xref: /netbsd/lib/libwrap/hosts_access.c (revision bf9ec67e)
1 /*	$NetBSD: hosts_access.c,v 1.14 2002/05/24 05:38:20 itojun Exp $	*/
2 
3  /*
4   * This module implements a simple access control language that is based on
5   * host (or domain) names, NIS (host) netgroup names, IP addresses (or
6   * network numbers) and daemon process names. When a match is found the
7   * search is terminated, and depending on whether PROCESS_OPTIONS is defined,
8   * a list of options is executed or an optional shell command is executed.
9   *
10   * Host and user names are looked up on demand, provided that suitable endpoint
11   * information is available as sockaddr_in structures or TLI netbufs. As a
12   * side effect, the pattern matching process may change the contents of
13   * request structure fields.
14   *
15   * Diagnostics are reported through syslog(3).
16   *
17   * Compile with -DNETGROUP if your library provides support for netgroups.
18   *
19   * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands.
20   */
21 
22 #include <sys/cdefs.h>
23 #ifndef lint
24 #if 0
25 static char sccsid[] = "@(#) hosts_access.c 1.21 97/02/12 02:13:22";
26 #else
27 __RCSID("$NetBSD: hosts_access.c,v 1.14 2002/05/24 05:38:20 itojun Exp $");
28 #endif
29 #endif
30 
31 /* System libraries. */
32 
33 #include <sys/types.h>
34 #include <sys/param.h>
35 #ifdef INET6
36 #include <sys/socket.h>
37 #endif
38 #include <netinet/in.h>
39 #include <arpa/inet.h>
40 #include <stdio.h>
41 #include <stdlib.h>
42 #include <syslog.h>
43 #include <ctype.h>
44 #include <errno.h>
45 #include <setjmp.h>
46 #include <string.h>
47 #include <netdb.h>
48 #ifdef  NETGROUP
49 #include <netgroup.h>
50 #include <rpcsvc/ypclnt.h>
51 #endif
52 
53 /* Local stuff. */
54 
55 #include "tcpd.h"
56 
57 /* Error handling. */
58 
59 extern jmp_buf tcpd_buf;
60 
61 /* Delimiters for lists of daemons or clients. */
62 
63 static char sep[] = ", \t\r\n";
64 
65 /* Constants to be used in assignments only, not in comparisons... */
66 
67 #define	YES		1
68 #define	NO		0
69 
70  /*
71   * These variables are globally visible so that they can be redirected in
72   * verification mode.
73   */
74 
75 char   *hosts_allow_table = HOSTS_ALLOW;
76 char   *hosts_deny_table = HOSTS_DENY;
77 int     hosts_access_verbose = 0;
78 
79  /*
80   * In a long-running process, we are not at liberty to just go away.
81   */
82 
83 int     resident = (-1);		/* -1, 0: unknown; +1: yes */
84 
85 /* Forward declarations. */
86 
87 static int table_match __P((char *, struct request_info *));
88 static int list_match __P((char *, struct request_info *,
89     int (*)(char *, struct request_info *)));
90 static int server_match __P((char *, struct request_info *));
91 static int client_match __P((char *, struct request_info *));
92 static int host_match __P((char *, struct host_info *));
93 static int rbl_match __P((char *, char *));
94 static int string_match __P((char *, char *));
95 static int masked_match __P((char *, char *, char *));
96 static int masked_match4 __P((char *, char *, char *));
97 #ifdef INET6
98 static int masked_match6 __P((char *, char *, char *));
99 #endif
100 
101 /* Size of logical line buffer. */
102 
103 #define	BUFLEN 2048
104 
105 /* hosts_access - host access control facility */
106 
107 int     hosts_access(request)
108 struct request_info *request;
109 {
110     int     verdict;
111 
112     /*
113      * If the (daemon, client) pair is matched by an entry in the file
114      * /etc/hosts.allow, access is granted. Otherwise, if the (daemon,
115      * client) pair is matched by an entry in the file /etc/hosts.deny,
116      * access is denied. Otherwise, access is granted. A non-existent
117      * access-control file is treated as an empty file.
118      *
119      * After a rule has been matched, the optional language extensions may
120      * decide to grant or refuse service anyway. Or, while a rule is being
121      * processed, a serious error is found, and it seems better to play safe
122      * and deny service. All this is done by jumping back into the
123      * hosts_access() routine, bypassing the regular return from the
124      * table_match() function calls below.
