1 /* $NetBSD: xform_ah.c,v 1.26 2009/04/18 14:58:06 tsutsui Exp $ */ 2 /* $FreeBSD: src/sys/netipsec/xform_ah.c,v 1.1.4.1 2003/01/24 05:11:36 sam Exp $ */ 3 /* $OpenBSD: ip_ah.c,v 1.63 2001/06/26 06:18:58 angelos Exp $ */ 4 /* 5 * The authors of this code are John Ioannidis (ji@tla.org), 6 * Angelos D. Keromytis (kermit@csd.uch.gr) and 7 * Niels Provos (provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de). 8 * 9 * The original version of this code was written by John Ioannidis 10 * for BSD/OS in Athens, Greece, in November 1995. 11 * 12 * Ported to OpenBSD and NetBSD, with additional transforms, in December 1996, 13 * by Angelos D. Keromytis. 14 * 15 * Additional transforms and features in 1997 and 1998 by Angelos D. Keromytis 16 * and Niels Provos. 17 * 18 * Additional features in 1999 by Angelos D. Keromytis and Niklas Hallqvist. 19 * 20 * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 by John Ioannidis, 21 * Angelos D. Keromytis and Niels Provos. 22 * Copyright (c) 1999 Niklas Hallqvist. 23 * Copyright (c) 2001 Angelos D. Keromytis. 24 * 25 * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software with or without fee 26 * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in 27 * all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or 28 * modification of this software. 29 * You may use this code under the GNU public license if you so wish. Please 30 * contribute changes back to the authors under this freer than GPL license 31 * so that we may further the use of strong encryption without limitations to 32 * all. 33 * 34 * THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR 35 * IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY 36 * REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE 37 * MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR 38 * PURPOSE. 39 */ 40 41 #include <sys/cdefs.h> 42 __KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: xform_ah.c,v 1.26 2009/04/18 14:58:06 tsutsui Exp $"); 43 44 #include "opt_inet.h" 45 #ifdef __FreeBSD__ 46 #include "opt_inet6.h" 47 #endif 48 49 #include <sys/param.h> 50 #include <sys/systm.h> 51 #include <sys/mbuf.h> 52 #include <sys/socket.h> 53 #include <sys/syslog.h> 54 #include <sys/kernel.h> 55 #include <sys/sysctl.h> 56 57 #include <net/if.h> 58 59 #include <netinet/in.h> 60 #include <netinet/in_systm.h> 61 #include <netinet/ip.h> 62 #include <netinet/ip_ecn.h> 63 #include <netinet/ip6.h> 64 65 #include <net/route.h> 66 #include <netipsec/ipsec.h> 67 #include <netipsec/ipsec_private.h> 68 #include <netipsec/ah.h> 69 #include <netipsec/ah_var.h> 70 #include <netipsec/xform.h> 71 72 #ifdef INET6 73 #include <netinet6/ip6_var.h> 74 #include <netipsec/ipsec6.h> 75 # ifdef __FreeBSD__ 76 # include <netinet6/ip6_ecn.h> 77 # endif 78 #endif 79 80 #include <netipsec/key.h> 81 #include <netipsec/key_debug.h> 82 #include <netipsec/ipsec_osdep.h> 83 84 #include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h> 85 86 /* 87 * Return header size in bytes. The old protocol did not support 88 * the replay counter; the new protocol always includes the counter. 89 */ 90 #define HDRSIZE(sav) \ 91 (((sav)->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? \ 92 sizeof (struct ah) : sizeof (struct ah) + sizeof (u_int32_t)) 93 /* 94 * Return authenticator size in bytes. The old protocol is known 95 * to use a fixed 16-byte authenticator. The new algorithm gets 96 * this size from the xform but is (currently) always 12. 97 */ 98 #define AUTHSIZE(sav) \ 99 ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 16 : (sav)->tdb_authalgxform->authsize) 100 101 percpu_t *ahstat_percpu; 102 103 int ah_enable = 1; /* control flow of packets with AH */ 104 int ip4_ah_cleartos = 1; /* clear ip_tos when doing AH calc */ 105 106 #ifdef __FreeBSD__ 107 SYSCTL_DECL(_net_inet_ah); 108 SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO, 109 ah_enable, CTLFLAG_RW, &ah_enable, 0, ""); 110 SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO, 111 ah_cleartos, CTLFLAG_RW, &ip4_ah_cleartos, 0, ""); 112 SYSCTL_STRUCT(_net_inet_ah, IPSECCTL_STATS, 113 stats, CTLFLAG_RD, &ahstat, ahstat, ""); 114 115 #endif /* __FreeBSD__ */ 116 117 static unsigned char ipseczeroes[256]; /* larger than an ip6 extension hdr */ 118 119 static int ah_input_cb(struct cryptop*); 120 static int ah_output_cb(struct cryptop*); 121 122 /* 123 * NB: this is public for use by the PF_KEY support. 124 */ 125 struct auth_hash * 126 ah_algorithm_lookup(int alg) 127 { 128 if (alg >= AH_ALG_MAX) 129 return NULL; 130 switch (alg) { 131 case SADB_X_AALG_NULL: 132 return &auth_hash_null; 133 case SADB_AALG_MD5HMAC: 134 return &auth_hash_hmac_md5_96; 135 case SADB_AALG_SHA1HMAC: 136 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha1_96; 137 case SADB_X_AALG_RIPEMD160HMAC: 138 return &auth_hash_hmac_ripemd_160_96; 139 case SADB_X_AALG_MD5: 140 return &auth_hash_key_md5; 141 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA: 142 return &auth_hash_key_sha1; 143 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_256: 144 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_256; 145 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_384: 146 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_384; 147 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_512: 148 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_512; 149 } 150 return NULL; 151 } 152 153 size_t 154 ah_hdrsiz(struct secasvar *sav) 155 { 156 size_t size; 157 158 if (sav != NULL) { 159 int authsize; 160 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL, 161 ("ah_hdrsiz: null xform")); 162 /*XXX not right for null algorithm--does it matter??