1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */ 2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58 /* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 /* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 113 * 114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. 116 * 117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 118 * license provided above. 119 * 120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by 121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. 122 * 123 */ 124 /* ==================================================================== 125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 126 * 127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by 128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 129 * license. 130 * 131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of 132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites 133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. 134 * 135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in 136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received 137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. 138 * 139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not 140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third 141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights 142 * to make use of the Contribution. 143 * 144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN 145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA 146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY 147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 148 * OTHERWISE. 149 */ 150 151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 153 154 #include <stdio.h> 155 #include "ssl_locl.h" 156 #include "kssl_lcl.h" 157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h" 158 #include <openssl/buffer.h> 159 #include <openssl/rand.h> 160 #include <openssl/objects.h> 161 #include <openssl/evp.h> 162 #include <openssl/hmac.h> 163 #include <openssl/x509.h> 164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 165 # include <openssl/dh.h> 166 #endif 167 #include <openssl/bn.h> 168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 169 # include <openssl/krb5_asn.h> 170 #endif 171 #include <openssl/md5.h> 172 173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD 174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); 175 176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) 177 { 178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) 179 return (SSLv3_server_method()); 180 else 181 return (NULL); 182 } 183 184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, 185 ssl3_accept, 186 ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method) 187 #endif 188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 189 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) 190 { 191 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; 192 193 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 194 195 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && 196 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) { 197 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) { 198 /* 199 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp 200 * login name 201 */ 202 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; 203 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; 204 } else { 205 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al); 206 } 207 } 208 return ret; 209 } 210 #endif 211 212 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) 213 { 214 BUF_MEM *buf; 215 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); 216 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; 217 int ret = -1; 218 int new_state, state, skip = 0; 219 220 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0); 221 ERR_clear_error(); 222 clear_sys_error(); 223 224 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 225 cb = s->info_callback; 226 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 227 cb = s->ctx->info_callback; 228 229 /* init things to blank */ 230 s->in_handshake++; 231 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) 232 SSL_clear(s); 233 234 if (s->cert == NULL) { 235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); 236 return (-1); 237 } 238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 239 /* 240 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and 241 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during 242 * handshakes anyway. 243 */ 244 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { 245 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; 246 s->tlsext_hb_seq++; 247 } 248 #endif 249 250 for (;;) { 251 state = s->state; 252 253 switch (s->state) { 254 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: 255 s->renegotiate = 1; 256 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ 257 258 case SSL_ST_BEFORE: 259 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 260 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 261 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 262 263 s->server = 1; 264 if (cb != NULL) 265 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); 266 267 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) { 268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 269 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 270 return -1; 271 } 272 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT; 273 274 if (s->init_buf == NULL) { 275 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { 276 ret = -1; 277 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 278 goto end; 279 } 280 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { 281 BUF_MEM_free(buf); 282 ret = -1; 283 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 284 goto end; 285 } 286 s->init_buf = buf; 287 } 288 289 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { 290 ret = -1; 291 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 292 goto end; 293 } 294 295 s->init_num = 0; 296 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; 297 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 298 /* 299 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. 300 */ 301 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; 302 303 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) { 304 /* 305 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the 306 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) 307 */ 308 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) { 309 ret = -1; 310 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 311 goto end; 312 } 313 314 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 315 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; 316 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; 317 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && 318 !(s->options & 319 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { 320 /* 321 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't 322 * support secure renegotiation. 323 */ 324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, 325 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 326 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 327 ret = -1; 328 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 329 goto end; 330 } else { 331 /* 332 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a 333 * HelloRequest 334 */ 335 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; 336 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; 337 } 338 break; 339 340 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: 341 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: 342 343 s->shutdown = 0; 344 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s); 345 if (ret <= 0) 346 goto end; 347 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; 348 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 349 s->init_num = 0; 350 351 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 352 break; 353 354 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: 355 s->state = SSL_ST_OK; 356 break; 357 358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: 359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: 360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: 361 362 s->shutdown = 0; 363 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) { 364 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s); 365 if (ret <= 0) 366 goto end; 367 } 368 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 369 { 370 int al; 371 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) { 372 /* 373 * callback indicates firther work to be done 374 */ 375 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 376 goto end; 377 } 378 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) { 379 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 380 /* 381 * This is not really an error but the only means to for 382 * a client to detect whether srp is supported. 383 */ 384 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) 385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 386 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 387 ret = -1; 388 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 389 goto end; 390 } 391 } 392 #endif 393 394 s->renegotiate = 2; 395 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; 396 s->init_num = 0; 397 break; 398 399 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: 400 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: 401 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s); 402 if (ret <= 0) 403 goto end; 404 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 405 if (s->hit) { 406 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 407 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 408 else 409 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 410 } 411 #else 412 if (s->hit) 413 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 414 #endif 415 else 416 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; 417 s->init_num = 0; 418 break; 419 420 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: 421 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: 422 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ 423 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */ 424 if (! 425 (s->s3->tmp. 426 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 | 427 SSL_aSRP)) 428 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { 429 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); 430 if (ret <= 0) 431 goto end; 432 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 433 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) 434 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; 435 else 436 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 437 } else { 438 skip = 1; 439 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 440 } 441 #else 442 } else 443 skip = 1; 444 445 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 446 #endif 447 s->init_num = 0; 448 break; 449 450 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: 451 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: 452 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 453 454 /* 455 * clear this, it may get reset by 456 * send_server_key_exchange 457 */ 458 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0; 459 460 /* 461 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a 462 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For 463 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if 464 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, 465 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for 466 * key exchange. 467 */ 468 if (0 469 /* 470 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if 471 * provided 472 */ 473 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 474 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) 475 #endif 476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 477 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ 478 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) 479 #endif 480 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kEDH)) 481 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) 482 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) 483 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL 484 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 485 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys 486 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) * 487 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 488 ) 489 ) 490 ) 491 ) { 492 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); 493 if (ret <= 0) 494 goto end; 495 } else 496 skip = 1; 497 498 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; 499 s->init_num = 0; 500 break; 501 502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: 503 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: 504 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ 505 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || 506 /* 507 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert 508 * during re-negotiation: 509 */ 510 ((s->session->peer != NULL) && 511 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || 512 /* 513 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see 514 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in 515 * RFC 2246): 516 */ 517 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && 518 /* 519 * ... except when the application insists on 520 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts 521 * this for SSL 3) 522 */ 523 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || 524 /* 525 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites 526 */ 527 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) || 528 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ 529 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) 530 /* 531 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests 532 * are omitted 533 */ 534 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { 535 /* no cert request */ 536 skip = 1; 537 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; 538 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 539 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 540 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 541 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 542 return -1; 543 } 544 } 545 } else { 546 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; 547 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); 548 if (ret <= 0) 549 goto end; 550 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 551 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 552 #else 553 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 554 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 555 #endif 556 s->init_num = 0; 557 } 558 break; 559 560 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: 561 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: 562 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s); 563 if (ret <= 0) 564 goto end; 565 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 566 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 567 s->init_num = 0; 568 break; 569 570 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: 571 572 /* 573 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending 574 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as 575 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely 576 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of 577 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush 578 * unconditionally. 