125      */
126 
127     if (resident <= 0)
128 	resident++;
129     verdict = setjmp(tcpd_buf);
130     if (verdict != 0)
131 	return (verdict == AC_PERMIT);
132     if (table_match(hosts_allow_table, request))
133 	return (YES);
134     if (table_match(hosts_deny_table, request))
135 	return (NO);
136     return (YES);
137 }
138 
139 /* table_match - match table entries with (daemon, client) pair */
140 
141 static int table_match(table, request)
142 char   *table;
143 struct request_info *request;
144 {
145     FILE   *fp;
146     char    sv_list[BUFLEN];		/* becomes list of daemons */
147     char   *cl_list;			/* becomes list of clients */
148     char   *sh_cmd = NULL;		/* becomes optional shell command */
149     int     match = NO;
150     struct tcpd_context saved_context;
151 
152     saved_context = tcpd_context;		/* stupid compilers */
153 
154     /*
155      * Between the fopen() and fclose() calls, avoid jumps that may cause
156      * file descriptor leaks.
157      */
158 
159     if ((fp = fopen(table, "r")) != 0) {
160 	tcpd_context.file = table;
161 	tcpd_context.line = 0;
162 	while (match == NO && xgets(sv_list, sizeof(sv_list), fp) != 0) {
163 	    if (sv_list[strlen(sv_list) - 1] != '\n') {
164 		tcpd_warn("missing newline or line too long");
165 		continue;
166 	    }
167 	    if (sv_list[0] == '#' || sv_list[strspn(sv_list, " \t\r\n")] == 0)
168 		continue;
169 	    if ((cl_list = split_at(sv_list, ':')) == 0) {
170 		tcpd_warn("missing \":\" separator");
171 		continue;
172 	    }
173 	    sh_cmd = split_at(cl_list, ':');
174 	    match = list_match(sv_list, request, server_match)
175 		&& list_match(cl_list, request, client_match);
176 	}
177 	(void) fclose(fp);
178     } else if (errno != ENOENT) {
179 	tcpd_warn("cannot open %s: %m", table);
180     }
181     if (match) {
182 	if (hosts_access_verbose > 1)
183 	    syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "matched:  %s line %d",
184 		   tcpd_context.file, tcpd_context.line);
185 	if (sh_cmd) {
186 #ifdef PROCESS_OPTIONS
187 	    process_options(sh_cmd, request);
188 #else
189 	    char    cmd[BUFSIZ];
190 	    shell_cmd(percent_x(cmd, sizeof(cmd), sh_cmd, request));
191 #endif
192 	}
193     }
194     tcpd_context = saved_context;
195     return (match);
196 }
197 
198 /* list_match - match a request against a list of patterns with exceptions */
199 
200 static int list_match(list, request, match_fn)
201 char   *list;
202 struct request_info *request;
203 int   (*match_fn) __P((char *, struct request_info *));
204 {
205     char   *tok;
206     int l;
207 
208     /*
209      * Process tokens one at a time. We have exhausted all possible matches
210      * when we reach an "EXCEPT" token or the end of the list. If we do find
211      * a match, look for an "EXCEPT" list and recurse to determine whether
212      * the match is affected by any exceptions.
213      */
214 
215     for (tok = strtok(list, sep); tok != 0; tok = strtok((char *) 0, sep)) {
216 	if (STR_EQ(tok, "EXCEPT"))		/* EXCEPT: give up */
217 	    return (NO);
218 	l = strlen(tok);
219 	if (*tok == '[' && tok[l - 1] == ']') {
220 	    tok[l - 1] = '\0';
221 	    tok++;
222 	}
223 	if (match_fn(tok, request)) {		/* YES: look for exceptions */
224 	    while ((tok = strtok((char *) 0, sep)) && STR_NE(tok, "EXCEPT"))
225 		 /* VOID */ ;
226 	    return (tok == 0 || list_match((char *) 0, request, match_fn) == 0);
227 	}
228     }
229     return (NO);
230 }
231 
232 /* server_match - match server information */
233 
234 static int server_match(tok, request)
235 char   *tok;
236 struct request_info *request;
237 {
238     char   *host;
239 
240     if ((host = split_at(tok + 1, '@')) == 0) {	/* plain daemon */
241 	return (string_match(tok, eval_daemon(request)));
242     } else {					/* daemon@host */
243 	return (string_match(tok, eval_daemon(request))
244 		&& host_match(host, request->server));
245     }
246 }
247 
248 /* client_match - match client information */
249 
250 static int client_match(tok, request)
251 char   *tok;
252 struct request_info *request;
253 {
254     char   *host;
255 
256     if ((host = split_at(tok + 1, '@')) == 0) {	/* plain host */
257 	return (host_match(tok, request->client));
258     } else {					/* user@host */
259 	return (host_match(host, request->client)
260 		&& string_match(tok, eval_user(request)));
261     }
262 }
263 
264 /* host_match - match host name and/or address against pattern */
265 
266 static int host_match(tok, host)
267 char   *tok;
268 struct host_info *host;
269 {
270     char   *mask;
271 
272     /*
273      * This code looks a little hairy because we want to avoid unnecessary
274      * hostname lookups.