*/ 163 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 164 size = roundup(authsize, sizeof (u_int32_t)) + HDRSIZE(sav); 165 } else { 166 /* default guess */ 167 size = sizeof (struct ah) + sizeof (u_int32_t) + 16; 168 } 169 return size; 170 } 171 172 /* 173 * NB: public for use by esp_init. 174 */ 175 int 176 ah_init0(struct secasvar *sav, struct xformsw *xsp, struct cryptoini *cria) 177 { 178 struct auth_hash *thash; 179 int keylen; 180 181 thash = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth); 182 if (thash == NULL) { 183 DPRINTF(("ah_init: unsupported authentication algorithm %u\n", 184 sav->alg_auth)); 185 return EINVAL; 186 } 187 /* 188 * Verify the replay state block allocation is consistent with 189 * the protocol type. We check here so we can make assumptions 190 * later during protocol processing. 191 */ 192 /* NB: replay state is setup elsewhere (sigh) */ 193 if (((sav->flags&SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0) ^ (sav->replay != NULL)) { 194 DPRINTF(("ah_init: replay state block inconsistency, " 195 "%s algorithm %s replay state\n", 196 (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? "old" : "new", 197 sav->replay == NULL ? "without" : "with")); 198 return EINVAL; 199 } 200 if (sav->key_auth == NULL) { 201 DPRINTF(("ah_init: no authentication key for %s " 202 "algorithm\n", thash->name)); 203 return EINVAL; 204 } 205 keylen = _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth); 206 if (keylen != thash->keysize && thash->keysize != 0) { 207 DPRINTF(("ah_init: invalid keylength %d, algorithm " 208 "%s requires keysize %d\n", 209 keylen, thash->name, thash->keysize)); 210 return EINVAL; 211 } 212 213 sav->tdb_xform = xsp; 214 sav->tdb_authalgxform = thash; 215 216 /* Initialize crypto session. */ 217 memset(cria, 0, sizeof (*cria)); 218 cria->cri_alg = sav->tdb_authalgxform->type; 219 cria->cri_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); 220 cria->cri_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth); 221 222 return 0; 223 } 224 225 /* 226 * ah_init() is called when an SPI is being set up. 227 */ 228 static int 229 ah_init(struct secasvar *sav, struct xformsw *xsp) 230 { 231 struct cryptoini cria; 232 int error; 233 234 error = ah_init0(sav, xsp, &cria); 235 if (!error) { 236 mutex_spin_enter(&crypto_mtx); 237 error = crypto_newsession(&sav->tdb_cryptoid, 238 &cria, crypto_support); 239 mutex_spin_exit(&crypto_mtx); 240 } 241 return error; 242 } 243 244 /* 245 * Paranoia. 246 * 247 * NB: public for use by esp_zeroize (XXX). 248 */ 249 int 250 ah_zeroize(struct secasvar *sav) 251 { 252 int err; 253 254 if (sav->key_auth) 255 memset(_KEYBUF(sav->key_auth), 0, _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth)); 256 257 mutex_spin_enter(&crypto_mtx); 258 err = crypto_freesession(sav->tdb_cryptoid); 259 mutex_spin_exit(&crypto_mtx); 260 sav->tdb_cryptoid = 0; 261 sav->tdb_authalgxform = NULL; 262 sav->tdb_xform = NULL; 263 return err; 264 } 265 266 /* 267 * Massage IPv4/IPv6 headers for AH processing. 268 */ 269 static int 270 ah_massage_headers(struct mbuf **m0, int proto, int skip, int alg, int out) 271 { 272 struct mbuf *m = *m0; 273 unsigned char *ptr; 274 int off, count; 275 276 #ifdef INET 277 struct ip *ip; 278 #endif /* INET */ 279 280 #ifdef INET6 281 struct ip6_ext *ip6e; 282 struct ip6_hdr ip6; 283 int alloc, len, ad; 284 #endif /* INET6 */ 285 286 switch (proto) { 287 #ifdef INET 288 case AF_INET: 289 /* 290 * This is the least painful way of dealing with IPv4 header 291 * and option processing -- just make sure they're in 292 * contiguous memory. 293 */ 294 *m0 = m = m_pullup(m, skip); 295 if (m == NULL) { 296 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: m_pullup failed\n")); 297 return ENOBUFS; 298 } 299 300 /* Fix the IP header */ 301 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); 302 if (ip4_ah_cleartos) 303 ip->ip_tos = 0; 304 ip->ip_ttl = 0; 305 ip->ip_sum = 0; 306 ip->ip_off = htons(ntohs(ip->ip_off) & ip4_ah_offsetmask); 307 308 /* 309 * On FreeBSD, ip_off and ip_len assumed in host endian; 310 * they are converted (if necessary) by ip_input(). 311 * On NetBSD, ip_off and ip_len are in network byte order. 312 * They must be massaged back to network byte order 313 * before verifying the HMAC. Moreover, on FreeBSD, 314 * we should add `skip' back into the massaged ip_len 315 * (presumably ip_input() deducted it before we got here?) 316 * whereas on NetBSD, we should not. 317 */ 318 #ifdef __FreeBSD__ 319 #define TOHOST(x) (x) 320 #else 321 #define TOHOST(x) (ntohs(x)) 322 #endif 323 if (!out) { 324 u_int16_t inlen = TOHOST(ip->ip_len); 325 326 #ifdef __FreeBSD__ 327 ip->ip_len = htons(inlen + skip); 328 #else /*!__FreeBSD__ */ 329 ip->ip_len = htons(inlen); 330 #endif /*!