579 */ 580 581 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; 582 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { 583 ret = -1; 584 goto end; 585 } 586 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 587 588 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; 589 break; 590 591 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: 592 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: 593 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */ 594 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s); 595 if (ret <= 0) 596 goto end; 597 if (ret == 2) 598 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; 599 else { 600 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { 601 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); 602 if (ret <= 0) 603 goto end; 604 } 605 s->init_num = 0; 606 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; 607 } 608 break; 609 610 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: 611 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: 612 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); 613 if (ret <= 0) 614 goto end; 615 if (ret == 2) { 616 /* 617 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH 618 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is 619 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses 620 * its key from the certificate for key exchange. 621 */ 622 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 623 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 624 #else 625 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 626 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 627 else 628 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 629 #endif 630 s->init_num = 0; 631 } else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 632 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 633 s->init_num = 0; 634 if (!s->session->peer) 635 break; 636 /* 637 * For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer at this point and 638 * digest cached records. 639 */ 640 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 642 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 643 return -1; 644 } 645 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; 646 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 647 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 648 return -1; 649 } 650 } else { 651 int offset = 0; 652 int dgst_num; 653 654 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 655 s->init_num = 0; 656 657 /* 658 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert, 659 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for 660 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next 661 * step 662 */ 663 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 664 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 665 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 666 return -1; 667 } 668 } 669 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++) 670 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) { 671 int dgst_size; 672 673 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, 674 EVP_MD_CTX_type 675 (s-> 676 s3->handshake_dgst 677 [dgst_num]), 678 &(s->s3-> 679 tmp.cert_verify_md 680 [offset])); 681 dgst_size = 682 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]); 683 if (dgst_size < 0) { 684 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 685 ret = -1; 686 goto end; 687 } 688 offset += dgst_size; 689 } 690 } 691 break; 692 693 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: 694 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: 695 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); 696 if (ret <= 0) 697 goto end; 698 699 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 700 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 701 #else 702 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 703 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 704 else 705 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 706 #endif 707 s->init_num = 0; 708 break; 709 710 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 711 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A: 712 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B: 713 /* 714 * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make 715 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the 716 * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be 717 * cautious. 718 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is 719 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until 720 * the client's Finished message is read. 721 */ 722 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 723 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 724 725 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s); 726 if (ret <= 0) 727 goto end; 728 s->init_num = 0; 729 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 730 break; 731 #endif 732 733 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: 734 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: 735 /* 736 * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has 737 * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make 738 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. 739 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is 740 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until 741 * the client's Finished message is read. 742 */ 743 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 744 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 745 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, 746 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); 747 if (ret <= 0) 748 goto end; 749 if (s->hit) 750 s->state = SSL_ST_OK; 751 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 752 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 753 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 754 #endif 755 else 756 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 757 s->init_num = 0; 758 break; 759 760 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 761 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: 762 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: 763 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); 764 if (ret <= 0) 765 goto end; 766 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 767 s->init_num = 0; 768 break; 769 770 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: 771 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: 772 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s); 773 if (ret <= 0) 774 goto end; 775 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 776 s->init_num = 0; 777 break; 778 779 #endif 780 781 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: 782 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: 783 784 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; 785 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { 786 ret = -1; 787 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 788 goto end; 789 } 790 791 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, 792 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A, 793 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); 794 795 if (ret <= 0) 796 goto end; 797 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; 798 s->init_num = 0; 799 800 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 801 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) 802 { 803 ret = -1; 804 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 805 goto end; 806 } 807 808 break; 809 810 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: 811 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: 812 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s, 813 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A, 814 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, 815 s->method-> 816 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, 817 s->method-> 818 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); 819 if (ret <= 0) 820 goto end; 821 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 822 if (s->hit) { 823 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 824 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 825 #else 826 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { 827 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 828 } else 829 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 830 #endif 831 } else 832 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; 833 s->init_num = 0; 834 break; 835 836 case SSL_ST_OK: 837 /* clean a few things up */ 838 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); 839 840 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); 841 s->init_buf = NULL; 842 843 /* remove buffering on output */ 844 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); 845 846 s->init_num = 0; 847 848 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a 849 * HelloRequest */ 850 s->renegotiate = 0; 851 s->new_session = 0; 852 853 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); 854 855 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; 856 /* s->server=1; */ 857 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept; 858 859 if (cb != NULL) 860 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); 861 } 862 863 ret = 1; 864 goto end; 865 /* break; */ 866 867 case SSL_ST_ERR: 868 default: 869 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); 870 ret = -1; 871 goto end; 872 /* break; */ 873 } 874 875 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { 876 if (s->debug) { 877 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) 878 goto end; 879 } 880 881 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) { 882 new_state = s->state; 883 s->state = state; 884 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1); 885 s->state = new_state; 886 } 887 } 888 skip = 0; 889 } 890 end: 891 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ 892 893 s->in_handshake--; 894 if (cb != NULL) 895 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret); 896 return (ret); 897 } 898 899 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) 900 { 901 unsigned char *p; 902 903 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) { 904 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 905 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; 906 *(p++) = 0; 907 *(p++) = 0; 908 *(p++) = 0; 909 910 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; 911 /* number of bytes to write */ 912 s->init_num = 4; 913 s->init_off = 0; 914 } 915 916 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ 917 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 918 } 919 920 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s) 921 { 922 int ok; 923 long n; 924 925 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per 926 * negotiation. */ 927 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE) { 928 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS); 929 return -1; 930 } 931 932 /* 933 * this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message, 934 * so permit appropriate message length 935 */ 936 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 937 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 938 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 939 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); 940 if (!ok) 941 return ((int)n); 942 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 943 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { 944 /* 945 * We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per 946 * negotiation. 947 */ 948 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE) { 949 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, 950 SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS); 951 return -1; 952 } 953 /* 954 * Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake, 955 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) 956 */ 957 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 958 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) { 959 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 960 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; 961 } 962 #endif 963 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 964 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { 965 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 966 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 967 } 968 #endif 969 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; 970 return 2; 971 } 972 return 1; 973 } 974 975 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) 976 { 977 int i, j, ok, al, ret = -1; 978 unsigned int cookie_len; 979 long n; 980 unsigned long id; 981 unsigned char *p, *d, *q; 982 SSL_CIPHER *c; 983 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 984 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; 985 #endif 986 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; 987 988 /* 989 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are 990 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down 991 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we 992 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1. 