275      *
276      * The KNOWN pattern requires that both address AND name be known; some
277      * patterns are specific to host names or to host addresses; all other
278      * patterns are satisfied when either the address OR the name match.
279      */
280 
281     if (tok[0] == '@') {			/* netgroup: look it up */
282 #ifdef  NETGROUP
283 	static char *mydomain = 0;
284 	if (mydomain == 0)
285 	    yp_get_default_domain(&mydomain);
286 	return (innetgr(tok + 1, eval_hostname(host), (char *) 0, mydomain));
287 #else
288 	tcpd_warn("netgroup support is disabled");	/* not tcpd_jump() */
289 	return (NO);
290 #endif
291     } else if (STR_EQ(tok, "KNOWN")) {		/* check address and name */
292 	char   *name = eval_hostname(host);
293 	return (STR_NE(eval_hostaddr(host), unknown) && HOSTNAME_KNOWN(name));
294     } else if (STR_EQ(tok, "LOCAL")) {		/* local: no dots in name */
295 	char   *name = eval_hostname(host);
296 	return (strchr(name, '.') == 0 && HOSTNAME_KNOWN(name));
297     } else if (strncmp(tok, "{RBL}.", 6) == 0) { /* RBL lookup in domain */
298 	return rbl_match(tok+6, eval_hostaddr(host));
299     } else if ((mask = split_at(tok, '/')) != 0) {	/* net/mask */
300 	return (masked_match(tok, mask, eval_hostaddr(host)));
301     } else {					/* anything else */
302 	return (string_match(tok, eval_hostaddr(host))
303 	    || (NOT_INADDR(tok) && string_match(tok, eval_hostname(host))));
304     }
305 }
306 
307 /* rbl_match() - match host by looking up in RBL domain */
308 
309 static int rbl_match(rbl_domain, rbl_hostaddr)
310 char   *rbl_domain;				/* RBL domain */
311 char   *rbl_hostaddr;				/* hostaddr */
312 {
313     char *rbl_name;
314     unsigned long host_address;
315     int ret = NO;
316     size_t len = strlen(rbl_domain) + (4 * 4) + 2;
317 
318     if (dot_quad_addr(rbl_hostaddr, &host_address) != 0) {
319 	tcpd_warn("unable to convert %s to address", rbl_hostaddr);
320 	return (NO);
321     }
322     /*  construct the rbl name to look up */
323     if ((rbl_name = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
324 	tcpd_jump("not enough memory to build RBL name for %s in %s", rbl_hostaddr, rbl_domain);
325 	/* NOTREACHED */
326     }
327     snprintf(rbl_name, len, "%u.%u.%u.%u.%s",
328 	    (unsigned int) ((host_address) & 0xff),
329 	    (unsigned int) ((host_address >> 8) & 0xff),
330 	    (unsigned int) ((host_address >> 16) & 0xff),
331 	    (unsigned int) ((host_address >> 24) & 0xff),
332 	    rbl_domain);
333     /* look it up */
334     if (gethostbyname(rbl_name) != NULL) {
335 	/* successful lookup - they're on the RBL list */
336 	ret = YES;
337     }
338     free(rbl_name);
339 
340     return ret;
341 }
342 
343 /* string_match - match string against pattern */
344 
345 static int string_match(tok, string)
346 char   *tok;
347 char   *string;
348 {
349     int     n;
350 
351     if (tok[0] == '.') {			/* suffix */
352 	n = strlen(string) - strlen(tok);
353 	return (n > 0 && STR_EQ(tok, string + n));
354     } else if (STR_EQ(tok, "ALL")) {		/* all: match any */
355 	return (YES);
356     } else if (STR_EQ(tok, "KNOWN")) {		/* not unknown */
357 	return (STR_NE(string, unknown));
358     } else if (tok[(n = strlen(tok)) - 1] == '.') {	/* prefix */
359 	return (STRN_EQ(tok, string, n));
360     } else {					/* exact match */
361 	return (STR_EQ(tok, string));
362     }
363 }
364 
365 /* masked_match - match address against netnumber/netmask */
366 
367 static int masked_match(net_tok, mask_tok, string)
368 char   *net_tok;
369 char   *mask_tok;
370 char   *string;
371 {
372 #ifndef INET6
373     return masked_match4(net_tok, mask_tok, string);
374 #else
375     if (dot_quad_addr(net_tok, NULL) != INADDR_NONE
376      && dot_quad_addr(mask_tok, NULL) != INADDR_NONE
377      && dot_quad_addr(string, NULL) != INADDR_NONE) {
378 	return masked_match4(net_tok, mask_tok, string);
379     } else
380 	return masked_match6(net_tok, mask_tok, string);
381 #endif
382 }
383 
384 static int masked_match4(net_tok, mask_tok, string)
385 char   *net_tok;
386 char   *mask_tok;
387 char   *string;
388 {
389     unsigned long net;
390     unsigned long mask;
391     unsigned long addr;
392 
393     /*
394      * Disallow forms other than dotted quad: the treatment that inet_addr()
395      * gives to forms with less than four components is inconsistent with the
396      * access control language. John P. Rouillard <rouilj@cs.umb.edu>.