__FreeBSD__ */ 331 DPRINTF(("ip len: skip %d, " 332 "in %d host %d: new: raw %d host %d\n", 333 skip, 334 inlen, TOHOST(inlen), 335 ip->ip_len, ntohs(ip->ip_len))); 336 337 338 if (alg == CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK || alg == CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK) 339 ip->ip_off &= IP_OFF_CONVERT(IP_DF); 340 else 341 ip->ip_off = 0; 342 } else { 343 if (alg == CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK || alg == CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK) 344 ip->ip_off &= IP_OFF_CONVERT(IP_DF); 345 else 346 ip->ip_off = 0; 347 } 348 349 ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *) + sizeof(struct ip); 350 351 /* IPv4 option processing */ 352 for (off = sizeof(struct ip); off < skip;) { 353 if (ptr[off] == IPOPT_EOL || ptr[off] == IPOPT_NOP || 354 off + 1 < skip) 355 ; 356 else { 357 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: illegal IPv4 " 358 "option length for option %d\n", 359 ptr[off])); 360 361 m_freem(m); 362 return EINVAL; 363 } 364 365 switch (ptr[off]) { 366 case IPOPT_EOL: 367 off = skip; /* End the loop. */ 368 break; 369 370 case IPOPT_NOP: 371 off++; 372 break; 373 374 case IPOPT_SECURITY: /* 0x82 */ 375 case 0x85: /* Extended security. */ 376 case 0x86: /* Commercial security. */ 377 case 0x94: /* Router alert */ 378 case 0x95: /* RFC1770 */ 379 /* Sanity check for option length. */ 380 if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) { 381 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: " 382 "illegal IPv4 option length for " 383 "option %d\n", ptr[off])); 384 385 m_freem(m); 386 return EINVAL; 387 } 388 389 off += ptr[off + 1]; 390 break; 391 392 case IPOPT_LSRR: 393 case IPOPT_SSRR: 394 /* Sanity check for option length. */ 395 if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) { 396 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: " 397 "illegal IPv4 option length for " 398 "option %d\n", ptr[off])); 399 400 m_freem(m); 401 return EINVAL; 402 } 403 404 /* 405 * On output, if we have either of the 406 * source routing options, we should 407 * swap the destination address of the 408 * IP header with the last address 409 * specified in the option, as that is 410 * what the destination's IP header 411 * will look like. 412 */ 413 if (out) 414 bcopy(ptr + off + ptr[off + 1] - 415 sizeof(struct in_addr), 416 &(ip->ip_dst), sizeof(struct in_addr)); 417 418 /* Fall through */ 419 default: 420 /* Sanity check for option length. */ 421 if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) { 422 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: " 423 "illegal IPv4 option length for " 424 "option %d\n", ptr[off])); 425 m_freem(m); 426 return EINVAL; 427 } 428 429 /* Zeroize all other options. */ 430 count = ptr[off + 1]; 431 memcpy(ptr, ipseczeroes, count); 432 off += count; 433 break; 434 } 435 436 /* Sanity check. */ 437 if (off > skip) { 438 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers(): malformed " 439 "IPv4 options header\n")); 440 441 m_freem(m); 442 return EINVAL; 443 } 444 } 445 446 break; 447 #endif /* INET */ 448 449 #ifdef INET6 450 case AF_INET6: /* Ugly... */ 451 /* Copy and "cook" the IPv6 header. */ 452 m_copydata(m, 0, sizeof(ip6), &ip6); 453 454 /* We don't do IPv6 Jumbograms. */ 455 if (ip6.ip6_plen == 0) { 456 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: unsupported IPv6 jumbogram\n")); 457 m_freem(m); 458 return EMSGSIZE; 459 } 460 461 ip6.ip6_flow = 0; 462 ip6.ip6_hlim = 0; 463 ip6.ip6_vfc &= ~IPV6_VERSION_MASK; 464 ip6.ip6_vfc |= IPV6_VERSION; 465 466 /* Scoped address handling. */ 467 if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_src)) 468 ip6.ip6_src.s6_addr16[1] = 0; 469 if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_dst)) 470 ip6.ip6_dst.s6_addr16[1] = 0; 471 472 /* Done with IPv6 header. */ 473 m_copyback(m, 0, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), &ip6); 474 475 /* Let's deal with the remaining headers (if any). */ 476 if (skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) > 0) { 477 if (m->m_len <= skip) { 478 ptr = (unsigned char *) malloc( 479 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), 480 M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT); 481 if (ptr == NULL) { 482 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: failed " 483 "to allocate memory for IPv6 " 484 "headers\n")); 485 m_freem(m); 486 return ENOBUFS; 487 } 488 489 /* 490 * Copy all the protocol headers after 491 * the IPv6 header. 