993 */ 994 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) { 995 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; 996 } 997 s->first_packet = 1; 998 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 999 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, 1000 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, 1001 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, 1002 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); 1003 1004 if (!ok) 1005 return ((int)n); 1006 s->first_packet = 0; 1007 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 1008 1009 /* 1010 * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte 1011 * for session id length 1012 */ 1013 if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) { 1014 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1015 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1016 goto f_err; 1017 } 1018 1019 /* 1020 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may 1021 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) 1022 */ 1023 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1]; 1024 p += 2; 1025 1026 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) || 1027 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) { 1028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 1029 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && 1030 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) { 1031 /* 1032 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version 1033 * number 1034 */ 1035 s->version = s->client_version; 1036 } 1037 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 1038 goto f_err; 1039 } 1040 1041 /* 1042 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just 1043 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check 1044 * cookie length... 1045 */ 1046 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { 1047 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length; 1048 1049 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1050 1051 if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) { 1052 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1053 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1054 goto f_err; 1055 } 1056 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1); 1057 1058 if (cookie_length == 0) 1059 return 1; 1060 } 1061 1062 /* load the client random */ 1063 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1064 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1065 1066 /* get the session-id */ 1067 j = *(p++); 1068 1069 if (p + j > d + n) { 1070 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1071 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1072 goto f_err; 1073 } 1074 1075 s->hit = 0; 1076 /* 1077 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in 1078 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally 1079 * ignore resumption requests with flag 1080 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather 1081 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this 1082 * for security won't even compile against older library versions). 1083 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to 1084 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains 1085 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the 1086 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored. 1087 */ 1088 if ((s->new_session 1089 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { 1090 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) 1091 goto err; 1092 } else { 1093 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n); 1094 /* 1095 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated 1096 * version. 1097 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption 1098 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but 1099 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable. 1100 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and 1101 * will abort the handshake with an error. 1102 */ 1103 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous 1104 * session */ 1105 s->hit = 1; 1106 } else if (i == -1) 1107 goto err; 1108 else { /* i == 0 */ 1109 1110 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) 1111 goto err; 1112 } 1113 } 1114 1115 p += j; 1116 1117 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { 1118 /* cookie stuff */ 1119 if (p + 1 > d + n) { 1120 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1122 goto f_err; 1123 } 1124 cookie_len = *(p++); 1125 1126 if (p + cookie_len > d + n) { 1127 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1129 goto f_err; 1130 } 1131 1132 /* 1133 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the 1134 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it 1135 * does not cause an overflow. 1136 */ 1137 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) { 1138 /* too much data */ 1139 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1141 goto f_err; 1142 } 1143 1144 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ 1145 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) { 1146 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); 1147 1148 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { 1149 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, 1150 cookie_len) == 0) { 1151 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1153 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1154 goto f_err; 1155 } 1156 /* else cookie verification succeeded */ 1157 } 1158 /* default verification */ 1159 else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, 1160 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) { 1161 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1163 goto f_err; 1164 } 1165 1166 ret = 2; 1167 } 1168 1169 p += cookie_len; 1170 } 1171 1172 if (p + 2 > d + n) { 1173 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1175 goto f_err; 1176 } 1177 n2s(p, i); 1178 1179 if (i == 0) { 1180 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); 1182 goto f_err; 1183 } 1184 1185 /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */ 1186 if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) { 1187 /* not enough data */ 1188 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1189 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1190 goto f_err; 1191 } 1192 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) { 1193 goto err; 1194 } 1195 p += i; 1196 1197 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ 1198 if (s->hit) { 1199 j = 0; 1200 id = s->session->cipher->id; 1201 1202 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 1203 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", 1204 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); 1205 #endif 1206 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { 1207 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); 1208 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 1209 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", 1210 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); 1211 #endif 1212 if (c->id == id) { 1213 j = 1; 1214 break; 1215 } 1216 } 1217 /* 1218 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack: 1219 * CVE-2010-4180. 1220 */ 1221 #if 0 1222 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) 1223 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) { 1224 /* 1225 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used 1226 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead 1227 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't 1228 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the 1229 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though. 1230 */ 1231 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); 1232 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) { 1233 s->session->cipher = c; 1234 j = 1; 1235 } 1236 } 1237 #endif 1238 if (j == 0) { 1239 /* 1240 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked 1241 * to reuse it 1242 */ 1243 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1245 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); 1246 goto f_err; 1247 } 1248 } 1249 1250 /* compression */ 1251 i = *(p++); 1252 if ((p + i) > (d + n)) { 1253 /* not enough data */ 1254 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1256 goto f_err; 1257 } 1258 q = p; 1259 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { 1260 if (p[j] == 0) 1261 break; 1262 } 1263 1264 p += i; 1265 if (j >= i) { 1266 /* no compress */ 1267 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); 1269 goto f_err; 1270 } 1271 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1272 /* TLS extensions */ 1273 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { 1274 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n, &al)) { 1275 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */ 1276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); 1277 goto f_err; 1278 } 1279 } 1280 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { 1281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1282 goto err; 1283 } 1284 1285 /* 1286 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake 1287 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before 1288 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket 1289 * processing to use it in key derivation. 1290 */ 1291 { 1292 unsigned char *pos; 1293 pos = s->s3->server_random; 1294 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) { 1295 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1296 goto f_err; 1297 } 1298 } 1299 1300 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) { 1301 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; 1302 1303 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); 1304 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, 1305 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers, 1306 &pref_cipher, 1307 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { 1308 s->hit = 1; 1309 s->session->ciphers = ciphers; 1310 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; 1311 1312 ciphers = NULL; 1313 1314 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ 1315 pref_cipher = 1316 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, 1317 s-> 1318 session->ciphers, 1319 SSL_get_ciphers 1320 (s)); 1321 if (pref_cipher == NULL) { 1322 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1324 goto f_err; 1325 } 1326 1327 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; 1328 1329 if (s->cipher_list) 1330 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); 1331 1332 if (s->cipher_list_by_id) 1333 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); 1334 1335 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1336 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1337 } 1338 } 1339 #endif 1340 1341 /* 1342 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other 1343 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression 1344 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. 1345 */ 1346 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL; 1347 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1348 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ 1349 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { 1350 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; 1351 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ 1352 /* Can't disable compression */ 1353 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) { 1354 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1356 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1357 goto f_err; 1358 } 1359 /* Look for resumed compression method */ 1360 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) { 1361 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); 1362 if (comp_id == comp->id) { 1363 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; 1364 break; 1365 } 1366 } 1367 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) { 1368 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1370 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 1371 goto f_err; 1372 } 1373 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ 1374 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) { 1375 if (q[m] == comp_id) 1376 break; 1377 } 1378 if (m >= i) { 1379 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1381 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); 1382 goto f_err; 1383 } 1384 } else if (s->hit) 1385 comp = NULL; 1386 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { 1387 /* See if we have a match */ 1388 int m, nn, o, v, done = 0; 1389 1390 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); 1391 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) { 1392 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); 1393 v = comp->id; 1394 for (o = 0; o < i; o++) { 1395 if (v == q[o]) { 1396 done = 1; 1397 break; 1398 } 1399 } 1400 if (done) 1401 break; 1402 } 1403 if (done) 1404 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; 1405 else 1406 comp = NULL; 1407 } 1408 #else 1409 /* 1410 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session 1411 * using compression. 1412 */ 1413 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { 1414 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1416 goto f_err; 1417 } 1418 #endif 1419 1420 /* 1421 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher 1422 */ 1423 1424 if (!s->hit) { 1425 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1426 s->session->compress_meth = 0; 1427 #else 1428 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id; 1429 #endif 1430 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL) 1431 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); 1432 s->session->ciphers = ciphers; 1433 if (ciphers == NULL) { 1434 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1436 goto f_err; 1437 } 1438 ciphers = NULL; 1439 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1440 1441 if (c == NULL) { 1442 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1444 goto f_err; 1445 } 1446 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; 1447 } else { 1448 /* Session-id reuse */ 1449 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 1450 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; 1451 SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL; 1452 SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL; 1453 1454 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) { 1455 sk = s->session->ciphers; 1456 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { 1457 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); 1458 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL) 1459 nc = c; 1460 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) 1461 ec = c; 1462 } 1463 if (nc != NULL) 1464 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc; 1465 else if (ec != NULL) 1466 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec; 1467 else 1468 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; 1469 } else 1470 #endif 1471 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; 1472 } 1473 1474 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION 1475 || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { 1476 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 1477 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1478 goto f_err; 1479 } 1480 } 1481 1482 /*- 1483 * we now have the following setup. 