397      */
398 
399     if (dot_quad_addr(string, &addr) != 0)
400 	return (NO);
401     if (dot_quad_addr(net_tok, &net) != 0
402 	|| dot_quad_addr(mask_tok, &mask) != 0) {
403 	tcpd_warn("bad net/mask expression: %s/%s", net_tok, mask_tok);
404 	return (NO);				/* not tcpd_jump() */
405     }
406 
407     if ((net & ~mask) != 0)
408 	tcpd_warn("host bits not all zero in %s/%s", net_tok, mask_tok);
409 
410     return ((addr & mask) == net);
411 }
412 
413 #ifdef INET6
414 /* Ugly because it covers IPv4 mapped address.  I hate mapped addresses. */
415 static int masked_match6(net_tok, mask_tok, string)
416 char   *net_tok;
417 char   *mask_tok;
418 char   *string;
419 {
420     struct in6_addr net;
421     struct in6_addr mask;
422     struct in6_addr addr;
423     int masklen;
424     int fail;
425     int i;
426     int maskoff;
427     int netaf;
428     int dirty;
429     const int sizoff64 = sizeof(struct in6_addr) - sizeof(struct in_addr);
430 
431     memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
432     if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, string, &addr) == 1)
433 	; /* okay */
434     else if (inet_pton(AF_INET, string, &addr.s6_addr[sizoff64]) == 1)
435 	addr.s6_addr[10] = addr.s6_addr[11] = 0xff;
436     else
437 	return NO;
438 
439     memset(&net, 0, sizeof(net));
440     if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, net_tok, &net) == 1) {
441 	netaf = AF_INET6;
442 	maskoff = 0;
443     } else if (inet_pton(AF_INET, net_tok, &net.s6_addr[sizoff64]) == 1) {
444 	netaf = AF_INET;
445 	maskoff = sizoff64;
446 	net.s6_addr[10] = net.s6_addr[11] = 0xff;
447     } else
448 	return NO;
449 
450     fail = 0;
451     if (mask_tok[strspn(mask_tok, "0123456789")] == '\0') {
452 	masklen = atoi(mask_tok) + maskoff * 8;
453 	if (0 <= masklen && masklen <= 128) {
454 	    memset(&mask, 0, sizeof(mask));
455 	    memset(&mask, 0xff, masklen / 8);
456 	    if (masklen % 8) {
457 		((u_char *)&mask)[masklen / 8] =
458 			(0xff00 >> (masklen % 8)) & 0xff;
459 	    }
460 	} else
461 	    fail++;
462     } else if (netaf == AF_INET6 && inet_pton(AF_INET6, mask_tok, &mask) == 1)
463 	; /* okay */
464     else if (netaf == AF_INET
465 	  && inet_pton(AF_INET, mask_tok, &mask.s6_addr[12]) == 1) {
466 	memset(&mask, 0xff, sizoff64);
467     } else
468 	fail++;
469     if (fail) {
470 	tcpd_warn("bad net/mask expression: %s/%s", net_tok, mask_tok);
471 	return (NO);				/* not tcpd_jump() */
472     }
473 
474     dirty = 0;
475     for (i = 0; i < sizeof(addr); i++) {
476 	addr.s6_addr[i] &= mask.s6_addr[i];
477 	dirty |= (net.s6_addr[i] & ~mask.s6_addr[i]);
478     }
479 
480     if (dirty)
481 	tcpd_warn("host bits not all zero in %s/%s", net_tok, mask_tok);
482 
483     return (memcmp(&addr, &net, sizeof(addr)) == 0);
484 }
485 #endif
486