492 */ 493 m_copydata(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), 494 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr); 495 alloc = 1; 496 } else { 497 /* No need to allocate memory. */ 498 ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *) + 499 sizeof(struct ip6_hdr); 500 alloc = 0; 501 } 502 } else 503 break; 504 505 off = ip6.ip6_nxt & 0xff; /* Next header type. */ 506 507 for (len = 0; len < skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);) 508 switch (off) { 509 case IPPROTO_HOPOPTS: 510 case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS: 511 ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *) (ptr + len); 512 513 /* 514 * Process the mutable/immutable 515 * options -- borrows heavily from the 516 * KAME code. 517 */ 518 for (count = len + sizeof(struct ip6_ext); 519 count < len + ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3);) { 520 if (ptr[count] == IP6OPT_PAD1) { 521 count++; 522 continue; /* Skip padding. */ 523 } 524 525 /* Sanity check. */ 526 if (count > len + 527 ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3)) { 528 m_freem(m); 529 530 /* Free, if we allocated. */ 531 if (alloc) 532 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 533 return EINVAL; 534 } 535 536 ad = ptr[count + 1]; 537 538 /* If mutable option, zeroize. */ 539 if (ptr[count] & IP6OPT_MUTABLE) 540 memcpy(ptr + count, ipseczeroes, 541 ptr[count + 1]); 542 543 count += ad; 544 545 /* Sanity check. */ 546 if (count > 547 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) { 548 m_freem(m); 549 550 /* Free, if we allocated. */ 551 if (alloc) 552 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 553 return EINVAL; 554 } 555 } 556 557 /* Advance. */ 558 len += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3); 559 off = ip6e->ip6e_nxt; 560 break; 561 562 case IPPROTO_ROUTING: 563 /* 564 * Always include routing headers in 565 * computation. 566 */ 567 ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *) (ptr + len); 568 len += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3); 569 off = ip6e->ip6e_nxt; 570 break; 571 572 default: 573 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: unexpected " 574 "IPv6 header type %d", off)); 575 if (alloc) 576 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 577 m_freem(m); 578 return EINVAL; 579 } 580 581 /* Copyback and free, if we allocated. */ 582 if (alloc) { 583 m_copyback(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), 584 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr); 585 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 586 } 587 588 break; 589 #endif /* INET6 */ 590 } 591 592 return 0; 593 } 594 595 /* 596 * ah_input() gets called to verify that an input packet 597 * passes authentication. 598 */ 599 static int 600 ah_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff) 601 { 602 struct auth_hash *ahx; 603 struct tdb_ident *tdbi; 604 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 605 struct m_tag *mtag; 606 struct newah *ah; 607 int hl, rplen, authsize; 608 609 struct cryptodesc *crda; 610 struct cryptop *crp; 611 612 IPSEC_SPLASSERT_SOFTNET("ah_input"); 613 614 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("ah_input: null SA")); 615 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->key_auth != NULL, 616 ("ah_input: null authentication key")); 617 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL, 618 ("ah_input: null authentication xform")); 619 620 /* Figure out header size. */ 621 rplen = HDRSIZE(sav); 622 623 /* XXX don't pullup, just copy header */ 624 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct newah *, m, skip, rplen); 625 if (ah == NULL) { 626 DPRINTF(("ah_input: cannot pullup header\n")); 627 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); /*XXX*/ 628 m_freem(m); 629 return ENOBUFS; 630 } 631 632 /* Check replay window, if applicable. */ 633 if (sav->replay && !ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(ah->ah_seq), sav)) { 634 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_REPLAY); 635 DPRINTF(("ah_input: packet replay failure: %s\n", 636 ipsec_logsastr(sav))); 637 m_freem(m); 638 return ENOBUFS; 639 } 640 641 /* Verify AH header length. */ 642 hl = ah->ah_len * sizeof (u_int32_t); 643 ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform; 644 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 645 if (hl != authsize + rplen - sizeof (struct ah)) { 646 DPRINTF(("ah_input: bad authenticator length %u (expecting %lu)" 647 " for packet in SA %s/%08lx\n", 648 hl, (u_long) (authsize + rplen - sizeof (struct ah)), 649 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 650 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 651 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_BADAUTHL); 652 m_freem(m); 653 return EACCES; 654 } 655 AH_STATADD(AH_STAT_IBYTES, m->m_pkthdr.len - skip - hl); 656 DPRINTF(("ah_input skip %d poff %d\n" 657 "len: hl %d authsize %d rpl %d expect %ld\n", 658 skip, protoff, 659 hl, authsize, rplen, 660 (long)(authsize + rplen - sizeof(struct ah)))); 661 662 /* Get crypto descriptors. */ 663 crp = crypto_getreq(1); 664 if (crp == NULL) { 665 DPRINTF(("ah_input: failed to acquire crypto descriptor\n")); 666 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 667 m_freem(m); 668 return ENOBUFS; 669 } 670 671 crda = crp->crp_desc; 672 IPSEC_ASSERT(crda != NULL, ("ah_input: null crypto descriptor")); 673 674 crda->crd_skip = 0; 675 crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len; 676 crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen; 677 678 /* Authentication operation. */ 679 crda->crd_alg = ahx->type; 680 crda->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth); 681 crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); 682 683 /* Find out if we've already done crypto. */ 684 for (mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_CRYPTO_DONE, NULL); 