1484 * client_random 1485 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers 1486 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers 1487 * compression - basically ignored right now 1488 * ssl version is set - sslv3 1489 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. 1490 * s->hit - session reuse flag 1491 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. 1492 */ 1493 1494 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ 1495 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { 1496 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) { 1497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1498 goto err; 1499 } 1500 } 1501 1502 if (ret < 0) 1503 ret = 1; 1504 if (0) { 1505 f_err: 1506 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1507 err: 1508 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1509 } 1510 1511 if (ciphers != NULL) 1512 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); 1513 return (ret); 1514 } 1515 1516 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) 1517 { 1518 unsigned char *buf; 1519 unsigned char *p, *d; 1520 int i, sl; 1521 unsigned long l; 1522 1523 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { 1524 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1525 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1526 p = s->s3->server_random; 1527 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) { 1528 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1529 return -1; 1530 } 1531 #endif 1532 /* Do the message type and length last */ 1533 d = p = &(buf[4]); 1534 1535 *(p++) = s->version >> 8; 1536 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; 1537 1538 /* Random stuff */ 1539 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1540 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1541 1542 /*- 1543 * There are several cases for the session ID to send 1544 * back in the server hello: 1545 * - For session reuse from the session cache, 1546 * we send back the old session ID. 1547 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) 1548 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" 1549 * (which doesn't actually identify the session). 1550 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new 1551 * session ID. 1552 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, 1553 * we send back a 0-length session ID. 1554 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, 1555 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed 1556 * to send back. 1557 */ 1558 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) 1559 && !s->hit) 1560 s->session->session_id_length = 0; 1561 1562 sl = s->session->session_id_length; 1563 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { 1564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1565 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1566 return -1; 1567 } 1568 *(p++) = sl; 1569 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl); 1570 p += sl; 1571 1572 /* put the cipher */ 1573 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p); 1574 p += i; 1575 1576 /* put the compression method */ 1577 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1578 *(p++) = 0; 1579 #else 1580 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) 1581 *(p++) = 0; 1582 else 1583 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; 1584 #endif 1585 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1586 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { 1587 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); 1588 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1589 return -1; 1590 } 1591 if ((p = 1592 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, 1593 buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == 1594 NULL) { 1595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1596 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1597 return -1; 1598 } 1599 #endif 1600 /* do the header */ 1601 l = (p - d); 1602 d = buf; 1603 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; 1604 l2n3(l, d); 1605 1606 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; 1607 /* number of bytes to write */ 1608 s->init_num = p - buf; 1609 s->init_off = 0; 1610 } 1611 1612 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ 1613 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1614 } 1615 1616 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) 1617 { 1618 unsigned char *p; 1619 1620 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) { 1621 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1622 1623 /* do the header */ 1624 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 1625 *(p++) = 0; 1626 *(p++) = 0; 1627 *(p++) = 0; 1628 1629 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; 1630 /* number of bytes to write */ 1631 s->init_num = 4; 1632 s->init_off = 0; 1633 } 1634 1635 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ 1636 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1637 } 1638 1639 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) 1640 { 1641 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1642 unsigned char *q; 1643 int j, num; 1644 RSA *rsa; 1645 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 1646 unsigned int u; 1647 #endif 1648 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1649 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp; 1650 #endif 1651 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1652 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp; 1653 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; 1654 int encodedlen = 0; 1655 int curve_id = 0; 1656 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1657 #endif 1658 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 1659 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 1660 unsigned char *p, *d; 1661 int al, i; 1662 unsigned long type; 1663 int n; 1664 CERT *cert; 1665 BIGNUM *r[4]; 1666 int nr[4], kn; 1667 BUF_MEM *buf; 1668 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; 1669 1670 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); 1671 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) { 1672 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1673 cert = s->cert; 1674 1675 buf = s->init_buf; 1676 1677 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; 1678 n = 0; 1679 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1680 if (type & SSL_kRSA) { 1681 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp; 1682 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) { 1683 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, 1684 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> 1685 tmp.new_cipher), 1686 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3-> 1687 tmp.new_cipher)); 1688 if (rsa == NULL) { 1689 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1690 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1691 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1692 goto f_err; 1693 } 1694 RSA_up_ref(rsa); 1695 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa; 1696 } 1697 if (rsa == NULL) { 1698 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1699 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1700 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1701 goto f_err; 1702 } 1703 r[0] = rsa->n; 1704 r[1] = rsa->e; 1705 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1; 1706 } else 1707 #endif 1708 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1709 if (type & SSL_kEDH) { 1710 dhp = cert->dh_tmp; 1711 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1712 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 1713 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> 1714 tmp.new_cipher), 1715 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3-> 1716 tmp.new_cipher)); 1717 if (dhp == NULL) { 1718 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1719 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1720 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1721 goto f_err; 1722 } 1723 1724 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) { 1725 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1726 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1727 goto err; 1728 } 1729 1730 if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) { 1731 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1732 goto err; 1733 } 1734 1735 s->s3->tmp.dh = dh; 1736 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL || 1737 dhp->priv_key == NULL || 1738 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) { 1739 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) { 1740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1741 goto err; 1742 } 1743 } else { 1744 dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key); 1745 dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key); 1746 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) { 1747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1748 goto err; 1749 } 1750 } 1751 r[0] = dh->p; 1752 r[1] = dh->g; 1753 r[2] = dh->pub_key; 1754 } else 1755 #endif 1756 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1757 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) { 1758 const EC_GROUP *group; 1759 1760 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp; 1761 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) { 1762 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, 1763 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> 1764 tmp.new_cipher), 1765 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s-> 1766 s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1767 } 1768 if (ecdhp == NULL) { 1769 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1770 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1771 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 1772 goto f_err; 1773 } 1774 1775 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { 1776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1777 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1778 goto err; 1779 } 1780 1781 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ 1782 if (ecdhp == NULL) { 1783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1784 goto err; 1785 } 1786 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) { 1787 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1788 goto err; 1789 } 1790 1791 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh; 1792 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1793 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1794 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) { 1795 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) { 1796 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1797 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1798 goto err; 1799 } 1800 } 1801 1802 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || 1803 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1804 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) { 1805 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1806 goto err; 1807 } 1808 1809 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && 1810 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) { 1811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1812 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); 1813 goto err; 1814 } 1815 1816 /* 1817 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named 1818 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is 1819 * non-zero. 1820 */ 1821 if ((curve_id = 1822 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) 1823 == 0) { 1824 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1825 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 1826 goto err; 1827 } 1828 1829 /* 1830 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and 1831 * allocate memory accordingly. 1832 */ 1833 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1834 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1835 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1836 NULL, 0, NULL); 1837 1838 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 1839 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char)); 1840 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); 1841 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) { 1842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1843 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1844 goto err; 1845 } 1846 1847 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1848 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1849 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1850 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); 1851 1852 if (encodedlen == 0) { 1853 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1854 goto err; 1855 } 1856 1857 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 1858 bn_ctx = NULL; 1859 1860 /* 1861 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in 1862 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four 1863 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams 1864 * structure. 