read(&events[0]); 39 event_read(&events[1]); 40 41 // We could scale all the events by running/enabled but we're lazy 42 // As long as the PMU is uncontended they should all run 43 FAIL_IF(events[0].result.running != events[0].result.enabled); 44 FAIL_IF(events[1].result.running != events[1].result.enabled); 45 46 pred = events[0].result.value; 47 mpred = events[1].result.value; 48 49 if (is_p9) { 50 event_read(&events[2]); 51 event_read(&events[3]); 52 FAIL_IF(events[2].result.running != events[2].result.enabled); 53 FAIL_IF(events[3].result.running != events[3].result.enabled); 54 55 pred += events[2].result.value; 56 mpred += events[3].result.value; 57 } 58 59 *miss_percent = 100 * mpred / pred; 60 61 return 0; 62 } 63 64 static void setup_event(struct event *e, u64 config, char *name) 65 { 66 event_init_named(e, config, name); 67 68 e->attr.disabled = 1; 69 e->attr.exclude_kernel = 1; 70 e->attr.exclude_hv = 1; 71 e->attr.exclude_idle = 1; 72 } 73 74 enum spectre_v2_state { 75 VULNERABLE = 0, 76 UNKNOWN = 1, // Works with FAIL_IF() 77 NOT_AFFECTED, 78 BRANCH_SERIALISATION, 79 COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED, 80 COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_SW, 81 COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_HW, 82 BTB_FLUSH, 83 }; 84 85 static enum spectre_v2_state get_sysfs_state(void) 86 { 87 enum spectre_v2_state state = UNKNOWN; 88 char buf[256]; 89 int len; 90 91 memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); 92 FAIL_IF(read_sysfs_file("devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2", buf, sizeof(buf))); 93 94 // Make sure it's NULL terminated 95 buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0'; 96 97 // Trim the trailing newline 98 len = strlen(buf); 99 FAIL_IF(len < 1); 100 buf[len - 1] = '\0'; 101 102 printf("sysfs reports: '%s'\n", buf); 103 104 // Order matters 105 if (strstr(buf, "Vulnerable")) 106 state = VULNERABLE; 107 else if (strstr(buf, "Not affected")) 108 state = NOT_AFFECTED; 109 else if (strstr(buf, "Indirect branch serialisation (kernel only)")) 110 state = BRANCH_SERIALISATION; 111 else if (strstr(buf, "Indirect branch cache disabled")) 112 state = COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED; 113 else if (strstr(buf, "Software count cache flush (hardware accelerated)")) 114 state = COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_HW; 115 else if (strstr(buf, "Software count cache flush")) 116 state = COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_SW; 117 else if (strstr(buf, "Branch predictor state flush")) 118 state = BTB_FLUSH; 119 120 return state; 121 } 122 123 #define PM_BR_PRED_CCACHE 0x040a4 // P8 + P9 124 #define PM_BR_MPRED_CCACHE 0x040ac // P8 + P9 125 #define PM_BR_PRED_PCACHE 0x048a0 // P9 only 126 #define PM_BR_MPRED_PCACHE 0x048b0 // P9 only 127 128 #define SPRN_PVR 287 129 130 int spectre_v2_test(void) 131 { 132 enum spectre_v2_state state; 133 struct event events[4]; 134 s64 miss_percent; 135 bool is_p9; 136 137 state = get_sysfs_state(); 138 if (state == UNKNOWN) { 139 printf("Error: couldn't determine spectre_v2 mitigation state?\n"); 140 return -1; 141 } 142 143 memset(events, 0, sizeof(events)); 144 145 setup_event(&events[0], PM_BR_PRED_CCACHE, "PM_BR_PRED_CCACHE"); 146 setup_event(&events[1], PM_BR_MPRED_CCACHE, "PM_BR_MPRED_CCACHE"); 147 FAIL_IF(event_open(&events[0])); 148 FAIL_IF(event_open_with_group(&events[1], events[0].fd) == -1); 149 150 is_p9 = ((mfspr(SPRN_PVR) >> 16) & 0xFFFF) == 0x4e; 151 152 if (is_p9) { 153 // Count pattern cache too 154 setup_event(&events[2], PM_BR_PRED_PCACHE, "PM_BR_PRED_PCACHE"); 155 setup_event(&events[3], PM_BR_MPRED_PCACHE, "PM_BR_MPRED_PCACHE"); 156 157 FAIL_IF(event_open_with_group(&events[2], events[0].fd) == -1); 158 FAIL_IF(event_open_with_group(&events[3], events[0].fd) == -1); 159 } 160 161 FAIL_IF(do_count_loop(events, is_p9, &miss_percent)); 162 163 event_report_justified(&events[0], 18, 10); 164 event_report_justified(&events[1], 18, 10); 165 event_close(&events[0]); 166 event_close(&events[1]); 167 168 if (is_p9) { 169 event_report_justified(&events[2], 18, 10); 170 event_report_justified(&events[3], 18, 10); 171 event_close(&events[2]); 172 event_close(&events[3]); 173 } 174 175 printf("Miss percent %lld %%\n", miss_percent); 176 177 switch (state) { 178 case VULNERABLE: 179 case NOT_AFFECTED: 180 case COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_SW: 181 case COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_HW: 182 // These should all not affect userspace branch prediction 183 if (miss_percent > 15) { 184 printf("Branch misses > 15%% unexpected in this configuration!\n"); 185 printf("Possible mis-match between reported & actual mitigation\n"); 186 return 1; 187 } 188 break; 189 case BRANCH_SERIALISATION: 190 // This seems to affect userspace branch prediction a bit? 191 if (miss_percent > 25) { 192 printf("Branch misses > 25%% unexpected in this configuration!\n"); 193 printf("Possible mis-match between reported & actual mitigation\n"); 194 return 1; 195 } 196 break; 197 case COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED: 198 if (miss_percent < 95) { 199 printf("Branch misses < 20%% unexpected in this configuration!\n"); 200 printf("Possible mis-match between reported & actual mitigation\n"); 201 return 1; 202 } 203 break; 204 case UNKNOWN: 205 case BTB_FLUSH: 206 printf("Not sure!\n"); 207 return 1; 208 } 209 210 printf("OK - Measured branch prediction rates match reported spectre v2 mitigation.\n"); 211 212 return 0; 213 } 214 215 int main(int argc, char *argv[]) 216 { 217 return test_harness(spectre_v2_test, "spectre_v2"); 218 } 219