685 mtag != NULL; 686 mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_CRYPTO_DONE, mtag)) { 687 tdbi = (struct tdb_ident *) (mtag + 1); 688 if (tdbi->proto == sav->sah->saidx.proto && 689 tdbi->spi == sav->spi && 690 !memcmp(&tdbi->dst, &sav->sah->saidx.dst, 691 sizeof (union sockaddr_union))) 692 break; 693 } 694 695 /* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */ 696 if (mtag == NULL) { 697 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof (struct tdb_crypto) + 698 skip + rplen + authsize, M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO); 699 } else { 700 /* Hash verification has already been done successfully. */ 701 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof (struct tdb_crypto), 702 M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO); 703 } 704 if (tc == NULL) { 705 DPRINTF(("ah_input: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n")); 706 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 707 crypto_freereq(crp); 708 m_freem(m); 709 return ENOBUFS; 710 } 711 712 /* Only save information if crypto processing is needed. */ 713 if (mtag == NULL) { 714 int error; 715 716 /* 717 * Save the authenticator, the skipped portion of the packet, 718 * and the AH header. 719 */ 720 m_copydata(m, 0, skip + rplen + authsize, (char *)(tc+1)); 721 722 { 723 u_int8_t *pppp = ((char *)(tc+1))+skip+rplen; 724 DPRINTF(("ah_input: zeroing %d bytes of authent " \ 725 "%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x\n", 726 authsize, 727 pppp[0], pppp[1], pppp[2], pppp[3], 728 pppp[4], pppp[5], pppp[6], pppp[7], 729 pppp[8], pppp[9], pppp[10], pppp[11])); 730 } 731 732 /* Zeroize the authenticator on the packet. */ 733 m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes); 734 735 /* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */ 736 error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family, 737 skip, ahx->type, 0); 738 if (error != 0) { 739 /* NB: mbuf is free'd by ah_massage_headers */ 740 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); 741 free(tc, M_XDATA); 742 crypto_freereq(crp); 743 return error; 744 } 745 } 746 747 /* Crypto operation descriptor. */ 748 crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */ 749 crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF; 750 crp->crp_buf = m; 751 crp->crp_callback = ah_input_cb; 752 crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid; 753 crp->crp_opaque = tc; 754 755 /* These are passed as-is to the callback. */ 756 tc->tc_spi = sav->spi; 757 tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst; 758 tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto; 759 tc->tc_nxt = ah->ah_nxt; 760 tc->tc_protoff = protoff; 761 tc->tc_skip = skip; 762 tc->tc_ptr = mtag; /* Save the mtag we've identified. */ 763 764 DPRINTF(("ah: hash over %d bytes, skip %d: " 765 "crda len %d skip %d inject %d\n", 766 crp->crp_ilen, tc->tc_skip, 767 crda->crd_len, crda->crd_skip, crda->crd_inject)); 768 769 if (mtag == NULL) 770 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 771 else 772 return ah_input_cb(crp); 773 } 774 775 #ifdef INET6 776 #define IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag) do { \ 777 if (saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) { \ 778 error = ipsec6_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag); \ 779 } else { \ 780 error = ipsec4_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag); \ 781 } \ 782 } while (0) 783 #else 784 #define IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag) \ 785 (error = ipsec4_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag)) 786 #endif 787 788 /* 789 * AH input callback from the crypto driver. 790 */ 791 static int 792 ah_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp) 793 { 794 int rplen, error, skip, protoff; 795 unsigned char calc[AH_ALEN_MAX]; 796 struct mbuf *m; 797 struct cryptodesc *crd; 798 struct auth_hash *ahx; 799 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 800 struct m_tag *mtag; 801 struct secasvar *sav; 802 struct secasindex *saidx; 803 u_int8_t nxt; 804 char *ptr; 805 int s, authsize; 806 u_int16_t dport = 0; 807 u_int16_t sport = 0; 808 #ifdef IPSEC_NAT_T 809 struct m_tag * tag = NULL; 810 #endif 811 812 crd = crp->crp_desc; 813 814 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque; 815 IPSEC_ASSERT(tc != NULL, ("ah_input_cb: null opaque crypto data area!")); 816 skip = tc->tc_skip; 817 nxt = tc->tc_nxt; 818 protoff = tc->tc_protoff; 819 mtag = (struct m_tag *) tc->tc_ptr; 820 m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf; 821 822 823 #ifdef IPSEC_NAT_T 824 /* find the source port for NAT-T */ 825 if ((tag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_NAT_T_PORTS, NULL))) { 826 sport = ((u_int16_t *)(tag + 1))[0]; 827 dport = ((u_int16_t *)(tag + 1))[1]; 828 } 829 #endif 830 831 s = splsoftnet(); 832 833 sav = KEY_ALLOCSA(&tc->tc_dst, tc->tc_proto, tc->tc_spi, sport, dport); 834 if (sav == NULL) { 835 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOTDB); 836 DPRINTF(("ah_input_cb: SA expired while in crypto\n")); 837 error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX*/ 838 goto bad; 839 } 840 841 saidx = &sav->sah->saidx; 842 IPSEC_ASSERT(saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET || 843 saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6, 844 ("ah_input_cb: unexpected protocol family %u", 845 saidx->dst.sa.sa_family)); 846 847 ahx = (struct auth_hash *) sav->tdb_authalgxform; 848 849 /* Check for crypto errors. */ 850 if (crp->crp_etype) { 851 if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0) 852 sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid; 853 854 if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) 855 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 856 857 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOXFORM); 858 DPRINTF(("ah_input_cb: crypto error %d\n", crp->crp_etype)); 859 error = crp->crp_etype; 860 goto bad; 861 } else { 862 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HIST + sav->alg_auth); 863 crypto_freereq(crp); /* No longer needed. */ 864 crp = NULL; 865 } 866 867 /* Shouldn't happen... */ 868 if (m == NULL) { 869 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 870 DPRINTF(("ah_input_cb: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n")); 871 error = EINVAL; 872 goto bad; 873 } 874 875 /* Figure out header size. */ 876 rplen = HDRSIZE(sav); 877 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 878 879 if (ipsec_debug) 880 memset(calc, 0, sizeof(calc)); 881 882 /* Copy authenticator off the packet. */ 883 m_copydata(m, skip + rplen, authsize, calc); 884 885 /* 886 * If we have an mtag, we don't need to verify the authenticator -- 887 * it has been verified by an IPsec-aware NIC. 888 */ 889 if (mtag == NULL) { 890 ptr = (char *) (tc + 1); 891 892 /* Verify authenticator. */ 893 if (memcmp(ptr + skip + rplen, calc, authsize)) { 894 u_int8_t *pppp = ptr + skip+rplen; 895 DPRINTF(("ah_input: authentication hash mismatch " \ 896 "over %d bytes " \ 897 "for packet in SA %s/%08lx:\n" \ 898 "%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x, " \ 899 "%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x\n", 900 authsize, 901 ipsec_address(&saidx->dst), 902 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi), 903 calc[0], calc[1], calc[2], calc[3], 904 calc[4], calc[5], calc[6], calc[7], 905 calc[8], calc[9], calc[10], calc[11], 906 pppp[0], pppp[1], pppp[2], pppp[3], 907 pppp[4], pppp[5], pppp[6], pppp[7], 908 pppp[8], pppp[9], pppp[10], pppp[11] 909 )); 910 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_BADAUTH); 911 error = EACCES; 912 goto bad; 913 } 914 915 /* Fix the Next Protocol field. */ 916 ((u_int8_t *) ptr)[protoff] = nxt; 917 918 /* Copyback the saved (uncooked) network headers. */ 919 m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr); 920 } else { 921 /* Fix the Next Protocol field. */ 922 m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), &nxt); 923 } 924 925 free(tc, M_XDATA), tc = NULL; /* No longer needed */ 926 927 /* 928 * Header is now authenticated. 929 */ 930 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR|M_AUTHIPDGM; 931 932 /* 933 * Update replay sequence number, if appropriate. 934 */ 935 if (sav->replay) { 936 u_int32_t seq; 937 938 m_copydata(m, skip + offsetof(struct newah, ah_seq), 939 sizeof (seq), &seq); 940 if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(seq), sav)) { 941 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_REPLAY); 942 error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX as above*/ 943 goto bad; 944 } 945 } 946 947 /* 948 * Remove the AH header and authenticator from the mbuf. 949 */ 950 error = m_striphdr(m, skip, rplen + authsize); 951 if (error) { 952 DPRINTF(("ah_input_cb: mangled mbuf chain for SA %s/%08lx\n", 953 ipsec_address(&saidx->dst), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 954 955 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); 956 goto bad; 957 } 958 959 IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag); 960 961 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 962 splx(s); 963 return error; 964 bad: 965 if (sav) 966 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 967 splx(s); 968 if (m != NULL) 969 m_freem(m); 970 if (tc != NULL) 971 free(tc, M_XDATA); 972 if (crp != NULL) 973 crypto_freereq(crp); 974 return error; 975 } 976 977 /* 978 * AH output routine, called by ipsec[46]_process_packet(). 979 */ 980 static int 981 ah_output( 982 struct mbuf *m, 983 struct ipsecrequest *isr, 984 struct mbuf **mp, 985 int skip, 986 int protoff 987 ) 988 { 989 struct secasvar *sav; 990 struct auth_hash *ahx; 991 struct cryptodesc *crda; 992 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 993 struct mbuf *mi; 994 struct cryptop *crp; 995 u_int16_t iplen; 996 int error, rplen, authsize, maxpacketsize, roff; 997 u_int8_t prot; 998 struct newah *ah; 999 1000 IPSEC_SPLASSERT_SOFTNET("ah_output"); 1001 1002 sav = isr->sav; 1003 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("ah_output: null SA")); 1004 ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform; 1005 IPSEC_ASSERT(ahx != NULL, ("ah_output: null authentication xform")); 1006 1007 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_OUTPUT); 1008 1009 /* Figure out header size. */ 1010 rplen = HDRSIZE(sav); 