1865 */ 1866 n = 4 + encodedlen; 1867 1868 /* 1869 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we 1870 * can set these to NULLs 1871 */ 1872 r[0] = NULL; 1873 r[1] = NULL; 1874 r[2] = NULL; 1875 r[3] = NULL; 1876 } else 1877 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ 1878 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1879 if (type & SSL_kPSK) { 1880 /* 1881 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint 1882 */ 1883 n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 1884 } else 1885 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ 1886 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1887 if (type & SSL_kSRP) { 1888 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || 1889 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || 1890 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) { 1891 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1892 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); 1893 goto err; 1894 } 1895 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N; 1896 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g; 1897 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s; 1898 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B; 1899 } else 1900 #endif 1901 { 1902 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1904 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); 1905 goto f_err; 1906 } 1907 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { 1908 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]); 1909 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1910 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) 1911 n += 1 + nr[i]; 1912 else 1913 #endif 1914 n += 2 + nr[i]; 1915 } 1916 1917 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) 1918 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { 1919 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md)) 1920 == NULL) { 1921 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1922 goto f_err; 1923 } 1924 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 1925 } else { 1926 pkey = NULL; 1927 kn = 0; 1928 } 1929 1930 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + 4 + kn)) { 1931 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF); 1932 goto err; 1933 } 1934 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1935 p = &(d[4]); 1936 1937 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { 1938 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1939 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) { 1940 *p = nr[i]; 1941 p++; 1942 } else 1943 #endif 1944 s2n(nr[i], p); 1945 BN_bn2bin(r[i], p); 1946 p += nr[i]; 1947 } 1948 1949 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1950 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) { 1951 /* 1952 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In 1953 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte 1954 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded 1955 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself 1956 */ 1957 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; 1958 p += 1; 1959 *p = 0; 1960 p += 1; 1961 *p = curve_id; 1962 p += 1; 1963 *p = encodedlen; 1964 p += 1; 1965 memcpy((unsigned char *)p, 1966 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen); 1967 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 1968 encodedPoint = NULL; 1969 p += encodedlen; 1970 } 1971 #endif 1972 1973 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1974 if (type & SSL_kPSK) { 1975 /* copy PSK identity hint */ 1976 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p); 1977 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, 1978 strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)); 1979 p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 1980 } 1981 #endif 1982 1983 /* not anonymous */ 1984 if (pkey != NULL) { 1985 /* 1986 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p 1987 * points to the space at the end. 1988 */ 1989 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1990 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA 1991 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) { 1992 q = md_buf; 1993 j = 0; 1994 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) { 1995 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, 1996 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); 1997 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2) 1998 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL); 1999 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), 2000 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 2001 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), 2002 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 2003 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n); 2004 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i); 2005 q += i; 2006 j += i; 2007 } 2008 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, 2009 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) { 2010 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA); 2011 goto err; 2012 } 2013 s2n(u, p); 2014 n += u + 2; 2015 } else 2016 #endif 2017 if (md) { 2018 /* 2019 * For TLS1.2 and later send signature algorithm 2020 */ 2021 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 2022 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) { 2023 /* Should never happen */ 2024 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2026 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2027 goto f_err; 2028 } 2029 p += 2; 2030 } 2031 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG 2032 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); 2033 #endif 2034 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); 2035 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), 2036 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 2037 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), 2038 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 2039 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n); 2040 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]), 2041 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) { 2042 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP); 2043 goto err; 2044 } 2045 s2n(i, p); 2046 n += i + 2; 2047 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 2048 n += 2; 2049 } else { 2050 /* Is this error check actually needed? */ 2051 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2052 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2053 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); 2054 goto f_err; 2055 } 2056 } 2057 2058 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; 2059 l2n3(n, d); 2060 2061 /* 2062 * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off 2063 */ 2064 s->init_num = n + 4; 2065 s->init_off = 0; 2066 } 2067 2068 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; 2069 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 2070 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 2071 f_err: 2072 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2073 err: 2074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2075 if (encodedPoint != NULL) 2076 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 2077 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2078 #endif 2079 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 2080 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 2081 return (-1); 2082 } 2083 2084 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) 2085 { 2086 unsigned char *p, *d; 2087 int i, j, nl, off, n; 2088 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL; 2089 X509_NAME *name; 2090 BUF_MEM *buf; 2091 2092 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) { 2093 buf = s->init_buf; 2094 2095 d = p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]); 2096 2097 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ 2098 p++; 2099 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p); 2100 d[0] = n; 2101 p += n; 2102 n++; 2103 2104 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 2105 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2); 2106 s2n(nl, p); 2107 p += nl + 2; 2108 n += nl + 2; 2109 } 2110 2111 off = n; 2112 p += 2; 2113 n += 2; 2114 2115 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); 2116 nl = 0; 2117 if (sk != NULL) { 2118 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { 2119 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); 2120 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); 2121 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 4 + n + j + 2)) { 2122 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, 2123 ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 2124 goto err; 2125 } 2126 p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4 + n]); 2127 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) { 2128 s2n(j, p); 2129 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); 2130 n += 2 + j; 2131 nl += 2 + j; 2132 } else { 2133 d = p; 2134 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); 2135 j -= 2; 2136 s2n(j, d); 2137 j += 2; 2138 n += j; 2139 nl += j; 2140 } 2141 } 2142 } 2143 /* else no CA names */ 2144 p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4 + off]); 2145 s2n(nl, p); 2146 2147 d = (unsigned char *)buf->data; 2148 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; 2149 l2n3(n, d); 2150 2151 /* 2152 * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off 2153 */ 2154 2155 s->init_num = n + 4; 2156 s->init_off = 0; 2157 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 2158 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) { 2159 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 2160 goto err; 2161 } 2162 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; 2163 2164 /* do the header */ 2165 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 2166 *(p++) = 0; 2167 *(p++) = 0; 2168 *(p++) = 0; 2169 s->init_num += 4; 2170 #endif 2171 2172 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; 2173 } 2174 2175 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ 2176 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 2177 err: 2178 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 2179 return (-1); 2180 } 2181 2182 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) 2183 { 2184 int i, al, ok; 2185 long n; 2186 unsigned long alg_k; 2187 unsigned char *p; 2188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2189 RSA *rsa = NULL; 2190 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 2191 #endif 2192 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2193 BIGNUM *pub = NULL; 2194 DH *dh_srvr; 2195 #endif 2196 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 2197 KSSL_ERR kssl_err; 2198 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 2199 2200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2201 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; 2202 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; 2203 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; 2204 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 2205 #endif 2206 2207 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2208 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, 2209 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, 2210 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok); 2211 2212 if (!ok) 2213 return ((int)n); 2214 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 2215 2216 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 2217 2218 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2219 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { 2220 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; 2221 int decrypt_len; 2222 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; 2223 size_t j; 2224 2225 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ 2226 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) { 2227 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)) 2228 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp; 2229 /* 2230 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already 2231 */ 2232 if (rsa == NULL) { 2233 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2235 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY); 2236 goto f_err; 2237 2238 } 2239 } else { 2240 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; 2241 if ((pkey == NULL) || 2242 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) { 2243 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2245 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); 2246 goto f_err; 2247 } 2248 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa; 2249 } 2250 2251 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */ 2252 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { 2253 n2s(p, i); 2254 if (n != i + 2) { 2255 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) { 2256 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2258 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2259 goto f_err; 2260 } else 2261 p -= 2; 2262 } else 2263 n = i; 2264 } 2265 2266 /* 2267 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure 2268 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire 2269 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The 2270 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the 2271 * bound is sufficient to be safe. 2272 */ 2273 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 2274 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2276 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2277 goto f_err; 2278 } 2279 2280 /* 2281 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of 2282 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, 2283 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and 2284 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt 2285 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 2286 */ 2287 2288 /* 2289 * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. 2290 */ 2291 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, 2292 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) 2293 goto err; 2294 decrypt_len = 2295 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); 2296 ERR_clear_error(); 2297 2298 /* 2299 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will 2300 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. 2301 */ 2302 decrypt_good = 2303 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); 2304 2305 /* 2306 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then 2307 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The 2308 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack 2309 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number 2310 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in 2311 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error. 2312 */ 2313 version_good = 2314 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8)); 2315 version_good &= 2316 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff)); 2317 2318 /* 2319 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the 2320 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the 2321 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). 2322 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol 2323 * version instead if the server does not support the requested 2324 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such 2325 * clients. 2326 */ 2327 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) { 2328 unsigned char workaround_good; 2329 workaround_good = 2330 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8)); 2331 workaround_good &= 2332 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff)); 2333 version_good |= workaround_good; 2334 } 2335 2336 /* 2337 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to 2338 * remain non-zero (0xff). 2339 */ 2340 decrypt_good &= version_good; 2341 2342 /* 2343 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using 2344 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not 2345 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees 2346 * it is still sufficiently large to read from. 2347 */ 2348 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) { 2349 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j], 2350 rand_premaster_secret[j]); 2351 } 2352 2353 s->session->master_key_length = 2354 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2355 s-> 2356 session->master_key, 2357 p, 2358 sizeof 2359 (rand_premaster_secret)); 2360 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)); 2361 } else 2362 #endif 2363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2364 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) { 2365 n2s(p, i); 2366 if (n != i + 2) { 2367 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) { 2368 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2369 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2370 goto err; 2371 } else { 2372 p -= 2; 2373 i = (int)n; 2374 } 2375 } 2376 2377 if (n == 0L) { /* the parameters are in the cert */ 2378 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2380 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS); 2381 goto f_err; 2382 } else { 2383 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) { 2384 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2386 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 2387 goto f_err; 2388 } else 2389 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh; 2390 } 2391 2392 pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL); 2393 if (pub == NULL) { 2394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB); 2395 goto err; 2396 } 2397 2398 i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr); 2399 2400 if (i <= 0) { 2401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 2402 BN_clear_free(pub); 2403 goto err; 2404 } 2405 2406 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 2407 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; 2408 2409 BN_clear_free(pub); 2410 pub = NULL; 2411 s->session->master_key_length = 2412 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2413 s-> 2414 session->master_key, 2415 p, i); 2416 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); 2417 } else 2418 #endif 2419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 2420 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) { 2421 krb5_error_code krb5rc; 2422 krb5_data enc_ticket; 2423 krb5_data authenticator; 2424 krb5_data enc_pms; 2425 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; 2426 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; 2427 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; 2428 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 2429 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; 2430 int padl, outl; 2431 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; 2432 krb5_ticket_times ttimes; 2433 int kerr = 0; 2434 2435 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); 2436 2437 if (!kssl_ctx) 2438 kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); 2439 2440 n2s(p, i); 2441 enc_ticket.length = i; 2442 2443 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) { 2444 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2445 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2446 goto err; 2447 } 2448 2449 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p; 2450 p += enc_ticket.length; 2451 2452 n2s(p, i); 2453 authenticator.length = i; 2454 2455 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) { 2456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2457 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2458 goto err; 2459 } 2460 2461 authenticator.data = (char *)p; 2462 p += authenticator.length; 2463 2464 n2s(p, i); 2465 enc_pms.length = i; 2466 enc_pms.data = (char *)p; 2467 p += enc_pms.length; 2468 2469 /* 2470 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption 2471 */ 2472 if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) { 2473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2474 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2475 goto err; 2476 } 2477 2478 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 2479 enc_pms.length + 6)) { 2480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2481 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2482 goto err; 2483 } 2484 2485 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes, 2486 &kssl_err)) != 0) { 2487 # ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2488 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n", 2489 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2490 if (kssl_err.text) 2491 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2492 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); 2494 goto err; 2495 } 2496 2497 /* 2498 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will 2499 * return authtime == 0. 2500 */ 2501 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator, 2502 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) { 2503 # ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2504 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n", 2505 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2506 if (kssl_err.text) 2507 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2508 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); 2510 goto err; 2511 } 2512 2513 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) { 2514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); 2515 goto err; 2516 } 2517 # ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2518 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); 2519 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2520 2521 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); 2522 if (enc == NULL) 2523 goto err; 2524 2525 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ 2526 2527 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) { 2528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2529 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2530 goto err; 2531 } 2532 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl, 2533 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length)) 2534 { 2535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2536 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2537 kerr = 1; 2538 goto kclean; 2539 } 2540 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 2541 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2542 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2543 kerr = 1; 2544 goto kclean; 2545 } 2546 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) { 2547 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2548 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2549 kerr = 1; 2550 goto kclean; 2551 } 2552 outl += padl; 2553 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 2554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2555 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2556 kerr = 1; 2557 goto kclean; 2558 } 2559 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8)) 2560 && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) { 2561 /* 2562 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as 2563 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, 2564 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH 2565 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random 2566 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If 2567 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. 2568 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos 2569 * cipher) 2570 */ 2571 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) { 2572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2573 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 2574 kerr = 1; 2575 goto kclean; 2576 } 2577 } 2578 2579 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); 2580 2581 s->session->master_key_length = 2582 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2583 s-> 2584 session->master_key, 2585 pms, outl); 2586 2587 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) { 2588 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); 2589 if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) { 2590 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len; 2591 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ, 2592 len); 2593 } 2594 } 2595 2596 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, 2597 * but it caused problems for apache. 2598 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); 2599 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; 2600 */ 2601 2602 kclean: 2603 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, sizeof(pms)); 2604 if (kerr) 2605 goto err; 2606 } else 2607 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 2608 2609 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2610 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { 2611 int ret = 1; 2612 int field_size = 0; 2613 const EC_KEY *tkey; 2614 const EC_GROUP *group; 2615 const BIGNUM *priv_key; 2616 2617 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ 2618 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { 2619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2620 goto err; 2621 } 2622 2623 /* Let's get server private key and group information */ 2624 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { 2625 /* use the certificate */ 2626 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec; 2627 } else { 2628 /* 2629 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the 2630 * ServerKeyExchange msg. 2631 */ 2632 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; 2633 } 2634 2635 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); 2636 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); 2637 2638 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || 2639 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) { 2640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2641 goto err; 2642 } 2643 2644 /* Let's get client's public key */ 2645 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { 2646 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2647 goto err; 2648 } 2649 2650 if (n == 0L) { 2651 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ 2652 2653 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) { 2654 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2656 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 2657 goto f_err; 2658 } 2659 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) 2660 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) { 2661 /* 2662 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication 2663 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the 2664 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we 2665 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is 2666 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly 2667 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group. 2668 */ 2669 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2671 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); 2672 goto f_err; 2673 } 2674 2675 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, 2676 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey-> 2677 pkey.ec)) == 0) { 2678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2679 goto err; 2680 } 2681 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ 2682 } else { 2683 /* 2684 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the 2685 * ClientKeyExchange message. 2686 */ 2687 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { 2688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2689 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2690 goto err; 2691 } 2692 2693 /* Get encoded point length */ 2694 i = *p; 2695 p += 1; 2696 if (n != 1 + i) { 2697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2698 goto err; 2699 } 2700 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) { 2701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2702 goto err; 2703 } 2704 /* 2705 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it 2706 * to the start 2707 */ 2708 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 2709 } 2710 2711 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ 2712 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); 2713 if (field_size <= 0) { 2714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2715 goto err; 2716 } 2717 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, 2718 NULL); 2719 if (i <= 0) { 2720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2721 goto err; 2722 } 2723 2724 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2725 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2726 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2727 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2728 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 2729 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 2730 2731 /* Compute the master secret */ 2732 s->session->master_key_length = 2733 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2734 s-> 2735 session->master_key, 2736 p, i); 2737 2738 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); 2739 return (ret); 2740 } else 2741 #endif 2742 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2743 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { 2744 unsigned char *t = NULL; 2745 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4]; 2746 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0; 2747 int psk_err = 1; 2748 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; 2749 2750 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2751 2752 n2s(p, i); 2753 if (n != i + 2) { 2754 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2755 goto psk_err; 2756 } 2757 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { 2758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2759 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2760 goto psk_err; 2761 } 2762 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { 2763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2764 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); 2765 goto psk_err; 2766 } 2767 2768 /* 2769 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback 2770 */ 2771 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i); 2772 memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i); 2773 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id, 2774 psk_or_pre_ms, 2775 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); 2776 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1); 2777 2778 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { 2779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2780 goto psk_err; 2781 } else if (psk_len == 0) { 2782 /* 2783 * PSK related to the given identity not found 2784 */ 2785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2786 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); 2787 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; 