1011 1012 /* Check for maximum packet size violations. */ 1013 switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) { 1014 #ifdef INET 1015 case AF_INET: 1016 maxpacketsize = IP_MAXPACKET; 1017 break; 1018 #endif /* INET */ 1019 #ifdef INET6 1020 case AF_INET6: 1021 maxpacketsize = IPV6_MAXPACKET; 1022 break; 1023 #endif /* INET6 */ 1024 default: 1025 DPRINTF(("ah_output: unknown/unsupported protocol " 1026 "family %u, SA %s/%08lx\n", 1027 sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family, 1028 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1029 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 1030 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOPF); 1031 error = EPFNOSUPPORT; 1032 goto bad; 1033 } 1034 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 1035 if (rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len > maxpacketsize) { 1036 DPRINTF(("ah_output: packet in SA %s/%08lx got too big " 1037 "(len %u, max len %u)\n", 1038 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1039 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi), 1040 rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len, maxpacketsize)); 1041 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_TOOBIG); 1042 error = EMSGSIZE; 1043 goto bad; 1044 } 1045 1046 /* Update the counters. */ 1047 AH_STATADD(AH_STAT_OBYTES, m->m_pkthdr.len - skip); 1048 1049 m = m_clone(m); 1050 if (m == NULL) { 1051 DPRINTF(("ah_output: cannot clone mbuf chain, SA %s/%08lx\n", 1052 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1053 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 1054 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); 1055 error = ENOBUFS; 1056 goto bad; 1057 } 1058 1059 /* Inject AH header. */ 1060 mi = m_makespace(m, skip, rplen + authsize, &roff); 1061 if (mi == NULL) { 1062 DPRINTF(("ah_output: failed to inject %u byte AH header for SA " 1063 "%s/%08lx\n", 1064 rplen + authsize, 1065 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1066 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 1067 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); /*XXX differs from openbsd */ 1068 error = ENOBUFS; 1069 goto bad; 1070 } 1071 1072 /* 1073 * The AH header is guaranteed by m_makespace() to be in 1074 * contiguous memory, at roff bytes offset into the returned mbuf. 1075 */ 1076 ah = (struct newah *)(mtod(mi, char *) + roff); 1077 1078 /* Initialize the AH header. */ 1079 m_copydata(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), (char *) &ah->ah_nxt); 1080 ah->ah_len = (rplen + authsize - sizeof(struct ah)) / sizeof(u_int32_t); 1081 ah->ah_reserve = 0; 1082 ah->ah_spi = sav->spi; 1083 1084 /* Zeroize authenticator. */ 1085 m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes); 1086 1087 /* Insert packet replay counter, as requested. */ 1088 if (sav->replay) { 1089 if (sav->replay->count == ~0 && 1090 (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_CYCSEQ) == 0) { 1091 DPRINTF(("ah_output: replay counter wrapped for SA " 1092 "%s/%08lx\n", 1093 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1094 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 1095 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_WRAP); 1096 error = EINVAL; 1097 goto bad; 1098 } 1099 #ifdef IPSEC_DEBUG 1100 /* Emulate replay attack when ipsec_replay is TRUE. */ 1101 if (!ipsec_replay) 1102 #endif 1103 sav->replay->count++; 1104 ah->ah_seq = htonl(sav->replay->count); 1105 } 1106 1107 /* Get crypto descriptors. */ 1108 crp = crypto_getreq(1); 1109 if (crp == NULL) { 1110 DPRINTF(("ah_output: failed to acquire crypto descriptors\n")); 1111 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 1112 error = ENOBUFS; 1113 goto bad; 1114 } 1115 1116 crda = crp->crp_desc; 1117 1118 crda->crd_skip = 0; 1119 crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen; 1120 crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len; 1121 1122 /* Authentication operation. */ 1123 crda->crd_alg = ahx->type; 1124 crda->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth); 1125 crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); 1126 1127 /* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */ 1128 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc( 1129 sizeof(struct tdb_crypto) + skip, M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO); 1130 if (tc == NULL) { 1131 crypto_freereq(crp); 1132 DPRINTF(("ah_output: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n")); 1133 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 1134 error = ENOBUFS; 1135 goto bad; 1136 } 1137 1138 /* Save the skipped portion of the packet. */ 1139 m_copydata(m, 0, skip, (tc + 1)); 1140 1141 /* 1142 * Fix IP header length on the header used for 1143 * authentication. We don't need to fix the original 1144 * header length as it will be fixed by our caller. 