2788 goto psk_err; 2789 } 2790 2791 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */ 2792 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len; 2793 t = psk_or_pre_ms; 2794 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len); 2795 s2n(psk_len, t); 2796 memset(t, 0, psk_len); 2797 t += psk_len; 2798 s2n(psk_len, t); 2799 2800 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) 2801 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); 2802 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i); 2803 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) { 2804 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2805 goto psk_err; 2806 } 2807 2808 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) 2809 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); 2810 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 2811 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL && 2812 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { 2813 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2814 goto psk_err; 2815 } 2816 2817 s->session->master_key_length = 2818 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2819 s-> 2820 session->master_key, 2821 psk_or_pre_ms, 2822 pre_ms_len); 2823 psk_err = 0; 2824 psk_err: 2825 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); 2826 if (psk_err != 0) 2827 goto f_err; 2828 } else 2829 #endif 2830 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2831 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { 2832 int param_len; 2833 2834 n2s(p, i); 2835 param_len = i + 2; 2836 if (param_len > n) { 2837 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2839 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); 2840 goto f_err; 2841 } 2842 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) { 2843 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); 2844 goto err; 2845 } 2846 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 2847 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { 2848 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2849 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2850 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); 2851 goto f_err; 2852 } 2853 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL) 2854 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); 2855 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); 2856 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { 2857 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2858 goto err; 2859 } 2860 2861 if ((s->session->master_key_length = 2862 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s, 2863 s->session->master_key)) < 0) { 2864 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2865 goto err; 2866 } 2867 2868 p += i; 2869 } else 2870 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ 2871 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { 2872 int ret = 0; 2873 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; 2874 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; 2875 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start; 2876 size_t outlen = 32, inlen; 2877 unsigned long alg_a; 2878 int Ttag, Tclass; 2879 long Tlen; 2880 2881 /* Get our certificate private key */ 2882 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 2883 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94) 2884 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey; 2885 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) 2886 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; 2887 2888 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); 2889 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx); 2890 /* 2891 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe 2892 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from 2893 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a 2894 * client certificate for authorization only. 2895 */ 2896 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); 2897 if (client_pub_pkey) { 2898 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) 2899 ERR_clear_error(); 2900 } 2901 /* Decrypt session key */ 2902 if (ASN1_get_object 2903 ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, 2904 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE 2905 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { 2906 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2907 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2908 goto gerr; 2909 } 2910 start = p; 2911 inlen = Tlen; 2912 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt 2913 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) { 2914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2915 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2916 goto gerr; 2917 } 2918 /* Generate master secret */ 2919 s->session->master_key_length = 2920 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2921 s-> 2922 session->master_key, 2923 premaster_secret, 32); 2924 OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret)); 2925 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ 2926 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl 2927 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) 2928 ret = 2; 2929 else 2930 ret = 1; 2931 gerr: 2932 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey); 2933 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); 2934 if (ret) 2935 return ret; 2936 else 2937 goto err; 2938 } else { 2939 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2940 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); 2941 goto f_err; 2942 } 2943 2944 return (1); 2945 f_err: 2946 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2947 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP) 2948 err: 2949 #endif 2950 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2951 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2952 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2953 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 2954 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2955 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2956 #endif 2957 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 2958 return (-1); 2959 } 2960 2961 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) 2962 { 2963 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 2964 unsigned char *p; 2965 int al, ok, ret = 0; 2966 long n; 2967 int type = 0, i, j; 2968 X509 *peer; 2969 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 2970 EVP_MD_CTX mctx; 2971 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); 2972 2973 /* 2974 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received 2975 * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non 2976 * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even 2977 * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static 2978 * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the 2979 * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here. 2980 */ 2981 if (s->session->peer == NULL) { 2982 ret = 1; 2983 goto end; 2984 } 2985 2986 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2987 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, 2988 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, 2989 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, 2990 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); 2991 2992 if (!ok) 2993 return ((int)n); 2994 2995 peer = s->session->peer; 2996 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer); 2997 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey); 2998 2999 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { 3000 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, 3001 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); 3002 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 3003 goto f_err; 3004 } 3005 3006 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ 3007 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3008 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ 3009 /* 3010 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without 3011 * length field 3012 */ 3013 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || 3014 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) { 3015 i = 64; 3016 } else { 3017 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 3018 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); 3019 /* Should never happen */ 3020 if (sigalg == -1) { 3021 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3022 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3023 goto f_err; 3024 } 3025 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */ 3026 if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) { 3027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, 3028 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); 3029 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3030 goto f_err; 3031 } 3032 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]); 3033 if (md == NULL) { 3034 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); 3035 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3036 goto f_err; 3037 } 3038 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG 3039 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); 3040 #endif 3041 p += 2; 3042 n -= 2; 3043 } 3044 n2s(p, i); 3045 n -= 2; 3046 if (i > n) { 3047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3048 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3049 goto f_err; 3050 } 3051 } 3052 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 3053 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) { 3054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); 3055 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3056 goto f_err; 3057 } 3058 3059 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 3060 long hdatalen = 0; 3061 void *hdata; 3062 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); 3063 if (hdatalen <= 0) { 3064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3065 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3066 goto f_err; 3067 } 3068 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG 3069 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n", 3070 EVP_MD_name(md)); 3071 #endif 3072 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) 3073 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) { 3074 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 3075 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3076 goto f_err; 3077 } 3078 3079 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) { 3080 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); 3082 goto f_err; 3083 } 3084 } else 3085 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 3086 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { 3087 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, 3088 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, 3089 pkey->pkey.rsa); 3090 if (i < 0) { 3091 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3092 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); 3093 goto f_err; 3094 } 3095 if (i == 0) { 3096 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); 3098 goto f_err; 3099 } 3100 } else 3101 #endif 3102 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 3103 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { 3104 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 3105 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 3106 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa); 3107 if (j <= 0) { 3108 /* bad signature */ 3109 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE); 3111 goto f_err; 3112 } 3113 } else 3114 #endif 3115 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 3116 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { 3117 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 3118 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 3119 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec); 3120 if (j <= 0) { 3121 /* bad signature */ 3122 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3123 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 3124 goto f_err; 3125 } 3126 } else 3127 #endif 3128 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 3129 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { 3130 unsigned char signature[64]; 3131 int idx; 3132 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); 3133 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx); 3134 if (i != 64) { 3135 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i); 3136 } 3137 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) { 3138 signature[63 - idx] = p[idx]; 3139 } 3140 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, 3141 32); 3142 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 3143 if (j <= 0) { 3144 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 3146 goto f_err; 3147 } 3148 } else { 3149 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3150 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; 3151 goto f_err; 3152 } 3153 3154 ret = 1; 3155 if (0) { 3156 f_err: 3157 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3158 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3159 } 3160 end: 3161 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 3162 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); 3163 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; 3164 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; 3165 } 3166 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); 3167 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 3168 return (ret); 3169 } 3170 3171 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) 3172 { 3173 int i, ok, al, ret = -1; 3174 X509 *x = NULL; 3175 unsigned long l, nc, llen, n; 3176 const unsigned char *p, *q; 3177 unsigned char *d; 3178 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; 3179 3180 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 3181 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 3182 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 3183 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); 3184 3185 if (!ok) 3186 return ((int)n); 3187 3188 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { 3189 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 3190 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 3191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3192 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 3193 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3194 goto f_err; 3195 } 3196 /* 3197 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list 3198 */ 3199 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { 3200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3201 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); 3202 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 3203 goto f_err; 3204 } 3205 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 3206 return (1); 3207 } 3208 3209 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { 3210 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 3211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); 3212 goto f_err; 3213 } 3214 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3215 3216 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { 3217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3218 goto err; 3219 } 3220 3221 n2l3(p, llen); 3222 if (llen + 3 != n) { 3223 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3225 goto f_err; 3226 } 3227 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) { 3228 n2l3(p, l); 3229 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) { 3230 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3232 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3233 goto f_err; 3234 } 3235 3236 q = p; 3237 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l); 3238 if (x == NULL) { 3239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); 3240 goto err; 3241 } 3242 if (p != (q + l)) { 3243 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3245 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3246 goto f_err; 3247 } 3248 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { 3249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3250 goto err; 3251 } 3252 x = NULL; 3253 nc += l + 3; 3254 } 3255 3256 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { 3257 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ 3258 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { 3259 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3261 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); 3262 goto f_err; 3263 } 3264 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ 3265 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 3266 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 3267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3268 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 3269 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3270 goto f_err; 3271 } 3272 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ 3273 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 3274 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3275 goto f_err; 3276 } 3277 } else { 3278 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); 3279 if (i <= 0) { 3280 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); 3281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3282 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED); 3283 goto f_err; 3284 } 3285 } 3286 3287 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */ 3288 X509_free(s->session->peer); 3289 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); 3290 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; 3291 3292 /* 3293 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we 3294 * arrive here. 3295 */ 3296 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { 3297 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); 3298 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { 3299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3300 goto err; 3301 } 3302 } 3303 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) 3304 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); 3305 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk; 3306 /* 3307 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own 3308 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c 3309 */ 3310 3311 sk = NULL; 3312 3313 ret = 1; 3314 if (0) { 3315 f_err: 3316 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3317 err: 3318 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3319 } 3320 3321 if (x != NULL) 3322 X509_free(x); 3323 if (sk != NULL) 3324 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); 3325 return (ret); 3326 } 3327 3328 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) 3329 { 3330 unsigned long l; 3331 X509 *x; 3332 3333 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) { 3334 x = ssl_get_server_send_cert(s); 3335 if (x == NULL) { 3336 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ 3337 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) || 3338 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) { 3339 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, 3340 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3341 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3342 return (0); 3343 } 3344 } 3345 3346 l = ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, x); 3347 if (!l) { 3348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3349 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3350 return (0); 3351 } 3352 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; 3353 s->init_num = (int)l; 3354 s->init_off = 0; 3355 } 3356 3357 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ 3358 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3359 } 3360 3361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 3362 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */ 3363 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) 3364 { 3365 unsigned char *senc = NULL; 3366 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 3367 HMAC_CTX hctx; 3368 3369 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) { 3370 unsigned char *p, *macstart; 3371 const unsigned char *const_p; 3372 int len, slen_full, slen; 3373 SSL_SESSION *sess; 3374 unsigned int hlen; 3375 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 3376 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 3377 unsigned char key_name[16]; 3378 3379 /* get session encoding length */ 3380 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); 3381 /* 3382 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too 3383 * long 3384 */ 3385 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) { 3386 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3387 return -1; 3388 } 3389 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); 3390 if (!senc) { 3391 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3392 return -1; 3393 } 3394 3395 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 3396 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 3397 3398 p = senc; 3399 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) 3400 goto err; 3401 3402 /* 3403 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up 3404 */ 3405 const_p = senc; 3406 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); 3407 if (sess == NULL) 3408 goto err; 3409 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ 3410 3411 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); 3412 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */ 3413 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3414 goto err; 3415 } 3416 p = senc; 3417 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) { 3418 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3419 goto err; 3420 } 3421 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3422 3423 /*- 3424 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 3425 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length 3426 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + 3427 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + 3428 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session 3429 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). 3430 */ 3431 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 3432 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + 3433 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) 3434 goto err; 3435 3436 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3437 /* do the header */ 3438 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; 3439 /* Skip message length for now */ 3440 p += 3; 3441 /* 3442 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does 3443 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. 3444 */ 3445 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { 3446 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, 3447 &hctx, 1) < 0) 3448 goto err; 3449 } else { 3450 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0) 3451 goto err; 3452 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 3453 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv)) 3454 goto err; 3455 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 3456 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL)) 3457 goto err; 3458 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); 3459 } 3460 3461 /* 3462 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified 3463 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for 3464 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions. 3465 */ 3466 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p); 3467 3468 /* Skip ticket length for now */ 3469 p += 2; 3470 /* Output key name */ 3471 macstart = p; 3472 memcpy(p, key_name, 16); 3473 p += 16; 3474 /* output IV */ 3475 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); 3476 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 3477 /* Encrypt session data */ 3478 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen)) 3479 goto err; 3480 p += len; 3481 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len)) 3482 goto err; 3483 p += len; 3484 3485 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart)) 3486 goto err; 3487 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen)) 3488 goto err; 3489 3490 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3491 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3492 3493 p += hlen; 3494 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ 3495 /* Total length */ 3496 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3497 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1; 3498 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */ 3499 p += 4; 3500 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */ 3501 3502 /* number of bytes to write */ 3503 s->init_num = len; 3504 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; 3505 s->init_off = 0; 3506 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3507 } 3508 3509 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ 3510 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3511 err: 3512 if (senc) 3513 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3514 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3515 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3516 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3517 return -1; 3518 } 3519 3520 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) 3521 { 3522 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) { 3523 unsigned char *p; 3524 /*- 3525 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 3526 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + 3527 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) 3528 * + (ocsp response) 3529 */ 3530 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) { 3531 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3532 return -1; 3533 } 3534 3535 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3536 3537 /* do the header */ 3538 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; 3539 /* message length */ 3540 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p); 3541 /* status type */ 3542 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type; 3543 /* length of OCSP response */ 3544 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); 3545 /* actual response */ 3546 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); 3547 /* number of bytes to write */ 3548 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; 3549 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; 3550 s->init_off = 0; 3551 } 3552 3553 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ 3554 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3555 } 3556 3557 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 3558 /* 3559 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. 3560 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found 3561 */ 3562 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) 3563 { 3564 int ok; 3565 int proto_len, padding_len; 3566 long n; 3567 const unsigned char *p; 3568 3569 /* 3570 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the 3571 * extension in their ClientHello 3572 */ 3573 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { 3574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, 3575 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION); 3576 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3577 return -1; 3578 } 3579 3580 /* See the payload format below */ 3581 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 3582 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A, 3583 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, 3584 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok); 3585 3586 if (!ok) 3587 return ((int)n); 3588 3589 /* 3590 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in 3591 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by 3592 * ssl3_get_finished). 3593 */ 3594 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { 3595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS); 3596 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3597 return -1; 3598 } 3599 3600 if (n < 2) { 3601 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3602 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */ 3603 } 3604 3605 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3606 3607 /*- 3608 * The payload looks like: 3609 * uint8 proto_len; 3610 * uint8 proto[proto_len]; 3611 * uint8 padding_len; 3612 * uint8 padding[padding_len]; 3613 */ 3614 proto_len = p[0]; 3615 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) { 3616 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3617 return 0; 3618 } 3619 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1]; 3620 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) { 3621 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3622 return 0; 3623 } 3624 3625 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len); 3626 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) { 3627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3628 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3629 return 0; 3630 } 3631 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len); 3632 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len; 3633 3634 return 1; 3635 } 3636 # endif 3637 #endif 3638