1145 */ 1146 switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) { 1147 #ifdef INET 1148 case AF_INET: 1149 bcopy(((char *)(tc + 1)) + 1150 offsetof(struct ip, ip_len), 1151 &iplen, sizeof(u_int16_t)); 1152 iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize); 1153 m_copyback(m, offsetof(struct ip, ip_len), 1154 sizeof(u_int16_t), &iplen); 1155 break; 1156 #endif /* INET */ 1157 1158 #ifdef INET6 1159 case AF_INET6: 1160 bcopy(((char *)(tc + 1)) + 1161 offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen), 1162 &iplen, sizeof(u_int16_t)); 1163 iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize); 1164 m_copyback(m, offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen), 1165 sizeof(u_int16_t), &iplen); 1166 break; 1167 #endif /* INET6 */ 1168 } 1169 1170 /* Fix the Next Header field in saved header. */ 1171 ((u_int8_t *) (tc + 1))[protoff] = IPPROTO_AH; 1172 1173 /* Update the Next Protocol field in the IP header. */ 1174 prot = IPPROTO_AH; 1175 m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), &prot); 1176 1177 /* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */ 1178 error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family, 1179 skip, ahx->type, 1); 1180 if (error != 0) { 1181 m = NULL; /* mbuf was free'd by ah_massage_headers. */ 1182 free(tc, M_XDATA); 1183 crypto_freereq(crp); 1184 goto bad; 1185 } 1186 1187 /* Crypto operation descriptor. */ 1188 crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */ 1189 crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF; 1190 crp->crp_buf = m; 1191 crp->crp_callback = ah_output_cb; 1192 crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid; 1193 crp->crp_opaque = tc; 1194 1195 /* These are passed as-is to the callback. */ 1196 tc->tc_isr = isr; 1197 tc->tc_spi = sav->spi; 1198 tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst; 1199 tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto; 1200 tc->tc_skip = skip; 1201 tc->tc_protoff = protoff; 1202 1203 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 1204 bad: 1205 if (m) 1206 m_freem(m); 1207 return (error); 1208 } 1209 1210 /* 1211 * AH output callback from the crypto driver. 1212 */ 1213 static int 1214 ah_output_cb(struct cryptop *crp) 1215 { 1216 int skip, protoff, error; 1217 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 1218 struct ipsecrequest *isr; 1219 struct secasvar *sav; 1220 struct mbuf *m; 1221 void *ptr; 1222 int s, err; 1223 1224 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque; 1225 IPSEC_ASSERT(tc != NULL, ("ah_output_cb: null opaque data area!")); 1226 skip = tc->tc_skip; 1227 protoff = tc->tc_protoff; 1228 ptr = (tc + 1); 1229 m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf; 1230 1231 s = splsoftnet(); 1232 1233 isr = tc->tc_isr; 1234 sav = KEY_ALLOCSA(&tc->tc_dst, tc->tc_proto, tc->tc_spi, 0, 0); 1235 if (sav == NULL) { 1236 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOTDB); 1237 DPRINTF(("ah_output_cb: SA expired while in crypto\n")); 1238 error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX*/ 1239 goto bad; 1240 } 1241 IPSEC_ASSERT(isr->sav == sav, ("ah_output_cb: SA changed\n")); 1242 1243 /* Check for crypto errors. */ 1244 if (crp->crp_etype) { 1245 if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0) 1246 sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid; 1247 1248 if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) { 1249 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 1250 splx(s); 1251 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 1252 } 1253 1254 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOXFORM); 1255 DPRINTF(("ah_output_cb: crypto error %d\n", crp->crp_etype)); 1256 error = crp->crp_etype; 1257 goto bad; 1258 } 1259 1260 /* Shouldn't happen... */ 1261 if (m == NULL) { 1262 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 1263 DPRINTF(("ah_output_cb: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n")); 1264 error = EINVAL; 1265 goto bad; 1266 } 1267 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HIST + sav->alg_auth); 1268 1269 /* 1270 * Copy original headers (with the new protocol number) back 1271 * in place. 1272 */ 1273 m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr); 1274 1275 /* No longer needed. */ 1276 free(tc, M_XDATA); 1277 crypto_freereq(crp); 1278 1279 #ifdef IPSEC_DEBUG 1280 /* Emulate man-in-the-middle attack when ipsec_integrity is TRUE. */ 1281 if (ipsec_integrity) { 1282 int alen; 1283 1284 /* 1285 * Corrupt HMAC if we want to test integrity verification of 1286 * the other side. 1287 */ 1288 alen = AUTHSIZE(sav); 1289 m_copyback(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - alen, alen, ipseczeroes); 1290 } 1291 #endif 1292 1293 /* NB: m is reclaimed by ipsec_process_done. */ 1294 err = ipsec_process_done(m, isr); 1295 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 1296 splx(s); 1297 return err; 1298 bad: 1299 if (sav) 1300 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 1301 splx(s); 1302 if (m) 1303 m_freem(m); 1304 free(tc, M_XDATA); 1305 crypto_freereq(crp); 1306 return error; 1307 } 1308 1309 static struct xformsw ah_xformsw = { 1310 XF_AH, XFT_AUTH, "IPsec AH", 1311 ah_init, ah_zeroize, ah_input, ah_output, 1312 NULL, 1313 }; 1314 1315 INITFN void 1316 ah_attach(void) 1317 { 1318 ahstat_percpu = percpu_alloc(sizeof(uint64_t) * AH_NSTATS); 1319 xform_register(&ah_xformsw); 1320 } 1321 1322 #ifdef __FreeBSD__ 1323 SYSINIT(ah_xform_init, SI_SUB_PROTO_DOMAIN, SI_ORDER_MIDDLE, ah_attach, NULL); 1324 #endif 1325